ARRESTS, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

ART. III, SEC 2 & 3

PURPOSE AND IMPORTANCE OF THE GUARANTY

AURELIO S. ALVERO vs ARSENIO P. DIZON, et al.,

G.R. No. L-342 May 4, 1946

FACTS:
The petitioner has been accused of treason; that at the hearing on his petition for bail, the
prosecution presented, as part of its evidence, certain documents which had been allegedly
seized by soldiers of the United States Army, accompanied by Filipino Guerrillas in the
petitioner’s house. The Petitioner further contends that the seized documents should be
returned as it obtained by means of force and intimidation or through coercion, those are not his
personal papers but part of the files of the New Leader’s Association, which was proven to be
an organization created for the purpose of collaborating with the enemy. Lastly, the presentation
of the seized documents in the trial is tantamount to compelling him to testify against himself, in
violation of his constitutional rights.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the “seized” documents are legal?
Whether or not the documents seized should be admitted as evidence in the trial court?

HELD.
No. The petition for Certiorari with Injunction is absolutely no merit.

RATIONALE:
The right of the officer and men of the United States Army to arrest the petitioner as a
collaborationist suspect, and to seize his personal papers is unquestionable. Also, proclamation
of General Douglas McArthur, as Commander in Chief of the United States of Army, declaring
his purpose to remove certain citizens of the Philippines, who had voluntarily given aid and
comfort to the enemy, in violation of the allegiance.

EXCEPTION:
Important exception to the necessity for a Search Warrant is the right of search and seizure as
an incident to a lawful arrest. A lawful arrest may be made either while a crime is being
committed or after its commission. The right to search includes in both instances that of
searching the person of him who is arrested, in order to find and seize things arrested with the
crime as its fruits as the means by which it was committed.

The Petitioner consented to the presentation of the seized documents, as part of the evidence
for the prosecution, at the hearing in his petition for bail and at the trial of the case on the merits,
without having insisted that the question of the alleged illegality of the search and seizure of
said papers and documents should first have been directly litigated and established by a motion.

COMPULSORY SELF-INCRIMINATION
Not violated by the use of evidence of articles obtained by an unconstitutional search and
seizure. Thus, the petitioner is estopped from questioning their admission.

PURPOSE: (Adam vs New York)

The purpose of the constitutional provisions against unlawful searched and seizures is to
prevent violations of private security in person and property, and unlawful invasions of the
sanctity of the home, by officers of the law acting under legislative and judicial sanction, and to
give remedy against such usurpations when attempted.

TO WHOM DIRECTED

People vs. Andre Marti G.R. No. 81561, January 18, 1991 193 SCRA 57 (1991)
Fact:
In 1987, the appellant informed Anita Reyes that he was sending the packages to a
friend in Zurich, Switzerland. Appellant filled up the contract necessary for the transaction,
writing therein his name, passport number, the date of shipment and the name and address of
the consignee, namely, “WALTER FIERZ, Mattacketr II, 8052 Zurich, Switzerland” Anita Reyes
then asked the appellant if she could examine and inspect the packages. Appellant, however,
refused, assuring her that the packages simply contained books, cigars, and gloves and were
gifts to his friend in Zurich. In view of appellant’s representation, Anita Reyes no longer insisted
on inspecting the packages. Before delivery of appellant’s box to the Bureau of Customs and/or
Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes (proprietor) and husband of Anita (Reyes), following standard
operating procedure, opened the boxes for final inspection. When he opened appellant’s box, a
peculiar odor emitted therefrom. His curiousity aroused, He made an opening on one of the
cellophane wrappers and took several grams of the contents thereof. Job Reyes forthwith
prepared a letter reporting the shipment to the NBI and requesting a laboratory examination of
the samples he extracted from the cellophane wrapper. He brought the letter and a sample of
appellant’s shipment to the Narcotics Section of the NBI and informed the them that the rest of
the shipment was still in his office. Therefore, Job Reyes and three NBI agents, and a
photographer, went to the Reyes’ office at Ermita. The package which allegedly contained
books was likewise opened by Job Reyes. He discovered that the package contained bricks or
cake-like dried marijuana leaves. The package which allegedly contained tabacalera cigars was
also opened. It turned out that dried marijuana leaves were neatly stocked underneath the
cigars. The NBI agents made an inventory and took charge of the box and of the contents
thereof, after signing a “Receipt” acknowledging custody of the said effects . Thereafter, an
Information was filed against appellant for violation of RA 6425, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act.

Issue:
Whether the search and seizure committed by the private individual inviolate the
constitutional right of the accused against unlawful searches and seizures?

Held:
No, The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore
applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the
enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint
against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed. Corolarilly, alleged violations
against unreasonable search and seizure may only be invoked against the State by an
individual unjustly traduced by the exercise of sovereign authority. To agree with appellant that
an act of a private individual in violation of the Bill of Rights should also be construed as an act
of the State would result in serious legal complications and an absurd interpretation of the
constitution. That the Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution is not meant to be invoked
against acts of private individuals finds support in the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission. True, the liberties guaranteed by the fundamental law of the land must always be
subject to protection.

DOES THE PROHIBITION ON UNLAWFUL SEARCH INCLUDES BARANGAY TANODS

Ruben Del Castillo
vs.
People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 185125 January 30, 2012

Facts:
Pursuant to a confidential information that petitioner Del Castillo was engaged in selling
shabu, police officers headed by SPO3 Bienvenido Masnayon, after conducting surveillance
and test-buy operation at the house of petitioner, secured a search warrant from the RTC. Upon
arrival to the residence of Del Castillo to implement the search warrant, SPO3 Masnayon
claimed that he saw petitioner run towards a small structure, a nipa hut, in front of his house.
Masnayon chased him but to no avail, because he and his men were not familiar with the
entrances and exits of the place. They all went back to the residence of Del Castillo and
requested his men to get a barangay tanod and a few minutes thereafter, his men returned with
two barangay tanods who searched the house of petitioner including the nipa hut where the
petitioner allegedly ran for cover. His men who searched the residence of the petitioner found
nothing, but one of the barangay tanods was able to confiscate from the nipa hut several
articles, including four (4) plastic packs containing white crystalline substance.

Thus, an information was filed against Del Castillo for violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A.
6425 and was found guilty by the RTC and affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Petitioner filed with
the Supreme Court the petition for certiorari contending among others that CA erred in finding
him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of prohibited drugs, because he could
not be presumed to be in possession of the same just because they were found inside the nipa
hut.

Issue:
Can petitioner Del Castillo be held liable for violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A.
6425 by mere presumption that the petitioner has dominion and control over the place where
the shabu was found?

Held:
No. While it is not necessary that the property to be searched or seized should be owned
by the person against whom the search warrant is issued, there must be sufficient showing that
the property is under petitioner’s control or possession. The records are void of any evidence to
show that petitioner owns the nipa hut in question nor was it established that he used the said
structure as a shop. The RTC, as well as the CA, merely presumed that petitioner used the said
structure due to the presence of electrical materials, the petitioner being an electrician by
profession.

The prosecution must prove that the petitioner had knowledge of the existence and
presence of the drugs in the place under his control and dominion and the character of the
drugs. With the prosecution’s failure to prove that the nipa hut was under petitioner’s control and
dominion, there casts a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. In considering a criminal case, it is
critical to start with the law’s own starting perspective on the status of the accused — in all
criminal prosecutions, he is presumed innocent of the charge laid unless the contrary is proven
beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt, or that quantum of proof sufficient to
produce a moral certainty that would convince and satisfy the conscience of those who act in
judgment, is indispensable to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence.
WHO MAY INVOKE THE RIGHT?
Bache & Co Inc vs. Ruiz
GR L-32409, 27 February 1971
Facts:
On 24 February 1970, Misael P. Vera, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, wrote a letter
addressed to Judge Vivencio M. Ruiz requesting the issuance of a search warrant against
Bache & Co. (Phil.), Inc. and Frederick E. Seggerman for violation of Section 46(a) of the
National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), in relation to all other pertinent provisions thereof,
particularly Sections 53, 72, 73, 208 and 209, and authorizing Revenue Examiner Rodolfo de
Leon to make and file the application for search warrant which was attached to the letter.
In the afternoon of the following day, De Leon and his witness, Arturo Logronio, went to
the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal. They brought with them the following papers: Vera’s
letter-request; an application for search warrant already filled up but still unsigned by De Leon;
an affidavit of Logronio subscribed before De Leon; a deposition in printed form of Logronio
already accomplished and signed by him but not yet subscribed; and a search warrant already
accomplished but still unsigned by Judge. At that time the Judge was hearing a certain case; so,
by means of a note, he instructed his Deputy Clerk of Court to take the depositions of De Leon
and Logronio.
After the session had adjourned, the Judge was informed that the depositions had
already been taken. The stenographer, upon request of the Judge, read to him her stenographic
notes; and thereafter, the Judge asked Logronio to take the oath and warned him that if his
deposition was found to be false and without legal basis, he could be charged for perjury.
The Judge signed de Leon’s application for search warrant and Logronio’s deposition.
Search Warrant 2-M-70 was then signed by Judge and accordingly issued. 3 days later (a
Saturday), the BIR agents served the search warrant to the corporation and Seggerman at the
offices of the corporation on Ayala Avenue, Makati, Rizal.
The corporation’s lawyers protested the search on the ground that no formal complaint
or transcript of testimony was attached to the warrant. The agents nevertheless proceeded with
their search which yielded 6 boxes of documents.
On 3 March 1970, the corporation and Seggerman filed a petition with the Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Rizal praying that the search warrant be quashed, dissolved or recalled, that
preliminary prohibitory and mandatory writs of injunction be issued, that the search warrant be
declared null and void, and that Vera, Logronio, de Leon, et. al., be ordered to pay the
corporation and Seggerman, jointly and severally, damages and attorney’s fees.
After hearing and on 29 July 1970, the court issued an order dismissing the petition for
dissolution of the search warrant. In the meantime, or on 16 April 1970, the Bureau of Internal
Revenue made tax assessments on the corporation in the total sum of P2,594,729.97, partly, if
not entirely, based on the documents thus seized.
The corporation and Seggerman filed an action for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus.

Issue:
Whether the corporation has the right to contest the legality of the seizure of documents
from its office.

Held:
The legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been
impaired thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal
and cannot be availed of by third parties. In Stonehill, et al. vs. Diokno, et al. (GR L-19550, 19
June 1967; 20 SCRA 383) the Supreme Court impliedly recognized the right of a corporation to
object against unreasonable searches and seizures; holding that the corporations have their
respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of the corporate officers,
regardless of the amount of shares of stock or the interest of each of them in said corporations,
whatever, the offices they hold therein may be; and that the corporate officers therefore may not
validly object to the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized
from the offices and premises of the corporations, since the right to object to the admission of
said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects
belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their
individual capacity.
The distinction between the Stonehill case and the present case is that: in the former
case, only the officers of the various corporations in whose offices documents, papers and
effects were searched and seized were the petitioners; while in the latter, the corporation to
whom the seized documents belong, and whose rights have thereby been impaired, is itself a
petitioner.
On that score, the corporation herein stands on a different footing from the corporations
in Stonehill. Moreover, herein, the search warrant was void inasmuch as First, there was no
personal examination conducted by the Judge of the complainant (De Leon) and his witness
(Logronio).
The Judge did not ask either of the two any question the answer to which could possibly
be the basis for determining whether or not there was probable cause against Bache & Co. and
Seggerman. The participation of the Judge in the proceedings which led to the issuance of
Search Warrant 2-M-70 was thus limited to listening to the stenographer’s readings of her notes,
to a few words of warning against the commission of perjury, and to administering the oath to
the complainant and his witness. This cannot be consider a personal examination.
Second, the search warrant was issued for more than one specific offense. The search
warrant was issued for at least 4 distinct offenses under the Tax Code. The first is the violation
of Section 46(a), Section 72 and Section 73 (the filing of income tax returns), which are
interrelated. The second is the violation of Section 53 (withholding of income taxes at source).
The third is the violation of Section 208 (unlawful pursuit of business or occupation); and
the fourth is the violation of Section 209 (failure to make a return of receipts, sales, business or
gross value of output actually removed or to pay the tax due thereon). Even in their
classification the 6 provisions are embraced in 2 different titles: Sections 46(a), 53, 72 and 73
are under Title II (Income Tax); while Sections 208 and 209 are under Title V (Privilege Tax on
Business and Occupation).
Lastly, the search warrant does not particularly describe the things to be seized. Search
Warrant No. 2-M-70 tends to defeat the major objective of the Bill of Rights, i.e., the elimination
of general warrants, for the language used therein is so all-embracing as to include all
conceivable records of the corporation, which, if seized, could possibly render its business
inoperative. Thus, Search Warrant 2-M-70 is null and void.
Stonehill vs Diokno
20 SCRA 383

Facts:
Respondents herein secured a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners herein
and/or the corporations of which they were officers, to search “books of accounts, financial
records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals,
typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including
disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette
wrappers),” as “the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the
offense,” or “used or intended to be used as the means of committing the offense,” which is
described in the applications adverted to above as “violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and
Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code.”

The petitioner contended that the search warrants are null and void as their issuance
violated the Constitution and the Rules of Court for being general warrants.

The documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in
question may be split into two (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the
offices of the aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found and seized in the residences of
petitioners herein.

Issue:
Whether petitioners can validly assail the search warrant against the corporation.

Held:
No.
As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to
assail the legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for
the simple reason that said corporations have their respective personalities, separate and
distinct from the personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or
of the interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein
may be. Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party
whose rights have been impaired thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search and
seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. Consequently, petitioners
herein may not validly object to the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and
things seized from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the
right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the
corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate
officers in proceedings against them in their individual capacity.
CONDITIONS FOR A VALID WARRANT
*EXISTENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE

Jose Burgos vs. Chief of Staff

G.R. No L-64261
December 26, 1984

Facts:

Two warrants were issued against petitioners for the search on the premises of
“Metropolitan Mail” and “We Forum” newspapers and the seizure of items alleged to have been
used in subversive activities. Petitioners prayed that a writ of preliminary mandatory and
prohibitory injunction be issued for the return of the seized articles, and that respondents be
enjoined from using the articles thus seized as evidence against petitioner.

Petitioners questioned the warrants for the lack of probable cause and that the two
warrants issued indicated only one and the same address. In addition, the items seized subject
to the warrant were real properties.

Issue:
Whether or not the two warrants were valid to justify seizure of the items.

Held:
The defect in the indication of the same address in the two warrants was held by the
court as a typographical error and immaterial in view of the correct determination of the place
sought to be searched set forth in the application. The purpose and intent to search two distinct
premises was evident in the issuance of the two warrant.

As to the issue that the items seized were real properties, the court applied the principle
in the case of Davao Sawmill Co. v. Castillo, ruling “that machinery which is movable by nature
becomes immobilized when placed by the owner of the tenement, property or plant, but not so
when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any other person having only a temporary right,
unless such person acted as the agent of the owner.” In the case at bar, petitioners did not
claim to be the owners of the land and/or building on which the machineries were placed. This
being the case, the machineries in question, while in fact bolted to the ground remain movable
property susceptible to seizure under a search warrant.

However, the Court declared the two warrants null and void.

Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would
lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and
that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.

The Court ruled that the affidavits submitted for the application of the warrant did not
satisfy the requirement of probable cause, the statements of the witnesses having been mere
generalizations.

Furthermore, jurisprudence tells of the prohibition on the issuance of general warrants.

(Stanford vs. State of Texas). The description and enumeration in the warrant of the items to be
searched and seized did not indicate with specification the subversive nature of the said items.
People v. Chua Ho San 308 SCRA 432 (1999) G.R. No. 128222, June 17, 1999

Fact:
In response to reports of rampant smuggling of firearms and other contraband, CID
began patrolling the Bacnotan coastline with his officers. While monitoring the coastal area he
intercepted a radio call from ALMOITE requesting police assistance regarding an unfamiliar
speedboat. CID and six of his men. When the speedboat landed, the male passenger alighted,
and using both hands, carried what appeared a multicolored strawbag. He then walked towards
the road. By this time, ALMOITE, CID and BADUA, the latter two conspicuous in their uniform
and issued side-arms, became suspicious of the man as he suddenly changed direction and
broke into a run upon seeing the approaching officers. BADUA, however, prevented the man
from fleeing by holding on to his right arm. Although CID introduced themselves as police
officers, the man appeared impassive. Speaking in English, CID then requested the man to
open his bag, but he seem not to understand. CID thus tried speaking Tagalog, then Ilocano,
but still to no avail. CID then resorted to what he termed “sign language;” he motioned with his
hands for the man to open the bag. This time, the man apparently understood and acceded to
the request. A search of the bag yielded several transparent plastic packets containing yellowish
crystalline substances. which was later found out that it was Shabu. CID then gestured to the
man to close the bag, which he did. As CID wished to proceed to the police station, he signaled
the man to follow, but the latter did not to comprehend. Hence, CID placed his arm around the
shoulders of the man and escorted the latter to the police headquarters. CHUA was initially
charged with illegal possession of methaphetamine hydrochloride before the RTC. The RTC
convicted Chua Ho San guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Chua Ho San prays for his acquitttal
and the reversal of the judgment of the RTC.

Issue:
Whether the accused who was acting suspiciously constitute Probable Cause impelling
the police officers from effecting an in flagrante delicto arrest.

Held:
No, the Court, finds that these do not constitute “probable cause.” None of the telltale
clues, e.g., bag or package emanating the pungent odor of marijuana or other prohibited drug,
confidential report and/or positive identification by informers of courier(s) of prohibited drug
and/or the time and place where they will transport/deliver the same, suspicious demeanor or
behavior and suspicious bulge in the waist — accepted by this Court as sufficient to justify a
warrantless arrest exists in this case. The term probable cause had been understood to mean a
reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to
warrant a cautious man’s belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is
charged. Specifically with respect to arrests, it is such facts and circumstances which would
lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed by
the person sought to be arrested. In cases of in fragrante delicto, arrests, a peace officer or a
private person may without a warrant, arrest a person, when, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. The
arresting officer, therefore, must have personal knowledge of such facts or as recent case law
adverts to, personal knowledge of facts or circumstances convincingly indicative or constitutive
of probable cause.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DELIA C. MOLINA ET. AL
G.R. No. 229712, February 28, 2018

Facts:
Appellant was charged for the crime of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale under
Section[s] 6 and 7 of Republic Act No. 8042 in an Information which alleges that the accused,
mutually helping and aiding one another, feloniously recruit for a fee, promise employment/job
placement abroad to five (5) persons, hence, committed in large scale, and received payments
from complainants in connection with the documentation and processing of their papers for
purposes of their deployment, but said accused failed or refused to deploy herein complainants
abroad without the fault of the latter and to reimburse the amounts to said complainants, to the
damage and prejudice of the latter.

Appellant claimed that she has not met personally all the private complainants in this
case. On cross-examination, accused Molina admitted that there were about 100 cases of illegal
recruitment filed against her in different courts and that she was convicted of illegal recruitment
in the RTC of Makati City, Branch 148 and Branch 150.

Issue:
Whether or not appellant is guilty of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale.

Ruling:
Yes, the appellant is guilty as charged.
Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered
an offense involving economic sabotage. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a
syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring or confederating with
one another. It is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more
persons individually or as a group.
In this case, appellant cannot escape from liability for large scale illegal recruitment as
the recruitment was made in the recruitment agency of which accused-appellant is the
President. Moreover, private complainants testified that they saw accused-appellant at the
agency and she was introduced to them by Pacon as the owner of the agency, and she even
assured them that they would be deployed for employment soon. Appellant, as President of the
recruitment agency, is therefore liable for failure to reimburse the expenses incurred by private
complainants in connection with their documentation and processing for purposes of
deployment to South Korea, which did not actually take place without their fault.
Ratio Decidendi: In case of juridical persons, the officers having control, management
or direction of their business shall be liable.

Gist: This is an appeal from the Decision, affirming the Decision of the RTC, finding
accused-appellant Delia C. Molina guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal
recruitment in large scale.
Columbia Pictures v. Flores, G.R. No. 78631, June 29, 1993

FACTS:
As a consequence of a complaint filed by the Motion Picture Association of America,
Inc., NBI agents conducted surveillance operations on certain video establishments, among
them respondent FGT Video Network, Inc. (FGT), for “unauthorized sale, rental, reproduction
and/or disposition of copyrighted film," a violation of PD 49 (the old Intellectual Property Law).
After an NBI agent was able to have copyrighted motion pictures “Cleopatra” (owned by 20th
Century Fox) and “The Ten Commandments” (owned by Paramount) reproduced in video
format in FGT, the NBI applied for and was able to obtain from the respondent judge the subject
Search Warrant No. 45 which reads:

TO ANY PEACE OFFICER:

GREETINGS:

It appearing to the satisfaction of the Undersigned after examining under oath NBI
Senior Agent Lauro C. Reyes and his witnesses Mr. Danilo Manalang and Ms. Rebecca
Benitez-Cruz, that there is a probable cause to believe that Violation of Section 56 P.D. No. 49
as amended by P.D. No. 1988 (otherwise known as the Decree on Protection of Intellectual
Property) has been committed and that there are good and sufficient reasons to believe that
FGT Video Network, Inc., Manuel Mendoza, Alfredo C. Ongyanco, Eric Apolonio, Susan Yang
and Eduardo Yotoko are responsible and have in control/possession at No. 4 Epifanio de los
Santos corner Connecticut, Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila (per attached sketch and list of
MPAA member Company Titles) the following properties to wit:

(a) Pirated video tapes of the copyrighted motion pictures/films the titles of which are
mentioned in the attached list;
(b) Posters, advertising leaflets, flyers, brochures, invoices, lists of titles being reproduced or
retaped, journals, ledgers, jon (sic) order slips, delivery slips and books of accounts bearing
and/or mentioning the pirated films with titles (as per attached list), or otherwise used in the
reproduction/retaping business of the defendants;
(c) Television sets, video cassette recorders, rewinders, tape head cleaners, accessories,
equipment and other machines and paraphernalia or materials used or intended to be used in
the unlawful sale, lease, distribution, or possession for purpose of sale, lease, distribution,
circulation or public exhibition of the above-mentioned pirated video tapes which they are
keeping and concealing in the premises above-described, which should be seized and brought
to the Undersigned.

You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at any time in the day
between 8:00 A.M. to 5:00 P.M. of the premises above-described and forthwith seize and take
possession of the above-enumerated personal properties, and bring said properties to the
undersigned immediately upon implementation to be dealt with as the law directs.

In the course of the implementation of the search warrant in the premises of FGT, the
NBI agents found and seized various video tapes of copyrighted films owned and exclusively
distributed by petitioners. Also seized were machines and equipment, television sets,
paraphernalia, materials, accessories, rewinders, tape head cleaners, statements of order,
return slips, video prints, flyers, production orders, and posters.

FGT moved for the release of the seized television sets, video cassette recorders,
rewinders, tape head cleaners, accessories, equipment and other machines or paraphernalia
seized by virtue of the subject warrant. It argued that as a licensed video reproducer, it had the
right possess the seized reproduction equipment, which are not illegal per se, but are rather
exclusively used and intended to be used for reproduction and not in the “sale, lease,
distribution or possession for purposes of sale, lease distribution, circulation or public exhibition
of pirated video tapes.”

Finding that FGT was a registered and duly licensed distributor and in certain instances
and under special instructions and conditions reproducer of videograms and that, therefore, its
right to possess and use the seized equipment had been placed in serious doubt, the lower
court ordered the return of the “television sets, video cassette recorders, rewinders, tape head
cleaners, accessories, equipment and other machines or paraphernalia” to FGT.

ISSUE

Did the respondent judge act with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in
ordering the immediate return of some of the items seized by virtue of the search warrant?

RULING

[The High Tribunal DISMISSED the petition and AFFIRMED the order of the respondent Judge
Flores.]

NO, the respondent judge DID NOT act with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction in ordering the immediate return of some of the items seized by virtue of the
search warrant.
Search Warrant No. 45 fails to satisfy the test of legality. This is more so because the
Court has previously decided a case dealing with virtually the same kind of search warrant. In
20th Century Fox vs. CA, the Court upheld the legality of the order of the lower court lifting the
search warrant issued under circumstances similar to those obtaining in the case at bar. A
striking similarity between this case and 20th Century Fox is the fact that Search Warrant No.
45, specifically paragraph (c) thereof describing the articles to be seized, contains an almost
identical description as the warrant issued in the 20th Century Fox case, to wit:

(c) Television sets, Video Cassettes Recorders, rewinders, tape head cleaners, accessories,
equipments and other machines used or intended to be used in the unlawful reproduction, sale,
rental/lease, distribution of the above-mentioned video tapes which she is keeping and
concealing in the premises above-described.

On the propriety of the seizure of the articles above-described, the Court held in 20th
Century Fox:

Television sets, video cassette recorders, rewinders and tape cleaners are articles which can be
found in a video tape store engaged in the legitimate business of lending or renting out betamax
tapes. In short, these articles and appliances are generally connected with, or related to a
legitimate business not necessarily involving piracy of intellectual property or infringement of
copyright laws. Hence, including these articles without specification and/or particularity that they
were really instruments in violating an Anti-Piracy law makes the search warrant too general
which could result in the confiscation of all items found in any video store.

The language used in paragraph (c) of Search Warrant No. 45 is thus too all-embracing
as to include all the paraphernalia of FGT in the operation of its business. As the search warrant
is in the nature of a general one, it is constitutionally objectionable.

The Court concluded that the respondent judge did not gravely abuse his discretion in
ordering the immediate release of the enumerated items, but that he was merely correcting his
own erroneous conclusions in issuing Search Warrant No. 45. This can be gleaned from his
statement that “. . . the machines and equipment could have been used or intended to be used
in the illegal reproduction of tapes of the copyrighted motion pictures/films, yet, it cannot be said
with moral certainty that the machines or equipment(s) were used in violating the law by the
mere fact that pirated video tapes of the copyrighted motion pictures/films were reproduced. As
already stated, FGT Video Network, Inc. is a registered and duly licensed distributor and in
certain instances and under special instructions . . . reproducer of videograms, and as such, it
has the right to keep in its possession, maintain and operate reproduction equipment(s) and
paraphernalia(s).”
HO vs PEOPLE (1997)

FACTS
On August 8, 1991, the Anti-Graft League of the Philippines, represented by its chief
prosecutor Atty. Reynaldo L. Bagatsing, filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a complaint
against Doris Teresa Ho, Rolando S. Narciso (petitioners in G.R. Nos. 106632 and 106678,
respectively), Anthony Marden, Arsenio Benjamin Santos and Leonardo Odoño. The complaint
was for alleged violation of Section 3 (g) of Republic Act 3019 prohibiting a public officer from
entering into any contract or transaction on behalf of the government if it is manifestly and
grossly disadvantageous to the latter, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit
thereby.
According to the information, Rolando Narciso, being then the Vice-President of the
National Steel Corporation (NSC), a government-owned or controlled corporation organized and
operating under the Philippine laws, and Doris Ho, the President of National Marine Corporation
(NMC), a private corporation organized and operating under our Corporation law, was said to
have entered without legal justification into a negotiated contract of affreightment
disadvantageous to the NSC for the haulage of its products at the rate of P129.50/MT, from
Iligan City to Manila. Such contract was entered into despite their full knowledge that the rate
they have agreed upon was much higher than those offered by the Loadstar Shipping
Company, Inc. (LSCI) and Premier Shipping Lines, Inc. (PSLI), in the amounts of P109.56 and
P123.00 per Metric Ton, respectively, in the public bidding, thereby giving unwarranted benefits
to the National Marine Corporation.
Ho and Narciso alleged that the Sandiganbayan, in determining probable cause for the
issuance of the warrant for their arrest, merely relied on the information and the resolution
attached thereto, filed by the Ombudsman without other supporting evidence, in violation of the
requirements of Section 2, Article III of the Constitution, and settled jurisprudence. They contend
that a judge, in personally determining the existence of probable cause, must have before him
sufficient evidence submitted by the parties, other than the information filed by the investigating
prosecutor, to support his conclusion and justify the issuance of an arrest warrant. Such
evidence should not be “merely described in a prosecutor’s resolution.”
Sandiganbayan’s Denial: “Considering, therefore, that this Court did not rely solely on
the certification appearing in the information in this case in the determination of whether
probable cause exists to justify the issuance of the warrant of arrest but also on the basis
predominantly shown by the facts and evidence appearing in the resolution/memorandum of
responsible investigators/ prosecutors, then the recall of the warrant of arrest, or the
reconsideration sought for, cannot be granted. More so, when the information, as filed, clearly
shows that it is sufficient in form and substance based on the facts and evidence adduced by
both parties during the preliminary investigation. To require this Court to have the entire record
of the preliminary investigation to be produced before it, including the evidence submitted by the
complainant and the accused-respondents, would appear to be an exercise in futility.”

ISSUE
May a judge determine probable cause and issue a warrant of arrest solely on the basis
of the resolution of the prosecutor (in the instant case, the Office of the Special Prosecutor of
the Ombudsman) who conducted the preliminary investigation, without having before him any of
the evidence (such as complainant’s affidavit, respondent’s counter-affidavit, exhibits, etc.)
which may have been submitted at the preliminary investigation?

DECISION & RATIO NO.

• Art III Section 2, 1987 Constitution: The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. (Art III Section 2,
1987 Constitution)
The word “personally” does not appear in the corresponding provisions of our previous
Constitutions. This emphasis shows the present Constitution’s intent to place a greater degree
of responsibility upon trial judges than that imposed under the previous Charters.

• Soliven vs. Makasiar: “In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for
the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the
complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1)
personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding
the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on
the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal’s report and require
the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to
the existence of probable cause.”

• People vs. Inting: There is a difference between the judge’s goal from that of the
prosecutor’s.
First, the determination of probable cause is a function of the Judge. It is not for the
Provincial Fiscal or Prosecutor or for the Election Supervisor to ascertain.
Second, the preliminary inquiry made by a Prosecutor does not bind the Judge. It
merely assists him to make the determination of probable cause.
Third, Judges and Prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry which
determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary
investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or released.
Even if the two inquiries are conducted in the course of one and the same proceeding, there
should be no confusion about the objectives.

• The Court, in this case, reiterated and elaborated on the doctrine laid down in
People vs. Inting and ruled that:
“First, as held in Inting, the determination of probable cause by the prosecutor is for a
purpose different from that which is to be made by the judge. Whether there is reasonable
ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and should be held for trial is
what the prosecutor passes upon. The judge, on the other hand, determines whether a warrant
of arrest should be issued against the accused, i.e. whether there is a necessity for placing him
under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. Thus, even if both should
base their findings on one and the same proceeding or evidence, there should be no confusion
as to their distinct objectives.
Second, since their objectives are different, the judge cannot rely solely on the report
of the prosecutor in finding probable cause to justify the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
Obviously and understandably, the contents of the prosecutor’s report will support his own
conclusion that there is reason to charge the accused of an offense and hold him for trial.
However, the judge must decide independently. Hence, he must have supporting evidence,
other than the prosecutor’s bare report, upon which to legally sustain his own findings on the
existence (or nonexistence) of probable cause to issue an arrest order. This responsibility of
determining personally and independently the existence or nonexistence of probable cause is
lodged in him by no less than the most basic law of the land. Parenthetically, the prosecutor
could ease the burden of the judge and speed up the litigation process by forwarding to the
latter not only the information and his bare resolution finding probable cause, but also so much
of the records and the evidence on hand as to enable His Honor to make his personal and
separate judicial finding on whether to issue a warrant of arrest
Lastly, it is not required that the complete or entire records of the case during the
preliminary investigation be submitted to and examined by the judge. We do not intend to
unduly burden trial courts by obliging them to examine the complete records of every case all
the time simply for the purpose of ordering the arrest of an accused. What is required, rather, is
that the judge must have sufficient supporting documents (such as the complaint, affidavits,
counter-affidavits, sworn statements of witnesses or transcripts of stenographic notes, if any)
upon which to make his independent judgment or, at the very least, upon which to verify the
findings of the prosecutor as to the existence of probable cause. The point is: he cannot rely
solely and entirely on the prosecutor’s recommendation, as Respondent Court did in this case.
Although the prosecutor enjoys the legal presumption of regularity in the performance of his
official duties and functions, which in turn gives his report the presumption of accuracy, the
Constitution, we repeat, commands the judge to personally determine probable cause in the
issuance of warrants of arrest. This Court has consistently held that a judge fails in his bounden
duty if he relies merely on the certification or the report of the investigating officer.”

IN THE INSTANT CASE, the public respondent relied fully and completely upon the
resolution of the graft investigation officer and the memorandum of the reviewing prosecutor,
attached to the information filed before it, and its conjecture that the Ombudsman would not
have approved their recommendation without supporting evidence. It had no other documents
from either the complainant (the Anti-Graft League of the Philippines) or the People from which
to sustain its own conclusion that probable cause exists. Respondent Court palpably committed
grave abuse of discretion in ipso facto issuing the challenged warrant of arrest on the sole basis
of the prosecutor’s findings and recommendation, and without determining on its own the issue
of probable cause based on evidence other than such bare findings and recommendation.
PARTIALLY VALID WARRANT

PEOPLE v. SALANGUIT

FACTS:
Two criminal cases were filed against Salanguit, the first for possession/use of shabu,
and the second, for possession/use of marijuana. Sr. Insp. Aguilar applied in the RTC of Cavite
a warrant to search the premises of Robert Salanguit for shabu and shabu paraphernalias. He
presented as a witness Edmund Badua, an undercover officer, which transacted with Salanguit
for the purchase of shabu.
The application was granted and the team of Aguilar proceeded to the premises of
Salanguit in QC to serve the warrant. The operatives proceeded to knock on Salanguit’s door
but the same was left unanswered. The operatives heard people panicking inside the house and
they began to force their way inside the house. They indicated their authority to conduct the
search and began which yielded to the finding of clear plastic bags with shabu and 2 bricks of
dried marijuana leaves covered in newspaper.
Salanguit refused to sign the receipt for the confiscated drugs. During his arraignment,
he pleaded not guilty and in the trial court, he gave stated that he never got the chance to
review the purported warrant that Aguilar and his team has. He further stated that the operatives
ate their food and took his cash and valuable, as well as canned goods.
The RTC found him guilty for possession/use of shabu and marijuana. Salanguit
appealed the said decision and argues that the shabu allegedly recovered from his residence is
inadmissible as evidence against him on the ground that the warrant used to obtain it was
invalid and that the marijuana seized from him was also inadmissible as evidence against him
pursuant to the plain view doctrine, and that the operatives employed unnecessary force in
executing the warrant.

ISSUES:
1. W/N the warrant used to seize the shabu was valid and the said shabu was
inadmissible in evidence against him.
2. W/N the marijuana seized was admissible in evidence against Salanguit pursuant to
plain view doctrine.

HELD:
1. Yes, all the requisites for the issuance of a search warrant were satisfied.
2. No, the marijuana was not one of the drugs indicated in the warrant and it was not in
plain view when it was seized.

RATIO:
1. The warrant authorized the seizure of undetermined quantity of shabu and drug
paraphernalia. Salanguit contends that it should be void as it did not indicate the existence of
drug paraphernalias. The warrant was valid as to the seizure of shabu and void as to the
seizure of drug paraphernalia. It is to be noted that no drug paraphernalia was seized. Salanguit
further contends that the warrant was issued for more than one specific offense because
possession or uses are punished under two different provisions in the Dangerous Drugs Act.
This Court has decided in the case of People v Dichoso that a warrant that does not specify
what provisions of the law were violated, is valid as to the authority to search and seize
marijuana, shabu and drug paraphernalias. Lastly, Salanguit argues that the search warrant
failed to indicate the place to be searched with sufficient particularity. The rule is that a
description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with
reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place to be searched. The location of Salanguit’s
house being indicated by the evidence on record, there can be no doubt that the warrant
described the place to be searched with sufficient particularity.
2. Because the location of the shabu was indicated in the warrant and thus known to the
police operatives, it is reasonable to assume that the police found the packets and shabu first.
Once the valid portion of the search warrant has been executed, the plain view doctrine can no
longer provide basis for admitting the other items subsequently found. The marijuana bricks
were wrapped in newsprint. There was no apparent illegality to justify their seizure. Not being in
a transparent container, the contents wrapped in newsprint could not have been readily
discernible as marijuana. That being said, we hold that the marijuana is inadmissible in
evidence against Salanguit.
MICROSOFT CORPORATION and LOTUS DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioners,
vs.
MAXICORP, INC., respondent.

FACTS:
This case involves the issuance of search warrant to the respondent MAXICORP Inc for
alleged violation of Section 29 of Intellectual Property and Article 189 of the RPC (unfair
competition).
Armed with the search warrants, NBI agents conducted a search of Maxicorp’s premises
and seized property fitting the description stated in the search warrants.
Maxicorp filed a motion to quash the search warrants alleging that there was no
probable cause for their issuance and that the warrants are in the form of "general warrants."
Where the RTC denied the motion and at the same time denied their motion for reconsideration.
According to RTC they’ve found a probable cause to issue such warrant after examining
the NBI agent and the computer technician who visited Maxicorp.
Maxicorp filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals seeking to set aside the
RTC’s order. The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC’s order denying Maxicorp’s motion to
quash the search warrants. Petitioners moved for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals denied
petitioners’ motion on 29 November 1999.
The Court of Appeals held that NBI Agent Samiano failed to present during the
preliminary examination conclusive evidence that Maxicorp produced or sold the counterfeit
products. The Court of Appeals pointed out that the sales receipt NBI Agent Samiano presented
as evidence that he bought the products from Maxicorp was in the name of a certain "Joel
Diaz."
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not there’s a probable cause on the part of CA to quash the search
warrants issued by RTC
2. Whether or not respondent violated the intellectual property right of the petitioner.

RULING:
According to the SC the offense charged against Maxicorp is copyright infringement
under Section 29 of PD 49 and unfair competition under Article 189 of the RPC. To support
these charges, petitioners presented the testimonies of NBI Agent Samiano, computer
technician Pante, and Sacriz, a civilian. The offenses that petitioners charged Maxicorp
contemplate several overt acts. The sale of counterfeit products is but one of these acts. Both
NBI Agent Samiano and Sacriz related to the RTC how they personally saw Maxicorp commit
acts of infringement and unfair competition.

Probable cause means "such reasons, supported by facts and circumstances as will
warrant a cautious man in the belief that his action and the means taken in prosecuting it are
legally just and proper."Thus, probable cause for a search warrant requires such facts and
circumstances that would lead a reasonably prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and the objects sought in connection with that offense are in the place to be
searched.
The testimonies of these two witnesses, coupled with the object and documentary
evidence they presented, are sufficient to establish the existence of probable cause. From what
they have witnessed, there is reason to believe that Maxicorp engaged in copyright infringement
and unfair competition to the prejudice of petitioners. Both NBI Agent Samiano and Sacriz were
clear and insistent that the counterfeit software were not only displayed and sold within
Maxicorp’s premises, they were also produced, packaged and in some cases, installed there.
The determination of probable cause does not call for the application of rules and
standards of proof that a judgment of conviction requires after trial on the merits. As implied by
the words themselves, "probable cause" is concerned with probability, not absolute or even
moral certainty. The prosecution need not present at this stage proof beyond reasonable doubt.
The standards of judgment are those of a reasonably prudent man,24 not the exacting
calibrations of a judge after a full-blown trial.
No law or rule states that probable cause requires a specific kind of evidence. No
formula or fixed rule for its determination exists.25 Probable cause is determined in the light of
conditions obtaining in a given situation.26 Thus, it was improper for the Court of Appeals to
reverse the RTC’s findings simply because the sales receipt evidencing NBI Agent Samiano’s
purchase of counterfeit goods is not in his name.
For purposes of determining probable cause, the sales receipt is not the only proof that
the sale of petitioners’ software occurred. During the search warrant application proceedings,
NBI Agent Samiano presented to the judge the computer unit that he purchased from Maxicorp,
in which computer unit Maxicorp had pre-installed petitioners’ software.
The Supreme Court held:

“xxx No provision of the law exists which requires that a warrant, partially defective in
specifying some items sought to be seized yet particular with respect to the other items, should
be nullified as a whole. A partially defective warrant remains valid as to the items specifically
described in the warrant. A search warrant is severable, the items not sufficiently described may
be cut off without destroying the whole warrant.”

In addition the Highest Court stated:

“xxx The exclusionary rule found in Section 3(2) of Article III of the constitution renders
inadmissible in any proceeding all evidence obtained through unreasonable searches and
seizures. Thus, all items seized under paragraph © after search warrants, not falling under
paragraphs a, b, c, d, e, f, should be returned to Maxico
Can a police just seize porno materials without warrant?
PITA VS COURT OF APPEALS

Facts:
On December 1 and 3, 1983, pursuing an Anti-Smut Campaign initiated by the Mayor of
the City of Manila, Ramon D. Bagatsing, elements of the Special Anti-Narcotics Group,
Auxilliary Services Bureau, Western Police District, INP of the Metropolitan Police Force of
Manila, seized and confiscated from dealers, distributors, newsstand owners and peddlers
along Manila sidewalks, magazines, publications and other reading materials believed to be
obscene, pornographic and indecent and later burned the seized materials in public at the
University belt along C.M. Recto Avenue, Manila, in the presence of Mayor Bagatsing and
several officers and members of various student organizations.
Among the publications seized, and later burned, was "Pinoy Playboy" magazines
published and co-edited by plaintiff Leo Pita.
Plaintiff filed a case for injunction with prayer for issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction against Mayor Bagatsing and Narcisco Cabrera, as superintendent of Western Police
District of the City of Manila, seeking to enjoin said defendants and their agents from
confiscating plaintiff’s magazines or from preventing the sale or circulation thereof claiming that
the magazine is a decent, artistic and educational magazine which is not per se obscene, and
that the publication is protected by the Constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and of
the press. Plaintiff also filed an Urgent Motion for issuance of a temporary restraining order
against indiscriminate seizure, confiscation and burning of plaintiff's "Pinoy Playboy" Magazines,
pending hearing on the petition for preliminary injunction. The Court granted the temporary
restraining order. The case was set for trial upon the lapse of the TRO. RTC ruled that the
seizure was valid. This was affirmed by the CA.

Issue:
Whether or Not the seizure violative of the freedom of expression of the petitioner.

Held:
Freedom of the press is not without restraint as the state has the right to protect society
from pornographic literature that is offensive to public morals, as indeed we have laws punishing
the author, publishers and sellers of obscene publications. However, It is easier said than done
to say, that if the pictures here in question were used not exactly for art's sake but rather for
commercial purposes, the pictures are not entitled to any constitutional protection. Using the
Kottinger rule: the test of obscenity is "whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscene,
is to deprave or corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences and into whose
hands a publication or other article charged as being obscene may fall." Another is whether it
shocks the ordinary and common sense of men as an indecency. Ultimately "whether a picture
is obscene or indecent must depend upon the circumstances of the case and that the question
is to be decided by the "judgment of the aggregate sense of the community reached by it." The
government authorities in the instant case have not shown the required proof to justify a ban
and to warrant confiscation of the literature First of all, they were not possessed of a lawful court
order: (1) finding the said materials to be pornography, and (2) authorizing them to carry out a
search and seizure, by way of a search warrant. The court provides that the authorities must
apply for the issuance of a search warrant from a judge, if in their opinion an obscenity seizure
is in order and that;

1. The authorities must convince the court that the materials sought to be seized are obscene
and pose a clear and present danger of an evil substantive enough to warrant State interference
and action;
2. The judge must determine whether or not the same are indeed obscene. The question is to
be resolved on a case-to-case basis and on the judge’s sound discretion;
OTHER CASES
STA. ROSA MINING COMPANY vs. ASSISTANT PROV FISCAL AUGUSTO ZABALA

Facts:
Mandamus to compel respondent Fiscal to prosecute Criminal Case.
In March 1974, petitioner filed a complaint for attempted theft against Romeo Garrido
and Gil Alapan with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Camarines Norte.
The case was assigned to Assistant Fiscal Esteban P. Panotes for preliminary
investigation who filed the information for Attempted Theft on a prima facie case which was
approved by Prov Fiscal Joaquin Ilustre.
Fiscal Ilustre filed with the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte the Information.
On March 6, 1975, the Secretary of Justice reversed the findings of prima facie case and
directed said prosecuting officer to dismiss the case.
On April 19, 1976, respondent Fiscal filed a Motion to Dismiss the case which was
denied.
The fiscal manifested that he would not prosecute the case.

Issue:
Whether or not the fiscal be compelled to prosecute the case, after motion to dismiss
has been denied by the trial court?

Held:
Notwithstanding his personal convictions, the fiscal must proceed with his duty of
presenting evidence to the court to enable the court to arrive at its own independent judgment.
Accordingly, if the fiscal is not at all convinced that a prima facie case exists, he simply
cannot move for the dismissal of the case and, when denied, refuse to prosecute the same.
He is obliged by law to proceed and prosecute the criminal action.
He cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. At least what he can do is to continue
appearing for the prosecution and then turn over the presentation of evidence to another fiscal.
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in
Court any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused
rests in the sound discretion of the Court.
Paderanga v Drilon (1991)

1. On 16 October 1986, an information for multiple murder was filed in the Regional Trial Court,
Gingoog City, against Felipe Galarion, Manuel Sabit,Cesar Sabit, Julito Ampo, Eddie Torion,
John Doe, Peter Doe and Richard Doe, for the deaths on 1 May 1984 of Renato Bucag, his wife
MelchoraBucag, and theirson Renato Bucag II. Venue was, however, transferred to Cagayan de
Oro City per Administrative Matter 87-2-244.

2. Only Felipe Galarion was tried and found guilty as charged. The rest of the accused
remained at large. Felipe Galarion, however, escaped from detention and has not
been apprehended since then. In an amended information filed on 6 October 1988,
Felizardo Roxas, alias "Ely Roxas,""Fely Roxas" and "Lolong Roxas," was included as a co-
accused. Roxasretained Atty. Miguel P. Paderanga as his counsel.

3. As counsel for Roxas, Paderanga filed an Omnibus Motion to dismiss, to Quash the Warrant
of Arrest and to Nullify the Arraignment on 14 October1988. The trial court denied the omnibus
motion but directed the City Prosecutor "to conduct another preliminary investigation or
reinvestigationin order to grant the accused all the opportunity to adduce
whateverevidence he has in support of his defense."

4. In the course of the preliminary investigation, through a signed affidavit,Felizardo Roxas

implicated Atty. Paderanga in the commission of the crime charged. The City Prosecutor of
Cagayan de Oro City inhibited himself from further conducting the preliminary investigation
against Paderanga atthe instance of the latter's counsel, per his resolution dated 7 July 1989.

5. In his first indorsement to the Department of Justice, dated 24July 1989,said city prosecutor
requested the Department of Justice to designate a state prosecutor to continue the preliminary
investigation against Paderanga. In a resolution dated 6 September 1989, the State
Prosecutor Henrick F.Gingoyon, who was designated to continue with the conduct
of the preliminary investigation against Paderanga, directed the amendment of the previously
amended information to include and implead Paderanga as one of the accused therein.
Paderanga moved for reconsideration, contending that the preliminary investigation was
not yet completed when said resolution was promulgated, and that he was deprived of his
right to presenta corresponding counter-affidavit and additional evidence crucial to the
determination of his alleged "linkage" to the crime charged.

6. The motion was, however, denied by Gingoyon in his order dated 29January 1990. From the
aforesaid resolution and order, Paderanga filed a Petition for Review with the Department
of Justice. Thereafter, he submitted a Supplemental Petition with Memorandum, and
then aSupplemental Memorandum with Additional Exculpatory/ExoneratingEvidence
Annexed, attaching thereto an affidavit of Roxas dated 20 June1990 and purporting to be a
retraction of his affidavit of 30 March 1990wherein he implicated Paderanga. On 10 August
1990, the Department ofJustice, through Undersecretary Silvestre H. Bello III, issued
Resolution648 dismissing the said petition for review. His motion for reconsideration having
been likewise denied, Paderanga then filed the petition for mandamus and prohibition
before the Supreme Court

ISSUE:
What is the quantum of evidence needed for probable in preliminary
investigation? (I think #2 under “held” is the one relevant in this case)

HELD:
1. Petitioner avers that he was deprived of full preliminary investigation because when the
resolution was issued there were still incidents pending such as the validity of testimonies and
affidavits of Roxas, Hanpol as bases for preliminary investigation, the polygraph test of Roxas
which he failed, the clarifactory question that were supposed to be propounded by petitioner’s
counsel to Roxas and Hanapol. He also claims he was deprived of the opportunity to file
his counter-affidavit to the subpoena of April 25 - BUT THESE CONTENTIONS ARE
WITHOUT MERI Ta. He already filed his counter-affidavit pursuant to the subpoena issued
tohim where he controverted the charge against him and dismissed it saying it was malicious
design of his political opponents. He also failed To show the subpoena issued involved a
separate complaint charging an offense different from that charged in the complaint attached in
the 1st subpoena
b. The credibility of witness and their testimonies are matters of defense best addressed trial
court for evaluation c. Right to ask clarifactory question is not absolute. Fiscal has discretion if
hewill propound these questions to the parties or witnesses concerned. d. Proper forum before
which absence of preliminary investigation should be ventilated is the Court of First Instance,
not this Court.. Absence of a preliminary investigation does not go to the jurisdiction of the court
but merely to the regularity of the proceedings. It could even be waived. Indeed, it is frequently
waived. These are matters to be inquired into by the trial court

2. Petitioner also alleged that there is no prima facie evidence, or probable cause, or sufficient
justification to hold him to a tedious and prolonged public trial, on the basis of the following
grounds: a. the questioned resolution of respondent Gingoyon is full of factual
misrepresentations or misapprehensions

b. respondent’s reliance on the decision of the Regional Trial Court against Felipe Galarion
suffers from constitutional and procedural infirmities considering that petitioner was not a
party thereto, much less was he given any opportunity to comment on or rebut the prosecution
evidence;
c. reliance on Rogelio Hanopol’s testimony is likewise “contemptible,” it being merely hearsay
in addition to the fact that petitioner was never given the opportunity to cross-examine Hanopol
at the time he testified in court; d. the affidavit of Roxas dated March 30, 1989, which is the only
evidence against petitioner, has been rendered nugatory by his affidavit of retraction dated June
20, 1990. Preliminary investigation is generally inquisitorial, and it is often the only means of
discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the fiscal to
prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no
purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is
probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof, and it does not place the person
against whom it is taken in jeopardy.
The quantum of evidence now required in preliminary investigation is such evidence sufficient
to “engender a well-founded belief” as to the fact of the commission of a crime and the
respondent’s probable guilt thereof. A preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full
and exhaustive display of the parties’ evidence; it is for the presentation of such evidence only
as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the
accused is probably guilty thereof.
we are in accord with the state prosecutor’s findings in the case at bar that there exists
prima facie evidence of petitioner’s involvement in the commission of the crime, it being
sufficiently supported by the evidence presented and the facts obtaining therein.GR: The
institution of a criminal action depends upon the sound discretion of the fiscal. He has the quasi-
judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court. Hence,
the general rule is that an injunction will notbe granted to restrain a criminal prosecution XPN:

Citing the case of Brocka et al vs Enrile a. To afford adequate protection to the constitutional
rights of the accused; b. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or
to avoidoppression or multiplicity of actions; c. When there is a pre-judicial question which is
sub judice; d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority; e. Where the
prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation; f. When double jeopardy is clearly
apparent; g. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense; h. Where it is a case of
persecution rather than prosecution; i. Where the charges are manifestly false and
motivated by the lust for vengeance; and j. When there is clearly no prima facie case against
the accused and a motion to quash on that ground has been denied. - In this case, the
circumstances of the case do not fall in any of the exceptions.
3. As to petitioner’s contention that he was not granted the opportunity of cross-examination:
It is a fundamental principle that the accused in a preliminary investigation has no
right to cross-examine the witnesses which the complainant may present.
Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that the respondent shall only
have the right to submit a counter-affidavit, to examine all other evidence submitted by
the complainant and, where the fiscal sets a hearing to propound clarificatory questions to the
parties or their witnesses, to be afforded an opportunity to be present but without the right to
examine or cross-examine.
Thus, even if petitioner was not given the opportunity to cross-examine Galarion and
Hanopol at the time they were presented to testify during these parate trial of the case against
Galarion and Roxas, he cannot assert any legal right to cross-examine them at the preliminary
investigation precisely because such right was never available to him.
The admissibility or inadmissibility of said testimonies should be ventilated before the trial
court during the trial proper and not in the preliminary investigation.
Abdula vs Guiani

Facts:
A petition for certiorari and prohibition to set aside the warrant of arrest issued by herein
respondent Japal guiani, then presiding judge of Branch 14 of RTC of Cotabato City, was filed
before the Supreme Court.
A complaint for murder was filed but was dismissed by the provincial prosecutor on the
gorund that there was no prima facie case for murder again a number of accused (6). However,
he recommended the filing of an information for murder against one of the respondents
(accused) only before the sala of the respondent judge Guiani. Guiani returned the case to the
provincial prosecutor for further investigation since there was no necessary resolution required
under the Rules of Court to show how the investigating prosecutor arrived at such a conclusion
(charging only one of the 8 respondent-accused). Upon the return of the records of the case, it
was assigned for reinvestigation to another prosecutor who then recommended the filing of
charges against 5 accused, 2 of whom are herein petitioners.
On January 2, 1995, an information was filed against petitioner-spouses and 3 others.
The following day, January 3, respondent Judge issued a warrant for the arrest of petitioners.
On January 4, petitioners filed an urgent Ex-Parte motion for the setting aside of saide warrant
of arrest. On January 11, a petition for review was filed with the DOJ. Despite said filing,
respondent judge did not act upon petitioner’s pending Motion to Set Aside the Warrant of
Arrest.
Hence, this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition praying the warrant of Arrest be set
aside and declared void ab initio.

Issue:
WON the Warrant of Arrest should be set aside and declared void ab initio.

Held:
Section 2, Art. III, 1987 Constititution: “The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and NO SEARCH WARRANT OR WARRANT
OF ARREST SHALL ISSUE EXCEPT UPON PROBABLE CAUSE TO BE DETERMINED
PERSONALLY BY THE JUDGE AFTER EXAMINATION UNDER OATH OR AFFIRMATION OF
THE COMPLAINANT AND THE WITNESSES HE MAY PRODUCE and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.”

It must be stressed that the 1987 Constitution requires the judge to determine probable
cause "personally," a requirement which does not appear in the corresponding provisions of our
previous constitutions. This emphasis evinces the intent of the framers to place a greater
degree of responsibility upon trial judges than that imposed under previous Constitutions.
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the
issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the
existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to
personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and
procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted
by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a
warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the
fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in
arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.
Ho vs. People 41 summarizes existing jurisprudence on the matter as follows:
Lest we be too repetitive, we only wish to emphasize three vital matters once more: First, as
held in Inting, the determination of probable cause by the prosecutor is for a purpose different
from that which is to be made by the judge. Whether there is reasonable ground to believe that
the accused is guilty of the offense charged and should be held for trial is what the prosecutor
passes upon. The judge, on the other hand, determines whether a warrant of arrest should be
issued against the accused, i.e., whether there is a necessity for placing him under immediate
custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.
Second, since their objectives are different, the judge cannot rely solely on the report of
the prosecutor in finding probable cause to justify the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The judge
must decide independently. Hence, he must have supporting evidence, other than the
prosecutor's bare report, upon which to legally sustain his own findings on the existence (or
nonexistence) of probable cause to issue an arrest order. This responsibility of determining
personally and independently the existence or nonexistence of probable cause is lodged in him
by no less than the most basic law of the land.
Lastly, it is not required that the complete or entire records of the case during the
preliminary investigation be submitted to and examined by the judge.What is required, rather, is
that the judge must have sufficient supporting documents (such as the complaint, affidavits,
counter-affidavits, sworn statements of witnesses or transcript of stenographic notes, if any)
upon which to make his independent judgment or, at the very least, upon which to verify the
findings of the prosecutor as to the existence of probable cause. The point is: he cannot rely
solely and entirely on the prosecutor's recommendation, as Respondent Court did in this case.
In the case at bench, respondent admits that he issued the questioned warrant as there was "no
reason for (him) to doubt the validity of the certification made by the Assistant Prosecutor that a
preliminary investigation was conducted and that probable cause was found to exist as against
those charged in the information filed." The statement is an admission that respondent relied
solely and completely on the certification made by the fiscal that probable cause exists as
against those charged in the information and issued the challenged warrant of arrest on the sole
basis of the prosecutor's findings and recommendations. He adopted the judgment of the
prosecutor regarding the existence of probable cause as his own. CONSEQUENTLY, THE
WARRANT OF ARREST SHOULD BE DECLARED NULL AND VOID.
People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee
Vs.
Olive Rubio Mamaril, Accused-appellant

FACTS:
On 25 March 2003, at 9:30 o’clock in the evening, SPO4 Alexis Gotidoc, along with the
members of Intel Operatives of Tarlac City Police Station and Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA), implemented Search Warrant No. 144C dated 18 March 2003 issued by Judge
Alipio Yumul of Branch 66, Regional Trial Court, Capas, Tarlac against the appellant in her
residence at Zone 1, Barangay Maliwalo, Tarlac City, Province of Tarlac.
Prior to the search, the police team invited Barangay Kagawad Oscar Tabamo of
Barangay Maliwalo to witness the conduct of the search and seizure operation in the appellant’s
house. With Barangay Kagawad Tabamo, the police team presented the search warrant to
appellant and informed her of the purpose of the search and her constitutional rights.
Afterwards, SPO4 Gotidoc, the designated searcher, started searching the appellant’s
house, in the presence of the appellant and Kagawad Tabamo. During his search, he found on
the top cover of the refrigerator one (1) plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance.
Thereafter he prepared a Certificate of Good Search and Confiscation Receipt which the
appellant refused to sign.
The plastic sachet was brought to the Tarlac Provincial Crime Laboratory located at
Tarlac Provincial Hospital for qualitative examination. The examination conducted by Engr.
Marcene G. Agala, the Forensic Chemist who tested the white crystalline substance, yielded
positive results for 0.055 gram of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, commonly known as shabu,
a dangerous drug.
The factual version presented by the defense is:
On 25 March 2003, at 9:30 o’ clock in the evening the police officers arrived at
appellant’s house and showed her a search warrant. Thereafter, the policemen searched her
house but found nothing. Then a certain Police Officer Pangilinan asked her where she was
sleeping. When she replied that she was inside the hut, the police officers proceeded to and
searched the place and found the plastic sachet containing the shabu.
Thereafter, she was brought to the sub-station at Maliwalo and was told, particularly by
SPO4 Gotidoc and a certain Ma’am Dulay that in exchange of P20,000.00, no case would be
filed against her. When she told them that she did not have money, she was detained.
However, on cross-examination, the appellant admitted that the alleged extortion of P20,000.00
was not reported to the higher ranking police officers.
Appellant claims that the police officers framed her up and planted the shabu inside her house
because of her refusal to give them money.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused-appellant is innocent of violating Section 11, Article II, of RA
9165.

RULING:
No. The Court of Appeals ruled that the evidence for the prosecution fully proved beyond
reasonable doubt the elements necessary to successfully prosecute a case for illegal
possession of a regulated drug, namely, (a) the accused is in possession of an item or an object
identified to be a prohibited or a regulated drug, (b) such possession is not authorized by law
and (c) the accused freely and consciously possessed said drug.
Centered on the conduct of the search of appellant’s house that yielded the prohibited
substance, the Court of Appeals upheld the trial court on the finding that “after a careful
evaluation and analysis of the arguments presented by the prosecution and the defense, we
hold that the search conducted by the INTEL Operatives of Tarlac City Police Station, in
coordination with the PDEA, on the residence of the accused-appellant on 25 March 2003 at
Zone 1, Barangay Maliwalo, Tarlac City and the seizure therein of one (1) plastic pack of white
crystalline substance of methamphetamine hydrochloride or “shabu” weighing 0.055 gram are
legal. As a consequence of the legal search, the said methamphetamine hydrochloride or
“shabu” seized on the occasion thereof, is admissible in evidence against the accused-
appellant.”
The accused-appellant, through her new counsel from the Public Attorney’s Office, goes
further back, presenting new arguments, that (1) the search warrant was not based on probable
cause, hence, the evidence allegedly obtained through it may not be admitted to support the
accused-appellant’s conviction and (2) the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official functions by public officers cannot prevail over the presumption of innocence.
The original position of the accused which, in this petition, begins with the contention of
non-compliance with all the requisites of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. We agree with
the rulings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that there was indeed full satisfaction of
the requisites for the conviction of the accused.
The trial court found that the evidence presented by the prosecution was not adequately
defeated. Re-stating that in illegal possession of prohibited drugs, there are only three (3)
elements to secure conviction: (1) accused is in possession of the prohibited drugs; (2) such
possession is not authorized by law; and (3) accused consciously and freely possessed the
prohibited drugs, the trial court held that all these were established beyond doubt. It determined
that appellant failed to proffer evidence enough to discredit the prosecution and render doubtful
his guilt.
The argument is without merit.
In the case at hand, the so-called frame-up was virtually pure allegation bereft of
credible proof. The narration of the police officer who implemented the search warrant, was
found after trial and appellate review as the true story. It is on firmer ground than the self-
serving statement of the accused-appellant of frame-up.The defense cannot solely rely upon the
constitutional presumption of innocence for, while it is constitutional, the presumption is not
conclusive. Notably, the accused-appellant herself stated in her brief that “no proof was
proffered by the accused-appellant of the police officers’ alleged ill motive.”
HUBERT J. P. WEBB, petitioner
VS.
HONORABLE RAUL E. DE LEON, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Parañaque, Branch 258, HONORABLE ZOSIMO V. ESCANO, the Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Parañaque, Branch 259, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ZENON L.
DE GUIYAB, JOVENCITO ZUÑO, LEONARDO GUIYAB, JR., ROBERTO LAO, PABLO
FORMARAN, and NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, and HONORABLE AMELITA G.
TOLENTINO, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque, Branch 274,
respondents
LAURO VIZCONDE, intervenor

FACTS:
On June 19, 1994, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) filed with the Department
of Justice a letter-complaint charging petitioners Hubert Webb, Michael Gatchalian, Antonio J.
Lejano and six (6) other persons with the crime of Rape and Homicide of Carmela N. Vizconde,
her mother Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde, and her sister Anne Marie Jennifer in their home at
Number 80 W. Vinzons, St., BF Homes Paranaque, Metro Manila on June 30, 1991.
Forthwith, the Department of Justice formed a panel of prosecutors headed by Assistant
Chief State Prosecutor Jovencio R. Zuno to conduct the preliminary investigation.

ARGUMENTS:
Petitioners fault the DOJ Panel for its finding of probable cause. They assail the
credibility of Jessica Alfaro as inherently weak and uncorroborated due to the inconsistencies
between her April 28, 1995 and May 22, 1995 sworn statements. They criticize the procedure
followed by the DOJ Panel when it did not examine witnesses to clarify the alleged
inconsistencies.

Petitioners charge that respondent Judge Raul de Leon and, later, respondent Judge
Amelita Tolentino issued warrants of arrest against them without conducting the required
preliminary examination.

Petitioners complain about the denial of their constitutional right to due process and
violation of their right to an impartial investigation. They also assail the prejudicial publicity that
attended their preliminary investigation.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the DOJ Panel likewise gravely abused its discretion in holding that there
is probable cause to charge them with the crime of rape and homicide
Whether or not respondent Judges de Leon and Tolentino gravely abused their
discretion when they failed to conduct a preliminary examination before issuing warrants of
arrest against them
Whether or not the DOJ Panel denied them their constitutional right to due process
during their preliminary investigation
Whether or not the DOJ Panel unlawfully intruded into judicial prerogative when it failed
to charge Jessica Alfaro in the information as an accused.

HELD:
NO.
NO.
NO. There is no merit in this contention because petitioners were given all the
opportunities to be heard.
NO.

REASONS:
The Court ruled that the DOJ Panel did not gravely abuse its discretion when it found
probable cause against the petitioners. A probable cause needs only to rest on evidence
showing that more likely than not, a crime has been committed and was committed by the
suspects. Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither
on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence
establishing absolute certainty of guilt.
The Court ruled that respondent judges did not gravely abuse their discretion. In arrest
cases, there must be a probable cause that a crime has been committed and that the person to
be arrested committed it. Section 6 of Rule 112 simply provides that “upon filing of an
information, the Regional Trial Court may issue a warrant for the accused. Clearly the, our laws
repudiate the submission of petitioners that respondent judges should have conducted
“searching examination of witnesses” before issuing warrants of arrest against them.
The DOJ Panel precisely allowed the parties to adduce more evidence in their behalf
and for the panel to study the evidence submitted more fully.
Petitioner’s argument lacks appeal for it lies on the faulty assumption that the decision
whom to prosecute is a judicial function, the sole prerogative of the courts and beyond executive
and legislative interference. In truth, the prosecution of crimes appertains to the executive
department of government whose principal power and responsibility is to see that our laws are
faithfully executed. A necessary component of this power is the right to prosecute their violators
(See R.A. No. 6981 and section 9 of Rule 119 for legal basis).
With regard to the inconsistencies of the sworn statements of Jessica Alfaro, the Court
believes that these have been sufficiently explained and there is no showing that the
inconsistencies were deliberately made to distort the truth.
With regard to the petitioners’ complaint about the prejudicial publicity that attended their
preliminary investigation, the Court finds nothing in the records that will prove that the tone and
content of the publicity that attended the investigation of petitioners fatally infected the fairness
and impartiality of the DOJ Panel. Petitioners cannot just rely on the subliminal effects of
publicity on the sense of fairness of the DOJ Panel, for these are basically unbeknown and
beyond knowing.
EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES

MATA VS BAYONA

FACTS:
Soriano Mata was accused under Presidential Decree (PD) 810, as amended by PD
1306, the information against him alleging that Soriano Mata offered, took and arranged bets on
the Jai Alai game by “selling illegal tickets known as ‘Masiao tickets’ without any authority from
the Philippine Jai Alai & Amusement Corporation or from the government authorities
concerned.” Mata claimed that during the hearing of the case, he discovered that nowhere from
the records of the said case could be found the search warrant and other pertinent papers
connected to the issuance of the same, so that he had to inquire from the City Fiscal its
whereabouts, and to which inquiry Judge Josephine K. Bayona, presiding Judge of the City
Court of Ormoc replied, “it is with the court”. The Judge then handed the records to the Fiscal
who attached them to the records. This led Mata to file a motion to quash and annul the search
warrant and for the return of the articles seized, citing and invoking, among others, Section 4 of
Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court. The motion was denied by the Judge on 1 March 1979,
stating that the court has made a thorough investigation and examination under oath of
Bernardo U. Goles and Reynaldo T. Mayote, members of the Intelligence Section of 352nd PC
Co./Police District II INP; that in fact the court made a certification to that effect; and that the fact
that documents relating to the search warrant were not attached immediately to the record of
the criminal case is of no moment, considering that the rule does not specify when these
documents are to be attached to the records. Mata’s motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid
order having been denied, he came to the Supreme Court, with the petition for certiorari,
praying, among others, that the Court declare the search warrant to be invalid for its alleged
failure to comply with the requisites of the Constitution and the Rules of Court, and that all the
articles confiscated under such warrant as inadmissible as evidence in the case, or in any
proceedings on the matter.

ISSUE:
WON the judge must before issuing the warrant personally examine on oath or
affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may produce and take their depositions in
writing, and attach them to the record, in addition to any affidavits presented to him?

HELD:
YES. Under the Constitution “no search warrant shall issue but upon probable cause to
be determined by the Judge or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce”.
More emphatic and detailed is the implementing rule of the constitutional injunction, The Rules
provide that the judge must before issuing the warrant personally examine on oath or affirmation
the complainant and any witnesses he may produce and take their depositions in writing, and
attach them to the record, in addition to any affidavits presented to him. Mere affidavits of the
complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge has to take
depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and to attach them
to the record. Such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to
properly determine the existence or nonexistence of the probable cause, to hold liable for
perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are false. We, therefore,
hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality by the failure of the Judge to conform with
the essential requisites of taking the depositions in writing and attaching them to the record,
rendering the search warrant invalid.
PARTICULARITY of Description

PAPER INDUSTRIES CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES vs JUDGE MAXIMO

ASUNCION

FACTS:
Police Chief Inspector Napoleon B. Pascua applied for a search warrant before Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, that the Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines
located at Bislig, Surigao De Sur is in possession or has in its control high powered firearms,
ammunitions, explosives, which are the subject of the offense.

ISSUE:
Whether the Search Warrant is Valid?

HELD:
No, petition for Certiorari and prohibition is hereby granted and Search Warrant No. 799
accordingly declared null and void, TRO permanent.

RATIONALE:
There is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged
facts.

Main Issue: Validity of Search Warrrant (Article III, Section 2, 1987, 1987 Constitution & Rule
126, Sections 3&4 of Rules of Court).

Requisites of Valid Search Warrant are:

1. Probable Cause is present
2. Such presence is determined personally by the Judge
3. The complainant and the Witnesses he or she may produce are personally examined by
the Judge, in writing and under oath or affirmation
4. The applicant and the Witnesses testify on facts personally known to them
5. The Warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and things to be seized
a. Present case, the Search Warrant is INVALID because
i. The Trial Court failed to examine personally the
complainant and the other dependents
ii. SP03 Bacolod had no personal knowledge that
petitioners were not licensed to possess the subject firearms
iii. The place to be searched was not described with
particularity

Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses does are thus not sufficient. The examining
Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce
and attached them to the record.

Particularity of the Place to be searched:

The belief to value privacy of home and person and to afford it constitutional protection against
the long reach of government is no less than to value human dignity, and that his privacy must
not be disturbed except in case of overriding social need and then only under stringent
procedural safeguards.
The aforementioned premises, did not specify such premises. The warrant identifies only one
place and that is Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines, located at PICOP compound.
However; it was made of 200 offices / building, 15 plants, 84 staffs houses, airstrip, 3 piers /
wharves, and 23 warehouses.

Jurisprudence: People vs CA
What is material in determining the validity of a search is the place stated in the warrant itself,
not what the applicants had in their thoughts, or had represented in the proofs they submitted to
the Court issuing the warrant.
- It would concede to police officers the power of choosing the place to be searched, even if
not delineated in the warrant
- The particularization of the description of the place to be searched may properly be done by
the Judge, and only in the warrant itself; it cannot be left to the discretion of the police officers
conducting the search.
OBJECTS OF SEIZURE