G.R. No. L-19450 May 27, 1965 Sec.
1965 Sec. 31, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court provides that in the court of a justice of the
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
SIMPLICIO VILLANUEVA, defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Magno T. Buese for defendant-appellant.
PAREDES, J.:
On September 4, 1959, the Chief of Police of Alaminos, Laguna, charged Simplicio
Villanueva with the Crime of Malicious Mischief before the Justice of the Peace Court of
said municipality. Said accused was represented by counsel de officio but later on
replaced by counsel de parte. The complainant in the same case was represented by City
Attorney Ariston Fule of San Pablo City, having entered his appearance as private
prosecutor, after securing the permission of the Secretary of Justice. The condition of his
appearance as such, was that every time he would appear at the trial of the case, he would
be considered on official leave of absence, and that he would not receive any payment for
his services. The appearance of City Attorney Fule as private prosecutor was questioned
by the counsel for the accused, invoking the case of Aquino, et al. vs. Blanco, et al.,
L-1532, Nov. 28, 1947, wherein it was ruled that "when an attorney had been appointed to
the position of Assistant Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal and therein qualified, by operation
of law, he ceased to engage in private law practice." Counsel then argued that the JP
Court in entertaining the appearance of City Attorney Fule in the case is a violation of the
above ruling. On December 17, 1960 the JP issued an order sustaining the legality of the
appearance of City Attorney Fule.
Under date of January 4, 1961, counsel for the accused presented a "Motion to Inhibit
Fiscal Fule from Acting as Private Prosecutor in this Case," this time invoking Section 32,
Rule 27, now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court, which bars certain attorneys from
practicing. Counsel claims that City Attorney Fule falls under this limitation. The JP Court
ruled on the motion by upholding the right of Fule to appear and further stating that he
(Fule) was not actually enagaged in private law practice. This Order was appealed to the
CFI of Laguna, presided by the Hon. Hilarion U. Jarencio, which rendered judgment on
December 20, 1961, the pertinent portions of which read:
The present case is one for malicious mischief. There being no reservation by the
offended party of the civil liability, the civil action was deemed impliedly instituted
with the criminal action. The offended party had, therefore, the right to intervene in
the case and be represented by a legal counsel because of her interest in the civil
liability of the accused.
peace a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend
appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. Assistant City
Attorney Fule appeared in the Justice of the Peace Court as an agent or friend of
the offended party. It does not appear that he was being paid for his services or
that his appearance was in a professional capacity. As Assistant City Attorney of
San Pablo he had no control or intervention whatsoever in the prosecution of
crimes committed in the municipality of Alaminos, Laguna, because the
prosecution of criminal cases coming from Alaminos are handled by the Office of
the Provincial Fiscal and not by the City Attornev of San Pablo. There could be no
possible conflict in the duties of Assistant City Attorney Fule as Assistant City
Attorney of San Pablo and as private prosecutor in this criminal case. On the other
hand, as already pointed out, the offended party in this criminal case had a right to
be represented by an agent or a friend to protect her rights in the civil action which
was impliedly instituted together with the criminal action.
In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that Asst. City Attorney Ariston D. Fule
may appear before the Justice of the Peace Court of Alaminos, Laguna as private
prosecutor in this criminal case as an agent or a friend of the offended party.
WHEREFORE, the appeal from the order of the Justice of the Peace Court of
Alaminos, Laguna, allowing the apprearance of Ariston D. Fule as private
prosecutor is dismissed, without costs.
The above decision is the subject of the instant proceeding.
The appeal should be dismissed, for patently being without merits. 1äwphï1.ñët
Aside from the considerations advanced by the learned trial judge, heretofore reproduced,
and which we consider plausible, the fallacy of the theory of defense counsel lies in his
confused interpretation of Section 32 of Rule 127 (now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules),
which provides that "no judge or other official or employee of the superior courts or of the
office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as a member of the bar or
give professional advice to clients." He claims that City Attorney Fule, in appearing as
private prosecutor in the case was engaging in private practice. We believe that the
isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did not constitute private practice within the
meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more than an isolated appearance,
for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In
other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42
LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted
as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as customarily and
demanding payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644, 647).
The appearance as counsel on one occasion is not conclusive as determinative of
1
engagement in the private practice of law. The following observation of the Solicitor
General is noteworthy:
Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented
himself to be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that
his professional services are available to the public for a compensation, as a
source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services.
For one thing, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given permission
by his immediate superior, the Secretary of Justice, to represent the complainant in the
case at bar, who is a relative.
CONFORMABLY WITH ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from should be,
as it is hereby affirmed, in all respects, with costs against appellant..
Bengzon, C.J., Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon,
J.P., and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
Bautista Angelo, J., took no part.
Respondent Atty. Ernesto L. Lumaya of Banganga, Davao Oriental is administratively
charged with unethical practices, conflict of interest and disloyalty to client by Maximo
Dumadag in a sworn letter-complaint dated 22 December 1983. Respondent was
complainant's counsel in Civil Case No. 148 before the RTC of Banganga, Davao Oriental,
filed against spouses Jose and Jesusa Avellanosa, involving the sale of a parcel of land.
Civil Case No. 148 was terminated via a compromise agreement which provided, inter alia,
that not later than 1 October 1979, the Avellanosas would pay Dumadag the amount of
P4,644.00 and in turn Dumadag would execute in favor of the Avellanosas a deed of
reconveyance of the land. However, in case of failure of the Avellanosas to make full
payment of the P4,644.00 within the stipulated period, Dumadag would be entitled to
obtain possession of the land. The compromise agreement, prepared by respondent, was
approved by the trial court. The Avellanosas failed to comply with their undertaking under
the compromise agreement to pay complainant the amount of P4,644.00 not later than 1
October 1979, which necessitated the filing by Dumadag of a motion for execution.
According to complainant, he asked his then counsel, herein respondent, to prepare and
file the appropriate motion for execution; however, the latter failed to do so. It was through
the assistance of the court stenographer, Mr. Eleuterio Catubig, that complainant himself
signed and filed the motion and later obtained the writ of execution.

When the writ of execution was issued, Deputy Sheriff Rogelio Dongiapon, according to
the complainant, instead of serving the same on the Avellanosas, connived with
respondent attorney by selling a one (1) hectare portion of the land subject of Civil Case
No. 148 to one Eleonora Astudillo to satisfy complainant's claim out of the proceeds of the
Republic of the Philippines sale, without however Dumadag's knowledge and consent. The Deed of Sale between the
SUPREME COURT Avellanosas and Astudillo, dated 14 September 1981, was notarized by respondent
Manila attorney and stated that the "parcel of land, together with all the improvements found and
existing thereon, (is) free from liens and encumbrances, whatsoever. "It expressly stated
EN BANC on its face "That this Deed of Sale is executed also to satisfy finally the claim of Maximo
Dumadag in Civil Case No. 148 of the CFI of Banganga, Davao Oriental."

After the sale to Astudillo, or on 16 June 1983, Deputy Sheriff Rogelio Dongiapon made a
A.C. No. 2614 May 21, 1991 Sheriff's Return of Service which stated:

MAXIMO DUMADAG, petitioner, Respectfully returned to MR. JAIME B. TOROBA, Officer-in-Charge, Office of the
vs. Clerk of Court, this Court, the original copy of the Writ of Execution in Civil Case
ERNESTO L. LUMAYA, respondent. No. 148, with the information that said Writ of execution was partially satisfied the
defendants Jose R. Avellanosa and Jesusa N. Avellanosa having paid the amount
RESOLUTION of FOUR THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED FORTY FOUR (P4,344. 00) Philippine
Currency to Atty. Ernesto L. Lumaya, plaintiff's counsel in the above entitled case
in November, 1981, with the balance of P300.00 which the defendants Jose R.
PER CURLAM:
Avellanosa and Jesusa N. Avellanosa have not paid up to this moment. (Emphasis
ours)
2
The said amount of P4,344.00, according to complainant, was not delivered to him by
respondent attorney, even after the former made a demand on the latter.
After respondent's comment and complainant's reply had been filed, the case was referred
to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. Actual
investigation and hearings were conducted by Provincial Fiscal Arnulfo M. Agleron of Mati,
Davao Oriental, who submitted a report to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). Based
on said report, the OSG prepared and submitted its own report, including therewith a
complaint for disbarment against respondent attorney, pursuant to Sec. 4, Rule 139 of the
Rules of Court.
While respondent later filed an answer to the OSG — prepared complaint against him, he
however, did not appear at the earlier investigation despite due notice. We will nonetheless
consider his answer as well as comment prior to the referral of the case to the OSG.
Respondent claims that it was the presiding judge in Civil Case No. 148 who played an
active role in the settlement proceedings between Dumadag and the Avellanosas, and that
it is unfortunate, according to respondent, that there are no written records to prove this
fact, but that it was agreed that Jose Avellanosa would pay Dumadag the amount of
P4,644.00 in installments, which he did, and that complainant Dumadag claimed and
received the money each time payment was made by Jose Avellanosa; thru herein
respondent. His (respondent's) mistake according to him, was that he merely noted at the
back of his own copy of the judgment by compromise the sums paid, all in the total amount
of P3,000.00, and all taken by complainant Dumadag, without any receipts. All his
(respondent's) records of the case, according to respondent, were also taken by Dumadag
from his office when he became a provincial board member.
Respondent also denies having been asked by Dumadag to file a motion for execution in
Civil Case No. 148 or having received from him a cow or P700.00; however he was
promised one cow since he paid the expenses in Civil Case No. 148.
Anent the sale by the Avellanosas to Eleonora Astudillo, the same, according to
respondent, was a private sale, Dumadag was not a party thereto. Respondent also claims
that he was not aware that a motion for execution had been filed in Civil Case No. 148 by
Dumadag when the Deed of Sale between the Avellanosas and Astudillo was presented
to him for notarization, and that he did not see any cash change hands as he was informed
that it was just a ratification of an earlier verbal sale. He notarized the deed of sale without
intention to cause any damage. Respondent however admits that in a later case, Civil
Case No. 283 (where the validity of the sale from the Avellanosas to Astudillo was assailed
by Dumadag), it was disclosed that from the P7,000.00 actually realized from the sale of
the land to Astudillo, the sheriff deducted P1,605.00 for his expenses, with the balance
being given to the vendors (Avellanosas), because Dumadag had already been paid by
the Avellanosas thru their lawyer, herein respondent.
In the Court's resolution of 16 April 1990, respondent was required to answer the OSG
complaint. Respondent's answer merely reiterates his earlier explanation and further
1âw phi 1
states:
The truth of the matter was that the DEED OF SALE WAS ALREADY Prepared
when SHERIFF Dongiapon, the spouses Avellanosa and Maxima Astudillo came
to my Office for the Notarization of that DEED OF SALE. What respondent did was
only to ask whether the signatures are their and that the consideration was paid
but did not go over the contents. All of the parties affirmed their signature and
informed respondent that the consideration was paid in installments. At that time
respondent never was informed that the proceeds was for the final satisfaction of
Mr. Dumadag's claim. Respondent knew it only when Mr. Dumadag came to claim
the money of course I have to tell the truth and I told him, Maximo Dumadag, that
I have never received any money from Sheriff ROGELIO DONGIAPON and I did
not even know that there was a petition for the issuance of a writ of execution that
he filed because I was never asked by him. Mr. Maximo Dumadag told me that he
will file a case against me if I will not give the money . . .
For the reasons that respondent's acts constitute lack of fidelity, loyalty and devotion to his
client's cause, unethical practice and a violation of his lawyer's oath, the OSG recommends
respondent's suspension from the practice of law for not less than five (5) years.
In the case of Licuanan vs. Melo (Adm. Case No. 2361 — February 9, 1989) a lawyer was
disbarred for retaining for his personal benefit for over a one (1) year period, the amount
of P5,220.00 received by him in behalf of his client, thereby compelling the latter to file a
groundless collection suit which exposed said client to a damage countersuit.
While not exactly identical with the Licuanan case, herein complainant Dumadag had to
file a separate civil case (No. 283 — for annulment of sale, damages and attorney's fees)
to recover the amount of P4,344.00 from his previous counsel, herein respondent, Atty.
Lumaya.
Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 16 —
Rule 16.01 — A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received
for or from the client.
Rule 16.02 — A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from
his own and those of others kept by him.
Rule 16.03 — A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due
or upon demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so
3
 much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements,
giving notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same
extent on all judgments and executions he has secured for his client as provided
for in the Rules of Court.
Both parties failed to apprise this Court of the final disposition of Civil Case No. 283, even
as the Court took note of the RTC decision in said case where a finding was made that the
land earlier sold by the Avellanosas to Dumadag is separate and distinct from the one (1)
hectare portion sold by the Avellanosas to Astudillo. However, the RTC in its decision also
ordered co-defendant (herein respondent) Atty. Lumaya to pay the plaintiff (herein
complainant) the sum of P4,344.00 he (Atty. Lumaya) had received from Deputy Sheriff
Rogelio Dongiapon for herein complainant.
Therefore, even a respondent consistently denied liability to Dumadag, his former client,
the records abundantly point to his receipt of and failure to deliver the amount of P4,344.00
to his client, the herein complainant, a clear breach of the canons of professional
responsibility.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court hereby SUSPENDS Atty. Ernesto Lumaya INDEFINITELY
from the practice of law effective from date of his receipt of this resolution.
Let this resolution be served personally on the respondent at his given address of record
and entered in his record as attorney. Let the IBP and the Court Administrator be furnished
also a copy of this resolution for their information and guidance as well as for circularization
to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano,
Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr.,
JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 100643 December 12, 1995
ADEZ REALTY, INCORPORATED, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, Br. 79, Morong Rizal, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR QUEZON CITY, and
AGUEDO EUGENIO, respondents.
RESOLUTION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
On 30 October 1992 the Court found movant, Atty. Benjamin M. Dacanay, guilty of
intercalating a material fact in a decision of the Court of Appeals, which he appealed to
this Court on certiorari, thereby altering the factual findings of the Court of Appeals with
the apparent purpose of misleading this Court in order to obtain a favorable judgment.
Consequently, Atty. Dacanay was disbarred from the practice of law.1
On 20 November 1992 movant filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Leave to Offer
Evidence Re Charge of Unauthorized Intercalation in a Judicial Record dated 18
November 1992. He claimed that the inserted words were written by his client, the
President of Adez Realty, Inc., in the draft of the petition to be filed before the Supreme
Court and unwittingly adopted by movant's secretary when the latter formalized the
petition. He manifested that he would not risk committing the act for which he was found
guilty considering that he was a nominee of the Judicial and Bar Council to the President
for appointment as regional trial judge.2 But the Court on 3 December 1992 denied the
motion for want of a compelling reason to justify a reversal of the questioned resolution.3
On 23 February 1994 movant Dacanay filed a Motion to Lift (Disbarment) stating that he
was already 62 years old, has learned his lesson from his mistake, was terribly sorry for
what he had done, and in all candor promised that if given another chance he would live
up to the exacting demands of the legal profession. He appended to his motion
certifications of good moral character from: Fr. Celso Fernando, Parochial Vicar, Parish
of St. Michael Archangel, Marilao, Bulacan; Fr. Lauro V. Larlar, OAR, Rector, San
Sebastian College-Recoletos; Sis. Aniceta B. Abion, EMM, Chairperson, Center for
Housing and Ecology Development Foundation, Inc.; Dean Rufus B. Rodriquez, College
of Law, San Sebastian College-Recoletos; Judge Pedro T. Santiago, Executive Judge,
RTC, Quezon City; Judge Teodoro P. Regino, RTC-Br. 84, Quezon City; Judge Antonio
4
P. Solano, RTC-Br. 86, Quezon City; and Judge Gregorio D. Dayrit, MTC-Br. 35, Quezon
City.4 However, on 11 August 1994 the Court denied the motion.5
On 1 December 1994 movant again filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Lift Disbarment alleging
among others that he had been deprived of his means to life; he had pursued civic,
religious and community work, especially for the poor and the underprivileged short of
extending legal assistance because of his incapacity; he had admitted "with profound
regret and with utmost humility his commission of an unpardonable mistake and ask(ed)
that he be given another chance;" and, he was "remorseful for what he has done and
comes to this Honorable Court with a contrite heart."6
His wife Norma M. Dacanay likewise wrote the Court on 1 December 1994 saying that
while she did not condone what her husband had done, it had been her fervent wish that
the Court took a second look into its decision disbarring her husband as her entire family
had been traumatized by his disbarment.7
On 6 March 1995 movant sent a letter addressed to the Chief Justice and the Associate
Justices of the Court reiterating his Ex-Parte Motion to Lift Disbarment of 1 December
1994. Thus —
I am truly penitent for the serious offense I committed and admit full
responsibility for it. I realize it was dishonest and unfair to pass the blame to
my secretary who was merely following my instructions. The intercalation was
my own act and I am justly punished for it.
Your Honors, I do not question your decision but I only beg for your mercy. I
have a wife and children to support but my only means of livelihood has been
withdrawn from me. I am destitute and desperate and can only turn to you for
relief . . . .
Looking back, I cannot imagine how I could have even thought of blackening
the law profession, to which I owe so much. Please let me redeem myself by
admitting me back to its precincts, where I swear to live strictly according to its
canons . . . .8
On 21 March 1995 the Court noted the letter of 6 March 1995 of movant Dacanay.
On 4 August 1995 movant again prayed for his reinstatement —
It has been 33 long months since my disbarment, during which time I
have been struggling to make both ends meet to provide for my wife and
three children. Please give me the chance to prove that I am a reformed
offender who will henceforth do nothing whatsoever to dishonor the legal
profession.9
On 12 September 1995 the Court noted respondent's 4 August 1995 letter.10
On 17 November, 1995 movant once more wrote the Court —
I humbly acknowledge again that I committed a grievous offense for
which I was justly punished at the time with the extreme sanction of
disbarment.
I have been suffering much since my disbarment more than 36 months
ago, but it is my wife and children who have suffered more for my
transgression. Although innocent, they bear with me the stigma and
burden of my punishment.11
The disbarment of movant Benjamin M. Dacanay for three (3) years has, quite
apparently, given him sufficient time and occasion to soul-search and reflect on his
professional conduct, redeem himself and prove once more that he is worthy to practice
law and be capable of upholding the dignity of the legal profession. His admission of guilt
and repeated pleas for compassion and reinstatement show that he is ready once more
to meet the exacting standards the legal profession demands from its practitioners.
Accordingly, the Court lifts the disbarment of Benjamin M. Dacanay. However he should
be sternly warned that —
[T]he practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence
to the rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest
degree of morality and faithful compliance with the rules of the legal
profession are the conditions required for remaining a member of good
standing of the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law. The
Supreme Court, as guardian of the legal profession, has ultimate
disciplinary power over attorneys. This authority to discipline its members
is not only a right, but a bounden duty as well . . . That is why respect and
fidelity to the Court is demanded of its members . . .12
WHEREFORE, the disbarment of BENJAMIN M. DACANAY from the practice of law is
LIFTED and he is therefore allowed to resume the practice of law upon payment of the
required legal fees. This resolution is effective immediately.
SO ORDERED.
5

EN BANC
B. M. No. 1154 June 8, 2004
IN THE MATTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF BAR EXAMINEE HARON S.
MELING IN THE 2002 BAR EXAMINATIONS AND FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AS
MEMBER OF THE PHILIPPINE SHARI’A BAR, ATTY. FROILAN R.
MELENDREZ, petitioner.
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
The Court is here confronted with a Petition that seeks twin reliefs, one of which is ripe
while the other has been rendered moot by a supervening event.
The antecedents follow.
On October 14, 2002, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez (Melendrez) filed with the Office of the
Bar Confidant (OBC) a Petition1 to disqualify Haron S. Meling (Meling) from taking the
2002 Bar Examinations and to impose on him the appropriate disciplinary penalty as a
member of the Philippine Shari’a Bar.
In the Petition, Melendrez alleges that Meling did not disclose in his Petition to take the
2002 Bar Examinations that he has three (3) pending criminal cases before the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Cotabato City, namely: Criminal Cases Noa. 15685 and
15686, both for Grave Oral Defamation, and Criminal Case No. 15687 for Less Serious
Physical Injuries.
The above-mentioned cases arose from an incident which occurred on May 21, 2001,
when Meling allegedly uttered defamatory words against Melendrez and his wife in front
of media practitioners and other people. Meling also purportedly attacked and hit the face
of Melendrez’ wife causing the injuries to the latter.
Furthermore, Melendrez alleges that Meling has been using the title "Attorney" in his
communications, as Secretary to the Mayor of Cotabato City, despite the fact that he is
not a member of the Bar. Attached to the Petition is an indorsement letter which shows
that Meling used the appellation and appears on its face to have been received by the
Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cotabato City on November 27, 2001.
Pursuant to this Court’s R E S O L U T I O N2 dated December 3, 2002, Meling filed
his Answer with the OBC.
In his Answer,3 Meling explains that he did not disclose the criminal cases filed against him
by Melendrez because retired Judge Corocoy Moson, their former professor, advised him
to settle his misunderstanding with Melendrez. Believing in good faith that the case would
be settled because the said Judge has moral ascendancy over them, he being their former
professor in the College of Law, Meling considered the three cases that actually arose
from a single incident and involving the same parties as "closed and terminated."
Moreover, Meling denies the charges and adds that the acts complained of do not involve
moral turpitude.
As regards the use of the title "Attorney," Meling admits that some of his communications
really contained the word "Attorney" as they were, according to him, typed by the office
clerk.
In its Report and Recommendation4 dated December 8, 2003, the OBC disposed of the
charge of non-disclosure against Meling in this wise:
The reasons of Meling in not disclosing the criminal cases filed against him in his
petition to take the Bar Examinations are ludicrous. He should have known that
only the court of competent jurisdiction can dismiss cases, not a retired judge nor
a law professor. In fact, the cases filed against Meling are still pending.
Furthermore, granting arguendo that these cases were already dismissed, he is
still required to disclose the same for the Court to ascertain his good moral
character. Petitions to take the Bar Examinations are made under oath, and should
not be taken lightly by an applicant.
The merit of the cases against Meling is not material in this case. What matters is his act
of concealing them which constitutes dishonesty.
In Bar Matter 1209, the Court stated, thus:
It has been held that good moral character is what a person really is, as
distinguished from good reputation or from the opinion generally entertained of
him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in the place where he is known.
6
 Moral character is not a subjective term but one which corresponds to objective
reality. The standard of personal and professional integrity is not satisfied by such
conduct as it merely enables a person to escape the penalty of criminal law. Good
moral character includes at least common honesty.
The non-disclosure of Meling of the criminal cases filed against him makes him
also answerable under Rule 7.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
states that "a lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false statement
or suppressing a material fact in connection with his application for admission to
the bar."5
As regards Meling’s use of the title "Attorney", the OBC had this to say:
Anent the issue of the use of the appellation "Attorney" in his letters, the
explanation of Meling is not acceptable. Aware that he is not a member of the Bar,
there was no valid reason why he signed as "attorney" whoever may have typed
the letters.
Although there is no showing that Meling is engaged in the practice of law, the fact
is, he is signing his communications as "Atty. Haron S. Meling" knowing fully well
that he is not entitled thereto. As held by the Court in Bar Matter 1209, the
unauthorized use of the appellation "attorney" may render a person liable for
indirect contempt of court.6
Consequently, the OBC recommended that Meling not be allowed to take the Lawyer’s
Oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys in the event that he passes the Bar Examinations.
Further, it recommended that Meling’s membership in the Shari’a Bar be suspended until
further orders from the Court.7
We fully concur with the findings and recommendation of the OBC. Meling, however, did
not pass the 2003 Bar Examinations. This renders the Petition, insofar as it seeks to
prevent Meling from taking the Lawyer’s Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys, moot and
academic.
On the other hand, the prayer in the same Petition for the Court to impose the appropriate
sanctions upon him as a member of the Shari’a Bar is ripe for resolution and has to be
acted upon.
Practice of law, whether under the regular or the Shari’a Court, is not a matter of right but
merely a privilege bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in the law but who
are also known to possess good moral character.8 The requirement of good moral
character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of law, its continued
possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law.9
The standard form issued in connection with the application to take the 2002 Bar
Examinations requires the applicant to aver that he or she "has not been charged with any
act or omission punishable by law, rule or regulation before a fiscal, judge, officer or
administrative body, or indicted for, or accused or convicted by any court or tribunal of, any
offense or crime involving moral turpitude; nor is there any pending case or charge against
him/her." Despite the declaration required by the form, Meling did not reveal that he has
three pending criminal cases. His deliberate silence constitutes concealment, done under
oath at that.
The disclosure requirement is imposed by the Court to determine whether there is
satisfactory evidence of good moral character of the applicant.10 The nature of whatever
cases are pending against the applicant would aid the Court in determining whether he is
endowed with the moral fitness demanded of a lawyer. By concealing the existence of
such cases, the applicant then flunks the test of fitness even if the cases are ultimately
proven to be unwarranted or insufficient to impugn or affect the good moral character of
the applicant.
Meling’s concealment of the fact that there are three (3) pending criminal cases against
him speaks of his lack of the requisite good moral character and results in the forfeiture of
the privilege bestowed upon him as a member of the Shari’a Bar.
Moreover, his use of the appellation "Attorney", knowing fully well that he is not entitled to
its use, cannot go unchecked. In Alawi v. Alauya,11 the Court had the occasion to discuss
the impropriety of the use of the title "Attorney" by members of the Shari’a Bar who are not
likewise members of the Philippine Bar. The respondent therein, an executive clerk of court
of the 4th Judicial Shari’a District in Marawi City, used the title "Attorney" in several
correspondence in connection with the rescission of a contract entered into by him in his
private capacity. The Court declared that:
…persons who pass the Shari’a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine
Bar, hence, may only practice law before Shari’a courts. While one who has been
admitted to the Shari’a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar,
may both be considered "counselors," in the sense that they give counsel or advice
in a professional capacity, only the latter is an "attorney." The title "attorney" is
reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law
and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they
only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.12
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The judiciary has no place for dishonest officers of the court, such as Meling in this case.
The solemn task of administering justice demands that those who are privileged to be part
of service therein, from the highest official to the lowliest employee, must not only be
competent and dedicated, but likewise live and practice the virtues of honesty and integrity.
Anything short of this standard would diminish the public's faith in the Judiciary and
constitutes infidelity to the constitutional tenet that a public office is a public trust.
In Leda v. Tabang, supra, the respondent concealed the fact of his marriage in his
application to take the Bar examinations and made conflicting submissions before the
Court. As a result, we found the respondent grossly unfit and unworthy to continue in the
practice of law and suspended him therefrom until further orders from the Court.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted insofar as it seeks the imposition of appropriate
sanctions upon Haron S. Meling as a member of the Philippine Shari’a Bar. Accordingly,
the membership of Haron S. Meling in the Philippine Shari’a Bar is hereby SUSPENDED
until further orders from the Court, the suspension to take effect immediately. Insofar as
the Petition seeks to prevent Haron S. Meling from taking the Lawyer’s Oath and signing
the Roll of Attorneys as a member of the Philippine Bar, the same is DISMISSED for having
become moot and academic.
Copies of this Decision shall be circulated to all the Shari’a Courts in the country for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
B.M. No. 135 January 29, 1987
PETITION OF SOCORRO LADRERA, 1954 SUCCESSFUL BAR EXAMINEE TO TAKE
THE LAWYER'S OATH.
RESOLUTION
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
Socorro Ke. Ladrera passed the 1954 bar examinations. Before he could participate in the
scheduled oath taking of successful bar examinees, an administrative complaint for
immorality was filed against him by Lucila C. Casas.
Lucila stated that she and Ladrera were married on May 23, 1944 and that when she
married him he represented himself to be single. Sometime in 1948, Lucila learned that
her husband had been previously married on March 23, 1936 to Florencia Orticio by whom
he had a child called Monserrat. Lucila filed a case for annulment of her marriage to
Ladrera on October 5, 1949. A decision was rendered on February 13, 1950 annulling the
marriage and ordering Ladrera to give P40.00 a month for the support of his three minor
children with Lucila.
In 1951, Socorro Ladrera filed a civil case to declare his first wife, Florencia Orticio as
presumptively dead, In a November 24, 1951 decision, the Court of First Instance of Davao
stated that Ladrera and Orticio were married on March 23, 1936 in the Roman Catholic
church of Capul, Samar. The couple had a daughter, Monserrat Ladrera, who lived with
the petitioner from birth up to the date of the decision. It appears that, while the couple
were living in Cebu, Florencia Orticio eloped with a certain Ramon E steban and left the
conjugal home without the petitioner's knowledge. Inspite of allegedly determined
searches by the petitioner in Samar, Cebu, Bohol, and Manila, Florencia could not be
located or her whereabouts ascertained. The court therefore ruled "that the petition to
declare Florencia Orticio presumptively dead for all intents and purposes of law has
satisfactorily been established."
Petitioner Ladrera had three children with his second wife, Lucila C. Casas.
Sometime after the judicial declaration that his first wife was presumptively dead, Ladrera
married his third wife, Socorro Santos by whom he has five children. After Ladrera married
a third time, his first wife showed up and filed a bigamy case against him with the Court of
First Instance of Davao. According to the immorality complaint filed by Lucila, the second
wife, this bigamy case was later dismissed as a result of alleged monetary concessions
which Ladrera made in favor of Orticio. Incidentally, the latest information about Florencia
Orticio is that she is quite well off, having inherited properties from her parents and that
she teaches Spanish at the University of Eastern Philippines in Catarman, Samar.
On the basis of the administrative complaint filed against Ladrera, this Court suspended
his oath taking and directed him to file an answer to the complaint. In his Answer, Ladrera
alleged that:
8
 ... [W]hen he married complainant, he honestly believed that his first wife,
Florencia Orticio, was already dead; that complainant in fact knew that
respondent was previously married because respondent's child with
Florencia Orticio lived with respondent and complainant after the latter's
marriage and until its annulment; that respondent has paid all the monthly
pensions to complainant's three minor children; that respondent later
discovered that complainant's motive in suing for annulment of her
marriage to respondent was to get a share of the properties acquired by
respondent, and as a matter of fact, complainant has squandered and sold
the properties adjudicated to her in Civil Case No. 470, and the money
realized from the sales was not used for the benefit of their children; that
the value of the properties adjudicated to the complainant in the case for
liquidation of conjugal properties was approximately P37,000.00; that
respondent married Socorro Santos and still lives with her in view of the
decision in Civil Case No. 501, dated November 24, 1951, declaring
respondent's first wife, Florencia Orticio presumptively dead; that
respondent's admission in Civil Case No. 399 for annulment of
complainant's marriage, that Florencia Orticio was alive and residing in
Manila was made in good faith, he having then received information from
his brother, Fr. Emerardo Ladrera, that Florencia Orticio was in Manila; that
subsequent search and inquiries, however, led the respondent to believe
that Florencia Orticio was not alive and this resulted in the filing by
respondent of the petition in Civil Case No. 501, praying that Florencia
Orticio be declared presumptively dead; that Criminal Case No. 1863,
against the respondent for bigamy, was dismissed by the Court of First
Instance of Davao upon motion of the City Attorney of Davao; that the mere
filing of civil cases against respondent does not necessarily reflect
immorality on his part, not to mention the circumstances that said cases
were settled or otherwise dismissed; that complainant's charges were
motivated by hatred and revenge, intended as a ruse to compel respondent
to give to complainant another ten hectares of first class agricultural land
located in Monteverde, Calinan, Davao City, plus complainant's desire to
put respondent down politically.
The then Supreme Court Clerk of Court, Jose S. de la Cruz, was ordered to investigate
the administrative charge and to submit his report.
On August 31, 1955, de la Cruz submitted his Report, the salient portion of which reads:
It is noteworthy that the complainant had chosen not to testify in the
investigation, and that by merely presenting documentary evidence
consisting of copies of the complaint for annulment of marriage in Civil
Case No. 399; the decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao in said
case annulling the marriage between complainant and respondent; the
decision in Special Case No. 501 wherein the Court of First Instance of
Davao declared respondent's first wife, Florencia Orticio, presumptively
dead; the order of the Court of First Instance of Davao in Criminal Case
No. 1863 against respondent for bigamy, dismissing said case, the
complainant is basing her charges of immorality against respondent upon
the latter's bad faith arising from the fact that, while in the annulment
proceedings respondent and his attorney admitted that Florencia Orticio
was alive, in Special Case No. 501 filed in 1951 by respondent, the latter
claimed that said Florencia Orticio could not be located and was unheard
from for several years, and from the fact that he married for the third time
Socorro Santos while respondent's first wife was alive, and who, as a
matter of fact, filed a case for bigamy against respondent.
Upon the other hand, the respondent testified during the investigation and
declared that he acted in good faith, first, in marrying complainant;
secondly, in instituting Special Case No. 501; and, thirdly, in marrying
Socorro Santos. He explained that when he married complainant in 1944,
he honestly believed that his first wife, Florencia Orticio, was already dead;
that he had to admit in the annulment proceedings, Civil Case No. 399,
that Florencia was alive because of a letter he received from his brother,
Fr. Ladrera; that he filed the subsequent Special Case No. 501 after
suspecting that complainant's purpose in annulling her marriage to
respondent was merely to obtain her snare in the conjugal properties, and
in order also to establish definitely his civil status; and that he married his
third wife, Socorro Santos, after the decision in Special Case No. 501,
declaring his first wife Florencia presumptively dead, had become final.
While the complainant's charges are based upon inferences or
assumptions, the testimony of respondent is unrefuted that he acted in
good faith In the first place, the fact that no annulment proceeding was
instituted by complainant until after three children were born to her
marriage with respondent, at least shows that Florencia Orticio was not
generally known to be alive. In the second place, the admission by
respondent and his counsel in the annulment proceeding that Florencia
was alive, is explained by respondent's receipt of a letter from his brother,
Fr. Ladrera, to the effect that she might still be living, which at any rate was
the very fact alleged in the complaint for annulment. In the third place,
respondent was constrained to file Special Case No. 501 because he
subsequently realized that complainant annulled her marriage to
respondent mainly to get her share of their conjugal properties, and
because he also wanted to respondent settle his own civil status after
failing to locate the whereabouts of his first wife, Florencia Orticio; and the
9
 respondent undoubtedly had the right to look for Florencia after his
marriage to complainant was judicially set aside on the ground that
Florencia was alive. It is very significant that no opposition whatsoever was
interposed in Special Case No. 501 either by complainant or by Florencia
inspite of due publication of the proceedings; and the final decision therein
can be said to have legally paved the way for respondent's third marriage
to Socorro Santos. As a matter of fact, in the order of the Court of First
Instance of Davao dismissing the bigamy case against respondent, it was
in effect held that respondent married Socorro Santos without fraudulent
intent, and said order had become final.
Complainant's allegation that respondent has failed to comply with his
obligation to pay the monthly support of his three children with complainant
as ordered in the decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao in Civil
Case No. 399, is neither touched nor pressed in complainant's
memorandum. At any rate, complainant may avail herself of any
appropriate civil remedy for the collection or enforcement (or even
increase) of said support; and respondent has presented evidence to show
that he had complied with his obligation at least to the date of this
investigation in March, 1955. The claim that respondent is immoral
because of the filing against him of several civil cases, deserves no serious
consideration since, according to respondent's evidence, said cases, aside
from having been dismissed or otherwise settled, do not necessarily imply
moral perversity.
WHEREFORE, it is recommended that respondent Socorro Ke. Ladrera
be allowed to take the lawyer's oath.
The favorable recommendation, notwithstanding, this Court, on September 7, 1955 issued
a resolution disqualifying Ladrera from taking the lawyer's oath, to wit:
Acting upon the complaint for immorality filed by Lucila Casas against
Socorro Ke. Ladrera, 1954 successful bar candidate; the answer filed by
the latter; the evidence taken during the investigation; the report of the
investigator; as well as all the circumstances surrounding the case, the
Court RESOLVED to disqualify respondent Socorro Ke. Ladrera from
taking the lawyer's oath
A motion for reconsideration of the above-quoted resolution was denied in another
resolution issued on October 11, 1955.
Up to now or more than thirty-one years after he passed the bar examinations, Ladrera
has not been allowed to take the lawyer's oath. All his motions to allow him to take the
oath filed every year without fail beginning on May 23, 1956 up to September 7, 1982 have
been denied. Before us, now is Ladrera's April 15, 1985 urgent motion, to wit:
NOW COMES your petitioner, by and for himself and unto tills Honorable
Supreme Tribunal most respectfully stated:
That your petitioner has been deprived from taking his Lawyer's Oath as
member of the Philippine Bar since January 20, 1955, because of a petition
of Lucila C. Casas who has long ago withdrawn her complaint and has in
fact attested to the good reputation and character of the herein respondent;
That considering the time that has elapsed which is already more than
thirty (30) years is more than sufficient punishment, your respondent now
prays this Honorable Tribunal to grant him the privilege to take the
Lawyer's Oath together with the new successful candidates scheduled to
take their oath on April 25, 1985 at the Philippine Convention Center,
Manila.
On October 4, 1986, he wrote another letter, this time to the Court Administrator asking for
the approval of his petition of nearly 32 years.
An applicant for admission to the bar must be of good moral character. (Rule 138, Sec. 2).
What constitutes good moral character within the meaning of the rule has been elucidated
in precedent cases.
In Carmen E. Bacarro v. Ruben M. Pinataca (127 SCRA 218), this Court cited various
precedent cases and ruled:
One of the indispensable requisites for admission to the Philippine Bar is
that the applicant must be of good moral character. This requirement aims
to maintain and uphold the high moral standards and the dignity of the legal
profession, and one of the ways of achieving this end is to admit to the
practice of this noble profession only those persons who are known to be
honest and to possess good moral character. (Martin, Ruperto G., "Legal
& Judicial Ethics," 5th ed., p. 15, citing In Re Parazo, 82 Phil 230) As a
man of law, (a lawyer) is necessarily a leader of the community, looked up
to as a model citizen. (Planza v. Archangel 21 SCRA 1, 4). He sets an
example to his fellow citizens not only for his respect for the law, but also
for his clean living. (Martin, supra, p. 36) Thus, becoming a lawyer is more
than just going through a law course and passing the Bar examinations.
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 One who has the lofty aspiration of becoming a member of the Philippine
Bar must satisfy this Court, which has the power, jurisdiction and duty to
pass upon the qualifications, ability and moral character of candidates for
admission to the Bar, that he has measured up to that rigid and Ideal
standard of moral fitness required by his chosen vocation.
The Court, in the past, consistently denied the annual petitions of Ladrera that he be
allowed to take the lawyer's oath. He claimed that when he married his second wife, he
sincerely believed that his first wife was already dead. He married his third wife only after
the first wife had been declared presumptively dead and after his second marriage-e had
been annulled. There may have been compliance with a strict or narrow interpretation of
the letter of the law but the Court was of the view that Ladrera had failed to live up to the
high moral standards required for membership in the Bar.
All of that, however, is in the past. Ladrera now states that if he has committed an act
which justified the suspension from taking the lawyer's oath, the time that has elapsed is
more than sufficient punishment. He submits that "he humbly believes with all candor and
sincerity that he has more than atoned for it by living a very moral and exemplary life since
then."
Apart from his marital misadventures, there is nothing in the records to warrant a
permanent denial of Ladreras petition, He worked as a janitor-messenger in Cebu City
while pursuing his college education at night. He has also served in fairly important
positions in the government such as Technical Assistant to President Ramon Magsaysay,
Special Assistant to President Carlos P. Garcia, and member and later Chairman of the
Board of People's Homesite and Housing Corporation. He has served as Treasurer of the
Escolta Walking Corporation and Director of the Foreign Affairs Association of the
Philippines.
As early as 1960, then Senator Quintin Paredes endorsed Ladrera's petition stating that
the latter was "honest, dependable, and trustworthy" and followed this up with another
endorsement in 1966.
In July 13, 1966, Lucila Casas filed a motion for the withdrawal or dismissal of her
complaint. Casas stated as her "considered opinion" that Ladrera has been sufficiently
punished by the then 12-year suspension of his oathtaking as a lawyer. Casas stated that
her children by Ladrera — Teresita, graduating with AB and BSC degrees; Belen,
preparatory medicine student; and Socorro, Jr. an engineering student — were suffering
from the stigma of the punishment which arose from her complaint. Casas observed that
Ladrera was "behaving well and leading an exemplary life."
The records show various indorsements of good character from lawyers, a law professor
in Davao City, a congressman, and others. A priest, Fr. Emiliano Sabandal attested that
Ladrera "is a man of high moral character, humble and possessed with an innate religious
quality; as a consequence thereof he is a daily communicant of the blessed sacrament."
In the 32 years since Ladrera passed the bar examinations, he has supported and sent
through college all his children by the three women he married — a daughter by Florencia
Orticio, three children by Lucila Casas, and five children by Socorro Santos. Some of the
children have joined their father in his many petitions asking for the privilege of taking his
lawyer's oath.
Ladrera was a guerrilla officer during World War II in Bohol and Mindanao. After the war,
he was elected head of the Davao War Veterans Association and led the veterans'
movement to acquire some of the lands left by Japanese-owners. He became a successful
businessman in Davao, acquiring a gasoline station, three corn and rice mills, and a
transportation line called "Ladrera Overland Transit".
There was moral deliquency in Mr. Ladrera's younger days but he has made up for it by
observing a respectable, useful, and religious life since then. Thirty-two years of rejecting
his petitions are enough for chastisement and retribution. Considering that the respondent
has realized the wrongfulness of his past conduct and demonstrated a sincere willingness
to make up for that moral lapse, the Court has decided to admit him to membership in the
Philippine bar.
WHEREFORE, the PETITION of Mr. Socorro Ke. Ladrera to be allowed to take the
lawyer's oath is hereby GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.
11