name should be "Ma. Lourdes B. Eleosida," instead of "Ma. Lourdes E. Borbon.
" In support
G.R. No. 130277. May 9, 2002.*
MA. LOURDES BARRIENTOS ELEOSIDA, for and in behalf of her minor child, CHARLES
CHRISTIAN ELEOSIDA, petitioner, vs. LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY,
and CARLOS VILLENA BORBON, respondents.
Civil Law; Civil Registry; Even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected
and the true facts established under Rule 108 provided the parties aggrieved by the error
avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding.—Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of
Court provides the procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry.
The proceedings under said rule may either be summary or adversary in nature. If the
correction sought to be made in the civil register is clerical, then the procedure to be adopted
is summary. If the rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party,
it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is adversary. This is our ruling
in Republic vs. Valencia where we held that even substantial errors in a civil registry may
be corrected and the true facts established under Rule 108 provided the parties aggrieved by
the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. An appropriate
adversary suit or proceeding is one where the trial court has conducted proceedings where
all relevant facts have been fully and properly developed, where opposing counsel have been
given opportunity to demolish the opposite party’s case, and where the evidence has been
thoroughly weighed and considered.
Same; Same; Substantial changes are now allowed under Rule 108 in accordance with
the ruling in Republic vs. Valencia provided that the appropriate procedural requirements
are complied with.—It is true in the case at bar that the changes sought to be made by
petitioner are not merely clerical or harmless errors but substantial ones as they would
affect the status of the marriage between petitioner and Carlos Borbon, as well as the
legitimacy of their son, Charles Christian. Changes of such nature, however, are now
allowed under Rule 108 in accordance with our ruling in Republic vs. Valencia provided that
the appropriate procedural requirements are complied with.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Br. 89.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Quiazon, Makalintal, Barot, Torres & Ibarra for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for public respondent.
PUNO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Order1 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 89, which dismissed motu proprio the petition of Ma. Lourdes Eleosida to
correct some entries in the birth certificate of her son, Charles Christian. The birth
certificate shows, among others, that the child's full name is Charles Christian Eleosida
Borbon. He was born on May 24, 1992 to Ma. Lourdes Barrientos Eleosida and Carlos
Villena Borbon. The birth certificate also indicates that the child's parents were married on
January 10, 1985 in Batangas City.2
On January 30, 1997, petitioner Ma. Lourdes Eleosida filed a petition before the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City seeking to correct the following entries in the birth certificate of
her son, Charles Christian: first, the surname "Borbon" should be changed to "Eleosida;"
second, the date of the parents' wedding should be left blank; and third, the informant's
of her petition, petitioner alleged that she gave birth to her son out of wedlock on May 24,
1992; that she and the boy's father, Carlos Borbon, were never married; and that the child is
therefore illegitimate and should follow the mother's surname. The petition impleaded the
Local Registrar of Quezon City and Carlos Villena Borbon as respondents. 3
On April 23, 1997, the trial court issued a notice of hearing stating:
"Verified petition having been filed by petitioner Ma. Lourdes Barrientos Eleosida, praying that the
entries in the Certificate of Live Birth of her minor child, Charles Christian Eleosida Borbon, be
changed and/or corrected, such that, his last name BORBON be deleted and instead place therein the
name ELEOSIDA, which is the surname of his mother-petitioner; the entry "January 10, 1985 –
Batangas City", be likewise deleted, since the petitioner and respondent Carlos Villena Borbon, at
the time of the minor's birth were not legally married; and the surname BORBON of petitioner Ma.
Lourdes E. Borbon under the column Informant, be also deleted;
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN, that this petition is set for hearing on June 26, 1997 at 8:30 o'clock in
the morning, in the Session Hall of this Court sitting at the Ground Floor, Room 118, Hall of Justice,
Quezon City, which is ordered published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks, in a newspaper
of general circulation and published in Metro Manila, to be selected by raffle, at the expense of the
petitioner, at which date, time and place, the petitioner shall appear and prove her petition, in that
all other persons having or claiming any interest thereon shall also appear and show cause why, if
any, they have, the petition shall not be granted.1âwphi1.nêt
Let copies of this notice be furnished the petitioner, and together with copies of the petition,
respondent Carlos Villena Borbon; the Offices of the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the
Solicitor General, who are given fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of
publication of such notice, within which to file their opposition thereto, if any. In the event that the
Solicitor General may not be able to appear on the scheduled hearing, to designate the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City to appear for and in behalf of the State.
SO ORDERED."4
On June 26, 1997, the trial court issued another order setting the date for the presentation
of evidence on July 23, 1997. It stated:
"Considering that there is no opposition filed despite notice to the Solicitor General as contained in
the notice of hearing dated April 23, 1997 requiring that office to file their opposition, if any, to the
petition for correction of entries in the birth certificate of minor child Charles Christian Eleosida, the
petitioner will be allowed to present compliance with the jurisdictional requirements and at the same
time initially present evidence on July 23, 1997, at 8:30 o'clock in the morning." 5
On August 25, 1997, the trial court motu proprio dismissed the petition for lack of merit. It
ruled:
"It is an established jurisprudence that, only CLERICAL ERRORS OF A HARMLESS AND
INNOCUOUS NATURE like: misspelled name, occupation of the parents, etc., may be the subject of
a judicial order (contemplated under Article 412 of the New Civil Code), authorizing changes or
corrections and: NOT as may affect the CIVIL STATUS, NATIONALITY OR CITIZENSHIP OF THE
PERSONS INVOLVED.
In the present case, it is very clear that the changes desired by the petitioner will ultimately affect
the CIVIL STATUS OF CHARLES CHRISTIAN, as she wants the Court to Direct the Civil Registrar
of Quezon City to substitute her maiden name, ELEOSIDA, with that of BORBON; to delete the
information supplied in ITEM 12, respecting the date and place of marriage of parents, on the
ground that she was never married to respondent CARLOS VILLENA BORBON and amend the
 information in ITEM 14, respecting the name of the informant, from MA. LOURDES E. BORBON to
MA. LOURDES B. ELEOSIDA, and is indicative of petitioner's intention and device to establish that
CHARLES CHRISTIAN's civil status as ILLEGITIMATE.
With the petition's ultimate purpose on the part of petitioner to secure judicial order, which would
authorize a change in the civil status of CHARLES CHRISTIAN, this Court, finds the action
improper. The matters desired to be cancelled and/or changed by petitioner cannot be considered
falling under the ambit of the words 'clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous nature.'
WHEREFORE, for LACK OF MERIT, the petition is now MOTU PROPIO (sic) dismissed." 6
Petitioner fled the instant petition for review raising the issue of whether corrections of
entries in the certificate of live birth pursuant to Article 412 of the Civil Code, in relation to
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court may be allowed even if the errors to be corrected are
substantial and not merely clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous nature. 7
The Court required the respondents to comment on the petition. The Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) filed a Manifestation in Lieu of Comment. The OSG submitted that even
substantial errors in the civil registry may be corrected provided that the parties aggrieved
by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. Thus it argued that
even if the petition seeks the correction and eventual change in the civil status of Charles
Christian, the same can be ordered by the court as long as all the parties who may be
affected by the entries are notified and represented. 8 Respondent Carlos Borbon, on the
other hand, failed to submit his comment on the petition despite several notices from this
Court. Hence, on January 24, 2001, the Court dispensed with the filing of respondent
Borbon's comment and gave due course to the petition.9
We find merit in the petition. Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court provides the procedure
for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry. The proceedings under said rule
may either be summary or adversary in nature. If the correction sought to be made in the
civil register is clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is summary. If the rectification
affects the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the
procedure to be adopted is adversary.10 This is our ruling in Republic vs. Valencia11 where
we held that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts
established under Rule 108 provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of
the appropriate adversary proceeding. An appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is one
where the trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and
properly developed, where opposing counsel have been given opportunity to demolish the
opposite party's case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and considered.
The Court further laid down the procedural requirements to make the proceedings under
Rule 108 adversary, thus:
"The pertinent sections of Rule 108 provide:
SEC. 3. Parties.—When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the
civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby
shall be made parties to the proceeding.1âwphi1.nêt
SEC. 4. Notice and publication.—Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order,
fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be
given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published
once in a week for three 93) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the
province.
SEC. 5. Opposition.—The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under
the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice, file
his opposition thereto.
Thus, the persons who must be made parties to a proceeding concerning the cancellation or
correction of an entry in the civil register are—(1) the civil registrar, and (2) all persons who have or
claim any interest which would be affected thereby. Upon the filing of the petition, it becomes the
duty of the court to—(1) issue an order fixing the time and place for the hearing of the petition, and
(2) cause the order for hearing to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in the province. The following are likewise entitled to oppose the
petition:--(1) the civil registrar, and (2) any person having or claiming any interest under the entry
whose cancellation or correction is sought.
If all these procedural requirements have been followed, a petition for correction and/or cancellation
of entries in the record of birth even if filed and conducted under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of
Court can no longer be described as 'summary'. xxx"12
It is true in the case at bar that the changes sought to be made by petitioner are not merely
clerical or harmless errors but substantial ones as they would affect the status of the
marriage between petitioner and Carlos Borbon, as well as the legitimacy of their son,
Charles Christian. Changes of such nature, however, are now allowed under Rule 108 in
accordance with our ruling in Republic vs. Valencia provided that the appropriate
procedural requirements are complied with. The records show that upon receipt of the
petition, the trial court issued a notice of hearing setting the hearing on June 26, 1997 at
8:30 in the morning at Room 118, Hall of Justice, Quezon City. The trial court likewise
ordered the publication of said notice once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation and its posting in selected places in Metro Manila. The
notice stated that the petitioner shall prove her petition during said hearing and all other
persons having or claiming any interest thereon shall also appear and show if there is any
reason why the petition should not be granted. Respondents Carlos Villena Borbon, the
Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the Solicitor General were all furnished with a
copy of the notice of hearing together with a copy of the petition. On June 26, 1997, the trial
court issued a second order giving the petitioner an opportunity to show compliance with
the jurisdictional requirements and to present evidence during the hearing set on July 23,
1997. The foregoing satisfy all the requirements of Rule 108 to make it an adversary
proceeding. It was therefore an error for the trial court to dismiss the petition motu
proprio without allowing the petitioner to present evidence to support her petition and all
the other persons who have an interest over the matter to oppose the same.1âwphi1.nêt
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED and the Order dated August 25, 1997 of
the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 89, subject of the petition at bar is set aside. The case
is REMANDED to the court a quo for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
 leaving to Rule 108 the correction of substantial changes in the civil registry in appropriate
G.R. No. 170340. June 29, 2007.*
adversarial proceedings.—The enactment in March 2001 of Republic Act No. 9048,
otherwise known as “AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE CITY OR MUNICIPAL CIVIL
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.CARLITO I. KHO, MICHAEL KHO,
REGISTRAR OR THE CONSUL GENERAL TO CORRECT A CLERICAL OR
MERCY NONA KHO-FORTUN, HEDDY MOIRA KHO-SERRANO, KEVIN DOGMOC KHO
TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR IN AN ENTRY AND/OR CHANGE OF FIRST NAME OR
(Minor), and KELLY DOGMOC KHO (Minor), respondents.
NICKNAME IN THE CIVIL REGISTER WITHOUT NEED OF JUDICIAL ORDER,” has
been considered to lend legislative affirmation to the judicial precedence that substantial
Civil Registry; Correction of Entries; Names; Citizenship; Marital Status; Substantial
corrections to the civil status of persons recorded in the civil registry may be effected
and controversial amendments in entries in the Civil Registry can only be granted in an
through the filing of a petition under Rule 108. Thus, this Court in Republic v. Benemerito,
adversary proceeding.—It can not be gainsaid that the petition, insofar as it sought to
425 SCRA 488 (2004), observed that the obvious effect of Republic Act No. 9048 is to make
change the citizenship of Carlito’s mother as it appeared in his birth certificate and delete
possible the administrative correction of clerical or typographical errors or change of first
the “married” status of Carlito’s parents in his and his siblings’ respective birth certificates,
name or nickname in entries in the civil register, leaving to Rule 108 the correction of
as well as change the date of marriage of Carlito and Marivel involves the correction of not
substantial changes in the civil registry in appropriate adversarial proceedings.
just clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous nature. Rather, the changes entail
substantial and controversial amendments. For the change involving the nationality of
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Parties; Publication of the order of hearing under
Carlito’s mother as reflected in his birth certificate is a grave and important matter that has
Section 4 of Rule 108 cures the failure to implead an indispensable party.—What surfaces as
a bear-ing and effect on the citizenship and nationality not only of the parents, but also of
an issue is whether the failure to implead Marivel and Carlito’s parents rendered the trial
the offspring. Further, the deletion of the entry that Carlito’s and his siblings’ parents were
short of the required adversary proceeding and the trial court’s judgment void. A similar
“married” alters their filiation from “legitimate” to “illegitimate,” with significant
issue was earlier raised in Barco v. Court of Appeals, 420 SCRA 162 (2004). That case
implications on their successional and other rights. Clearly, the changes sought can only be
stemmed from a petition for correction of entries in the birth certificate of a minor, June
granted in an adversary proceeding. Labayo-Rowe v. Republic, 168 SCRA 294 (1988),
Salvacion Maravilla, to reflect the name of her real father (Armando Gustilo) and to
explains the raison d’être: x x x. The philosophy behind this requirement lies in the fact that
correspondingly change her surname. The petition was granted by the trial court. Barco,
the books making up the civil register and all documents relating thereto shall be prima
whose minor daughter was allegedly fathered also by Gustilo, however, sought to annul the
facie evidence of the facts therein contained. If the entries in the civil register could be
trial court’s decision, claiming that she should have been made a party to the petition for
corrected or changed through mere summary proceedings and not through
correction. Failure to implead her deprived the RTC of jurisdiction, she contended. In
appropriate action wherein all parties who may be affected by the entries are
dismissing Barco’s petition, this Court held that the publication of the order of hearing
notified or represented, the door to fraud or other mischief would be set open, the
under Section 4 of Rule 108 cured the failure to implead an indispensable party.
consequence of which might be detrimental and far reaching.
Same; Same; Same; The cancellation or correction of entries involving changes of
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Even substantial errors in a
name falls under letter “o” of Section 2 of Rule 108; Even if the jurisdictional requirements of
civil registry may be corrected through a petition filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court;
Rule 103 (which governs petitions for change of name) were not complied with, observance of
“Adversary proceeding” has been defined as one having opposing parties, contested, as
the provisions of Rule 108 suffices to effect the correction sought for.—With respect to the
distinguished from an ex parte application, one of which the party seeking relief has given
correction in Carlito’s birth certificate of his name from “Carlito John” to “Carlito,” the same
legal warning to the other party, and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it.—
was properly granted under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. As correctly pointed out by the
In Republic v. Valencia, 141 SCRA 462 (1986), however, this Court ruled, and has since
CA, the cancellation or correction of entries involving changes of name falls under letter “o”
repeatedly ruled, that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected through a
of the following provision of Section 2 of Rule 108: Section 2. Entries subject to cancellation
petition filed under Rule 108. It is undoubtedly true that if the subject matter of a petition is
or correction.—Upon good and valid grounds, the following entries in the civil register may
not for the correction of clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous nature, but one
be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separation; (e)
involving nationality or citizenship, which is indisputably substantial as well as
judgments of annulment of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void from the
controverted, affirmative relief cannot be granted in a proceeding summary in
beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j)
nature. However, it is also true that a right in law may be enforced and a wrong
naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial
may be remedied as long as the appropriate remedy is used. This Court adheres to
determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of
the principle that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and
name. (Emphasis and italics supplied) Hence, while the jurisdictional requirements of Rule
the true facts established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail
103 (which governs petitions for change of name) were not complied with, observance of the
themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. x x x x What is meant by
provisions of Rule 108 suffices to effect the correction sought for.
“appropriate adversary proceeding?” Black’s Law Dictionary defines “adversary
proceeding[”] as follows: One having opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from an ex
Same; Same; Same; The correction of the name of the wife of one of the petitioners,
parte application, one of which the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other
from “Maribel” to “Marivel,” is appropriate, the mistake being clearly clerical or
party, and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it. x x x
typographical, which is not only visible to the eyes, but is also obvious to the understanding
considering that the name reflected in the marriage certificate is “Marivel.”—Outside the
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Republic Act No. 9048; The enactment in March
ambit of substantial corrections, of course, is the correction of the name of Carlito’s wife
2001 of R.A. No. 9048 has been considered to lend legislative affirmation to the judicial
from “Maribel” to “Marivel.” The mistake is clearly clerical or typographical, which is not
precedence that substantial corrections to the civil status of persons recorded in the civil
only visible to the eyes, but is also obvious to the understanding considering that the name
registry may be effected through the filing of a petition under Rule 108—the obvious effect of
reflected in the marriage certificate of Carlito and his wife is “Marivel.” Apropos is Yu v.
Republic Act No. 9048 is to make possible the administrative correction of clerical or
Republic, 21 SCRA 1018 (1967), which held that changing the appellant’s Christian name of
typographical errors or change of first name or nickname in entries in the civil register,
“Sincio” to “Sencio” amounts merely to the righting of a clerical error. The change of name
from Beatriz Labayo/Beatriz Labayu to Emperatriz Labayo was also held to be a mere
innocuous alteration, which can be granted through a summary proceeding. The same
ruling holds true with respect to the correction in Carlito’s marriage certificate of his
father’s name from “John Kho” to “Juan Kho.” Except in said marriage certificate, the name
“Juan Kho” was uniformly entered in the birth certificates of Carlito and of his siblings.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Dollfuss R. Go and Associates Law Offices for respondents.
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
Challenged via petition for review on certiorari is the October 27, 2005 Decision1 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 78124 which affirmed the September 4, 2002
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Butuan City, Branch 5 granting the prayer of
respondents Carlito I. Kho (Carlito), Michael Kho, Mercy Nona Kho-Fortun, and Heddy
Moira Kho-Serrano for the correction of entries in their birth certificates as well as those of
Carlito’s minor children Kevin and Kelly Dogmoc Kho.
The undisputed facts are as follows:
On February 12, 2001, Carlito and his siblings Michael, Mercy Nona and Heddy Moira filed
before the RTC of Butuan City a verified petition for correction of entries in the civil registry
of Butuan City to effect changes in their respective birth certificates. Carlito also asked the
court in behalf of his minor children, Kevin and Kelly, to order the correction of some entries
in their birth certificates.
In the case of Carlito, he requested the correction in his birth certificate of the citizenship of
his mother to "Filipino" instead of "Chinese," as well as the deletion of the word "married"
opposite the phrase "Date of marriage of parents" because his parents, Juan Kho and
Epifania Inchoco (Epifania), were allegedly not legally married.
The same request to delete the "married" status of their parents from their respective birth
certificates was made by Carlito’s siblings Michael, Mercy Nona, and Heddy Moira.
With respect to the birth certificates of Carlito’s children, he prayed that the date of his and
his wife’s marriage be corrected from April 27, 1989 to January 21, 2000, the date appearing
in their marriage certificate.
The Local Civil Registrar of Butuan City was impleaded as respondent.
On April 23, 2001, Carlito et al. filed an Amended Petition3 in which it was additionally
prayed that Carlito’s second name of "John" be deleted from his record of birth; and that the
name and citizenship of Carlito’s father in his (Carlito’s) marriage certificate be corrected
from "John Kho" to "Juan Kho" and "Filipino" to "Chinese," respectively.
As required, the petition was published for three consecutive weeks4 in Mindanao Daily
Patrol-CARAGA, a newspaper of general circulation, after which it was set for hearing on
August 9, 2001.
In a letter of June 18, 2001 addressed to the trial court, the city civil registrar 5 stated her
observations and suggestions to the proposed corrections in the birth records of Carlito and
his siblings but interposed no objections to the other amendments.
On the scheduled hearing of the petition on August 9, 2001, only the counsel for respondents
appeared as the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) had yet to enter its appearance for the
city civil registrar. The trial court thus reset the hearing to October 9, 2001. 6 On September
14, 2001,7 the OSG entered its appearance with an authorization to the city prosecutor of
Butuan City to appear in the case and render assistance to it (the OSG).
On January 31, 2002, respondents presented documentary evidence showing compliance
with the jurisdictional requirements of the petition. They also presented testimonial
evidence consisting of the testimonies of Carlito and his mother, Epifania. During the same
hearing, an additional correction in the birth certificates of Carlito’s children was requested
to the effect that the first name of their mother be rectified from "Maribel" to "Marivel."
By Decision8 of September 4, 2002, the trial court directed the local civil registrar of Butuan
City to correct the entries in the record of birth of Carlito, as follows: (1) change the
citizenship of his mother from "Chinese" to "Filipino"; (2) delete "John" from his name; and
(3) delete the word "married" opposite the date of marriage of his parents. The last
correction was ordered to be effected likewise in the birth certificates of respondents
Michael, Mercy Nona, and Heddy Moira.
Additionally, the trial court ordered the correction of the birth certificates of the minor
children of Carlito to reflect the date of marriage of Carlito and Marivel Dogmoc (Marivel)
as January 21, 2000, instead of April 27, 1989, and the name "Maribel" as "Marivel."
With respect to the marriage certificate of Carlito and Marivel, the corrections ordered
pertained to the alteration of the name of Carlito’s father from "John Kho" to "Juan Kho"
and the latter’s citizenship from "Filipino" to "Chinese."
Petitioner, Republic of the Philippines, appealed the RTC Decision to the CA, faulting the
trial court in granting the petition for correction of entries in the subject documents despite
the failure of respondents to implead the minors’ mother, Marivel, as an indispensable party
and to offer sufficient evidence to warrant the corrections with regard to the questioned
"married" status of Carlito and his siblings’ parents, and the latter’s citizenship.
Petitioner also faulted the trial court for ordering the change of the name "Carlito John
Kho" to "Carlito Kho" for non-compliance with jurisdictional requirements for a change of
name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.
By the assailed Decision of October 27, 2005, the CA denied petitioner’s appeal and affirmed
the decision of the trial court.
The CA found that Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court, which outlines the proper
procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry, was observed in the
case.
Regarding Carlito’s minor children Kevin and Kelly, the appellate court held that the
correction of their mother’s first name from "Maribel" to "Marivel" was made to rectify an
innocuous error.
As for the change in the date of the marriage of Carlito and Marivel, albeit the CA conceded
that it is a substantial alteration, it held that the date would not affect the minors’ filiation
from "legitimate" to "illegitimate" considering that at the time of their respective births in
1991 and 1993, their father Carlito’s first marriage was still subsisting as it had been
annulled only in 1999.
In light of Carlito’s legal impediment to marry Marivel at the time they were born, their
children Kevin and Kelly were illegitimate. It followed, the CA went on to state, that
Marivel was not an indispensable party to the case, the minors having been represented by
their father as required under Section 5 of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Further, the CA ruled that although Carlito failed to observe the requirements of Rule 103
of the Rules of Court, he had complied nonetheless with the jurisdictional requirements for
correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The petition
for correction of entry in Carlito’s birth record, it noted, falls under letter "o" of the
enumeration under Section 2 of Rule 108.
In the present petition, petitioner contends that since the changes sought by respondents
were substantial in nature, they could only be granted through an adversarial proceeding in
which indispensable parties, such as Marivel and respondents’ parents, should have been
notified or impleaded.
Petitioner further contends that the jurisdictional requirements to change Carlito’s name
under Section 2 of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court were not satisfied because the Amended
Petition failed to allege Carlito’s prior three-year bona fide residence in Butuan City, and
that the title of the petition did not state Carlito’s aliases and his true name as "Carlito
John I. Kho." Petitioner concludes that the same jurisdictional defects attached to the
change of name of Carlito’s father.
The petition fails.
It can not be gainsaid that the petition, insofar as it sought to change the citizenship of
Carlito’s mother as it appeared in his birth certificate and delete the "married" status of
Carlito’s parents in his and his siblings’ respective birth certificates, as well as change the
date of marriage of Carlito and Marivel involves the correction of not just clerical errors of a
harmless and innocuous nature.10 Rather, the changes entail substantial and controversial
amendments.
For the change involving the nationality of Carlito’s mother as reflected in his birth
certificate is a grave and important matter that has a bearing and effect on the citizenship
and nationality not only of the parents, but also of the offspring.11
Further, the deletion of the entry that Carlito’s and his siblings’ parents were "married"
alters their filiation from "legitimate" to "illegitimate," with significant implications on their
successional and other rights.
Clearly, the changes sought can only be granted in an adversary proceeding. Labayo-Rowe
v. Republic12 explains the raison d etre:
x x x. The philosophy behind this requirement lies in the fact that the books making up the
civil register and all documents relating thereto shall be prima facie evidence of the facts
therein contained. If the entries in the civil register could be corrected or changed through
mere summary proceedings and not through appropriate action wherein all parties who may
be affected by the entries are notified or represented, the door to fraud or other mischief
would be set open, the consequence of which might be detrimental and far reaching. x x x
(Emphasis supplied)
In Republic v. Valencia,13 however, this Court ruled, and has since repeatedly ruled, that
even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected through a petition filed under
Rule 108.14
It is undoubtedly true that if the subject matter of a petition is not for the correction of
clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous nature, but one involving nationality or
citizenship, which is indisputably substantial as well as controverted, affirmative relief
cannot be granted in a proceeding summary in nature. However, it is also true that a right
in law may be enforced and a wrong may be remedied as long as the appropriate remedy is
used. This Court adheres to the principle that even substantial errors in a civil registry may
be corrected and the true facts established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail
themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding.
xxxx
What is meant by "appropriate adversary proceeding?" Black’s Law Dictionary defines
"adversary proceeding["] as follows:
One having opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from an ex parte application, one
of which the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party, and afforded
the latter an opportunity to contest it. x x x 15(Emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)
The enactment in March 2001 of Republic Act No. 9048, otherwise known as "An Act
Authorizing the City or Municipal Civil Registrar or the Consul General to Correct a
Clerical or Typographical Error in an Entry and/or Change of First Name or Nickname in
the Civil Register Without Need of Judicial Order," has been considered to lend legislative
affirmation to the judicial precedence that substantial corrections to the civil status of
persons recorded in the civil registry may be effected through the filing of a petition under
Rule 108.16
Thus, this Court in Republic v. Benemerito17 observed that the obvious effect of Republic Act
No. 9048 is to make possible the administrative correction of clerical or typographical errors
or change of first name or nickname in entries in the civil register, leaving to Rule 108 the
correction of substantial changes in the civil registry in appropriate adversarial proceedings.
When all the procedural requirements under Rule 108 are thus followed, the appropriate
adversary proceeding necessary to effect substantial corrections to the entries of the civil
register is satisfied.18 The pertinent provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court read:
SEC. 3. Parties. – When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil registrar is sought,
the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected
thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and publication. — Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an
order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice
thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order xxxx
to be published once in a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation in the province.
The purpose precisely of Section 4, Rule 108 is to bind the whole world to the subsequent
judgment on the petition. The sweep of the decision would cover even parties who should
SEC. 5. Opposition. — The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any have been impleaded under Section 3, Rule 108, but were inadvertently left out. x x x
interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15)
days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice, file his
xxxx
opposition thereto. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Verily, a petition for correction is an action in rem, an action against a thing and not against
There is no dispute that the trial court’s Order19 setting the petition for hearing and
a person. The decision on the petition binds not only the parties thereto but the whole world.
directing any person or entity having interest in the petition to oppose it was posted20 as
An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication. Publication is notice to
well as published for the required period; that notices of hearings were duly served on the
the whole world that the proceeding has for its object to bar indefinitely all who might be
Solicitor General, the city prosecutor of Butuan and the local civil registrar; and that trial
minded to make an objection of any sort against the right sought to be established. It is the
was conducted on January 31, 2002 during which the public prosecutor, acting in behalf of
publication of such notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the case and vests the
the OSG, actively participated by cross-examining Carlito and Epifania.
court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it.22

What surfaces as an issue is whether the failure to implead Marivel and Carlito’s parents
Given the above ruling, it becomes unnecessary to rule on whether Marivel or respondents’
rendered the trial short of the required adversary proceeding and the trial court’s judgment
parents should have been impleaded as parties to the proceeding. It may not be amiss to
void.
mention, however, that during the hearing on January 31, 2002, the city prosecutor who
was acting as representative of the OSG did not raise any objection to the non-inclusion of
A similar issue was earlier raised in Barco v. Court of Appeals. 21 That case stemmed from a Marivel and Carlito’s parents as parties to the proceeding.
petition for correction of entries in the birth certificate of a minor, June Salvacion Maravilla,
to reflect the name of her real father (Armando Gustilo) and to correspondingly change her
Parenthetically, it seems highly improbable that Marivel was unaware of the proceedings to
surname. The petition was granted by the trial court.
correct the entries in her children’s birth certificates, especially since the notices, orders and
decision of the trial court eHe were all sent to the residence 23 she shared with Carlito and
Barco, whose minor daughter was allegedly fathered also by Gustilo, however, sought to the children.
annul the trial court’s decision, claiming that she should have been made a party to the
petition for correction. Failure to implead her deprived the RTC of jurisdiction, she
It is also well to remember that the role of the court in hearing a petition to correct certain
contended.
entries in the civil registry is to ascertain the truth about the facts recorded therein. 24

In dismissing Barco’s petition, this Court held that the publication of the order of hearing
under Section 4 of Rule 108 cured the failure to implead an indispensable party.
The essential requisite for allowing substantial corrections of entries in the civil registry is
that the true facts be established in an appropriate adversarial proceeding. This is embodied
in Section 3, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, which states:
Section 3. Parties. – When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is
sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be
affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.
xxxx
Undoubtedly, Barco is among the parties referred to in Section 3 of Rule 108. Her interest
was affected by the petition for correction, as any judicial determination that June was the
daughter of Armando would affect her ward’s share in the estate of her father. x x x.
With respect to the date of marriage of Carlito and Marivel, their certificate of
marriage25 shows that indeed they were married on January 21, 2000, not on April 27, 1989.
Explaining the error, Carlito declared that the date "April 27, 1989" was supplied by his
helper, adding that he was not married to Marivel at the time his sons were born because
his previous marriage was annulled only in 1999.26 Given the evidence presented by
respondents, the CA observed that the minors were illegitimate at birth, hence, the
correction would bring about no change at all in the nature of their filiation.
With respect to Carlito’s mother, it bears noting that she declared at the witness stand that
she was not married to Juan Kho who died in 1959. 27 Again, that testimony was not
challenged by the city prosecutor.
The documentary evidence supporting the deletion from Carlito’s and his siblings’ birth
certificates of the entry "Married" opposite the date of marriage of their parents, moreover,
consisted of a certification issued on November 24, 1973 by St. Joseph (Butuan City) Parish
priest Eugene van Vught stating that Juan Kho and Epifania had been living together as
common law couple since 1935 but have never contracted marriage legally.28

Yet, even though Barco was not impleaded in the petition, the Court of Appeals correctly
A certification from the office of the city registrar, which was appended to respondents’
pointed out that the defect was cured by compliance with Section 4, Rule 108, which
Amended Petition, likewise stated that it has no record of marriage between Juan Kho and
requires notice by publication x x x.
Epifania.29 Under the circumstances, the deletion of the word "Married" opposite the "date SO ORDERED.
of marriage of parents" is warranted.

With respect to the correction in Carlito’s birth certificate of his name from "Carlito John" to
"Carlito," the same was properly granted under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. As correctly
pointed out by the CA, the cancellation or correction of entries involving changes of name
falls under letter "o" of the following provision of Section 2 of Rule 108: 30

Section 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. — Upon good and valid grounds, the
following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages;
(c) deaths; (d) legal separation; (e) judgments of annulment of marriage; (f) judgments
declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i)
acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of
citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes ofname. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Hence, while the jurisdictional requirements of Rule 103 (which governs petitions for
change of name) were not complied with, observance of the provisions of Rule 108 suffices to
effect the correction sought for.

More importantly, Carlito’s official transcript of record from the Urious College in Butuan
City,31 certificate of eligibility from the Civil Service Commission,32 and voter registration
record33 satisfactorily show that he has been known by his first name only. No prejudice is
thus likely to arise from the dropping of the second name.

The correction of the mother’s citizenship from Chinese to Filipino as appearing in Carlito’s
birth record was also proper. Of note is the fact that during the cross examination by the
city prosecutor of Epifania, he did not deem fit to question her citizenship. Such failure to
oppose the correction prayed for, which certainly was not respondents’ fault, does not in any
way change the adversarial nature of the proceedings.

Also significant to note is that the birth certificates of Carlito’s siblings uniformly stated the
citizenship of Epifania as "Filipino." To disallow the correction in Carlito’s birth record of his
mother’s citizenship would perpetuate an inconsistency in the natal circumstances of the
siblings who are unquestionably born of the same mother and father.

Outside the ambit of substantial corrections, of course, is the correction of the name of
Carlito’s wife from "Maribel" to "Marivel." The mistake is clearly clerical or typographical,
which is not only visible to the eyes, but is also obvious to the understanding 34 considering
that the name reflected in the marriage certificate of Carlito and his wife is "Marivel."

Apropos is Yu v. Republic35 which held that changing the appellant’s Christian name of
"Sincio" to "Sencio" amounts merely to the righting of a clerical error. The change of name
from Beatriz Labayo/Beatriz Labayu to Emperatriz Labayo was also held to be a mere
innocuous alteration, which can be granted through a summary proceeding. 36The same
ruling holds true with respect to the correction in Carlito’s marriage certificate of his
father’s name from "John Kho" to "Juan Kho." Except in said marriage certificate, the name
"Juan Kho" was uniformly entered in the birth certificates of Carlito and of his siblings. 37

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is

AFFIRMED.

G.R. No. 159966. March 30, 2005.*
IN RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME AND/OR CORRECTION/CANCELLATION
OF ENTRY IN CIVIL REGISTRY OF JULIAN LIN CARULASAN WANG also known as
JULIAN LIN WANG, to be amended/corrected as JULIAN LIN WANG, JULIAN LIN
WANG, duly represented by his mother ANNA LISA WANG, petitioner, vs. CEBU CITY
CIVIL REGISTRAR, duly represented by the Registrar OSCAR B. MOLO, respondent.
Civil Registry; Change of Name; Before a person can be authorized to change his name
given him either in his certificate of birth or civil registry, he must show proper or reasonable
cause, or any compelling reason which may justify such change.—The Court has had
occasion to express the view that the State has an interest in the names borne by
individuals and entities for purposes of identification, and that a change of name is a
privilege and not a right, so that before a person can be authorized to change his name given
him either in his certificate of birth or civil registry, he must show proper or reasonable
cause, or any compelling reason which may justify such change. Otherwise, the request
should be denied.
Same; Same; Grounds Held Valid for a Change of Name.—Among the grounds for
change of name which have been held valid are: (a) when the name is ridiculous,
dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a
legal consequence, as in legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one
has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was
unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of
former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the
surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name
was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest.
Same; Same; It is best that the matter of change of his name be left to his judgment
and discretion when he reaches the age of major-ity.—In addition, petitioner is only a minor.
Considering the nebulous foundation on which his petition for change of name is based, it is
best that the matter of change of his name be left to his judgment and discretion when he
reaches the age of majority. As he is of tender age, he may not yet understand and
appreciate the value of the change of his name and granting of the same at this point may
just prejudice him in his rights under our laws.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Br.
57.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Magdalena M.R. Lepiten for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondent.
TINGA, J.:
I will not blot out his name out of the book of life.
Revelation 3:5
On 22 September 2002, petitioner Julian Lin Carulasan Wang, a minor, represented by his
mother Anna Lisa Wang, filed a petition dated 19 September 2002 for change of name
and/or correction/cancellation of entry in the Civil Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang.
Petitioner sought to drop his middle name and have his registered name changed from
Julian Lin Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin Wang.
The petition was docketed as Special Proceedings Case No. 11458 CEB and raffled to the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 57.
The RTC established the following facts:
Julian Lin Carulasan Wang was born in Cebu City on February 20, 1998 to parents Anna
Lisa Wang and Sing-Foe Wang who were then not yet married to each other. When his
parents subsequently got married on September 22, 1998, ...they executed a deed of
legitimation of their son so that the child’s name was changed from Julian Lin Carulasan to
Julian Lin Carulasan Wang….
The parents of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang plan to stay in Singapore for a long time because
they will let him study there together with his sister named Wang Mei Jasmine who was
born in Singapore…. Since in Singapore middle names or the maiden surname of the mother
are not carried in a person’s name, they anticipate that Julian Lin Carulasan Wang will be
discriminated against because of his current registered name which carries a middle name.
Julian and his sister might also be asking whether they are brother and sister since they
have different surnames. Carulasan sounds funny in Singapore’s Mandarin language since
they do not have the letter "R" but if there is, they pronounce it as "L." It is for these reasons
that the name of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang is requested to be changed to Julian Lin
Wang.1
On 30 April 2003, the RTC rendered a decision denying the petition. 2 The trial court found
that the reason given for the change of name sought in the petition—that is, that petitioner
Julian may be discriminated against when studies in Singapore because of his middle
name—did not fall within the grounds recognized by law. The trial court ruled that the
change sought is merely for the convenience of the child. Since the State has an interest in
the name of a person, names cannot be changed to suit the convenience of the bearers.
Under Article 174 of the Family Code, legitimate children have the right to bear the
surnames of the father and the mother, and there is no reason why this right should now be
taken from petitioner Julian, considering that he is still a minor. The trial court added that
when petitioner Julian reaches the age of majority, he could then decide whether he will
change his name by dropping his middle name.3
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision but this was denied in a
resolution dated 20 May 2004.4The trial court maintained that the Singaporean practice of
not carrying a middle name does not justify the dropping of the middle name of a legitimate
Filipino child who intends to study there. The dropping of the middle name would be
tantamount to giving due recognition to or application of the laws of Singapore instead of
Philippine law which is controlling. That the change of name would not prejudice public
interest or would not be for a fraudulent purpose would not suffice to grant the petition if
the reason for the change of name is itself not reasonable.5
Petitioner then filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari (Under Rule 45)6 arguing that the
trial court has decided a question of substance not theretofore determined by the Court, that
is: whether or not dropping the middle name of a minor child is contrary to Article 174 7 of
the Family Code. Petitioner contends that "[W]ith globalization and mixed marriages, there
is a need for the Supreme Court to rule on the matter of dropping of family name for a child
to adjust to his new environment, for consistency and harmony among siblings, taking into
consideration the "best interest of the child."8 It is argued that convenience of the child is a
valid reason for changing the name as long as it will not prejudice the State and others.
Petitioner points out that the middle name "Carulasan" will cause him undue
embarrassment and the difficulty in writing or pronouncing it will be an obstacle to his
social acceptance and integration in the Singaporean community. Petitioner also alleges
that it is error for the trial court to have denied the petition for change of name until he had
reached the age of majority for him to decide the name to use, contrary to previous
cases9 decided by this Court that allowed a minor to petition for change of name. 10
The Court required the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to comment on the petition.
The OSG filed its Comment11 positing that the trial court correctly denied the petition for
change of name. The OSG argues that under Article 174 of the Family Code, legitimate
children have the right to bear the surnames of their father and mother, and such right
cannot be denied by the mere expedient of dropping the same. According to the OSG, there
is also no showing that the dropping of the middle name "Carulasan" is in the best interest
of petitioner, since mere convenience is not sufficient to support a petition for change of
name and/or cancellation of entry.12 The OSG also adds that the petitioner has not shown
any compelling reason to justify the change of name or the dropping of the middle name, for
that matter. Petitioner’s allegation that the continued use of the middle name may result in
confusion and difficulty is allegedly more imaginary than real. The OSG reiterates its
argument raised before the trial court that the dropping of the child’s middle name could
only trigger much deeper inquiries regarding the true parentage of petitioner. Hence, while
petitioner Julian has a sister named Jasmine Wei Wang, there is no confusion since both
use the surname of their father, Wang. Even assuming that it is customary in Singapore to
drop the middle name, it has also not been shown that the use of such middle name is
actually proscribed by Singaporean law.13
We affirm the decision of the trial court. The petition should be denied.
The Court has had occasion to express the view that the State has an interest in the names
borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification, and that a change of name is
a privilege and not a right, so that before a person can be authorized to change his name
given him either in his certificate of birth or civil registry, he must show proper or
reasonable cause, or any compelling reason which may justify such change. Otherwise, the
request should be denied.14
The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there be ‘proper and reasonable
cause’ for which the change is sought.15 To justify a request for change of name, petitioner
must show not only some proper or compelling reason therefore but also that he will be
prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. Among the grounds for change of name
which have been held valid are: (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely
difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence, as in
legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used
and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage;
(e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good
faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment
and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or
that the change of name would prejudice public interest.16
In granting or denying petitions for change of name, the question of proper and reasonable
cause is left to the sound discretion of the court. The evidence presented need only be
satisfactory to the court and not all the best evidence available. What is involved is not a
mere matter of allowance or disallowance of the request, but a judicious evaluation of the
sufficiency and propriety of the justifications advanced in support thereof, mindful of the
consequent results in the event of its grant and with the sole prerogative for making such
determination being lodged in the courts.17
The petition before us is unlike other petitions for change of name, as it does not simply
seek to change the name of the minor petitioner and adopt another, but instead seeks to
drop the middle name altogether. Decided cases in this jurisdiction involving petitions for
change of name usually deal with requests for change of surname. There are only a handful
of cases involving requests for change of the given name 18 and none on requests for changing
or dropping of the middle name. Does the law allow one to drop the middle name from his
registered name? We have to answer in the negative.
A discussion on the legal significance of a person’s name is relevant at this point. We quote,
thus:
…For all practical and legal purposes, a man's name is the designation by which he is
known and called in the community in which he lives and is best known. It is defined as the
word or combination of words by which a person is distinguished from other individuals and,
also, as the label or appellation which he bears for the convenience of the world at large
addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with him. Names are used merely as one
method of indicating the identity of persons; they are descriptive of persons for
identification, since, the identity is the essential thing and it has frequently been held that,
when identity is certain, a variance in, or misspelling of, the name is immaterial.
The names of individuals usually have two parts: the given name or proper name, and the
surname or family name. The given or proper name is that which is given to the individual
at birth or baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals. The name or family name is
that which identifies the family to which he belongs and is continued from parent to child.
The given name may be freely selected by the parents for the child; but the surname to
which the child is entitled is fixed by law.
A name is said to have the following characteristics: (1) It is absolute, intended to protect
the individual from being confused with others. (2) It is obligatory in certain respects, for
nobody can be without a name. (3) It is fixed, unchangeable, or immutable, at least at the
start, and may be changed only for good cause and by judicial proceedings. (4) It is outside
the commerce of man, and, therefore, inalienable and intransmissible by act inter vivos or
mortis causa. (5) It is imprescriptible.19
This citation does not make any reference to middle names, but this does not mean that
middle names have no practical or legal significance. Middle names serve to identify the
maternal lineage or filiation of a person as well as further distinguish him from others who
may have the same given name and surname as he has.
Our laws on the use of surnames state that legitimate and legitimated children shall
principally use the surname of the father.20 The Family Code gives legitimate children the
right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother, 21 while illegitimate children shall
use the surname of their mother, unless their father recognizes their filiation, in which case
they may bear the father’s surname.22
Applying these laws, an illegitimate child whose filiation is not recognized by the father
bears only a given name and his mother’s surname, and does not have a middle name. The
name of the unrecognized illegitimate child therefore identifies him as such. It is only when
the illegitimate child is legitimated by the subsequent marriage of his parents or
acknowledged by the father in a public document or private handwritten instrument that he
bears both his mother’s surname as his middle name and his father’s surname as his
surname, reflecting his status as a legitimated child or an acknowledged illegitimate child.
Accordingly, the registration in the civil registry of the birth of such individuals requires
that the middle name be indicated in the certificate. The registered name of a legitimate,
legitimated and recognized illegitimate child thus contains a given or proper name, a middle
name, and a surname.
Petitioner theorizes that it would be for his best interest to drop his middle name as this
would help him to adjust more easily to and integrate himself into Singaporean society. In
support, he cites Oshita v. Republic23 and Calderon v. Republic,24 which, however, are not
apropos both.
In Oshita, the petitioner therein, a legitimate daughter of a Filipino mother, Buena
Bartolome, and a Japanese father, Kishimatsu Oshita, sought to change her name from
Antonina B. Oshita to Antonina Bartolome. The Court granted her petition based on the
following considerations: she had elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority; her other siblings who had also elected Philippine citizenship have been using
their mother’s surname; she was embarrassed to bear a Japanese surname there still being
ill feeling against the Japanese due to the last World War; and there was no showing that
the change of name was motivated by a fraudulent purpose or that it will prejudice public
interest.
The factual antecedents and unique circumstances of the cited cases are not at all analogous
to the case at bar. The instant case is clearly distinguishable from the cases
of Oshita and Alfon, where the petitioners were already of age when they filed their
petitions for change of name. Being of age, they are considered to have exercised their
discretion and judgment, fully knowing the effects of their decision to change their
surnames. It can also be unmistakably observed that the reason for the grant of the
petitions for change of name in these two cases was the presence of reasonable or compelling
grounds therefore. The Court, in Oshita, recognized the tangible animosity most Filipinos
had during that time against the Japanese as a result of World War II, in addition to the
fact of therein petitioner’s election of Philippine citizenship. In Alfon, the Court granted the
petition since the petitioner had been known since childhood by a name different from her
registered name and she had not used her registered name in her school records and voter’s
registration records; thus, denying the petition would only result to confusion.
Calderon, on the other hand, granted the petition for change of name filed by a mother in
behalf of her illegitimate minor child. Petitioner cites this case to buttress his argument
that he does not have to reach the age of majority to petition for change of name. However,
it is manifest in Calderon that the Court, in granting the petition for change of name, gave
paramount consideration to the best interests of the minor petitioner therein.
In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping his middle name
is convenience. However, how such change of name would make his integration into
Singaporean society easier and convenient is not clearly established. That the continued use
of his middle name would cause confusion and difficulty does not constitute proper and
reasonable cause to drop it from his registered complete name.

In Calderon, the Court allowed petitioner Gertrudes Josefina del Prado, an illegitimate
In addition, petitioner is only a minor. Considering the nebulous foundation on which his
minor child acting through her mother who filed the petition in her behalf, to change her
petition for change of name is based, it is best that the matter of change of his name be left
name to Gertudes Josefina Calderon, taking the surname of her stepfather, Romeo C.
to his judgment and discretion when he reaches the age of majority. 26 As he is of tender age,
Calderon, her mother’s husband. The Court held that a petition for change of name of an
he may not yet understand and appreciate the value of the change of his name and granting
infant should be granted where to do is clearly for the best interest of the child. The Court
of the same at this point may just prejudice him in his rights under our laws.
took into consideration the opportunity provided for the minor petitioner to eliminate the
stigma of illegitimacy which she would carry if she continued to use the surname of her
illegitimate father. The Court pronounced that justice dictates that every person be allowed WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED.
to avail of any opportunity to improve his social standing as long as doing so he does not
cause prejudice or injury to the interests of the State or of other people.
SO ORDERED.

Petitioner cites Alfon v. Republic,25 in arguing that although Article 174 of the Family Code
gives the legitimate child the right to use the surnames of the father and the mother, it is
not mandatory such that the child could use only one family name, even the family name of
the mother. In Alfon, the petitioner therein, the legitimate daughter of Filomeno Duterte
and Estrella Alfon, sought to change her name from Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva
Duterte (her name as registered in the Local Civil Registry) to Estrella S. Alfon (the name
she had been using since childhood, in her school records and in her voter’s registration).
The trial court denied her petition but this Court overturned the denial, ruling that while
Article 364 of the Civil Code states that she, as a legitimate child, should principally use the
surname of her father, there is no legal obstacle for her to choose to use the surname of
herm other to which she is entitled. In addition, the Court found that there was ample
justification to grant her petition, i.e., to avoid confusion.

Weighing petitioner’s reason of convenience for the change of his name against the
standards set in the cases he cites to support his contention would show that his
justification is amorphous, to say the least, and could not warrant favorable action on his
petition.
 G.R. No. 181174. December 4, 2009.*
MA. CRISTINA TORRES BRAZA, PAOLO JOSEF T. BRAZA and JANELLE ANN T.
BRAZA, petitioners, vs.THE CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR OF HIMAMAYLAN CITY, NEGROS
OCCIDENTAL, minor PATRICK ALVIN TITULAR BRAZA, represented by LEON
TITULAR, CECILIA TITULAR and LUCILLE C. TITULAR, respondents.
Civil Registry; Correction of Entry; In a special proceeding for correction of entry
under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Original Registry), the trial
court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages and rule on legitimacy and filiation.—In a
special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of
Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages and
rule on legitimacy and filiation. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court vis-à-vis Article 412 of the
Civil Code charts the procedure by which an entry in the civil registry may be cancelled or
corrected. The proceeding contemplated therein may generally be used only to correct
clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil registry. A clerical
error is one which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding; an error made by a
clerk or a transcriber; a mistake in copying or writing, or a harmless change such as a
correction of name that is clearly misspelled or of a misstatement of the occupation of the
parent. Substantial or contentious alterations may be allowed only in adversarial
proceedings, in which all interested parties are impleaded and due process is properly
observed.
Same; Same; Marriages; Declaration of Nullity of Marriage; Filiation; Jurisdiction;
Doctrinally, validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only
in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through collateral attack; An
action seeking the declaration of marriage as void for being bigamous and one impugning a
child’s legitimacy are governed not by Rule 108 but by A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and Art. 171 of
the Family Code, respectively, and the petition should be filed in a Family Court.—The
allegations of the petition filed before the trial court clearly show that petitioners seek to
nullify the marriage between Pablo and Lucille on the ground that it is bigamous and
impugn Patrick’s filiation in connection with which they ask the court to order Patrick to be
subjected to a DNA test. Petitioners insist, however, that the main cause of action is for the
correction of Patrick’s birth records and that the rest of the prayers are merely incidental
thereto. Petitioners’ position does not lie. Their cause of action is actually to seek the
declaration of Pablo and Lucille’s marriage as void for being bigamous and impugn Patrick’s
legitimacy, which causes of action are governed not by Rule 108 but by A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC which took effect on March 15, 2003, and Art. 171 of the Family Code, respectively,
hence, the petition should be filed in a Family Court as expressly provided in said Code. It is
well to emphasize that, doctrinally, validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation
can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not
through collateral attack such as the petition filed before the court a quo.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Japhet T. Masculino for petitioners.
Jerry P. Basiao for respondents.
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Petitioner Ma. Cristina Torres (Ma. Cristina) and Pablo Sicad Braza, Jr. (Pablo), also known
as "Pablito Sicad Braza," were married1 on January 4, 1978. The union bore Ma. Cristina’s
co-petitioners Paolo Josef2 and Janelle Ann3 on May 8, 1978 and June 7, 1983, respectively,
and Gian Carlo4 on June 4, 1980.
Pablo died5 on April 15, 2002 in a vehicular accident in Bandung, West Java, Indonesia.
During the wake following the repatriation of his remains to the Philippines, respondent
Lucille Titular (Lucille) began introducing her co-respondent minor Patrick Alvin Titular
Braza (Patrick) as her and Pablo's son. Ma. Cristina thereupon made inquiries in the course
of which she obtained Patrick's birth certificate6 from the Local Civil Registrar of
Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental with the following entries:
Name of Child : PATRICK ALVIN CELESTIAL TITULAR
Date of Birth : 01 January 1996
Mother : Lucille Celestial Titular
Father : Pablito S. Braza
Date Received at the Local January 13, 1997
Civil Registrar :
Annotation : "Late Registration"
Annotation/Remarks : "Acknowledge (sic) by the father Pablito Braza on January 13, 1997"
Remarks : Legitimated by virtue of subsequent marriage of parents on April 22,
1998 at Manila. Henceforth, the child shall be known as Patrick Alvin
Titular Braza (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Ma. Cristina likewise obtained a copy7 of a marriage contract showing that Pablo and
Lucille were married on April 22, 1998, drawing her and her co-petitioners to file on
December 23, 2005 before the Regional Trial Court of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental
a petition8 to correct the entries in the birth record of Patrick in the Local Civil Register.
Contending that Patrick could not have been legitimated by the supposed marriage between
Lucille and Pablo, said marriage being bigamous on account of the valid and subsisting
marriage between Ma. Cristina and Pablo, petitioners prayed for (1) the correction of the
entries in Patrick's birth record with respect to his legitimation, the name of the father and
his acknowledgment, and the use of the last name "Braza"; 2) a directive to Leon, Cecilia
and Lucille, all surnamed Titular, as guardians of the minor Patrick, to submit Parick to
DNA testing to determine his paternity and filiation; and 3) the declaration of nullity of the
legitimation of Patrick as stated in his birth certificate and, for this purpose, the declaration
of the marriage of Lucille and Pablo as bigamous.
On Patrick’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, the trial court, by Order 9 of
September 6, 2007, dismissed the petition without prejudice, it holding that in a special
proceeding for correction of entry, the court, which is not acting as a family court under the
Family Code, has no jurisdiction over an action to annul the marriage of Lucille and Pablo,
impugn the legitimacy of Patrick, and order Patrick to be subjected to a DNA test, hence,
the controversy should be ventilated in an ordinary adversarial action.
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration having been denied by Order 10 of November 29, 2007,
they filed the present petition for review.
Petitioners maintain that the court a quo may pass upon the validity of marriage and
questions on legitimacy even in an action to correct entries in the civil registrar.
Citing Cariño v. Cariño,11 Lee v. Court of Appeals12 and Republic v. Kho,13 they contend that
even substantial errors, such as those sought to be corrected in the present case, can be the
subject of a petition under Rule 108.14
The petition fails. In a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108
(Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has no
jurisdiction to nullify marriages and rule on legitimacy and filiation.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court vis a vis Article 412 of the Civil Code15 charts the procedure
by which an entry in the civil registry may be cancelled or corrected. The proceeding
contemplated therein may generally be used only to correct clerical, spelling, typographical
and other innocuous errors in the civil registry. A clerical error is one which is visible to the
eyes or obvious to the understanding; an error made by a clerk or a transcriber; a mistake in
copying or writing, or a harmless change such as a correction of name that is clearly
misspelled or of a misstatement of the occupation of the parent. Substantial or contentious
alterations may be allowed only in adversarial proceedings, in which all interested parties
are impleaded and due process is properly observed.16
the petitioners and Keh Shiok Cheng. That is why the Court ordered the cancellation of the
name of Keh Shiok Cheng as the petitioners’ mother and the substitution thereof with "Tiu
Chuan" who is their biological mother. Thus, the collateral attack was allowed and the
petition deemed as adversarial proceeding contemplated under Rule 108.
In Republic v. Kho, it was the petitioners themselves who sought the correction of the
entries in their respective birth records to reflect that they were illegitimate and that their
citizenship is "Filipino," not Chinese, because their parents were never legally married.
Again, considering that the changes sought to be made were substantial and not merely
innocuous, the Court, finding the proceedings under Rule 108 to be adversarial in nature,
upheld the lower court’s grant of the petition.
It is thus clear that the facts in the above-cited cases are vastly different from those
obtaining in the present case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

The allegations of the petition filed before the trial court clearly show that petitioners seek
to nullify the marriage between Pablo and Lucille on the ground that it is bigamous and
impugn Patrick’s filiation in connection with which they ask the court to order Patrick to be
subjected to a DNA test.

Petitioners insist, however, that the main cause of action is for the correction of Patrick’s
birth records17 and that the rest of the prayers are merely incidental thereto.

Petitioners’ position does not lie. Their cause of action is actually to seek the declaration of
Pablo and Lucille’s marriage as void for being bigamous and impugn Patrick’s legitimacy,
which causes of action are governed not by Rule 108 but by A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which
took effect on March 15, 2003, and Art. 17118 of the Family Code, respectively, hence, the
petition should be filed in a Family Court as expressly provided in said Code.1avvphi1

It is well to emphasize that, doctrinally, validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and

filiation can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and
not through collateral attack such as the petition filed before the court a quo.

Petitioners’ reliance on the cases they cited is misplaced.

Cariño v. Cariño was an action filed by a second wife against the first wife for the return of
one-half of the death benefits received by the first after the death of the husband. Since the
second wife contracted marriage with the husband while the latter’s marriage to the first
wife was still subsisting, the Court ruled on the validity of the two marriages, it being
essential to the determination of who is rightfully entitled to the death benefits.

In Lee v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that contrary to the contention that the petitions
filed by the therein petitioners before the lower courts were actions to impugn legitimacy,
the prayer was not to declare that the petitioners are illegitimate children of Keh Shiok
Cheng as stated in their records of birth but to establish that they are not the latter’s
children, hence, there was nothing to impugn as there was no blood relation at all between

G.R. No. 174689. October 19, 2007
ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner, vs.REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Change of Name; The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and
entities for purposes of identification; A change of name is a privilege, not a right.—The State
has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification.
A change of name is a privilege, not a right. Petitions for change of name are controlled by
statutes. In this connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides: ART. 376. No person can
change his name or surname without judicial authority.
Same; Clerical Error Law (RA 9048); Administrative Law; Jurisdictions; RA 9048
now governs the change of first name, and vests the power and authority to entertain
petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general
concerned; The intent and effect of the law is to exclude the change of first name from the
coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the
Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative petition for change
of name is first filed and subsequently denied—in sum, the remedy and the proceedings
regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial.—RA
9048 now governs the change of first name. It vests the power and authority to entertain
petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general
concerned. Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name
is now primarily lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and
effect of the law is to exclude the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103
(Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of
the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative petition for change of name is first
filed and subsequently denied. It likewise lays down the corresponding venue, form and
procedure. In sum, the remedy and the proceedings regulating change of first name are
primarily administrative in nature, not judicial.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Sex Change; A change of name does not alter one’s legal
capacity or civil status—RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of
sex reassignment.— Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex
reassignment. He intended to make his first name compatible with the sex he thought he
transformed himself into through surgery. However, a change of name does not alter one’s
legal capacity or civil status. RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the
ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioner’s first
name for his declared purpose may only create grave complications in the civil registry and
the public interest. Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present
proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such change. In addition, he
must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. In this case,
he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his
true and official name.
Same; Same; A petition in the trial court in so far as it prays for change of first name
is not within that court’s primary jurisdiction as the petition should be filed with the local
civil registrar concerned, namely, where the birth certificate is kept.—The petition in the trial
court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioner’s first name was not within that
court’s primary jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed with the local civil
registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally done. It was an improper remedy because
the proper remedy was administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048. It was also
filed in the wrong venue as the proper venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of
Manila where his birth certificate is kept. More importantly, it had no merit since the use of
his true and official name does not prejudice him at all. For all these reasons, the Court of
Appeals correctly dismissed petitioner’s petition in so far as the change of his first name was
concerned.
Same; Same; Sex Change; No law allows the change of entry in the birth certificate as
to sex on the ground of sex reassignment; Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry
involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error—it is a substantial
change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.—Section 2(c) of
RA 9048 defines what a “clerical or typographical error” is: SECTION 2. Definition of
Terms.—As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean: x x x x x x x x x (3)
“Clerical or typographical error” refers to a mistake committed in the performance of clerical
work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is
harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled name or misspelled place of birth or the like,
which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected or changed
only by reference to other existing record or records: Provided, however, That no correction
must involve the change of nationality, age, status or sex of the petitioner. (emphasis
supplied) Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not
a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable
procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil
Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407
and 408 of the Civil Code.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Statutory Construction; No reasonable
interpretation of Art. 407 of the Civil Code can justify the conclusion that it covers the
correction on the ground of sex reassignment; To correct simply means “to make or set aright;
to remove the faults or error from” while to change means “to replace something with
something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a substitute.”—The acts,
events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even those
that occur after birth. However, no reasonable interpretation of the provision can justify the
conclusion that it covers the correction on the ground of sex reassignment. To correct simply
means “to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from” while to change means “to
replace something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a
substitute.” The birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries therein,
including those corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. No correction is
necessary.
Same; Same; Same; Same; “Status” refers to the circumstances affecting the legal
situation (that is, the sum total of capacities and incapacities) of a person in view of his age,
nationality and his family membership.—“Status” refers to the circumstances affecting the
legal situation (that is, the sum total of capacities and incapacities) of a person in view of his
age, nationality and his family membership. The status of a person in law includes all his
personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily
terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being
married or not. The comprehensive term status… include such matters as the beginning and
end of legal personality, capacity to have rights in general, family relations, and its various
aspects, such as birth, legitimation, adoption, emancipation, marriage, divorce, and
sometimes even succession. (emphasis supplied)
Same; Same; Same; Same; A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family
relations—it is a part of a person’s legal capacity and civil status; There is no such special
law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects.—A person’s sex is an
essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a person’s legal capacity and
civil status. In this connection, Article 413 of the Civil Code provides: ART. 413. All other
matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed by special laws. But
there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects.
This is fatal to petitioner’s cause.
 Same; Same; Same; Same; Civil Register Law (Act 3753); Under the Civil Register
Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at the time of birth—
thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the
physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant; Considering that there is no
law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex made at the
time of his or her birth, if not attended by error, is immutable.—Under the Civil Register
Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at the time of birth.
Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the
physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no
law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex made at the
time of his or her birth, if not attended by error, is immutable.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction;When words are not defined
in a statute they are to be given their common and ordinary meaning in the absence of a
contrary legislative intent; The words “sex,” “male” and “female” as used in the Civil Register
Law and laws concerning the civil registry (and even all other laws) should therefore be
understood in their common and ordinary usage, there being no legislative intent to the
contrary; Sex is defined as “the sum of peculiarities of structure and function that distinguish
a male from a female” or “the distinction between male and female”; The words “male” and
“female” in everyday understanding do not include persons who have undergone sex
reassignment; While a person may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance
through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in
the civil registry for that reason.— When words are not defined in a statute they are to be
given their common and ordinary meaning in the absence of a contrary legislative intent.
The words “sex,” “male” and “female” as used in the Civil Register Law and laws concerning
the civil registry (and even all other laws) should therefore be understood in their common
and ordinary usage, there being no legislative intent to the contrary. In this connection, sex
is defined as “the sum of peculiarities of structure and function that distinguish a male from
a female” or “the distinction between male and female.” Female is “the sex that produces
ova or bears young” and male is “the sex that has organs to produce spermatozoa for
fertilizing ova.” Thus, the words “male” and “female” in everyday understanding do not
include persons who have undergone sex reassignment. Furthermore, “words that are
employed in a statute which had at the time a well-known meaning are presumed to have
been used in that sense unless the context compels to the contrary.” Since the statutory
language of the Civil Register Law was enacted in the early 1900s and remains unchanged,
it cannot be argued that the term “sex” as used then is something alterable through surgery
or something that allows a post-operative male-to-female transsexual to be included in the
category “female.” For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his
body and appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the
change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for
his petition for the correction or change of the entries in his birth certificate.
Same; Same; Same; Marriage; To grant the changes in name and sex sought by
petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family
relations—it will allow the union of a man with another man who has undergone sex
reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative transsexual).—The changes sought by
petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy consequences. First,
even the trial court itself found that the petition was but petitioner’s first step towards his
eventual marriage to his male fiancé. However, marriage, one of the most sacred social
institutions, is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman. One of
its essential requisites is the legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male
and a female. To grant the changes sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and
greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a man
with another man who has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative
transsexual). Second, there are various laws which apply particularly to women such as the
provisions of the Labor Code on employment of women, certain felonies under the Revised
Penal Code and the presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under Rule 131 of the
Rules of Court, among others. These laws underscore the public policy in relation to women
which could be substantially affected if petitioner’s petition were to be granted.
Same; Same; Same; Separation of Powers; Judicial Legislation; Article 9 of the Civil
Code which mandates that “[n]o judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of
the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law” is not a license for courts to engage in
judicial legislation; In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to
do so, to determine what guidelines should govern the recognition of the effects of sex
reassignment.—It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that “[n]o judge or court
shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the
law.” However, it is not a license for courts to engage in judicial legislation. The duty of the
courts is to apply or interpret the law, not to make or amend it. In our system of
government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so, to determine what guidelines
should govern the recognition of the effects of sex reassignment. The need for legislative
guidelines becomes particularly important in this case where the claims asserted are
statutebased.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; If the legislature intends to confer on a person who
has undergone sex reassignment the privilege to change his name and sex to conform with his
reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the guidelines in turn governing the
conferment of that privilege; The Supreme Court cannot enact a law where no law exists.—To
reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change of first name and for
correction or change of entries in the civil registry, where they may be filed, what grounds
may be invoked, what proof must be presented and what procedures shall be observed. If
the legislature intends to confer on a person who has undergone sex reassignment the
privilege to change his name and sex to conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact
legislation laying down the guidelines in turn governing the conferment of that privilege. It
might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on when a person may be
recognized as having successfully changed his sex. However, this Court has no authority to
fashion a law on that matter, or on anything else. The Court cannot enact a law where no
law exists. It can only apply or interpret the written word of its co-equal branch of
government, Congress.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Court recognizes that there are people whose
preferences and orientation do not fit neatly into the commonly recognized parameters of
social convention and that, at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal, but the remedies involve
questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the legislature, not by the courts.—
Petitioner pleads that “[t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life of happiness,
contentment and [the] realization of their dreams.” No argument about that. The Court
recognizes that there are people whose preferences and orientation do not fit neatly into the
commonly recognized parameters of social convention and that, at least for them, life is
indeed an ordeal. However, the remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy
to be addressed solely by the legislature, not by the courts.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Benito R. Cuesta for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondent.
CORONA, J.:
When God created man, He made him in the likeness of God; He created them male
and female. (Genesis 5:1-2)
 Amihan gazed upon the bamboo reed planted by Bathala and she heard voices
coming from inside the bamboo. "Oh North Wind! North Wind! Please let us out!,"
the voices said. She pecked the reed once, then twice. All of a sudden, the bamboo
cracked and slit open. Out came two human beings; one was a male and the other
was a female. Amihan named the man "Malakas" (Strong) and the woman
"Maganda" (Beautiful). (The Legend of Malakas and Maganda)
When is a man a man and when is a woman a woman? In particular, does the law recognize
the changes made by a physician using scalpel, drugs and counseling with regard to a
person’s sex? May a person successfully petition for a change of name and sex appearing in
the birth certificate to reflect the result of a sex reassignment surgery?
On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the
change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 8. The petition, docketed as SP Case No. 02-105207, impleaded the civil
registrar of Manila as respondent.
Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the spouses
Melecio Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was
registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of live birth (birth
certificate). His sex was registered as "male."
He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels,
thinks and acts as a female" and that he had always identified himself with girls since
childhood.1 Feeling trapped in a man’s body, he consulted several doctors in the United
States. He underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast
augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to a "woman" culminated on January 27,
2001 when he underwent sex reassignment surgery2 in Bangkok, Thailand. He was
thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and reconstruction surgeon
in the Philippines, who issued a medical certificate attesting that he (petitioner) had in fact
undergone the procedure.
From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then
sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely,"
and his sex from "male" to "female."
An order setting the case for initial hearing was published in the People’s Journal Tonight,
a newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila, for three consecutive weeks. 3 Copies of
the order were sent to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the civil registrar of
Manila.
On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional requirements were established. No
opposition to the petition was made.
During trial, petitioner testified for himself. He also presented Dr. Reysio-Cruz, Jr. and his
American fiancé, Richard P. Edel, as witnesses.
On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision4 in favor of petitioner. Its relevant
portions read:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any
infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of making
his birth records compatible with his present sex.
The sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief asked for.
The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative.
Firstly, the [c]ourt is of the opinion that granting the petition would be more in
consonance with the principles of justice and equity. With his sexual [re-
assignment], petitioner, who has always felt, thought and acted like a woman, now
possesses the physique of a female. Petitioner’s misfortune to be trapped in a
man’s body is not his own doing and should not be in any way taken against him.
Likewise, the [c]ourt believes that no harm, injury [or] prejudice will be caused to
anybody or the community in granting the petition. On the contrary, granting the
petition would bring the much-awaited happiness on the part of the petitioner and
her [fiancé] and the realization of their dreams.
Finally, no evidence was presented to show any cause or ground to deny the
present petition despite due notice and publication thereof. Even the State,
through the [OSG] has not seen fit to interpose any [o]pposition.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition and
ordering the Civil Registrar of Manila to change the entries appearing in the
Certificate of Birth of [p]etitioner, specifically for petitioner’s first name from
"Rommel Jacinto" to MELY and petitioner’s gender from "Male" to FEMALE. 5
On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a
petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. 6 It alleged that there is no law allowing the
change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration.
On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals7 rendered a decision8 in favor of the Republic. It
ruled that the trial court’s decision lacked legal basis. There is no law allowing the change of
either name or sex in the certificate of birth on the ground of sex reassignment through
surgery. Thus, the Court of Appeals granted the Republic’s petition, set aside the decision of
the trial court and ordered the dismissal of SP Case No. 02-105207. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration but it was denied.9 Hence, this petition.
Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his birth certificate is
allowed under Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court
and RA 9048.10
The petition lacks merit.
A Person’s First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of Sex Reassignment
Petitioner invoked his sex reassignment as the ground for his petition for change of name
and sex. As found by the trial court:
 Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any
infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of
making his birth records compatible with his present sex. (emphasis
supplied)
Petitioner believes that after having acquired the physical features of a female, he became
entitled to the civil registry changes sought. We disagree.
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of
identification.11 A change of name is a privilege, not a right. 12 Petitions for change of name
are controlled by statutes.13 In this connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.
This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). In particular,
Section 1 of RA 9048 provides:
SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of
First Name or Nickname. – No entry in a civil register shall be changed or
corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors and
change of first name or nickname which can be corrected or changed by the
concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the
provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations.
RA 9048 now governs the change of first name.14It vests the power and authority to
entertain petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul
general concerned. Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of first
name is now primarily lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers. The intent
and effect of the law is to exclude the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103
(Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of
the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative petition for change of name is first
filed and subsequently denied.15 It likewise lays down the corresponding venue,16 form17 and
procedure. In sum, the remedy and the proceedings regulating change of first name are
primarily administrative in nature, not judicial.
RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may be allowed:
SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. – The petition for
change of first name or nickname may be allowed in any of the following cases:
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with
dishonor or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by
the petitioner and he has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in
the community; or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.
Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. He
intended to make his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself
into through surgery. However, a change of name does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil
status.18 RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex
reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioner’s first name for his
declared purpose may only create grave complications in the civil registry and the public
interest.
Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable
cause or any compelling reason justifying such change.19 In addition, he must show that he
will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. 20 In this case, he failed to show,
or even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official
name.
In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioner’s first
name was not within that court’s primary jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed
with the local civil registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally done. It was an
improper remedy because the proper remedy was administrative, that is, that provided
under RA 9048. It was also filed in the wrong venue as the proper venue was in the Office of
the Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth certificate is kept. More importantly, it had no
merit since the use of his true and official name does not prejudice him at all. For all these
reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioner’s petition in so far as the change
of his first name was concerned.
No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As To Sex On the
Ground of Sex Reassignment
The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the
court must look to the statutes.21 In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a
judicial order.
Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by RA 9048 in so
far as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such matters
can now be made through administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial
order. In effect, RA 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the
correction of such errors.22 Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and corrections
in entries in the civil register.23
Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or typographical error" is:
SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act, the following terms shall
mean:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the
performance of clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing
an entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous, such as
misspelled name or misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible
 to the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected or
changed only by reference to other existing record or records: Provided,
however, That no correction must involve the change of nationality,
age, status or sex of the petitioner. (emphasis supplied)
Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere
clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure
is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code: 24
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons
shall be recorded in the civil register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of
marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7)
legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10)
naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14)
judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and
(16) changes of name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include
even those that occur after birth.25 However, no reasonable interpretation of the provision
can justify the conclusion that it covers the correction on the ground of sex reassignment.
To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from" while to
change means "to replace something with something else of the same kind or with
something that serves as a substitute."26 The birth certificate of petitioner contained no
error. All entries therein, including those corresponding to his first name and sex, were all
correct. No correction is necessary.
Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of certain acts (such as
legitimations, acknowledgments of illegitimate children and naturalization), events (such as
births, marriages, naturalization and deaths) and judicial decrees (such as legal
separations, annulments of marriage, declarations of nullity of marriages, adoptions,
naturalization, loss or recovery of citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial determination of
filiation and changes of name). These acts, events and judicial decrees produce legal
consequences that touch upon the legal capacity, status and nationality of a person. Their
effects are expressly sanctioned by the laws. In contrast, sex reassignment is not among
those acts or events mentioned in Article 407. Neither is it recognized nor even mentioned
by any law, expressly or impliedly.
"Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the sum total of
capacities and incapacities) of a person in view of his age, nationality and his family
membership.27
The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and
relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at
his own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or
not. The comprehensive term status… include such matters as the beginning and
end of legal personality, capacity to have rights in general, family relations, and
its various aspects, such as birth, legitimation, adoption, emancipation, marriage,
divorce, and sometimes even succession.28 (emphasis supplied)
A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a
person’s legal capacity and civil status. In this connection, Article 413 of the Civil Code
provides:
ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be
governed by special laws.
But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its
effects. This is fatal to petitioner’s cause.
Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides:
SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births. – The declaration of the physician
or midwife in attendance at the birth or, in default thereof, the declaration of
either parent of the newborn child, shall be sufficient for the registration of a birth
in the civil register. Such declaration shall be exempt from documentary stamp
tax and shall be sent to the local civil registrar not later than thirty days after the
birth, by the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or by either parent of
the newborn child.
In such declaration, the person above mentioned shall certify to the following
facts: (a) date and hour of birth; (b) sex and nationality of infant; (c) names,
citizenship and religion of parents or, in case the father is not known, of the
mother alone; (d) civil status of parents; (e) place where the infant was born; and
(f) such other data as may be required in the regulations to be issued.
xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)
Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they
existed at the time of birth.29Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done
by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant.
Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of
a person’s sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error, 30 is immutable.31
When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their common and ordinary
meaning in the absence of a contrary legislative intent. The words "sex," "male" and
"female" as used in the Civil Register Law and laws concerning the civil registry (and even
all other laws) should therefore be understood in their common and ordinary usage, there
being no legislative intent to the contrary. In this connection, sex is defined as "the sum of
peculiarities of structure and function that distinguish a male from a female" 32 or "the
distinction between male and female."33Female is "the sex that produces ova or bears
young"34 and male is "the sex that has organs to produce spermatozoa for fertilizing
ova."35 Thus, the words "male" and "female" in everyday understanding do not include
persons who have undergone sex reassignment. Furthermore, "words that are employed in a
statute which had at the time a well-known meaning are presumed to have been used in
that sense unless the context compels to the contrary."36 Since the statutory language of the
Civil Register Law was enacted in the early 1900s and remains unchanged, it cannot be
argued that the term "sex" as used then is something alterable through surgery or
something that allows a post-operative male-to-female transsexual to be included in the
category "female."
For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance
through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex
in the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the
correction or change of the entries in his birth certificate.
law exists. It can only apply or interpret the written word of its co-equal branch of
government, Congress.
Petitioner pleads that "[t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life of happiness,
contentment and [the] realization of their dreams." No argument about that. The Court
recognizes that there are people whose preferences and orientation do not fit neatly into the
commonly recognized parameters of social convention and that, at least for them, life is
indeed an ordeal. However, the remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy
to be addressed solely by the legislature, not by the courts.

Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate As to First Name or Sex Be Changed WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
on the Ground of Equity
Costs against petitioner.
The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in consonance with the principles of
justice and equity. It believed that allowing the petition would cause no harm, injury or
SO ORDERED.
prejudice to anyone. This is wrong.

The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy
consequences. First, even the trial court itself found that the petition was but petitioner’s
first step towards his eventual marriage to his male fiancé. However, marriage, one of the
most sacred social institutions, is a special contract of permanent union between a man and
a woman.37 One of its essential requisites is the legal capacity of the contracting parties who
must be a male and a female.38 To grant the changes sought by petitioner will substantially
reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the
union of a man with another man who has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female
post-operative transsexual). Second, there are various laws which apply particularly to
women such as the provisions of the Labor Code on employment of women, 39 certain felonies
under the Revised Penal Code40 and the presumption of survivorship in case of calamities
under Rule 131 of the Rules of Court,41 among others. These laws underscore the public
policy in relation to women which could be substantially affected if petitioner’s petition were
to be granted.

It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o judge or court shall decline to
render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law." However, it
is not a license for courts to engage in judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply
or interpret the law, not to make or amend it.

In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so, to determine
what guidelines should govern the recognition of the effects of sex reassignment. The need
for legislative guidelines becomes particularly important in this case where the claims
asserted are statute-based.

To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change of first name and for
correction or change of entries in the civil registry, where they may be filed, what grounds
may be invoked, what proof must be presented and what procedures shall be observed. If
the legislature intends to confer on a person who has undergone sex reassignment the
privilege to change his name and sex to conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact
legislation laying down the guidelines in turn governing the conferment of that privilege.

It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on when a person may be
recognized as having successfully changed his sex. However, this Court has no authority to
fashion a law on that matter, or on anything else. The Court cannot enact a law where no
 Same; Same; Same; Same; The current state of Philippine statutes apparently compels
G.R. No. 166676. September 12, 2008.*
that a person be classified either as a male or as a female, but this Court is not controlled by
mere appearances when nature itself fundamentally negates such rigid classification.—
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. JENNIFER B. CAGANDAHAN,
Intersex individuals are treated in different ways by different cultures. In most societies,
respondent.
intersex individuals have been expected to conform to either a male or female gender role.
Since the rise of modern medical science in Western societies, some intersex people with
Civil Registry; Correction of Entries in Birth Certificates; Clerical Error Law (R.A. No.
ambiguous external genitalia have had their genitalia surgically modified to resemble either
9048); R.A. No. 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction
male or female genitals. More commonly, an intersex individual is considered as suffering
of such errors—Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries
from a “disorder” which is almost always recommended to be treated, whether by surgery
in the civil register.—The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is
and/or by taking lifetime medication in order to mold the individual as neatly as possible
a legal issue and the court must look to the statutes. In this connection, Article 412 of the
into the category of either male or female. In deciding this case, we consider the
Civil Code provides: ART. 412. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected
compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of intersex as variations which
without a judicial order. Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was
should not be subject to outright denial. “It has been suggested that there is some middle
amended by Republic Act No. 9048 in so far as clerical or typographical errors are involved.
ground between the sexes, a ‘no-man’s land’ for those individuals who are neither truly
The correction or change of such matters can now be made through administrative
‘male’ nor truly ‘female.’” The current state of Philippine statutes apparently compels that a
proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In effect, Rep. Act No. 9048 removed
person be classified either as a male or as a female, but this Court is not controlled by mere
from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors. Rule 108 now
appearances when nature itself fundamentally negates such rigid classification.
applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil register.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the
Same; Same; The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable
determining factor in his gender classification would be what the individual, having reached
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil
the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex; Sexual development in cases of
Code; The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code
intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive—it is at maturity that
include even those that occur after birth.—Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil
the gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed.—Biologically, nature endowed
registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a
respondent with a mixed (neither consistently and categorically female nor consistently and
substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The
categorically male) composition. Respondent has female (XX) chromosomes. However,
entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the
respondent’s body system naturally produces high levels of male hormones (androgen). As a
Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code: ART. 407. Acts,
result, respondent has ambiguous genitalia and the phenotypic features of a male.
events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the
Ultimately, we are of the view that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the
civil register. ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register: (1) Births; (2)
determining factor in his gender classification would be what the individual, like
marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6) judgments
respondent, having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex.
declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9)
Respondent here thinks of himself as a male and considering that his body produces high
acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of
levels of male hormones (androgen) there is preponderant biological support for considering
citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary
him as being male. Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender
emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name. The acts, events or factual errors
classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like
contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even those that occur after birth.
respondent, is fixed.
Same; Same; Intersexuality; Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH); Words and
Same; Same; Same; Same; To the person with Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH)
Phrases; During the twentieth century, medicine adopted the term “intersexuality” to apply to
belongs the human right to the pursuit of happiness and of health, and to him should belong
human beings who cannot be classified as either male or female—an organism with intersex
the primordial choice of what courses of action to take along the path of his sexual
may have biological characteristics of both male and female sexes.—Respondent
development and maturation.—In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not
undisputedly has CAH. This condition causes the early or “inappropriate” appearance of
dictate on respondent concerning a matter so innately private as one’s sexuality and
male characteristics. A person, like respondent, with this condition produces too much
lifestyle preferences, much less on whether or not to undergo medical treatment to reverse
androgen, a male hormone. A newborn who has XX chromosomes coupled with CAH usually
the male tendency due to CAH. The Court will not consider respondent as having erred in
has a (1) swollen clitoris with the urethral opening at the base, an ambiguous genitalia often
not choosing to undergo treatment in order to become or remain as a female. Neither will
appearing more male than female; (2) normal internal structures of the female reproductive
the Court force respondent to undergo treatment and to take medication in order to fit the
tract such as the ovaries, uterus and fallopian tubes; as the child grows older, some features
mold of a female, as society commonly currently knows this gender of the human species.
start to appear male, such as deepening of the voice, facial hair, and failure to menstruate
Respondent is the one who has to live with his intersex anatomy. To him belongs the human
at puberty. About 1 in 10,000 to 18,000 children are born with CAH. CAH is one of many
right to the pursuit of happiness and of health. Thus, to him should belong the primordial
conditions that involve intersex anatomy. During the twentieth century, medicine adopted
choice of what courses of action to take along the path of his sexual development and
the term “intersexuality” to apply to human beings who cannot be classified as either male
maturation. In the absence of evidence that respondent is an “incompetent” and in the
or female. The term is now of widespread use. According to Wikipedia, intersexuality “is the
absence of evidence to show that classifying respondent as a male will harm other members
state of a living thing of a gonochoristic species whose sex chromosomes, genitalia, and/or
of society who are equally entitled to protection under the law, the Court affirms as valid
secondary sex characteristics are determined to be neither exclusively male nor female. An
and justified the respondent’s position and his personal judgment of being a male.
organism with intersex may have biological characteristics of both male and female sexes.”
Same; Same; Names; There is merit in the change of name of a person with Congenital
Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) where the same is the consequence of the recognition of his
preferred gender.—As for respondent’s change of name under Rule 103, this Court has held
that a change of name is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in
the light of the reasons adduced and the consequences that will follow. The trial court’s
grant of respondent’s change of name from Jennifer to Jeff implies a change of a feminine
name to a masculine name. Considering the consequence that respondent’s change of name
merely recognizes his preferred gender, we find merit in respondent’s change of name. Such
a change will conform with the change of the entry in his birth certificate from female to
male.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Siniloan,
Laguna, Br. 33.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Edgard N. Smith for respondent.
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising purely questions of
law and seeking a reversal of the Decision[1] dated January 12, 2005 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna, which granted the Petition for Correction of
Entries in Birth Certificate filed by Jennifer B. Cagandahan and ordered the following
changes of entries in Cagandahan’s birth certificate: (1) the name "Jennifer Cagandahan"
changed to "Jeff Cagandahan" and (2) gender from "female" to "male."
The facts are as follows.
On December 11, 2003, respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a Petition for Correction of
Entries in Birth Certificate2 before the RTC, Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna.
In her petition, she alleged that she was born on January 13, 1981 and was registered as a
female in the Certificate of Live Birth but while growing up, she developed secondary male
characteristics and was diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which is
a condition where persons thus afflicted possess both male and female characteristics. She
further alleged that she was diagnosed to have clitoral hyperthropy in her early years and
at age six, underwent an ultrasound where it was discovered that she has small ovaries. At
age thirteen, tests revealed that her ovarian structures had minimized, she has stopped
growing and she has no breast or menstrual development. She then alleged that for all
interests and appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has become a male person.
Thus, she prayed that her birth certificate be corrected such that her gender be changed
from female to male and her first name be changed from Jennifer to Jeff.
The petition was published in a newspaper of general circulation for three (3) consecutive
weeks and was posted in conspicuous places by the sheriff of the court. The Solicitor General
entered his appearance and authorized the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to appear in his
behalf.
To prove her claim, respondent testified and presented the testimony of Dr. Michael Sionzon
of the Department of Psychiatry, University of the Philippines-Philippine General Hospital.
Dr. Sionzon issued a medical certificate stating that respondent’s condition is known as
CAH. He explained that genetically respondent is female but because her body secretes
male hormones, her female organs did not develop normally and she has two sex organs –
female and male. He testified that this condition is very rare, that respondent’s uterus is not
fully developed because of lack of female hormones, and that she has no monthly period. He
further testified that respondent’s condition is permanent and recommended the change of
gender because respondent has made up her mind, adjusted to her chosen role as male, and
the gender change would be advantageous to her.
The RTC granted respondent’s petition in a Decision dated January 12, 2005 which reads:
The Court is convinced that petitioner has satisfactorily shown that he is entitled to the
reliefs prayed [for]. Petitioner has adequately presented to the Court very clear and
convincing proofs for the granting of his petition. It was medically proven that petitioner’s
body produces male hormones, and first his body as well as his action and feelings are that
of a male. He has chosen to be male. He is a normal person and wants to be acknowledged
and identified as a male.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Civil Register of Pakil, Laguna is hereby ordered
to make the following corrections in the birth [c]ertificate of Jennifer Cagandahan upon
payment of the prescribed fees:
a) By changing the name from Jennifer Cagandahan to JEFF CAGANDAHAN; and
b) By changing the gender from female to MALE.
It is likewise ordered that petitioner’s school records, voter’s registry, baptismal certificate,
and other pertinent records are hereby amended to conform with the foregoing corrected
data.
SO ORDERED.[3]
Thus, this petition by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) seeking a reversal of the
abovementioned ruling.
The issues raised by petitioner are:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION CONSIDERING THAT:
I.
THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULES 103 AND 108 OF THE RULES OF COURT HAVE NOT
BEEN COMPLIED WITH; AND,
II.
CORRECTION OF ENTRY UNDER RULE 108 DOES NOT ALLOW CHANGE OF "SEX"
OR "GENDER" IN THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE, WHILE RESPONDENT’S MEDICAL
CONDITION, i.e., CONGENITAL ADRENAL HYPERPLASIA DOES NOT MAKE HER A
"MALE."4
Simply stated, the issue is whether the trial court erred in ordering the correction of entries
in the birth certificate of respondent to change her sex or gender, from female to male, on
the ground of her medical condition known as CAH, and her name from "Jennifer" to "Jeff,"
under Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court.
The OSG contends that the petition below is fatally defective for non-compliance with Rules
103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because while the local civil registrar is an indispensable
party in a petition for cancellation or correction of entries under Section 3, Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court, respondent’s petition before the court a quo did not implead the local civil
registrar.5 The OSG further contends respondent’s petition is fatally defective since it failed
to state that respondent is a bona fide resident of the province where the petition was filed
for at least three (3) years prior to the date of such filing as mandated under Section 2(b),
Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.6 The OSG argues that Rule 108 does not allow change of sex
or gender in the birth certificate and respondent’s claimed medical condition known as CAH
does not make her a male.7
On the other hand, respondent counters that although the Local Civil Registrar of Pakil,
Laguna was not formally named a party in the Petition for Correction of Birth Certificate,
nonetheless the Local Civil Registrar was furnished a copy of the Petition, the Order to
publish on December 16, 2003 and all pleadings, orders or processes in the course of the
proceedings,8 respondent is actually a male person and hence his birth certificate has to be
corrected to reflect his true sex/gender,9 change of sex or gender is allowed under Rule
108,10 and respondent substantially complied with the requirements of Rules 103 and 108 of
the Rules of Court.11
Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court provide:
Rule 103
CHANGE OF NAME
Section 1. Venue. – A person desiring to change his name shall present the petition to the
Regional Trial Court of the province in which he resides, [or, in the City of Manila, to the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court].
Sec. 2. Contents of petition. – A petition for change of name shall be signed and verified by
the person desiring his name changed, or some other person on his behalf, and shall set
forth:
(a) That the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the province where the petition is
filed for at least three (3) years prior to the date of such filing;
(b) The cause for which the change of the petitioner's name is sought;
(c) The name asked for.
Sec. 3. Order for hearing. – If the petition filed is sufficient in form and substance, the court,
by an order reciting the purpose of the petition, shall fix a date and place for the hearing
thereof, and shall direct that a copy of the order be published before the hearing at least
once a week for three (3) successive weeks in some newspaper of general circulation
published in the province, as the court shall deem best. The date set for the hearing shall
not be within thirty (30) days prior to an election nor within four (4) months after the last
publication of the notice.
Sec. 4. Hearing. – Any interested person may appear at the hearing and oppose the petition.
The Solicitor General or the proper provincial or city fiscal shall appear on behalf of the
Government of the Republic.
Sec. 5. Judgment. – Upon satisfactory proof in open court on the date fixed in the order that
such order has been published as directed and that the allegations of the petition are true,
the court shall, if proper and reasonable cause appears for changing the name of the
petitioner, adjudge that such name be changed in accordance with the prayer of the petition.
Sec. 6. Service of judgment. – Judgments or orders rendered in connection with this rule
shall be furnished the civil registrar of the municipality or city where the court issuing the
same is situated, who shall forthwith enter the same in the civil register.
Rule 108
CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION OF ENTRIES
IN THE CIVIL REGISTRY
Section 1. Who may file petition. – Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree
concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file
a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the
Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located.
Sec. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. – Upon good and valid grounds, the
following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages;
(c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments
declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i)
acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of
citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name.
Sec. 3. Parties. – When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought,
the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected
thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.
Sec. 4. Notice and publication. – Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order,
fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be
given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be
published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation
in the province.
Sec. 5. Opposition. – The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest
under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from
notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice, file his opposition
thereto.
Sec. 6. Expediting proceedings. – The court in which the proceedings is brought may make
orders expediting the proceedings, and may also grant preliminary injunction for the
preservation of the rights of the parties pending such proceedings.
Sec. 7. Order. – After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition or issue an order
granting the cancellation or correction prayed for. In either case, a certified copy of the
judgment shall be served upon the civil registrar concerned who shall annotate the same in
his record.
The OSG argues that the petition below is fatally defective for non-compliance with Rules
103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because respondent’s petition did not implead the local
civil registrar. Section 3, Rule 108 provides that the civil registrar and all persons who have
or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the
proceedings. Likewise, the local civil registrar is required to be made a party in a proceeding
for the correction of name in the civil registry. He is an indispensable party without whom
no final determination of the case can be had.[12] Unless all possible indispensable parties
were duly notified of the proceedings, the same shall be considered as falling much too short
of the requirements of the rules.13 The corresponding petition should also implead as
respondents the civil registrar and all other persons who may have or may claim to have
any interest that would be affected thereby.14 Respondent, however, invokes Section
6,[15] Rule 1 of the Rules of Court which states that courts shall construe the Rules liberally
to promote their objectives of securing to the parties a just, speedy and inexpensive
disposition of the matters brought before it. We agree that there is substantial compliance
with Rule 108 when respondent furnished a copy of the petition to the local civil registrar.
The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the
court must look to the statutes. In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 412. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order.
Together with Article 376[16] of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by Republic Act
No. 9048[17] in so far as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction or
change of such matters can now be made through administrative proceedings and without
the need for a judicial order. In effect, Rep. Act No. 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule
108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors. Rule 108 now applies only to
substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil register.18
Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not
a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable
procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.19
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be
recorded in the civil register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6)
judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9)
acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of
citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include
even those that occur after birth.20
Respondent undisputedly has CAH. This condition causes the early or "inappropriate"
appearance of male characteristics. A person, like respondent, with this condition produces
too much androgen, a male hormone. A newborn who has XX chromosomes coupled with
CAH usually has a (1) swollen clitoris with the urethral opening at the base, an ambiguous
genitalia often appearing more male than female; (2) normal internal structures of the
female reproductive tract such as the ovaries, uterus and fallopian tubes; as the child grows
older, some features start to appear male, such as deepening of the voice, facial hair,
and failure to menstruate at puberty. About 1 in 10,000 to 18,000 children are born with
CAH.
CAH is one of many conditions[21] that involve intersex anatomy. During the twentieth
century, medicine adopted the term "intersexuality" to apply to human beings who cannot
be classified as either male or female.[22] The term is now of widespread use. According to
Wikipedia, intersexuality "is the state of a living thing of a gonochoristic species whose sex
chromosomes, genitalia, and/or secondary sex characteristics are determined to be neither
exclusively male nor female. An organism with intersex may have biological characteristics
of both male and female sexes."
Intersex individuals are treated in different ways by different cultures. In most societies,
intersex individuals have been expected to conform to either a male or female gender
role.[23] Since the rise of modern medical science in Western societies, some intersex people
with ambiguous external genitalia have had their genitalia surgically modified to resemble
either male or female genitals.[24] More commonly, an intersex individual is considered as
suffering from a "disorder" which is almost always recommended to be treated, whether by
surgery and/or by taking lifetime medication in order to mold the individual as neatly as
possible into the category of either male or female.
In deciding this case, we consider the compassionate calls for recognition of the various
degrees of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial. "It has been
suggested that there is some middle ground between the sexes, a ‘no-man’s land’ for those
individuals who are neither truly ‘male’ nor truly ‘female’."[25] The current state of
Philippine statutes apparently compels that a person be classified either as a male or as a
female, but this Court is not controlled by mere appearances when nature itself
fundamentally negates such rigid classification.
In the instant case, if we determine respondent to be a female, then there is no basis for a
change in the birth certificate entry for gender. But if we determine, based on medical
testimony and scientific development showing the respondent to be other than female, then
a change in the
subject’s birth certificate entry is in order.
Biologically, nature endowed respondent with a mixed (neither consistently and
categorically female nor consistently and categorically male) composition. Respondent has
female (XX) chromosomes. However, respondent’s body system naturally produces high
levels of male hormones (androgen). As a result, respondent has ambiguous genitalia and
the phenotypic features of a male.
Ultimately, we are of the view that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the
determining factor in his gender classification would be what the individual, like
respondent, having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex.
Respondent here thinks of himself as a male and considering that his body produces high
levels of male hormones (androgen) there is preponderant biological support for considering
him as being male. Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender
classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like
respondent, is fixed.

Respondent here has simply let nature take its course and has not taken unnatural steps to
arrest or interfere with what he was born with. And accordingly, he has already ordered his
life to that of a male. Respondent could have undergone treatment and taken steps, like
taking lifelong medication,[26]to force his body into the categorical mold of a female but he
did not. He chose not to do so. Nature has instead taken its due course in respondent’s
development to reveal more fully his male characteristics.

In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate on respondent concerning a
matter so innately private as one’s sexuality and lifestyle preferences, much less on whether
or not to undergo medical treatment to reverse the male tendency due to CAH. The Court
will not consider respondent as having erred in not choosing to undergo treatment in order
to become or remain as a female. Neither will the Court force respondent to undergo
treatment and to take medication in order to fit the mold of a female, as society commonly
currently knows this gender of the human species. Respondent is the one who has to live
with his intersex anatomy. To him belongs the human right to the pursuit of happiness and
of health. Thus, to him should belong the primordial choice of what courses of action to take
along the path of his sexual development and maturation. In the absence of evidence that
respondent is an "incompetent"[27] and in the absence of evidence to show that classifying
respondent as a male will harm other members of society who are equally entitled to
protection under the law, the Court affirms as valid and justified the respondent’s position
and his personal judgment of being a male.

In so ruling we do no more than give respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and (2) how an
individual deals with what nature has handed out. In other words, we respect respondent’s
congenital condition and his mature decision to be a male. Life is already difficult for the
ordinary person. We cannot but respect how respondent deals with his unordinary state and
thus help make his life easier, considering the unique circumstances in this case.

As for respondent’s change of name under Rule 103, this Court has held that a change of
name is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the
reasons adduced and the consequences that will follow.[28] The trial court’s grant of
respondent’s change of name from Jennifer to Jeff implies a change of a feminine name to a
masculine name. Considering the consequence that respondent’s change of name merely
recognizes his preferred gender, we find merit in respondent’s change of name. Such a
change will conform with the change of the entry in his birth certificate from female to male.

WHEREFORE, the Republic’s petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 12, 2005 of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna, is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement
as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 198010. August 12, 2013.*
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. DR. NORMA S. LUGSANAY UY,
respondent.
Remedial Law; Special Proceedings; Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry;
Adversarial Proceedings; Even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the
true facts established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the
appropriate adversary proceeding.―It has been settled in a number of cases starting
with Republic v. Valencia, 141 SCRA 462 (1986), that even substantial errors in a civil
registry may be corrected and the true facts established provided the parties aggrieved by
the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. The pronouncement of
the Court in that case is illuminating: It is undoubtedly true that if the subject matter of a
petition is not for the correction of clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous nature, but
one involving nationality or citizenship, which is indisputably substantial as well as
controverted, affirmative relief cannot be granted in a proceeding summary in nature.
However, it is also true that a right in law may be enforced and a wrong may be remedied as
long as the appropriate remedy is used. This Court adheres to the principle that even
substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established
provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary
proceeding. x x x What is meant by “appropriate adversary proceeding?” Black’s Law
Dictionary defines “adversary proceeding” as follows: One having opposing parties;
contested, as distinguished from an ex parte application, one of which the party seeking
relief has given legal warning to the other party, and afforded the latter an opportunity to
contest it. Excludes an adoption proceeding.
Same; Civil Procedure; Notice of Hearing; The fact that the notice of hearing was published in a
newspaper of general circulation and notice thereof was served upon the State will not change the nature
of the proceedings taken.―Respondent’s birth certificate shows that her full name is Anita Sy, that she is
a Chinese citizen and a legitimate child of Sy Ton and Sotera Lugsanay. In filing the petition, however,
she seeks the correction of her first name and surname, her status from “legitimate” to “illegitimate” and
her citizenship from “Chinese” to “Filipino.” Thus, respondent should have impleaded and notified not
only the Local Civil Registrar but also her parents and siblings as the persons who have interest and are
affected by the changes or corrections respondent wanted to make. The fact that the notice of hearing was
published in a newspaper of general circulation and notice thereof was served upon the State will not
change the nature of the proceedings taken. A reading of Sections 4 and 5, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
shows that the Rules mandate two sets of notices to different potential oppositors: one given to the
persons named in the petition and another given to other persons who are not named in the petition but
nonetheless may be considered interested or affected parties. Summons must, therefore, be served not for
the purpose of vesting the courts with jurisdiction but to comply with the requirements of fair play and
due process to afford the person concerned the opportunity to protect his interest if he so chooses. While
there may be cases where the Court held that the failure to implead and notify the affected or interested
parties may be cured by the publication of the notice of hearing, earnest efforts were made by petitioners
in bringing to court all possible interested parties. Such failure was likewise excused where the
interested parties themselves initiated the corrections proceedings; when there is no actual or
presumptive awareness of the existence of the interested parties; or when a party is inadvertently left
out.
Same; Special Proceedings; Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry; When a petition
for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register involves substantial and
controversial alterations, including those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation,
or legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with the requirements of Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court is mandated.―When a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil
register involves substantial and controversial alterations, including those on citizenship,
legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with the
requirements of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is mandated. If the entries in the civil
register could be corrected or changed through mere summary proceedings and not through
appropriate action wherein all parties who may be affected by the entries are notified or
represented, the door to fraud or other mischief would be set open, the consequence of which
might be detrimental and far reaching.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals. PERALTA, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the Court of
Appeals (CA)1Decision2 dated February 18, 2011 and Resolution3 dated July 27, 2011 in CA-G.R. CV No.
00238-MIN. The assailed decision dismissed the appeal filed by petitioner Republic of the Philippines
and, consequently, affirmed in toto the June 28, 2004 Order4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
27, Gingoog City in Special Proceedings No. 230-2004 granting the Petition for Correction of Entry of
Certificate of Live Birth filed by respondent Dr. Norma S. Lugsanay Uy; while the assailed resolution
denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On March 8, 2004, respondent filed a Petition for Correction of Entry in her Certificate of Live
Birth.5 Impleaded as respondent is the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City. She alleged that she was
born on February 8, 1952 and is the illegitimate daughter of Sy Ton and Sotera Lugsanay 6 Her
Certificate of Live Birth7 shows that her full name is "Anita Sy" when in fact she is allegedly known to
her family and friends as "Norma S. Lugsanay." She further claimed that her school records, Professional
Regulation Commission (PRC) Board of Medicine Certificate,8 and passport9 bear the name "Norma S.
Lugsanay." She also alleged that she is an illegitimate child considering that her parents were never
married, so she had to follow the surname of her mother. 10 She also contended that she is a Filipino
citizen and not Chinese, and all her siblings bear the surname Lugsanay and are all Filipinos. 11
Respondent allegedly filed earlier a petition for correction of entries with the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar of Gingoog City to effect the corrections on her name and citizenship which was supposedly
granted.12 However, the National Statistics Office (NSO) records did not bear such changes. Hence, the
petition before the RTC.
On May 13, 2004, the RTC issued an Order13 finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance
and setting the case for hearing, with the directive that the said Order be published in a newspaper of
general circulation in the City of Gingoog and the Province of Misamis Oriental at least once a week for
three (3) consecutive weeks at the expense of respondent, and that the order and petition be furnished
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the City Prosecutor’s Office for their information and
guidance.14 Pursuant to the RTC Order, respondent complied with the publication requirement.
On June 28, 2004, the RTC issued an Order in favor of respondent, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. THE CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR OF
GINGOOG CITY, or any person acting in his behalf is directed and ordered to effect the correction or change of the entries
in the Certificate of Live Birth of petitioner’s name and citizenship so that the entries would be:
a) As to petitioner’s name :
First Name : NORMA
Middle Name : SY
Last Name : LUGSANAY
b) As to petitioner’s nationality/citizenship :
: FILIPINO
SO ORDERED.15
The RTC concluded that respondent’s petition would neither prejudice the government nor
any third party. It also held that the names "Norma Sy Lugsanay" and "Anita Sy" refer to
one and the same person, especially since the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City has
effected the correction. Considering that respondent has continuously used and has been
known since childhood as "Norma Sy Lugsanay" and as a Filipino citizen, the RTC granted
the petition to avoid confusion.16
On February 18, 2011, the CA affirmed in toto the RTC Order. The CA held that
respondent’s failure to implead other indispensable parties was cured upon the publication
of the Order setting the case for hearing in a newspaper of general circulation for three (3)
consecutive weeks and by serving a copy of the notice to the Local Civil Registrar, the OSG
and the City Prosecutor’s Office.17 As to whether the petition is a collateral attack on
respondent’s filiation, the CA ruled in favor of respondent, considering that her parents
were not legally married and that her siblings’ birth certificates uniformly state that their
surname is Lugsanay and their citizenship is Filipino.18 Petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated July 27, 2011.
Hence, the present petition on the sole ground that the petition is dismissible for failure to
implead indispensable parties.
Cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry is governed by Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court, to wit:
SEC. 1. Who may file petition. – Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning the
civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the
cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province
where the corresponding civil registry is located.
SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. – Upon good and valid grounds, the following entries
in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal
separations; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void from the
beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k)
election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n)
voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name.
SEC. 3. Parties. – When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil
registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made
parties to the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and Publication. – Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time
and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons
named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
SEC. 5. Opposition. – The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under the entry
whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or
from the last date of publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto.
SEC. 6. Expediting proceedings. – The court in which the proceeding is brought may make orders
expediting the proceedings, and may also grant preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights
of the parties pending such proceedings.
SEC. 7. Order. – After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the
cancellation or correction prayed for. In either case, a certified copy of the judgment shall be served upon
the civil registrar concerned who shall annotate the same in his record.19
In this case, respondent sought the correction of entries in her birth certificate, particularly
those pertaining to her first name, surname and citizenship. She sought the correction
allegedly to reflect the name which she has been known for since childhood, including her
legal documents such as passport and school and professional records. She likewise relied on
the birth certificates of her full blood siblings who bear the surname "Lugsanay" instead of
"Sy" and citizenship of "Filipino" instead of "Chinese." The changes, however, are obviously
not mere clerical as they touch on respondent’s filiation and citizenship. In changing her
surname from "Sy" (which is the surname of her father) to "Lugsanay" (which is the
surname of her mother), she, in effect, changes her status from legitimate to illegitimate;
and in changing her citizenship from Chinese to Filipino, the same affects her rights and
obligations in this country. Clearly, the changes are substantial.
It has been settled in a number of cases starting with Republic v. Valencia 20 that even
substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established
provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary
proceeding.21 The pronouncement of the Court in that case is illuminating:
It is undoubtedly true that if the subject matter of a petition is not for the correction of
clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous nature, but one involving nationality or
citizenship, which is indisputably substantial as well as controverted, affirmative relief
cannot be granted in a proceeding summary in nature. However, it is also true that a right
in law may be enforced and a wrong may be remedied as long as the appropriate remedy is
used. This Court adheres to the principle that even substantial errors in a civil registry may
be corrected and the true facts established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail
themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. x x x
What is meant by "appropriate adversary proceeding?" Black’s Law Dictionary defines
"adversary proceeding" as follows:
One having opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from an ex parte application, one of which the
party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party, and afforded the latter an opportunity to
contest it. Excludes an adoption proceeding.22
In sustaining the RTC decision, the CA relied on the Court’s conclusion in Republic v.
Kho,23 Alba v. Court of Appeals,24 and Barco v. Court of Appeals,25 that the failure to
implead indispensable parties was cured by the publication of the notice of hearing
pursuant to the provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. In Republic v. Kho, 26 petitioner
therein appealed the RTC decision granting the petition for correction of entries despite
respondents’ failure to implead the minor’s mother as an indispensable party. The Court,
however, did not strictly apply the provisions of Rule 108, because it opined that it was
highly improbable that the mother was unaware of the proceedings to correct the entries in
her children’s birth certificates especially since the notices, orders and decision of the trial
court were all sent to the residence she shared with them.27
In Alba v. Court of Appeals,28 the Court found nothing wrong with the trial court’s decision
granting the petition for correction of entries filed by respondent although the proceedings
was not actually known by petitioner. In that case, petitioner’s mother and guardian was
impleaded in the petition for correction of entries, and notices were sent to her address
appearing in the subject birth certificate. However, the notice was returned unserved,
because apparently she no longer lived there. Thus, when she allegedly learned of the
granting of the petition, she sought the annulment of judgment which the Court denied.
Considering that the petition for correction of entries is a proceeding in rem, the Court held
that acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner is, therefore, not required
and the absence of personal service was cured by the trial court’s compliance with Rule 108
which requires notice by publication.29
In Barco v. Court of Appeals,30 the Court addressed the question of whether the court
acquired jurisdiction over petitioner and all other indispensable parties to the petition for
correction of entries despite the failure to implead them in said case. While recognizing that
petitioner was indeed an indispensable party, the failure to implead her was cured by
compliance with Section 4 of Rule 108 which requires notice by publication. In so ruling, the
Court pointed out that the petitioner in a petition for correction cannot be presumed to be
aware of all the parties whose interests may be affected by the granting of a petition. It
emphasized that the petitioner therein exerted earnest effort to comply with the provisions
of Rule 108. Thus, the publication of the notice of hearing was considered to have cured the
failure to implead indispensable parties.
In this case, it was only the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City who was impleaded as
respondent in the petition below. This, notwithstanding, the RTC granted her petition and
allowed the correction sought by respondent, which decision was affirmed in toto by the CA.
We do not agree with the RTC and the CA.
This is not the first time that the Court is confronted with the issue involved in this case.
Aside from Kho, Alba and Barco, the Court has addressed the same in Republic v. Coseteng-
Magpayo,31 Ceruila v. Delantar,32 and Labayo-Rowe v. Republic.33
In Republic v. Coseteng-Magpayo,34 claiming that his parents were never legally married,
respondent therein filed a petition to change his name from "Julian Edward Emerson
Coseteng Magpayo," the name appearing in his birth certificate to "Julian Edward Emerson
Marquez Lim Coseteng." The notice setting the petition for hearing was published and there
being no opposition thereto, the trial court issued an order of general default and eventually
granted respondent’s petition deleting the entry on the date and place of marriage of
parties; correcting his surname from "Magpayo" to "Coseteng"; deleting the entry "Coseteng"
for middle name; and deleting the entry "Fulvio Miranda Magpayo, Jr." in the space for his
father. The Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG, assailed the RTC decision on the
grounds that the corrections made on respondent’s birth certificate had the effect of
changing the civil status from legitimate to illegitimate and must only be effected through
an appropriate adversary proceeding. The Court nullified the RTC decision for respondent’s
failure to comply strictly with the procedure laid down in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
Aside from the wrong remedy availed of by respondent as he filed a petition for Change of
Name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, assuming that he filed a petition under Rule
108 which is the appropriate remedy, the petition still failed because of improper venue and
failure to implead the Civil Registrar of Makati City and all affected parties as respondents
in the case.
In Ceruila v. Delantar,35 the Ceruilas filed a petition for the cancellation and annulment of
the birth certificate of respondent on the ground that the same was made as an instrument
of the crime of simulation of birth and, therefore, invalid and spurious, and it falsified all
material entries therein. The RTC issued an order setting the case for hearing with a
directive that the same be published and that any person who is interested in the petition
may interpose his comment or opposition on or before the scheduled hearing. Summons was
likewise sent to the Civil Register of Manila. After which, the trial court granted the
petition and nullified respondent’s birth certificate. Few months after, respondent filed a
petition for the annulment of judgment claiming that she and her guardian were not
notified of the petition and the trial court’s decision, hence, the latter was issued without
jurisdiction and in violation of her right to due process. The Court annulled the trial court’s
decision for failure to comply with the requirements of Rule 108, especially the non-
impleading of respondent herself whose birth certificate was nullified.1âwphi1
In Labayo-Rowe v. Republic,36 petitioner filed a petition for the correction of entries in the
birth certificates of her children, specifically to change her name from Beatriz V.
Labayu/Beatriz Labayo to Emperatriz Labayo, her civil status from "married" to "single,"
and the date and place of marriage from "1953-Bulan" to "No marriage." The Court modified
the trial court’s decision by nullifying the portion thereof which directs the change of
petitioner’s civil status as well as the filiation of her child, because it was the OSG only that
was made respondent and the proceedings taken was summary in nature which is short of
what is required in cases where substantial alterations are sought.
Respondent’s birth certificate shows that her full name is Anita Sy, that she is a Chinese
citizen and a legitimate child of Sy Ton and Sotera Lugsanay. In filing the petition,
however, she seeks the correction of her first name and surname, her status from
"legitimate" to "illegitimate" and her citizenship from "Chinese" to "Filipino." Thus,
respondent should have impleaded and notified not only the Local Civil Registrar but also
her parents and siblings as the persons who have interest and are affected by the changes or
corrections respondent wanted to make.
The fact that the notice of hearing was published in a newspaper of general circulation and
notice thereof was served upon the State will not change the nature of the proceedings
taken.37 A reading of Sections 4 and 5, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court shows that the Rules
mandate two sets of notices to different potential oppositors: one given to the persons named
in the petition and another given to other persons who are not named in the petition but
nonetheless may be considered interested or affected parties. 38 Summons must, therefore, be
served not for the purpose of vesting the courts with jurisdiction but to comply with the
requirements of fair play and due process to afford the person concerned the opportunity to
protect his interest if he so chooses.39
While there may be cases where the Court held that the failure to implead and notify the
affected or interested parties may be cured by the publication of the notice of hearing,
earnest efforts were made by petitioners in bringing to court all possible interested
parties.40 Such failure was likewise excused where the interested parties themselves
initiated the corrections proceedings;41 when there is no actual or presumptive awareness of
the existence of the interested parties;42 or when a party is inadvertently left out.43
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that when a petition for cancellation or correction of
an entry in the civil register involves substantial and controversial alterations, including
those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict
compliance with the requirements of Rule 108 ofthe Rules of Court is mandated. 44 If the
entries in the civil register could be corrected or changed through mere summary
proceedings and not through appropriate action wherein all parties who may be affected by
the entries are notified or represented, the door to fraud or other mischief would be set open,
the consequence of which might be detrimental and far reaching.45
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated February 18,
2011 and Resolution dated July 27, 20011 in CA-G.R. CV No. 00238-MIN, are SET ASIDE. Consequently, the June 28,
2004 Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, Gingoog City, in Spl. Proc. No. 230-2004 granting the Petition for
Correction of Entry of Certificate of Live Birth filed by respondent Dr. Norma S. Lugsanay Uy, is NULLIFIED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 196049. June 26, 2013.*
MINORU FUJIKI, petitioner, vs. MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA,
LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, and THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL
REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE, respondents.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Foreign Judgments; Conflict of Law; For Philippine
courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the
parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign
judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court.—For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign
judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a
foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the
Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in
evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39,
Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court. Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family Court
judgment through (1) an official publication or (2) a certification or copy attested by the
officer who has custody of the judgment. If the office which has custody is in a foreign
country such as Japan, the certification may be made by the proper diplomatic or consular
officer of the Philippine foreign service in Japan and authenticated by the seal of office.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage
affects the civil status, condition and legal capacity of its parties. However, the effect of a
foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the
Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the foreign judgment is consistent with
domestic public policy and other mandatory laws.—A foreign judgment relating to the
status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition and legal capacity of its parties.
However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign
judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the foreign judgment is
consistent with domestic public policy and other mandatory laws. Article 15 of the Civil
Code provides that “[l]aws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition
and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though
living abroad.” This is the rule of lex nationalii in private international law. Thus, the
Philippine State may require, for effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by Philippine
courts of a foreign judgment affecting its citizen, over whom it exercises personal
jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and legal capacity of such citizen.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a
marriage void does not require relitigation under a Philippine court of the case as if it were a
new petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.—A petition to recognize a foreign
judgment declaring a marriage void does not require relitigation under a Philippine court of
the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine courts
cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which the foreign judgment was rendered.
They cannot substitute their judgment on the status, condition and legal capacity of the
foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine courts can
only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according to the rules of evidence.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Once a foreign judgment is admitted and proven in a
Philippine court, it can only be repelled on grounds external to its merits, i.e., “want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.”—
Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign judgment or final order
against a person creates a “presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their
successors in interest by a subsequent title.” Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules of Court
states that “the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.”
Thus, Philippine courts exercise limited review on foreign judgments. Courts are not
allowed to delve into the merits of a foreign judgment. Once a foreign judgment is admitted
and proven in a Philippine court, it can only be repelled on grounds external to its
merits, i.e., “want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact.” The rule on limited review embodies the policy of efficiency and the
protection of party expectations, as well as respecting the jurisdiction of other states.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Civil Law; Divorce; While the Philippines does not have a
divorce law, Philippine courts may, however, recognize a foreign divorce decree under the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino citizen to remarry
when his or her foreign spouse obtained a divorce decree abroad.—Since 1922 in Adong v.
Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil. 43 (1922), Philippine courts have recognized foreign divorce
decrees between a Filipino and a foreign citizen if they are successfully proven under the
rules of evidence. Divorce involves the dissolution of a marriage, but the recognition of a
foreign divorce decree does not involve the extended procedure under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
or the rules of ordinary trial. While the Philippines does not have a divorce law, Philippine
courts may, however, recognize a foreign divorce decree under the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino citizen to remarry when his or her
foreign spouse obtained a divorce decree abroad.72
Same; Same; Same; Same; Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires
proof of fact of the judgment, it may be made in a special proceeding for cancellation or
correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section
3 of the Rules of Court provides that “[a] special proceeding is a remedy by which a party
seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact.”—Since the recognition of a foreign
judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be made in a special proceeding
for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that “[a] special proceeding is a
remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact.” Rule 108
creates a remedy to rectify facts of a person’s life which are recorded by the State pursuant
to the Civil Register Law or Act No. 3753. These are facts of public consequence such as
birth, death or marriage, which the State has an interest in recording. As noted by the
Solicitor General, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, 628 SCRA 266 (2010), this Court declared that
“[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself,
as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is
precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact.”
Civil Law; Marriages; Parties; When Section 2(a) states that “[a] petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the
wife” — it refers to the husband or the wife of the subsisting marriage; The husband or the
wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the one who has the personality to file a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC.—Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting
marriage to question the validity of a subsequent marriage on the ground of bigamy. On the
contrary, when Section 2(a) states that “[a] petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife” — it refers to the husband or
the wife of the subsisting marriage. Under Article 35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous
marriages are void from the beginning. Thus, the parties in a bigamous marriage are
neither the husband nor the wife under the law. The husband or the wife of the prior
subsisting marriage is the one who has the personality to file a petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.73
Criminal Law; Bigamy; Parties; Bigamy is a public crime. Thus, anyone can initiate
prosecution for bigamy because any citizen has an interest in the prosecution and prevention
of crimes. If anyone can file a criminal action which leads to the declaration of nullity of a
bigamous marriage, there is more reason to confer personality to sue on the husband or the
wife of a subsisting marriage.—Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous
marriages void from the beginning, is the civil aspect of Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code, which penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is a public crime. Thus, anyone can initiate
prosecution for bigamy because any citizen has an interest in the prosecution and
prevention of crimes. If anyone can file a criminal action which leads to the declaration of
nullity of a bigamous marriage, there is more reason to confer personality to sue on the
husband or the wife of a subsisting marriage. The prior spouse does not only share in the
public interest of prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is also personally interested in the
purely civil aspect of protecting his marriage.
Remedial Law; Special Proceedings; Correction of Entries; A petition for correction or
cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a
marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and
procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other
related laws.—To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil
registry cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary
to prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under
the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. Among these safeguards are
the requirement of proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of marriage,
support pendente lite of the spouses and children, the liquidation, partition and distribution
of the properties of the spouses, and the investigation of the public prosecutor to determine
collusion. A direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is also
necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the
Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or
correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial Court “where the
corresponding civil registry is located.” In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his
marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.
However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a civil registry
entry based on the recognition of a foreign judgment annulling a marriage where one of the
parties is a citizen of the foreign country. There is neither circumvention of the substantive
and procedural safeguards of marriage under Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of
Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to
nullify a marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a
foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which was already tried and decided
under foreign law. The procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a petition to
recognize a foreign judgment annulling a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a
citizen of the foreign country. Neither can R.A. No. 8369 define the jurisdiction of the
foreign court.
Civil Law; Conflict of Law; Marriages; Annulment of Marriage; Foreign Judgments;
Divorce; Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the
effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine
the validity of the dissolution of the marriage.—Article 26 of the Family Code confers
jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino
spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage.
The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides that “[w]here a marriage
between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.” In Republic v. Orbecido, 472
SCRA 114 (2005), this Court recognized the legislative intent of the second paragraph of
Article 26 which is “to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains
married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse” under the laws of his or her country. The second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code only authorizes Philippine courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce
decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine courts cannot try
the case on the merits because it is tantamount to trying a case for divorce.
Same; Same; Marriages; Annulment of Marriage; Divorce; Foreign Judgments; The
principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage between a Filipino and a
foreign citizen who obtains a foreign judgment nullifying the marriage on the ground of
bigamy; If the foreign judgment is not recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino spouse will
be discriminated — the foreign spouse can remarry while the Filipino spouse cannot
remarry.—The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage between a
Filipino and a foreign citizen who obtains a foreign judgment nullifying the marriage on the
ground of bigamy. The Filipino spouse may file a petition abroad to declare the marriage
void on the ground of bigamy. The principle in the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code applies because the foreign spouse, after the foreign judgment nullifying the
marriage, is capacitated to remarry under the laws of his or her country. If the foreign
judgment is not recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino spouse will be discriminated —
the foreign spouse can remarry while the Filipino spouse cannot remarry.
Same; Same; Same; Bigamy, as a ground for the nullity of marriage, is fully consistent
with Philippine public policy as expressed in Article 35(4) of the Family Code and Article 349
of the Revised Penal Code.—Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,
Philippine courts are empowered to correct a situation where the Filipino spouse is still tied
to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry. Moreover, notwithstanding Article
26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts already have jurisdiction to extend the effect of a
foreign judgment in the Philippines to the extent that the foreign judgment does not
contravene domestic public policy. A critical difference between the case of a foreign divorce
decree and a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is that bigamy, as a ground
for the nullity of marriage, is fully consistent with Philippine public policy as expressed in
Article 35(4) of the Family Code and Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The Filipino
spouse has the option to undergo full trial by filing a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, but this is not the only remedy available to him or
her. Philippine courts have jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying a
bigamous marriage, without prejudice to a criminal prosecution for bigamy.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Courts; Conflict of Law; Philippine courts will only
determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is inconsistent with an overriding public policy
in the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to
repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion,
fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.—Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the
foreign judgment is inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2)
whether any alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign
judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact. If there is neither inconsistency with public policy nor adequate proof
to repel the judgment, Philippine courts should, by default, recognize the foreign judgment
as part of the comity of nations. Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court states that the
foreign judgment is already “presumptive evidence of a right between the parties.” Upon
recognition of the foreign judgment, this right becomes conclusive and the judgment serves
as the basis for the correction or cancellation of entry in the civil registry. The recognition of
the foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is a subsequent event that establishes
a new status, right and fact that needs to be reflected in the civil registry. Otherwise, there
will be an inconsistency between the recognition of the effectivity of the foreign judgment
and the public records in the Philippines.
Criminal Law; Bigamy; Foreign Judgments; Conflict of Law; The recognition of a
foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is not a ground for extinction of criminal
liability under Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised Penal Code.—The recognition of a foreign
judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is without prejudice to prosecution for bigamy
under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The recognition of a foreign judgment
nullifying a bigamous marriage is not a ground for extinction of criminal liability under
Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised Penal Code. Moreover, under Article 91 of the Revised
Penal Code, “[t]he term of prescription [of the crime of bigamy] shall not run when the
offender is absent from the Philippine archipelago.”
PETITION for review on certiorari of the order of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Br. 107.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Lorenzo U. Padilla for petitioner.
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a direct recourse to this Court from the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 107,
Quezon City, through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
on a pure question of law. The petition assails the Order1 dated 31 January 2011 of the RTC
in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 and its Resolution dated 2 March 2011 denying petitioner’s
Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC dismissed the petition for "Judicial Recognition of
Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)" based on improper venue
and the lack of personality of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the petition.
The Facts
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz
Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines2 on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit
well with petitioner’s parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he
resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first
marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon
City, Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered
physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.3
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In
2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared
the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. 4 On 14 January
2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment
(or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese Family
Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and
Maekara be declared void ab initiounder Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the
Philippines;5 and (3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to
annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between
Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the Office of the Administrator
and Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics Office (NSO).6
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC immediately issued an Order dismissing
the petition and withdrawing the case from its active civil docket.7 The RTC cited the
following provisions of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC):
Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. –
(a) Who may file. – A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be
filed solely by the husband or the wife.
xxxx
Sec. 4. Venue. – The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city where
the petitioner or the respondent has been residing for at least six months prior to the date of
filing, or in the case of a non-resident respondent, where he may be found in the Philippines,
at the election of the petitioner. x x x
The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the petition was in "gross violation" of the
above provisions. The trial court based its dismissal on Section 5(4) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
which provides that "[f]ailure to comply with any of the preceding requirements may be a
ground for immediate dismissal of the petition."8 Apparently, the RTC took the view that
only "the husband or the wife," in this case either Maekara or Marinay, can file the petition
to declare their marriage void, and not Fujiki.
Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
contemplated ordinary civil actions for declaration of nullity and annulment of marriage.
Thus, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply. A petition for recognition of foreign judgment is
a special proceeding, which "seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact,"9 and
not a civil action which is "for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or
redress of a wrong."10 In other words, the petition in the RTC sought to establish (1) the
status and concomitant rights of Fujiki and Marinay as husband and wife and (2) the fact of
the rendition of the Japanese Family Court judgment declaring the marriage between
Marinay and Maekara as void on the ground of bigamy. The petitioner contended that the
Japanese judgment was consistent with Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the
Philippines11 on bigamy and was therefore entitled to recognition by Philippine courts.12
In any case, it was also Fujiki’s view that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applied only to void
marriages under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological
incapacity.13 Thus, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC provides that "a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages may be filed solely by the husband or the
wife." To apply Section 2(a) in bigamy would be absurd because only the guilty parties
would be permitted to sue. In the words of Fujiki, "[i]t is not, of course, difficult to realize
that the party interested in having a bigamous marriage declared a nullity would be the
husband in the prior, pre-existing marriage."14 Fujiki had material interest and therefore
the personality to nullify a bigamous marriage.
Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of
the Rules of Court is applicable. Rule 108 is the "procedural implementation" of the Civil
Register Law (Act No. 3753)15 in relation to Article 413 of the Civil Code. 16 The Civil
Register Law imposes a duty on the "successful petitioner for divorce or annulment of
marriage to send a copy of the final decree of the court to the local registrar of the
municipality where the dissolved or annulled marriage was solemnized."17 Section 2 of Rule
108 provides that entries in the civil registry relating to "marriages," "judgments of
annulments of marriage" and "judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning" are
subject to cancellation or correction.18 The petition in the RTC sought (among others) to
annotate the judgment of the Japanese Family Court on the certificate of marriage between
Marinay and Maekara.
Fujiki’s motion for reconsideration in the RTC also asserted that the trial court "gravely
erred" when, on its own, it dismissed the petition based on improper venue. Fujiki stated
that the RTC may be confusing the concept of venue with the concept of jurisdiction,
because it is lack of jurisdiction which allows a court to dismiss a case on its own. Fujiki
cited Dacoycoy v. Intermediate Appellate Court19 which held that the "trial court cannot pre-
empt the defendant’s prerogative to object to the improper laying of the venue by motu
proprio dismissing the case."20Moreover, petitioner alleged that the trial court should not
have "immediately dismissed" the petition under Section 5 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC because
he substantially complied with the provision.
On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. In its
Resolution, the RTC stated that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies because the petitioner, in
effect, prays for a decree of absolute nullity of marriage. 21 The trial court reiterated its two
grounds for dismissal, i.e. lack of personality to sue and improper venue under Sections 2(a)
and 4 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. The RTC considered Fujiki as a "third person"22 in the
proceeding because he "is not the husband in the decree of divorce issued by the Japanese
Family Court, which he now seeks to be judicially recognized, x x x."23 On the other hand,
the RTC did not explain its ground of impropriety of venue. It only said that "[a]lthough the
Court cited Sec. 4 (Venue) x x x as a ground for dismissal of this case[,] it should be taken
together with the other ground cited by the Court x x x which is Sec. 2(a) x x x."24
The RTC further justified its motu proprio dismissal of the petition based on Braza v. The
City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental. 25 The Court in Braza ruled
that "[i]n a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or
Correction of Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify
marriages x x x."26 Braza emphasized that the "validity of marriages as well as legitimacy
and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party,
and not through a collateral attack such as [a] petition [for correction of entry] x x x."27
The RTC considered the petition as a collateral attack on the validity of marriage between
Marinay and Maekara. The trial court held that this is a "jurisdictional ground" to dismiss
the petition.28 Moreover, the verification and certification against forum shopping of the
petition was not authenticated as required under Section 529 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
Hence, this also warranted the "immediate dismissal" of the petition under the same
provision.
The Manifestation and Motion of the Office of the Solicitor General and the
Letters of Marinay and Maekara
On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to file their comment on the petition for
review.30 The public respondents, the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the
Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the NSO, participated through the Office of
the Solicitor General. Instead of a comment, the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and
Motion.31
The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He prayed that the RTC’s "pronouncement
that the petitioner failed to comply with x x x A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC x x x be set aside" and
that the case be reinstated in the trial court for further proceedings. 32 The Solicitor General
argued that Fujiki, as the spouse of the first marriage, is an injured party who can sue to
declare the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara void. The Solicitor General
cited Juliano-Llave v. Republic33 which held that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does
not apply in cases of bigamy. In Juliano-Llave, this Court explained:
[t]he subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she had only discovered
during the connubial period that the marriage was bigamous, and especially if the conjugal
bliss had already vanished. Should parties in a subsequent marriage benefit from the
bigamous marriage, it would not be expected that they would file an action to declare the
marriage void and thus, in such circumstance, the "injured spouse" who should be given a
legal remedy is the one in a subsisting previous marriage. The latter is clearly the aggrieved
party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the property ownership
aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior
spouse. The subsequent marriage will always be a reminder of the infidelity of the spouse
and the disregard of the prior marriage which sanctity is protected by the Constitution. 34
The Solicitor General contended that the petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court
judgment may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding. 35 In Corpuz v. Santo Tomas,36 this Court
held that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108
proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular
fact."37 While Corpuzconcerned a foreign divorce decree, in the present case the Japanese
Family Court judgment also affected the civil status of the parties, especially Marinay, who
is a Filipino citizen.
The Solicitor General asserted that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is the procedure to record
"[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons" in the civil registry
as required by Article 407 of the Civil Code. In other words, "[t]he law requires the entry in
the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce legal consequences upon a person’s legal
capacity and status x x x."38 The Japanese Family Court judgment directly bears on the civil
status of a Filipino citizen and should therefore be proven as a fact in a Rule 108 proceeding.
Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no jurisdictional infirmity in assailing a
void marriage under Rule 108, citing De Castro v. De Castro39 and Niñal v. Bayadog40 which
declared that "[t]he validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked."41
Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the Court to comply with the directive for
them to comment on the petition.42 Maekara wrote that Marinay concealed from him the
fact that she was previously married to Fujiki.43Maekara also denied that he inflicted any
form of violence on Marinay.44 On the other hand, Marinay wrote that she had no reason to
oppose the petition.45 She would like to maintain her silence for fear that anything she say
might cause misunderstanding between her and Fujiki.46
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following legal issues:
(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.
(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a
foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse
and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.
(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a
proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule
108 of the Rules of Court.
The Ruling of the Court
We grant the petition.
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign
judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a
foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic,47 this Court held that the rule in
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or
annulment of marriage "does not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy."48
I.
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage
where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove
the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy of the
foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132,
Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court. 49 Petitioner
may prove the Japanese Family Court judgment through (1) an official publication or (2) a
certification or copy attested by the officer who has custody of the judgment. If the office
which has custody is in a foreign country such as Japan, the certification may be made by
the proper diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign service in Japan and
authenticated by the seal of office.50
To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign judgment
would mean that the trial court and the parties should follow its provisions, including the
form and contents of the petition,51 the service of summons,52 the investigation of the public
prosecutor,53 the setting of pre-trial,54 the trial55 and the judgment of the trial court.56 This
is absurd because it will litigate the case anew. It will defeat the purpose of recognizing
foreign judgments, which is "to limit repetitive litigation on claims and issues."57 The
interpretation of the RTC is tantamount to relitigating the case on the merits. In Mijares v.
Rañada,58 this Court explained that "[i]f every judgment of a foreign court were reviewable
on the merits, the plaintiff would be forced back on his/her original cause of action,
rendering immaterial the previously concluded litigation."59
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition and
legal capacity of its parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To
extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must determine
if the foreign judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and other mandatory
laws.60 Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights and duties,
or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, even though living abroad." This is the rule of lex nationalii in private
international law. Thus, the Philippine State may require, for effectivity in the Philippines,
recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment affecting its citizen, over whom it
exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and legal capacity of such
citizen.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require
relitigation under a Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which
the foreign judgment was rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment on the status,
condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another
state. Thus, Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according
to the rules of evidence.
Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign judgment or final order
against a person creates a "presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their
successors in interest by a subsequent title." Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules of Court
states that "the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact."
Thus, Philippine courts exercise limited review on foreign judgments. Courts are not
allowed to delve into the merits of a foreign judgment. Once a foreign judgment is admitted
and proven in a Philippine court, it can only be repelled on grounds external to its
merits, i.e. , "want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact." The rule on limited review embodies the policy of efficiency and the
protection of party expectations,61 as well as respecting the jurisdiction of other states.62
Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,63 Philippine courts have recognized foreign divorce
decrees between a Filipino and a foreign citizen if they are successfully proven under the
rules of evidence.64 Divorce involves the dissolution of a marriage, but the recognition of a
foreign divorce decree does not involve the extended procedure under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
or the rules of ordinary trial. While the Philippines does not have a divorce law, Philippine
courts may, however, recognize a foreign divorce decree under the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino citizen to remarry when his or her
foreign spouse obtained a divorce decree abroad.65
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese Family
Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of
bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is
fully consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from
the beginning under Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of
the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court
judgment in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section
48(b) of the Rules of Court.
II.
Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment, it
may be made in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court
provides that "[a] special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a
status, a right, or a particular fact." Rule 108 creates a remedy to rectify facts of a person’s
life which are recorded by the State pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act No. 3753.
These are facts of public consequence such as birth, death or marriage, 66 which the State
has an interest in recording. As noted by the Solicitor General, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas this
Court declared that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule
108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact."67
Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in any act, event, order or
decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil
register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating
thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry
is located. (Emphasis supplied)
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court
judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy
because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the same reason
he has the personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage
between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of the
Japanese Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining
the integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it. There
is also no doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage
in the civil registry, which compromises the public record of his marriage. The interest
derives from the substantive right of the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited
instances68) his most intimate human relation, but also to protect his property interests that
arise by operation of law the moment he contracts marriage. 69 These property interests in
marriage include the right to be supported "in keeping with the financial capacity of the
family"70 and preserving the property regime of the marriage.71
Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution,72
but a
spouse’s right in a marriage extends further to relational rights recognized under Title III
("Rights and Obligations between Husband and Wife") of the Family Code.73 A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC cannot "diminish, increase, or modify" the substantive right of the spouse to maintain
the integrity of his marriage.74 In any case, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC preserves
this substantive right by limiting the personality to sue to the husband or the wife of the
union recognized by law.
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting marriage to
question the validity of a subsequent marriage on the ground of bigamy. On the contrary,
when Section 2(a) states that "[a] petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage
may be filed solely by the husband or the wife"75—it refers to the husband or the wife of
the subsisting marriage. Under Article 35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous marriages are
void from the beginning. Thus, the parties in a bigamous marriage are neither the husband
nor the wife under the law. The husband or the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the
one who has the personality to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages void from the
beginning, is the civil aspect of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code,76 which penalizes
bigamy. Bigamy is a public crime. Thus, anyone can initiate prosecution for bigamy because
any citizen has an interest in the prosecution and prevention of crimes. 77 If anyone can file a
criminal action which leads to the declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage,78 there is
more reason to confer personality to sue on the husband or the wife of a subsisting
marriage. The prior spouse does not only share in the public interest of prosecuting and
preventing crimes, he is also personally interested in the purely civil aspect of protecting his
marriage.
When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the spouse is clearly an
injured party and is therefore interested in the judgment of the suit.79 Juliano-Llave ruled
that the prior spouse "is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only
threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of
all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse."80 Being a real party in interest, the
prior spouse is entitled to sue in order to declare a bigamous marriage void. For this
purpose, he can petition a court to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the bigamous
marriage and judicially declare as a fact that such judgment is effective in the Philippines.
Once established, there should be no more impediment to cancel the entry of the bigamous
marriage in the civil registry.
III.
In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, this Court held
that a "trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages" in a special proceeding for
cancellation or correction of entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. 81 Thus, the "validity
of marriage[] x x x can be questioned only in a direct action" to nullify the marriage. 82 The
RTC relied on Braza in dismissing the petition for recognition of foreign judgment as a
collateral attack on the marriage between Marinay and Maekara.
Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve a recognition of a foreign judgment
nullifying a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country.
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot
substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent
circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family
Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. Among these safeguards are the
requirement of proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of
marriage,83 support pendente lite of the spouses and children,84 the liquidation, partition
and distribution of the properties of the spouses,85 and the investigation of the public
prosecutor to determine collusion.86 A direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment of
marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts
under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation
or correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial Court "where
the corresponding civil registry is located."87 In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot
dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil
registry.
However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a civil registry
entry based on the recognition of a foreign judgment annulling a marriage where one of the
parties is a citizen of the foreign country. There is neither circumvention of the substantive
and procedural safeguards of marriage under Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of
Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to
nullify a marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a
foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which was already tried and decided
under foreign law. The procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a petition to
recognize a foreign judgment annulling a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a
citizen of the foreign country. Neither can R.A. No. 8369 define the jurisdiction of the
foreign court.
Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of
a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the
validity of the dissolution of the marriage. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code provides that "[w]here a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry
under Philippine law." In Republic v. Orbecido,88 this Court recognized the legislative intent
of the second paragraph of Article 26 which is "to avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no there is neither inconsistency with public policy nor adequate proof to repel the judgment,
longer married to the Filipino spouse"89 under the laws of his or her country. The second Philippine courts should, by default, recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity of
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code only authorizes Philippine courts to adopt the nations. Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court states that the foreign judgment is
effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce. already "presumptive evidence of a right between the parties." Upon recognition of the
Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits because it is tantamount to trying a case foreign judgment, this right becomes conclusive and the judgment serves as the basis for the
for divorce. correction or cancellation of entry in the civil registry. The recognition of the foreign
judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is a subsequent event that establishes a new
status, right and fact92 that needs to be reflected in the civil registry. Otherwise, there will
The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective measure to address the anomaly that
be an inconsistency between the recognition of the effectivity of the foreign judgment and
results from a marriage between a Filipino, whose laws do not allow divorce, and a foreign
the public records in the Philippines.1âwphi1
citizen, whose laws allow divorce. The anomaly consists in the Filipino spouse being tied to
the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country.
The correction is made by extending in the Philippines the effect of the foreign divorce However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is without
decree, which is already effective in the country where it was rendered. The second prejudice to prosecution for bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. 93 The
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is based on this Court’s decision in Van Dorn v. recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is not a ground for
Romillo90 which declared that the Filipino spouse "should not be discriminated against in extinction of criminal liability under Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised Penal Code.
her own country if the ends of justice are to be served."91 Moreover, under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, "[t]he term of prescription [of the
crime of bigamy] shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine archipelago."
The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage between a Filipino and
a foreign citizen who obtains a foreign judgment nullifying the marriage on the ground of Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court no longer sees the need to address the
bigamy. The Filipino spouse may file a petition abroad to declare the marriage void on the questions on venue and the contents and form of the petition under Sections 4 and 5,
ground of bigamy. The principle in the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code respectively, of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
applies because the foreign spouse, after the foreign judgment nullifying the marriage, is
capacitated to remarry under the laws of his or her country. If the foreign judgment is not
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated 31 January 2011 and the
recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino spouse will be discriminated—the foreign spouse
Resolution dated 2 March 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 107, Quezon City, in
can remarry while the Filipino spouse cannot remarry.
Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court
is ORDERED to REINSTATE the petition for further proceedings in accordance with this
Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts are Decision.
empowered to correct a situation where the Filipino spouse is still tied to the marriage while
the foreign spouse is free to marry. Moreover, notwithstanding Article 26 of the Family
SO ORDERED.
Code, Philippine courts already have jurisdiction to extend the effect of a foreign judgment
in the Philippines to the extent that the foreign judgment does not contravene domestic
public policy. A critical difference between the case of a foreign divorce decree and a foreign
judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is that bigamy, as a ground for the nullity of
marriage, is fully consistent with Philippine public policy as expressed in Article 35(4) of the
Family Code and Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The Filipino spouse has the option
to undergo full trial by filing a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC, but this is not the only remedy available to him or her. Philippine courts have
jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage, without
prejudice to a criminal prosecution for bigamy.

In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute

their judgment on how a case was decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on the
"family rights and duties, or on the status, condition and legal capacity" of the foreign
citizen who is a party to the foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the
question of whether to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a
foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage involving a citizen of a foreign country,
Philippine courts only decide whether to extend its effect to the Filipino party, under the
rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil Code.

For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is
inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any
alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If
G.R. No. 189538. February 10, 2014.*
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. MERLINDA L. OLAYBAR, respondent.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on Certiorari; A direct
recourse to the Supreme Court from the decisions and final orders of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) may be taken where only questions of law are raised or involved.—At the outset,
it is necessary to stress that a direct recourse to this Court from the decisions and final
orders of the RTC may be taken where only questions of law are raised or involved. There is
a question of law when the doubt arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts,
which does not call for the examination of the probative value of the evidence of the parties.
Here, the issue raised by petitioner is whether or not the cancellation of entries in the
marriage contract which, in effect, nullifies the marriage may be undertaken in a Rule 108
proceeding. Verily, petitioner raised a pure question of law.
Same; Special Proceedings; Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry; Since the
promulgation of Republic v. Valencia, 141 SCRA 462 in 1986, the Supreme Court has
repeatedly ruled that “even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected through a
petition filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, with the true facts established and the
parties aggrieved by the error availing themselves of the appropriate adversarial
proceeding.”—Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or
correction of entries in the civil registry. The proceedings may either be summary or
adversary. If the correction is clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is summary. If the
rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed
substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is adversary. Since the promulgation
of Republic v. Valencia, 141 SCRA 462 in 1986, the Court has repeatedly ruled that “even
substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected through a petition filed under Rule
108, with the true facts established and the parties aggrieved by the error availing
themselves of the appropriate adversarial proceeding.” An appropriate adversary suit or
proceeding is one where the trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts
have been fully and properly developed, where opposing counsel have been given
opportunity to demolish the opposite party’s case, and where the evidence has been
thoroughly weighed and considered.
Same; Same; Same; As long as the procedural requirements in Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court are followed, it is the appropriate adversary proceeding to effect substantial corrections
and changes in entries of the civil register.—It is true that in special proceedings, formal
pleadings and a hearing may be dispensed with, and the remedy [is] granted upon mere
application or motion. However, a special proceeding is not always summary. The procedure
laid down in Rule 108 is not a summary proceeding per se. It requires publication of the
petition; it mandates the inclusion as parties of all persons who may claim interest which
would be affected by the cancellation or correction; it also requires the civil registrar and
any person in interest to file their opposition, if any; and it states that although the court
may make orders expediting the proceedings, it is after hearing that the court shall either
dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the same. Thus, as long as the procedural
requirements in Rule 108 are followed, it is the appropriate adversary proceeding to effect
substantial corrections and changes in entries of the civil register.
Same; Same; Same; A Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere
expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.—Indeed the Court made a
pronouncement in the recent case of Minoru Fujiki v. Maria Paz Galela Marinay, Shinichi
Maekara, Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City, and the Administrator and Civil Registrar
General of the National Statistics Office, 700 SCRA 69 (2013), that: To be sure, a petition for
correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for an action to
invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the
substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC and other related laws. Among these safeguards are the requirement of proving the
limited grounds for the dissolution of marriage, support pendente lite of the spouses and
children, the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses and the
investigation of the public prosecutor to determine collusion. A direct action for declaration
of nullity or annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention of the
jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No.
8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed
in the Regional Trial Court where the corresponding civil registry is located. In other words,
a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry
of marriage in the civil registry.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and order Regional Trial Court of Cebu
City, Br. 6.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Office of the Solicitor General for petitioner.
Salvador O. Solima for respondent.
PERALTA, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the
Regional Trial Court1(RTC) Decision2 dated May 5, 2009 and Order3 dated August 25, 2009
in SP. Proc. No. 16519-CEB. The assailed decision granted respondent Merlinda L.
Olaybar's petition for cancellation of entries in the latter's marriage contract; while the
assailed order denied the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Republic of the
Philippines through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).
The facts of the case are as follows:
Respondent requested from the National Statistics Office (NSO) a Certificate of No
Marriage (CENOMAR) as one of the requirements for her marriage with her boyfriend of
five years. Upon receipt thereof, she discovered that she was already married to a certain Ye
Son Sune, a Korean National, on June 24, 2002, at the Office of the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities (MTCC), Palace of Justice. She denied having contracted said marriage and claimed
that she did not know the alleged husband; she did not appear before the solemnizing
officer; and, that the signature appearing in the marriage certificate is not hers. 4 She, thus,
filed a Petition for Cancellation of Entries in the Marriage Contract, especially the entries in
the wife portion thereof.5 Respondent impleaded the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, as
well as her alleged husband, as parties to the case.
During trial, respondent testified on her behalf and explained that she could not have
appeared before Judge Mamerto Califlores, the supposed solemnizing officer, at the time the
marriage was allegedly celebrated, because she was then in Makati working as a medical
distributor in Hansao Pharma. She completely denied having known the supposed husband,
but she revealed that she recognized the named witnesses to the marriage as she had met
them while she was working as a receptionist in Tadels Pension House. She believed that
her name was used by a certain Johnny Singh, who owned a travel agency, whom she gave
her personal circumstances in order for her to obtain a passport. 6 Respondent also presented
as witness a certain Eufrocina Natinga, an employee of MTCC, Branch 1, who confirmed
that the marriage of Ye Son Sune was indeed celebrated in their office, but claimed that the
alleged wife who appeared was definitely not respondent. 7 Lastly, a document examiner
testified that the signature appearing in the marriage contract was forged.8
On May 5, 2009, the RTC rendered the assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, the petition is granted in favor of the
petitioner, Merlinda L. Olaybar. The Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City is directed to cancel
all the entries in the WIFE portion of the alleged marriage contract of the petitioner and
respondent Ye Son Sune.
SO ORDERED.9
Finding that the signature appearing in the subject marriage contract was not that of
respondent, the court found basis in granting the latter’s prayer to straighten her record
and rectify the terrible mistake.10
Petitioner, however, moved for the reconsideration of the assailed Decision on the grounds
that: (1) there was no clerical spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the
marriage contract for it to fall within the provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court; and
(2) granting the cancellation of all the entries in the wife portion of the alleged marriage
contract is, in effect, declaring the marriage void ab initio.11
In an Order dated August 25, 2009, the RTC denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration
couched in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the court hereby denies the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Republic
of the Philippines. Furnish copies of this order to the Office of the Solicitor General, the
petitioner’s counsel, and all concerned government agencies.
SO ORDERED.12
Contrary to petitioner’s stand, the RTC held that it had jurisdiction to take cognizance of
cases for correction of entries even on substantial errors under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court being the appropriate adversary proceeding required. Considering that respondent’s
identity was used by an unknown person to contract marriage with a Korean national, it
would not be feasible for respondent to institute an action for declaration of nullity of
marriage since it is not one of the void marriages under Articles 35 and 36 of the Family
Code.13
Petitioner now comes before the Court in this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the assailed RTC Decision and Order based
on the following grounds:
I.
RULE 108 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT APPLIES ONLY WHEN THERE ARE
ERRORS IN THE ENTRIES SOUGHT TO BE CANCELLED OR CORRECTED.
II.
GRANTING THE CANCELLATION OF "ALL THE ENTRIES IN THE WIFE PORTION OF
THE ALLEGED MARRIAGE CONTRACT," IS IN EFFECT DECLARING THE MARRIAGE
VOID AB INITIO.14
Petitioner claims that there are no errors in the entries sought to be cancelled or corrected,
because the entries made in the certificate of marriage are the ones provided by the person
who appeared and represented herself as Merlinda L. Olaybar and are, in fact, the latter’s
personal circumstances.15 In directing the cancellation of the entries in the wife portion of
the certificate of marriage, the RTC, in effect, declared the marriage null and void ab
initio.16Thus, the petition instituted by respondent is actually a petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage in the guise of a Rule 108 proceeding.17
We deny the petition.
At the outset, it is necessary to stress that a direct recourse to this Court from the decisions
and final orders of the RTC may be taken where only questions of law are raised or
involved. There is a question of law when the doubt arises as to what the law is on a certain
state of facts, which does not call for the examination of the probative value of the evidence
of the parties.18 Here, the issue raised by petitioner is whether or not the cancellation of
entries in the marriage contract which, in effect, nullifies the marriage may be undertaken
in a Rule 108 proceeding. Verily, petitioner raised a pure question of law.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets forth the rules on cancellation or correction of entries in
the civil registry, to wit:
SEC. 1. Who may file petition. – Any person interested in any act, event, order or
decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil
register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry
relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the
corresponding civil registry is located.
SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. – Upon good and valid
grounds, the following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected:
(a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments of
annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void from the
beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural
children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil
interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a
minor; and (o) changes of name.
SEC. 3. Parties. – When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register
is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which
would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and Publication. – Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall,
by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause
reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The
court shall also cause the order to be published once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
SEC. 5. Opposition. – The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any
interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within
 fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of
such notice, file his opposition thereto.
SEC. 6. Expediting proceedings. – The court in which the proceedings is brought
may make orders expediting the proceedings, and may also grant preliminary
injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties pending such
proceedings.
where the alleged marriage was conducted, as well as a document examiner, testified.
Several documents were also considered as evidence. With the testimonies and other
evidence presented, the trial court found that the signature appearing in the subject
marriage certificate was different from respondent’s signature appearing in some of her
government issued identification cards.23 The court thus made a categorical conclusion that
respondent’s signature in the marriage certificate was not hers and, therefore, was forged.
Clearly, it was established that, as she claimed in her petition, no such marriage was
celebrated.

SEC. 7. Order. – After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition or issue
Indeed the Court made a pronouncement in the recent case of Minoru Fujiki v. Maria Paz
an order granting the cancellation or correction prayed for. In either case, a
Galela Marinay, Shinichi Maekara, Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City, and the
certified copy of the judgment shall be served upon the civil registrar concerned
Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the National Statistics Office 24 that:
who shall annotate the same in his record.

To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or correction of
substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent
entries in the civil registry. The proceedings may either be summary or adversary. If the
circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family
correction is clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is summary. If the rectification
Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. Among these safeguards are the
affects the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the
requirement of proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of marriage, support
procedure to be adopted is adversary. Since the promulgation of Republic v. Valencia19 in
pendente lite of the spouses and children, the liquidation, partition and distribution of the
1986, the Court has repeatedly ruled that "even substantial errors in a civil registry may be
properties of the spouses and the investigation of the public prosecutor to determine
corrected through a petition filed under Rule 108, with the true facts established and the
collusion. A direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is also
parties aggrieved by the error availing themselves of the appropriate adversarial
necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the
proceeding."20 An appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is one where the trial court has
Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or
conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and properly developed,
correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial Court where the
where opposing counsel have been given opportunity to demolish the opposite party’s case,
corresponding civil registry is located. In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his
and where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and considered.21
marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.

It is true that in special proceedings, formal pleadings and a hearing may be dispensed
Aside from the certificate of marriage, no such evidence was presented to show the existence
with, and the remedy [is] granted upon mere application or motion. However, a special
of marriage.1âwphi1 Rather, respondent showed by overwhelming evidence that no
proceeding is not always summary. The procedure laid down in Rule 108 is not a summary
marriage was entered into and that she was not even aware of such existence. The
proceeding per se. It requires publication of the petition; it mandates the inclusion as
testimonial and documentary evidence clearly established that the only "evidence" of
parties of all persons who may claim interest which would be affected by the cancellation or
marriage which is the marriage certificate was a forgery. While we maintain that Rule 108
correction; it also requires the civil registrar and any person in interest to file their
cannot be availed of to determine the validity of marriage, we cannot nullify the proceedings
opposition, if any; and it states that although the court may make orders expediting the
before the trial court where all the parties had been given the opportunity to contest the
proceedings, it is after hearing that the court shall either dismiss the petition or issue an
allegations of respondent; the procedures were followed, and all the evidence of the parties
order granting the same. Thus, as long as the procedural requirements in Rule 108 are
had already been admitted and examined. Respondent indeed sought, not the nullification of
followed, it is the appropriate adversary proceeding to effect substantial corrections and
marriage as there was no marriage to speak of, but the correction of the record of such
changes in entries of the civil register.22
marriage to reflect the truth as set forth by the evidence. Otherwise stated, in allowing the
correction of the subject certificate of marriage by cancelling the wife portion thereof, the
In this case, the entries made in the wife portion of the certificate of marriage are trial court did not, in any way, declare the marriage void as there was no marriage to speak
admittedly the personal circumstances of respondent. The latter, however, claims that her of.
signature was forged and she was not the one who contracted marriage with the purported
husband. In other words, she claims that no such marriage was entered into or if there was,
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Regional
she was not the one who entered into such contract. It must be recalled that when
Trial Court Decision dated May 5, 2009 and Order dated August 25, 2009 in SP. Proc. No.
respondent tried to obtain a CENOMAR from the NSO, it appeared that she was married to
16519-CEB, are AFFIRMED.
a certain Ye Son Sune. She then sought the cancellation of entries in the wife portion of the
marriage certificate.
SO ORDERED.
In filing the petition for correction of entry under Rule 108, respondent made the Local Civil
Registrar of Cebu City, as well as her alleged husband Ye Son Sune, as parties-respondents.
It is likewise undisputed that the procedural requirements set forth in Rule 108 were
complied with. The Office of the Solicitor General was likewise notified of the petition which
in turn authorized the Office of the City Prosecutor to participate in the proceedings. More
importantly, trial was conducted where respondent herself, the stenographer of the court
 G.R. No. 197174. September 10, 2014.*
FRANCLER P. ONDE, petitioner, vs. THE OFFICE OF THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR
OF LAS PIÑAS CITY, respondent.
Remedial Law; Special Proceedings; Correction of Entries in the Civil Register;
Clerical or Typographical Errors; Changes of First Name; Under Section 1 of Republic Act
(RA) No. 9048, clerical or typographical errors on entries in a civil register can be corrected
and changes of first name can be done by the concerned city civil registrar without need of a
judicial order.—We agree with the RTC that the first name of petitioner and his mother as
appearing in his birth certificate can be corrected by the city civil registrar under R.A. No.
9048. We note that petitioner no longer contested the RTC’s ruling on this point. Indeed,
under Section 1 of R.A. No. 9048, clerical or typographical errors on entries in a civil
register can be corrected and changes of first name can be done by the concerned city civil
registrar without need of a judicial order. Aforesaid Section 1, as amended by R.A. No.
10172, now reads: SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and
Change of First Name or Nickname.—No entry in a civil register shall be changed or
corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors and
change of first name or nickname, the day and month in the date of birth or sex of a
person where it is patently clear that there was a clerical or typographical error or mistake
in the entry, which can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or
municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act
and its implementing rules and regulations.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The remedy and the proceedings regulating change
of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial; The law removed from
the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of clerical or typographical
errors.—In Silverio v. Republic, 537 SCRA 373 (2007), we held that under R.A. No. 9048,
jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now primarily lodged with
administrative officers. The intent and effect of said law is to exclude the change of first
name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction
of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative
petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied. The remedy and the
proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not
judicial. In Republic v. Cagandahan, 565 SCRA 72 (2008), we said that under R.A. No. 9048,
the correction of clerical or typographical errors can now be made through administrative
proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. The law removed from the ambit of
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of clerical or typographical errors. Thus,
petitioner can avail of this administrative remedy for the correction of his and his mother’s
first name.
Same; Same; Same; Correcting the entry on petitioner’s birth certificate that his
parents were married on December 23, 1983 in Bicol to “not married” is a substantial
correction requiring adversarial proceedings.—We also agree with the RTC in ruling that
correcting the entry on petitioner’s birth certificate that his parents were married on
December 23, 1983 in Bicol to “not married” is a substantial correction requiring adversarial
proceedings. Said correction is substantial as it will affect his legitimacy and convert him
from a legitimate child to an illegitimate one. In Republic v. Uy, 703 SCRA 425 (2013), we
held that corrections of entries in the civil register including those on
citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, involve
substantial alterations. Substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true
facts established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the
appropriate adversary proceedings.
Same; Same; Same; Even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and
the true facts established under Rule 108 [of the Rules of Court] provided the parties
aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding.—The RTC’s
dismissal is without prejudice. As we said, petitioner can avail of the administrative remedy
for the correction of his and his mother’s first name. He can also file a new petition before
the RTC to correct the alleged erroneous entry on his birth certificate that his parents were
married on December 23, 1983 in Bicol. This substantial correction is allowed under Rule
108 of the Rules of Court. As we reiterated in Eleosida v. Local Civil Registrar of Quezon
City, 382 SCRA 22 (2002): x x x This is our ruling in Republic v. Valencia, where we held
that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts
established under Rule 108 [of the Rules of Court]provided the parties aggrieved by
the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. x x x x x x It is true in
the case at bar that the changes sought to be made by petitioner are not merely clerical or
harmless errors but substantial ones as they would affect the status of the marriage
between petitioner and Carlos Borbon, as well as the legitimacy of their son, Charles
Christian. Changes of such nature, however, are now allowed under Rule 108 in
accordance with our ruling in Republic v. Valencia provided that the appropriate procedural
requirements are complied with.
Same; Same; Same; Parties; A petition seeking a substantial correction of an entry in a
civil register must implead as parties to the proceedings not only the local civil registrar, as
petitioner did in the dismissed petition for correction of entries, but also all persons who have
or claim any interest which would be affected by the correction.—A petition seeking a
substantial correction of an entry in a civil register must implead as parties to the
proceedings not only the local civil registrar, as petitioner did in the dismissed petition for
correction of entries, but also all persons who have or claim any interest which would be
affected by the correction. This is required by Section 3, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 3. Parties.—When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is
sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which
would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.
Same; Same; Same; Same; In Republic v. Uy, 703 SCRA 425 (2013), the Supreme
Court (SC) has similarly ruled that when a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry
in the civil register involves substantial and controversial alterations, including those on
citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance
with the requirements of the Rules of Court is mandated. Thus, in his new petition, petitioner
should at least implead his father and mother as parties since the substantial correction he is
seeking will also affect them.—In Eleosida v. Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City, 382 SCRA
22 (2002), we cited Section 3, and Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, as the
procedural requirements laid down by the Court to make the proceedings under Rule
108 adversary. In Republic v. Uy, 703 SCRA 425 (2013), we have similarly ruled that when
a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register involves substantial
and controversial alterations, including those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or
filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with the requirements of the Rules
of Court is mandated. Thus, in his new petition, petitioner should at least implead his
father and mother as parties since the substantial correction he is seeking will also affect
them.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the orders of the Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas
City, Br. 201.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
W.A. Legaspi Law Office for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Orders 1 dated October 7, 2010 and
March 1, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 201, Las Piñas City, in Special
Proceedings Case No. 10-0043. The RTC dismissed the case filed by petitioner Francler P.
Onde for correction of entries in his certificate of live birth.
The antecedent facts follow:
Petitioner filed a petition2 for correction of entries in his certificate of live birth before the R
TC and named respondent Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Las Pifias City as sole
respondent. Petitioner alleged that he is the illegitimate child of his parents Guillermo A.
Onde and Matilde DC Pakingan, but his birth certificate stated that his parents were
married. His birth certificate also stated that his mother's first name is Tely and that his
first name is Franc Ler. He prayed that the following entries on his birth certificate be
corrected as follows:
Entry From
1) Date and place of marriage of his parents December 23, 1983 - Bicol
2) First name of his mother Tely
3) His first name Franc Ler
In its Order dated October 7, 2010, the RTC dismissed the petition for correction of entries
on the ground thatit is insufficient in form and substance. It ruled that the proceedings
must be adversarial since the first correction is substantial in nature and would affect
petitioner’s status as a legitimate child. It was further held that the correction in the first
name of petitioner and his mother can be done by the city civil registrar under Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9048, entitled An Act Authorizing the City or Municipal Civil Registrar or the
ConsulGeneral to Correct a Clerical or Typographical Error in an Entry and/or Change of
First Name or Nickname in the Civil Registrar Without Need of a Judicial Order, Amending
for this Purpose Articles 376 and 412 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
In its Order dated March 1, 2011,the RTC denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, as
it found no proof that petitioner’s parents were not married on December 23, 1983.
Essentially, the petition raises fourissues: (1) whether the RTC erred in ruling that the
correction on the first name of petitioner and his mother can be done by the city civil
registrar under R.A. No. 9048; (2) whether the RTC erred in ruling that correcting the entry
on petitioner’s birth certificate that his parents were married on December 23, 1983 in Bicol
to "not married" is substantial in nature requiring adversarial proceedings; (3) whether the
RTC erred in dismissing the petition for correction of entries; and (4) whether the RTC erred
in ruling that there is no proof that petitioner’s parents were not married on December 23,
1983.
Petitioner argues that Rule 108 ofthe Rules of Court allows a substantial correction of
entries in the civil registry, stating that in Eleosida v. Local Civil Registrar of Quezon
City,3 the case cited by the RTC, we have actually ruled that substantial changes in the civil
registry are now allowed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. He likewise adds that proof
that his parents were not married will be presented during the trial, not during the filing of
the petition for correction of entries.
In its comment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that the RTC correctly
dismissed the petition for correction of entries. It points out that the first names of
petitioner and his mother can be corrected thru administrative proceedings under R.A. No.
9048. Such correction of the entry on petitioner’s birth certificate that his parents were
married on December 23, 1983 in Bicol to "not married" is a substantial correction affecting
his legitimacy. Hence, it must be dealt with in adversarial proceedings where all interested
parties are impleaded.
We deny the petition.
On the first issue, we agree with the RTC that the first name of petitioner and his mother as
appearing in his birth certificate can be corrected by the city civil registrar under R.A. No.
9048. We note that petitioner no longer contested the RTC’s ruling on this point. 4 Indeed,
under Section 15 of R.A. No. 9048, clerical or typographical errors on entries in a civil
register can be corrected and changes of first name can be done by the concerned city civil
registrar without need of a judicial order. Aforesaid Section 1, as amended by R.A. No.
To
10172, now reads: SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and
Not Married
Change of First Name or Nickname. – No entry in a civil register shall be changed or
correctedwithout a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors and change of
Matilde first name or nickname, the day and month in the dateof birth or sex of a person where it is
patently clear that there was a clerical or typographical error or mistake in the entry, which
Francler
can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipalcivil registraror consul
general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and
regulations. (Emphasis supplied.)
In Silverio v. Republic,6 we held that under R.A. No. 9048, jurisdiction over applications for
change of first name is now primarily lodged with administrative officers. The intent and
effect of said law is to exclude the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103
(Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of
the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative petition for change of name is first
filed and subsequently denied. The remedy and the proceedings regulating change of first
name are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial. In Republic v. Cagandahan, 7 we
said that under R.A.No. 9048, the correction of clerical or typographical errors can now be
made through administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. The law
removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules ofCourt the correction of clerical or
typographical errors. Thus petitioner can avail of this administrative remedy for the
correction of his and his mother’s first name.
On the second issue, we also agree with the RTC in ruling that correcting the entry on
petitioner’s birth certificate that his parents were married on December 23, 1983 in Bicol to
"not married" is a substantial correction requiring adversarial proceedings. Said correction
is substantial as it will affect his legitimacy and convert him from a legitimate child to an
illegitimate one. In Republic v. Uy,8 we held that corrections of entries in the civil register
including those on citizenship, legitimacyof paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of
marriage,involve substantial alterations. Substantial errors in a civil registry may be
corrected and the true facts established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail
themselves of the appropriate adversaryproceedings.9
On the third issue, we likewise affirm the RTC in dismissing the petition for correction of
entries. As mentioned, petitioner no longer contested the RTC ruling that the correction he
sought on his and his mother’s first name can be done by the city civil registrar. Under the
circumstances, we are constrained to deny his prayer that the petition for correction of
entries before the RTC bereinstated since the same petition includes the correction he No pronouncement as to costs.
sought on his and his mother’s first name.
SO ORDERED.
We clarify, however, that the RTC’s dismissal is without prejudice. As we said, petitioner
can avail ofthe administrative remedy for the correction of his and his mother’s first
name.1âwphi1 He can also file a new petition before the RTC to correct the alleged
erroneous entry on his birth certificate that his parents were married on December 23, 1983
in Bicol. This substantial correction is allowed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. As we
reiterated in Eleosida v. Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City: 10

x x x This is our ruling in Republic vs. Valenciawhere we held that even substantial errors
in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established under Rule 108 [of the
Rules of Court]provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the
appropriate adversary proceeding. x x x

xxxx

It is true in the case at bar that the changes sought to be made by petitioner are not merely
clerical or harmless errors but substantial ones as they would affect the status of the
marriage between petitioner and Carlos Borbon, as well as the legitimacy of their son,
Charles Christian. Changes of such nature, however, are now allowed under Rule 108in
accordance with our ruling in Republic vs. Valenciaprovided that the appropriate procedural
requirements are complied with. x x x (Emphasis supplied.)

We also stress that a petition seeking a substantial correction of an entry in a civil register
must implead as parties to the proceedings not only the local civil registrar, as petitioner did
in the dismissed petition for correction of entries, but also all persons who have or claim any
interest which would be affected by the correction. This is required by Section 3, Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court:

SEC. 3. Parties. - When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought,
the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected
thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding. (Emphasis supplied.)

In Eleosida,11 we cited Section 3, and Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, as
the procedural requirements laid down by the Court to make the proceedings under Rule
108 adversary. In Republic v. Uy,12 we have similarly ruled that when a petition for
cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register involves substantial and
controversial alterations, including those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation,
or legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with the requirements of the Rules of Court is
mandated. Thus, in his new petition, petitioner should at least implead his father and
mother as parties since the substantial correction he is seeking will also affect them.

In view of the foregoing discussion, it is no longer necessary to dwell on the last issue as
petitioner will have his opportunity to prove his claim that his parents were not married on
December 23, 1983 when he files the new petition for the purpose.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the Orders dated October 7, 2010 and
March 1, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 201, Las Pifias City, in Special
Proceedings Case No. 10-0043. The dismissal ordered by the Regional Trial Court is,
however, declared to be without prejudice.