ictj briefing

Aileen Thomson
December 2015
Opening Up Remedies in Myanmar
Understanding the Range of Options for Dealing with Myanmar’s Past

This year has been pivotal for Myanmar: Elections were held in November and an 18-month
negotiation process between the government and ethnic armed organizations resulted in a
partial Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement signed in October.1 Despite the many limitations
of each, the elections and ceasefire represent a step toward democracy and sustainable peace,
and there is a general feeling that a better future is possible in Myanmar. However, systems
of oppression and the legacy of impunity act as some of the biggest barriers to this future.

Whenever a challenge or mild opposition arises, security forces default to their brutal
traditions of violence and repression. For instance, memories of the 1988 protests and
crackdown surfaced during the repression of student protests in March 2015, fueling
public outrage and fear. Efforts to end decades of armed conflict between ethnic armed
groups and the Myanmar military are also impacted by the past. Broken promises,
conflicting narratives and the refusal to acknowledge grave abuses committed by the
military lead to mistrust among leaders and between civilians and the government.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Between Revenge and
Avoidance
Apology and Acknowledgment
Addressing the Past in the Peace
Process
Political Prisoners
Inter-Communal Truth Telling
Role of International Community 9
Conclusion
Further, the culture of impunity leads to continuing human rights violations, including
sexual violence and torture, which fuel conflict. Victims and their families suffer
enormous physical, psychological, social, and economic impacts from violations that do
not ease with time. These violations also contribute to displacement, as civilians flee their
homes and communities to avoid not only direct conflict but the accompanying abuses
against civilians. Fear of retribution for past misdeeds lurks behind the military’s refusal
to give up their constitutionally mandated 25 percent of parliamentary seats.
In spite of existing misgivings, a measured and responsible process of dealing with the
past could help break the cycle of violence and human rights violations. An honest and
1 open acknowledgment by the government of past violations and its responsibility to
3 provide a remedy, combined with practical steps to fulfill that responsibility, would go a
long way toward building trust and promoting reconciliation.
5
7
Between Revenge and Avoidance
8
There is common misunderstanding among Myanmar’s political elites that transitional
10 justice means revenge and/or only criminal justice. While that view is evolving in

1 The Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement was meant to include all ethnic armed organizations operating in Myanmar,
but in the end the government would not allow six groups to sign; others chose not to sign due to concerns about the
lack of inclusivity.

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ictj briefing
Opening Up Remedies in
Myanmar: Understanding the
Range of Options for Dealing
with Myanmar’s Past
About the Author
Aileen Thomson is ICTJ’s lead
expert in Myanmar. Previously
she worked on Myanmar
issues for various local and
international organizations on
the Thai-Myanmar border and in
Washington, DC.
some cases, there is still a significant lack of understanding about the range of options
available for dealing with the past. Local civil society organizations have started to
advance proposals that fall between the perceived dichotomy of revenge and immediate
forgiveness, but have struggled to engage policy makers in meaningful discussion. The
most common of these proposals is for the government to acknowledge and apologize for
abuses committed in the past. On a societal level there is also much emerging advocacy
and activity around reparations and truth telling, in order to build solidarity and
understanding among different ethnic and religious groups.
Military Dominance and Fear of Retribution
Despite a constitutional amnesty for members of current and previous governments
covering any acts committed in office, top leaders appear to worry about retribution.
This fear for personal security, finances, and well-being is part of the reason that the
military is intent on holding their power and preventing any discussion of past human
rights violations. Unless the military refrains from blocking measures to address the past
and perhaps even actively decides to support them, governments will continue to be
restrained in what they can accomplish.
The next government, to be led by the National League for Democracy (NLD), will have
to walk a delicate balance with the military in order to govern effectively, constrained in
part by the military’s fear of retribution for the past. There is a risk that this balancing act
will lead to an agreement to leave the past unaddressed, and in fact NLD leader Aung
San Suu Kyi has recently implied that such an arrangement is acceptable to her.
At this point, retribution against perpetrators is far from the minds of most civil society
activists and politicians who are interested in addressing the past. They are quite careful
to stress that they do not want revenge and do not want to punish. They recognize that
some victims may be angry and may want to take revenge, while others reasonably want
justice for past violations to which they are entitled. For these activists, the range of
opinions demonstrates the importance of finding a middle path between seeking revenge
and avoiding all mention of the past.
Local organizations working on transitional justice have started to take up the task of
breaching the gap and showing government leaders that the transitional justice they are
advocating for is not a threat. They intend to show that addressing the past can help
to build trust, consolidate democratic institutions, and demonstrate a commitment to
guaranteeing the rights and the dignity of the people.
There is a risk that if the government does not engage with victims and civil society on
their offers of compromise positions will become more extreme and the government will
have lost the opportunity for a productive, meaningful process of dealing with the past
that can contribute to reconciliation.2 Continuing to deny the truth about a past that
is slowly becoming more accessible and well known will prevent the government from
building much-needed legitimacy and civic trust and risk political polarization at a time
when national reconciliation is a high priority.
Behind the NLD’s victory in November are thousands of activists, monks, and others
who have sacrificed their freedom, health, education, family life, careers, citizenship, and,
all too often, their lives so that one day Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD would have a
chance to govern the country. The NLD cannot forever count on the support of its core
2 This process of increasing polarization can be seen in land confiscation cases in which victims first try to seek a
remedy through existing institutions but, when they are ignored, their demands take the form of protests, sit-ins, and
even self-immolation.
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Opening Up Remedies in
Myanmar: Understanding the
Range of Options for Dealing
with Myanmar’s Past
constituency if it is seen to betray their sacrifices and deny their experiences. On the
other hand, there are thousands of communities in conflict-affected areas where people
are now asking whether the NLD can be counted on to stand up for them in the face of
the institutions that have oppressed them for decades. Recognizing their suffering and
taking steps to heal the wounds of the past would go a long way to demonstrating that an
NLD-led government is not another Burman oppressor.
Taking the lead on a well-managed process of addressing the past and recognizing victims
could reduce some of the threat of retribution that some in the military feel hanging over
them. More importantly, it would contribute to a culture of respect for human rights and
demonstrate that Myanmar finally has a government that prioritizes the people’s well-
being over the desires and fears of the elite.
Initial Steps to Address the Impact of the Past
Dealing with the past does not immediately require large, comprehensive policies and
mechanisms. In the short term, the Myanmar government could take small steps toward
reparative justice by working with civil society to assist victims while recognizing its
own responsibility and role in causing harm. Although this would not necessarily fully
discharge the government’s obligations to provide a complete remedy, these steps would
help to build trust on both sides and demonstrate that addressing the past does not need
to be threatening or economically destabilizing.
Civil society organizations are already providing much-needed material and psychosocial
support to victims of human rights violations. One crucial needed step is for the
government to allow these organizations to do their work without interference. Human
rights defenders who are helping victims seek remedies, whether informally or through
the legal system, face harassment and restrictions on their work. Trauma centers and those
offering counseling services face similar restrictions on their operations and movements as
well as difficulties registering and securing property. In addition, groups are often denied
permission to use public spaces for events to support survivors. Accepting the legitimacy
of these organizations and their activities would go a long way towards building trust with
the dedicated and active citizens who run these organizations.
A second and equally important step involves promoting cooperation between state
services and civil society organizations and ensuring that survivors have access to
adequate state services. Victims with serious medical needs, including disabled torture
survivors, face barriers to accessing medical care. This includes the hesitation of some
medical care providers to deal with former political prisoners due to a perceived security
risk. Children of displaced communities cannot access public education; when they
seek to re-enter the formal system, their years of private education are not recognized,
making the process even more tedious and unnecessarily difficult. Ensuring equal access
to state services for victims of human rights violations, including addressing the unique
challenges they face, would help to demonstrate the state’s commitment to treating all
citizens equally and would be a step toward taking responsibility for violations.
Apology and Acknowledgment
Apology and acknowledgment have long been the baseline demands of many victims of
human rights violations in Myanmar. These measures are often described as necessary
for national reconciliation.3 For instance, monks who were beaten and arrested during
3 ICTJ Interviews 2, 8, 12, 16, 17, 18, Yangon and Mae Sot, Dec. 2013–March 2014.
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the Saffron Revolution have called for an apology, linking it to showing respect for
the population.4 Student groups have also publicly called for an apology for the
1988 crackdown on peaceful protests.5 The parents of a young girl killed during the
1988 protests have said that they feel ready to forgive the perpetrators if they were to
apologize.6 Similarly, victims of violations in ethnic areas have often asked for an apology
and acknowledgement, in addition to other remedial actions.7
To date, official government responses to allegations of human rights violations have
often repeated the same denials or offered the same justifications that were given by the
former military regime. More often, the violations of the past are simply ignored.
The few exceptions to the refusal to acknowledge human rights violations stand out as
isolated cases. Local police officials apologized for the violent crackdown on protesters
of the Letpadaung copper mine in 2012.8 Thein Sein described the ’88 student
movement as an important part of the country’s history;9 however, he stopped short of
acknowledging or apologizing for the brutal violence committed by the military against
the protesters and did not mention his own role, which has been the subject of much
speculation.10
While apologies from individual perpetrators may be meaningful to some victims, they
are rare and often viewed as insincere. An official apology for specific events of mass
violence and for widespread violations committed during the various ethnic conflicts
would help to recognize the victims as rights-bearing citizens and help build trust in the
government. It would also clearly demonstrate that the government stands on the side of
the victims, not on the side of the abusers. Official apology and acknowledgment should
come from the head of the government, as a representative of the state, regardless of
personal responsibility.
The unwillingness to admit the truth in the face of evidence harkens back to the military
governments’ attempts to be the sole source of information, a similarity that does not go
unnoticed. By denying the truth about the past, the government continues to disrespect
the victims, their families, and the general public, bringing back memories of previous
brutal regimes.
4 Kyaw Thu, “Myanmar Monks Demand Official Apology for Saffron Revolution Crackdown,” Radio Free Asia,
September 18, 2013, www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/monks-09182013183020.html?searchterm:utf8:ustring=Myan
mar+Monks+Demand+
5 Nay Rain Kyaw, “Myanmar Students’ Group Demands Apology for Brutal 1988 Crackdown,” Radio Free Asia,
August. 17, 2013, www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/students-08072013215834.html
6 Lawi Weng, “Thein Sein Makes Rare Comments on 1988 Uprising,” The Irrawaddy, September 2, 2013, www.
irrawaddy.org/burma/thein-sein-makes-rare-comments-on-1988-uprising.html
7 ICTJ Interviews 2, 16; See also John Zaw and Thomas Toe, “Balancing Reconciliation and Justice in Myanmar,” UCA
News, August 19, 2013, www.ucanews.com/news/balancing-reconciliation-and-justice-in-myanmar/6904. To quote
Bo Kyi, joint-secretary of the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners: “If [the former military rulers] reveal the
truth and admit their wrongdoing in the past, I believe Myanmar people will forgive them. Only then can we carry out
trust-building and move toward the goal of reconciliation.” See also Samantha Michaels, “Burma Support Withheld on
UN Pledge to End Sexual Violence,” The Irrawaddy, September 26, 2013, www.irrawaddy.org/women-gender/burma-
support-withheld-un-pledge-end-sexual-violence.html; Shwe Yee Saw Myint, “Women Call for Justice Over Sexual
Violence,” Myanmar Times, October 7, 2013, www.mmtimes.com/index.php/national-news/8394-women-call-for-
justice-over-sexual-violence.html
8 Phyo Wai Kyaw and Than Naing Soe, “Myanmar Makes Apology to Monks over Copper Mine Crackdown,”
Myanmar Times, December 24, 2012, www.mmtimes.com/index.php/national-news/mandalay-upper-myanmar/3650-
union-ministers-apologise-to-monks-over-november-29-raid.html
9 Lawi Weng, “Thein Sein Makes Rare Comments on 1988 Uprising,” The Irrawaddy, September 2, 2013,www.
irrawaddy.org/burma/thein-sein-makes-rare-comments-on-1988-uprising.html
10 A leaked U.S. Embassy diplomatic cable from October 20, 2004, indicates that Thein Sein, then-commander of
the Light Infantry Division-55, “distinguished himself” during the crackdown on the 1988 uprising. (See Amnesty
International, “Myanmar: Four Years On, Impunity is the Kachin Conflict’s Hallmark,” Burma Partnerships, June 9,
2015, www.burmapartnership.org/2015/06/myanmar-four-years-onimpunity-is-the-kachin-conflicts-hallmark/)
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Addressing the Past in the Peace Process
The political dialogue process following the October 2015 signature of the National
Ceasefire Agreement constitutes a major opportunity to discuss the past and its impact
on the country on a national level. For the past few years, the peace process has been
widely considered the first formal opportunity to discuss the substance of many important
political issues in Myanmar, including how to address massive human rights violations
of the past. Parallel processes that are part of the peace process, such as the return and
reintegration of internally displaced persons and the release of detainees charged with
“unlawful association,” also present opportunities to begin to address the past.
The representatives involved in creating the Framework for Political Dialogue, which
includes an agenda of issues to discuss, have until mid-December 2015 to finalize the
framework. National reconciliation and transitional justice are agenda items on several
dialogue frameworks proposals. Dealing with the violations that occurred during conflict
is an essential part of creating sustainable peace, because massive human rights violations
are not only effects but also drivers of conflict.
Political Detainees and Disappeared Civilians
One aspect of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement that may have an immediate impact
on civilians is a provision under Confidence-Building Measures requiring that any
person charged with associating with the signatory ethnic armed organizations under
the Unlawful Associations Act be released from detention.11 Narrowly construed, the
provision would have limited impact, as many civilians detained under the act are also
charged with offenses under the Explosives Act and other violent acts.12 It also only
applies to signatories; therefore, it would leave out significant numbers of civilians
detained in Kachin and parts of Shan States.
One way that this provision could be broadened is to release those charged under
the Unlawful Associations Act and other laws. Some ethnic leaders are reportedly
pushing for this option. Ideally, this would be accomplished through a process that
reviewed whether the other charges are legitimate or were imposed for political
reasons. However, it is more likely that those detainees would be released with no
acknowledgement of the wrongfulness of their detention, similar to the way in which
political prisoner releases have been handled in the past.13
Acknowledgment of the wrongfulness of the detention of these prisoners is important
because it can help to build trust and demonstrate a changed mindset on the part of the
11 At the time of writing, the scope of this provision was being contested in the Joint Implementation Coordination
Meeting, a set of meetings held by representatives of the government, military, and ethnic armed groups that
signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement to discuss and oversee the implementation of the agreement, including
establishing the Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Committee, drafting a Code of Conduct, and establishing the Union
Political Dialogue Joint Committee.
12 It should also be mentioned that not all of those detained for association were innocent bystanders, but in fact
some are accused of serious human rights violations. In most cases, however, detainees were arrested for belonging to
an armed group and/or committing acts of violence against the state, and not for the human rights violations they may
have committed against civilians. The most notorious of such cases are alleged perpetrators of the torture and killing
of suspected spies by the All-Burma Student Democratic Front (ABSDF) from 1991
92. At least one of those named as
most responsible in the ABSDF’s internal Truth and Justice Committee report, released in 2015, is currently in Burmese
prison, and could be released under this provision. Victims and their family members have filed legal cases against the
perpetrators of those crimes in local courts, and it remains to be seen how such cases will impact the release of detainees.
These cases demonstrate the importance of reviewing the political nature of charges against detainees and the need for a
separate accountability process for perpetrators of serious human rights violations on all sides of the conflicts.
13 Most releases of political prisoners in Myanmar have been executive orders of release without an official pardon or
acknowledgement of the political nature of the detention. Those released are subject to conditions which, if violated, could
trigger reimposition of the original sentence. The way that releases have been handled thus far have led to accusations that
the government is using political prisoners as pawns to gain international or local approval at key moments.
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government toward ethnic armed organizations, their supporters, and ethnic minority
citizens in general. Unfortunately there is nothing in the text about how the detainees
would be verified or the process for appeals or submission of names, so it appears to be
left up to the discretion of the president and military leadership.
The requirement to release certain detainees could also be used to seek the truth about
enforced disappearances committed in ethnic areas. Throughout the conflict, civilians have
been detained by the military without transparency or oversight. In some cases, they are
released after a period of detention, but in others they are suspected to have been killed or to
have died in detention. Families and civil society organizations have unsuccessfully sought
information about those cases for years. These cases of disappearances could potentially
fall under this provision, and some ethnic armed organizations are reportedly pressing for
investigations and publication of the truth about those cases as part of the detainee release
process, arguing that, to the best of their knowledge, they have been detainees and if they
cannot be released there should be an explanation as to what happened.
Reparations for Victims of Conflict-Related Abuses
While other aspects of transitional justice are focused on the perpetrators, government
institutions, and society as a whole, reparations are intended to address and repair—to
the extent possible and feasible—the harm suffered by victims. Reparations help to
address the most pressing impacts of the past, while avoiding some of the concerns in
demanding other transitional justice mechanisms at this point in the political shift.
There are two groups of victims who are priority targets for reparative measures that
could be discussed during political dialogue and included in a final agreement: displaced
persons (both internally displaced persons and refugees) and victims of serious human
rights violations, including torture and sexual violence. Both categories of victims are
emblematic of the effects that conflict and repressive rule had on civilians. Furthermore,
many victims and their families experience the continuing impact of violations,
preventing them from fully participating in social, economic, cultural, and political life.
Displaced Persons
Ethnic and religious conflicts in Myanmar have resulted in an estimated 1.1 million
civilians displaced internally and across international borders. Many civilians from ethnic
areas were systematically targeted and forcibly displaced. Some displacement can be
expected in any armed conflict; however, the vast scale of these movements throughout
Myanmar and the involvement of governmental institutions have caused great concern.
There is evidence of a military policy to resettle entire villages into government-controlled
areas and tactics designed to scatter the civilian population.
Return and resettlement of internally displaced persons and refugees is a priority for most
stakeholders, including the government. Displacement has also been the lens through
which many local humanitarian organizations, peace advocates, and human rights
defenders have discussed the impact of the conflicts on civilians. The issue of internally
displaced persons, in particular, appears to have generated the most public attention
and sympathy outside of conflict areas, inspiring fundraising drives, peace marches,
and benefit concerns in Yangon and other urban centers.14 This public concern outside
14 Kachinland News, “Burmese Youths Organize a Fundraising Event for Kachin and Rakhine Children,” August 16, 2012,
http://kachinlandnews.com/?p=22175; Sean Havey, “From Kachin State to Rangoon, Activists Raise Awareness of Long-
Running War,” The Irrawaddy, June 10, 2013, www.irrawaddy.org/multimedia-burma/from-kachin-state-to-rangoon-activists-
raise-awareness-of-long-running-war.html; and Peter Aung, “Artists Launch Peace Movement and Fundraising Campaign
for IDPs in Kachin State,” Burma Partnership, May 15, 2012, www.burmapartnership.org/2012/05/artists-launch-peace-
movement-and-fundraising-for-idps-in-kachin-state/
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conflict areas has been important to galvanize political will to address displacement and
keep the issue on the agenda.
Myanmar urgently needs to implement reparations that focus on harms that still
negatively impact the lives of victims of forced displacement. This includes addressing
the physical and mental health needs of civilians in conflict areas who have suffered
human rights violations that prevent them from leading a normal life. It also includes
the restoration of citizenship and its accompanying rights, while also providing access
to education, health care, and other state services for the displaced. Further steps to
remedy the harms of displacement include recognizing the nonformal education that
many displaced persons received from non-government sources during displacement
and providing identity cards and other legal documents, like land titles, that many
displaced due to prolonged displacement and cannot be easily re-obtained due to the
lack of government administrative control and services in most conflict-affected areas.
Victims of Serious Violations
One major principle of a transitional justice approach to the peace process is addressing
the serious violations that were committed during the conflict, by each side. In addition
to forcible displacement, the Myanmar military carried out a campaign of human rights
violations against ethnic civilians that spread fear among communities, punished perceived
support of ethnic armed organizations, and forced populations to move out of conflict-
affected areas. Some ethnic armed organizations have also been accused of forced recruitment,
forced displacement, and other serious abuses against civilians, particularly those from
communities who are not part of the dominant ethnic group in a given area. Direct victims
often fled their home villages after violations, and other civilians fled from areas close to
military bases or in conflict zones after hearing of the violations suffered by their neighbors.
The failure to acknowledge and provide redress for these serious violations contributes
to displaced persons’ mistrust of the state and other ethnic groups common in rural
conflict-affected areas and their hesitancy to return. Addressing these violations would
signal to displaced communities that the government is taking civilian security seriously
and that this peace process is different from those of the past.
Reparations for serious crimes, such as sexual violence, torture, and forced labor, could
involve providing a number of measures, from health care for injuries and illnesses caused by
the violations, psychosocial counseling programs, livelihood training, education, and other
rehabilitative measures to direct monetary compensation. These programs should be based on
consultation with potential recipients to determine their needs, priorities, and preferences.
Political Prisoners
The arrest and torture of political activists is perhaps the most serious example of
a government that accepted no criticism or political opposition and that sacrificed
its citizens in order to stay in power. Outside of prison, the military dictatorship’s
harassment and defamation campaign against democracy activists led their family
members, neighbors, and former associates of political prisoners to see them in a negative
light—as troublemakers, criminals, and subversives.
Since 2011, hundreds of political prisoners have been released, a move that was
welcomed but also criticized as selective.15 However, as mentioned previously, releases
15 The significance of the releases should not be understated. Releases resulted in the freeing of hundreds of
activists, many of whom currently play important roles in politics, civil society, the press, the arts, and other aspects
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have been conditional and those who have been released continue to face restrictions on
their activities as well as limitations on their political and civil rights. These restrictions
include the monitoring of their activities, withholding passports and other official
documentation, and failing to return professional licenses that were confiscated at the
time of imprisonment.16 The government’s taking steps to restore their full citizenship
and professional status is crucial to building trust with the pro-democracy movement.
A first step toward providing reparations for those who have experienced political detention,
torture, and other inhumane treatment would be to officially recognize and define the
category of political prisoner. The Joint Political Prisoners Scrutiny Committee, established
by the president in 2013, worked on a case-by-case basis to identify political prisoners for
release without a guiding definition. This has led to many cases of disagreement and the
delegitimization of the committee after its members failed to come to an agreement on
the remaining cases. Recognizing political prisoners as such and developing programs to
provide reparations will require a carefully considered definition that can provide guidance
for determining the fates of what could be thousands of cases.
Some political prisoner organizations, including the Assistance Association for Political
Prisoners and the Former Political Prisoners Society, have come up with a draft definition
in consultation with political parties, human rights organizations, legal experts, and
others, but they have had little traction with the government on discussing or adopting
it. In July 2015, these efforts were set back by the announcement from the Deputy
Minister for Home Affairs that the use of the term political prisoner is unconstitutional
because it would “create inequality within the correctional system” and deny prisoners
“equal rights and protection under the law.”17
Once released, political prisoners have urgent rehabilitation needs that the government
has the responsibility to address. Many former political prisoners were tortured in ways
that continue to damage their health or have they developed other illnesses or conditions
that were poorly treated during detention or that received inadequate or no medical
care. There are also severe psychosocial needs stemming from detention (often solitary),
torture, and the isolation and blame from family and friends on their release.
Finally, many activists were arrested before completing their education, and their
applications to continue their studies have often been rejected. They have been out of the
workforce for many years and face physical and psychosocial challenges to maintaining
employment. Employers are also hesitant to hire former political prisoners to avoid any
political risk. For all of these reasons, former political prisoners have serious livelihood
needs that must be addressed with a combination of education/vocational training,
financial support, and employment opportunities.
Inter-Communal Truth Telling
Transitional justice in Myanmar is not only relevant for addressing the relationship
between the state and its citizens, but also for effective truth telling between various
ethnic and religious groups, a process that could be started by civil society and
of Myanmar life. The release of political prisoners was one of the major conditions for the international community’s
re-engagement with the country and a major factor in their lifting sanctions, increasing aid and investment, and
improving diplomatic relations with the government. Perhaps most importantly, the releases could have been used
to acknowledge, albeit tacitly, that the prisoners should not have been imprisoned in the first place and that the
participation of these activists was important for national reconciliation. However, the modalities under which the
release was “conditionally” granted has vanished that purpose.
16 “World Report 2013: Burma,” Human Rights Watch, www.hrw.org/world-report/2013/country-chapters/burma
17 Thant, Htoo and Pyae Thet Phyo, “Home affairs ministry defiant on political prisoner definition,” Myanmar Times, July 22,
2015, www.mmtimes.com/index.php/national-news/15609-home-affairs-ministry-defiant-on-political-prisoner-definition.html
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eventually backed by the government. The government, and to a lesser extent many
nonstate armed groups, have spread their conflicting narratives of the causes and
impact of conflict in schools, through the media, and at public events.18 The strict
state control of media and other forms of information sharing over the past decades,
combined with the inaccessibility of information in conflict areas, means that people
in one part of the country are rarely aware of the conflicts and human rights violations
that have taken place in other regions.
People who work with victims in remote, conflict-affected areas report that victims often
blame all Burmans for their suffering, directing a lot of anger and mistrust towards them.19
Similarly, the average resident of central Myanmar knows little about ethnic minorities and
the civil war aside from the minimal, often-biased media coverage and unverified content
on social media.20 In areas where a variety of ethnic minority groups live in close proximity
there are also deep divisions and grievances that have been generally suppressed in the name
of ethnic unity against the central Burma state. With ceasefires and increased mobility in
some areas, there will be increased contact between different ethnic groups whose lack of
knowledge and understanding about past conflicts and the experiences of other groups
could lead to serious social conflict, while old grievances are likely to resurface.
Sharing experiences with people outside of victims’ own ethnic groups can help to
build civic trust and break down misperceptions. In recent years, with many Burman
democracy activists traveling to conflict areas for the first time, informal exchanges of
their experiences under the military government have contributed to increased trust on
an individual level.21 Similar exchanges have also built trust between Burmans and ethnic
minorities living in exile along the border when they interacted out of necessity.22
Acknowledging and accepting varying experiences of the conflict is necessary to establish
a basic level of trust and understanding before deeper reconciliation can begin. This
may require a process of truth telling whereby all groups are exposed to the experiences,
perspectives, and historical narratives of other groups with whom they may not
necessarily agree, but whom they can witness and learn to empathize with.
In the short to midterm, civil society can start to spread knowledge by scaling up truth-
telling activities to cover new areas of the country and creating a network to promote inter-
community truth telling. Civil society documentation can also help to preserve testimonies
so that future generations can learn lessons from the conflicts and human rights violations
of the past, something that is crucial for the youth of any country. Research should also be
done with victims to determine what they want to express, what they want others to know
about their experiences, and what they hope to learn about their and others’ experiences.
Role of International Community
The international community has a major role to play in Myanmar in ensuring that
international norms, particularly regarding victims’ rights, are fully understood and
18 Matthew J. Walton, “The “Wages of Burman-ness:” Ethnicity and Burman Privilege in Contemporary Myanmar,”
Journal of Contemporary Asia (2012); Kivimaki, Timo and Paul Pasch, “The Dynamics of Ethnic Conflict in the
Multiethnic Union of Myanmar,” Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (October 2009), 37
38.
19 ICTJ Interviews 8, 9 and 20, Chiang Mai and Mae Sot, January–March 2014.
20 For instance, in a recent survey by The Asia Foundation, only 55 percent of respondents nationwide were aware
that there is ongoing armed conflict in the country. See “Myanmar 2014: Civic Knowledge and Values in a Changing
Society,” The Asia Foundation 2014, http://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/MyanmarSurvey20141.pdf; ICTJ
Interview 20, Chiang Mai, March, 2014.
21 ICTJ Interview 8, Mae Sot, January 27, 2014.
22 ICTJ Interview 9, Mae Sot, January 28, 2014.
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ictj briefing
Opening Up Remedies in
Myanmar: Understanding the
Range of Options for Dealing
with Myanmar’s Past
implemented. Since 2010, many countries have improved relations with Myanmar—in
many cases lifting sanctions imposed due to human rights concerns—but they appear to
have focused more on developing economic and military relations than on human rights
protections and accountability.
International involvement in support of the peace process is particularly important to
facilitating a coordinated and informed approach to addressing the past. Some international
actors involved in supporting the peace process have steered clear of mentioning the
past, in order to refrain from threatening the fragile ceasefire negotiations and maintain
relationships with government officials to enable work on other topics. While this is
understandable, it reinforces the government’s impression that policies to implement
human rights as well as addressing with the past is threatening and/or unrequired.
Excluding transitional justice from the topics of technical assistance and capacity
building suggests to the government and other stakeholders that addressing the past is
not necessary for a sustainable peace. In the post-ceasefire period, addressing the past
should not be seen as off-limits, particularly as stakeholders in the peace process have
identified it to be an important topic for political dialogue. In order to minimize the
risks faced by emerging civil society work on the past and to facilitate better cooperation,
those with access to government leaders should take the opportunity to progressively
introduce the idea that transitional justice could benefit them and it is not necessarily
about revenge and retribution.
Conclusion
Given Myanmar’s traumatic past, there is much at stake for future negotiations and
government actions. The massive human rights violations of the past and present will
remain a part of the country’s legacy, affecting the culture and daily life of individuals
unless something is done to address them.
Dealing with the impact of the past by addressing the urgent needs of victims is crucial
for the government to build trust not only with victims but communities affected by
conflict and human rights violations. Apology and acknowledgement, while important,
would have much less impact without concrete measures to demonstrate the government’s
sincerity. In the short term, the government and civil society need to work together to
build the confidence that addressing the past does not need to be dangerous or violent.
Myanmar needs an open, honest discussion about what happened in the past and
ongoing violations. That discussion, which can be managed and conducted in stages,
should start soon. Leaders from all aspects of Myanmar political life—those in
government, in the opposition, in civil society, and those who provide political leadership
for ethnic armed groups—should take steps to engage each other and the public in this
conversation. International actors should support this process by helping to facilitate
trust building, while dispelling the idea that dealing with the past is dangerous.
The International Center for Transitional Justice assists countries pursuing ac- ICTJ
countability for past mass atrocity or human rights abuse. ICTJ works in societ- 5 Hanover Square. Floor 24
ies emerging from repressive rule or armed conflict, as well as in established New York, NY 10004
democracies where historical injustices or systemic abuse remain unresolved. To
learn more, visit www.ictj.org
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