ALMORADIE, Ma. Cariza L.

2016-80001
Criminal Procedure
Atty. Salvador S. Panelo

Zaldivar vs People
785 SCRA 429
March 02, 2016

Facts:

Fe Zaldivar and Jeanette Artajo were charged with Estafa filed by Mamerto Dumasis before RTC Iloilo,
Branch 33. Pre-trial conference was held by this court and a Pre-trial Order was issued on the same date,
February 15, 2005. Zaldivar and Artajo both pleaded not guilty during the arraignment.

During trial, the prosecution presented Alma Dumasis and Delia Surmieda as witnesses, and they both
identified the respective affidavits, constituting as their direct testimonies. Atty. Salvador Cabluna,
Zaldivar’s counsel, opted not to cross-examine the witnesses, while Artajo’s counsel was deemed to have
waived his right to cross-examine due to his absence despite notice.

Dumasis, by himself and without the consent of the Public Prosecutor filed a Motion for Inhibition against
Judge Virgilio Patag which was subsequently granted. Hence, the case was re-raffled to Branch 23, presided
by Judge Edgardo Catilo.

On November 18, 2005, RTC issued an Order denying the admission of the prosecution’s exhibit, and also
nullified and set aside the previous proceedings conducted and set the case anew for pre-trial conference.

A Motion to Declare Prosecution’s Case Terminated was thereafter filed on January 16, 2006 by Zaldivar
but it was denied by the RTC on March 10, 2006. The Motion for Consideration was also denied in an
Order dated June 20, 2006.

Hence, Zaldivar filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. She argues that the
denial of the admission of the prosecution’s exhibits upon timely and sustained objections of the accused
has the effect of terminating the case of the prosecution for failure to adduce competent and admissible
evidence during the trial proper. Also, the prosecution has failed to establish by competent and admissible
evidence the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, and therefore, the case should be dismissed
instead of being tried anew or re-opened for further proceedings. Zaldivar further contends that directing
the conduct of another pre-trial or re-opening of the case violated her right not to be prosecuted and tried
twice on the same information against her.

Issue:

1) Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion committed by Judge Catilo in nullifying the
proceedings and setting the case anew for pre-trial?

Held:

1) YES. The Court of Appeals correctly found grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court
when it nullified the proceedings previously conducted and ordered anew a pre-trial of the case. One of the
main reasons presented by Judge Catilo in nullifying the pre-trial proceedings was that the proceedings
conducted after pre-trial conference did not comply with the prescribed procedures in the presentation of
witnesses. But, as propounded by CA, and even the OSG who appeared for Judge Catilo, what the trial
court should have done to correct any perceived procedural lapses committed during the presentation of
prosecution’s evidence was to recall the prosecution’s witnesses and have them identify the exhibits
mentioned in their Affidavits, as provided by the Sec. 9, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court which states that:

Sec. 9. After the examination of a witness by both sides has been concluded, the
witness cannot be recalled without leave of court. The court will grant or
withhold leave in its discretion as the interest of justice may require.

In this case, there is also nothing on record hat shows any disregard of the Rule 118, Sec. 1of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure, to wit:

Sec. 1. Pre-Trial; mandatory in criminal cases. In all criminal cases cognizable

by the Sandiganbayan, [RTC], Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court
in Cities, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the court
shall, after arraignment and within 30 days from the date of the court acquires
jurisdiction over the person of the accused, unless a shorter period is provided
for in special laws or circulars of the Supreme Court, order a pre-trial
conference to consider the following:

a) Plea bargaining
b) Stipulation of facts
c) Marking for identification of evidence of the parties
d) Waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence
e) Modification of the order of trial if the accused admits the charge, but
interposes a lawful defense; and
f) Such matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial of the criminal
and civil aspects of the case

There is nothing on record that will show any disregard of the rule. Pieces of evidence were marked,
objections thereto were raised, issues were identified, no admissions on factual matters were arrived at, and
trial dates were set. As found by the CA “a close scrutiny of the Pre-Trial Conference Order dated February
15, 2005, would show that there was due compliance with the Rules relative to the conduct of pre-trial. xxx
Verily, there is nothing in the pre-trial order which calls for its nullification as the same clearly complies
with the Rules.” And while the court recognizes the trial court’s zeal in ensuring compliance with the rules,
it cannot, however, simply set aside the proceedings that have been previously conducted, without treading
on the rights of both the prosecution and the defense who did not raise any objection to the pre-trial
proceedings. Pre-trial is a procedural device intended to clarify and limit the basis issues between the
parties and to take the trial of cases out of the realm of surprise and maneuvering. Its chief objective
is to simplify, abbreviate and expedite or dispense with the trial. In this case, the purpose was to
clearly subverted when the trial hastily set aside the pre-trial proceedings and its results. Absent any
palpable explanation as to why and how said proceedings were conducted in violation of the rules and thus
should be set aside, the court sustain the CA’s findings that the trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion in nullifying the previous proceedings and setting the case anew for pre-trial
ALMORADIE, Ma. Cariza L.
2016-80001
Criminal Procedure
Atty. Salvador S. Panelo

Franco vs Philippines
782 SCRA 526
February 01, 2016

Facts:

On November 3, 2004 at around 11 o’clock in the morning, Benjamin Joseph Nakamoto went to work out
at the Body Shape Gym located at Malong Street, Tondo, Manila. After working out, he placed his Nokia
3660 cell phone worth PhP 18, 500 on the altar where gym users usually put their valuables and proceeded
to the comfort room to change his clothes. After ten minutes, he returned to get his cellphone, but it was
already missing. Arnie Rosario, who was working out, informed him that he saw Franco get a cap and a
cell phone from the altar. Nakamoto requested everyone not to leave the gym, but upon verification from
the logbook, he found out that Franco had left within the time that he was in the shower.

The gym’s caretaker, Virgilio Ramos, testified that he saw Franco in the gym, but he was not working ou
and was just going around the area. In fact, it was just Franco’s second time at the gym. Ramos even met
him near the door and as Franco did not log out, he was the one who indicated it in their logbook. When
Nakamoto announced that his cell phone was missing and asked that nobody leaves the place, he put an
asterisk opposite the name of Franco in the log book to indicate that he as the only one who left the gym
after the cell phone was declared lost.

Nakamoto, together with Jeoffrey Masangkay, a police officer who was also working out at the gym, tried
to locate Franco within the gym's vicinity but they failed to find him. They proceeded to the police station
and while there, a report was received from another police officer that somebody saw Franco along Coral
Street, which is near the gym and that he was holding a cell phone. They went to Coral Street but he was
already gone. A vendor told them that he saw a person who was holding a cell phone, which was then
ringing and that the person was trying to shut it off. When they went to Franco's house, they were initially
not allowed to come in but were eventually let in by Franco's mother. They talked to Franco who denied
having taken the cell phone.

Nakamoto then filed a complaint with the barangay but no settlement took place; hence, a criminal
complaint for theft was filed against Franco before the City Prosecutor's Office of Manila, docketed as I.S.
No. 04K-25849.

In his defense, Franco denied the charge, alleging that if Nakamoto had indeed lost his cell phone at around
1:00 p.m., he and his witnesses could have confronted him as at that time, he was still at the gym, having
left only at around 2:45 p.m. He also admitted to have taken a cap and cell phone from the altar but claimed
these to be his.

RTC convicted Franco of Theft, for finding that his defense and denial cannot be given evidentiary value
over the testimony of Rosario. CA affirmed the RTC’s findings, upon Franco’s appeal.
Issue:

1) Whether or not Franco’s conviction of the crime charged is proper, considering the inconsistencies
and irreconcilable testimonies of the prosecution’s witnesses?

Held:

NO. Franco is acquitted of the crime of Theft because his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.

The burden of such proof rests with the prosecution, which must rely on the strength of its case rather than
on the weakness of the case for the defense. Proof beyond reasonable doubt, or that quantum of proof
sufficient to produce a moral certainty that would convince and satisfy the conscience of those who act in
judgment, is indispensable to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence.

In every criminal conviction, the prosecution is required to prove two things beyond reasonable
doubt: first, the fact of the commission of the crime charged, or the presence of all the elements of
the offense; and second, the fact that the accused was the perpetrator of the crime.

Under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, the essential elements of the crime of theft are: (1) the taking
of personal property; (2) the property belongs to another; (3) the taking away was done with intent to gain;
(4) the taking away was done without the consent of the owner; and (5) the taking away is accomplished
without violence or intimidation against person or force upon things.25cralawred

The corpus delicti in theft has two elements, to wit: (1) that the property was lost by the owner; and (2) that
it was lost by felonious taking.26 In this case, the crucial issue is whether the prosecution has presented
proof beyond reasonable doubt to establish the corpus delicti of the crime. In affirming Franco's conviction,
the CA ruled that the elements were established. Moreover, the RTC and the CA apparently relied heavily
on circumstantial evidence.

To sustain a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court
provides that the following requisites must concur: (1) there must be more than one circumstance to
convict; (2) the facts on which the inference of guilt is based must be proved; and (3) the combination
of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. With respect to
the third requisite, it is essential that the circumstantial evidence presented must constitute an
unbroken chain, which leads one to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the
exclusion of others, as the guilty person.

The prosecution presented three (3) witnesses - Nakamoto, the complainant; Ramos, the gym's caretaker;
and Rosario, another gym user.

Their testimonies established the following circumstances: (1) Nakamoto placed his cell phone on the altar,
left and went to change his clothes, and alter ten minutes, returned to get his cell phone but the same was
already missing;29 (2) Rosario saw Franco get a cap and a cell phone from the same place; and (3) Ramos
saw Franco leave the gym at 1:15 p.m. and the latter failed to log out in the logbook.31 The RTC and the
CA wove these circumstances in order to arrive at the "positive identification" of Franco as the perpetrator.

A perusal of their testimonies, however, shows that certain facts have been overlooked by both courts.

For one, it was only Rosario who saw Franco get a cap and a cell phone from the altar. His lone testimony,
however, cannot be considered a positive identification of Franco as the perpetrator.
In People v. Pondivida, the Court held:

Positive identification pertains essentially to proof of identity and not per se to that
of being an eyewitness to the very act of commission of the crime. There are two
types of positive identification. A witness may identify a suspect or accused in a
criminal case as the perpetrator of the crime as an eyewitness to the very act of the
commission of the crime. This constitutes direct evidence. There may, however, be
instances where, although a witness may not have actually seen the very act of
commission of a crime, he may still be able to positively identify a suspect or
accused as the perpetrator of a crime as for instance when the latter is the person or
one of the persons last seen with the victim immediately before and right after the
commission of the crime. This is the second, type of positive identification, which
forms part of circumstantial evidence, which, when taken together with other pieces
of evidence constituting an unbroken chain, leads to only fair and reasonable
conclusion, which is that the accused is the author of the crime to the exclusion of
all others. x x x.35 (Emphasis omitted and underscoring ours)

Rosario's testimony definitely cannot fall under the first category of positive identification. While it may
support the conclusion that Franco took a cell phone from the altar, it does not establish with certainty that
what Franco feloniously took, assuming that he did, was Nakamoto's cell phone. Rosario merely testified
that Franco took "a cell phone."

Neither can the prosecution's testimonial evidence fall under the second category of positive identification,
that is, Franco having been identified as the person or one of the persons last seen immediately before and
right after the commission of the theft. Records show that there were other people in the gym before and
after Nakamoto lost his cell phone. In fact, Nakamoto himself suspected Rosario of having taken his cell
phone

The prosecution's evidence does not rule out the following possibilities: one, that what Franco took was his
own cell phone; two, even on the assumption that Franco stole a cell phone from the altar, that what he
feloniously took was Nakamoto's cell phone, considering the feet that at the time Nakamoto was inside the
changing room, other people may have placed their cell phone on the same spot; and three, that some other
person may have taken Nakamoto's cell phone.

It must be emphasized that "[c]ourts must judge the guilt or innocence of the accused based on facts
and not on mere conjectures, presumptions, or suspicions." It is iniquitous to base Franco's guilt on
the presumptions of the prosecution's witnesses for the Court has, time and again, declared that if
the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more interpretations, one of which
being consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other or others consistent with his guilt,
then the evidence in view of the constitutional presumption of innocence has not fulfilled the test of
moral certainty and is thus insufficient to support a conviction.

The facts and circumstances proven by the prosecution, taken together, are not sufficient to justify
the unequivocal conclusion that Franco feloniously took Nakamoto's cell phone. No other convincing
evidence was presented by the prosecution that would link him to the theft. The fact Franco took a cell
phone from the altar does not necessarily point to the conclusion that it was Nakamoto's cell phone that he
took. In the appreciation of circumstantial evidence, the rule is that the circumstances must be
proved, and not themselves presumed. The circumstantial evidence must exclude the possibility that
some other person has committed the offense charged.
ALMORADIE, Ma. Cariza L.
2016-80001
Criminal Procedure
Atty. Salvador S. Panelo

Cabo vs Sandiganbayan
491 SCRA 264
June 16, 2006

Facts:

An Information for violation of Sec. 3(b) of RA 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act was filed
against Jocelyn Cabo and her co-accused, Bonifacio C. Balahay on June 26, 2004. Alleging that she was
deprived of her right to preliminary investigation for, according to her, she did not receive a Notice to
Submit a Counter-Affidavit, Cabo filed for Motion for Reinvestigation before Sandiganbayan, which was
subsequently granted.

Thereafter, Cabo filed a Motion seeking the court’s permission to travel abroad for a family vacation. It
was granted by Sandiganbayan in an ORDER dated May 14, 2004, with the condition that she will be
arraigned conditionally, considering that this case is still pending reinvestigation/review before the Office
of the Special Prosecutor. If upon such reinvestigation/review, it shall be found that there is no probable
cause to proceed against said accused, the conditional arraignment this morning shall be with no force and
effect. However, if it should be found that there is a need to amend the present indictment or to pave the
way for the filing of some other indictment/s, then the accused shall waive her right to object under Section
14, Rule 110 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure and her constitutional right to be protected against
double jeopardy. During such arraignment, Cabo pleaded not guilty.

When Cabo returned to the Philippines on May 24, 2004, the Special Prosecutor thereafter found probable
cause to charge her for violation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019. Her arraignment was set anew by
Sandiganbayan on October 12, 2004, with her co-accused.

On the day before her intended arraignment, Cabo filed an Urgent Manifestation with Motion praying that
“she be allowed to reiterated on her previous plea of ‘not guilty’ xxx entered during her conditional
arraignment held last May 14, 2004, so that she may be excuse from attending the scheduled arraignment
for October 12, 2004.” However, Sandiganbayan denied such Manifestation.

Balahay, on the other hand, failed to attend the intended arraignment, and this prompted Sandiganbayan to
order his arrest and forfeiture of his bail bond. But, upon his Motion, Balahay’s warrant was recalled and
the Sandiganbayan reset the arraignment on November 30, 2004.

On January 18, 2005, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution sustaining Balahay’s contention that the facts
charged in the information do not constitute the offense of violation of Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019. Apart
from the failure to allege that Balahay had to officially intervene in the transaction pursuant to law, it also
failed to allege that Balahay accepted and received the money "for himself or for another." The information
was thus defective in that it failed to allege every single fact necessary to constitute all the elements of the
offense charged.

The Sandiganbayan, however, did not order the immediate quashal of the information. It held that under
Section 4, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, "if the motion to quash is based on the ground that the facts
charged in the information do not constitute an offense x x x the (c)ourt should not quash the information
outright, but should instead direct the prosecution to correct the defect therein by proper amendment. It is
only when the prosecution fails or refuses to undertake such amendment, or when despite such amendment
the information still suffers from the same vice or defect," that the court would be finally justified in
granting the motion to quash. The Sandiganbayan thus gave the prosecution a period of 15 days from notice
within which to file an amended information that is sufficient as to both form and substance.

The prosecution thus amended the Information on February 7, 2005, incorporating then all the essential
elements of the crime charged. A new arraignment was then set on April 14, 2005; however, Cabo filed a
Motion to Cancel Arraignment, contending that the Amended Information pertain to Balahay alone, and
that she could no longer be arraigned since substantial amendment of an Information is not allowed after a
plea had been made. Sandiganbayan denied such Motion.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration from the foregoing resolution on the additional ground that
double jeopardy had already set in. She asserted that her conditional arraignment under the original
information had been validated or confirmed by her formal manifestation dated October 7, 2004, wherein
she reiterated her plea of "not guilty." Thus, her arraignment on the original information was no longer
conditional in nature such that double jeopardy would attach.

Issue:

2) Whether or not double jeopardy would attach on the basis of “not guilty” entered by Cabo on the
original Information?

Held:

2) NO. Initially, it must be pointed out that the Sandiganbayan’s practice of "conditionally" arraigning
the accused pending reinvestigation of the case by the Ombudsman is not specifically provided in the
regular rules of procedure. In People v. Espinosa, however, the Court tangentially recognized the practice
of "conditionally" arraigning the accused, provided that the alleged conditions attached thereto should be
"unmistakable, express, informed and enlightened." The Court ventured further by requiring that said
conditions be expressly stated in the order disposing of the arraignment. Otherwise, it was held that the
arraignment should be deemed simple and unconditional.

In the case at bar, the Sandiganbayan Order dated May 14, 2004 unequivocally set forth the conditions for
petitioner’s arraignment pending reinvestigation of the case as well as her travel abroad. Among the
conditions specified in said order is "if it should be found that there is a need to amend the present indictment
x x x, then the accused shall waive her right to object under Section 14, Rule 110 of the 2000 Rules of
Criminal Procedure and her constitutional right to be protected against double jeopardy." Petitioner was
duly assisted by counsel during the conditional arraignment and was presumably apprised of the legal
consequences of such conditions. In fact, she signed the minutes of the proceedings which could only
signify her informed acceptance of and conformity with the terms of the conditional arraignment.

Thus, petitioner cannot now be allowed to turn her back on such conditions on the pretext that she affirmed
her conditional arraignment by means of a written manifestation. To begin with, there is no showing that
the Sandiganbayan ruled on her written manifestation and motion that she be allowed to merely confirm
her previous plea on the original information. It is likewise doubtful that petitioner may legally confirm her
conditional arraignment by means of a mere written motion or manifestation. Section 1(b), Rule 116 of
the Rules of Court explicitly requires that "(t)he accused must be present at the arraignment and
must personally enter his plea."
At any rate, with or without a valid plea, still petitioner cannot rely upon the principle of double
jeopardy to avoid arraignment on the amended information. It is elementary that for double jeopardy
to attach, the case against the accused must have been dismissed or otherwise terminated without his
express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid information sufficient in form and
substance and the accused pleaded to the charge. In the instant case, the original information to which
petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty" was neither valid nor sufficient to sustain a conviction, and
the criminal case was also neither dismissed nor terminated. Double jeopardy could not, therefore,
attach even if petitioner is assumed to have been unconditionally arraigned on the original charge.

It should be noted that the previous information in Criminal Case No. 27959 failed to allege all the essential
elements of violation of Section 3(b), R.A. No. 3019. It, in fact, did not charge any offense and was, to all
intents and purposes, void and defective. A valid conviction cannot be sustained on the basis of such
information. Petitioner was resultantly not placed in danger of being convicted when she entered her plea
of "not guilty" to the insufficient indictment.

Moreover, there was no dismissal or termination of the case against petitioner. What the Sandiganbayan
ordered was for the amendment of the information pursuant to the express provision of Section 4,
Rule 117, which states:

SEC. 4. Amendment of complaint or information.- If the motion to quash is based

on an alleged defect of the complaint or information which can be cured by
amendment, the court shall order that an amendment be made.

The Sandiganbayan correctly applied the foregoing provision when petitioner’s co-accused filed a motion
to quash the original information on the ground that the same does not charge an offense. Contrary to
petitioner’s submission, the original information can be cured by amendment even after she had pleaded
thereto, since the amendments ordered by the court below were only as to matters of form and not of
substance. The amendment ordered by the Sandiganbayan did not violate the first paragraph of
Section 14, Rule 110, which provides:

SEC. 14. Amendment or substitution. – A complaint or information may be

amended, in form or in substance, without leave court, at any time before the
accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment
may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing
prejudice to the rights of the accused.

In the case at bar, while certain elements of the crime charged were missing in the indictment, the
amended information did not change the nature of the offense which is for violation of Section 3(b),
R.A. No. 3019. The amended information merely clarified the factual averments in the accusatory
portion of the previous information, in order to reflect with definiteness the essential elements of the
crime charged.

All told, the Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it ordered the re-arraignment
of petitioner on the amended information. Double jeopardy did not attach by virtue of petitioner’s
"conditional arraignment" on the first information. It is well-settled that for a claim of double jeopardy
to prosper, the following requisites must concur: (1) there is a complaint or information or other
formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the same is filed before a
court of competent jurisdiction; (3) there is a valid arraignment or plea to the charges; and (4) the
accused is convicted or acquitted or the case is otherwise dismissed or terminated without his express
consent. The first and fourth requisites are not present in the case at bar.
ALMORADIE, Ma. Cariza L.
2016-80001
Criminal Procedure
Atty. Salvador S. Panelo

SAN MIGUEL vs MACEDA

520 SCRA 205
April 3, 2007

Facts:

Eduardo San Miguel charged Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda, Presiding Judge of RTC Las Pinas Branch
275 for Ignorance of the Law, Manifest Partiality, Gross Misconduct, Grave Abuse of Authority, Evident
Bad Faith and Gross Inexcusable Negligence, relative to the former’s criminal case entitled People of the
Philippins vs Eduardo M. San Miguel and Socorro B. Osorio for Violation of Sec. 15, Art. III, RA 6425.

San Miguel was arrested for illegal sale, dispensation, distribution and delivery of .50 grams of
methamphetamine hydrochloride, punishable by prision correccional. He jumped bail. On May 10, 2001,
then Judge Florentino Alumbres issued a bench warrant and canceled his bail bond in the amount of
P60,000.00 and fixed a new bail bond in the amount of P120,000.00.

On September 8, 2001, San Miguel was arrested, and subsequently, the State Prosecutor filed a Motion to
Cancel Recommended Bail on the reasonable belief and indications pointing to the probability that he is
seriously considering flight from prosecution. The Motion was set for hearing on September 19, 2001. On
September 17, 2001, San Miguel filed an Opposition to the Motion. On the same day, or two (2) days before
the scheduled hearing, Judge Maceda issued an Order granting the Motion. During the hearing of September
19, 2001, Judge Maceda opted to consider San Miguel’s Opposition as a motion for reconsideration and
merely ordered the prosecutor to file a reply thereto. On November 21, 2001, Judge Maceda issued an Order
clarifying his Order of September 17, 2001.

San Miguel then came to this Court alleging that his right to procedural due process was gravely violated
when Judge Maceda issued an Order on September 17, 2001, without giving him the opportunity to
comment on the same. On the other hand, Judge Maceda contended that the Order of cancellation is dated
September 17, 2001 while the Information for murder was filed against complainant on September 14, 2001
or three days earlier. Thus, the cancellation was in due course because complainant was already detained
for the non-bailable offense of murder three days before the cancellation was ordered.

Issue:

2) Whether or not San Miguel is entitled to bail as a matter of right?

Held:

YES. Section 4, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that before conviction by
the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment,
all persons in custody shall be admitted to bail as a matter of right.
Records show that San Miguel was charged with violation of Section 15, Article III of R.A. No. 6425
which is punishable by prision correccional. Following the provisions of the Constitution and the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, complainant is entitled to bail as a matter of right.

The prosecutor's Motion to Cancel Recommended Bail was very precise in its prayer, i.e., that the allowance
for bail granted to the accused to secure his provisional liberty provided in the Warrant of Arrest dated May
10, 2001 be canceled as there is reasonable ground to believe and all indications point to the probability
that accused is seriously considering flight from the prosecution of the case.

The OCA was right in observing that it was a mere afterthought on the part of Judge Maceda in issuing the
clarificatory Order, for how can the latter cancel the P60,000.00 bail when the same was already forfeited
as a consequence of San Miguel’s jumping bail?

And even granting for the sake of argument that San Miguel was also charged with the crime of murder on
September 14, 2001, or three days before the Order of cancellation was issued, Judge Maceda failed to
consider that what was being prayed for by the prosecutor was the cancellation of the recommended
bail for violation of R.A. No. 6425 and not that of the crime of murder.

Judge Maceda’s asseveration that the cancellation of the bail without due hearing was justified considering
that San Miguel was already detained for the non-bailable offense of murder three days before the
cancellation was ordered, is misplaced.

For liability to attach for ignorance of the law, the assailed order of a judge must not only be erroneous;
more important, it must be motivated by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred or some other similar motive. San
Miguel, having failed to present positive evidence to show that respondent judge was so motivated in
granting the Motion without hearing, cannot be held guilty of gross ignorance of the law. He was only
charged with Simple Misconduct, and was fined with PhP 5, 000 with a warning that a repetition of the
same or similar acts in the future will be dealt more severely
ALMORADIE, Ma. Cariza L.
2016-80001
Criminal Procedure
Atty. Salvador S. Panelo

Burgos, Jr vs Naval
793 SCRA 120
June 08, 2016

Facts:

Jose Burgos filed a complaint for Estafa through Falsification of Public Documents against SPS.
Eladio SJ Naval and Arlina B. Naval, and Amalia B. Naval before the Office of the City Proseutor on April
26, 2012. Burgos alleged that he and his wife, Rubie Burgos were the registered owners of a lot in Taytay,
Rizal, consisting of 1, 389 square meters, which is covered by a TCT No. 550579. They purportedly
mortgaged said property to a certain Antonio Assad on November 19, 1996. To avoid having the property
foreclosed, he loaned from SPS. Naval, who thereafter asked him to sign some blank documents, to which
he complied.

In February 2011, Burgos discovered that the title of his property was cancelled, and that a new
one was issued under TCT No. 644582, in favor of SPS. Naval on April 01, 1998. Burgos claimed that the
blank documents which he and his wife signed turned out to be a receipt, and a Deed of Absolute Sale over
the subject through the ploy and conspiracy of the Navals. Subsequently, an Information was filed in court
against the Navals before RTC Antipolo, Br. 97 on February 11, 2013

Before arraignment, the Navals filed a Motion to Quash on the ground that their criminal liability
has been extinguished due to prescription, the Information failed to charge Amalia with an offense, and that
they were not afforded the opportunity of a preliminary investigation. They further averred that the
Information was filed beyond the reglamentary period or after 10 years from the registration of the title on
April 01, 1998.

The RTC granted the Motion filed by the Navals on the ground of prescription. Meanwhile the CA
dismissed the petition for failure of Burgos to join the “People” in his Certiorari as required by the
Administrative Code of 1987.

Issue:

3) Whether or not CA correctly dismissed the Certiorari petition on the ground that the “People” as
represented by the OSG, was not impleaded as party?

Held:

YES. Jurisprudence dictates that it is the OSG which possesses the requisite authority to represent the
“People” in an appeal on the criminal aspect of a case. It is the law office of the government whose specific
powers and functions include that of representing the Republic and/or People before any court in any action
which affects the welfare of the people as the ends of justice may require. Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title
III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code provides that:

Section 35. Powers and Functions. - The Office of the Solicitor

General shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its
 agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any
litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of
lawyer, x x x. It shall have the following specific powers and
functions:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

(1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the

Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings; represent the
Government and its officers in the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and
special proceedings in which the Government or any officer
thereof in his official capacity is a party. (Emphases supplied)

In this case, records show that Burgos's petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 138203 sought for the
reinstatement of the Information and/or a ruling that the crime has not vet prescribed. Accordingly, the same
was not intended to merely preserve his interest in the civil aspect of the case. Thus, as his certiorari petition
was filed seeking for relief/s in relation to the criminal aspect of the case, it is necessary that the same be
filed with the authorization of the OSG, which, by law, is the proper representative of the People, the real
party in interest in the criminal proceedings. As the CA aptly noted, "[t]o this date, the [OSG] as appellant's
counsel of the [People] has not consented to the filing of the present suit." There being no authorization
given - as his request to the OSG filed on April 10, 2015 was not shown to have been granted -
the certiorari petition was rightfully dismissed.

It must, however, be clarified that the CA's dismissal of Burgos's certiorari petition is without prejudice to
his filing of the appropriate action to preserve his interest in the civil aspect of the Estafa through
Falsification of Public Documents case, provided that the parameters of Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure are complied with.

It is noteworthy to point out that "[t]he extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the
extinction of the civil action where[:] (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only
preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the liability of the accused is only
civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of
which the accused was acquitted. The civil action based on delict may, however, be deemed extinguished
if there is a finding on the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil
liability may arise did not exist."In this case, the RTC did not render any ruling that the act or omission
from which the civil liability may arise did not exist; instead, the RTC granted the motion to quash and
thereby, dismissed the criminal case on the sole ground of prescription. Any misgivings regarding the
propriety of that disposition is for the People, thru the OSG, and not for Burgos to argue. As earlier
intimated, Burgos's remedy is to institute a civil case under the parameters of Rule 111 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure.