Notarial Law
Roberto
HEIRS OF PEDRO ALILANO REPRESENTED BY DAVID
ALILANO, Complainants, v. ATTY. ROBERTO E.
EXAMEN, Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a complaint1 for disbarment filed before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) by the heirs of Pedro
Alilano against Atty. Roberto E. Examen for misconduct
and malpractice for falsifying documents and presenting
these as evidence in court thus violating the Lawyer’s
Oath,2 Canons 1,3 104and 19,5 and Rules
1.01, 1.02, 10.01, and 19.01 of the Code of Professional
6 7 8 9
Responsibility (CPR).
Pedro Alilano and his wife, Florentina, were the holders of
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-23261 covering a
98,460 sq. m. parcel of land identified as Lot No. 1085 Pls-
544-D located in Paitan, Esperanza, Sultan Kudarat. Pedro
and Florentina died on March 6, 1985 and October 11,
1989, respectively.
It appears that on March 31, 1984 and September 12, 1984
Absolute Deeds of Sale10 were executed by the Spouses
Alilano in favor of Ramon Examen and his wife, Edna. Both
documents were notarized by respondent Atty. Roberto
Examen, brother of the vendee. Sometime in September
1984, Spouses Examen obtained possession of the
property.
On January 12, 2002, the heirs of Alilano filed a suit for
recovery of possession before the Regional Trial Court of
Sultan Kudarat against Edna Examen and Atty.
Examen.11 It was during this proceeding that Atty. Examen
introduced into evidence the March 31, 1984 and
September 12, 1984 Absolute Deeds of Sale.
On November 15, 2003,12 the heirs of Alilano filed this
complaint alleging that Atty. Examen, based on Barretto v.
Cabreza,13 violated the notarial law when he notarized
the absolute deeds of sale since a notary public is
prohibited from notarizing a document when one of the
parties is a relative by consanguinity within the fourth civil
degree or affinity within the second civil degree. It is also
alleged that Atty. Examen notarized the documents
knowing that the cedula or residence certificate number
used by Ramon Examen was not actually his but the
residence certificate number of Florentina. Atty. Examen
also falsely acknowledged that the two witnesses
personally appeared before him when they did not.
Lastly, it is alleged that despite knowing the infirmities of
these documents, Atty. Examen introduced these
documents into evidence violating his oath as a lawyer
and the CPR.
In his defense, Atty. Examen pointed out that there was no
longer any prohibition under the Revised Administrative
Code for a notary public to notarize a document where
one of the parties is related to him by consanguinity and
affinity.14 With regard to the use of Florentina’s residence
certificate as Ramon’s, Atty. Examen said that he was in
good faith and that it was office practice that the
secretary type details without him personally examining
the output.15 In any event, he reasoned that the use of
another’s residence certificate is not a ground for
disbarment and is barred by prescription based on IBP
Resolution No. XVI-2004-13 dated January 26, 2004 where it
was proposed that the Rules of Procedure of the
Commission on Bar Discipline Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, Section 1, Rule VIII, be revised to include a
prescription period for professional misconduct: within two
years from the date of the act.16cralawred
In its Report and Recommendation,17 the IBP Commission
on Bar Discipline (CBD) found Atty. Examen liable for
breach of the Notarial Law and introducing false Absolute
Deeds of Sale before court proceedings. It stated that
there was ample evidence to support the complainants’
contention that the Spouses Alilano did not voluntarily and
knowingly convey their property, i.e. denials under oath by
attesting witnesses and NBI Report by Handwriting Expert
Jennifer Dominguez stating that Pedro Alilano’s signature
in the September 1984 Absolute Deed of Sale was
significantly different from the specimen signatures. It also
noted that Ramon Examen’s residence certificate
number, date and place of issue were also falsified since
the residence certificate actually belonged to Florentina
Pueblo. It thus recommended that the penalty of
disbarment be imposed.
The IBP Board of Governors (BOG) in its June 26, 2007
Resolution18 adopted the IBP CBD’s report but modified
the penalty to suspension from the practice of law for a
period of two years and a suspension of Atty. Examen’s
Notarial Commission for a period of two years.
Atty. Examen moved for reconsideration. In its Notice of
Resolution, the IBP BOG denied the motion for
reconsideration. It also modified the penalty imposed to
suspension from the practice of law for a period of one
year and disqualification from re-appointment as Notary
Public for a period of two years.19cralawred
We agree with the IBP that Atty. Examen is administratively
liable and hereby impose a modified penalty.
In disbarment cases the only issue that is to be decided by
the Court is whether the member of the bar is fit to be
allowed the privileges as such or not.20 It is not therefore
the proper venue for the determination of whether there
had been a proper conveyance of real property nor is it
the proper proceeding to take up whether witnesses’
signatures were in fact forged.
NO PRESCRIPTION OF ACTIONS FOR
ACTS OF ERRING MEMBERS OF THE BAR
In Frias v. Atty. Bautista-Lozada,21 the Court En Banc
opined that there can be no prescription in bar discipline
cases. It pointed out this has been the policy since 1967
with the Court’s ruling in Calo, Jr. v. Degamo22 and
reiterated in Heck v. Santos23 where we had the chance
to state:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
If the rule were otherwise, members of the bar would be
emboldened to disregard the very oath they took as
lawyers, prescinding from the fact that as long as no
private complainant would immediately come forward,
they stand a chance of being completely exonerated
from whatever administrative liability they ought to answer
for. It is the duty of this Court to protect the integrity of the
practice of law as well as the administration of justice. No
matter how much time has elapsed from the time of the
commission of the act complained of and the time of the
institution of the complaint, erring members of the bench
and bar cannot escape the disciplining arm of the Court.
This categorical pronouncement is aimed at unscrupulous
members of the bench and bar, to deter them from
committing acts which violate the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the Code of Judicial Conduct, or the
Lawyer’s Oath. x x x the Revised Rules on Notarial Practice27 was passed by the
Supreme Court.
Thus, even the lapse of considerable time from the
commission of the offending act to the institution of the In Kapunan, et al. v. Casilan and Court of Appeals, 28 the
administrative complaint will not erase the administrative Court had the opportunity to state that enactment of the
culpability of a lawyer…. (Italics Revised Administrative Code repealed the Spanish
supplied) cralawlawlibrary
24 Notarial Law of 1889. Thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

It is petitioners’ contention that Notary Public Mateo

We therefore ruled in Frias, that Rule VIII, Section 1 of the
Canonoy, who was related to the parties in the donation
Rules of Procedure of the IBP CBD was void and had no
within the fourth civil degree of affinity, was, under Articles
legal effect for being ultra vires and thus null and
22 and 28 of the Spanish Notarial Law, incompetent and
void.25cralawred
disqualified to authenticate the deed of donation
executed by the Kapunan spouses in favor of their
This ruling was reiterated in the more recent case
daughter Concepcion Kapunan Salcedo. Said deed of
of Bengco v. Bernardo,26 where the Court stated that
donation, according to petitioners, became a mere
putting a prescriptive period on administrative cases
private instrument under Article 1223 of the old Civil Code,
involving members of the bar would only serve to
so that under the ruling laid down in the case of Barretto
embolden them to disregard the very oath they took as
vs. Cabreza (33 Phil., 413), the donation was inefficacious.
lawyers, prescinding from the fact that as long as no
The appellate court, however, in the decision complained
private complainant would immediately come forward,
of held that the Spanish Notarial Law has been repealed
they stand a chance of being completely exonerated
with the enactment of Act No. 496. We find this ruling to
from whatever administrative liability they ought to answer
be correct. In the case of Philippine Sugar Estate vs.
for.
Poizart (48 Phil., 536), cited in Vda. de Estuart vs. Garcia
(Adm. Case No. 212, prom. February 15, 1957), this Court
Atty. Examen’s defense of prescription therefore is of no
held that “The old Spanish notarial law and system of
moment and deserves scant consideration.
conveyance was repealed in the Philippines and another
and different notarial law and system became the law of
THE SPANISH NOTARIAL LAW OF
the land with the enactment of Act No. 496.”29 (Emphasis
1889 WAS REPEALED BY THE REVISED
supplied)cralawlawlibrary
ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1917
In this case, the heirs of Alilano stated that Atty. Examen
Prior to 1917, governing law for notaries public in the
was prohibited to notarize the absolute deeds of sale
Philippines was the Spanish Notarial Law of 1889.
since he was related by consanguinity within the fourth
However, the law governing Notarial Practice is changed
civil degree with the vendee, Ramon. The prohibition
with the passage of the January 3, 1916 Revised
might have still applied had the applicable rule been the
Administrative Code, which took effect in 1917. In 2004,
Spanish Notarial Law. However, following the Court’s ruling
in Kapunan, the law in force at the time of signing was the
Revised Administrative Code, thus, the prohibition was
removed. Atty. Examen was not incompetent to notarize
the document even if one of the parties to the deed was
a relative, his brother. As correctly observed by the IBP
CBD:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
At the time of notarization, the prevailing law governing
notarization was Sections 231-259, Chapter 11 of the
Revised Administrative Code and there was no prohibition
on a notary public from notarizing a document when one
of the interested parties is related to the notary public
within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or second
degree of affinity.30cralawlawlibrary
Note must be taken that under 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice, Rule IV, Section 3(c), a notary public is
disqualified among others to perform the notarial act if he
is related by affinity or consanguinity to a principal within
the fourth civil degree, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 3. Disqualifications. – A notary public is disqualified
from performing a notarial act if he:
x x x x
(c) is a spouse, common-law partner, ancestor,
descendant, or relative by affinity or consanguinity of the
principal within the fourth civil degree.cralawlawlibrary
That Atty. Examen was not incompetent to act as a notary
public in the present case does not mean that he can
evade administrative liability under the CPR in conjunction
with the provisions of the Notarial Law.
NOTARIES PUBLIC MUST PERFORM
THEIR DUTIES DILIGENTLY AND
WITH UTMOST CARE
In Nunga v. Atty. Viray,31 this Court
stated:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
…[N]otarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary
act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that
only those who are qualified or authorized may act as
notaries public. The protection of that interest necessarily
requires that those not qualified or authorized to act must
be prevented from imposing upon the public, the courts,
and the administrative offices in general. It must be
underscored that the notarization by a notary public
converts a private document into a public document
making that document admissible in evidence without
further proof of the authenticity thereof. A notarial
document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its
face. For this reason, notaries public must observe with
utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of
their duties.32 (Emphasis supplied; citations
omitted)cralawlawlibrary
Thus under the prevailing law at the time of notarization it
was the duty of the notary public to comply with the
requirements of the Notarial Law. This includes the duty
under Chapter 11, Section 251 of the Revised
Administrative Code:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 251. Requirement as to notation of payment of
cedula [residence] tax. – Every contract, deed, or other
document acknowledged before a notary public shall
have certified thereon that the parties thereto have
presented their proper cedula [residence] certificates or
are exempt from the cedula [residence] tax, and there
shall be entered by the notary public as a part of such
certification the number, place of issue, and date of each
cedula [residence] certificate as aforesaid.
cralawlawlibrary
Under Chapter 11, Section 249 of the Revised
Administrative Code provided a list of the grounds for
disqualification:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 249. Grounds for revocation of commission. – The
following derelictions of duty on the part of a notary public
shall, in the discretion of the proper judge of first instance,
be sufficient ground for the revocation of his commission:
x x x x
(f) The failure of the notary to make the proper notation
regarding cedula certificates.chanrobleslaw
x x x x
cralawlawlibrary
In Soriano v. Atty. Basco,33 the Court stated that notaries
public are required to follow formalities as these are
mandatory and cannot be simply neglected. Thus, the
Notarial Law requires them to certify that a party to the
instrument acknowledged before him has presented the
proper residence certificate (or exemption from the
residence certificate) and to enter its number, place of
issue and date as part of the certification. Failure to
perform his duties results in the revocation of a notary’s
commission. The Court said:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
As a lawyer commissioned as a notary public, respondent
is mandated to discharge with fidelity the sacred duties
appertaining to his office, such duties being dictated by
public policy and impressed with public interest. Faithful
observance and utmost respect for the legal solemnity of
an oath in an acknowledgment are sacrosanct. He
cannot simply disregard the requirements and solemnities
of the Notarial Law.34 (Emphasis supplied)cralawlawlibrary
Here, based on the submission of the complainants, it is
clear that the residence certificate number used by
Ramon Examen and as notarized by Atty. Examen in both
Absolute Deeds of Sale was not in fact the residence
certificate of Ramon but Florentina’s residence certificate
number.35 Atty. Examen interposes that he was in good
faith in that it was office practice to have his secretary
type up the details of the documents and requirements
without him checking the correctness of same.
A notary public must discharge his powers and duties,
which are impressed with public interest, with accuracy
and fidelity.36 Good faith cannot be a mitigating
circumstance in situations since the duty to function as a
notary public is personal. We note that the error could
have been prevented had Atty. Examen diligently
performed his functions: personally checked the
correctness of the documents. To say that it was his
secretary’s fault reflects disregard and unfitness to
discharge the functions of a notary public for it is he who
personally acknowledges the document. He was
behooved under Section 251, Chapter 11 of the Revised
Administrative Code to check if the proper cedulas were
presented and inspect if the documents to be
acknowledged by him reflected the correct details. This
Court cannot stress enough that notarization is not a
routinary act. It is imbued with substantive public interest
owing to the public character of his duties37.
Atty. Examen posits that the failure of a notary to make the
proper notation of cedulas can only be a ground for
disqualification and not the proper subject for a
disbarment proceeding. We disagree.
In violating the provisions of the Notarial Law, Atty. Examen
also transgressed the his oath as a lawyer, provisions of the
CPR and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which
provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme
Court; grounds therefor. – A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before admission to practice, or for a
wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court,
or for corruptly and willfully appearing as an attorney for a
party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice.cralawlawlibrary
By his negligent act of not checking the work of his
secretary and merely perfunctorily notarizing documents, it
cannot be said that he upheld legal processes thus
violating Canon 1 of the CPR. Neither can it be said that
he promoted confidence in the legal system. If anything,
his acts serve to undermine the functions of a diligent
lawyer. He thus ran afoul Rule 1.02 of the CPR. We cannot
stress enough that as a lawyer, respondent is expected at
all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession and refrain from any act or omission which
might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the
public in the integrity of the legal profession.38 A lawyer’s
mandate includes thoroughly going over documents
presented to them typed or transcribed by their
secretaries.39cralawred
The Court notes that the case between the parties is not
the first that reached this Court. In Edna Examen and
Roberto Examen v. Heirs of Pedro Alilano and Florentina
Pueblo,40 Atty. Examen and his sister-in-law questioned via
a petition for certiorari41 the propriety of three Court of
Appeals’ Resolutions relating to a case involving Lot No.
1085 Pls-544-D this time with respect to its fruits. There the
Court of Appeals (CA) after giving Atty. Examen 90 days to
file his appellant’s brief, denied a second motion for
extension of time merely on the basis of a flimsy reason
that he had misplaced some of the transcript of the
witnesses’ testimonies. The CA did not find the reason of
misplaced transcript as good and sufficient cause to grant
the extension pursuant to Section 12,42 Rule 44 of the
Revised Rules of Court. It stated that it was a “flimsy and
lame excuse to unnecessarily delay the proceedings.”43
The CA was of the opinion that defendant-appellant’s,
herein respondent, motion was “a mockery of the
procedural rules.”44 This Court denied the petition for
various procedural defects.45cralawred
With respect to the penalty imposed, given that Atty.
Examen not only failed to uphold his duty as a notary
public but also failed to uphold his lawyer’s oath and ran
afoul the provisions of the CPR, the Court deems it proper
to suspend Atty. Examen from the practice of law for a
period of two years following this Court’s decision
in Caalim-Verzonilla v. Pascua.46cralawred
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Roberto E. Examen is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law forTWO (2)
YEARS. In addition, his present notarial commission, if any,
is hereby REVOKED, and he is DISQUALIFIED from
reappointment as a notary public for a period of two (2)
years from finality of this Decision. He is
further WARNED that any similar act or infraction in the alleged lot owner would wait for 30 years before filing an
future shall be dealt with more severely. action to quiet title. They prayed for the dismissal of the
petition and, by way of counterclaim, sought the award of
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the
moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and costs
Bar Confidant to be appended to respondent’s personal
record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the of suit.
Philippines, the Department of Justice and all courts in the
Aggrieved by the foregoing facts, Barbosa filed for
country for their information and guidance.
Quieting of Title and cancellation of IVQ’s registration, and
stated that; he was a buyer in good faith who have it
General Considerations registered and took possession of the disputed land.

IVQ vs. Ruben Barbasa RTC granted Barbasa’s petition, CA affirmed the decision
G.R. No. 193156 of the RTC.
January 18, 2017
After the decision of the CA, IVQ was able to produce
Facts: additional evidence which was not available at the earlier
stage. IVQ then filed a petition for certiorari.
The case was about a disputed land bought by Ruben
Barbasa from a the vendor, Therese Vargas, ISSUE: Does IVQ’s petition has merit?

It was alleged by Barbasa, that he took possession of the HELD:

disputed property immediately after the transfer
SC ruled that; based on the newly discovered evidence
certificate of title and deed of absolute sale was
presented by IVQ, the case must be reassess and re-
produced in favor of him. Later, Barbasa found out that
evaluated. Therefore, the case was remanded to the CA
the subject property was previously registered in the name
for the purpose of hearing and receiving the new
of Kawilihan corp, and that such property is was also sold
evidence presented by the parties.
to another person, Jose Vargas, who also sold it to IVQ
land holdings. In their Answer to the above petition, Jose Abadiano vs Martir
Vargas III, Benito Montinola, and IVQ (respondents in the G.R. No. 156310
court a quo) countered that the alleged title from where July 31, 2008
Barbosa's title was allegedly derived from was the one that
was fraudulently acquired and that Barbosa was allegedly DECISION
part of a syndicate that falsified titles for purposes of "land
NACHURA, J.:
grabbing." They argued that it was questionable that an

Before this Court is a Petition for Review
on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure assailing the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals
(CA) dated March 14, 2002 and its
Resolution dated November 21, 2002 in CA-G.R. CV No.
[2]
51679. The CA affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Kabankalan, Negros
Occidental declaring respondents as the owners of the
[3]
property in question.
The case stemmed from an action for quieting of
title and/or recovery of possession[4] of a parcel of land
filed by herein respondents against Roberto Abadiano,
Faustino Montao, and Quirico Mandaguit. Petitioner
Xerxes A. Abadiano intervened in that case.
Lot No. 1318 of the Kabankalan Cadastre consists of
34,281 square meters covered by Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) No. 20461 issued on November 19, 1923 in the
name of the spouses Inocentes Baares and Feliciana
Villanueva. Before the issuance of OCT No. 20461,
however, Inocentes and the heirs of Feliciana Villanueva
(who had predeceased her husband) executed an
Agreement of Partition dated June 1, 1922 over Lot No.
1318. The lot was partitioned and distributed as follows: (1)
14,976 sq m denominated as Lot No. 1318-A, in favor of
Demetrio Baares; (2) 10,125 sq m denominated as Lot No.
1318-B, in favor of Ramon and David Abadiano
(grandchildren of Inocentes and Feliciana); and (3) 10,180
sq m denominated as Lot No. 1318-C, in favor of Amando
Baares. The partition is embodied in a Deed of Partition
executed on June 1, 1922 and notarized the following day
by Notary Public Jose Peralta with notarial inscriptions Reg.
No. 64, Pag. 69, Libro III.[5]
On September 30, 1939, David Abadiano, who was
absent during the execution of the Agreement of Partition,
executed a Deed of Confirmation acknowledging and
ratifying the document of partition.[6]
OCT No. 20461 was administratively reconstituted
on February 15, 1962 and in lieu thereof OCT No. RO-8211
(20461) was issued over Lot No. 1318, still in the name of
Inocentes Baares and Felicidad Villanueva. Annotated at
the back of the reconstituted title were the Agreement of
Partition and the Deed of Confirmation.[7]
On June 14, 1957 Demetrio Baares sold his share of
the lot to his son, Leopoldo. The same was annotated at
the back of OCT No. RO-8211 (20461).[8]
Subsequently, on February 21, 1962, Leopoldo
Baares filed before the Court of First Instance (CFI) of
Negros Occidental an ex-parte petition praying for: first,
the confirmation of the Agreement of Partition, the
Conformity executed by David Abadiano, and the Deed
of Sale between him and his father; and second, the
cancellation of OCT No. RO-8211 (20461) and, in lieu
thereof, the issuance of a new certificate of title over the
property. In an Order dated February 22, 1962, the court
ordered the cancellation of OCT No. RO-8211 (20461) and
the issuance of a new certificate of title in the names of Dr.
Leopoldo Baares, Amando Baares, and Ramon and David
Abadiano. Pursuant thereto, Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. T-31862 was issued by the Register of Deeds for
Negros Occidental.[9]
 Petitioner insists that this is still the valid and subsisting
title over Lot No. 1318 and that no sale of the portion
pertaining to Ramon and David Abadiano ever took
place.[10]
On the other hand, respondent spouses alleged
that, prior to the issuance of TCT No. T-31862, Ramon
Abadiano, for himself and on behalf of David Abadiano,
had already sold their rights and interests over Lot No.
1318-C[11] to Victor Garde. The sale was allegedly
evidenced by a document of sale (Compra Y Venta)
dated June 3, 1922 and acknowledged before Notary
Public Jose Peralta and bearing notarial inscription Doc.
No. 64, Pag. No. 60, Book No. III, series of 1922. The sale was
allegedly affirmed by David Abadiano in a document
dated September 30, 1939.[12]
They further alleged that from the time of the sale,
Victor Garde and his heirs were in continuous, public,
peaceful, and uninterrupted possession and occupation in
the concept of an owner of Lot No. 1318-C.[13] On
December 29, 1961, the heirs of Victor Garde sold their
rights and interests over Lot No. 1318-C[14] to Jose Garde,
who immediately took possession thereof. Jose Garde
continuously planted sugarcane on the land until he sold
the property to Lolita Martir in 1979.[15]
After acquiring the property, respondent spouses
continued to plant sugarcane on the land. Sometime in
March 1982, after respondent Jesus Martir harvested the
sugarcane he had planted on Lot No. 1318-C, defendant
below Roberto Abadiano (son of Ramon) allegedly
entered the property and cultivated the remaining stalks
of sugarcane and refused to vacate despite demands to
do so. The following year, defendants Roberto Abadiano,
Faustino Montao, and Quirico Mandaguit again harvested
the sugarcane on Lot No. 1318-C.[16] Further, the
defendants also entered the property and harvested the
sugarcane on Lot No. 1318-B,[17] which by then had been
acquired by Lolita B. Martir from her adoptive father,
Amando Baares.[18]
Thus, in April 1982, herein respondent-spouses filed
the Action to Quiet Title and/or Recovery of Possession
with Damages before the then CFI of Negros Occidental.
In their Answer with Counterclaim,[19] defendants
denied that the subject property was ever sold by Ramon
and David Abadiano, and that, consequently, defendant
Roberto Abadiano had inherited the same from Ramon.
They also alleged, by way of Special and Affirmative
Defenses, that the subject land still belonged to the estate
of Ramon and David Abadiano and was never alienated.
They alleged further that the act of spouses Martir in
planting sugarcane on the land was without Robertos
consent; that Roberto had demanded that the spouses
Martir pay him reasonable rental for the land but that they
had persistently refused to do so; and that sometime in
March 1981, Roberto and the spouses Martir came to an
agreement whereby the defendant continued to cultivate
the remaining stalks of sugarcane left by plaintiffs and that
until the harvest of said sugarcane, plaintiffs never posed
any objection thereto.
Xerxes Abadiano intervened in the proceedings
before the trial court alleging likewise that his predecessor
Ramon Abadiano never sold their share of the property to
Victor Garde.[20]
After trial, the court issued a Decision[21] dated June
23, 1995, ruling in favor of the spouses Martir.
 The trial court rejected therein defendants
contention that the Compra Y Venta was null and void
because the co-owner, David Abadiano, did not sign the
same. It held that the Supreme Court has ruled to the
effect that the sale by a co-owner of the entire property
without the consent of the other co-owners was not null
and void but that only the rights of the co-owner-seller are
transferred, making the buyer a co-owner. The trial court
also held that although the Compra Y Venta was not
annotated either on the OCT or on the reconstituted OCT,
the validity of the sale was not vitiated. The registration or
annotation is required only to make the sale valid as to
third persons. Thus, the trial court concluded that
the Compra Y Venta was valid between the parties,
Ramon Abadiano and Victor Garde.
The trial court also brushed aside the defendants
contention that the Compra Y Venta contained the same
notarial inscription as the Deed of Partition. It said that
assuming this to be true, this may be considered an error
which did not nullify the Compra Y Venta; at most, the
document would be non-registrable but still valid.
On the contention that the alleged confirmation
executed by David Abadiano was for the Deed of
Partition and not for the Compra Y Venta, the trial court
agreed. It, however, interpreted the same to mean that
David Abadiano must not have authorized his brother to
sell his share in Lot No. 1318-C. The effect was that David
Abadiano continued to be one of the registered owners of
the property and his heirs stepped into his shoes upon his
death.
However, the trial court found that the plaintiffs
(respondents) claim that they and their predecessors-in-
interest have been in possession of the property for more
than sixty (60) years was duly established. In contrast, the
court found that defendants and intervenor, and their
deceased parents, had not been in possession of their
share in the property. It held that the defendants and
intervenor were guilty of laches for failing to avail of the
many opportunities for them to bring an action to establish
their right over Lot No. 1318-C.
Defendants appealed to the CA. However, the
same was summarily dismissed in a Resolution
dated February 11, 1997 due to defendants failure to pay
the required docket fee within the period set. Nonetheless,
the records were retained for the appeal of Xerxes
Abadiano, intervenor in the trial court.
On March 14, 2002, the CA rendered a Decision
affirming the Decision of the RTC in toto.[23]
Xerxes Abadiano now comes before this Court
raising the following arguments:
A
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED,
BASED ON ITS MISAPPREHENSION AND/OR
OMISSION OF THE FACTS, IN DISREGARDING
THE PRIMORDIAL ISSUE OF WHETHER OR NOT
THE DEED OF SALE (COMPRA Y VENTA) IS A
SPURIOUS DOCUMENT
B
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
FINDING PETITIONER GUILTY OF LACHES OVER
REGISTERED LAND[24]

The Petition is impressed with merit. We believe the
trial court and the CA erred in ruling for the respondents.
Accordingly, we reverse the assailed Decision and
Resolution.
It is well settled that the findings of fact of the trial
court, especially when affirmed by the CA, are accorded
the highest degree of respect, and generally will not be
disturbed on appeal. Such findings are binding and
conclusive on the Court. Further, it is not the Courts
function under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure to review, examine and evaluate or weigh the
probative value of the evidence presented. The
jurisdiction of the Court in a petition for review under Rule
45 is limited to reviewing only errors of law. Unless the case
falls under the recognized exceptions, the rule shall not be
disturbed.[25]
However, this Court has consistently recognized the
following exceptions: (1) when the findings are grounded
entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when
the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or
impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4)
when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of
facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6)
when in making its findings, the CA went beyond the issues
of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of
both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the
findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when
the findings are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set
forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and
reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; and (10)
when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence
on record.[26]
In the present case, we find that the trial court
based its judgment on a misapprehension of facts, as well
as on the supposed absence of evidence which is
contradicted by the records.
In appreciating the alleged Compra Y
Venta presented by respondents, the trial court
concluded that [t]he parties have no quarrel on the
existence of a Deed of Sale of a portion of Lot No. 1318
executed by Ramon Abadiano for himself and as
representative of David Abadiano, dated June 3, [1922] in
favor of Victor Garde.[27]
The trial court erred in its conclusion.
Borne very clearly by the records is the defendants
repudiation of the existence of the sale in their Answer with
Counterclaim. They stated:
2. That defendants admit plaintiffs
allegation in paragraph 4 that there has been
no particular designation of lot number (sic)
for each of the co-owner (sic) of Lot No. 1318
but specifically deny under oath the other
allegations thereof the truth being that the
property referred to here as Lot No. 1318
remains undivided to this day that the owners
thereof as shown by the TCT No. 31862 co-
own the same pro-indiviso;
3. That defendants have no knowledge
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the
allegations in paragraph 5[28] and
 therefore specifically deny the same under
oath the truth being that Ramon Abadiano
and David Abadiano had not sold the land at
bar to anyone and that consequently,
defendant Roberto Abadiano had inherited
the same from the former; x x x.[29](emphasis
supplied).
Likewise, petitioner specifically denied the
allegations in paragraph 5 of the Complaint. He alleged
that the lot had never been sold or alienated and the
same still remains intact as the property of the Intervenor
and his co-owners by operation of law.[30]
This was testified to by Roberto Abadiano during the
trial, thus:
Q: During the lifetime of your father, do you
know if your father has ever sold to any
party his share on Lot No. 1318?
A: He has not sold his share.[31]
These statements were enough to impugn the due
execution of the document. While it is true that this Court
had previously ruled that mere denials would not have
sufficed to impeach the document, in this case, there was
an effective specific denial as contemplated by law in
accordance with our ruling that -
defendant must declare under oath that he
did not sign the document or that it is
otherwise false or fabricated. Neither does
the statement of the answer to the effect that
the instrument was procured by fraudulent
representation raise any issue as to its
genuineness or due execution. On the
contrary such a plea is an admission both of
the genuineness and due execution thereof,
since it seeks to avoid the instrument upon a
ground not affecting either.[32]
It was error then for the RTC to have brushed aside
this issue and then make so sweeping a conclusion in the
face of such opposition. In light of this challenge to the
very existence of the Compra Y Venta, the trial court
should have first resolved the issue of the documents
authenticity and due execution before deciding on its
validity. Unfortunately, the CA did not even discuss this
issue.
We are cognizant, however, that it is now too late in
the day to remand the case to the trial court for the
determination of the purported Compra Y Ventas
authenticity and due execution. Thus, we will resolve this
very issue here and now in order to put an end to this
protracted litigation.
There is no denying that TCT No. 31862 is still the
subsisting title over the parcel of land in dispute. It is also a
fact that the purported Compra Y Venta was not
annotated on TCT No. 31862 until April 1982, shortly before
the complaint was commenced, even though the deed
was allegedly executed in 1922.
Considering that the action is one for quieting of title
and respondents anchored their claim to the property on
the disputed Compra Y Venta, we find it necessary to
repeat that it was incumbent upon the trial court to have
resolved first the issue of the documents due execution
and authenticity, before determining its validity.
Rule 130, Section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court
reads:
Original document must be produced;
exceptions. When the subject of inquiry is the
contents of a document, no evidence shall
be admissible other than the original
document itself, except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or
destroyed, or cannot be produced in court
without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or
under the control of the party against whom
the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to
produce it after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of
numerous accounts or other documents
which cannot be examined in court without
great loss of time and the fact sought to be
established from them is only the general
result of the whole;
(d) When the original is a public record
in the custody of a public officer or is
recorded in a public office.
Respondents attached only a photocopy of
the Compra Y Venta to their complaint. According to
respondent Lolita Martir, the original of said document was
in the office of the Register of Deeds. They allegedly tried
to obtain a copy from that office but their request was
refused. No other evidence but these bare assertions,
however, was presented to prove that the original is
indeed in the custody of the Register of Deeds or that
respondents due and diligent search for the same was
unsuccessful.
The Rule states that when the original document is
unavailable, has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be
produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution
or existence and the cause of its unavailability without
bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or
by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or
by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated.[33]
In the case at bar, respondents failed to establish
that the offer in evidence of the document was made in
accordance with any of the exceptions allowed under the
abovequoted rule, and yet, the trial court accepted the
document as genuine and proceeded to determine its
validity based on such assumption.
The trial court likewise brushed aside the apparent
defect that the document presented contained the same
notarial inscription as the Agreement on Partition. Indeed,
the Deed of Partition and the Compra Y Venta, though
executed on different days, were notarized on the same
day, and both documents contained the signatures of the
same witnesses and the same notarial inscription.
This notwithstanding, the court concluded, Assuming
this to be true, same could be considered an error which
did not nullify, (sic) the Deed of Sale or Compra Y Venta.
At most, the document would be a non-registrable, but
valid document.[34]

We stress that a notarial document is evidence of
the facts in the clear unequivocal manner therein
expressed and has in its favor the presumption of
regularity.[35]
In this case, while it is true that the error in the
notarial inscription would not have invalidated the sale if
indeed it took place the same error would have meant
that the document cannot be treated as a notarial
document and thus, not entitled to the presumption of
regularity. The document would be taken out of the realm
of public documents whose genuineness and due
execution need not be proved.[36]
Accordingly, respondents not having proven the
due execution and genuineness of the purported Compra
Y Venta, the weight of evidence preponderates in favor of
petitioner.
Next, we determine if petitioner is guilty of laches.
On this issue, we rule in the negative.
Under the Property Registration Decree,[37] no title to
registered land in derogation of the title of the registered
owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse
possession.[38] Indefeasibility and imprescriptibility are the
cornerstones of land registration proceedings. Barring any
mistake or use of fraud in the procurement of the title,
owners may rest secure on their ownership and possession
once their title is registered under the protective mantle of
the Torrens system.[39]
Nonetheless, even if a Torrens title is indefeasible
and imprescriptible,[40] the registered landowner may lose
his right to recover the possession of his registered property
by reason of laches.[41]
Laches has been defined as neglect or omission to
assert a right, taken in conjunction with lapse of time and
other circumstances causing prejudice to an adverse
party, as will operate as a bar in equity. It is a delay in the
assertion of a right which works disadvantage to another
because of the inequity founded on some change in the
condition or relations of the property or parties. It is based
on public policy which, for the peace of society, ordains
that relief will be denied to a stale demand which
otherwise could be a valid claim.[42]
The four basic elements of laches are: (1) conduct
on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he
claims, giving rise to the situation of which complaint is
made and for which the complaint seeks a remedy; (2)
delay in asserting the complainant's rights, the
complainant having had knowledge or notice of the
defendants conduct and having been afforded an
opportunity to institute suit; (3) lack of knowledge or notice
on the part of the defendant that the complainant would
assert the right on which he bases his suit; and (4) injury or
prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded
to the complainant or the suit is not held to be barred.[43]
The reason for the rule is not simply the lapse of time
during which the neglect to enforce the right has existed,
but the changes of condition which may have arisen
during the period in which there has been neglect. In
other words, where a court finds that the position of the
parties will change, that equitable relief cannot be
afforded without doing injustice, or that the intervening
rights of third persons may be destroyed or seriously
impaired, it will not exert its equitable powers in order to
save one from the consequences of his own neglect.[44]

Though laches applies even to imprescriptible
actions, its elements must be proved positively. Laches is
evidentiary in nature and cannot be established by mere
allegations in the pleadings.[45]
Based on the foregoing, we hold that petitioner is
not guilty of laches. The evidence on record does not
support such finding.
Petitioner had reasonable ground to believe that
the property, being still in the name of his predecessor in
interest, continued to be theirs, especially considering that
the annotation of the purported sale was done only in
1982. According to petitioner, his father had told him that
his (the fathers) inheritance was in the possession of their
uncle, Amando Baares who knew likewise that the
property was theirs.
From the testimonies of petitioner and the
defendants during trial, it would appear that they were
unaware of any of respondents actions in relation to the
property until the death of their grandfather, Amando
Baares. When they did find out that respondents were
occupying the land, they immediately took action to
occupy what they believed was still rightfully theirs.
That petitioner and his co-heirs waited until the
death of Amando Baares to try and occupy the land is
understandable. They had to be careful about the actions
they took, lest they sow dissent within the
family. Furthermore, they knew that their parents revered
Amando.[50]
The Court has recognized that this reaction cannot
be characterized as such delay as would amount to
laches, thus:
in determining whether a delay in seeking to
enforce a right constitutes laches, the
existence of a confidential relationship
between the parties is an important
circumstance for consideration, a delay
under such circumstances not being so strictly
regarded as where the parties are strangers to
each other. The doctrine of laches is not
strictly applied between near relatives, and
the fact that parties are connected by ties of
blood or marriage tends to excuse an
otherwise unreasonable delay.[51]
In addition, several other factors militate against the
finding of laches on the part of the petitioner.
When the Original Certificate of Title was
reconstituted on February 15, 1962, no annotation therein
was made of the Compra Y Venta or of the Deed of Sale
between Ramon Abadiano and Victor Garde. Only the
Agreement of Partition, the Confirmation by David
Abadiano, and the sale from Demetrio to Leopoldo
Baares were annotated therein.[52] Neither does the Deed
of Sale of Demetrios share in favor of Leopoldo, executed
in 1957, mention that the property belonged to anyone
other than the parties to the Deed of Partition.[53]
Likewise, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-31862,
which was issued in 1962 pursuant to an Order of the
Kabankalan CFI, was issued in the names of Leopoldo
Baares, Amando Baares, and Ramon and David
Abadiano. Even at the time of the issuance of said TCT,
there was no annotation of the alleged sale to Victor
Garde, which according to respondents took place in
1922.
If respondents contention were true, the TCT should
not have been issued in April 1962 in the name of Ramon
and David Abadiano, but in the name of Victor Garde or
Jose Garde who by then had supposedly acquired the
property by virtue of the Declaration of Heirship and Deed
of Sale executed on December 29, 1961.[54] As it is, neither
respondents nor any of their predecessors in interest
participated in any of the proceedings for the issuance of
the OCT, the reconstituted OCT, or the TCT. The petitioners
testimony on the matter is revealing:
Again, the TCT bears out the fact that the
purported Compra Y Venta to Victor Garde was
annotated thereon only on April 23, 1982. On the other
hand, several entries made in 1981 evince that petitioner
and his co-heirs took steps after Amandos death to assert
their rights over the property.[56]
In 1976, the heirs of David Abadiano executed a
Special Power of Attorney in favor of Roberto Abadiano
giving the latter authority to act, sue, and/or represent
them in any suit or action for recovery of possession or of
whatever kind or nature.[57] For their part, the heirs of
Ramon Abadiano executed a Declaration of Heirship and
Adjudication over the part of Lot No. 1318 pertaining to
their predecessor.[58]
Ranged against these positive steps, respondents
only have their bare assertions to support their claim that
they indeed had possession of the land through their
predecessors in interest, which are insufficient to
overcome the testimony that it was Amando Baares and
not Victor Garde who had possession of the property
during the formers lifetime, or that after Amandos death,
the lot remained unoccupied.
In sum, we find that petitioner is not guilty of such
neglect or inaction as would bar his claim to the property
in question. In contrast, it is most telling that respondents,
who are claiming to have been in possession of the
property by virtue of an alleged duly constituted sale for
almost 60 years, have themselves failed within that long
period to have the same property transferred in their
name or even only to have the sale annotated on the title
of the property.
Finally, we come to the issue of damages. Petitioner
prays that respondents be made to pay actual damages
of not less that P30,000.00 plus rentals on the property from
the time of the latters occupation, moral damages
amounting to P100,000.00, and exemplary damages, as
well as attorneys fees.
The record shows that petitioner testified on the
prevailing rate of rentals on the subject property from the
time of Amando Baares death in 1976 until the time of the
trial. According to petitioner, the rental rate from 1976 until
1985 was P3,000.00 per hectare, while from 1985 until the
time of his testimony in 1994, the rental rate was P5,000.00
per hectare. We thus rule that the actual damages that
may be awarded shall be based only on these rates.[59]
Considering, however, that petitioners co-heirs
(defendants Roberto Abandiano, et al.) were able to
enter the property and harvest the sugarcane therein in
1981 and, thereafter, the land remained unoccupied, the
rent must be reckoned only from the time respondents
actually occupied the land until March 1981.

The claims for moral damages must be anchored on
a definite showing that the claiming party actually
experienced emotional and mental sufferings.[60] In this
case, we find that petitioners testimony that he suffered
from sleepless nights from worrying about this case and
considering the great distance he had to travel from his
home in Tacloban to see the case through are enough
bases to award him moral damages. With the award of
moral damages, exemplary damages are likewise in
order.[61]
Attorneys fees are recoverable when exemplary
damages are awarded, or when the court deems it just
and equitable. The grant of attorneys fees depends on the
circumstances of each case and lies within the discretion
of the court.[62] Given the circumstances of this case, we
grant the prayer for attorneys fees.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the
Petition is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51679 are REVERSED
AND SET ASIDE. A new one is entered:
(1) reversing the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Kabankalan,
Negros Occidental in Civil Case No.
1331;
(2) declaring the heirs of Ramon and
David Abadiano as the lawful owners
of Lot No. 1318-B, a portion of Lot No.
1318 covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-31862, Kabankalan
Cadastre, Negros Occidental; and
(3) ordering respondents to pay
petitioner and his co-heirs rentals at the
rate of P3,000.00 per hectare per year,
from the time of actual occupation of
the land in 1976 until March 1981, moral
damages in the amount of P100,00.00,
exemplary damages in the amount
of P30,000.00, and attorneys fees in the
amount of P10,000.00.
Leonor Camcam, et.al vs. CA and Frias
G.R. No. 142977
September 30, 2008
Petitioner Leonor and her husband Laureano were the
registered owners of two parcels of land (Lot Nos. 19554
and 18738) located in Pangasinan. The latter died
intestate and was survived by Leonor and his brothers.
Leonor and Laureano’s filed before the RTC a
complaint against respondent Frias, for annulment of the
following documents executed by Leonor in favor with
Frias covering said lots:
1. Deed of Adjudication with Sale dated November 4,
1982;
2. Deed of Absolute Sale dated November 23, 1982;
and
 3. Deed of Extrajudicial Partition
and Sale dated November 4, 1982
They alleged that said documents did not reflect their
true intention, the shares of the plaintiffs, other than
plaintiff Leonor, were included without their knowledge,
participation and consent and that said documents were
absolutely fictitious and simulated. Furthermore, they
contented that from the appearance of these
documents, particularly the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition
and Sale and the Deed of Adjudication with Sale, while
both were notarized by the same notary public, yet they
have identical notarial documentary identification, i.e.,
the same documentary number to be 464, same page
number 44, the same book number X and the same series
of 1982, and appeared to have been sworn before the
notary public on the same date November 4, 1982, thus
should be declared null and void.
Issue: Whether or not the said documents should be
declared null and void CONSIDERING THEIR PHYSICAL
APPEARANCE AND CONDITIONS INDICATING STRONGLY
THE IRREGULARITIES OF THEIR EXECUTION.
Ruling: No. Without passing on the merits of Frias claim that
Leonor originally sold to him of Lot No. 18739 as reflected in
the first November 4, 1982 document but later conveyed
the remaining thereof, hence, the execution of the
second document bearing the same date, an irregular
notarization merely reduces the evidentiary value of a
document to that of a private document, which requires
proof of its due execution and authenticity to be
admissible as evidence.
The irregular notarization or, for that matter, the lack of
notarization does not thus necessarily affect the validity of
the contract reflected in the document. Tigno v.
Aquino[30] enlightens:
x x x From a civil law perspective, the absence of
notarization of the Deed of Sale would not necessarily
invalidate the transaction evidenced therein. Article 1358
of the Civil Code requires that the form of a contract that
transmits or extinguishes real rights over immovable
property should be in a public document, yet it is also an
accepted rule that the failure to observe the proper form
does not render the transaction invalid. Thus, it has been
uniformly held that the form required in Article 1358 is not
essential to the validity or enforceability of the transaction,
but required merely for convenience. We have even
affirmed that a sale of real property though not consigned
in a public instrument or formal writing, is nevertheless valid
and binding among the parties, for the time-honored rule
is that even a verbal contract of sale or real estate
produces effects between the parties.
(EQUITABLE MORTGAGE; ONLY ENJOYS PRESUMPTION OF
REGULARITY IF THE NOTARIZATION IS NOT DEFECTIVE, EVEN
IF REGULAR NOT A GUARANTEE OF THE VALIDITY OF THE
CONTENTS)
SPOUSES LEHNER and LUDY MARTIRES, Petitioners,
vs.
MENELIA CHUA,
Subject of the instant controversy are twenty-four
memorial lots located at the Holy Cross Memorial Park in
Barangay Bagbag, Novaliches, Quezon City. Respondent,
together with her mother, Florencia R. Calagos, own the
disputed property. Their co-ownership is evidenced by a
Deed of Sale and Certificate of Perpetual Care.
Respondent borrowed from petitioner spouses the amount
of P150,000.00. The loan was secured by a real estate
mortgage over the abovementioned property.
Respondent failed to fully settle her obligation.
Subsequently, without foreclosure of the mortgage,
ownership of the subject lots were transferred in the name
of petitioners via a Deed of Transfer.5
Respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City a Complaint against petitioners, Manila
Memorial Park Inc., the company which owns the Holy
Cross Memorial Park, and the Register of Deeds of Quezon
City, praying for the annulment of the contract of
mortgage between her and petitioners on the ground that
the interest rates imposed are unjust and exorbitant. She
likewise prayed for the reconveyance the disputed
property to her.6
Respondent amended her complaint to include the
allegation that she later discovered that ownership of the
subject lots was transferred in the name of petitioners by
virtue of a forged Deed of Transfer and Affidavit of
Warranty. Respondent prayed that the Deed of Transfer
and Affidavit of Warranty be annulled.7
After trial, the RTC of Quezon City denied and dismissed
the complaint for lack of merit.
On appeal, the CA affirmed, with modification.
Respondent filed a Motion for
Reconsideration. Petitioners opposed it.
11 12
the CA grants the movant's Motion for Reconsideration
and reversed the RTC.(CHUA FAVOR)
Declaring The Deed of Transfer dated, as well as the
Affidavit of Warranty, are hereby declared void ab
initio;
The CA reconsidered its findings and concluded that the
Deed of Transfer which, on its face, transfers ownership of
the subject property to petitioners, is, in fact, an equitable
mortgage. The CA held that the true intention of
respondent was merely to provide security for her loan
and not to transfer ownership of the property to petitioners.
[The CA so ruled on the basis of its findings that: (1)
the consideration, amounting to P150,000.00, for
the alleged Deed of Transfer is unusually
inadequate, considering that the subject property
consists of 24 memorial lots; (2) the Deed of
Transfer was executed by reason of the same loan
extended by petitioners to respondent; (3) the
Deed of Transfer is incomplete and defective; and
(4) the lots subject of the Deed of Transfer are one
and the same property used to secure
respondent's P150,000.00 loan from petitioners.]
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration,14 but the CA
denied petitioners filed a Second Motion for
Reconsideration,15 but again, the CA denied it via its
Resolution
Hence, the present petition based on the following
grounds:
A. THE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN NOT
UPHOLDING THE DEED OF TRANSFER EXECUTED BY THE
RESPONDENT IN FAVOR OF THE PETITIONERS BY RULING
THAT:
1. The Deed of Transfer executed by respondent in
favor of petitioners over the subject property was
not entered in the Notarial Book of Atty. Francisco
Talampas and reported in the Notarial Section of
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
2. The Deed of Transfer was not duly notarized by
Atty. Francisco Talampas inasmuch as there was no
convincing proof that respondent appeared before
Notary Public Atty. Talampas.
The petition lacks merit.
(Filed out of time)
(Notarization defective) Anent the first assigned error,
petitioners are correct in pointing out that notarized
documents carry evidentiary weight conferred upon them
with respect to their due execution and enjoy the
presumption of regularity which may only be rebutted by
evidence so clear, strong and convincing as to exclude all
controversy as to falsity.20However, the presumptions that
attach to notarized documents can be affirmed only so
long as it is beyond dispute that the notarization was
regular.21 A defective notarization will strip the document
of its public character and reduce it to a private
instrument.22 Consequently, when there is a defect in the
notarization of a document, the clear and convincing
evidentiary standard normally attached to a duly-
notarized document is dispensed with, and the measure to
test the validity of such document is preponderance of
evidence.23
In the present case, the CA has clearly pointed out the
dubious circumstances and irregularities attendant in the
alleged notarization of the subject Deed of Transfer, to wit:
(1) the Certification24 issued by the Clerk of Court of the
Notarial Section of the RTC of Makati City which
supposedly attested that a copy of the subject Deed of
Transfer is on file with the said court, was contradicted by
the Certification25 issued by the Administrative Officer of
the Notarial Section of the same office as well as by the
testimony of the court employee who prepared the
Certification issued by the Clerk of Court, to the effect that
the subject Deed of Transfer cannot, in fact, be found in
their files; (2) respondent's categorical denial that she
executed the subject Deed of Transfer; and (3) the subject
document did not state the date of execution and lacks
the marital consent of respondent's husband.
(EVEN IF REGULAR NOTARIZED NOT A GUARANTEE OF
VALIDITY) Assuming further that the notarization of the
disputed Deed of Transfer was regular, the Court,
nonetheless, is not persuaded by petitioners' argument
that such Deed is a sufficient evidence of the validity of the
agreement between petitioners and respondent.
While indeed a notarized document enjoys the
presumption of regularity, the fact that a deed is notarized
is not a guarantee of the validity of its contents.28 The
presumption is not absolute and may be rebutted by clear
and convincing evidence to the contrary.29 In the present
case, the presumption cannot be made to apply,
because aside from the regularity of its notarization,
(VALIDITY WAS OVERTHROWN BY QUESTIONABLE
CIRCUMSTANCES IN EXECUTION) the validity of the
contents and execution of the subject Deed of Transfer
was challenged in the proceedings below where its prima
facie validity was subsequently overthrown by the
questionable circumstances attendant in its supposed
execution. These circumstances include: (1) the alleged
agreement between the parties that the ownership of the
subject property be simply assigned to petitioners instead
of foreclosure of the contract of mortgage which was
earlier entered into by them; (2) the Deed of Transfer was
executed by reason of the loan extended by petitioners to
respondent, the amount of the latter's outstanding
obligation being the same as the amount of the
consideration for the assignment of ownership over the
subject property; (3) the inadequacy of the consideration;
and (4) the claim of respondent that she had no intention
of transferring ownership of the subject property to
petitioners.
the agreement between petitioners and respondent is, in
fact, an equitable mortgage.
Since the original transaction between the parties was a
mortgage, the subsequent assignment of ownership of the
subject lots to petitioners without the benefit of foreclosure
proceedings, partakes of the nature of a pactum
commissorium, as provided for under Article 2088 of the
Civil Code.
(MORTAGAGE PROP- NOTARIZATION NOT REGULAR: DID
NOT APPEAR, CONTRADICTED; EVEN IF NOTARIZATON
REGULAR- NOT GUARANTEE OF CONTENT, BUT CAN BE
OVERTHROWN BY CLEAR AND CONVCING EVIDENCE;
AGREEMENT IS EQUITABLE MORTGAGE)
[G.R. No. 156407. January 15, 2014.]
THELMA M. ARANAS, petitioner, vs. TERESITA V. MERCADO,
FELIMON V. MERCADO, CARMENCITA M. SUTHERLAND,
RICHARD V. MERCADO, MA. TERESITA M. ANDERSON, and
FRANKLIN L. MERCADO, respondents.
FACTS:
Emigdio S. Mercado (Emigdio) died intestate on
January 12, 1991, survived by his second wife, Teresita V.
Mercado (Teresita), and their five children, namely: Allan
V. Mercado, Felimon V. Mercado, Carmencita M.
Sutherland, Richard V. Mercado, and Maria Teresita M.
Anderson; and his two children by his first marriage,
namely: respondent Franklin L. Mercado and petitioner
Thelma M. Aranas (Thelma).
Emigdio inherited and acquired real properties
during his lifetime. He owned corporate shares in Mervir
Realty Corporation (Mervir Realty) and Cebu Emerson
Transportation Corporation (Cebu Emerson). He assigned
his real properties in exchange for corporate stocks of
Mervir Realty, and sold his real property in Badian, Cebu
(Lot 3353 covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3252)
to Mervir Realty.
Thelma filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cebu
City a petition for the appointment of Teresita as the
administrator of Emigdio's estate. The RTC granted the
petition considering that there was no opposition. The
letters of administration in favor of Teresita.
 As the administrator, Teresita submitted an inventory
of the estate of Emigdio for the consideration and
approval by the RTC. She indicated in the inventory that at
the time of his death, Emigdio had "left no real properties
but only personal properties" worth P6,675,435.25 in all,
consisting of cash of P32,141.20; furniture and fixtures worth
P20,000.00; pieces of jewelry valued at P15,000.00; 44,806
shares of stock of Mervir Realty worth P6,585,585.80; and 30
shares of stock of Cebu Emerson worth P22,708.25.
Claiming that Emigdio had owned other properties
that were excluded from the inventory, Thelma moved
that the RTC direct Teresita to amend the inventory, and
to be examined regarding it. Teresita filed a compliance
with the order of January 8, 1993, 3 supporting her
inventory with copies of three certificates of stocks
covering the 44,806 Mervir Realty shares of stock; 4 the
deed of assignment executed by Emigdio on January 10,
1991 involving real properties with the market value of
P4,440,651.10 in exchange for 44,407 Mervir Realty shares
of stock with total par value of P4,440,700.00; 5 and the
certificate of stock issued on January 30, 1979 for 300
shares of stock of Cebu Emerson worth P30,000.00.
Thelma again moved to require Teresita to be
examined under oath on the inventory. The RTC issued an
order expressing the need for the parties to present
evidence and for Teresita to be examined to enable the
court to resolve the motion for approval of the inventory.
Thelma opposed the approval of the inventory, and asked
leave of court to examine Teresita on the inventory.
The RTC issued on March 14, 2001 an order finding
and holding that the inventory submitted by Teresita had
excluded properties that should be included. The RTC
denied the administratrix's motion for approval of inventory
and orders the said administratrix to re-do the inventory of
properties which are supposed to constitute as the estate
of the late Emigdio S. Mercado. The RTC also directed the
administratrix to render an account of her administration
of the estate of the late Emigdio S. Mercado which had
come to her possession.
Teresita, joined by other heirs of Emigdio, timely
sought the reconsideration of the order of March 14, 2001
on the ground that one of the real properties affected, Lot
No. 3353 located in Badian, Cebu, had already been sold
to Mervir Realty,
On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC decision
insofar as the inclusion of the inclusion of parcels of land
known as Lot No. 3353 located at Badian, Cebu with an
area of 53,301 square meters subject matter of the Deed
of Absolute Sale dated November 9, 1989 and the various
parcels of land subject matter of the Deeds of Assignment
dated February 17, 1989 and January 10, 1991 in the
revised inventory to be submitted by the administratrix is
concerned.
ISSUE:
Whether or not he RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
directing the inclusion of certain properties in the inventory
notwithstanding that such properties had been either
transferred by sale or exchanged for corporate shares in
Mervir Realty by the decedent during his lifetime?
RULING: No. The CA's conclusion of grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the RTC was unwarranted and
erroneous.
 WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for
review on certiorari; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision
promulgated on May 15, 2002; REINSTATES the orders
issued on March 14, 2001 and May 18, 2001 by the
Regional Trial Court in Cebu; DIRECTS the Regional Trial
Court in Cebu to proceed with dispatch in Special
Proceedings No. 3094-CEB entitled Intestate Estate of the
late Emigdio Mercado, Thelma Aranas, petitioner, and to
resolve the case; and ORDERS the respondents to pay the
costs of suit.
RATIO:
The probate court is authorized to determine the
issue of ownership of properties for purposes of their
inclusion or exclusion from the inventory to be submitted
by the administrator, but its determination shall only be
provisional unless the interested parties are all heirs of the
decedent, or the question is one of collation or
advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of
jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third
parties are not impaired. Its jurisdiction extends to matters
incidental or collateral to the settlement and distribution of
the estate, such as the determination of the status of each
heir and whether property included in the inventory is the
conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased spouse.
Under Section 6 (a), Rule 78 of the Rules of Court,
the letters of administration may be granted at the
discretion of the court to the surviving spouse, who is
competent and willing to serve when the person dies
intestate. Upon issuing the letters of administration to the
surviving spouse, the RTC becomes duty-bound to direct
the preparation and submission of the inventory of the
properties of the estate, and the surviving spouse, as the
administrator, has the duty and responsibility to submit the
inventory within three months from the issuance of letters
of administration pursuant to Rule 83 of the Rules of Court,
viz.:
Section 1. Inventory and appraisal
to be returned within three
months. — Within three (3)
months after his appointment
every executor or administrator
shall return to the court a true
inventory and appraisal of all the
real and personal estate of the
deceased which has come into
his possession or knowledge. In
the appraisement of such estate,
the court may order one or more
of the inheritance tax appraisers
to give his or their assistance.
The usage of the word all in Section 1, supra,
demands the inclusion of all the real and personal
properties of the decedent in the inventory. However, the
word all is qualified by the phrase which has come into his
possession or knowledge, which signifies that the
properties must be known to the administrator to belong
to the decedent or are in her possession as the
administrator. Section 1 allows no exception, for the
phrase true inventory implies that no properties appearing
to belong to the decedent can be excluded from the
inventory, regardless of their being in the possession of
another person or entity.
The objective of the Rules of Court in requiring the
inventory and appraisal of the estate of the decedent is
"to aid the court in revising the accounts and determining
the liabilities of the executor or the administrator, and in
malting a final and equitable distribution (partition) of the
estate and otherwise to facilitate the administration of the
estate." Hence, the RTC that presides over the
administration of an estate is vested with wide discretion
on the question of what properties should be included in
the inventory. According to Peralta v. Peralta, the CA
cannot impose its judgment in order to supplant that of
the RTC on the issue of which properties are to be
included or excluded from the inventory in the absence of
"positive abuse of discretion," for in the administration of
the estates of deceased persons, "the judges enjoy ample
discretionary powers and the appellate courts should not
interfere with or attempt to replace the action taken by
them, unless it be shown that there has been a positive
abuse of discretion." As long as the RTC commits no
patently grave abuse of discretion, its orders must be
respected as part of the regular performance of its judicial
duty.
There is no dispute that the jurisdiction of the trial
court as an intestate court is special and limited. The trial
court cannot adjudicate title to properties claimed to be
a part of the estate but are claimed to belong to third
parties by title adverse to that of the decedent and the
estate, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the
decedent. All that the trial court can do regarding said
properties is to determine whether or not they should be
included in the inventory of properties to be administered
by the administrator. Such determination is provisional and
may be still revised. As the Court said in Agtarap v.
Agtarap:
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial
court, either as a probate court or an intestate court,
relates only to matters having to do with the probate of
the will and/or settlement of the estate of deceased
persons, but does not extend to the determination of
questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings.
The patent rationale for this rule is that such court merely
exercises special and limited jurisdiction. As held in several
cases, a probate court or one in charge of estate
proceedings, whether testate or intestate, cannot
adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a
part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to
outside parties, not by virtue of any right of inheritance
from the deceased but by title adverse to that of the
deceased and his estate. All that the said court could do
as regards said properties is to determine whether or not
they should be included in the inventory of properties to
be administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute,
there poses no problem, but if there is, then the parties, the
administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to
an ordinary action before a court exercising general
jurisdiction for a final determination of the conflicting
claims of title.
However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as
justified by expediency and convenience.
The probate court may provisionally pass upon in an
intestate or a testate proceeding the question of inclusion
in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property
without prejudice to final determination of ownership in a
separate action. Second, if the interested parties are all
heirs to the estate, or the question is one of collation or
advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of
jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third
parties are not impaired, then the probate court is
competent to resolve issues on ownership. Verily, its
jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or collateral to
the settlement and distribution of the estate, such as the
determination of the status of each heir and whether the
property in the inventory is conjugal or exclusive property
of the deceased spouse.
 The inventory of the estate of Emigdio must be
prepared and submitted for the important purpose of
resolving the difficult issues of collation and advancement
to the heirs. Article 1061 of the Civil Code required every
compulsory heir and the surviving spouse, herein Teresita
herself, to "bring into the mass of the estate any property
or right which he (or she) may have received from the
decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of
donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may
be computed in the determination of the legitime of each
heir, and in the account of the partition." Section 2, Rule 90
of the Rules of Court also provided that any advancement
by the decedent on the legitime of an heir "may be heard
and determined by the court having jurisdiction of the
estate proceedings, and the final order of the court
thereon shall be binding on the person raising the
questions and on the heir." Rule 90 thereby expanded the
special and limited jurisdiction of the RTC as an intestate
court about the matters relating to the inventory of the
estate of the decedent by authorizing it to direct the
inclusion of properties donated or bestowed by gratuitous
title to any compulsory heir by the decedent.
The determination of which properties should be
excluded from or included in the inventory of estate
properties was well within the authority and discretion of
the RTC as an intestate court. In making its determination,
the RTC acted with circumspection, and proceeded
under the guiding policy that it was best to include all
properties in the possession of the administrator or were
known to the administrator to belong to Emigdio rather
than to exclude properties that could turn out in the end
to be actually part of the estate. As long as the RTC
commits no patent grave abuse of discretion, its orders
must be respected as part of the regular performance of
its judicial duty. Grave abuse of discretion means either
that the judicial or quasi-judicial power was exercised in
an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility, or that the respondent judge, tribunal or
board evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to
perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of
law, such as when such judge, tribunal or board exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted in a capricious or
whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction.
G.R. No. 208450 SPS. ROBERTO ABOITIZ AND MARIA
CRISTINA CABARRUS vs. SPS. PETER L. PO AND VICTORIA
L. PO
Facts:This case involves a parcel of land located in
Cabancalan, Mandaue City, initially registered under the
name of Roberto Aboitiz. This parcel of land originally
belonged to the late Mariano Seno. On July 31, 1973,
Mariano executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of his
son, Ciriaco Seno. On May 5, 1978, Ciriaco sold the two (2)
lots to Victoria Po (Victoria). The parties executed a Deed
of Absolute Sale. On July 15, 1982, Mariano died and was
survived by his five (5) children.
In 1990, Peter Po discovered that Ciriaco “had executed a
quitclaim dated August 7, 1989 renouncing his interest in
favor of Roberto. In the quitclaim, Ciriaco stated that he
was “the declared owner of Lot Nos. 2835 and 2807.
The Spouses Po confronted Ciriaco. By way of remedy,
Ciriaco and the Spouses Po executed a Memorandum of
Agreement dated June 28, 1990 in which Ciriaco agreed
to pay Peter the difference between the amount paid by
the Spouses Po as consideration for the entire property
and the value of the land the Spouses Po were left with
after the quitclaim. However, also in 1990, Lot No. 2835
was also sold to Roberto. The Mariano Heirs, including
Ciriaco, executed separate deeds of absolute sale in
favor of Roberto. Thereafter, Roberto immediately
developed the lot as part of a subdivision called North
Town Homes. On April 19, 1993, Roberto filed an
application for original registration of Lot No. 2835, the trial
court granted the issuance of Original Certificate of Title
No. 0-887 in the name of Roberto. The lot was immediately
subdivided with portions sold to Ernesto and Jose.
On November 19, 1996, the Spouses Po filed a complaint
to recover the land and to declare nullity of title with
damages.
The Spouses Aboitiz appealed to the Court of Appeals. The
Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated October 31, 2012,
partially affirmed the trial court decision, declaring the
Spouses Po as the rightful owner of the land. However, it
ruled that the titles issued to respondents Jose, Ernesto,
and Isabel should be respected.
The Court of Appeals discussed the inapplicability of the
rules on double sale and the doctrine of buyer in good
faith since the land was not yet registered when it was sold
to the Spouses Po. However, it ruled in favor of the Spouses
Po on the premise that registered property may be
reconveyed to the “rightful or legal owner or to the one
with a better right if the title was wrongfully or erroneously
registered in another person’s name.” The Court of
Appeals held that the Mariano Heirs were no longer the
owners of the lot at the time they sold it to Roberto in 1990
because Mariano, during his lifetime, already sold this to
Ciriaco in 1973.
It found that the Deed of Absolute Sale between Ciriaco
and the Spouses Po was duly notarized and was thus
presumed regular on its face. Their Memorandum of
Agreement did not cancel or rescind the Deed of
Absolute Sale but rather strengthened their claim that they
“entered into a contract of sale. “It likewise ruled that,
contrary to the assertion of the Spouses Aboitiz, there was
no showing that Ciriaco merely held the property in trust
for the Mariano Heirs.It held that the action of the Spouses
Po had not yet prescribed because their complaint in 1996
was within the 10-year prescriptive period as the title in
favor of the Spouses Aboitiz was issued in 1994. However,
the Court of Appeals ruled that the certificates of title of
Jose, Ernesto, and Isabel were valid as they were innocent
buyers in good faith.
Issue: Whether or not the action of Spouses Po is barred by
prescription even with the existence of fraud.
Ruling: The Spouses Po’s action has not prescribed. In all
cases of registration procured by fraud, the owner may
pursue all his legal and equitable remedies against the
parties to such fraud without prejudice, however, to the
rights of any innocent holder for value of a certificate of
title …
Article 1456 of the Civil Code provides that a person
acquiring a property through fraud becomes an implied
trustee of the property’s true and lawful owner.
An implied trust is based on equity and is either (i) a
constructive trust, or (ii) a resulting trust. A resulting trust is
created by implication of law and is presumed as
intended by the parties. A constructive trust is created by
force of law such as when a title is registered in favor of a
person other than the true owner. The implied trustee only
acquires the right “to the beneficial enjoyment of the
property.” legal title remains with the true owner.
Art. 1456 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud,
the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a
trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from
whom the property comes.
Thus, it was held that when a party uses fraud or
concealment to obtain a certificate of title of property, a
constructive trust is created in favor of the defrauded
party.
Constructive trusts are “created by the construction of
equity in order to satisfy the demands of justice and
prevent unjust enrichment. They arise contrary to intention
against one who, by fraud, duress or abuse of confidence,
obtains or holds the legal right to property which he ought
not, in equity and good conscience, to hold.”
When property is registered in another’s name, an implied
or constructive trust is created by law in favor of the true
owner. The action for reconveyance of the title to the
rightful owner prescribes in 10 years from the issuance of
the title.
Thus, the law creates a trust in favor of the property’s true
owner.
The prescriptive period to enforce this trust is 10 years from
the time the right of action accrues. It is now well-settled
that the prescriptive period to recover property obtained
by fraud or mistake, giving rise to an implied trust under
Art. 1456 of the Civil Code, is 10 years pursuant to Art. 1144.
This ten year prescriptive period begins to run from the
date the adverse party repudiates the implied trust, which
repudiation takes place when the adverse party registers
the land.
Considering that the Spouses Po’s complaint was filed on
November 19, 1996, less than three (3) years from the
issuance of the Torrens title over the property on April 6,
1994, it is well within the 10-year prescriptive period
imposed on an action for reconveyance.
A.C. No. 10303 April 22, 2015
JOY A. GIMENO, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. PAUL CENTILLAS ZAIDE, Respondent
FACTS: On August 8, 2007, complainant Joy A. Gimeno
(Cimeno) filed a complaint3 with the IBP's Commission on
Bar Discipline, charging Atty. Zaide with: (1) usurpation of a
notary public's office; (2) falsification; (3) use of
intemperate, offensive and abusive language; and (4)
violation of lawyer-client trust. In her complaint, Gimeno
alleged that even before Atty. Zaide's admission to the Bar
and receipt of his notarial commission, he had notarized a
partial extrajudicial partition with deed of absolute sale on
March 29, 2002. She also accused Atty. Zaide of making
false and irregular entries in his notarial registers.
On October 4, 2007, the IBP CBD issued an order setting
the case for mandatory conference. Commissioner Pedro
A. Magpayo, Jr. (Commissioner Magpayo) found Atty.
Zaide administratively liable for violating the Notarial
Practice Rules, representing conflicting interests, and using
abusive and insulting language in his pleadings.
He noted that Atty. Zaide violated Section 1(a) and 1(b),
Rule VI of the Notarial Practice Rules when he maintained
several active notarial registers in different offices. These
provisions respectively require a notary public to "keep,
maintain, protect and provide for lawful inspection, a
chronological official register of notarial acts consisting of
a permanently bound book with numbered papers" and
to "keep only one active notarial register at any given
time.
Finally, the investigating commissioner noted that Atty.
Zaide used intemperate, offensive, and abusive language
when he called Gimeno a "notorious extortionist" in one of
his pleadings.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Zaide violated Section 1(a) and
1(b), Rule VI of the Notarial Practice Rules when he
maintained several active notarial registers in different
offices and violated Notarial Practice Rules.
HELD: YES. The Notarial Practice Rules strictly requires
anotary public to maintain only one (1) active notarial
register andensure that the entries in it are chronologically
arranged. The “oneactive notarial register” rule is in place
to deter a notary public from assigning several notarial
regiters to different offices manned by assistants who
perform notarial services on his behalf.
Since a notarial commission is personal to each lawyer, the
notary public must also personally administer the notarial
acts29 that the law authorizes him to execute. This
important duty is vested with public interest. Thus, no other
person, other than the notary public, should perform it.
This Court stresses that a notary public should not trivialize
his functions as his powers and duties are impressed with
public interest. A Notary public's office is not merely an
income-generating venture. It is a public duty that each
lawyer who has been privileged to receive a notarial
commission must faithfully and conscientiously perform.
Atty. Zaide should have been acutely aware of the
requirements of his notarial commission. His flagrant
violation of Section 1, Rule VI of the Notarial Practice Rules
is not merely a simple and excusable negligence. It
amounts to a clear violation of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which provides that "a lawyer
[should] uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land
and promote respect for law and legal processes." The
prohibition on the use of intemperate, offensive and
abusive language in a lawyer's professional dealings,
whether with the courts, his clients, or any other person, is
based on the following canons and rules of the Code of
Professional Responsibility:
Canon 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with
courtesy, fairness and candor toward his
professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing
tactics against opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional
dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive
or otherwise improper.
Canon 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the
respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and
should insist on similar conduct by others.
Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous,
offensive or menacing language or behavior before
the Courts. (emphasis supplied)
As shown in the record, Atty. Zaide,in the reply that he
drafted in the Ombudsman case, called Gimeno a
"notorious extortionist." And in another case, Gimeno
observed that Atty. Zaide used the following demeaning
and immoderate language in presenting his comment
against his opposing counsel.
Her declaration in Public put a shame, DISGRACE,
INDIGNITY AND HUMILIATION in the whole Justice System,
and the Department of Justice in particular, where the
taxpayers paid for her salary over her incompetence and
poor performance as a prosecutor...This is a clear
manifestation that the Public prosecutor suffers serious
mental incompetence as regard her mandate as an
Assistant City Prosecutor.35 (emphasis supplied)
This clearly confirms Atty. Zaide's lack of restraint in the use
and choice of his words - a conduct unbecoming of an
officer of the court.
While a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and
courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use of
offensive and abusive language. Language abounds with
countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but
respectful, convincing but not derogatory, and
illuminating but not offensive.36
On many occasions, the Court has reminded the members
of the Bar to abstain from any offensive personality and to
refrain from any act prejudicial to the honor or reputation
of a party or a witness. In keeping with the dignity of the
legal profession, a lawyer's language even in his
pleadings, must be dignified.
Disqualifications
Fe Ylaya vs. Atty. Gacott
Facts:
Fe Ylaya filed a disbarment complaint against Atty. GacOtt. Acco
rding to her, Atty. Gacott deceived her and her late husband, La
urentino, into signing a preparatory deed of sale which they tho
ught would be used in the sale of the properties to the City Gove
rnment of Puerto Prinsesa because at that time the said properti
es were subject to expropriation proceedings. But to their disma
y, according to her, it was converted into a deed of absolute sale
in favor of Atty. Gacott’s uncle Reynolds So.
Atty. Gacott denied these and claimed that Laurentino and Reyn
old had originally purchased the properties
that they were co owners and that Laurentino subsequently sold
his share to Reynold under the deed of absolute sale. He also arg
ued that it was clear from the document that the intended buyer
was a natural person, not juridical. because there were spaces fo
r the buyer’s legal age, marital status, and citizenship. Also, he cl
aimed that he was even constrained to file a subsequent motion
to intervene on behalf of Reynold because the complainant mali
ciously retained the TCTs to the subject properties after borrowi
ng them from his office.
Then, after some time, Fe Ylaya submitted a motion to withdraw
and executed an affidavit affirming and confirming the existenc
e, genuineness, and due execution of the deed of aabsolute sale.
The IBP governor resolved to suspend Atty. Gacott to 2 years, fin
ding him guilty of violation of Rule 1.01 and canon 16 of the code
of professional responsibility.
 Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Gacott indeed deceived the spouses and sh
ould be suspended;
Whether or not the motion to withdraw and affidavit affirming a
nd confirming the existence, genuiness, and due execution will a
ffect the disbarment proceedings.
Held:
1. Yes but not because of violation of Rule 1.01. Atty. Gacott’s failur
e to prove the existence of co ownership does not lead to the con
clusion that the deed of aabsolute sale is spurious and he was res
ponsible for creating the spurious documents.
However, he is liable for violating canon 16, rule 15.03, and rule
18.03. Canon 16, he was remiss in his obligation to hold in trust
his client’s properties. He lost certificates of land titles that were
entrusted to his care by Reynold. Rule 15.03, he admitted to be a
acting as legal counsel for the former owner of the subject prope
rties, spouses Ylaya, and Reynold So. There was no written cons
ent from any of the parties involved. Rule 18.03, he neglected leg
al matters entrusted to him. Records show that he never filed m
otion for leave to intervene on behalf of the spouses in the expro
priation proceedings, contrary to what he claimed.
2. No. While Fe Ylaya submitted the motion to withdraw the verifie
d complaint and the affidavit appear to exonerate Atty. Gacott, c
omplete exoneration is not the necessary legal effect as they are i
mmaterial for purposes of the disbarment proceedings. Accordi
ng to Sec 5 Rule 139-
B of the rules of Court, “no investigation shall be interrupted or t
erminated by reason of desistance, settlement, compromise, rest
itution, withdrawal of charges or failure of the complainant to pr
osecute the same”.
Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford n
o redress for private grievances. They are undertaken and prosec
ute solely for the public welfare. s to the second issue, this
Commission believes that the respondent committed serious error in
notarizing the Deed of Sale and the Memorandum of Agreement between
his uncle Reynold So and Laurentino Ylaya based on Rule IV, Section 3
(c) of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC which provides as follows:
"Sec. 3. Disqualifications – a notary public is disqualified from performing
a notarial act if he:
(a) x x x.
(b) x x x.
(c) is a spouse, common-law partner, ancestor, descendant, or
relative by affinity or consanguinity of the principal within the
fourth civil degree."
The defense therefore of the respondent that he did not violate the
aforementioned Rule becausehis uncle Reynold So, the buyer is not the
principal in the Subject Deed of Sale but the seller Laurentino Ylaya
(please see page 3 of the respondent’s Supplemental Position Paper) is
misplaced. Clearly, both the buyer and the seller in the instant case are
considered principals in the contract entered into.
Furthermore, if we are to consider the argument of the respondent that
his uncle was not a principal so as to apply the afore-quoted provision of
the Rules, the respondent still violated the Rules when he notarized the
subject Memorandum of Agreement between Laurentino Ylaya and his
uncle Reynold So. Clearly, both complainant and Reynold So were
principal parties in the said Memorandum of Agreement.
Atty. Gacott was suspended from practice of law for one year.
Bernard Jandoquile, complainant
Atty Quirino Revilla Jr, respondent
Facts:
The facts of the case are not disputed. Atty Revilla Jr notarized
a complaint-affidavit signed by Heneraline Brosas, Herizalyn
Brosas Pedrosa and Elmer Alvarado. Heneraline Brosas is a
sister of Heizel Wynda Brosas Revilla, Atyy Revilla Jr’s wife.
Jandoquile complains that Atyy Revilla Jr is disqualified to
perform the notarial act per Section 3 (c), Rule IV of the 2004
Rules on Notarial Practice. Complainant also complains that
respondent did not require the three affiants in the complaint-
affidavit to show their valid identification cards.Atty Revilla did
not deny but admitted complainant’s material allegations.
Issue: Whether or not the single act of notarizing the complaint-
affidavit of relatives within the fourth civil degree of affinity and,
at the same time, not requiring them to present valid
identification cards is a ground for disbarment.
Rulings:
No. Since the facts are not contested, the court deems it more
prudent to resolve the case. Indeed, Atty Revilla, Jr. violated
the disqualification rule under Section 3 ©, Rule IV of the 2004
Rules on Notarial Practice. The court agree with him, that
respondent’s violation is not sufficient ground for disbarment.
Given the clear provision of the disqualification rule, it behooved
upon Atty. Revilla, Jr. to act with prudence and refuse
notarizing the document. On the second charge, Atty Revilla, Jr.
cannot be held liable. If the notary public knows the affiants
personally, he need not require them to show their valid
identification cards. This rule is supported by the definition of a
“jurat” under Sec 6, Rule II of the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice. A “Jurat” refers to an act in which an individual on a
single occasion: (a) appears in person before the notary public
and presents an instruments or documents; (b) is personally
known to the notary public or identified by the notary public
through competent evidence of identity; (c) signs the
instrument or document in the presence of the notary; (d) takes
an oath or affirmation before the notary public as to such
instrument or document. In this case, Heneraline Brosas is a
sister-in-law of Atty Revilla, Jr’s wife; Herizalyn Brosas Pedrosa
is his wife’s sister-in-law; and Elmer Alvarado is the live-in
house boy of the Brosas family. Respondent knows the three
affiants personally, thus he was justified in no longer requiring
them to show valid identification cards. But respondent is not
without fault for failing to indicate such fact in the “jurat” of the
complaint-affidavit. While he has a valid defense as to the
second charge, it does not exempt him from liability for violating
the disqualification rule.
Refusal to Notarize and False or Incomplete
Certificates
[ A.C. No. 6470, July 08, 2014 ]
MERCEDITA DE JESUS, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY.
JUVY MELL SANCHEZ-MALIT, RESPONDENT.
RESOLUTION
SERENO, C.J.:
Before the Court is a disbarment complaint filed by
Mercedita De Jesus (De Jesus) against respondent
Atty. Juvy Mell Sanchez-Malit (Sanchez-Malit) on the
following grounds: grave misconduct, dishonesty,
malpractices, and unworthiness to become an officer of
the Court.
 THE FACTS OF THE CASE alienated.

In addition to the documents attached to her

In the Affidavit-Complaint [1] filed by complainant
complaint, complainant subsequently submitted three
before the Office of the Bar Confidant on 23 June
Special Powers of Attorney (SPAs) notarized by
2004, she alleged that on 1 March 2002, respondent
respondent and an Affidavit of Irene Tolentino
had drafted and notarized a Real Estate Mortgage of a
(Tolentino), complainant's secretary/treasurer. The
public market stall that falsely named the former as its
SPAs were not signed by the principals named therein
absolute and registered owner. As a result, the
and bore only the signature of the named attorney-in-
mortgagee sued complainant for perjury and for
fact, Florina B. Limpioso (Limpioso). Tolentino's
collection of sum of money. She claimed that
Affidavit corroborated complainant's allegations
respondent was a consultant of the local government
against respondent.[2]
unit of Dinalupihan, Bataan, and was therefore aware
that the market stall was government-owned.
On 4 August 2004, the Second Division of the Supreme
Court issued a Resolution requiring respondent to
Prior thereto, respondent had also notarized two
submit her comment on the Complaint within ten (10)
contracts that caused complainant legal and financial
days from receipt of notice.[3]
problems. One contract was a lease agreement
notarized by respondent sometime in September 1999
In her Comment,[4] respondent explained that the
without the signature of the lessees. However,
mortgage contract was prepared in the presence of
complainant only found out that the agreement had
complainant and that the latter had read it before
not been signed by the lessees when she lost her copy
affixing her signature. However, complainant urgently
and she asked for another copy from respondent. The
needed the loan proceeds so the contract was hastily
other contract was a sale agreement over a property
done. It was only copied from a similar file in
covered by a Certificate of Land Ownership Award
respondent's computer, and the phrase "absolute and
(CLOA) which complainant entered into with a certain
registered owner" was inadvertently left unedited. Still,
Nicomedes Tala (Tala) on 17 February 1998.
it should not be a cause for disciplinary action, because
Respondent drafted and notarized said agreement, but
complainant constructed the subject public market
did not advise complainant that the property was still
stall under a "Build Operate and Transfer" contract
covered by the period within which it could not be
with the local government unit and, technically, she
could be considered its owner. Besides, there had been
a prior mortgage contract over the same property in
which complainant was represented as the property's
absolute owner, but she did not complain. Moreover,
the cause of the perjury charge against complainant
was not the representation of herself as owner of the
mortgaged property, but her guarantee that it was free
from all liens and encumbrances. The perjury charge
was even dismissed, because the prosecutor found that
complainant and her spouse had, indeed, paid the debt
secured with the previous mortgage contract over the
same market stall.
With respect to the lease agreement, respondent
countered that the document attached to the Affidavit-
Complaint was actually new. She gave the court's copy
of the agreement to complainant to accommodate the
latter's request for an extra copy. Thus, respondent
prepared and notarized a new one, relying on
complainant's assurance that the lessees would sign it
and that it would be returned in lieu of the original
copy for the court. Complainant, however, reneged on
her promise.
As regards the purchase agreement of a property
covered by a CLOA, respondent claimed that
complainant was an experienced realty broker and,
therefore, needed no advice on the repercussions of
that transaction. Actually, when the purchase
agreement was notarized, complainant did not present
the CLOA, and so the agreement mentioned nothing
about it. Rather, the agreement expressly stated that
the property was the subject of a case pending before
the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (DARAB); complainant was thus notified of the
status of the subject property. Finally, respondent
maintained that the SPAs submitted by complainant as
additional evidence were properly notarized. It can be
easily gleaned from the documents that the attorney-
in-fact personally appeared before respondent; hence,
the notarization was limited to the former's
participation in the execution of the document.
Moreover, the acknowledgment clearly stated that the
document must be notarized in the principal's place of
residence.
An exchange of pleadings ensued after respondent
submitted her Comment. After her rejoinder,
complainant filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for
Submission of Additional Evidence.[5] Attached thereto
were copies of documents notarized by respondent,
including the following: (1) an Extra Judicial Deed of
Partition which referred to the SPAs naming Limpioso
as attorney-in-fact; (2) five SPAs that lacked the
signatures of either the principal or the attorney-in-
fact; (3) two deeds of sale with incomplete signatures
of the parties thereto; (4) an unsigned Sworn
Statement; (5) a lease contract that lacked the
signature of the lessor; (6) five unsigned Affidavits; (7)
an unsigned insurance claim form (Annual Declaration
by the Heirs); (8) an unsigned Invitation Letter to a
potential investor in Japan; (9) an unsigned Bank
Certification; and (10) an unsigned Consent to
Adoption.
After the mandatory conference and hearing, the
parties submitted their respective Position
Papers.[6] Notably, respondent's Position Paper did not
tackle the additional documents attached to
complainant's Urgent Ex Parte Motion.
THE FINDINGS OF THE IBP
In his 15 February 2008 Report, IBP Investigating
Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr. recommended
the immediate revocation of the Notarial Commission
of respondent and her disqualification as notary public
for two years for her violation of her oath as such by
notarizing documents without the signatures of the
parties who had purportedly appeared before her. He
accepted respondent's explanations with respect to the
lease agreement, sale contract, and the three SPAs
pertaining to Limpioso. However, he found that the
inaccurate crafting of the real estate mortgage contract
was a sufficient basis to hold respondent liable for
violation of Canon 18[7] and Rule 18.03[8] of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. Thus, he also
recommended that she be suspended from the practice
of law for six months.[9]
The IBP Board of Governors, in its Resolution No.
XVIII-2008-245 dated 22 May 2008, unanimously
adopted and approved the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner,
with the modification that respondent be suspended
from the practice of law for one year.[10]
Respondent filed her first Motion for
Reconsideration[11] and Second Motion for
Reconsideration.[12] She maintained that the additional
documents submitted by complainant were
inadmissible, as they were obtained without observing
the procedural requisites under Section 4, Rule VI of
Adm. No. 02-08-13 SC (2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice).[13] Moreover, the Urgent Ex Parte Motion of
complainant was actually a supplemental pleading,
which was prohibited under the rules of procedure of
the Committee on Bar Discipline; besides, she was not
the proper party to question those documents. Hence,
the investigating commissioner should have expunged
the documents from the records, instead of giving them
due course. Respondent also prayed that mitigating
circumstances be considered, specifically the following:
absence of prior disciplinary record; absence of
dishonest or selfish motive; personal and emotional
problems; timely good-faith effort to make restitution
or to rectify the consequences of her misconduct; full
and free disclosure to the disciplinary board or
cooperative attitude toward the proceedings; character
or reputation; remorse; and remoteness of prior
offenses.
The IBP Board of Governors, in its Resolution No. XX-
2012-119 dated 10 March 2012, denied respondent's
motion for reconsideration for lack of substantial
reason to justify a reversal of the IBP's findings.[14]
Pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, Director
for Bar Discipline Pura Angelica Y. Santiago through a
letter addressed to then acting Chief Justice Antonio T.
Carpio transmitted the documents pertaining to the
disbarment Complaint against respondent.[15]
THE COURT'S RULING
After carefully reviewing the merits of the complaint
against respondent and the parties' submissions in this
case, the Court hereby modifies the findings of the IBP.
Before going into the substance of the charges against
respondent, the Court shall first dispose of some
procedural matters raised by respondent.
Respondent argues that the additional documents
submitted in evidence by complainant are inadmissible
for having been obtained in violation of Section 4, Rule
VI of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. A
comparable argument was raised in Tolentino v.
Mendoza,[16] in which the respondent therein opposed
the admission of the birth certificates of his illegitimate
children as evidence of his grossly immoral conduct,
because those documents were obtained in violation
Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, Series of
1993.[17] Rejecting his argument, the Court reasoned as
follows:
Section 3, Rule 128 of the Revised Rules on Evidence
provides that "evidence is admissible when it is
relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or
these rules." There could be no dispute that the subject
birth certificates are relevant to the issue. The only
question, therefore, is whether the law or the rules
provide for the inadmissibility of said birth certificates
allegedly for having been obtained in violation of Rule
24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993.
Note that Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of
1993 only provides for sanctions against persons
violating the rule on confidentiality of birth records, as evidence against respondent, the protection against
but nowhere does it state that procurement of birth unreasonable searches and seizures does not apply.
records in violation of said rule would render said
Since both Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series
records inadmissible in evidence. On the other hand,
of 1993 and the Revised Rules on Evidence do not
the Revised Rules of Evidence only provides for the
provide for the exclusion from evidence of the birth
exclusion of evidence if it is obtained as a result of
certificates in question, said public documents are,
illegal searches and seizures. It should be emphasized,
therefore, admissible and should be properly taken
however, that said rule against unreasonable searches
into consideration in the resolution of this
and seizures is meant only to protect a person from
administrative case against respondent.[18]
interference by the government or the state. In People
vs. Hipol, we explained that:
Similarly, the 2004 Rules on Notarial Law contain no
provision declaring the inadmissibility of documents
The Constitutional proscription enshrined in the Bill of
obtained in violation thereof. Thus, the IBP correctly
Rights does not concern itself with the relation
considered in evidence the other notarized documents
between a private individual and another individual. It
submitted by complainant as additional evidence.
governs the relationship between the individual and
the State and its agents. The Bill of Rights only tempers
Respondent's argument that the Urgent Ex-
governmental power and protects the individual
Parte Motion of complainant constitutes a
against any aggression and unwarranted interference
supplemental pleading must fail as well. As its very
by any department of government and its agencies.
name denotes, a supplemental pleading only serves to
Accordingly, it cannot be extended to the acts
bolster or adds something to the primary pleading. Its
complained of in this case. The alleged "warrantless
usual office is to set up new facts which justify, enlarge
search" made by Roque, a co-employee of appellant at
or change the kind of relief with respect to the same
the treasurer's office, can hardly fall within the ambit
subject matter as the controversy referred to in the
of the constitutional proscription on unwarranted
original complaint.[19] Accordingly, it cannot be said
searches and seizures.
that the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion filed by complainant
was a supplemental pleading. One of her charges
Consequently, in this case where complainants, as
against respondent is that the latter notarized
private individuals, obtained the subject birth records
incomplete documents, as shown by the SPAs and lease
agreement attached to the Affidavit-Complaint.
Complainant is not legally barred from submitting
additional evidence to strengthen the basis of her
complaint.
Going now into the substance of the charges against
respondent, the Court finds that she committed
misconduct and grievously violated her oath as a
notary public.
The important role a notary public performs cannot be
overemphasized. The Court has repeatedly stressed
that notarization is not an empty, meaningless
routinary act, but one invested with substantive public
interest. Notarization converts a private document into
a public document, making it admissible in evidence
without further proof of its authenticity. Thus, a
notarized document is, by law, entitled to full faith and
credit upon its face. It is for this reason that a notary
public must observe with utmost care the basic
requirements in the performance of his notarial duties;
otherwise, the public's confidence in the integrity of a
notarized document would be undermined.[20]
Where the notary public admittedly has personal
knowledge of a false statement or information
contained in the instrument to be notarized, yet
proceeds to affix the notarial seal on it, the Court must
not hesitate to discipline the notary public accordingly
as the circumstances of the case may dictate.
Otherwise, the integrity and sanctity of the
notarization process may be undermined, and public
confidence in notarial documents diminished. [21] In
this case, respondent fully knew that complainant was
not the owner of the mortgaged market stall. That
complainant comprehended the provisions of the real
estate mortgage contract does not make respondent
any less guilty. If at all, it only heightens the latter's
liability for tolerating a wrongful act. Clearly,
respondent's conduct amounted to a breach of Canon
1[22] and Rules 1.01[23] and 1.02[24] of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Respondent's explanation about the unsigned lease
agreement executed by complainant sometime in
September 1999[25] is incredulous. If, indeed, her file
copy of the agreement bore the lessees' signatures, she
could have given complainant a certified photocopy
thereof. It even appears that said lease agreement is
not a rarity in respondent's practice as a notary public.
Records show that on various occasions from 2002 to
2004, respondent has notarized 22 documents that
were either unsigned or lacking signatures of the
parties. Technically, each document maybe a ground
for disciplinary action, for it is the duty of a notarial
officer to demand that a document be signed in his or
her presence.[26]

A notary public should not notarize a document unless
the persons who signed it are the very same ones who
executed it and who personally appeared before the
said notary public to attest to the contents and truth of
what are stated therein.[27] Thus, in acknowledging that
the parties personally came and appeared before her,
respondent also violated Rule 10.01[28] of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and her oath as a lawyer
that she shall do no falsehood.[29]
Certainly, respondent is unfit to continue enjoying the
solemn office of a notary public. In several instances,
the Court did not hesitate to disbar lawyers who were
found to be utterly oblivious to the solemnity of their
oath as notaries public.[30] Even so, the rule is that
disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of
misconduct that seriously affect the standing and
character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and
the Court will not disbar a lawyer where a lesser
penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired
end.[31] The blatant disregard by respondent of her
basic duties as a notary public warrants the less severe
punishment of suspension from the practice of law and
perpetual disqualification to be commissioned as a
notary public.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Juvy Mell Sanchez-
Malit is found guilty of violating Canon 1 and Rules
1.01, 1.02, and 10.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility as well as her oath as notary public.
Hence, she is SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for ONE YEAReffective immediately. Her notarial
commission, if still existing, is IMMEDIATELY
REVOKED and she is hereby PERPETUALLY
DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a
notary public.
Crisostomo vs Nazareno, June 10, 2014
Perlas – Bernabe, J.
The Facts:
In 2001, the complainants In the disbarment case filed against Atty. Philip
(Nazareno), bought housing units in Patricia South Subdivision, from Rudex
International Development Corporation (Rudex). They then filed, in two
batches, complaints for rescission of contracts against Rudex. In all of these
cases, Rudex was represented by Atty. Philip. In the first batch of cases, the
HLURB rendered judgments I default against Rudex, hence the latter filed
Petitions for Review before the HLURB assailing them. In the certifications
against forum shopping, Atty. Philip Rudex through its president Ruben, and
legal counsel Philip stated that they have not commenced or has knowledge
of any action involving the same issues pending before the NLRC, this
despite the fact that Rudex filed ejectment cases against the complainants
therein. Rudex again filed a complaint for rescission of contract with the
HLURB against Melinda Sioting. Again, the certification against no forums
shopping signed by Norilyn stated that no pending action involving the same
issues were pending, which certification was notarised by Atty. Philip. On
April 1, 2004, Rudex again filed six complaints for rescission of contract
against the other complainants, with the same manifestation in the
certification against forum shopping.
The complainants then filed a disbarment complaint against Philip, alleging
that he made false declarations in the certifications against forum shopping
attached to the several complaints filed by Rudex against them. Despite
notice, Atty. Philip did not submit his comment during the proceedings. In
the meantime, the HLURB dismissed the complaints filed by Rudex due to
the erroneous certifications against forum shopping. The IBP Investigating
Commissioner recommended the suspension from the practice of law for six
months of Atty. Philip. The IBP adopted the findings and recommendation of
the investigating commissioner but modified it to one month suspension
from the practice of law.
Issue:
WON Atty. Nazareno should be held administratively liable.
Held:
The Court affirms the IBP’s findings with modification as to the penalty
imposed.
Separate from the proscription against forum shopping is the violation of
the certification requirement against forum shopping, which was
distinguished in the case of Sps. Ong v. CA as follows:
The distinction between the prohibition against forum shopping and the
certification requirement should by now be too elementary to be
misunderstood. To reiterate, compliance with the certification against
forum shopping is separate from and independent of the avoidance of the
act of forum shopping itself. There is a difference in the treatment between
failure to comply with the certification requirement and violation of the
prohibition against forum shopping not only in terms of imposable sanctions
but also in the manner of enforcing them. The former constitutes sufficient
cause for the dismissal without prejudice to the filing of the complaint or
initiatory pleading upon motion and after hearing, while the latter is a
ground for summary dismissal thereof and for direct contempt. x x x.
Under Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, the submission of false
entries in a certification against forum shopping constitutes indirect or
direct contempt of court, and subjects the erring counsel to the
corresponding administrative and criminal actions, viz.:
Section 5. Certification against forum shopping. — The plaintiff or principal
party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading
asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and
simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced
any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal
or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other
action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action
or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he
should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been
filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to
the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been
filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by
mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be
cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise
provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission of a false
certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall
constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the
corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or
his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the
same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall
constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions.
(Emphases supplied)
In the realm of legal ethics, said infraction may be considered as a violation
of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 and Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (Code) which read as follows:
CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS
OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
xxxx
CANON 10 – A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE
COURT.
Rule 10.01 – A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing
of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any
artifice.
In this case, it has been established that Atty. Nazareno made false
declarations in the certifications against forum shopping attached to
Rudex’s pleadings, for which he should be held administratively liable.
Records show that Atty. Nazareno, acting as Rudex’s counsel, filed, in
August 2003, petitions for review assailing the judgments of default
rendered in the first batch of rescission cases without disclosing in the
certifications against forum shopping the existence of the ejectment case it
filed against Sps. Sioting which involves an issue related to the
complainants’ rescission cases. Further, on January 29, 2004, Rudex,
represented by Atty. Nazareno, filed a complaint for rescission and
ejectment against Sps. Sioting without disclosing in the certifications against
forum shopping the existence of Sioting’s May 24, 2002 rescission complaint
against Rudex as well as Rudex’s own September 9, 2002 ejectment
complaint also against Sps. Sioting. Finally, on April 1, 2004, Atty. Nazareno,
once more filed rescission and ejectment complaints against the other
complainants in this case without disclosing in the certifications against
forum shopping the existence of complainants’ own complaints for
rescission.
Owing to the evident similarity of the issues involved in each set of cases,
Atty. Nazareno – as mandated by the Rules of Court and more pertinently,
the canons of the Code – should have truthfully declared the existence of
the pending related cases in the certifications against forum shopping
attached to the pertinent pleadings. Considering that Atty. Nazareno did not
even bother to refute the charges against him despite due notice, the Court
finds no cogent reason to deviate from the IBP’s resolution on his
administrative liability. However, as for the penalty to be imposed, the
Court deems it proper to modify the IBP’s finding on this score.
In Molina v. Atty. Magat, a penalty of six (6) months suspension from the
practice of law was imposed against the lawyer therein who was shown to
have deliberately made false and untruthful statements in one of his
pleadings. Given that Atty. Nazareno’s infractions are of a similar nature,
but recognizing further that he, as may be gleaned from the foregoing
discussion, had repetitively committed the same, the Court hereby
suspends him from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year.
Separately, the Court further finds Atty. Nazareno guilty of malpractice as a
notary public, considering that he assigned only one document number (i.e.,
Doc. No. 1968) to the certifications against forum shopping attached to the
six (6) April 1, 2004 complaints for rescission and ejectment despite the fact
that each of them should have been treated as a separate notarial act. It is a
standing rule that for every notarial act, the notary shall record in the
notarial register at the time of the notarization, among others, the entry
and page number of the document notarized, and that he shall give to each
instrument or document executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him a
number corresponding to the one in his register[5]. Evidently, Atty.
Nazareno did not comply with the foregoing rule.
Worse, Atty. Nazareno notarized the certifications against forum shopping
attached to all the aforementioned complaints, fully aware that they
identically asserted a material falsehood, i.e., that Rudex had not
commenced any actions or proceedings or was not aware of any pending
actions or proceedings involving the same issues in any other forum. The
administrative liability of an erring notary public in this respect was clearly
delineated as a violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code in the case of
Heirs of the Late Spouses Villanueva v. Atty. Beradi to wit:
Where admittedly the notary public has personal knowledge of a false
statement or information contained in the instrument to be notarized, yet
proceeds to affix his or her notarial seal on it, the Court must not hesitate to
discipline the notary public accordingly as the circumstances of the case
may dictate. Otherwise, the integrity and sanctity of the notarization
process may be undermined and public confidence on notarial documents
diminished. In this case, respondent’s conduct amounted to a breach of
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which requires lawyers
to obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the law and legal
processes. Respondent also violated Rule 1.01 of the Code which proscribes
lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful
conduct. (Emphasis supplied)
In said case, the lawyer who knowingly notarized a document containing
false statements had his notarial commission revoked and was disqualified
from being commissioned as such for a period of one (1) year. Thus, for his
malpractice as a notary public, the Court is wont to additionally impose the
same penalties of such nature against him. However, due to the multiplicity
of his infractions on this front, coupled with his willful malfeasance in
discharging the office, the Court deems it proper to revoke his existing
commission and permanently disqualify him from being commissioned as a
notary public. Indeed, respondent ought to be reminded that:
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Philip Z. A. Nazareno is found GUILTY of
making false declarations in the certifications against forum shopping
subject of this case, as well as malpractice as a notary public. Accordingly,
he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year,
effective upon his receipt of this Decision, with a STERN WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
Further, he is PERMANENTLY DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a
notary public and, his notarial commission, if currently existing, is hereby
REVOKED.
Samonte v. Jumamil A.C. No. 11668,
17 July 2017
Facts: Atty. Jumamil failed to file the necessary position paper
before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) which
resulted into an adverse ruling against Samonte, his client, who
then filed a disbarment compliant for acts unbecoming of a
lawyer and betrayal of trust. On the other hand, Atty. Jumamil
maintained that his omission was due to his client’s failure to
adduce credible witnesses to testify in her favor. In the course of
the proceedings, Atty. Jumamil admittedly prepared and
notarized the affidavit of Samonte’s intended witness despite his
belief that such was a perjured one.
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Jumamil should be held
administratively liable.
Decision: Yes. Failure to produce any credible witness is not a
valid justification to completely abandon his client’s cause. Also,
notarization of a perjured affidavit constitutes a violation of the
rules on notarial practice. Atty. Jumamil is ordered:
1. Suspended for one (1) year;
2. Revoked notarial commission;
3. Disqualified from being commissioned as a notary public for
two (2) years;
4. Sternly warned that repetition would be dealt with more
severely
Notably, the notarization of a perjured affidavit also constituted a violation of
the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Section 4 (a), Rule IV thereof pertinently
provides:
SEC. 4. Refusal to Notarize. – A notary public shall not perform any notarial act
described in these Rules for any person requesting such an act even if he
tenders the appropriate fee specified by these Rules if:

(a) the notary knows or has good reason to
believe that the notarial act or transaction
is unlawful or immoral[.] (Emphasis supplied)
On this score, it is well to stress that "notarization is not an empty,
meaningless routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest. It
must be underscored that the notarization by a notary public converts a private
document into a public document, making that document admissible in
evidence without further proof of authenticity thereof. A notarial document is,
by law, entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. For this reason, a notary
public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the
performance of their duties; otherwise, the confidence of the public in the
integrity of this form of conveyance would be undermined."27
Having established respondent's administrative liability, the Court
determines the proper penalty.
Commission Period and Expiration
Efigenia Tenoso, complainant
Atty Anselmo Echanez, respondent
Facts:
Complainant Efigenia Tenoso filed a complaint against Atty
Anselmo Echanez, respondent alleging that the latter was
engaged in notarial practice without having been properly
commissioned by RTC Santiago City, the court having
jurisdiction over Cordon, Isabela. The complainant support her
allegations by presenting documents issued by Executive Judge
Efren Cacatian bearing the names of commissioned notaries
public for the years 2006 to 2008 which respondent’s name
does not appear; documents notarized by the respondent in
year 2006, 2007 and 2008, and a copy of a certification issued
by Judge Cacatian stating respondent’s notarization could not
be authenticated. Respondent denied the allegations and added
he never committed any malpractice, nor deceit nor have
violated the lawyer’s oath and that such allegations is politically
motivated and meant to harass or intimidate him and guessed
that the affidavit-complaint were tampered and adulterated or
that somebody might forged his signature.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty Echanez’s contention is tenable.
now
Rulings:
No. The court empahasizes that the practice of law is imbued
with public interest and that “ a lawyer owes substantial duties
not only to his client, but also to this brethren in the profession,
to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the
most important functions of the State-the administration of
justice-as an officer of the court. Accordingly, lawyers are
bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency,
but also of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing. In
misrepresenting himself as a notary public, respondent exposed
party-ligitants, courts, other lawyers and the general public to
the perils of ordinary documents posing as public instruments.
Respondent committed act of deceit and falsehood in open
violation of the explicit pronouncement of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Evidently, respondent’s conduct falls
miserably short of the high standards of morality, honesty,
integrity and fair dealing required from lawyers. It is proper that
he be sanctioned.
SLU vs. DELA CRUZ
Facts: A disbarment case filed by the Faculty members and Staff
of the Saint Louis University-Laboratory High School (SLU-
LHS) against Atty. Rolando C. Dela Cruz, principal of SLU-LHS,
predicated on the following grounds:
1. Gross misconduct- he has pending case of child abuse,
administrative case and labor case.
2. Grossly immoral conduct – contracting a second marriage
despite the existence of his first marriage.
3. Malpractice- notarizing documents despite the expiration of
his commission.
Issue: May a pending case constitutes facts that determines the
existence of gross misconduct by the respondent?
Held: Practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by
the State on those who show that they possess the qualifications
required by law. The purpose of suspending or disbarring an
attorney is to remove from the profession those unfit to be
entrusted with the duties and responsibilities thereby protecting
the public and those charged with the administration of justice,
rather than to punish an attorney.
Contracting a second marriage despite existence of first
marriage is a violation of the continous possession of good
moral character as a requirement to the enjoyment of the
privilege of law practice.
The Court has characterized a lawyer’s act of notarizing
documents without the requisite commission to do so as
“reprehensible, constituting as it does not only malpractice but
also the crime of falsification of public documents.” Notarization
of a private document converts the document into a public one
making it admissible in court without further proof of its
authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith
and credit upon its face and, for this reason, notaries public
must observe with the utmost care the basic requirements in the
performance of their duties. Pending case does not constitute
facts that determines the existence of gross misconduct by the
respondent as these are still pending before the proper forums.
At such stages, the presumption of innocence still prevails in
favor of the respondent.
HEINZ R. HECK v. JUDGE ANTHONY E. SANTOS
401 SCRA 46 (2003)
Delegating to a counsel of one of the parties the preparation of
a decision and parroting it verbatim reflect blatant judicial
sloth.
Heinz R. Heck is one of the defendants in a Civil Case before the
Regional Trial presided by Judge Anthony E. Santos. Heck and
his co-defendant did not receive a copy of the order
to schedule the
trial on June 10 and 11, 1996. Consequently, they and their
counsel failed to appear therein. Since only the plaintiff’s
counsel, Atty. Manuel Singson, appeared in that hearing, Judge
Santos considered the non-attendance of Heck and his co-
defendant as waiver of their right to present evidence. Judge
Santos thereafter ordered that the case to be submitted for
decision. He therefore authorized Atty. Singson to prepare the
draft of the decision.
The decision issued by Judge Santos was copied verbatim from
the draft which Atty. Singson prepared. Hence, Heck filed an
administrative complaint charging Judge Santos with violation
of Section 1, Rule 36 of the Revised Rules of Court. The Office of
the Court Administrator (OCA) found Judge Santos guilty for
adopting Singson’s work as his own.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Santos is guilty of gross ignorance of the
law
HELD:
The Court agrees with the findings of the OCA. Santos’ order for
the counsel of one of the parties to draft the decision and his
adoption verbatim of the draft clearly violate the Code of
Judicial Conduct. The pertinent canons of which read: Canon 2,
a Judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all activities. Canon 3, a Judge should perform
official duties honestly, and with impartiality
and diligence adjudicative responsibilities.
By such order, Judge Santos abdicated a function exclusively
granted to him by no less than the fundamental law of the land.
It is axiomatic that decision-making, among other duties, is the
primordial and most important duty of a member of the bench.
He must use his own perceptiveness in understanding and
analyzing the evidence presented before him and his own
discernment when determining the proper action, resolution or
decision. Delegating to a counsel of one of the parties the
preparation of a decision and parroting it verbatim reflect
blatant judicial sloth.
Lack of malice or bad faith is not an excuse. It bears emphasis
that a judge must not only render a just, correct and impartial
decision. He should do so in such a manner as to be free from
any suspicion as to his fairness, impartiality and integrity.
Notarizing Documents Without
The Requisite Commission
Therefore Constitutes
Malpractice, If Not The Crime
Of Falsification Of Public
Documents
It must be remembered that notarization is not an
empty, meaningless, routinary act. On the contrary, it is
invested with substantive public interest, such that only
those who are qualified or authorized may act as
notaries public. Notarization by a notary public converts
[31]
a private document into a public one, making it
admissible in evidence without the necessity of
preliminary proof of its authenticity and due execution. [32]
The requirements for the issuance of a commission
as notary public must not be treated as a mere casual
formality. The Court has characterized a lawyers act of
[33]
notarizing documents without the requisite commission
therefore as reprehensible, constituting as it does not
only malpractice, but also the crime of falsification of
public documents. For such reprehensible conduct, the
[34]
Court has sanctioned erring lawyers by suspension from
the practice of law, revocation of the notarial commission
and disqualification from acting as such, and even
disbarment. [35]
In the case of Nunga v. Viray, the Court had the
[36]
occasion to state -
Where the notarization of a document is done by a member of
the Philippine Bar at a time when he has no authorization or
commission to do so, the offender may be subjected to
disciplinary action. For one, performing a notarial [act]
without such commission is a violation of the lawyers oath to
obey the laws, more specifically, the Notarial Law. Then, too,
by making it appear that he is duly commissioned when he is
not, he is, for all legal intents and purposes, indulging in
deliberate falsehood, which the lawyers oath similarly
proscribes. These violations fall squarely within the
prohibition of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which provides: A lawyer shall
not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct. [37]
The importance of the function of a notary public
cannot, therefore, be over-emphasized. No less than the
public faith in the integrity of public documents is at stake
in every aspect of that function. [38]
[A.C. NO. 6753 - September 5, 2012]
MILA VIRTUSIO, Complainant, v. ATTY. GRENALYN V.
VIRTUSIO, Respondent.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This administrative case concerns a lawyer who failed to use the money given
by another to fund the checks she issued as accommodation party in payment
for the property that was purchased by such person and performed a notarial
act without commission.
The Facts and the Case
On June 14, 2005, Mila Virtusio (Mila) filed with this Court a Complaint for
1
ςrν ll
disbarment against her husband's distant relative, Atty. Grenalyn V.
Virtusio.Mila alleged that sometime in 1999 Atty. Virtusio convinced her to buy
a house and lot at North Olympus Subdivision in Novaliches, Quezon City, from
its developer, Stateland Investment Corporation (Stateland). Mila agreed for
Atty. Virtusio to use her personal checks in paying the seller with Mila
reimbursing her. Under this arrangement, Mila gave Atty. Virtusio the following
amounts: P 95,000.00, P 25,000.00, P 65,000.00, P 64,000.00
and P 64,000.00. All of these were properly receipted except for
the P 95,000.00 for which she got a receipt from her for only P 90,000.00.2 On
October 25 and November 24, 1999, Mila deposited identical amounts
of P 64,000.00 each in Atty. Virtusio s checking account with Equitable
Bank.3 In all, Mila gave her P 441,000.00.
ςrνll
To her surprise, however, Mila began receiving letters from Stateland,
demanding that she make good the dishonored checks that it got. When she
confronted Atty. Virtusio regarding this, the latter assured her that she would
take care of the problem. But the demand letters persisted.
For fear of losing the property, Mila directly dealt with Stateland in January
2000. She then found out that her arrearages had come close to P 200,000.00,
inclusive of penalty and interest. In order not to lose the property, Mila and her
husband decided to settle their overdue obligation with money they borrowed
at high interest.4 In turn, Stateland turned over to her three checks of Atty.
ςrνl l
Virtusio, each for P 71,944.97, with the notation "DAIF."5 ςrνll ς rνll
Mila further alleged that Atty. Virtusio declined to return to her the money the
latter misappropriated despite demand. Only when Mila threatened to file a
case against her did Atty. Virtusio agree to pay her on February 20, 2001 by
executing a deed of sale in her favor covering her Mazda car. Despite the sale,
however, Atty. Virtusio pleaded with Mila and her husband to let her keep the
car meanwhile since she needed it in her work. When she refused to give up
the car, Mila filed a replevin case against Atty. Virtusio that the court
eventually decided in Mila s favor.6 But, as it turned out, Atty. Virtusio had
ςrνll
managed to register the car in her children s name and sold it to a third
person. Mila filed a case of estafa against Atty. Virtusio7 apart from the
ςrν ll
present disbarment case.
Mila claimed that Atty. Virtusio evaded the return of money she
misappropriated, impeded the execution of a final judgment, and engaged in
conduct that discredits the legal profession, all in violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, rendering her unfit to remain a member of the
bar.8
ςrνl lς rνll
In a July 27, 2005 Resolution,9 the Court required Atty. Virtusio to comment
ςrνll
on the complaint. She asked for extension of time to comply but did not file her
comment just the same.10 On Mila s motion,11 the Court again required Atty.
ςrνl l ςrνll
Virtusio to file her comment and to show cause why she had not complied with
its previous orders.12 Still, she did not file any comment, prompting the Court
ς rνll
to impose on her on November 15, 2006 a P 500.00 fine. The court again
reiterated its order for her to file her comment.13
ς rνll ς rνll
With no response, on August 1, 2007, the Court directed the Clerk of Court to
resend its November 15, 2006 Resolution to Atty. Virtusio14 but this was ς rνll
returned unserved with the notation, "RTS-Person moved out." On December
3, 2007 the Court ordered the resending of the May 3 and November 15, 2006
Resolutions to Atty. Virtusio, this time at an address in Sta. Mesa that Mila
furnished. When this last resolution was returned unserved with the notation,
ςrν ll
"RTS-Unclaimed," the Court issued a Resolution15 on April 30, 2008 that ςrνl l
considered Atty. Virtusio to have waived her right to file a comment
considering that she filed none despite having sought an extension from the
Court. The Court also referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation.
The IBP Investigating Commissioner directed Atty. Virtusio to file a position
paper. She filed a motion for extension of time to file the same but did not.16
ςrνll ς rνll
Atty. Virtusio also pointed out, that the charges against her were not born of
some professional relation between Mila and her. She had acted as an
accommodation party, allowing Mila to make use of her personal checks to
facilitate the purchase of a property from Stateland. And, assuming that the
predicament she finds herself in has a bearing on her professional conduct, the
same does not amount to grossly immoral conduct since she owned up to her

responsibilities and exerted tireless effort to settle her accounts.25

Based on the pleadings on hand, the IBP Investigating Commissioner reported
ςrν ll ςrνl l

having found that Atty. Virtusio appropriated portions of the money that Mila
gave her for payment to Stateland, thus evidencing her moral unfitness to Further, Atty. Virtusio claimed that she should not be penalized for violation of
practice the profession. The Commissioner recommended the imposition of the the notarial law since this offense did not form part of the original complaint to
penalty of one year suspension from the practice of law17 with a two-year which she was required to respond. At any rate, she merely committed an
oversight. She had religiously renewed her notarial commission yearly since
ςrν ll

disqualification from reappointment as Notary Public, given that she had

notarized documents despite the expiration of her notarial commission.18 The May 1995. When she notarized the questioned documents, she believed in
good faith that she had renewed her notarial commission for 2006 and 2007
ς rνll

IBP Board of Governors approved the report and recommendation.19

just as before. She asked not to be punished for her mistake since it was
ςrνl lς rνll

brought about by her sincere commitment to extend free legal service to the
Atty. Virtusio filed a motion for reconsideration of the IBP Investigating disadvantaged.26
Commissioner s action on April 30, 2009.20 She explained that her failure to
ςrνll ςrν ll

ςrν ll

file her position paper was brought about by her belief that she needed to wait
for the IBP s action on her motion for extension of time to file the same. Thus, Lastly, Atty. Virtusio asked the Court to reconsider the harsh penalty imposed
she prayed that her attached position paper be admitted and considered in on her in the light of the peculiar circumstances of her case and the good faith
resolving her motion for reconsideration.21 ς rνll ς rν ll
she showed.27 ςrνl lς rνll

In her version of the facts, Atty. Virtusio wants to convince the Court that she On June 26, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution XIX-2011-
committed no intentional wrongs and that she was but a victim of 47728 denying the motion despite an affidavit of desistance that Mila filed in
ς rνll

circumstances. Although she admitted using Mila s money rather than pay the meantime.29 As provided in Section 12(b),30 Rule 139-B of the Rules of
ςrνl l ς rνll

Stateland with it, she explained that, having been busy attending to her sick Court, the IBP forwarded the instant case to this Court for final action.
son in Manila, she failed to monitor her check disbursements, entrusting it to
an office staff. Only in December 1999 was she able to audit the same and Questions Presented
discover the mismanagement of her funds and its co-mingling with office
funds, resulting in overlapping of accountabilities and non-funding of the The questions presented in this case are:
checks for Stateland when they fell due.22
ςηα ñrοblεš ν ιr†υαl l αω l ιb rα rÿ

ςrνl lς rνll

1. Whether or not the IBP erred in finding Atty. Virtusio guilty of grave
On becoming aware of the lapses, however, Atty. Virtusio misconduct in her dealings with Mila and in notarizing documents without a
borrowed P 165,000.00 from Engr. Marciano de Guzman so she could pay Mila renewed commission; and
but, having failed to pay him as well, he went after Mila who was co-maker of
cra lawlib rary

the loan. When Atty. Virtusio tried to make further arrangements to pay what
she owed Mila, the latter refused to negotiate and did not acknowledge the 2. Assuming Atty. Virtusio was guilty of some offenses, whether or not the IBP
past payments she had already made. When Atty. Virtusio refused to yield to imposed the appropriate penalties on her.
Mila s demand for payment of the entire P 165,000.00, she filed a replevin
case, a complaint for estafa, and disbarment charge against her.23
chanrobles vi rt ual law li bra ry

ςrνl lς rνll

Rulings of the Court

Atty. Virtusio averred that in October 2006 she and Mila entered into a verbal
agreement whereby she would pay her P 200,000.00, with P 87,500.00 up
Lawyers are, as officers of the court and instruments for the administration of
front, in exchange for Mila s dismissal of all her actions. Notwithstanding that
justice, expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but also a high standard
the compromise agreement had not been formalized, Atty. Virtusio claimed
of morality, honesty, and fair dealing. A lawyer s gross misconduct, whether in
that it obliterated her liabilities, given that she substantially settled her
his professional or private capacity, is ground for suspension or disbarment
obligations to Mila.24
under the principle that, since good moral character is an essential qualification
ς rνll ς rνll

for the admission to the practice of law, maintaining such trait is a condition for
keeping the privilege.31 ςrνl lς rνll
By her own account, Atty. Virtusio admitted misusing the money that Mila
entrusted to her for payment to Stateland. Her excuse is that she lost track of
her finances and mixed up her office funds with her personal funds. But this
excuse is too thin. She admitted misusing P 165,000.00 of Mila s money, which
is not petty cash. Indeed she tried to borrow money from a third person to
cover it up rather than just offer her shallow excuse to Mila. Atty. Virtusio s use
for personal purpose of money entrusted to her constitutes dishonest and
deceitful conduct under the Code of Professional Responsibility. It provides:
lαω lιb rα rÿ
ςη αñ rοbl ε š νιr⠀ υα l
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
CANON 7 A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND
DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR.
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in
a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
chanrobles vi rt ual law li bra ry
Atty. Virtusio cannot absolve herself of liability by claiming that she failed to
attend to her finances because she had to look after a sick child at that time.
Assuming she had such a child, the fact is that it was not by mere oversight
that she failed to finance the checks for Stateland. For, if this were so, she
could have easily rectified her mistake by using her other funds. In truth, she
spent the money that Mila entrusted to her because she had no other funds.
Indeed, she had to borrow money from a third party later to remedy her
financial problems.
What is more, supposedly to cover up for her fault, Atty. Virtusio executed a
deed of sale covering her car in Mila s favor rather than return the money she
defalcated. But, again acting with guile, she withheld possession of the car and
transferred its registration in the name of her children.
Atty. Virtusio is guilty by her above acts of gross misconduct that warrants her
suspension for one year from the practice of law following Section 27,32 Rule
ςrνll
138 of the Rules of Court.
The Court cannot also countenance Atty. Virtusio s notarization of documents
after her notarial commission had expired. Although the IBP discovered this
violation of the notarial law only in the course of the proceedings and was not a
subject matter of Mila s complaint, it cannot close its eyes to the same.
Besides, Atty. Virtusio had an opportunity to defend herself against this
additional charge.33 Her defense is that she thought that she had renewed her
ς rν ll
commission.
Again, Atty. Virtusio s defense is unsubstantial. She did not renew her notarial
commission for two years, 2006 and 2007, not just one. She could not have
missed that fact considering that, as she said, she had been renewing her
commission yearly from 1995 to 2005.
A lawyer who notarizes a document without a proper commission violates his
lawyer s oath to obey the law. He makes it appear that he is commissioned
when he is not. He thus indulges in deliberate falsehood that the lawyer s oath
forbids. This violation falls squarely under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and Canon 7 as well.34 A proper sanction is
ςrνl l
authorized.35 ς rνll ςrν ll
Considering, however, that based on the evidence Atty. Virtusio had notarized
only two documents without a proper notarial commission, the Court finds her
suspension from notarial practice for one year adequate.36 ς rν ll ςrνl l
That Mila had agreed after some financial settlement to withdraw her complaint
against Atty. Virtusio cannot exempt the latter from the prescribed sanction.
She has outraged the country s professional code and this demands a measure
of justice. As the Court said in Spouses Soriano v. Atty. Reyes,37 disbarment is ς rνll
a disciplinary action taken for the public good. Consequently, it is as a rule not
subject to some compromise entered into with the complainant. Besides, Mila's
evidence is already a matter of record and the Court cannot simply ignore the
same.38ςrνll ς rν ll
WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS Atty. Grenalyn V. Virtusio GUILTY of gross
misconduct and violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and IMPOSES on her the penalty of SUSPENSION from the practice of law for
one year, effective immediately. In addition, the Court REVOKES any Notarial
Commission she may presently have and DISQUALIFIES her from applying
for it for one year also effective immediately. Further, she is WARNED of a
more severe penalty should she commit a similar infraction in the future.
VICTORINA BAUTISTA vs. ATTY. SERGIO E.
BERNABE, A.C. No. 6963 February 9, 2006
FACTS: Complainant alleged that on January 3, 1998,
respondent prepared and notarized a Magkasanib na
Salaysay purportedly executed by Donato Salonga and
complainant’s mother, Basilia de la Cruz. Both affiants
declared that a certain parcel of land in Bigte,
Norzagaray, Bulacan, was being occupied by Rodolfo
Lucas and his family for more than 30 years.
Complainant claimed that her mother could not have
executed the joint affidavit on January 3, 1998 because
she has been dead since January 28, 1961.
In his Answer, respondent denied that he
falsified the Magkasanib na Salaysay. He disclaimed
any knowledge about Basilia’s death. He alleged that
before he notarized the document, he requested for
Basilia’s presence and in her absence, he allowed a
certain Pronebo, allegedly a son-in-law of Basilia, to
sign above the name of the latter as shown by the word
“by”on top of the name of Basilia. Respondent
maintained that there was no forgery since the
signature appearing on top of Basilia’s name was the
signature of Pronebo.
ISSUE: Can a notarized document be signed “by”?
Ruling: A notary public should not notarize a document
unless the persons who signed the same are the very
same persons who executed and personally appeared
before him to attest to the contents and truth of what
are stated therein. The presence of the parties to the
deed will enable the notary public to verify the
genuineness of the signature of the affiant.
BAUTISTA v SILVA
GR No. 157434
FACTS: Spouses Berlina Silva and Pedro Silva were the owners of a parcel
of land with a Transfer Certificate of Title No B-37189, which was registered
on August 14, 1980 in their names.
On March 3, 1988, Pedro , for himself and as attorney-in-fact of his wife
Berlina, thru a Special Power of Attorney purportedly executed by Berlina in
his favor, executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the said parcel of land in
favor of defendants-spouses Claro Bautista and Nida Bautista.
As a consequence, TCT No B-37189 was cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT
No. V-2765 was issued in the names of Spouses Claro Bautista and Nida
Bautista on March 4, 1988.
Based on the evidence presented, the signature appearing on the SPA as
that of Berlina is a forgery and consequently the Deed of Absolute Sale
Executed by Pedro in favor os Spouses Bautista is not authorized by Berlina.
Thus the RTC declared the Deed of Absolute Sale dated March 3, 1988
executed by Pedro M. Silva, for himself and as attorney-in-fact of Berlina F.
Silva, in favor of defendants-spouses Claro Bautista and Nida Bautista over
the parcel of land as null and void.
ISSUE:Whether or Not petitioners are considered as purchasers in good faith
and for value having relied upon a SPA which appears legal, valid, and
genuine on its face
Whether the nullity of the deed of sale includes the one half share of the
husband gratia argumenti that the special power of attorney is a forgery and
the deed of sale executed by the husband is null and void
HELD: There is no merit to petitioners' claim that they are purchasers in
good faith.
There was positive and convincing evidence that respondent did not sign the
SPA, and on the uncontroverted Certification of Dorado that respondent was
in Germany working as a nurse when the SPA was purportedly executed in
1987. The SPA being a forgery, it did not vest in Pedro any authority to
alienate the subject property without the consent of respondent. Absent such
marital consent, the deed of sale was a nullity.
The petitioners are not buyers in good faith. A buyer for value in good faith is
one who buys property of another, without notice that some other person has
a right to, or interest in, such property and pays full and fair price for the
same, at the time of such purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or
interest of some other persons in the property. He buys the property with
the well-founded belief that the person from whom he receives the
thing had title to the property and capacity to convey it.
To prove good faith, a buyer of registered and titled land need only show
that he relied on the face of the title to the property. He need not prove that
he made further inquiry for he is not obliged to explore beyond the four
corners of the title. Such degree of proof of good faith, however, is
sufficient only when the following conditions concur: first, the seller is the
registered owner of the land; second, the latter is in possession thereof; and
third, at the time of the sale, the buyer was not aware of any claim or interest SPA. Finally, petitioners conducted the transaction in haste. It took them all
of some other person in the property, or of any defect or restriction in the title but three days or from March 2 to 4, 1988 to enter into the deed of sale,
of the seller or in his capacity to convey title to the property. notwithstanding the restriction on the capacity to sell of Pedro. In no way
then may petitioners qualify as buyers for value in good faith.
Absent one or two of the foregoing conditions, then the law itself puts the
buyer on notice and obliges the latter to exercise a higher degree of diligence That said, we come to the third issue on whether petitioners may retain the
by scrutinizing the certificate of title and examining all factual circumstances portion of Pedro Silva in the subject property. Certainly not. It is well-settled
in order to determine the seller's title and capacity to transfer any interest in that the nullity of the sale of conjugal property contracted by the husband
the property. Failure to exercise such degree of precaution makes him a without the marital consent of the wife affects the entire property, not just the
buyer in bad faith. To prove good faith then, petitioners must show that they share of the wife.
inquired not only into the title of Pedro but also into his capacity to sell.
Notarial Jurisdiction
A test has to be done whether the buyer had a choice between knowing the
forgery and finding it out, or he had no such choice at all.
FIRST DIVISION
A person dealing with a seller who has possession and title to the property
but whose capacity to sell is restricted, qualifies as a buyer in good faith if he
proves that he inquired into the title of the seller as well as into the latter's
[ G.R. NO. 174144, April 17, 2007 ]
capacity to sell; and that in his inquiry, he relied on the notarial
acknowledgment found in the seller's duly notarized special power of BELLA A. GUERRERO, PETITIONER, VS.
attorney. He need not prove anything more for it is already the function of the
notarial acknowledgment to establish the appearance of the parties to the RESURRECCION A. BIHIS, RESPONDENT.
document, its due execution and authenticity. Said rule should not apply
when there is an apparent flaw afflicting the notarial acknowledgment of the
special power of attorney as would cast doubt on the due execution and DECISION
authenticity of the document; or when the buyer has actual notice of
circumstances outside the document that would render suspect its CORONA, J.:
genuineness.
The Scriptures tell the story of the brothers Jacob and
In the present case, petitioners knew that Berlina was in Germany at the time Esau[1], siblings who fought bitterly over the
they were buying the property and the SPA relied upon by petitioners has a
defective notarial acknowledgment. The SPA was a mere photocopy and we inheritance of their father Isaac's estate. Jurisprudence
are not convinced that there ever was an original copy of said SPA as it was is also replete with cases involving acrimonious
only this photocopy that was testified to by petitioner Nida Bautista and
offered into evidence by her counsel. But then said photocopy of the SPA conflicts between brothers and sisters over
contains no notarial seal. There being no notarial seal, the signature of the
notary public on the notarial certificate was therefore incomplete. It was a
successional rights. This case is no exception.
mere private document which petitioners cannot foist as a banner of good
faith.
On February 19, 1994, Felisa Tamio de Buenaventura,
All told, it was not sufficient evidence of good faith that petitioners merely mother of petitioner Bella A. Guerrero and respondent
relied on the photocopy of the SPA as this turned out to be a mere private
document. They verified with Atty. Lucero whether the SPA was authentic but Resurreccion A. Bihis, died at the Metropolitan
then the latter was not the notary public who prepared the document. Worse, Hospital in Tondo, Manila.
they purposely failed to inquire who was the notary public who prepared the

On May 24, 1994, petitioner filed a petition for the
probate of the last will and testament of the decedent
in Branch 95[2] of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City where the case was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. Q-
94-20661.
The petition alleged the following: petitioner was
named as executrix in the decedent's will and she was
legally qualified to act as such; the decedent was a
citizen of the Philippines at the time of her death; at
the time of the execution of the will, the testatrix was
79 years old, of sound and disposing mind, not acting
under duress, fraud or undue influence and was
capacitated to dispose of her estate by will.
Respondent opposed her elder sister's petition on the
following grounds: the will was not executed and
attested as required by law; its attestation clause and
acknowledgment did not comply with the requirements
of the law; the signature of the testatrix was procured
by fraud and petitioner and her children procured the
will through undue and improper pressure and
influence.
In an order dated November 9, 1994, the trial court
appointed petitioner as special administratrix of the
decedent's estate. Respondent opposed petitioner's
appointment but subsequently withdrew her
opposition. Petitioner took her oath as temporary
special administratrix and letters of special
administration were issued to her.
On January 17, 2000, after petitioner presented her
evidence, respondent filed a demurrer thereto alleging
that petitioner's evidence failed to establish that the
decedent's will complied with Articles 804 and 805 of
the Civil Code.
In a resolution dated July 6, 2001, the trial court
denied the probate of the will ruling that Article 806 of
the Civil Code was not complied with because the will
was "acknowledged" by the testatrix and the witnesses
at the testatrix's, residence at No. 40 Kanlaon Street,
Quezon City before Atty. Macario O. Directo who was a
commissioned notary public for and in Caloocan City.
The dispositive portion of the resolution read:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court
finds, and so declares that it cannot admit the last will
and testament of the late Felisa Tamio de
Buenaventura to probate for the reasons hereinabove
discussed and also in accordance with Article 839 [of
the Civil Code] which provides that if the formalities
required by law have not been complied with, the will
shall be disallowed. In view thereof, the Court shall
henceforth proceed with intestate succession in regard
to the estate of the deceased Felisa Tamio de
Buenaventura in accordance with Article 960 of the Article 806 of the Civil Code provides:
[Civil Code], to wit: "Art. 960. Legal or intestate
succession takes place: (1) If a person dies without a
ART. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a
will, or with a void will, or one which has subsequently
notary public by the testator and the witnesses. The
lost its validity, xxx."
notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of
the will, or file another with the office of the Clerk of
SO ORDERED.[3]
Court.
Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals but
One of the formalities required by law in connection
the appellate court dismissed the appeal and affirmed
with the execution of a notarial will is that it must be
the resolution of the trial court.[4]
acknowledged before a notary public by the testator
and the witnesses.[6] This formal requirement is one of
Thus, this petition.[5]
the indispensable requisites for the validity of a
will.[7] In other words, a notarial will that is not
Petitioner admits that the will was acknowledged by
acknowledged before a notary public by the testator
the testatrix and the witnesses at the testatrix's
and the instrumental witnesses is void and cannot be
residence in Quezon City before Atty. Directo and that,
accepted for probate.
at that time, Atty. Directo was a commissioned notary
public for and in Caloocan City. She, however, asserts
An acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed
that the fact that the notary public was acting outside
a deed in going before some competent officer and
his territorial jurisdiction did not affect the validity of
declaring it to be his act or deed.[8] In the case of a
the notarial will.
notarial will, that competent officer is the notary
public.
Did the will "acknowledged" by the testatrix and the
instrumental witnesses before a notary public acting
The acknowledgment of a notarial will coerces the
outside the place of his commission satisfy the
testator and the instrumental witnesses to declare
requirement under Article 806 of the Civil Code? It did
before an officer of the law, the notary public, that they
not.
executed and subscribed to the will as their own free
act or deed.[9] Such declaration is under oath and
under pain of perjury, thus paving the way for the
criminal prosecution of persons who participate in the
execution of spurious wills, or those executed without
the free consent of the testator.[10] It also provides a
further degree of assurance that the testator is of a
certain mindset in making the testamentary
dispositions to the persons instituted as heirs or
designated as devisees or legatees in the will.[11]
Acknowledgment can only be made before a competent
officer, that is, a lawyer duly commissioned as a notary
public.
In this connection, the relevant provisions of the
Notarial Law provide:
SECTION 237. Form of commission for notary public. -
The appointment of a notary public shall be in writing,
signed by the judge, and substantially in the following
form:
GOVERNMENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
PROVINCE OF ___________
This is to certify that ____________, of the
municipality of ________ in said province, was on
the ___ day of __________, anno Domini nineteen
hundred and _______, appointed by me a notary
public, within and for the said province, for the term
ending on the first day of January, anno Domini
nineteen hundred and _____.
_________________
Judge of the Court of
irst Instance[12] of said
Province
xxx xxx xxx
SECTION 240. Territorial jurisdiction. - The
jurisdiction of a notary public in a province shall be co-
extensive with the province. The jurisdiction of a
notary public in the City of Manila shall be co-
extensive with said city. No notary shall possess
authority to do any notarial act beyond the limits of his
jurisdiction. (emphases supplied)
A notary public's commission is the grant of authority
in his favor to perform notarial acts.[13] It is issued
"within and for" a particular territorial jurisdiction and
the notary public's authority is co-extensive with it. In
other words, a notary public is authorized to perform
notarial acts, including the taking of acknowledgments,
within that territorial jurisdiction only. Outside the
place of his commission, he is bereft of power to
perform any notarial act; he is not a notary public. Any
notarial act outside the limits of his jurisdiction has no
force and effect. As this Court categorically pronounced
in Tecson v. Tecson:[14]
An acknowledgment taken outside the territorial limits
of the officer's jurisdiction is void as if the person
taking it ware wholly without official character.
(emphasis supplied)
Since Atty. Directo was not a commissioned notary
public for and in Quezon City, he lacked the authority
to take the acknowledgment of the testatrix and the
instrumental witnesses. In the same vein, the testatrix
and her witnesses could not have validly acknowledged
the will before him. Thus, Felisa Tamio de
Buenaventura's last will and testament was, in effect,
not acknowledged as required by law.
Moreover, Article 5 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 5. Acts executed against the provisions of
mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void, except
when the law itself authorizes their validity.
The violation of a mandatory or a prohibitory statute
renders the act illegal and void unless the law itself
declares its continuing validity. Here, mandatory and
prohibitory statutes were transgressed in the execution
of the alleged "acknowledgment." The compulsory
language of Article 806 of the Civil Code was not
complied with and the interdiction of Article 240 of the
Notarial Law was breached. Ineluctably, the acts of the
testatrix, her witnesses and Atty. Directo were all
completely void.
The Court cannot turn a blind eye to Atty. Directo's
participation in the preparation, execution and
unlawful "acknowledgment" of Felisa Tamio de
Buenaventura's will. Had he exercised his notarial
commission properly, the intent of the law to effectuate
the decedent's final statements[15] as expressed in her
will would not have come to naught.[16] Hence, Atty.
Directo should show cause why he should not be
administratively sanctioned as a member of the bar
and as an officer of the court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
A.C. No. 7036 June 29, 2009
JUDGE LILY LYDIA A. LQUINDANUM (Complainant) vs. ATTY NESTOR
Q. QUINTANA (Respondent)
FACTS:
Complainant:
 An administrative case was filed by Judge Laquindanum of the
Regional Trial Court of Midsayap, Cotabato against Atty
Quintana, requesting that proper disciplinary action should be
imposed on the latter for the following reasons:
(1) he performed notarial functions in Midsayap
Cotabato, which is beyond the territorial jurisdiction
of the commissioning court that issued his notarial
commission which is within Cotabato City and the
Province of Maguindanao only;
o AM No. 03-8-02-SC states that executive
judges are required to closely monitor the
activities of notaries public within the
territorial bounds of their jurisdiction and to
see to it that notaries public shall not extend
notarial functions beyond the limits of their
authority.
o Evidences: Notarized the Affidavit of Loss
ATM Card and Affidavit of Loss of Driver’s
License in Midsayap, Cotabato
o Respondent alleged that he was singled out
by Judge Laquindanum when he filed for
notarial commission before the RTC in
Midsayap, Cotabato as he was humiliated (I.e.
disseminated information) and was asked for
much more requirements (i.e. payment to be
a member of the IBP of Kidapawan City)
compared to other lawyers; thus, he
withdrew his petition and chose to be
affiliated with the IBP of Cotabato City.
o Complainant alleged that she did not act upon
such petition because he failed to pay his IBP
dues which is a requirement.
(2) he performed notarial acts with an expired
commission;
o Atty Quintana continued to notarize
documents in 2006 and 2007 even if his
commission as notary public within Cotabato
City and the Province of Maguindanao
expired in December 31, 2005.
(3) he let his wife do notarial acts in his absence;
o Atty Quintana alleged that those documents
notarized by his wife within Midsayap,
Cotabato was an entrapment operation by
Judge Laquindanum, knowing that his wife
was not a lawyer.
(4) he notarized a document wherein one of the
signatories therein already passed away that time.
o Evidence: Deed of Donation notarized by
Atty Quintana in 2004 when the donor’s wife,
which was one of the signatories, died in
2003.
Respondent:
(1) He maintained that he did not act outside the province of
Cotabato since Midsayap, Cotabato, where he practices his
legal profession and subscribes documents, is part of the
province of Cotabato
(2) Atty. Quintana alleged that he filed a petition for notarial
commission before Branch 18, Regional Trial Court,
Midsayap, Cotabato. However, the same was not acted upon
by Judge Laquindanum for three weeks
(3) He also denied the he authorized his wife to notarize
documents. According to him, he slapped his wife and told
her to stop doing it as it would ruin his profession|.
(4) Atty. Quintana lamented that he was singled out by Judge
Laquindanum, because the latter immediately issued notarial
commissions to other lawyers without asking for so many
requirements|||
(5) Atty. Quintana asked for forgiveness for what he had done
and promised not to repeat the same. He also asked that he
be given another chance and not be divested of his
privilege to notarize, as it was the only bread and butter of
his family.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not Atty Quintana, being a lawyer in good standing,
has the right to practice his profession including notarial acts in
the entire Philippines?
(2) Whether or not Atty Quintana can perform notarial acts with an
expired commission?
 (3) Whether or not Atty Quintana can pass the blame to his wife for
her unauthorized practice of law- notarizing documents?
(4) Whether or not Atty Quintana can notarize documents despite
one of the signatories being dead?
RULING:
OBC ruling
In its Report and Recommendation, the OBC recommended that Atty.
Quintana be disqualified from being appointed as a notary public for two
(2) years; and that if his notarial commission still exists, the same should
be revoked for two (2) years. The OBC found the defenses and
arguments raised by Atty. Quintana to be without merit,
(1) NO- Although lawyers in good standing are allowed to engage in
the practice of law in the Philippines, not every lawyer even in
good standing can perform notarial functions without having
been commissioned as notary public as provided for under
Section 11 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. And it is also
based on the discretion of the commissioning court whether
lawyer should be issued notarial practice or not.
 Section 11 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice states that:
Jurisdiction and Term A person commissioned
as notary public may perform notarial acts in
any place within the territorial jurisdiction of
the commissioning court for a period of two (2)
years commencing the first day of January of
the year in which the commissioning court is
made, unless earlier revoked [or] the notary
public has resigned under these Rules and the
Rules of Court.
 Aside from violating Section 11 of the 2004 Rules
on Notarial Pratice, this also partakes of
malpractice of law and falsification as stated in
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which talks about the lawyers oath
which unconditionally requires lawyers not to do
or declare any falsehood.
 Thus, respondent may perform his notarial acts
only within the territorial jurisdiction of the
commissioning court of Cotabato City and the
Province of Maguindanao and not in Midsayap or
Kabacan which is part of Cotabato Province
located in North Cotabato or anywhere beyond.
(2) NO- Notarizing documents with an expired commission is a
violation of the lawyers oath to obey the laws, more specifically,
the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Since the public is deceived
into believing that he has been duly commissioned, it also
amounts to indulging in deliberate falsehood, which the lawyer's
oath proscribes as stated in the Code of Professional
responsibility Rule 1.01.
(3) NO- Respondent cannot take refuge in claiming that he did not
authorize his wife to notarize thus it was his wife's act. A person
who is commissioned as a notary public must not only take full
responsibility for all the entries in his notarial register , but also
take personally accountability for the activities in his office and
acts of his personnel including his wife who is his secretary.
 Respondent therefore is guilty of violating Canon 9 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which requires lawyers not to
directly or indirectly assist in the unauthorized practice of law.
 In the case of Lingan v. Calubaquib et al., Adm. Case No. 5377, June
15, 2006 the Court held, thus: A notary public is personally
accountable for all entries in his notarial register; He cannot
relieve himself of this responsibility by passing the buck to
their (sic) secretaries
(4) NO- Sec. 2, (b), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice
provides, thus: A person
 shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as
signatory to the instrument or document (1) is not in the
notarys presence personally at the time of the
notarization; and (2) is not personally known to the
notary public through competent evidence of identity as
defined by these Rules.
 In failing to determine the presence and qualifications of
the affiants, respondent only shows his gross negligence
and ignorance of the provisions of the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice.
The Supreme Court adopts the findings with adjustments to the
penalty
 Atty. Quintana fell short of his obligation under Canon 7 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which directs every lawyer to
uphold at all times the integrity and dignity of the legal profession
 Although Atty Quintana relies on his notarial commission as his
sole source of income, this will not lessen the penalty. It should be
reminded that a notarial commission should not be treated as
money-making but a privilege to perform duties to protect public
interest such that only those qualified may act as such since
notarizing converts a private document into a public one
admissible in evidence without further proof of authenticity.
 Atty Nestor Q. Quintana is being revoked and disqualified from
being commissioned as a notary public for a period of two (2)
years. He is also suspended from the practice of law for six (6)
months.
A.M. No. 09-6-1-SC, January 21, 2015
RE: VIOLATION OF RULES ON NOTARIAL PRACTICE
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This case stemmed from three (3) letter-complaints for Violation of Rules on
Notarial Practice endorsed to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for
appropriate action. The first letter-complaint,1 dated March 2, 2009, was filed
by the commissioned notaries public within and for the jurisdiction of Lingayen,
Pangasinan, namely, Atty. Butch Cardinal Torio, Atty. Nepthalie Pasiliao, Atty.
Dominique Evangelista, and Atty. Elizabeth C. Tugade (complainants) before
the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Lingayen, Pangasinan (RTC-
Lingayen) against Atty. Juan C. Siapno, Jr. (Atty. Siapno) for notarizing
documents without a commission.
In their letter, complainants alleged that Atty. Siapno was maintaining a
notarial office along Alvear Street East, Lingayen, Pangasinan, and was
performing notarial acts and practices in Lingayen, Natividad and Dagupan City
without the requisite notarial commission. They asserted that Atty. Siapno was
never commissioned as Notary Public for and within the jurisdiction of
Lingayen, Natividad and Dagupan City. Instead, he applied and was
commissioned to perform notarial functions by Executive Judge Anthony Sison
of the RTC, San Carlos City, Pangasinan from March 22, 2007 to December 31,
2008. His notarial commission, however, was never renewed upon expiration.
Complainants presented evidence supporting their allegations such as the
pictures of Atty. Siapno’s law office in Lingayen, Pangasinan; and documents to
prove that Atty. Siapno performed acts of notarization in Lingayen, Natividad
and Dagupan City, to wit: (1) Addendum to Loan and Mortgage
Agreement2 showing that the Promissory Note was notarized before Atty.
Siapno in Lingayen, Pangasinan in 2007; (2) Deed of Absolute Sale,3 dated
January 24, 2008, notarized in Natividad, Pangasinan; (3) Joint Affidavit of
Two Disinterested Persons Re: Given Name and Date of Birth,4 dated January
6, 2009, notarized in Dagupan City; and (4) Acknowledgement of Debt,5dated
January 24, 2008, notarized in Dagupan City.
Complainants also averred that Atty. Siapno had delegated his notarial
authority to his secretaries, Mina Bautista (Bautista) and Mary Ann Arenas
(Arenas), who wrote legal instruments and signed the documents on his behalf.
On March 17, 2009, the RTC-Lingayen forwarded the said letter-complaint to
the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)6 which, in turn, indorsed the same
to the OBC.
The second letter-complaint7 was filed by Audy B. Espelita (Espelita) against
Atty. Pedro L. Santos (Atty. Santos). It alleged that in 2008, Espelita lost his
driver’s license and he executed an affidavit of loss which was notarized by
Atty. Santos. The said affidavit, however, was denied for authentication when
presented before the Notarial Section in Manila because Atty. Santos was not
commissioned to perform notarial commission within the City of Manila.
The third letter-complaint8 came from a concerned citizen reporting that a
certain Atty. Evelyn who was holding office at Room 402 Leyba Bldg., 381
Dasmariñas Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila, had been notarizing and signing
documents for and on behalf of several lawyers.
In its Resolution,9 dated June 9, 2009, the Court directed the Executive Judge
of the RTC-Lingayen to conduct a formal investigation on the complaint against
Atty. Siapno and Executive Judge Reynaldo G. Ros (Judge Ros) of the RTC-
Manila to conduct a formal investigation on the alleged violation of the Notarial
Law by Atty. Santos, and the illegal activities of a certain Atty. Evelyn, and
thereafter, to submit a report and recommendation thereon.
Re: Complaint against Atty. Siapno
With regard to the complaint against Atty. Siapno, the Executive Judge
conducted a hearing wherein the complainants affirmed the allegations in their
letter-complaint. For his part, Atty. Siapno denied the accusations and averred
that the law office in Lingayen, Pangasinan, was not his and that Bautista and
Arenas were not his secretaries.10
In her Report and Recommendation,11 the Executive Judge found that Atty.
Siapno was issued a notarial commission within the jurisdiction of Lingayen,
Pangasinan, from January 20, 2003 to December 31, 2004 and February 8,
2005 to December 3, 2006. His commission, however, was cancelled on June
8, 2006 and he was not issued another commission thereafter. The Executive
Judge found Atty. Siapno to have violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Commission when he performed notarial functions without commission and
recommended that he be fined in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00).
The Court agrees with the findings of the Executive Judge but not to the
recommended penalty.
A review of the records and evidence presented by complainants shows that
Atty. Siapno indeed maintained a law office in Lingayen, Pangasinan, just
beside the law office of one of the complainants, Atty. Elizabeth Tugade. It was
also proven that Atty. Siapno notarized several instruments with an expired
notarial commission outside the territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning
court. Section 11, Rule III of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice provides
that:chanroble svirtual lawlib rary
Jurisdiction and Term – A person commissioned as notary public may perform
notarial acts in any place within the territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning
court for a period of two (2) years commencing the first day of January of the
year in which the commissioning is made, unless earlier revoked or the notary
public has resigned under these Rules and the Rules of Court.
Under the rule, only persons who are commissioned as notary public may
perform notarial acts within the territorial jurisdiction of the court which
granted the commission. Clearly, Atty. Siapno could not perform notarial
functions in Lingayen, Natividad and Dagupan City of the Province of
Pangasinan since he was not commissioned in the said places to perform such
act.
Time and again, this Court has stressed that notarization is not an empty,
meaningless and routine act. It is invested with substantive public interest that
only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public.12 It must
be emphasized that the act of notarization by a notary public converts a
private document into a public document making that document admissible in
evidence without further proof of authenticity. A notarial document is by law
entitled to full faith and credit upon its face, and for this reason, notaries public
must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of
their duties.
By performing notarial acts without the necessary commission from the court,
Atty. Siapno violated not only his oath to obey the laws particularly the Rules
on Notarial Practice but also Canons 1 and 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which proscribes all lawyers from engaging in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct and directs them to uphold the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession, at all times.13
In a plethora of cases, the Court has subjected lawyers to disciplinary action
for notarizing documents outside their territorial jurisdiction or with an expired
commission. In the case of Nunga v. Viray,14 a lawyer was suspended by the
Court for three (3) years for notarizing an instrument without a commission.
In Zoreta v. Simpliciano,15 the respondent was likewise suspended from the
practice of law for a period of two (2) years and was permanently barred from
being commissioned as a notary public for notarizing several documents after
the expiration of his commission. In the more recent case of Laquindanum v.
Quintana,16 the Court suspended a lawyer for six (6) months and was
disqualified from being commissioned as notary public for a period of two (2)
years because he notarized documents outside the area of his commission, and
with an expired commission.
Considering that Atty. Siapno has been proven to have performed notarial work
in Ligayen, Natividad and Dagupan City in the province of Pangasinan without
the requisite commission, the Court finds the recommended penalty
insufficient. Instead, Atty. Siapno must be barred from being commissioned as
notary public permanently and suspended from the practice of law for a period
of two (2) years.
Re: Complaints against Atty. Santos and Atty. Evelyn
In a letter,17 dated July 29, 2013, Judge Ros informed the Court that he could
not have complied with the June 9, 2009 and August 4, 2009 orders of the
Court because he was no longer the Executive Judge of the RTC-Manila at that
time. To date, no formal investigation has been conducted on the alleged
violation of Atty. Santos and the reported illegal activities of a certain Atty.
Evelyn.
With respect to the complaints against Atty. Santos and a certain Atty. Evelyn,
the Clerk of Court is ordered to RE-DOCKET the same as separate
administrative cases.
The incumbent Executive Judge of the RTC-Manila, whether permanent or in
acting capacity, is ordered to conduct a formal investigation on the matter and
to submit his Report and Recommendation within sixty (60) days from receipt
of copy of this decision.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Juan C. Siapno, Jr. is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years and BARRED
PERMANENTLY from being commissioned as Notary Public, effective upon his
receipt of a copy of this decision.

Let copies of this decision be furnished all the courts of the land through the
Office of the Court Administrator, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the
Office of the Bar Confidant, and be recorded in the personal files of the
respondent.
With respect to the complaints against Atty. Pedro L. Santos and a certain Atty.
Evelyn, the Clerk of Court is ordered to RE-DOCKET them as separate
administrative cases. The Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Manila,
is ordered to conduct a formal investigation on the matter and to submit his
Report and Recommendation within sixty (60) days from receipt of a copy of
this decision.
SO ORDERED
Notarial Seal and Register
Parties:
Complainants: Fr. Ranhilio C. Aquino(Academic Head of the
Philippine Judicial Academy) et al.
Respondent: Atty. Edwin Pascua (Notary Public in Cagayan)
Facts:
Complainants:
In his letter-complaint, Father Aquino alleged that Atty. Pascua
falsified two documents committed as follows:
(1) He made it appear that he had notarized the "Affidavit-Complaint"
of one Joseph B. Acorda entering the same as "Doc. No. 1213, Page
No. 243, Book III, Series of 1998, dated December 10, 1998".
(2) He also made it appear that he had notarized the "Affidavit-
Complaint" of one Remigio B. Domingo entering the same as "Doc.
No. 1214, Page 243, Book III, Series of 1998, dated December 10,
1998.
Father Aquino further alleged that on June 23 and July 26, 1999, Atty.
Angel Beltran, Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Tuguegarao,
certified that none of the above entries appear in the Notarial Register
of Atty. Pascua; that the last entry therein was Document No. 1200
executed on December 28, 1998; and that, therefore, he could not
have notarized Documents Nos. 1213 and 1214 on December 10,
1998.
Lina M. Garan and other complainants contend that Atty. Pascua's
omission was not due to inadvertence but a clear case of falsification.
Respondent:
In his comment on the letter-complaint dated September 4, 1999, Atty.
Pascua admitted having notarized the two documents on December
10, 1998, but they were not entered in his Notarial Register due to the
oversight of his legal secretary, Lyn Elsie C. Patli, whose affidavit was
attached to his comment
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent is guilty of misconduct in the
performance of his duties
Held:
Atty. Pascua is guilty of misconduct in the performance of his duties
while Atty. Pascua claims that the omission was not intentional but
due to oversight of his staff. Whichever is the case, Atty. Pascua
cannot escape liability. His failure to enter into his notarial register the
documents that he admittedly notarized is a dereliction of duty on his
part as a notary public and he is bound by the acts of his staff.
The claim of Atty. Pascua that it was simple inadvertence is far from
true.
The photocopy of his notarial register shows that the last entry which
he notarized on December 28, 1998 is Document No. 1200 on Page
240. On the other hand, the two affidavit-complaints allegedly
notarized on December 10, 1998 are Document Nos. 1213 and 1214,
respectively, under Page No. 243, Book III. Thus, Fr. Ranhilio and the
other complainants are, therefore, correct in maintaining that Atty.
Pascua falsely assigned fictitious numbers to the questioned affidavit-
complaints, a clear dishonesty on his part not only as a Notary Public,
but also as a member of the Bar.
This is not to mention that the only supporting evidence of the claim of
inadvertence by Atty. Pascua is the affidavit of his own secretary
which is hardly credible since the latter cannot be considered a
disinterested witness or party.
Noteworthy also is the fact that the questioned affidavit of Acorda
(Doc. No. 1213) was submitted only when Domingo's affidavit (Doc.
No. 1214) was withdrawn in the administrative case filed by Atty.
Pascua against Lina Garan, et al. with the CSC. This circumstance
lends credence to the submission of herein complainants that Atty.
Pascua ante-dated another affidavit-complaint making it appear as
notarized on December 10, 1998 and entered as Document No. 1213.
It may not be sheer coincidence then that both documents are dated
December 10, 1998 and numbered as 1213 and 1214.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Edwin Pascua is declared GUILTY of
misconduct and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3)
months with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or
similar act will be dealt with more severely. His notarial commission, if
still existing, is ordered REVOKED.
The case defined Misconduct:
"Misconduct" generally means wrongful, improper or unlawful conduct
motivated by a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose.[4] The
term, however, does not necessarily imply corruption or criminal
intent.
[A.C. No. 5838. January 17, 2005]
SPOUSES BENJAMIN SANTUYO AND EDITHA
SANTUYO, complainants, vs. ATTY. EDWIN
A. HIDALGO, respondent.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
In a verified complaint-affidavit dated September 18,
2001, spouses Benjamin Santuyo and Editha Santuyo
[1]
accused respondent Atty. Edwin A. Hidalgo of serious
misconduct and dishonesty for breach of his lawyers
oath and the notarial law.
Complainants stated that sometime in December
1991, they purchased a parcel of land covered by a deed
of sale. The deed of sale was allegedly notarized by
respondent lawyer and was entered in his notarial
register as Doc. No. 94 on Page No. 19 in Book No. III,
Series of 1991. Complainant spouses averred that about
six years after the date of notarization, they had a
dispute with one Danilo German over the ownership of
the land. The case was estafa through falsification of a
public document.
During the trial of the case, German presented in
court an affidavit executed by respondent denying the
authenticity of his signature on the deed of sale. The
spouses allegedly forged his notarial signature on said
deed.[2]
According to complainants, respondent overlooked
the fact that the disputed deed of sale contained all the
legal formalities of a duly notarized document, including
an impression of respondents notarial dry seal. Not being
persons who were learned in the technicalities
surrounding a notarial act, spouses contended that they
could not have forged the signature of herein
respondent. They added that they had no access to his
notarial seal and notarial register, and could not have
made any imprint of respondents seal or signature on the
subject deed of sale or elsewhere.[3]
In his answer to the complaint, respondent denied
[4]
the allegations against him. He denied having notarized
any deed of sale covering the disputed property.
According to respondent, he once worked as a junior
lawyer at Carpio General and Jacob Law Office where
he was asked to apply for a notarial commission. While
he admitted that he notarized several documents in that
office, these, however, did not include the subject deed
of sale. He explained that, as a matter of office
procedure, documents underwent scrutiny by the senior
lawyers and it was only when they gave their approval
that notarization was done. He claimed that, in some
occasions, the secretaries in the law firm, by themselves,
would affix the dry seal of the junior associates on
documents relating to cases handled by the law firm.
Respondent added that he normally required the parties
to exhibit their community tax certificates and made them
personally acknowledge the documents before him as
notary public. He would have remembered complainants
had they actually appeared before him. While he
admitted knowing complainant Editha Santuyo, he said
he met the latters husband and co-complainant only on
November 5, 1997, or about six years from the time that
he purportedly notarized the deed of sale. Moreover,
respondent stressed that an examination of his alleged
signature on the deed of sale revealed that it was forged;
the strokes were smooth and mild. He suspected that a
lady was responsible for forging his signature.
To further refute the accusations against him,
respondent stated that, at the time the subject deed of
sale was supposedly notarized, on December 27, 1991,
he was on vacation. He surmised that complainants must
have gone to the law office and enticed one of the
secretaries, with the concurrence of the senior lawyers,
to notarize the document. He claimed he was a victim of
a criminal scheme motivated by greed.
The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation. In a report it submitted to the Court,
[5]
the IBP noted that the alleged forged signature of
respondent on the deed of sale was different from his
signatures in other documents he submitted during the
investigation of the present case. However, it ruled that
[6]
respondent was also negligent because he allowed the
office secretaries to perform his notarial functions,
including the safekeeping of his notarial dry seal and
notarial register. It thus recommended:
[7]
WHEREFORE[,] in view of the foregoing, it is respectfully
recommended that respondents commission as notary public
be revoked for two (2) years if he is commissioned as such; or
he should not be granted a commission as notary public for
two (2) years upon receipt hereof. [8]
 After going over the evidence submitted by the
parties, complainants did not categorically state that they
appeared before respondent to have the deed of sale
notarized. Their appearance before him could have
bolstered this allegation that respondent signed the
document and that it was not a forgery as he claimed.
The records show that complainants themselves were
not sure if respondent, indeed, signed the document;
what they were sure of was the fact that his signature
appeared thereon. They had no personal knowledge as
well as to who actually affixed the signature of
respondent on the deed.
Furthermore, complainants did not refute
respondents contention that he only met complainant
Benjamin Santuyo six years after the alleged notarization
of the deed of sale. Respondents assertion was
corroborated by one Mrs. Lyn Santy in an affidavit
executed on November 17, 2001 wherein she stated
[9]
that complainant Editha Santuyo had to invite
respondent to her house on November 5, 1997 to meet
her husband since the two had to be introduced to each
other. The meeting between complainant Benjamin
Santuyo and respondent was arranged after the latter
insisted that Mr. Santuyo personally acknowledge a deed
of sale concerning another property that the spouses
bought.
In finding respondent negligent in performing his
notarial functions, the IBP reasoned out:
xxx xxx xxx.
Considering that the responsibility attached to a notary public
is sensitive respondent should have been more discreet and
cautious in the execution of his duties as such and should not
have wholly entrusted everything to the secretaries; otherwise
he should not have been commissioned as notary public.
For having wholly entrusted the preparation and other
mechanics of the document for notarization to the secretary
there can be a possibility that even the respondents signature
which is the only one left for him to do can be done by the
secretary or anybody for that matter as had been the case
herein.
As it is respondent had been negligent not only in the supposed
notarization but foremost in having allowed the office
secretaries to make the necessary entries in his notarial registry
which was supposed to be done and kept by him alone; and
should not have relied on somebody else. [10]
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Edwin A. Hidalgo is
hereby found GUILTY of negligence in the performance
of his duties as notary public and is hereby
SUSPENDED from his commission as a notary public for
a period of two years, if he is commissioned, or if he is
not, he is disqualified from an appointment as a notary
public for a period of two years from finality of this
resolution, with a warning that a repetition of similar
negligent acts would be dealt with more severely.
MARIANO AGADAN, EDEN MOLLEJON, ARSENIO IGME,
JOSE NUMBAR, CECILIA LANGAWAN, PABLO PALMA,
JOSELITO CLAVERIA, MIGUEL FLORES, and ALBERT
GAYDOWEN vs. ATTY. RICHARD BALTAZAR KILAAN
[A.C. No. 9385. November 11, 2013.]
DEL CASTILLO, J p:
Facts:
Complainants filed before the IBP-Baguio-Benguet Chapter a
complaint against respondent Atty. Kilaan for falsification of
documents, dishonesty and deceit. They alleged that
respondent intercalated certain entries in the application for
issuance of Certificate of Public Convenience (CPC) to operate
public utility jeepney filed before the LTFRB-Cordillera
Administrative Region and substituted the name of the applicant
from Adasing to Batingwed; and respondent submitted false
and/or insufficient documentary requirements in support of
Batingwed's application for CPC; that respondent prepared a
decision based on the resolution of the LTFRB Central Office
which dismissed the Opposition filed by the complainants; and
that the said Decision was adopted by the LTFRB-CAR.
The IBP-Baguio-Benguet Chapter endorsed the Complaint to
the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) for appropriate
action. Respondent denied violating the Lawyer's Oath and the
Code of Professional Responsibility. He claimed that Batingwed
had decided to abandon his application hence he no longer
submitted the necessary requirements therefor. Respondent
claimed that he knew about the favorable Decision only when
Batingwed showed him the same. He narrated that considering
the incomplete documents, the LTFRB mistakenly approved
Batingwed's application.
He denied intercalating the entries in the application for CPC of
Batingwed. He averred that once an application has been filed,
the application and all accompanying records remain with the
LTFRB and could no longer be retrieved by the applicant or his
counsel. Respondent further explained that it was Adasing who
paid the filing fee in behalf of Batingwed but the cashier
erroneously indicated Adasing instead of Batingwed as payor.
Complainants on the other hand, alleged that the Verification in
Batingwed's application actually refers to a Deed of Sale and
not the Verification of Batingwed's application. Complainants
also presented an Affidavit of Adasing claiming that he never left
the country. CIAHDT
The Investigating Commissioner found that complainants failed
to prove that Atty. Kilaan intercalated the entries. However,
respondent was not totally absolved as he was found liable for
violating the Notarial Law considering that the Verification of
Batingwed's application was actually recorded as a Deed of
Sale in his Notarial Register. In addition, respondent lied under
oath when he alleged that Adasing was abroad as this was
squarely belied by Adasing in his Affidavit.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved with
modification.
Issue:
Is respondent guilty of violating the Notarial Law, the Lawyer’s
Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility?
Held:
YES, respondent is guilty. It is settled that it is the notary public
who is personally accountable for the accuracy of the entries in
his Notarial Register. The Court is not persuaded by
respondent's explanation that he is burdened with cases thus he
was constrained to delegate the recording of his notarial acts in
his Notarial Register to his secretary. Stated in Rule VI,
Sections 1 and 2 of the 2004 Rules of Notarial Practice require
a notary public to keep and maintain a Notarial Register wherein
he will record his every notarial act. His failure to make the
proper entry or entries in his notarial register concerning his
notarial acts is a ground for revocation of his notarial
commission. As mentioned, respondent failed to make the
proper entries in his Notarial Register; as such, his notarial
commission may be properly revoked.
Aside from violating the Notarial Law, respondent also violated
his Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility
by committing falsehood in the pleadings he submitted before
the IBP. His claim that Adasing was abroad was proved to be
untruthful when complainants submitted the Affidavit of Adasing
insisting that he never left the country. Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility expressly provides that
"[a] lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing
of any in Court; nor shall be mislead, or allow the Court to be
misled by any artifice." In the same vein, Canon 1, Rule 1.01
mandates that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." Respondent failed to
observe these Rules and hence must be sanctioned.

Hence, the notarial commission of Atty. Richard Baltazar Kilaan
is revoked.
.C. No. 4545 February 5, 2014
CARLITO ANG, Complainant, vs. ATTY. JAMES JOSEPH
GUPANA, Respondent.
Legal Ethics: Rule 9.01, Canon 7; Rule 9.01, Canon 9
FACTS:
The case stemmed from an affidavit-complaint filed by
complainant Carlito Ang against respondent. Ang alleged that he
and the other heirs of the late Candelaria Magpayo, namely
Purificacion Diamante and William Magpayo, executed an Extra-
judicial Declaration of Heirs and Partition involving a land which
was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. (T-22409)-6433.
He was given his share of 2,003 square meters designated as Lot
No. 2066-B-2-B-4, together with all the improvements thereon.
However, when he tried to secure a TCT in his name, he found out
that said TCT number had already been cancelled and in lieu
thereof, new TCTs had been issued in the names of William
Magpayo, Antonio Diamante, Patricia Diamante, Lolita D. Canque,
Gregorio Diamante, Jr. and Fe D. Montero.
Ang alleged that there is reasonable ground to believe that
respondent had a direct participation in the commission of
forgeries and falsifications because he was the one who prepared
and notarized the Affidavit of Loss and Deed of Absolute Sale that
led to the transfer and issuance of the new TCTs. Ang pointed out
that the Deed of Absolute Sale which was allegedly executed by
Candelaria Magpayo on April 17, 1989, was antedated and
Candelaria Magpayo’s signature was forged as clearly shown by
the Certification issued by the Office of the Clerk of Court of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu since the Notarial Report
indubitably showed that the document executed was an affidavit,
not a Deed of Absolute Sale.
As to the Affidavit of Loss, which was allegedly executed by the
late Candelaria Magpayo on April 29, 1994, it could not have been
executed by her as she Died three years prior to the execution of
the said affidavit of loss.
Ang further alleged that respondent made himself the attorney-in-
fact and executed a Deed of Sale selling the lot to Lim Kim So
Mecantile Co even though a civil case was pending before the RTC
of Mandaue City, Cebu.
Respondent denied any wrongdoing. According to the respondent,
in the pending civil case Ang anchored his claim on the Extra-
judicial Declaration of Heirs and Partition and sought to annul the
deed of sale and prayed for reconveyance of the subject parcel of
land. However, because of Ang’s admission that he is not an heir of
late Candelaria Magpayo, the notice of lis pendens annotated in the
title of land were ordered cancelled and the land became available
for disposition. Respondent surmised that these developments in
Civil Case No. Man-2202 meant that Ang would lose his case so
Ang resorted to the filing of the present administrative complaint.
Thus, respondent prayed for the dismissal of the case for being
devoid of any factual or legal basis, or in the alternative, holding
resolution of the instant case in abeyance pending resolution of
civil case.
Investigating Commissioner Navarro of the IBP Commission on
Bar Discipline found that respondent is administratively liable. She
recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of
law for three months. She held that respondent committed an
unethical act when he allowed himself to be an instrument in the
disposal of the subject property through a deed of sale executed
between him as attorney-in-fact of his client and Lim Kim So
Mercantile Co. despite his knowledge that said property is the
subject of a pending litigation before the RTC of Mandaue City,
Cebu.
The Investigating Commissioner additionally found that
respondent "delegated the notarial functions to the clerical staff of
their office before being brought to him for his signature." This,
according to the commissioner, "must have been the reason for the
forged signatures of the parties in the questioned document…as
well as the erroneous entry in his notarial register. Respondent
should not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of
any task which by law may only be performed by a member of the
bar in accordance with Rule 9.0117 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
ISSUE:
WON the respondent is administratively liable for violating the
notarial law and the Code of Professional Responsibility.
HELD:
The Court finds respondent administratively liable for violation of
his notarial duties when he failed to require the personal presence
of Candelaria Magpayo. it is clear that the party acknowledging
must appear before the notary public or any other person
authorized to take acknowledgments of instruments or
documents.23 In the case at bar, the jurat of the Affidavit of Loss
stated that Candelaria subscribed to the affidavit before
respondent on April 29, 1994, at Mandaue City. Candelaria,
however, was already dead since March 26, 1991. Hence, it is clear
that the jurat was made in violation of the notarial law.
As a lawyer commissioned as notary public, respondent is
mandated to subscribe to the sacred duties appertaining to his
office, such duties being dictated by public policy impressed with
public interest. Faithful observance and utmost respect of the legal
solemnity of the oath in an acknowledgment or jurat is sacrosanct.
The Code of Professional Responsibility also commands him not to
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct and to
uphold at all times the integrity and dignity of the legal profession.
Respondent likewise violated Rule 9.01, Canon 9, of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides that "[a] lawyer shall
not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any
task which by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar
in good standing."
in notarizing an affidavit executed by a dead person, respondent is
liable for misconduct. Under the facts and circumstances of the
case, the revocation of his notarial commission, disqualification
from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of two
years and suspension from the practice of law for one year is in
order.
A.C. No. 8103 December 3, 2014
ATTY. AURELIO C. ANGELES, JR., PROVINCIAL LEGAL OFFICER,
BATAAN CAPITOL, BALANGA CITY, BATAAN, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RENATO C. BAGAY, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Subject of this disposition is the September 28, 2013 Resolution1 or the
IBP Board of Governors which reads:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously
ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner xxx and finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules
and considering the Respondent guilty of negligence in the performance
of his notarial duty, Atty. Renato C. Bagay's Notarial Commission is
hereby immediately REVOKED. Further, he is DISQUALIFIED from
reappointment as Notary Public for two (2) years.
It appears from the records that this case stemmed from the letter,2 dated
June 11, 2008, submitted by Atty. Aurelio C. Angeles, Jr. (Atty. Angeles,
Jr.),the Provincial Legal Officer of Bataan, to Hon. Remigio M. Escalada,
Jr. (Executive Judge), Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Bataan against Atty. Renato C. Bagay (respondent), for his alleged
notarization of 18 documents at the time he was out of the country from
March 13, 2008 to April 8, 2008. The notarized documents were as
follows:
1. Deed of Donation executed by and between Renato Macalinao
and Loida C. Macalinao and Trisha Katrina Macalinao, notarized
on April 3, 2008;
2. Deed of Donation executed by and between Renato S. Sese
and Sandy Margaret L. Sese, notarized on March 25, 2008;
3. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Josefina A.
Castro married to Eduardo Samson and Thelma Medina and
Gina Medina notarized on April 3, 2008;
4. Deed of Absolute Sale executedby Rowena Berja, notarized on
March 17, 2008;
5. Deed of Donation executed by and between Crispulo
Rodriguez and Luisa Rodriguez Jorgensen, notarized on April 8,
2008;
6. Extra Judicial Settlement of Estate with Waiver of Rights
executed by the wife and sons of Rodrigo Dy Jongco, notarized
March 19, 2008;
7. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Sps. Rolando
and Nelia Francisco and Violeta Hernandez, notarized on April 3,
2008;
8. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Josefina
Baluyot and Carmelita Padlan, notarized on April 3, 2008;
9. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Gregorio Limcumpao and
Simeona Limcumpao, notarized on March 27, 2008;
 10. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Sps.
Eusebio and Libertad Bacricio and Carlos Tamayo married to
Teresa Tamayo notarized on March 18, 2008;
11. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Natividad S.
Consengco and Sps. Gilvert and Johanna Gervacio, notarized
March 18, 2008;
12. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between the Rural
Bank of Pilar and Mila Gatdula, notarized on April 2, 2008;
13. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Natividad
Cosengco and Sps. Jay and Helen Zulueta, notarized on March
18, 2008;
14. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Cipriano and Salvacion
Violago, notarized on April 1, 2008;
15. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Sahara Management and
Development Corporation, notarized on March 26, 2008;
16. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Danilo
Arellano, Luzviminda Ramos and Sps. Fernando and Agnes
Silva, notarized on March 18, 2008;
17. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Vicente
Banzon married to Elizabeth Banzon and Sps. Dommel and
Crystal Lima, notarized on April 2, 2008; and
18. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Marilyn T.
Casupanan and Dominador M. Manalansan notarized on March
14, 2008.
These documents were endorsed to the Provincial Legal Office by the
Provincial Treasurer who had information that they were notarized while
respondent was outside the country attending the Prayer and Life
Workshop in Mexico. The letter contained the affidavits of the persons
who caused the documents to be notarized which showed a common
statement that they did not see respondent sign the documents himself
and it was either the secretary who signed them or the documents
cameout of the office already signed. Upon verification with the Bureau of
Immigration, it was found out that a certain Renato C. Bagay departed
from the country on March 13, 2008 and returned on April 8, 2008. The
copy of the Certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration was also
attached to the letter.3
The Executive Judge referred the matter to the IBP, Bataan Chapter, and
the latter endorsed the same to the IBP National Office for appropriate
action. The latter endorsed it to the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD).
When CBD Director Alicia Risos-Vidal (Atty. Risos-Vidal) required Atty.
Angeles, Jr. to formalize the complaint, the latter replied on September
30, 2008 stating, among others, that his June 11, 2008 Letter was not
intended to be a formal complaint but rather "a report on, and
endorsement of, public documents by Atty. Bagay while he was out of the
country,"4 and that any advice on how to consider or treat the documents
concerned would be welcome.
On December 3, 2008, Atty. Risos-Vidal opted to endorse the matter to
the Office of the Bar Confidant for appropriate action.5
This Court, in its Resolution,6 dated February 2, 2009, resolved to note
the letter of Atty. Angeles, Jr., dated September 30,2008, and require
respondent to comment on the said letter. In his comment,7 dated 27
March 2009, respondent claimed that he was not aware that those were
documents notarized using his name while he was out of the country.
Upon his own inquiry, he found out that the notarizations were done by
his secretary and without his knowledge and authority. The said secretary
notarized the documents without realizing the import of the notarization
act. Respondent apologized to the Court for his lapses and averred that
he had terminated the employment of his secretary from his office.
The Court then referred the case tothe IBP for investigation, report and
recommendation. When the case was called for mandatory conference
on September 16, 2009, only respondent appeared. Atty. Angeles filed a
manifestation reiterating his original position and requesting that his
attendance be excused.8 The mandatory conference was terminated and
the parties were directed to file their respective position papers. Only
respondent submitted a position paper,9 to which he added that for 21
years that he had been practicing law, he acted as a notary public without
any blemish on record dutifully minding the rules of the law profession
and notarial practice.
The Report and Recommendation10 of Atty. Felimon C. Abelita III (Atty.
Abelita III)as Investigating Commissioner found that the letter of Atty.
Angeles, Jr., dated June11, 2008, was not verified, that most of the
attachments were not authenticated photocopies and that the comment
of respondent was likewise not verified. Atty. Abelita III, however,
observed that respondent’s signature on his comment appeared to be
strikingly similar to the signatures in most of the attached documents
which he admitted were notarized in his absence by his office
secretary.He admitted the fact that there were documents that were
notarized while he was abroad and his signature was affixed by his office
secretary who was not aware of the import of the act. Thus, by his own
admission, it was established that by his negligence in employing an
office secretary who had access to his office, his notarial seal and
records especially pertaining to his notarial documents without the proper
training, respondent failed to live up to the standard required by the Rules
on Notarial Practice.
Finding respondent guilty of negligence in the performance of his notarial
duty which gave his office secretary the opportunity to abuse his
prerogative authority as notary public, the Investigating Commissioner
recommended the immediate revocation of respondent’s commission as
notary public and his disqualification to be commissioned as such for a
period of two (2) years.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the said
recommendation in its Resolution,11 dated September 28, 2013.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration12 of the said resolution of
the IBP. He contended that by admitting and owning up to what had
happened, but without any wrongful intention, he should be merited with
leniency. Moreover, he claimed that he only committed simple negligence
which did not warrant such harsh penalty.
On May 4, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors denied the motion for
reconsideration of respondent stating:
RESOLVED to DENY Respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration, there
being no cogent reason to reverse the findings of the Commission and
the resolution subject of the motion, it being a mere reiteration of the
matters which had already been threshed out and taken into
consideration. Thus, Resolution No. XX-2013-85 dated September 28,
2013 is hereby affirmed.13
On August 1, 2014, the Director for Bar Discipline endorsed the May 4,
2014 Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors to the Office of the Chief
Justice for appropriate action.
The sole issue to resolve in this case is whether the notarization of
documents by the secretary of respondent while he was out of the
country constituted negligence.
The Court answers in the affirmative.
Respondent admitted in his commentand motion for reconsideration that
the 18 documents were notarized under his notarial seal by his office
secretary while he was out of the country. This clearly constitutes
negligence considering that respondent is responsible for the acts of his
secretary. Section 9 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice provides that
a "Notary Public" refers to any person commissioned to perform official
acts under these Rules. A notary public’s secretary is obviously not
commissioned to perform the official acts of a notary public. Respondent
cannot take refuge in his claim that it was his secretary’s act which he did
not authorize. He is responsible for the acts of the secretary which he
employed. He left his office open to the public while leaving his secretary
in charge. He kept his notarial seal and register within the reach of his
secretary, fully aware that his secretary could use these items to notarize
documents and copy his signature. Such blatant negligence cannot be
countenanced by this Court and it is far from being a simple negligence.
There is an inescapable likelihood that respondent’s flimsy excuse was a
mere afterthought and such carelessness exhibited by him could be a
conscious act of what his secretary did.
Respondent must fully bear the consequence of his negligence. A person
who is commissioned as a notary public takes full responsibility for all the
entries in his notarial register.14 He cannot relieve himself of this
responsibility by passing the buck to his secretary.
As to his plea of leniency, the Court cannot consider it. Respondent
claims that for the 21 years that he has been practicing law, he acted as
a notary public without any blemish and this was his first and only
infraction. His experience, however, should have placed him on guard
and could have prevented possible violations of his notarial duty. By his
sheer negligence, 18 documents were notarized by an unauthorized
person and the public was deceived. Such prejudicial act towards the
public cannot be tolerated by this Court. Thus, the penalty of revocation
of notarial commission and disqualification from reappointment as Notary
Public for two (2) years is appropriate.
Because of the negligence of respondent, the Court also holds him liable
for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).His failure
to solemnly perform his duty as a notary public not only damaged those
directly affected by the notarized documents but also undermined the
integrity of a notary public and degraded the function of notarization. He
should, thus, be held liable for such negligence not only as a notary
public but also as a lawyer.15Where the notary public is a lawyer, a graver
responsibility is placed upon his shoulder by reason of his solemn oath to
obey the laws and to do no falsehood or consent to the doing of
any.16 Respondent violated Canon 9 of the CPR which requires lawyers
not to directly or indirectly assist in the unauthorized practice of law. Due
to his negligence that allowed his secretary to sign on his behalf as
notary public, he allowed an unauthorized person to practice law. By
leaving his office open despite his absence in the country and with his
secretary in charge, he virtually allowed his secretary to notarize
documents without any restraint.
Respondent also violated his obligation under Canon 7 of the CPR, which
directs every lawyer to uphold at all times the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession. The people who came into his office while he was away,
were clueless as to the illegality of the activity being conducted therein.
They expected that their documents would be converted into public
documents. Instead, they later found out that the notarization of their
documents was a mere sham and without any force and effect. By
prejudicing the persons whose documents were notarized by an
unauthorized person, their faith in the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession was eroded.
Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, an additional
penalty of suspension from the practice of law for three (3) months is in
order.
Respondent should remember that a notarial commission is a privilege
and a significant responsibility. It is a privilege granted only to those who
are qualified to perform duties imbued with public interest. As we have
declared on several occasions, notarization is not an empty,
meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest,
such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notary
public. The protection of that interest necessarily requires that those not
qualified or authorized to act must be prevented from imposing upon the
public, the courts, and the administrative offices in general.17
It must be underscored that notarization by a notary public converts a
private document into a public document, making that document
admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. Thus,
notaries pub! ic must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in
the performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in
the integrity of pub! ic instruments would be undermined.18
Let this serve as a reminder to the members of the legal profession that
the Court will not take lightly complaints of unauthorized acts of
notarization, especially when the trust and confidence reposed by the
public in our legal system hang in the balance.
WHEREFORE, the recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines is ADOPTED with MODIFICATION. Finding Atty. Renato C.
1âwphi1
Bagay grossly negligent in his duty as a notary public, the Court
REVOKES his notarial commission and DISQUALIFIES him from being
commissioned as notary public for a period of two (2) years. The Court
also SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for three (3) months
effective immediately, with a WARNING that the repetition of a similar
violation will be dealt with even more severely.
The respondent is DIRECTED to report the date of his receipt of this
Decision to enable this Court to determine when his suspension shall
take effect.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to Office of the Bar Confidant to
be appended to Atty. Renato C. Bagay's personal record; the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines; and all courts in the country for their information
and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 10783
ATTY. BENIGNO T. BARTOLOME,, Complainant
vs.
ATTY. CHRISTOPHER A. BASILIO, Respondent
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
For resolution are the Motion to Lift Suspension1 dated July 19, 2017 filed
by respondent Atty. Christopher A. Basilio (Basilio), as well as the Report
and Recommendation2 dated September 13, 2017 of the Office of the Bar
Confidant (OBC), recommending that: (a) Basilio be meted with an
additional penalty of fine in the amount of ₱10,000.00 for his failure to
immediately comply with the Court's order of suspension from the
practice of law, as mandated in the Decision3 dated October 14, 2015 of
the Court; and (b) the lifting of the order of suspension be held in
abeyance pending the payment of the fine.
The Facts
In the October 14, 2015 Decision (the Decision), the Court suspended
4 that in the schedule of cases before Judge Bemar D. Fajardo of the
Basilio from the practice of law for one (1) year, revoked his incumbent
commission as a notary public, and prohibited him from being
commissioned as a notary public for two (2)
years, effective immediately, after finding him guilty of violating the 2004
Rules of Notarial Practice and Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He is further warned that a repetition of the
same offense or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more
severely.5
The Decision was circulated to all courts for the information and
implementation of the order of suspension.6 Basilio, thru his counsel, Atty.
Edward L. Robea (Robea), claimed to have received a copy of the
Decision on December 2, 2015,7 hence, his suspension from the practice
of law, as well as the revocation of his notarial commission and
prohibition from being commissioned as a notary public should have all
effectively commenced on the same date. In a Resolution8 dated April 20,
2016, the Court denied with finality Basilio's motion for reconsideration9 of
the Decision.
However, in a letter10 dated June 9, 2016, Atty. Sotero T. Rambayon
(Rambayon) inquired from the Court about the status of Basilio's
suspension, alleging that the latter still appeared before Judge Venancio
M. Ovejera of the Municipal Trial Court of Paniqui, Tarlac on April 26,
2016. The letter was subsequently referred to the OBC for appropriate
action.11 In a letter-reply12 dated July 25, 2016, the OBC informed
Rambayon that the Decision had already been circulated to all courts for
implementation, and that Basilio's motion for reconsideration had been
denied with finality by the Court.
Consequently, in a Report and Recommendation13 dated July 27, 2016,
the OBC recommended that Basilio be required to show cause why he
should not be held in contempt of court for not immediately complying
with the Court's order of suspension upon receipt of the Decision. He was
further required to file a sworn statement, with certifications from the
Office of the Executive Judge of the court where he practices his legal
profession and from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines' (IBP) Local
Chapter where he is affiliated with, affirming that he has ceased and
desisted from the practice of law, has not appeared in court as counsel,
and has not practiced his notarial commission during the mandated
period.
In another letter14 dated August 22, 2016, Rambayon informed the Court
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Paniqui, Tarlac, Branch 67, there were five
(5) cases15 where the litigants were supposedly represented by Basilio.
In a Resolution16 dated October 5, 2016, the Court, among others, noted
Rambayon's letter dated August 22, 2016 and further required Basilio
to: (a) show cause within ten (10) days from notice why he should not be
held in contempt of court for not immediately complying with the order of
suspension upon receipt of the Decision; and (b)file a sworn statement
with certifications affirming that he has fully served his penalty of
suspension.
Complying17 with the show cause order, Basilio explained that he did not
immediately comply with the suspension order because he believed that
his suspension was held in abeyance pending resolution of his motion for
reconsideration of the Decision, following the guidelines in Maniago v. De
Dios18(Maniago), wherein it was stated that "[u]nless the Court explicitly
states that the decision is immediately executory upon receipt thereof,
respondent has [fifteen (15)] days within which to file a motion for
reconsideration thereof. The denial of said motion shall render the
decision final and executory."19 On this score, he maintained that what
was immediately executory was only the revocation of his notarial
commission and the two (2)-year prohibition of being commissioned as a
notary public.20
In a Resolution21 dated March 15, 2017, the Court noted Basilio's
compliance, and referred the case to the OBC for evaluation, report, and
recommendation. In a Report and Recommendation22 dated June 22,
2017, the OBC recommended that the directives in the Court's October 5,
2016 Resolution be reiterated, i.e., the filing of a sworn statement with
certifications attesting to his compliance with the full service of
suspension, and require Basilio to comply with the same within ten (10)
days from notice.
Before the Court could act on the OBC's June 22, 2017 Report and
Recommendation, Basilio filed a Motion to Lift Suspension (Motion)23 on
July 25, 2017, attaching an Affidavit of Cessation/Desistance from
Practice of Law or Appearance in Court.24 In his motion, Basilio stated
that he "has commenced to serve his penalty on July 9, 2016 and
continue to serve his penalty until the present upon his receipt of the
Order of the [Court] denying his Motion for Reconsideration."25 He further
mentioned that he "immediately ceased and desisted from the practice of
his notarial commission on December 2, 2015 until the present."26 Basilio
likewise attached to his Motion the following: (a) Certification27 dated July
12, 2017 from the IBP-Tarlac Chapter, affirming that Basilio "has not
appeared in court beginning July 9, 2016 to July 9, 2017" and "has not
practiced his notarial commission as notary public from December 2,
2016 [up to] the present"; (b) Certification28 dated July 14, 2017 from the
RTC of Paniqui, Tarlac, Branch 67, attesting that Basilio has ceased and
desisted from the practice of law and has not practiced his notarial
commission from December 2, 2016 up to the present; and (c)
Certifications29 dated July 17, 2017, from the RTC of Camiling, Tarlac,
Branch 68 and July 20, 2017, from the RTC of Tarlac City, Branch 64,
both affirming that Basilio did not appear as counsel in said courts from
July 9, 2016 up to the present.
The Action and Recommendation of the OBC
In a Report and Recommendation30 dated September 13, 2017, the OBC
recommended that Basilio be meted with an additional penalty of a fine in
the amount of ₱10,000.00 for his failure to immediately comply with the
Court's order of suspension from the practice of law, as mandated in the
Decision. Likewise, it recommended that the lifting of the order of
suspension from the practice of law be held in abeyance pending his
payment of the fine.
The OBC maintained that Basilio, through his counsel, Robea, received
the Decision on November 3, 2015. Hence, the one (1)-year suspension
order from the practice of law imposed upon him commenced from the
said date should end on November 3, 2016. On the other hand, the two
(2)-year order of revocation of notarial commission and prohibition from
being commissioned as a notary public should end on November 3,
2017. However, the OBC observed that Basilio served his suspension
order from the practice of law beginning only on July 9, 2016 and
desisted from his notarial practice on December 2, 2015, as shown by
the attached Certifications; hence, the recommended fine.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issues for the Court's resolution are: (a) whether or not
Basilio's suspension should now be lifted, and (b) whether or not he
should be fined for his failure to immediately comply with the order of the
Court.
The Court's Ruling
The dispositive portion of the Decision explicitly states that the penalties
imposed on Basilio for violation of the 2004 Rules of Notarial Practice
and Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility -
namely: (a)suspension from the practice of law for a period of one (1)
year; (b) revocation of his incumbent commission as a notary public; and
(c) prohibition from being commissioned as a notary public for two (2)
years, were all "effective immediately", viz.:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Atty. Christopher A. Basilio GUILTY of
violating the 2004 Rules of Notarial Practice and Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, the Court hereby
SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for one (1) year; REVOKES his
incumbent commission as a notary public, if any; and PROHIBITS him
from being commissioned as a notary public for two (2) years, effective
immediately. He is WARNED that a repetition of the same offense or
similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.31 [Emphasis,
italics, and underscoring supplied]
Accordingly, Basilio's compliance with the order of suspension, as well as
all the other penalties, should have commenced on the day he received
the Decision.1âwphi 1
According to the OBC, Basilio received the Decision on November 3,
2015. However, records show that Basilio, through Robea, actually
received the Decision on December 2, 2015, as per the Registry Return
Receipt, and that the same was merely mailed on November 13 (not 3),
2015.32 The OBC - albeit still inaccurately - must have thought that this
latter date was to be considered as the date of receipt. In fact, Basilio, in
his motion for reconsideration and compliance to the Court's October 5,
2016 Resolution,33 has repeatedly maintained that he received the
Decision on December 2, 2015. This averment appears to be consistent
with the documents on record and hence, ought to prevail.
This notwithstanding, Basilio himself admitted that he served his
suspension only on July 9, 2016, proffering that he believed that what
was immediately executory was only the revocation of his notarial
commission and the two (2)-year prohibition against being commissioned
as a notary public. Unfortunately, the Court cannot accept such flimsy
excuse in light of the Decision's unequivocal wording.
Irrefragably, the clause "effective immediately" was placed at the end of
the enumerated series of penalties to indicate that the same pertained to
and therefore, qualified all three (3) penalties, which clearly include his
suspension from the practice of law. The immediate effectivity of the
order of suspension - not just of the revocation and prohibition against his
notarial practice - logically proceeds from the fact that all three (3)
penalties were imposed on Basilio as a result of the Court's finding that
he failed to comply with his duties as a notary public, in violation of the
provisions of the 2004 Rules of Notarial Practice, and his sworn duties as
a lawyer, in violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Thus, with the Decision's explicit wording that the same
was "effective immediately", there is no gainsaying that Basilio's
compliance therewith should have commenced immediately from his
receipt of the Decision on December 2, 2015. On this score, Basilio
cannot rely on the Maniago ruling as above-claimed since it was, in fact,
held therein that a decision is immediately executory upon receipt thereof
if the decision so indicates, as in this case.
All told, for his failure to immediately serve the penalties in the Decision
against him upon receipt, Basilio acted contumaciously,34 and thus should
be meted with a fine in the amount of ₱10,000.00,35 as recommended by
the OBC. Pending his payment of the fine and presentation of proof
thereof, the lifting of the order of suspension from the practice of law is
perforce held in abeyance.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby FINDS respondent Atty. Christopher A.
Basilio GUILTY of indirect contempt. He is hereby FINED in the amount
1âwphi 1
of Ten Thousand Pesos (₱10,000.00) and STERNLY WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar infractions will be dealt with more
severely. The lifting of the order of suspension from the practice of law
is HELD IN ABEYANCE pending his payment of the fine and
presentation of proof thereof.
CASTELO v. ATTY. CHING
Orlando S. Castelo, et al. Vs. Atty. Ronald Segundino C. Ching
A.C. No. 11165
February 6, 2017
FACTS:
Orlando Castello, et al received summons from Metropolitan Trial
Court, Branch 22 for an ejectment case filed against them by Leonida
Delen and Spouses Nestor and Jesiebel Delen alleged owner of the
residence of the Castellos. Upon verifying, the Castellos discovered
that the property in contention was actually named previously from
Castello heirs parents but was cancelled in favor of the Delens by
virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale. Irregularities were present in the
execution and authorization of the Deed of Absolute Sale. With their
discovery, the Castello heirs filed with IBP an administrative case
against Atty. Ching on the lawyer’s gross negligence in notarizing the
Deed. After due proceedings, Commissioner Eduardo Robles
rendered a report and recommendation finding Atty. CHing guilty of
gross negligence in notarizing the Deed. The IBP on the other hand
adopted and approved the recommendation with modification.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Ching was guilty of gross negligence in
notarizing the Deed?
RULING:
The Supreme Court affirmed Commissioner Robles’ observation.
Giving Atty. Ching the benefit of the doubt, the court cannot skip to
notice the fact that Atty. Ching still failed in insuring the necessary
requirements as regards those which were supposed to be entered in
the notarial books. This also meant that Atty. Ching failed to secure
properly his instruments, so that persons would not have opportunity
to forge notarizing documents with his signature affixed therein. With
there facts taken into considerations, the SC found Atty. Ching guilty
of gross negligence in notarizing Deed.
Malvar vs. Baleros A.C. No. 11346,
08 March 2017
Facts: Dr. Malvar claimed that Atty. Baleros, by notarizing an
assailed “Application for Certification of Alienable and
Disposable Land”, made it appear that he executed the same
when in truth, he never went to the office of the latter since he
was in Manila at the time of the alleged notarization and was
busy performing his duties as a doctor. Accordingly, Dr. Malvar
filed a disbarment complaint against Atty. Baleros for acts
amounting to grave misconduct consisting of falsification of
public documents. On the other hand, Atty. Baleros argued that
the charges filed against her were all part of Dr. Malvar’s scheme
to avoid his obligations to the buyer of his lot.
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Baleros should be held
administratively liable.
Decision: Yes. Atty. Baleros shall be made liable not only as a
notary public who failed to discharge her duties but also as a
lawyer who exhibited utter disregard to the integrity and dignity
he owed to the legal profession. Atty. Baleros is ordered:
1. Suspended for six (6) months;
2. Revoked notarial commission;
3. Disqualified from being commissioned as a notary public for
two (2) years;
4. Warned that repetition would be dealt with more severely
To reiterate, the respondent admitted having signed and notarized the
Application for Certification of Alienable and Disposable Land but based from
the foregoing, she indubitably failed to record the assailed document in her
notarial book. It is axiomatic that notarization is not an empty, meaningless or
routinary act. It is through the act of notarization that a private document is
converted into a public one, making it admissible in evidence without need of
preliminary proof of authenticity and due execution. "If the document or
instrument does not appear in the notarial records and there is no copy of it
therein, doubt is engendered that the document or instrument was not really
notarized, so that it is not a public document and cannot bolster any claim
made based on this document." The respondent's delegation of her notarial
function of recording entries in her notarial register to her staff is a clear
contravention of the explicit provision of the Notarial Rules dictating that such
duty be fulfilled by her and not somebody else.
Place of Notarization and Personal Presence
[A.C. No. 3441. August 11, 2005]
JUDGE GERVACIO A. LOPENA, petitioner,
vs. ATTY. ARTEMIO P.
CABATOS, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
Atty. Artemio P. Cabatos (respondent) was
administratively charged[1] by Judge Gervacio A. Lopena
(complainant) of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC)
of Tagbilaran-Clarin, Bohol of SERIOUS BREACH OF
PROFESSIONAL ETHICS and GRAVE MISCONDUCT
allegedly committed as follows:
1) Respondent knowingly falsified a Deed of
Donation[2] purportedly executed by one Crispina Panis
by notarizing the same on June 24, 1981 when the donor
had died on January 15, 1981, and
2) Respondent showed a grave disrespect to the
courts and the administration of justice by holding,
together with his followers, a parade/rally on September
21, 1984 around the principal streets of Tagbilaran City,
directed against complainant who had convicted
respondents close relatives in three criminal cases and
denied the applications for probation of two of the
convicts.
Acting on this Courts Resolution of February 14,
1990,[3] respondent submitted his COMMENT, by letter of
April 19, 1990,[4] claiming that he had been away from his
place of birth, Panaytayon, Tubigon, Bohol since 1958,
hence, when he notarized the questioned deed of
donation, he really did not recognize the person of
Cristina Panis, but he was led by one Gregorio Ricafort
to believe that the old woman before him at the time was
the said Crispina Panis.
Respondent informed that his notarization of the
questioned document in fact resulted to his indictment in
court for reckless imprudence resulting in falsification of
public document, which case was pending trial.
As for the charge of having conducted a rally/parade,
respondent claimed that the same was staged by PDP
Laban and BAYAN of Bohol as a protest against
complainant who showed bias in presiding over the trial
of the criminal cases against members of the Cabatos
family and disregarding the evidence in convicting them.
By Comment/Reply[5] to respondents COMMENT,
complainant countered that one of the witnesses to the
questioned document was respondents father, Geronimo
Cabatos,[6] a permanent resident of Panaytayon who
knew as he was related by blood to Crispina
Panis,[7] hence, it is incredible for respondent not to know
of Panis death on January 15, 1981 or that he did not
know the person of . . . Panis [even if] he ha[d] been
away from his place of birth since 1958.
This Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) by Resolution of June 4, 1990.[8]
The rollo shows that complainant had been
manifesting his zeal in pursuing the case, but until March
19, 2002 when a Commissioner of the IBP Commission
on Bar Discipline issued a Notice of Hearing[9] directing
the parties to appear at the IBP Building on April 19,
2002, the case appears to have in the interim remained
dormant.
Due to the unavailability of complainant and the IBP
Investigating Commissioner on the scheduled hearings
on April 19, 2002[10] and June 7, 2002, respectively, they
were reset to June 28, 2002.[11]
Before the June 28, 2002 scheduled hearing,
complainant filed before the IBP a MANIFESTATION
COUPLED WITH MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE
PLEADING[12] wherein he expressed wonder . . . why it
took the Committee on Bar Discipline of the IBP over ten
(10) long years to set th[e] case for hearing.
In the same Manifestation cum Motion, complainant
informed that his two witnesses, Aniceta P. Tarle, a
daughter of the deceased Crispina Panis, and Ricafort
(who, as reflected above, respondent claimed to have
led him to believe that the old woman presented before
him was Panis) had died.
Complainant further informed that he and respondent
were principal sponsors at a wedding, hence, he had not
pressed for the early investigation of the case.
Nonetheless, complainant prayed that the case be
decided on the basis of the pleadings.
Respondent, whose comment on complainants
above-said Manifestation cum Motion was sought by the
IBP by Order of June 28, 2002,[13] filed a Motion to
Dismiss[14] manifesting that he was joining complainants
motion to have the case resolved on the basis of the
pleadings, and informing that the criminal complaint
lodged against him in connection with his notarization of
the questioned document was dismissed, he having
proved
i) that when he notarized the subject Deed of Donation
one among six similar documents executed in favor
of Barangay Panaytayon, Tubigon, Bohol, for
 purposes of a school site someone represented to
respondent as Crispina Panis;
ii) that she turned [out] to be the daughter of Crispina
Panis, and that she ha[d] been instructed by Gregorio
Ricafor[t] who prepared the document to affix the
same Crispina Panis in the document;
iii) that the donation turned out to be the will and resolve
of the heirs of Crispina Panis[.]
Respondent accordingly prayed for the dismissal of the
case.
IBP Commissioner on Bar Discipline Victoria O. de
los Reyes, to whom the case was reassigned, issued a
Notice of Hearing[15] setting the case for hearing on
October 10, 2002 but not one of the parties showed up.
While the IBP received on October 4, 2002 complainants
Reiterative Manifestation dated September 30, 2002,[16] it
resolved to deny the Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings, by Order of October 10, 2002[17] upon its
finding of a need for complainant to substitute his
charges.
The IBP later received on October 6, 2002 a
REITERATIVE MANIFESTATION (RE:
COMPLAINANTS MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE
PLEADINGS)[18] alleging, among other things,
b) that respondent never personally knew the late Crispina
Panis nor his relationship to her, considering that
from 1958 (when respondent set foot on secondary
education) respondent left his native place and
resided in a convent with a parish priest (now Msgr.
Saturnino Felicitas) as an altar boy and convent
helper, until respondent graduated from two (2)
college courses;
c) that, in fact, the fact of death of said Crispina Panis was
known to respondent only when he became one of
the accused in a complaint for falsification of public
document filed with the MCTC of Tubigon-Clarin,
Bohol[.]
The case was set anew for complainant to present
evidence on November 11, 2002 during which, again,
none of the parties appeared, drawing the Commission
to consider the case submitted for resolution by Order of
even date.[19]
Commissioner de los Reyes submitted her REPORT
and RECOMMENDATION[20] the pertinent portion of
which read:
xxx
In view of the failure of the complainant to substantiate his
serious charges against the respondent, it is respectfully
recommended that this charge for disbarment be dismissed.
There is no question that the complainant waived his right to
present his evidence despite the opportunity given him by this
Commission and in effect deprived the respondent the right to
confront him and his witnesses.
However, this Commission would like to point out that there is
no issue that respondent Atty. Cabatos did not exercise that
degree of diligence required of him as a Notary Public.
It has been held in the case entitled Flores v. Chua, 306 SCRA
465, that where the notary public is a lawyer, a graver
responsibility is placed upon his shoulder by reason of his
solemn oath to obey the laws and to do no falsehood or
consent to the doing of any. And in the case Nunga v. Viray,
306 SCRA 487, the Honorable Court ruled that notaries public
must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the
performance of their duties.
In the case before us, the respondent himself admitted that he
did not exert any effort to find out if the person who
acknowledged to have executed the Deed of Donation was
really Crispina Panis. He merely relied on the assurance of Mr.
Gregorio Ricafort that the person who appeared before him as
Notary Public was the real Crispina Panis. Considering that
Tubigon, Bohol is a small town, it would have been easy to
determine the real identity of the person claiming to have
executed the document.
Moreover, it was easy for the respondent to require the person
who claimed to have executed the questioned Deed of
Donation to produce his Community Tax Certificate (formerly
Residence Certificate) and any other documents to identify
him or her. This he did not do.
It can therefore be validly concluded that respondent Atty.
Cabatos failed to exercise with utmost care and diligence his
duties as Notary Public.
For these reasons, it is recommended that respondent Atty.
Artemio P. Cabatos be reprimanded, with a warning that a
graver penalty will be recommended to be imposed on him in
the event he again fails to exercise that high degree of
diligence required of a Notary Public in the performance of his
duties as such. (Emphasis and italization in the original)
By NOTICE OF RESOLUTION,[21] the IBP National
Secretary quoted the IBP Resolution No. XVI-2003-89
adopting and approving the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner, which notice of Resolution, along with
[22]
the records of the case, was transmitted by letter of
September 29, 2002 of the IBP Director for Bar
Discipline and received on October 9, 2003 by the Office
of the Bar Confidant, this Court.[23]
When will the incidence of violations, by lawyers
commissioned as notaries public, of their oath of office
decline if not abate?
Why do notaries public seem to be impervious to the
call by this Court to faithfully discharge their sacred
duties which are dictated by public policy and impressed
with public interest?
Why did respondent rely on Ricaforts alleged leading
him to believe that the old woman before him
was the Crsipina Panis who purportedly executed the
document for notarization, when one of the
witnesses[24] to the execution of the document was his
(respondents) father, Geronimo Cabatos, from whom he
could have verified the identity of Crispina Panis, if
indeed he did not know her?
That respondent was, if true, exonerated from the
criminal case filed against him in connection with his
notarization of the questioned document does not
exonerate him from the present administrative case.
Nor does, if respondents information in his Motion to
Dismiss[25] is true, that the person who had been
instructed by Ricafort to affix the signature of Crispina
Panis was the latters daughter exonerate him. By such
information, he in fact impliedly admits that the document
had already been signed when it was brought to him for
notarization.
That a notary public should not notarize a document
unless the persons who signed it are the same persons
who executed and personally appeared before him to
attest to the contents of the truth of what are stated
therein bears reiterating. On pain of sounding like a
broken record, this Court has repeatedly held that the
purpose of the injunction is to enable the notary public to
verify the genuineness of the signature of the
acknowledging party in this case Crispina Panis and to
ascertain that the document is the partys free act of
deed.[26]
Respondent having thus failed to faithfully discharge
his sacred duties as a notary public, under the facts and
circumstances of the case, the revocation of his notarial
commission and disqualification from being
commissioned as notary public for a period of One (1)
Year is in order.
As for the charge against respondent of showing
grave disrespect to the courts and the administration of
justice by holding a parade/rally, along with his followers,
during which he imputed bias to complainant whom he
branded as worse than President Marcos, it has not
been sufficiently substantiated.
WHEREFORE, the notarial commission of
respondent, Atty. Artemio P. Cabatos, if still existing, is
hereby REVOKED and he is hereby DISQUALIFIED to
be commissioned as a notary public for a period of One
(1) Year, and WARNED that a similar violation by him
shall be dealt with more severely.
Mumar vs. Atty Flores
A.C. No. 5426 April 3, 2007
CHITA PANTOJA-MUMAR, Complainant, - versus - ATTY. JANUARIO C.
FLORES, Respondent.
The instant administrative case stemmed from the complaint filed by Chita
Pantoja-Mumar charging respondent Atty.Januario C. Flores with fraud,
misrepresentation, deceit, falsification of document, breach of duty and
violation of his oath as a lawyer.
Complainant is one of the compulsory heirs of the late Jose Pantoja, Sr. It
appears that respondent had prepared an Extrajudicial Partition with
Absolute Sale for her and 11 other co-heirs covering a three-hectare property
in Pangdan, Cambanay,Danao City. The deed was executed in favor of the
spouses Filomena and Edilberto Perez, who were later able to secure a
torrens title over the property under their names.
In the verified Complaint, complainant alleged that respondent had prepared
the Extrajudicial Partition with Absolute Sale dated December 29, 1987, but
averred that the transaction did not push through, and the deed was not
notarized.
The Investigating Commissioner found that while the validity of the Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale is yet to be resolved in the civil case, the
acts and omissions of respondent as notary public have been duly
established. According to the Investigating Commissioner:
1. The document, although already signed by some of the co-heirs/co-
owners on or before December 29, 1987, was not finalized because the
transaction was not pursued; however, the date of notarization was indicated
therein to be December 29, 1987;
2. Respondent notarized the document on or after June 13, 1988, without
the authority and/or in the absence of some of the supposed signatories;
3. Respondent did not see one of the co-heirs, Maximina Pantoja, actually
affix her thumbmark to the document; and
4. Respondent notarized the document even if Complainant, also a co-
heir, did not sign it.
The Investigating Commissioner pointed out that these acts and omissions
were established through respondents own admission that he notarized the
document even if Maximina Pantoja did not affix her thumbmark in his
presence, and that complainant did not appear before him to sign the deed.
The Investigating Commissioner also considered respondents testimony in
Civil Case No. DNA-574. Citing Gonzales v. Ramos, Commissioner Herbosa
recommended that the notarial commission of respondent be revoked; and
that he be disqualified from reappointment as notary public for a period of
two years and suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months.
Issue: WON respondent violated the Notarial law and his lawyer’s oath?
Held:
It cannot be overemphasized that notarization of documents is not an empty,
meaningless or routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest,
such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries
public. It is through the act of notarization that a private document is
converted into a public one, making it admissible in evidence without need of
preliminary proof of authenticity and due execution. Indeed, a notarial
document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face, and for this
reason, notaries public must observe utmost care in complying with the
elementary formalities in the performance of their duties. Otherwise, the
confidence of the public in the integrity of this form of conveyance would be
undermined. Hence, a notary public should not notarize a document unless
the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who executed
and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of
what are stated therein. A notary public is duty-bound to require the person
executing a document to be personally present, to swear before him that he
is that person and ask the latter if he has voluntarily and freely executed the
same.
Thus, in notarizing the Deed of Absolute Sale without ascertaining that all the
vendors-signatories thereto were the very same persons who executed it and
personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are
stated therein, respondent undermined the confidence of the public on
notarial documents; he thereby breached Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which requires lawyers to uphold the
Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the law and
legal processes, and Rule 1.01 thereof, which proscribes lawyers from
engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
It must be stressed that disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary
sanction, and, as such, the power to disbar must always be exercised with
great caution for only the most imperative reasons, and in clear cases of
misconduct affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer as an
officer of the court and a member of the bar. Accordingly, disbarment should
not be decreed where any punishment less severe such as a reprimand,
suspension, or fine would accomplish the end desired. Considering that this
is the respondents first administrative offense, the Court modifies the IBPs
recommendation of a two-year suspension from the practice of law to one
year.
[A.C. No. 5864. April 15, 2005]
ARTURO L. SICAT, complainant, vs. ATTY.
GREGORIO E. ARIOLA, JR., respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
In an affidavit-complaint, complainant Arturo L.
[1]
Sicat, a Board Member of the Sangguniang
Panglalawigan of Rizal, charged respondent Atty.
Gregorio E. Ariola, the Municipal Administrator of Cainta,
Rizal, with violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility by committing fraud, deceit and falsehood
in his dealings, particularly the notarization of a Special
Power of Attorney (SPA) purportedly executed by a one
Juanito C. Benitez. According to complainant,
respondent made it appear that Benitez executed the
said document on January 4, 2001 when in fact the latter
had already died on October 25, 2000.
He alleged that prior to the notarization, the
Municipality of Cainta had entered into a contract with
J.C. Benitez Architect and Technical Management,
represented by Benitez, for the construction of low-cost
houses. The cost of the architectural and engineering
designs amounted to P11,000,000 and two consultants
were engaged to supervise the project. For the services
of the consultants, the Municipality of Cainta issued a
check dated January 10, 2001 in the amount
of P3,700,000, payable to J.C. Benitez Architects and
Technical Management and/or Cesar Goco. The check
was received and encashed by the latter by virtue of the
authority of the SPA notarized by respondent Ariola.
Complainant further charged respondent with the
crime of falsification penalized under Article 171 of the
Revised Penal Code by making it appear that certain
persons participated in an act or proceeding when in fact
they did not.
In his Comment, respondent explained that, as early
[2]
as May 12, 2000, Benitez had already signed the SPA.
He claimed that due to inadvertence, it was only on
January 4, 2001 that he was able to notarize it.
Nevertheless, the SPA notarized by him on January 4,
2001 was not at all necessary because Benitez had
signed a similar SPA in favor of Goco sometime before
his death, on May 12, 2000. Because it was no longer
necessary, the SPA was cancelled the same day he
notarized it, hence, legally, there was no public
document that existed. Respondent prayed that the
complaint be dismissed on the ground of forum-shopping
since similar charges had been filed with the Civil
Service Commission and the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon. According to him, the complaints
were later dismissed based on findings that the assailed
act referred to violations of the implementing rules and
regulations of PD 1594, PD 1445, RA 7160 and other
[3] [4] [5]
pertinent rules of the Commission on Audit (COA). He
stressed that no criminal and administrative charges
were recommended for filing against him.
In a Resolution dated March 12, 2003, the Court[6]
referred the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation. On August 26, 2003, the IBP
submitted its investigation report:
x x x it is evident that respondent notarized the Special Power
of Attorney dated 4 January 2001 purportedly executed by
Juanito C. Benitez long after Mr. Benitez was dead. It is also
evident that respondent cannot feign innocence and claim that
he did not know Mr. Benitez was already dead at the time
because respondent, as member of the Prequalification and
Awards Committee of the Municipality of Cainta, personally
knew Mr. Benitez because the latter appeared before the
Committee a number of times. It is evident that the Special
Power of Attorney dated 4 January 2001 was part of a scheme
of individuals to defraud the Municipality of Cainta of money
which was allegedly due them, and that respondent by
notarizing said Special Power of Attorney helped said parties
succeed in their plans.
[7]
The IBP recommended to the Court that respondents
notarial commission be revoked and that he be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of one
year.[8]
 After a careful review of the records, we find that
respondent never disputed complainants accusation that
he notarized the SPA purportedly executed by Benitez
on January 4, 2001. He likewise never took issue with
the fact that on said date, Benitez was already dead. His
act was a serious breach of the sacred obligation
imposed upon him by the Code of Professional
Responsibility, specifically Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, which
prohibited him from engaging in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct. As a lawyer and as an
officer of the court, it was his duty to serve the ends of
justice, not to corrupt it. Oath-bound, he was expected
[9]
to act at all times in accordance with law and ethics, and
if he did not, he would not only injure himself and the
public but also bring reproach upon an honorable
profession. [10]
In the recent case of Zaballero v. Atty. Mario J.
Montalvan, where the respondent notarized certain
[11]
documents and made it appear that the deceased father
of complainant executed them, the Court declared the
respondent there guilty of violating Canon 10, Rule 10.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Court
[12]
was emphatic that lawyers commissioned as notaries
public should not authenticate documents unless the
persons who signed them are the very same persons
who executed them and personally appeared before
them to attest to the contents and truth of what are
stated therein. The Court added that notaries public must
observe utmost fidelity, the basic requirement in the
performance of their duties, otherwise the confidence of
the public in the integrity of notarized deeds and
documents will be undermined.
In the case at bar, the records show that Benitez died
on October 25, 2000. However, respondent notarized the
SPA, purportedly bearing the signature of Benitez, on
January 4, 2001 or more than two months after the
latters death. The notarial acknowledgement of
respondent declared that Benitez appeared before him
and acknowledged that the instrument was his free and
voluntary act. Clearly, respondent lied and intentionally
perpetuated an untruthful statement. Notarization is not
an empty, meaningless and routinary act. It converts a
[13]
private document into a public instrument, making it
admissible in evidence without the necessity of
preliminary proof of its authenticity and due execution.
[14]
Neither will respondents defense that the SPA in
question was superfluous and unnecessary, and
prejudiced no one, exonerate him of accountability. His
assertion of falsehood in a public document contravened
one of the most cherished tenets of the legal profession
and potentially cast suspicion on the truthfulness of
every notarial act. As the Municipal Administrator of
Cainta, he should have been aware of his great
responsibility not only as a notary public but as a public
officer as well. A public office is a public trust.
Respondent should not have caused disservice to his
constituents by consciously performing an act that would
deceive them and the Municipality of Cainta. Without the
fraudulent SPA, the erring parties in the construction
project could not have encashed the check amounting
to P3,700,000 and could not have foisted on the public a
spurious contract ― all to the extreme prejudice of the
very Municipality of which he was the Administrator.
According to the COA Special Task Force:
Almost all acts of falsification of public documents as
enumerated in Article 171 in relation to Article 172 of the
Revised Penal Code were evident in the transactions of the
Municipality of Cainta with J.C. Benitez & Architects
Technical Management for the consultancy services in the
conduct of Detailed Feasibility Study and Detailed
Engineering Design of the Proposed Construction of Cainta
Municipal Medium Rise Low Cost Housing, in the contract
amount of P11,000,000. The agent resorted to
misrepresentation, manufacture or fabrication of fictitious
document, untruthful narration of facts, misrepresentation, and
counterfeiting or imitating signature for the purpose of creating
a fraudulent contract. All these were tainted with deceit
perpetrated against the government resulting to undue injury.
The first and partial payment, in the amount of P3,700,000.00
was made in the absence of the required outputs. x x x [15]
We need not say more except that we are
constrained to change the penalty recommended by the
IBP which we find too light.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Gregorio E. Ariola,
Jr., is found guilty of gross misconduct and is hereby
DISBARRED from the practice of law. Let copies of this
Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant
and entered in the records of respondent, and brought to
the immediate attention of the Ombudsman.
SO ORDERED.
MANUEL MALLARI and MILLIE MALLARI v. REBECCA
ALSOL
G.R. No. 150866, March 6, 2006 (Carpio, J.)
FACTS:
Stalls No. 7 and 8 of the Supermarket Section of the
Cabanatuan City Public Market were awarded to and occupied by
Abelardo Mallari, father of Manuel Mallari and Rebecca Alsol. Before
Abelardo’s death, he gave the respective stalls to Manuel and Rebecca.
Sometime in 1988, respondent’s daughter became sick and the
Alsol family had to stay in Manila for two months for the medical
treatment. Upon their return, they found out that petitioners were
already occupying Stall No. 8. The partition between Stalls No. 7 and 8
had been removed and respondent’s merchandise and things were
already gone. The Mallaris refused Alsol’s demand to vacate the stall.
With the help of the City Market Committee, Stall No. 7 was
granted Mallari and Stall No. 8 to Alsol. Alsol and the city government
executed a lease contract with the right to occupy Stall No. 8 for a
monthly rental of P316 subject to increase or decrease in accordance
with the city rules and ordinances. However, the Mallaris still refused
to vacate and instead, they filed an action for annulment of such
contract before the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lease contract executed is valid.
HELD:
YES. Petitioners insist that the Lease Contract is not valid
because the City Treasurer should have signed the Lease Contract and
not Mayor Perez, the City Mayor. The Court agrees with petitioners
that RA 7160 is not the applicable law. It should have applied Batas
Pambansa Blg. 337 or the old Local Government Code. Still, even
under BP 337, city mayors have the authority to sign contracts on
behalf of city governments.
Petitioners also allege that the Lease Contract is not valid
because Mayor Perez did not appear before the notary public who
notarized the document. Such argument was not sustained by the
Court.
Notarization converts a private document into a public
document. However, the non-appearance of the parties before the
notary public who notarized the document does not necessarily nullify
nor render the parties’ transaction void ab initio. Thus:
 x x x Article 1358 of the New Civil Code on the necessity of a
public document is only for convenience, not for validity or
enforceability. Failure to follow the proper form does not
invalidate a contract. Where a contract is not in the form
prescribed by law, the parties can merely compel each other to
observe that form, once the contract has been perfected. This
is consistent with the basic principle that contracts are
obligatory in whatever form they may have been entered into,
provided all essential requisites are present.
Hence, the Lease Contract is valid despite Mayor Perez’s failure to
appear before the notary public.
St. Mary’s Farm, Inc. v. Prima Real Properties
Nachura, J.
July 31, 2008
Facts:
 St. Mary’s was the registered owner of an originally 25,598 sqm of
land in Las Pinas under TCT S-1648.
 In compliance with a final court decision in another civil case, St.
Mary’s passed and approved in 1988 a board resolution authorizing
defendant Rodolfo Agana to cede to T.S. Cruz Subdivision 4,000
sqm of the abovementioned land.
 Agana did not return to plaintiff the said title. Instead, allegedly
forged a board resolution of St. Mary’s authorizing Agana to sell
the remaining 21,598 sqm of land. This board resolution was duly
notarized. Agana was also with a Special Power of Attorney when it
dealt with T.S. Cruz and Prima Real Properties.
 Eventually, a deed of absolute sale was signed by Agana and
Prima Real Properties transferring ownership of the land from St.
Mary’s to Prima.
 Prima effected the cancellation of TCT S-1648 in the name of St.
Mary’s and another TCT T-6175 in its name was issued by the
Registry of deeds, Villanueva.
 Prima purchased from T.S. Cruz Subdivision the 4,000 sqm portion
of the land.
 St. Mary’s filed an action for rescission of the sale and the
reconveyance of the property.
According to St. Mary’s:
1. Sale of the realty entered into between Agana and Prima is null and
void for lack of authority on the part of Agana to sell the property.
2. The board resolution allegedly granting Agana the authority to sell in
behalf of the company, as certified by Corp. Secretary Agcaoili is a
forgery as no board meeting was held on June 27, 1988; the said
document was merely presented to the notary public for notarization
without Atty. Agcaoili appearing before him.
3. Consequently, the deed of absolute sale was void for being a result
of a fraudulent transaction.
Prima contends:
1. It acted in good faith when it relied solely on the face of the
authorization of Agana and paid in full the purchase price of
P2,567,760.00 making it a buyer in good faitgh and for value.
2. Even assuming that the authorization of Agana was forged, St.
Mary’s, through its president, accepted and received part of the
purchase price knowing fully well the same to be the proceeds of the
sale of the property, St. Mary’s is now estopped from asking for
rescission.
FIRST ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Prima was a buyer in bad faith
HELD:
No, Prima was a buyer in good faith and for value.
On the basis of the board resolution, Prima had every reason to rely
on Agana’s authority to sell the land.
 A buyer for value and in good faith is one who buys property
of another, without notice that some other person has a right
or interest in such property and pays full and fair price for the
same, at the same time of such purchase, or before he has
notice of the said claim or interest. To prove good faith, a
buyer of registered and titled land need only show that he
relied on the face of the title of the property. Sufficient that
the following conditions concur:
a. The seller is the registered owner of the land
b. Owner has possession of the land
c. At the time of the sale, the buyer was not aware of
any claim or interest of some other person in the
property, or of any defect or restriction in the title of
the seller or in his capacity to convey title to the
property
All the three conditions are present in the case.
1. Prima exerted efforts to verify the true background of the subject
land
2. Agana presented to Prima the notarized board resolution, separate
Certification by St. Mary’s president authorizing Agana to sell the
land, and a TCT of the property
SECOND ISSUE: Whether or not Agana was authorized to sell the subject
property
HELD:
 Yes, Agana had the authority to sell the subject property by virtue of Satisfied that the Trinidads owned the property, Metrobank
the notarized board resolution and the Special Power of Attorney.
RATIO:
accepted it as collateral and lent them money.
The document under scrutiny is a special power of attorney that is
duly notarized. It is a public document where the notarial acknowledgement Arguelles filed a complaint against the Trinidads and
is prima facie evidence of the fact of its due execution. A buyer presented Metrobank for the cancellation of the Transfer Certificate of Title
with such a document would have no choice between knowing and finding
out whether a forger lurks beneath the signature on it. The notarial
and of the real estate mortgage over the property. They alleged
acknowledgment has removed that choice from him replacing it with a that the Trinidads used a fictitious deed of sale notarized by
presumption sanctioned by law that the affiant appeared before the notary Atty. Saulog Jr. to effect the transferrin their names.
public and acknowledged that he executed the document, understood its
import and signed it. The buyer is given the luxury to rely on the presumption
of regularity of a duly notarized SPA.
The RTC and CA held that the deed was not authentic
based on that fact that the notary public who notarized the
Prima also relied on the confirmation and certification of the Register document could not recall if the Arguelleses personally
of Deeds of Las Pinas and Mr. T.S. Cruz. When Agana first sold the 4,000
sqm portion to T.S. Cruz, he showed a similar authorization by the petitioner appeared and signed the deed of sale before him.
which was also signed by the corporate secretary, Atty. Agcaoili. Agana
acted as St. Mary’s authorized agent and had full authority to bind the ISSUE: Whether or not the deed of sale is authentic.
company in that first transaction with Cruz.
HELD: Yes.
The board resolution also negates the assertion by St. Mary’s that
Agana’s authority was only limited to negotiate and not to sell. The
It is too much to expect a notary public who had but a
resolution further averred that Agana was “authorized and empowered
to sign any and all documents, instruments, papers or writings which brief time with the Arguelleses during the notarial ceremony to
may be required and necessary for this purpose to bind the corporation remember their faces 12 years later. What matters is Atty.
in this undertaking.” The certification of St. Mary’s president also attests to Saulog, Jr.’s testimony respecting the ritual of notarization that
this fact. With this, Agana, undeniably had the authority to cede the subject he invariably followed. He gave unbending assurance that he
property, carrying with it all the concomitant powers necessary to implement
ascertained the identities of the parties to documents who
said transaction.
appeared before him, including the Arguelleses, by requiring
METROBANK vs ARGUELLES them to show documentary proofs of the same and to sign the
documents in his presence.
FACTS:

Respondent Arguelleses were registered owners of a

parcel of land. They entered into a conditional deed of sale of
the land to Edgardo Trinidad and his wife. The Trinidads gave
Arguelleses 50,000php as down payment; the balance to be
paid in monthly installments. With a deed of sale in their favor,
the Trinidads had the land titled in their names. They applied
with Metrobank for a loan offering the land as collateral.
 On August 24, 1999, Atty. Quintin P. Alcid, counsel for
MARY JANE D. respondents, filed a Motion for Extension to File Comment
praying that an extension of sixty (60) days from August 16,
VELASCO, 1999 be given to them to file their comment.[3]

COMPLAINANT,VERS On October 4, 1999, the Court granted the Motion for Extension

US ATTY. CHARLIE with a warning that the same shall be the last and no further
extension will be given.[4]

DOROIN AND ATTY.

HECTOR CENTENO, The respondent lawyers failed to file their comment.

RESPONDENTS., A.C. On June 20, 2001, the Court ordered respondent lawyers and
their counsel to show cause why they should not be
NO. 5033, 2008 JULY disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for such failure and
to comply with the resolution requiring the comment. Copies of
28, EN BANC the resolution dated June 20, 2001 were returned unserved
from Atty. Alcid and Atty. Centeno with notations “party
This case refers to a disbarment complaint filed by Mary Jane out/unknown at/party moved out” and “moved out.” Atty. Doroin
D. Velasco on March 31, 1999, against respondent lawyers for received the said resolution on July 27, 2001.[5]
forgery and

falsification constitutive of malpractice.[1]

On April 17, 2002, complainant was required to submit the
correct addresses of Atty. Alcid and Atty. Centeno, while Atty.
Charlie Doroin was fined Php 500.00 for failure to comply with
On June 21, 1999, the Court’s Second Division required the
the show cause resolution dated June 20, 2001 and was
respondent lawyers to comment on the complaint within (10)
ordered to submit his comment.[6]
days from notice.[2]
Complainant failed to comply with the directive of the Court.
On July 23, 2003, the Court required the complainant to show
cause why she should not be disciplinarily dealt with for her
non-compliance with the said directive and to submit her
compliance within ten (10) days from notice. In the same
resolution, the fine imposed on Atty. Charlie Doroin was
increased from Php 500.00 to Php 1,000.00 for his failure to file
his comment on the complaint as required by the Court, or to
suffer imprisonment of five (5) days in case he fails to pay and
to submit his comment on the complaint within ten (10) days
from notice.[7]
In a report dated August 2, 2004, the Clerk of Court informed
the Court that respondent Atty. Doroin paid the fine of Php
1,000.00. However, Atty. Doroin still failed to submit the
comment on the administrative complaint required of him and
has not complied with the show cause resolution dated April 17,
2002 by submitting the correct addresses of Atty. Quintin P.
Alcid and respondent Atty. Hector Centeno.[8]
In a Manifestation submitted June 23, 2005, the complainant
submitted the addresses of Atty. Charlie Doroin and Atty. Hector
Centeno as well as a copy of a Special Power of Attorney
authorizing Mr. Juanito C. Perez to prosecute the instant
case.[9]
On July 27, 2005, the Court issued a resolution noting the
compliance of the complainant as well as the latter’s
manifestation and referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation within
ninety (90) days from receipt of the record.[10]
On October 3, 2005, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
through Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva Maala issued a
Notice of Mandatory Conference/Hearing to the parties to the
case scheduled on October 26, 2005 with a strict note that
“[n]on-appearance by any of the parties shall be deemed a
waiver of their right to participate in further proceedings.”[11]
On October 26, 2005, only Mr. Juanito Perez, attorney-in-fact of
the complainant, together with his counsel Atty. Andres Villaruel,
Jr. appeared. As respondents Atty. Charlie Doroin and Atty.
Hector Centeno had not filed their comment, they were directed
to submit it within (10) days from receipt of notice. The hearing
of the case was reset on November 30, 2005.[12]
On November 30, 2005, again, only Mr. Juanito Perez, attorney-
in-fact of the complaint, together with his counsel, Atty. Villaruel,
appeared. The notices sent to respondents were returned to the
Commission on Bar Discipline with a notation “RTS-Moved.” As
respondents had not filed their comment on the complaint, they
were declared in default. In an Order dated November 30, 2005,
Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva Maala submitted her report
and recommendation, viz.[13]
The Commission on Bar Discipline reported that:
xxx xxx xxx
In her Affidavit-Complaint, complaint alleged that she was
appointed as Administratrix in Special Proceedings Case No. Q-
96-27628 pending consideration before the Regional Trial
Court, Quezon City, Branch 87, entitled “In the matter of the
Settlement of the Estate of the Late Eduardo Doroin, Monina E.
Doroin, petitioner.” The deceased, Eduardo Doroin, died on 21
January 1996, in Papua New Guinea. In this Special
Proceedings case, respondents were collaborating counsels for
Oppositor, Josephine Abarquez.
On 21 March 1996, Atty. Doroin fooled complainant by deceitful
means into making her sign an Extra-Judicial Settlement and
Deed of Partition, allotting complainant the sum of
P1,216,078.00 giving the paramour of complainant’s father,
Josephine Abarquez, the share of P7,296,468.00 and also
allotting complainant’s two (2) alleged illegitimate brothers and
an alleged illegitimate sister, a similar sum of P1,216,075.00
each alleging that such sharing is in accordance with law. But
no share was assigned to complainant’s mother, who was the
legal wife of Dr. Eduardo Doroin.
To partially satisfy complainant’s share of Php 1,216,078.00,
Atty. Doroin required complainant to sign a paper which was an
alleged Confirmation of Authority to Sell the property of
complainant’s father located at Kingspoint subdivision, Bagbag,
Novaliches, Quezon City, covered by TCT No. 34885,
Complainant told Atty. Doroin that she will first consult a lawyer
regarding the legality of the said Confirmation of Authority to
Sell before she signs the same. Eventually, she was not able to
sign the said Confirmation because complainant’s lawyer, Atty.
Marapao, failed to confer and negotiate with Atty. Doroin
regarding the same.
When the complainant visited the lot situated at Kingspoint
Subdivision sometime in June 1996, there was no house
constructed thereon, but when she visited it again on January
1999, there was already a four-door townhouse constructed.
Complainant was informed by the caretaker at the site that the
owner is one Evangeline Reyes-Tonemura. Complainant also
learned later on that the property, which was one of the
properties submitted to the Court handling the Special
Proceedings case in the Inventory of Property dated 3 April
1996, was sold by Atty. Doroin to Evangeline Reyes-Yonemura
[sic], by forging the signature of complainant’s late father. Atty.
Hector B. Centeno, a Notary Public of Quezon City, knowing
that complainant’s father was already dead as of 21 January
1996, made it appear in the said Deed of Absolute Sale, that
complainant’s father appeared before him in Quezon City on 17
January 1997.
The Notice of Resolution and the Report and Recommendation
by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, were submitted to the
Court, through the Director for Bar Discipline, in a transmittal
Records show that a case for Falsification of Public Document
letter dated January 22, 2007.
was filed against respondent Atty. Hector Centeno before the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 39, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 104869. Atty. Centeno was arraigned on 12
The issue before us is whether Atty. Charlie Doroin and Atty.
September 2001 and pleaded “not guilty.” After the arraignment,
Hector Centeno are guilty of violating their lawyer’s oath and
Atty. Centeno did not anymore appeared [sic] in court and
Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
jumped bail.[14]
which would merit their disbarment.

The Commission found that respondents violated Rule 1.01,

We agree with the findings of the Board of Governors of the
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when they
IBP, but modify the penalty to be imposed on respondent Atty.
caused “extreme and great damage to the complainant.”[15]
Hector Centeno.
The Commissioner also noted that the failure of the respondents
to answer the complaint for disbarment despite due notice on
several occasions and to appear on the scheduled hearing set Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that:
showed “flouting resistance to lawful orders of the court and
illustrates despiciency for his oath of office as a lawyer, which
deserves disciplinary sanction.”[16] The Commissioner “A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
recommended that the respondent lawyers be disbarred. deceitful conduct.”[17]

On November 18, 2006, the Board of Governors of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines adopted and approved the
Report and Recommendation of the Commission on Bar
Discipline with the modification that respondent lawyers be
suspended indefinitely instead of being disbarred.
Lawyers must conduct themselves beyond reproach at all times,
whether they are dealing with their clients or the public at
large,[18] and a violation of the high moral standards of the legal
profession justifies the imposition of the appropriate penalty,
including suspension and disbarment.[19] In Marcelo v.
Javier,[20] we reminded the members of the legal profession
that:
A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession. The trust and confidence necessarily reposed
by clients require in the attorney a high standard and
appreciation of his duty to his clients, his profession, the courts
and the public. The bar should maintain a high standard of legal
proficiency as well as of honesty and fair dealing. Generally
speaking, a lawyer can do honor to the legal profession by
faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the
courts and to his clients. To this end, nothing should be done by
any member of the legal fraternity which might tend to lessen in
any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty
and integrity of the profession.
It bears stressing that membership in the bar is a privilege
burdened with conditions. A lawyer has the privilege and right to
practice law during good behaviour and can only be deprived of
it for misconduct ascertained and declared by judgment of the
court after opportunity to be heard has afforded him. Without
invading any constitutional privilege or right, and attorney’s right
to practice law may be resolved by a proceeding to suspend or
disbar him, based on conduct rendering him unfit to hold a
license or to exercise the duties and responsibilities of an
attorney.
In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof generally rests
upon the complainant, and for the court to exercise its
disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be
established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof.[22]
In the case at bar, complainant claims that respondent lawyers
forged the deed of sale and forced her to sign the deed of
extrajudicial settlement by explaining to her that it was “in
accordance with law.”
The complained actuations of the respondent lawyers constitute
a blatant violation of the lawyer’s oath to uphold the law and the
basic tenets of the Code of Professional Responsibility that no
lawyer shall engage in dishonest conduct. Elementary it is in
succession law that compulsory heirs like the widowed spouse
shall have a share in the estate by way of legitimes[23] and no
extrajudicial settlement can deprive the spouse of said right
except if she gives it up for lawful consideration, but never when
the spouse is not a party to the said settlement.[24] And the
Civil Code reminds us, that we must “give every man his due.”
The guilt of the respondent lawyers is beyond dispute. They
failed to answer the complaint filed against them. Despite due
notice, they failed to attend the disciplinary hearings set by the
IBP. Hence, the claims and allegations of the complainant
remain uncontroverted. In Ngayan v. Tugade,[26] we ruled that
“[a lawyer’s] failure to answer the complaint against him and his
failure to appear at the investigation are evidence of his flouting
resistance to lawful orders of the court and illustrate his
despiciency for his oath of office in violation of Section 3, Rule
138, Rules of Court.” [27]

The Court is mindful that disbarment is a grave penalty.
Considering that the license to practice law, though it is not a
property right, sustains a lawyer’s primary means of livelihood
and to strip someone of such license amounts to stripping one
of a career and a means to keep himself alive, we agree with
the modification submitted by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines that an indefinite suspension would be the more
appropriate penalty on Atty. Charlie Doroin. However, we
cannot be as lenient with Atty. Hector Centeno who, aside from
committing a dishonest act by depriving a person of her rightful
inheritance, also committed a criminal offense when he
falsificated a public document and thereafter absconded from
the criminal proceeding against him after having posted bail.
We also take this opportunity to remind the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and their regional and city chapters to maintain an
updated record of the office and residence addresses of their
members to help facilitate looking for lawyers. As officers of the
court, lawyers should be readily available upon the Court’s
beckoning.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, Atty. Charlie Doroin is suspended
indefinitely, and Atty. Hector Centeno is hereby DISBARRED
SUSAN LOBERES-PINTAL, Complainant - versus - ATTY. RAMONCITO B.
BAYLOSIS, Respondent
A.C. No. 11545
January 24, 2017
FACTS:
Susan Loberes-Pintal (Susan) filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty.
Baylosis for committing perjury, falsification of public documents and the use
of falsified documents. She alleged that Roldan C. Pintal (Roldan) filed a
Petition for Declaration of Nullity of their Marriage before the Regional Trial
Court of Caloocan City (RTC); that Atty. Baylosis conspired with Roldan by
making it appear that he was a resident of Caloocan City when in fact he was
a resident of Quezon City; and that Atty. Baylosis notarized the verification
and certification against non-forum shopping of the petition on May 13, 2011,
but, at that time, Roldan was out of the country. Susan submitted a
Certification from the Barangay Chairman and a Certification from the Bureau
of Immigration as proof.
Atty. Baylosis denied the accusation and insisted that when Roldan went to
his office in January 2011, he personally interviewed him and asked him to
submit his personal documents; that Roldan provided him a Certification from
the Chairman, that Roldan reviewed the petition and affixed his signature in
the Verification and Certification; that Roldan personally appeared before
him, swore in accordance with law and verified his petition in accordance
with the Rules of Court. Atty. Baylosis further averred that the date of
recording on May 13, 2011 of the Verification and Certification of the petition
was an honest mistake and excusable error on the part of his staff but his
claim that Roldan personally appeared before him was true.
The IBP-Board of Governors reversed and set aside the report and
recommendation of the CBD. In its Extended Resolution, the IBP-Board
ofGovernors found Atty. Baylosis guilty of violating the 2004 Rules onNotarial
Practice when he made it appear that Roldan was present during
thenotarization of the petition on May 13, 2011 and recommended the
immediate revocation of his notarial commission and his disqualificationfrom
being commissioned as notary public for two (2) years.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Baylosis guilty of violating the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice
HELD:
YES. Without a quibble, Atty. Baylosis was negligent in the performance of
his duty as a notary public when he notarized the petition for declaration of
the nullity of marriage without the presence of Roldan. This was evidenced
by the Certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration that Roldan was not
in the Philippines on May 13, 2011 as he had left the Philippines on April 10,
2011 and came back only on September 8, 2011. Atty. Baylosis'contention
that he personally interviewed Roldan when the latter went into his office and
personally read and signed the petition cannot be accorded a shred of
credence. In notarizing a document in the absence of a party, Atty. Baylosis
violated not only the rule on notarial practice but also the Code of
Professional Responsibility which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in any
unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct. By affixing his signature
and notarial seal on the document, he attested that Roldan personally
appeared before him on the day it was notarized and verified the contents
thereof. His conduct is fraught with dangerous possibilities considering the
conclusiveness on the due execution of a document that our courts and the
public accord to notarized documents. It must be emphasized that a lawyer
commissioned as a notary public, is mandated to discharge with fidelity the
sacred duties appertaining to his office, such duties being dictated by public
policy and impressed with public interest. It is for this reason that a notary
public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the
performance of their duties; otherwise, the public's confidence in the integrity
of the document would be undermined.
Competent Evidence of Identity
CHARLES B. BAYLON
vs.
ATTY. JOSE A. ALMO
FACTS:
Complainant averred that Pacita Filio, Rodolfo Llantino, Jr. and his
late wife, Rosemarie Baylon, conspired in preparing an SPA1 authorizing his
wife to mortgage his real property located in Signal Village, Taguig. He said
that he was out of the country when the SPA was executed. To prove that his
signature on the SPA was forged, the complainant presented a report 4 from
the National Bureau of Investigation stating to the effect that the questioned
signature on the SPA was not written by him.
The complainant likewise alleged that because of the SPA, his real
property was mortgaged to Lorna Express Credit Corporation and that it was
subsequently foreclosed due to the failure of his wife to settle her mortgage
obligations.
In his answer, the respondent admitted notarizing the SPA, but he
argued that he initially refused to notarize it when the complainant's wife first
came to his office on June 17, 1996, due to the absence of the supposed
affiant thereof. He said that he only notarized the SPA when the
complainant's wife came back to his office on June 26, 1996, together with a
person whom she introduced to him as Charles Baylon. He further contended
that he believed in good faith that the person introduced to him was the
complainant because said person presented to him a Community Tax
Certificate bearing the name Charles Baylon. To corroborate his claims, the
respondent attached the affidavit of his secretary, Leonilita de Silva.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent had been negligent in the performance of
his duties as a notary public in this case.
RULING:
The Supreme Court held that respondent had indeed been negligent
in the performance of his duties as a notary public in this case.
In Santiago v. Rafanan, Notarization is not an empty, meaningless,
routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only
those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization
converts a private document into a public document thus making that
document admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A
notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face.
Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to rely
upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended to a
private instrument.
For this reason, notaries public should not take for granted the
solemn duties pertaining to their office. Slipshod methods in their
performance of the notarial act are never to be countenanced. They are
expected to exert utmost care in the performance of their duties, which are
dictated by public policy and are impressed with public interest.
Mindful of his duties as a notary public and taking into account the
nature of the SPA which in this case authorized the complainant's wife to
mortgage the subject real property, the respondent should have exercised
utmost diligence in ascertaining the true identity of the person who
represented himself and was represented to be the complainant.12 He should
not have relied on the Community Tax Certificate presented by the said
impostor in view of the ease with which community tax certificates are
obtained these days.13 As a matter of fact, recognizing the established
unreliability of a community tax certificate in proving the identity of a person
who wishes to have his document notarized, we did not include it in the list of
competent evidence of identity that notaries public should use in ascertaining
the identity of persons appearing before them to have their documents
notarized.
Moreover, considering that respondent admitted15
in the IBP hearing
on February 21, 2005 that he had already previously notarized some
documents16 for the complainant, he should have compared the
complainant's signatures in those documents with the impostor's signature
before he notarized the questioned SPA.
WHEREFORE, the notarial commission, if still extant, of respondent
Atty. Jose A. Almo is hereby REVOKED. He is likewise DISQUALIFIED to be
reappointed as Notary Public for a period of two years.
MARIA FATIMA JAPITANA vs. ATTY. SYLVESTER C. PARADO
 On June 22, 2006, Atty. Parado notarized the Real Estate Mortgage
between RC Lending Investors, Inc. (RC Lending), as mortgagee, and
Maria Theresa G. Japitana (Theresa) and Ma. Nette Japitana (Nette),
as mortgagors.
 It was supposedly witnessed by Maria Sallie Japitana (Sallie) and
Maria Lourdes Japitana-Sibi (Lourdes) and her husband Dante Sibi
(Dante), Fatima's sisters and brother-in-law, respectively.
 The mortgage covered a parcel of land on which the family home of
the Japitanas was constituted.
 On the same date, Atty. Parado notarized the Affidavit allegedly
executed by Theresa, Nette, Lourdes, Dante, and Sallie to show their
conformity to the Real Estate Mortgage over the land where their
family home was situated.
 On October 23, 2006, RC Lending, through Cristeta G. Cuenco
(Cuenco), filed its Petition for ExtraJudicial Foreclosure of Real Estate
Mortgage.
 Consequently, the Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) was issued
under the name of RC Lending.
 On February 3, 2009, it filed an ex-parte motion for the issuance of a
break-open order, for RC Lending to effectively take the possession of
the subject property as it was gated and nobody would answer in spite
of the sheriffs repeated knocking.
 Fatima, however, assailed that the signatures in the Real Estate
Mortgage as well as in the Affidavit, both notarized on June 22, 2006,
were forgeries.
 She asserted that Atty. Parado did not require the persons who
appeared before him to present any valid identification.
 More importantly, Fatima averred that Atty. Parado had no notarial
authority, as certified8 by the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu (RTC).
IBP
 Commissioner Cachapero opined that there was no evidence to
support that Atty. Parado lied as the court had not set aside his
testimonies. Consequently, he concluded that it was not proven that
Atty. Parado forged the assailed documents and notarized the same.
 Commissioner Cachapero, however, found that Atty. Parado was
dishonest when he testified that he was issued a notarial commission
effective until 2008. His claim was belied by the certification issued by
the Clerk of Court of the RTC stating that Atty. Parado had not been
issued a notarial commission for 2006. As such, he recommended
that Atty. Parado be suspended from the practice of law for one (1)
year.
IBP-BOG
 resolved to revoke Atty. Parado's notarial commission, if presently
commissioned, for testifying that he had a notarial commission valid
until 2008, contrary to the certification issued by the Clerk of Court of
the RTC and for ignoring the notices sent by the Commission on Bar
Discipline. Likewise, the Board of Governors disqualified Atty.
Parado from being commissioned as a notary public for two (2)
years and suspended him from the practice of law for six (6)
months.
The Court's Ruling
The Court agrees with the IBP BOG but modifies the penalty imposed.
A close perusal of the records reveals that Atty. Parado had no existing
notarial commission when he notarized the documents in question in 2006.
This is supported by the certification issued by the Clerk of Court of the RTC
stating that based on the Notarial Records, Atty. Parado had not been issued
a notarial commission for the year 2006. He failed to refute the same as he
neither appeared during the mandatory conference nor filed his position paper.
Under the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice,16 a person commissioned as a
notary public may perform notarial acts in any place within the territorial
jurisdiction of the commissioning court for a period of two (2) years
commencing the first day of January of the year in which the commissioning is
made. Commission either means the grant of authority to perform notarial or
the written evidence of authority.17
Time and again, this Court has stressed that notarization is not an empty,
meaningless and routine act. It is invested with substantive public interest that
only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. It must
be emphasized that the act of notarization by a notary public converts a
private document into a public document making that document admissible in
evidence without further proof of authenticity.A notarial document is by law
entitled to full faith and credit upon its face, and for this reason, notaries
public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the
performance of their duties.
By performing notarial acts without the necessary commission from the
court, Atty. Siapno violated not only his oath to obey the laws
particularly the Rules on Notarial Practice but also Canons 1 and 7 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility which proscribes all lawyers from
engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct and directs them
to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, at all times.
Atty. Parado knowingly performed notarial acts in 2006 in spite of the absence
of a notarial commission for the said period. Further, he was dishonest when
he testified in court that he had a notarial commission effective until 2008,
when, in truth, he had none. Atty. Parado's misdeeds run afoul of his duties
and responsibilities, both as a lawyer and a notary public.
Moreover, even if Atty. Parado had a valid notarial commission, he still failed
to faithfully observe the Rules on Notarial Practice when he notarized the Real
Estate Mortgage and the Affidavit of Conformity with the persons who
executed the said documents merely presenting their Residence Certificate or
Community Tax Certificate (CTC) before him.
Section 2(b), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice requires the
presentation of a competent evidence of identity, if the person appearing
before the notary public is not personally known by him. Section 12, Rule II of
the same Rules defines competent evidence of identity as: (a) at least one
current identification document issued by an official agency bearing the
photograph and signature of the individual; or (b) the oath or affirmation of one
credible witness not privy to the instrument, document or transaction, who is
personally known to the notary public and who personally knows the
individual, or of two credible witnesses neither of whom is privy to the
instrument, document or transaction who each personally knows the individual
and shows to the notary public a documentary identification.
Atty. Parado did not claim to personally know the persons who executed the
said documents. Hence, the presentation of their CTCs was insufficient
because those cannot be considered as competent evidence of identity, as
defined in the Rules. Reliance on the CTCs alone is a punishable indiscretion
by the notary public.19
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Sylvester C. Parado is SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for two (2) years and PERMANENTLY DISQUALIFIED
from being commissioned as Notary Public.
A.C. No. 9676, April 02, 2018
IN RE: DECISION DATED SEPTEMBER 26, 2012 IN OMB-M-A-10-023-A,
ETC. AGAINST ATTY. ROBELITO* B. DIUYAN
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
The Office of the Ombudsman (Mindanao) furnished the Court a copy of its
September 26, 2012 Decision1 in Case No. OMB-M-A-10-023-A (Andrea M.
Camilo v. Raul C. Brion, Agrarian Reform Program Technologist (SG-10),
Municipal Agrarian Reform Office, Mati, Davao Oriental). In the said Decision,
the Office of the Ombudsman noted, viz.:
On a final note, this Office finds it unsettling that the Deed of Partition
submitted before the DAR was notarized by Atty. Robellito B. Diuyan on 23 July
2003, when one of the signatories therein, Alejandro F. Camilo, had earlier
died on 23 August 2001. On this matter, let a copy of this Decision be asked them if this is true and [they] answered in the positive. Then having
furnished the Supreme Court of the Philippines for its information and been satisfied of their answer I let them [sign] one by one in front of me after
appropriate action. which I notarized the same for free. [The] parties [were] personally present
and acknowledged that they [were the] same parties to the document and
In a Resolution2 dated July 24, 2013, this Court treated the September 26,
[they showed] to me their respective CTC.10
2012 Decision in OMB-M-A-10-023-A and the Deed of Partition as an
In a Report and Recommendation11 dated September 24, 2014, the IBP--
administrative complaint against respondent Atty. Robelito B. Diuyan and
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) found respondent guilty of violating the
required the latter to file a comment thereon.3
2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. While it found no deceit or malice on the part
of the respondent, and even considered the fact that respondent was a former
In a letter4 dated October 30, 2013, and by way of comment, respondent
public official with no previous record of misconduct, as well as the fact that
admitted notarizing the Deed of Partition in his capacity as District Public
the affiants in the subject Deed of Partition were farmers who did not have any
Attorney of the Public Attorney's Office in Mati City and all of Davao Oriental.
IDs and only had Community Tax Certificates (CTCs) to present and prove
He claimed that:
their identities, the IBP-CBD nonetheless found him grossly negligent in the
[The] signature as Notary Public in that [July 23, 2003] Deed of Partition
performance of his functions.
subject matter of the complaint was indeed mine. I was still connected with the
Public Attorney's Office as District Public Attorney at that time. I retired on
The IBP-CBD thus recommended as follows:
April 20, 2008. My function [included] the execution and/or notarization of a
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the undersigned finds respondent
document x x x.
guilty of breach of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice and accordingly,
recommends revocation of his notarial commission, if any, for one (1) year,
1n the case at bar, eight (8) persons appeared before me with the document
effective immediately. He is WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar
deed of partition prepared by them subject matter of the complaint. I asked
acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.12
them one by one if the document is true and correct [and] with their
In a Resolution13 dated December 14, 2014, the IBP-Board of Governors (BOG)
Community Tax Certificates, they answered me in the affirmative and after
adopted the IBP-CBD's Report and Recommendation but increased the
being satisfied with their answer I notarized the document for free as they are
recommended penalty, to wit:
considered as indigents. Of course, they signed it one by one in front of me.5
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED,
In a Resolution6 dated February 3, 2014, the Court referred the case to the
with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and
Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution
recommendation.
as Annex "A", and finding Respondent [guilty] for violation of the 2004 Rules
on Notarial Practice, Atty. Robellito R. Diuyan's notarial commission if presently
A mandatory conference was set on May 29, 20147 in Pasig City; however,
commissioned is immediately REVOKED. Further, he is DISQUALIFIED from
respondent was unable to attend the same since he had not fully recovered
being commissioned for two (2) years and SUSPENDED from the practice of
from a debilitating stroke that he suffered in 2012; he cannot stand or walk
law for six (6) months.14
unassisted; has difficulty speaking; and only relies on his meager monthly
The case is now before us for final disposition.
pension of P12,000.00. Thus, in an Order8 dated May 29, 2014, the mandatory
conference was terminated and respondent was required to submit his Position
Paper. Issue

By way of explanation, respondent narrated in his Position Paper9 that:
x x x I have nothing to do with present [charge]. [A]s public officer[,] I [enjoy]
the presumption of good faith and regularity in [the discharge] of my function
as Chief Public Attorney in Mati and all in Davao Oriental x x x; there is no
showing that I have committed any wrong since x x x becoming a lawyer and
member of x x x the [I]ntegrated Bar of the Philippines, as well as [during my]
22 years of x x x service in [the Public Attorney's Office] and in my private life
x x x.
With regard to the deed of partition x x x there is no showing that it was done
with irregularity x x x.
On July 23, 2003 the parties in the document appeared and requested to have
their document notarized for free[. A]s Public Attorney I am bound to do so
[since the affiants were indigents] I x x x then read the said document and
Whether respondent should he held administratively liable for notarizing a
Deed of Partition on the basis of the affiants' CTCs.
Our Ruling
This Court finds nothing. irregular with respondent's act of notarizing the Deed
of Partition on July 23, 2003 on the basis of the affiants' CTCs. The law
applicable at the time of the notarization only required the presentation of the
CTCs.
In Mabini v. Atty. Kintanar,15 this Court dismissed the administrative complaint
filed against the lawyer therein because the lawyer complied with the notarial
law extant at the time of notarizing the contested document, to wit:
It is a truism that the duties performed by a Notary Public are not just plain
ministerial acts. They are so impressed with public interest and dictated by
public policy. Such is the case since notarization makes a private document
into a public one; and as a public document, it enjoys full credit on its In fine, respondent did not violate any of his duties as Notary Public when he
face. However, a lawyer cannot be held liable for a violation his duties as notarized the Deed of Partition on July 23, 2003.
Notary-Public when the law in effect at the time of his complained act does not
provide any prohibition to the same, as in the case at bench. (Emphasis
supplied; citation omitted) Judges and Clerk of Court as Notaries Public Ex Officio
Similarly, respondent notarized the Deed of Partition on July 23, 2003,
or prior to the effectivity of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice,16 of which he is
being held accountable by the IBP. However, when the Deed was notarized on
July 23, 2003, the applicable law was the notarial law under Title IV, Chapter
11, Article VII of the Revised Administrative Code,17 Section 251 of which
states: [ G.R. No. 203786, October 23, 2013 ]
SECTION 251. Requirement as to notation of payment of (cedula) residence
tax. - Every contract, deed, or other document acknowledged before a notary
public shall have certified thereon that the parties thereto have presented their AQUILES RIOSA, PETITIONER, VS. TABACO LA
proper (cedula) residence certificates or are exempt from the (cedula)
residence tax, and there shall be entered by the notary public as a part of such SUERTE CORPORATION, RESPONDENT.
certification the number, place of issue, and date of each (cedula) residence
certificate as aforesaid.
In addition, Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 46518 also reiterated the need to DECISION
present a residence certificate when acknowledging documents before a notary
public, viz.: MENDOZA, J.:
Section 6. Presentation of residence certificate upon certain occasions. - When
a person liable to the taxes prescribed in this Act acknowledges any document
before a notary public, x x x it shall be the duty of such person or officer of
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
such corporation with whom such transaction is had or business done or from 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the
whom any salary or wage is received to require the exhibition of the residence
certificates showing the payment of the residence,taxes by such person: May 30, 2012 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA),
Provided, however, That the presentation of the residence certificate shall not
be required in connection with the registration of a voter. and its September 20, 2012 Resolution,[2] in CA-G.R.
x x x x (Underscoring supplied)
CV No. 96459, reversing the September 30, 2010
Thus, it was incorrect for the IBP to have applied the 2004 Rules on Notarial Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15,
Practice in holding respondent liable for notarizing the Deed of Partition. To
reiterate, the Deed was notarized on July 23, 2003. The 2004 Rules on Notarial Tabaco City, Albay (RTC), which granted the complaint
Practice were not yet in effect at that time.
for annulment/declaration of nullity of the deed of
Here, respondent was then the District Public Attorney in Mati, Davao Oriental
when affiants, who were indigent farmers and who did not have any personal
absolute sale and transfer certificate of title,
identification card or any other form of competent evidence save for their
CTCs,19 requested the notarization of the Deed of Partition. These eight
reconveyance and damages.
individuals who approached him presented themselves to be the affiants of the
said Deed and signed the same in respondent's presence. There was nothing
irregular on the face of the Deed that would have alerted respondent to ask The Facts
probing questions or inquire about the circumstances behind the execution of
the said instrument. On the contrary, the Deed was a valid exercise of the
farmers' right to divide the title in their favor as beneficiaries. The Ombudsman
affirmed this when it dismissed the administrative case filed against an
On February 26, 2002, petitioner Aquiles
agrarian reform officer concerning the Deed. In fact, the Ombudsman rule,d Riosa (Aquiles) filed his Complaint for
that "[t]he eventual breaking of TCT20 CLOA21 No. 454 into individual titles in
favor of the farmer-beneficiaries named in said collective CLOA is not irregular Annulment/Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Absolute
as it is, in fact, provided by DAR22 rules and regulations."23
Sale and Transfer Certificate of Title, Reconveyance
and Damages against respondent Tabaco La Suerte
Corporation (La Suerte) before the RTC.
In his complaint, Aquiles alleged that he was the owner
and in actual possession of a 52-square meter
commercial lot situated in Barangay Quinale, Tabaco
City, Albay; that he acquired the said property through
a deed of cession and quitclaim executed by his
parents, Pablo Riosa, Sr. and Sabiniana Biron; that he
declared the property in his name and had been
religiously paying the realty tax on the said property;
that thereafter, his daughter, Annie Lyn Riosa
Zampelis, renovated the commercial building on the lot
and introduced improvements costing no less than
P300,000.00; that subsequently, on three (3)
occasions, he obtained loans from Sia Ko Pio in the
total amount of P50,000.00; that as a security for the
payment of loans, Sia Ko Pio requested from him a
photocopy of the deed of cession and quitclaim; that
Sia Ko Pio presented to him a document purportedly a
receipt for the P50,000.00 loan with an undertaking to
pay the total amount of P52,000.00 including the
P2,000.00 attorney's fees; that without reading the
document, he affixed his signature thereon; and that
in September 2001, to his surprise, he received a letter
from La Suerte informing him that the subject lot was
already registered in its name.
Aquiles claimed that by means of fraud,
misrepresentation and deceit employed by Sia Ko Pio,
he was made to sign the document which he thought
was a receipt and undertaking to pay the loan, only to
find out later that it was a document of sale. Aquiles
averred that he did not appear before the notary public
to acknowledge the sale, and that the notary public, a
municipal judge, was not authorized to notarize a deed
of conveyance. He further claimed that he could not
have sold the commercial building on the lot as he had
no transmissible right over it, as it was not included in
the deed of cession and quitclaim. He, thus, prayed for
the nullification of the deed of sale and certificate of
title in the name of La Suerte and the reconveyance of
the subject property to him.[4]
In its Answer, La Suerte averred that it was the actual
and lawful owner of the commercial property, after
purchasing it from Aquiles on December 7, 1990; that
it allowed Aquiles to remain in possession of the
property to avoid the ire of his father from whom he
had acquired the property inter vivos, subject to his
obligation to vacate the premises anytime upon
demand; that on February 13, 1991, the Register of
Deeds of Albay issued Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. T-80054 covering the subject property
in its name; that Aquiles necessarily undertook the cost
of repairs and did not pay rent for using the premises;
that Aquiles transacted with it, through Sia Ko Pio,
now deceased, who was then its Chief Executive
Officer; that his opinion that only the land was sold
was absurd because the sale of the principal included
its accessories, not to mention that he did not make
any reservation at the time the deed was executed; that
it repeatedly asked Aquiles to vacate the premises but
to no avail; that, instead, he tried to renovate the
building in 2001 which prompted it to lodge a
complaint with the Office of the Mayor on the ground
that the renovation work was without a building
permit; and that Aquiles' complaint was barred by
prescription, laches, estoppel and indefeasibility of La
Suerte's title.[5]
During the trial, Aquiles and his daughter, Anita Riosa
Cabanele, testified to prove his causes of action. To
defend its rightful claim, La Suerte presented the
testimony of Juan Pielago Sia (Juan), the son of Sia Ko
Pio and a member of the board. Aquiles also presented
his wife, Erlinda, as rebuttal witness.
On September 30, 2010, the RTC ruled in favor of
Aquiles, disposing as follows:
Wherefore, foregoing premises considered, judgment
is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against
the defendant.
1. Ordering the annulment of sale of the subject lot
purportedly executed by plaintiff Aquiles Riosa in
favor of defendant corporation;
2. Annulling the Transfer Certificate of Title No.
80054 in the name of defendant corporation;
3. Ordering defendant corporation to pay plaintiff
the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00) as Attorney's fees;
4. Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the amount
of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) as exemplary
damages; and
5. Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the amount
of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) as
Attorney's fees.
SO ORDERED.[6]
The RTC gave credence to the testimony of Aquiles that
he was made to sign an instrument of sale without his
knowledge because he trusted Sia Ko Pio and he was of
the belief that what he had signed was merely an
instrument of indebtedness. It cited, as legal basis,
Article 1330 of the Civil Code which provides that a
contract where the consent is given thru violence,
intimidation, undue influence or fraud is voidable.
Inasmuch as the property was acquired thru fraud, the
person who obtained it by force of law was considered
a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the
person from whom the property came. Thus,
according to the RTC, La Suerte was bound to reconvey
to Aquiles the subject property.

With its motion for reconsideration denied, La Suerte
appealed to the CA. In its May 30, 2012 Decision, the
CA reversed the RTC decision and upheld the validity
of the subject deed of sale in favor of La Suerte. It
declared La Suerte as the lawful owner of the subject
lot and improvements thereon, subject to the right of
reimbursement for the renovation expenses. The CA
held that tax declarations or realty tax payments by
Aquiles were not conclusive evidence of ownership,
citing Spouses Camara v. Spouses Malabao,[7] where it
was ruled that a party's declaration of real property
and his payment of realty taxes could not defeat a
certificate of title which was an absolute and
indefeasible evidence of ownership of the property in
favor of the person whose name appeared thereon.
The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant
appeal is GRANTED. The September 30, 2010
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Tabaco City,
Albay, Branch 15, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and a new one is rendered:
1. DISMISSING the complaint for annulment of
deed of sale and transfer certificate of
title, without prejudice to the right of
plaintiff-appellee's daughter to a
reimbursement for the renovation works
she made on the structure/building on the
lot; and
2. GRANTING defendant-appellant's counterclaim
although in the reduced amount of
P100,000.00.
SO ORDERED.[8]
Aquiles filed his Motion for Reconsideration[9] of the
CA decision, but the same was denied by the CA in its
September 20, 2012 Resolution.
Hence, Aquiles filed the present petition before this
Court raising the following
ISSUES
1. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals
committed serious error in reversing the decision of
the Trial Court disregarding the conclusion and
findings of the Trial court;
2. Whether the Honorable Court of Appeals
committed serious error of law in holding that the
personal loan of petitioner obtained and granted by Sia
Ko Pio is a consideration of sale of the property in
favor of the respondent corporation La Suerte
Corporation;
3. Whether the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in
finding that there was a valid and perfected contract of
sale of real property between petitioner and
respondent corporation La Suerte Corporation;
4. Whether the Honorable Court of Appeals
committed serious error of law and applicable
jurisprudence in resolving petitioner's actual physical
possession of the property in question; and
5. Whether the Honorable Court of Appeals committed
serious error of law by awarding damages to the
respondent.[10]
The primordial issue to be resolved is whether there
was a perfected and valid contract of sale for the
subject property between Aquiles and La Suerte,
through its Chief Executive Officer, Sia Ko Pio.
Aquiles argues that there was no perfected contract to
sell because (1) there was no transaction between La
Suerte and Aquiles for the sale of the property in
question; (2) there was no board resolution authorizing
Sia Ko Pio to purchase the property; (3) there was no
evidence that the money received by Aquiles from Sia
Ko Pio came from La Suerte; and (4) he did not appear
before the notary public for notarization of the
instrument of sale. Moreover, there was a discrepancy
in the date appearing in the deed of sale and the date in
the acknowledgment and the notarial reference.
La Suerte, in its Comment,[11] argued that Aquiles'
petition should be dismissed because it raised only
questions of fact as only pure question of law is allowed
in a petition for certiorari under Rule 45. It counters
that the notarized deed of sale was the very evidence of
the agreement between them. According to it, said
deed of sale was binding and enforceable between
them, albeit there was a discrepancy in the dates, for
the time-honored rule is that even a verbal contract of
sale of real estate produces legal effect between the
parties. La Suerte adds that the absence of a board
resolution for the purchase of the property has no
controlling consequence as La Suerte had ratified the
act of Sia Ko Pio.
The Court's Ruling
Notably, the issues raised in the petition are factual in
nature. Essentially, Aquiles asks the Court to review
the factual determination of the CA. As a rule, only
questions of law may be raised in a petition for review
on certiorari because the Court is not a trier of facts
and is not to review or calibrate the evidence on
record.[12] When supported by substantial evidence,
the findings of fact by the CA are conclusive and
binding on the parties and are not reviewable by this
Court, unless the case falls under any of the recognized
exceptions.[13] An acceptable exception is where there
is a conflict between the factual determination of the
trial court and that of the appellate court. In such a
case, it becomes imperative to digress from this general
rule and revisit the factual circumstances surrounding
the controversy.[14]
In this case, although the RTC and the CA were one in
ruling that the prescriptive period of reconveyance did
not run against Aquiles because he remained in
possession of the subject property, they differred in
their findings of fact and conclusions on the question
of whether there was a perfected and valid contract of
sale.
The RTC annulled the sale of the subject properties on
the ground of fraud as Aquiles was made to sign an
instrument which he believed to be a receipt of
indebtedness. On the contrary, the CA ruled that the
contract of sale was valid. The CA wrote:
Nevertheless, We rule that the subject deed of sale is
valid. We are not convinced of [Aquiles'] bare assertion
that the said document was executed through fraud,
misrepresentation or deceit, and that his wife's
signature thereon was forged. The rule is that for an
action for reconveyance based on fraud to prosper, the
party seeking reconveyance must prove by clear and
convincing evidence his title to the property and the
fact of fraud. It must be stressed that mere allegations
of fraud are not enough. Intentional acts to deceive and
deprive another of his right, or in some manner, injure
him, must be specifically alleged and proved.[15]
After an assiduous assessment of the evidentiary
records, the Court holds otherwise.
The Court agrees with the finding of the RTC that there
was no perfected contract of sale. It is a hornbook
doctrine that the findings of fact of the trial court are
entitled to great weight on appeal and should not be
disturbed except for strong and valid reasons, because
the trial court is in a better position to examine the
demeanor of the witnesses while testifying.[16]
The elements of a contract of sale are: a] consent or
meeting of the minds, that is, consent to transfer
ownership in exchange for the price; b] determinate
subject matter; and c] price certain in money or its
equivalent.[17]

In this case, there was no clear and convincing
evidence that Aquiles definitely sold the subject
property to La Suerte, nor was there evidence that La
Suerte authorized its chief executive officer, Sia Ko Pio,
to negotiate and conclude a purchase of the property.
Aquiles' narration in open court is clear that he did not
intend to transfer ownership of his property.
Evidently, it was a series of transactions between
Aquiles and Sia Po Ko, but not between the parties.
The transactions were between Aquiles, as borrower,
and Sia Ko Pio, as lender. It was not a sale between
Aquiles, as vendor, and La Suerte, as vendee. There
was no agreement between the parties. As the first
element was wanting, Aquiles correctly argued that
there was no contract of sale. Under Article 1475 of the
Civil Code, the contract of sale is perfected at the
moment there is a meeting of minds on the thing which
is the object of the contract and on the price.
Aquiles acknowledged that he signed the receipt for the
total loan amount of P50,000.00 plus P2,000.00 as
attorney's fees. There is, however, no proof that it
came from La Suerte as the consideration of the sale.
Accordingly, there is no basis for a holding that the
personal loan of Aquiles from Sia Ko Pio was the
consideration for the sale of his property in favor of La
Suerte.
As to La Suerte's contention that a deed of absolute
sale was purportedly executed by Aquiles in its favor, it
failed to adduce convincing evidence to effectively
rebut his consistent claim that he was not aware that
what he had signed was already an instrument of sale,
considering his trust and confidence on Sia Ko Pio who
was his long-time friend and former employer.
The fact that the alleged deed of sale indubitably bore
Aquiles' signature deserves no evidentiary value there
being no consent from him to part with his property.
Had he known that the document presented to him
was an instrument of sale, he would not have affixed
his signature on the document. It has been held that
the existence of a signed document purporting to be a
contract of sale does not preclude a finding that the
contract is invalid when the evidence shows that there
was no meeting of the minds between the seller and
buyer.[19]
Indeed, if Aquiles sold the property in favor of La
Suerte, he would not have religiously and
continuously paid the real property taxes. Also of
note is the fact that his daughter spent
P300,000.00 for the renovation of
improvements. More important, La Suerte did not
earlier ask him to transfer the possession
thereof to the company. These uncontroverted
attendant circumstances bolster Aquiles' positive
testimony that he did not sell the property.
And for said reasons, the CA should not have favorably
considered the validity of the deed of absolute sale
absent any written authority from La Suerte's board of
directors for Sia Ko Pio to negotiate and purchase
Aquiles property on its behalf and to use its money to
pay the purchase price. The Court notes that when Sia
Ko Pio's son, Juan was presented as an officer of La
Suerte, he admitted that he could not find in the
records of the corporation any board resolution
authorizing his father to purchase the disputed
property.[20] In Spouses Firme v. Bukal Enterprises
and Development Corporation,[21] it was written:
It is the board of directors or trustees which exercises
almost all the corporate powers in a corporation. Thus,
the Corporation Code provides:
SEC. 23. The board of directors or trustees. Unless
otherwise provided in this Code, the corporate powers
of all corporations formed under this Code shall be
exercised, all business conducted and all property of
such corporations controlled and held by the board of
directors or trustees to be elected from among the
holders of stock, or where there is no stock, from
among the members of the corporation, who shall hold
office for one (1) year and until their successors are
elected and qualified. x x x validly delegate some of its functions to individual
SEC. 36. Corporate powers and capacity. Every
corporation incorporated under this Code has the
power and capacity:
x x x x
7. To purchase, receive, take or grant, hold, convey,
sell, lease, pledge, mortgage and otherwise deal with
such real and personal property, including securities
and bonds of other corporations, as the transaction of a
lawful business of the corporation may reasonably and
necessarily require, subject to the limitations
prescribed by the law and the Constitution.
xxxx
Under these provisions, the power to purchase
real property is vested in the board of directors
or trustees. While a corporation may appoint agents
to negotiate for the purchase of real property needed
by the corporation, the final say will have to be with the
board, whose approval will finalize the transaction. A
corporation can only exercise its powers and transact
its business through its board of directors and through
its officers and agents when authorized by a board
resolution or its by-laws. As held in AF Realty &
Development, Inc. v. Dieselman Freight Services, Co.:
Section 23 of the Corporation Code expressly provides
that the corporate powers of all corporations shall be
exercised by the board of directors. Just as a natural
person may authorize another to do certain acts in his
behalf, so may the board of directors of a corporation
officers or agents appointed by it. Thus, contracts or
acts of a corporation must be made either by the board
of directors or by a corporate agent duly authorized by
the board. Absent such valid
delegation/authorization, the rule is that the
declarations of an individual director relating
to the affairs of the corporation, but not in the
course of, or connected with, the performance
of authorized duties of such director, are held
not binding on the corporation.[22] [Emphases
supplied]
In the case at bench, Sia Ko Pio, although an officer of
La Suerte, had no authority from its Board of Directors
to enter into a contract of sale of Aquiles' property. It
is, thus, clear that the loan obtained by Aquiles from
Sia Ko Pio was a personal loan from the latter, not a
transaction between Aquiles and La Suerte. There was
no evidence to show that Sia Ko Pio was clothed with
authority to use his personal fund for the benefit of La
Suerte. Evidently, La Suerte was never in the picture.
The CA also failed to consider the glaring material
discrepancies on the dates appearing in the purported
deed of absolute sale notarized by Judge Arsenio Base,
Municipal Court Presiding Judge of Tabaco City (Judge
Base).
An examination of the alleged contract of sale shows
three (3) dates:
1. In witness whereof, I have hereunto affixed my
signature this 8th day of December 1999 in
Tabaco, Albay, Philippines;
2. Before me, this 7th day of December, 1990 in
Tabaco, Albay; and
3. Doc. No. 587;
Page No. 12;
Book No. 4;
Series of 1990.
The document was dated 1999, but the date in the
acknowledgment and notarial reference was an earlier
date, 1990. The ex-oficio notary public, Judge Base,
was not presented to explain the apparent material
discrepancy of the dates appearing on the questioned
document. This only confirms the claim of Aquiles that
he signed the receipt representing his loan at the
bodega of Sia Ko Pio sometime in 1990, and not at the
office of Judge Base in 1999.
La Suerte insists that the discrepancy on the dates was
a mere clerical error that did not invalidate the deed of
sale. It is worthy to stress that a notarial document is
evidence of the facts in the clear unequivocal manner
therein expressed and has in its favor the presumption
of regularity. While it is true that an error in the
notarial inscription does not generally invalidate a sale,
if indeed it took place, the same error can only mean
that the document cannot be treated as a notarial
document and thus, not entitled to the presumption of
regularity. The document would be taken out of the
realm of public documents whose genuineness and due
execution need not be proved.[23]
An even more substantial irregularity raised by Aquiles
pertains to the capacity of the notary public, Judge
Base, to notarize the deed of sale. Judge Base, who
acted as ex-oficio notary public, is not allowed under
the law to notarize documents not connected with the
exercise of his official duties. The case of Tigno v.
Aquino[24] is enlightening:
There are possible grounds for leniency in connection
with this matter, as Supreme Court Circular No. I-90
permits notaries public ex officio to perform any act
within the competency of a regular notary public
provided that certification be made in the notarized
documents attesting to the lack of any lawyer or notary
public in such municipality or circuit. Indeed, it is only
when there are no lawyers or notaries public that the
exception applies. The facts of this case do not warrant
a relaxed attitude towards Judge Cariño's improper
notarial activity. There was no such certification in the
Deed of Sale. Even if one was produced, we would be
hard put to accept the veracity of its contents,
considering that Alaminos, Pangasinan, now a city, was
even then not an isolated backwater town and had its
fair share of practicing lawyers.[25]
In this case, no such certification was attached to the
alleged notarized document. Also, the Court takes note
of Aquiles' averment that there were several lawyers
commissioned as notary public in Tabaco City. With
Judge Base not being authorized to notarize a deed of
conveyance, the notarized document cannot be
considered a valid registrable document in favor of La
Suerte.
Moreover, Aquiles' wife, Erlinda, who appeared to have
affixed her signature as a witness to the purported
document of sale, categorically stated that she never
signed such an instrument and never appeared before
a notary public.
Although it is true that the absence of notarization of
the deed of sale would not invalidate the transaction
evidenced therein,[26] yet an irregular notarization
reduces the evidentiary value of a document to that of a
private document, which requires proof of its due
execution and authenticity to be admissible as
evidence.[27]
It should be noted that the deed of sale was offered in
evidence as authentic by La Suerte, hence, the burden
was upon it to prove its authenticity and due
execution. La Suerte unfortunately failed to discharge
this burden. Accordingly, the preponderance of
evidence is in favor of Aquiles.
In fine, considering the irregularities or defects in the
execution and notarization of the deed of sale, the
Court finds Itself unable to stamp its seal of approval
on it. The RTC was correct in ordering its annulment.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The May
30, 2012 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 96459 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
September 30, 2010 Decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 15, Tabaco City, Albay, is
REINSTATED.
REX M. TUPAL, vs. JUDGE REMEGIO V. ROJO,
Branch 5, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC),
Bacolod City, Negros Occidental,
A.M. No. MTJ-14-1842
February 24, 2014

FACTS:
Rex M. Tupal filed a complaint against Judge Remegio V. Rojo for
violating the Code of Judicial Conduct and for gross ignorance of the
law. Judge Rojo allegedly solemnized marriages without the required
marriage license. He instead notarized affidavits of cohabitation and
issued them to the contracting parties.
ISSUE:
WON Judge Rojo is guilty of gross ignorance of the law.
HELD:
YES. Before performing the marriage ceremony, the judge must
personally interview the contracting parties and examine the
requirements they submitted. The parties must have complied with all
the essential and formal requisites of marriage. Among these formal
requisites is a marriage license. A marriage license is issued by the
local civil registrar to parties who have all the qualifications and none
of the legal disqualifications to contract marriage. Before performing
the marriage ceremony, the judge must personally examine the
marriage license presented. If the contracting parties have cohabited as
husband and wife for at least 5 years and have no legal impediment to
marry, they are exempt from the marriage license requirement. Instead,
the parties must present an affidavit of cohabitation sworn to before
any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The judge, as
solemnizing officer, must personally examine the affidavit of
cohabitation as to the parties having lived together as husband and
wife for at least 5 years and the absence of any legal impediment to
marry each other. The judge must also execute a sworn statement that
he personally ascertained the parties’ qualifications to marry and found
no legal impediment to the marriage.
Remedial Law / Legal Ethics – Notarial Practice
Mathaeus vs. Spouses Medequiso (GR No.196651,
February 03, 2016)
Ponente:
Justice Del Castillo
Doctrine:
Clerks of court are notaries public ex-officio, and may thus
notarize documents or administer oaths but only when the
matter is related to the exercise of their official
functions. Clerks of court should not, in their ex-officio
capacity, take part in the execution of private documents
bearing no relation at all to their official functions.
Facts:
The Tagbilaran MTCC rendered a decision ordering petitioner
to pay respondents P30,000. Petitioner interposed an appeal
before the RTC of Bohol. The RTC affirmed the decision of
the MTCC. Petitioner moved to reconsider but the RTC upheld
its judgment. Petitioner filed a Petition for Review with the
CA however it was dismissed by the court. The Court of
Appeals ratiocinated that the Verification and Certification on
Non-Forum Shopping was sworn to not before a notary public
but before a clerk of court ergo considered as improperly
verified and treated as unsigned and dismissible.
Issues:
 Whether or not clerks of court are at liberty to notarize
complaints, answers, petitions, or any other pleadings
on a daily or regular basis;
 Whether or not such action would lead to the dismissal
of the case;
Held:
 No, they cannot. The Honorable Supreme Court stated
that:
“Clerks of Court are notaries public ex-officio, and may thus
notarize documents or administer oaths but only when the
matter is related to the exercise of their official functions. x
x x [C]lerks of court should not, in their ex-officio capacity,
take part in the execution of private documents bearing no
relation at all to their official functions. We are not prepared
to rule in petitioner’s favor on this score; as it is, the workload
of a clerk of court is already heavy enough. We cannot add to
this the function of notarizing complaints, answers, petitions,
or any other pleadings on a daily or regular basis; such a
responsibility can very well be relegated to commissioned
notaries public. Besides, if the practice – specifically the
notarization by clerks of court of pleadings filed in cases
pending before their own salas or courts – is allowed,
unpleasant consequences might ensue; it could be subject to
abuse, and it distracts the clerks of court’s attention from the
true and essential work they perform.”
 Yes, it would lead to the dismissal of the case. The
Honorable Supreme Court ruled that:
“Under Sections 1 and 2, Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, a party desiring to appeal from a decision of the
RTC rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction may
file a verified petition for review with the CA, submitting
together with the petition a certification on non-forum
shopping. Under Section 3 of the same Rule, “[t]he failure of
the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing
requirements regarding the payment of the docket and other
lawful fees, the deposit for costs, proof of service of the
petition, and the contents of and the documents which should
accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground for the
dismissal thereof” Specifically with respect to certifications
against forum-shopping, we have repeatedly held that “non-
compliance therewith or a defect therein, unlike in verification,
is generally not curable by its subsequent submission or
correction thereof, unless there is a need to relax the Rule on
the ground of ‘substantial compliance’ or presence of ‘special
circumstances or compelling reasons.”‘ Taking the foregoing
circumstances and considerations to mind, the Court is not
inclined to relax the rules for the petitioner’s benefit; it
perceives no compelling reasons or circumstances to rule in his
favor. Quite the contrary, the CA pronouncement ordering the
dismissal of his Petition for Review is just, and thus should
stand.”
Notarization and Legal Representation
MALABED VS DELA PENA
FACTS:
An administrative case was filed against Atty. Dela Pena for dishonesty
grave misconduct. Complainant alleged the following: 1) That respondent
misrepresented submitting a certificate to file action when there was none; 2)
That respondent did not furnish complainant’s counsel with a copy of OCT
No. 1730 and that such title was fabricated by said respondent; 3) That
respondent is guilty of conflict of interest for notarizing a deed of donation
executed by complainant’s family and eventually representing became a
counsel for the opposing parties in a case where complainant’s family is
involved; 4) That respondent connived with RTC Judge Asis to rule in his
client’s favor; and 5) That respondent’s violation of prohibition in employment
in a government office after his dismissal as judge.
The IBP Commissioner noted the foul language used by respondent in his
pleadings submitted before the IBP. The Commissioner found the
respondent guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct and recommended his
suspension for 1 year.
ISSUE:
WON Respondent is guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct.
HELD:
Respondent is guilty of gross misconduct
 Using of foul language in pleadings
For using improper language in his pleadings, respondent violated Rule 8.01
of Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states:
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language
which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
 Non-submission of certificate to file action
Respondent misrepresented that he filed a certificate to file action when
there was none, which act violated Canon 10, Rule 10.01, and Rule 10.02 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit:
CANON 10. A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH
TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood; nor consent to the doing of
any in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any
artifice.
Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the
contents of a paper, x x x.
 Failure to furnish opposing counsel with copy of title
With regard to respondent's alleged act of not furnishing complainant's
counsel with a copy of the free patent title, we find that it does not constitute
dishonesty.
 Conflict of interest
Notarization is different from representation. A notary public simply performs
the notarial acts authorized by the Rules on Notarial Practice, namely,
acknowledgments, oaths and affirmations, jurat, signature witnessing, and
copy certifications. Legal representation, on the other hand, refers to the act
of assisting a party as counsel in a court action.
 Violation of prohibition on reemployment in government office
The prohibition on reemployment does not distinguish between permanent
and temporary appointments. Hence, that his designation was only
temporary does not absolve him from liability.
The Supreme Court suspended Atty. Dela Pena for 2 years.
Object of Pleadings
Catungal vs Rodriguez
Facts:
Agapita T. Catungal (Agapita) owned a parcel of land (Lot 10963) situated
in the Barrio of Talamban, Cebu City. Agapita, with the consent of her
husband Jose, entered into a Contract to Sell[6] with respondent Rodriguez
which subsequently purportedly “upgraded” into a Conditional Deed of
Sale.Both the Contract to Sell and the Conditional Deed of Sale were Rodirguez filed a complaint against the Catungal’s for arbitrarily rescinding

annotated on the title. the contract. In a Decision dated May 30, 1992, the trial court ruled in favor

of Rodriguez, finding that: (a) under the contract it was complainant

(Rodriguez) that had the option to rescind the sale; (b) Rodriguez’s
The provisions of the Conditional Deed of Sale pertinent to the present obligation to pay the balance of the purchase price arises only upon
dispute are quoted below: successful negotiation of the road right of way; (c) he proved his diligent

efforts to negotiate the road right of way; (d) the spouses Catungal were

guilty of misrepresentation which defeated Rodriguez’s efforts to acquire the

1.price 25 Million pesos
road right of way; and (e) the Catungals’ rescission of the contract had no
2. downpayment 500 Thousand
basis and was in bad faith.
3. balance shall be paid after the VENDEE have successfully negotiated,
secured and provided a Road Right of Way . If however said Road Right of
During the pendency of the case with the Court of Appeals, Agapita
Way could not be negotiated, the VENDEE shall give notice to the
VENDOR for them to reassess and solve the problem by taking other options Catungal passed away and thus, her husband, Jose, filed on February 17,
and should the situation ultimately prove futile, he shall take steps to rescind
or cancel the herein Conditional Deed of Sale. 1999 a motion for Agapita’s substitution by her surviving children.[46]

He likewise alleged that he actively negotiated for the road right of way as
stipulated in the contract.[9]
The Catungals alleged that the conditional deed of sale was void ab initio

because it violates the mutuality of contract in view of Article 1308 ncc.

On August 31, 1990 the spouses Catungal requested an advance Petitioners rely on Article 1308 of the Civil Code to support their

of P5,000,000.00 on the purchase price for personal reasons. Rodriquez conclusion regarding the claimed nullity of the aforementioned provisions.

allegedly refused on the ground that the amount was substantial and was not Article 1308 states that “[t]he contract must bind both contracting parties; its

due under the terms of their agreement. The Catungal’s rescinded the validity or compliance cannot be left to the will of one of them.”

contract.
 Article 1182 of the Civil Code, in turn, provides: with the sale or to waive the condition. This principle is evident in Article

1545 of the Civil Code on sales, which provides in part:

Art. 1182. When the fulfillment of the condition depends upon the
sole will of the debtor, the conditional obligation shall be void. If it depends
upon chance or upon the will of a third person, the obligation shall take effect
in conformity with the provisions of this Code.
Art. 1545. Where the obligation of either party to a contract
of sale is subject to any condition which is not performed, such party
may refuse to proceed with the contract or he may waive performance of
the condition x x x.

Issue Paragraph 1(b) of the Conditional Deed of Sale, stating that

respondent shall pay the balance of the purchase price when he has
W/N Conditional Deed of Sale violate the principle of mutuality of
successfully negotiated and secured a road right of way, is not a condition on
contracts under Article 1308 of the Civil Code?
the perfection of the contract nor on the validity of the entire contract or its

compliance as contemplated in Article 1308. It is a condition imposed only

. on respondent’s obligation to pay the remainder of the purchase price. In our

view and applying Article 1182, such a condition is not purely potestative as
Held:
petitioners contend. It is not dependent on the sole will of the debtor but also

on the will of third persons who own the adjacent land and from whom the

road right of way shall be negotiated.

No. In the past, this Court has distinguished between a condition imposed on

the perfection of a contract and a condition imposed merely on the

performance of an obligation. While failure to comply with the first

The condition is a mixed condition which is allowed by Article 1182.
condition results in the failure of a contract, failure to comply with the

second merely gives the other party the option to either refuse to proceed
 "potestative condition" is imposed not on the birth of the obligation
but on its fulfillment, only the condition is avoided, leaving unaffected the the choice either (a) to not proceed with the sale and demand return of his
obligation itself.
downpayment or (b) considering that the condition was imposed for his

benefit, to waive the condition and still pay the purchase price despite the

lack of road access. This is the most just interpretation of the parties’

contract that gives effect to all its provisions.

With respect to petitioners’ argument that paragraph 5 of the

Conditional Deed of Sale likewise rendered the said contract void, we find no
In any event, even if we assume for the sake of argument that the
merit to this theory.
grant to Rodriguez of an option to rescind, in the manner provided for in the

contract, is tantamount to a potestative condition, not being a condition

affecting the perfection of the contract, only the said condition would be

considered void and the rest of the contract will remain valid.

Reading paragraph 5 in its entirety will show that Rodriguez’s option

to rescind the contract is not absolute as it undeniably only limited to the

contingency that Rodriguez shall not be able to secure the road right of WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 8, 2000 and

way. . the Resolution dated January 30, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.

CV No. 40627 consolidated with CA-G.R. SP No. 27565 are AFFIRMED

with the following MODIFICATION:

In sum, Rodriguez’s option to rescind the contract is not purely

potestative but rather also subject to the same mixed condition as his

obligation to pay the balance of the purchase price – i.e., the negotiation of a

road right of way. In the event the condition is fulfilled (or the negotiation is If still warranted, respondent Angel S. Rodriguez is given a period of

successful), Rodriguez must pay the balance of the purchase price. In the thirty (30) days from the finality of this Decision to negotiate a road right of
event the condition is not fulfilled (or the negotiation fails), Rodriguez has

way. In the event no road right of way is secured by respondent at the end of
said period, the parties shall reassess and discuss other options as stipulated
in paragraph 1(b) of the Conditional Deed of Sale and, for this purpose, they
are given a period of thirty (30) days to agree on a course of action. Should
the discussions of the parties prove futile after the said thirty (30)-day period,
immediately upon the expiration of said period for discussion, Rodriguez
may (a) exercise his option to rescind the contract, subject to the return of his
downpayment, in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs 1(b) and 5 of
the Conditional Deed of Sale or (b) waive the road right of way and pay the
balance of the deducted purchase price as determined in the RTC Decision
dated May 30, 1992.
Formal Requirements, Procedural Rules and Technicalities
Intestate Estate of Jose Uy, and Administrator Wilson Uy v.
Atty.
Pacifico Maghari III
A.C. NO. 10525, September 01, 2015
LEONEN, J.:
Facts: On February 18, 1997, Lilia Hofileña (Hofileña) filed a
Petition before the Bacolod City Regional Trial Court
praying that she be designated administratrix of the estate
of her common-law partner, the deceased Jose Uy,
docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 97-241. Hofileña was initially
designated administratrix. However, a Motion for
Reconsideration of the Order designating Hofileña as
administrator was filed by Wilson Uy, one of Jose Uy's
children, on behalf of Jose Uy's spouse and other children.
In its Order dated June 9, 1998, the Regional Trial Court
designated Wilson Uy as administrator of Jose Uy's estate.
Subsequently, Hofileña's claims in the settlement of Jose
Uy's estate were granted. Hence, she filed a Motion for
Execution dated September 14, 2007.
In Spec. Proc No. 97-241 and in other proceedings arising
from the conflicting claims to Jose Uy's estate, Hofileña
was represented by her counsel, Atty. Mariano L. Natu-El
(Atty. Natu-el).
There appears to have been conflicts between Wilson Uy
and the other heirs of Jose Uy. In the course of the
proceedings, Wilson Uy prayed that a subpoena ad
testificandum be issued to Magdalena Uy as she was
alleged to have been the treasurer of several businesses
owned by Jose Uy. In its Order dated April 20, 2010, the
Regional Trial Court granted Wilson Uy's Motion that a
Subpoena ad Testificandum be issued to Magdalena Uy.
Thereafter, Magdalena Uy, through Maghari, her counsel,
filed a Motion to Quash Subpoena ad Testificandum with
Alternative Motion to Cite the Appearance of Johnny K.H.
Uy.
In signing the motion, Atty. Maghari indicated the same
professional details, aside from his name, as those found in
Atty. Natu-el’s motion for a Subpoena ad Testificandum;
the IBP O.R. number, PTR Number, Roll Number, and MCLE
Compliance Number were all copied with slight additions.
On November 9, 2010, Wilson Uy filed his Opposition to
Magdalena Uy's Motion to Quash. Magdalena Uy, through
Maghari, filed her Reply to Wilson Uy's Opposition. Maghari
then indicated a different set of IBP O.R., PTR and MCLE
numbers, whilst keeping the same Bar Roll Number
previously used. The Regional Trial Court subsequently
denied Magdalena Uy's Motion to Quash. Thereafter,
Maghari filed for Magdalena Uy a Motion for
Reconsideration dated July 15, 2011. In signing this Motion,
Maghari indicated a wholly different set of IBP O.R., PTR,
Roll, and MCLE numbers in the professional details. As the
Motion for Reconsideration was denied, Maghari filed for
Magdalena Uy a Motion to Recall Subpoena ad
Testificandum dated March 8, 2012. In signing this Motion,
Maghari indicated once again, a completely different set
of professional details as before.
At this point, Wilson Uy's counsel noticed that based on the
details indicated in the March 8, 2012 Motion, Maghari
appeared to have only recently passed the bar
examinations. This prompted Wilson Uy to check the
records of Spec. Proc No. 97-241. Upon doing so, he
learned that since 2010, Maghari had been changing the
professional details indicated in the pleadings he has
signed and has been copying the professional details of
Atty. Natu-El. Wilson Uy then filed a Motion to declare
Magdalena Uy in indirect contempt (as by then she had
still not complied with the Subpoena ad Testificandum)
and to require Maghari to explain why he had been
usurping the professional details of another lawyer. The
Regional Trial Court declined from citing Magdalena Uy in
contempt as no verified petition asking that she be so
cited had been filed. Wilson Uy filed before this court the
present Complaint for disbarment. Pointing to Maghari's
act of repeatedly a changing and using another lawyer's
professional details, Wilson Uy asserts that Maghari violated
the Lawyer's Oath and acted in a deceitful manner.
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Maghari engaged in unethical
conduct
Ruling: Yes. Atty. Maghari III engaged in deceitful conduct
violating not only the lawyer’s oath, but every single
chapter of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court provides for
deceit as a ground for disbarment. The Lawyer's Oath
entails commitment to, among others, obeying laws and
legal orders, doing no falsehood, conducting one's self as
a lawyer to the best of one's capacity, and acting with
fidelity to both court and client.
Respondent does not deny the existence of the errant
entries indicated by complainant. However, he insists that
he did not incur disciplinary liability. He claims that these
entries were mere overlooked errors. He attempts to
diminish the significance of the dubious entries and
instead ascribes ill motive to complainant. He faults
complainant for "nitpicking" and calls him a "sore loser"
and a "disgruntled litigant" who is merely "making a
mountain out of a molehill" and is predisposed to "fault-
finding. He even provides his supposedly correct
professional details for “the satisfaction of the
complainant”. Respondent's avowals, protestations, and
ad hominem attacks on complainant fail to impress.
The duplicitous entries speak for themselves. The errors are
manifest and respondent admits their existence. No
amount of feigned ignorance and ad hominem attacks
on complainant can negate the gravity of respondent's
actions. His insolent and mocking violation of statutory and
regulatory requirements is a violation of his duties to
society and to courts. His swiping of another lawyer's
information is a violation of his duties to the legal
profession. The unnecessary risks that he foiled on his client
as a possible result of deficiently signed pleadings violate
his duties to his client. Thus, respondent did not only act in
a deceitful manner and violate the solemn oath he took
to be admitted into the legal profession; he also violated
every single chapter of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
LAWYER’S SIGNATURE; PURPOSE:
As per Rule 7, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, A counsel's
signature on a pleading is neither an empty formality nor
even a mere means for identification. Through his or her
signature, a party's counsel makes a positive declaration.
In certifying through his or her signature that he or she has
read the pleading, that there is ground to support it, and
that it is not interposed for delay, a lawyer asserts his or her
competence, credibility, and ethics. Signing a pleading is
such a solemn component of legal practice that this court
has taken occasion to decry the delegation of this task to
non-lawyers as a violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, under Canon 9.01: “A lawyer shall not
delegate to any unqualified person the performance of
any task which by law may only be performed by a
member of the Bar in good standing. “
A counsel's signature is such an integral part of a pleading
that failure to comply with this requirement reduces a
pleading to a mere scrap of paper totally bereft of legal
effect. Thus, faithful compliance with this requirement is
not only a matter of satisfying a duty to a court but is as
much a matter of fidelity to one's client. A deficiency in
this respect can be fatal to a client's cause.
IBP O.R. NUMBER, PROFESSIONAL TAX RECEIPT NUMBER,
AND BAR ROLL NUMBER; PURPOSE:
The inclusion of a counsel's Roll of Attorneys number,
professional tax receipt number, and Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) receipt (or lifetime membership) number is
intended to preserve and protect the integrity of legal
practice. They seek to ensure that only those who have
satisfied the requisites for legal practice are able to
engage in it. With the Roll of Attorneys number, parties can
readily verify if a person purporting to be a lawyer has, in
fact, been admitted to the Philippine bar. With the
professional tax receipt number, they can verify if the
same person is qualified to engage in a profession in the
place where he or she principally discharges his or her
functions. With the IBP receipt number, they can ascertain
if the
same person remains in good standing as a lawyer. These
pieces of information, in the words of Galicto v. Aquino III,
"protect the public from bogus lawyers." Paying
professional taxes (and the receipt that proves this
payment) is likewise compliance with a revenue
mechanism that has been statutorily devolved to local
government units.
MCLE NUMBER; PURPOSE:
The inclusion of information regarding compliance with (or
exemption from) Mandatory Continuing Legal Education
(MCLE) seeks to ensure that legal practice is reserved only
for those who have complied with the recognized
mechanism for "keep[ing] abreast with law and
jurisprudence, maintaining] the ethics of the profession[,]
and enhancing] the standards of the practice of law."
ADDRESS AND CONTACT DETAILS; PURPOSE:
Lastly, the inclusion of a counsel's address and contact
details is designed to facilitate the dispensation of justice.
These pieces of information aid in the service of court
processes, enhance compliance with the requisites of due
process, and facilitate better representation of a client's
cause. There have been in the past when, because of
failure to inform the court of the change of address,
litigations were delayed. And this, not to speak of
inconvenience caused the other parties and the court.
Worse still, litigants have lost their cases in court because
of such negligence on the part of their counsel. It is painful
enough for a litigant to surfer a setback in a legal battle. It
is doubly painful if defeat is occasioned by his attorney's
failure to receive notice because the latter has changed
the place of his law office without giving the proper notice
therefore.
These requirements are not mere frivolities. They are not
mere markings on a piece of paper. To willfully disregard
them is, thus, to willfully disregard mechanisms put in place
to facilitate integrity, competence, and credibility in legal
practice; it is to betray apathy for the ideals of the legal
profession and demonstrates how one is wanting of the
standards for admission to and continuing inclusion in the
bar. Worse, to not only willfully disregard them but to feign
compliance only, in truth, to make a mockery of them
reveals a dire, wretched, and utter lack of respect for the
profession that one brandishes.
Facts proving Intent to Deceive:
Respondent acted deliberately. It is impossible that the
erroneous details he indicated on his pleadings are
products of mere inadvertence.
To begin with, details were copied from a pleading
submitted by another lawyer. These details somehow
found their way into respondent's own pleadings.
Certainly, these details could not have written themselves,
let alone transfer themselves from a pleading prepared by
one lawyer to those prepared by another. Someone must
have actually performed the act of copying and
transferring; that is, someone must have intended to copy
and transfer them. Moreover, the person responsible for
this could have only been respondent or someone acting
under his instructions; the pleadings on which they were
transferred are, after all, respondent's pleadings.
Second, these details were not merely copied, they were
modified. "B.C." was added to the IBP official receipt and
professional tax receipt numbers copied from Atty. Natu-
el. The facts of modification and addition show active
human intervention to make something more out of
markings that could otherwise have simply been
reproduced.
Third, in subsequent pleadings, some details copied from
Atty. Natuel were discarded while some were retained.
The December 8, 2010 Reply still bore Atty. Natu-el's Roll of
Attorneys number and MCLE compliance number, but no
longer his IBP official receipt number and professional tax
receipt number. The July 15, 2011 Motion for
Reconsideration only bore Atty. Natu-el's MCLE
compliance number.
This gradual act of segregating information—discarding
some while retaining others, and retaining less over time—
reveals that the author of these markings must have
engaged in a willful exercise that filtered those that were
to be discarded from those that were to be retained.
Respondent is rightly considered the author of these acts. WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Pacifico M. Maghari, III,
Any claim that the error was committed by a secretary is having clearly violated his Lawyer's Oath and the Canons
inconsequential. of the Code of Professional Responsibility through his
unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct, is SUSPENDED
In his Comment, respondent provided what are from the practice of law for two (2) years.
supposedly his correct professional details. We emphasize,
however, that he failed to attach to his Comment copies South Cotobato Communications Corp vs Tomas
of the pertinent official receipts, certifications, and other 638 SCRA 566 (2010)
supporting documents. All that he relies on is a self-serving
recital of numbers and dates. None but respondent, DECISION
himself, was in a better position to produce the documents
that could prove his claims. His failure to do so is, at the
very least, suspicious.

It can very well mean that they do not exist, or that he LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
willfully desisted from producing them. The latter would be
more damaging to respondent, as it calls into operation
the basic presumption “that evidence willfully suppressed
would be adverse if produced."

In any case, even assuming that the details provided by

respondent in his Comment are correct, it still remains that
he (1) used a false IBP official receipt number, professional
tax receipt number, Roll of Attorneys number, and MCLE
compliance number a total of seven (7) times; and (2)
used another lawyer's details seven (7) times. It is unsettling
that respondent engaged in the mockery and ridicule that
he did of the very same badges—his place in the Roll of
Attorneys, his membership in the Integrated Bar, his
recognition as a practicing professional, his continuing
training and competence—that are emblematic of his
being a lawyer. Seeing as how he manifested such
contempt for these badges, we find that there is every
reason for preventing him, at least temporarily, from
engaging in the profession these badges signify.
This a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court with application for temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction
seeking to set aside the Resolution[1] dated July 20, 2005 as
well as its related Resolution[2] dated May 22, 2006 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00179-MIN. In
essence, the same petition likewise seeks to set aside the
Order[3] dated November 8, 2004 and the Order[4] dated
February 24, 2005 of public respondent Secretary Patricia A.
Sto. Tomas of the Department of Labor and Employment

(DOLE) as well as the Order[5] dated May 20, 2004 of the
Regional Director, DOLE Regional XII Office.
The facts of this case, as culled from the Order dated
November 8, 2004 of DOLE Secretary Sto. Tomas, are as
follows:
On the basis of a complaint, an inspection was
conducted at the premises of appellant DXCP Radio
Station on January 13, 2004, where the following
violations of labor standards laws were noted:
1. Underpayment of minimum wage;
2. Underpayment of 13th month pay;
3. Non-payment of five (5) days service
incentive leave pay;
4. Non-remittance of SSS premiums;
5. Non-payment of rest day premium pay of
some employee;
6. Non-payment of holiday premium pay; and
7. Some employees are paid on commission
basis aside from their allowances.
A copy of the Notice of Inspection Results was
explained to and received by Tony Ladorna for
appellants. Later on, or on January 16, 200[4], another
copy of the Notice of Inspection Results was received
by Felipe S. Galindo, Technical Supervisor of appellant
DXCP. The Notice of Inspection Results required the
appellants to effect restitution and/or correction of the
above violations within five (5) calendar days from
receipt of the Notice. Likewise, appellants were
informed that any questions on the findings should be
submitted within five (5) working days from receipts of
the Notice.
A summary investigation was scheduled on
March 3, 2004, where only appellees appeared, while
appellants failed to appear despite due notice. Another
hearing was held on April 1, 2004, where appellees
appeared, while a certain Nona Gido appeared in behalf
of Atty. Thomas Jacobo. Ms. Gido sought to re-
schedule the hearing, which the hearing officer denied.
On May 20, 2004, the Regional Director issued
the assailed Order, directing appellants to pay appellees
the aggregate amount of Seven Hundred Fifty Nine
Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty Two Pesos
(Php759,752.00).[6]
The dispositive portion of the Order dated May 20,
2004 of the Regional Director of the DOLE Region XII
Office reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
respondent DXCP Radio Station and/or Engr. Gauvain
Benzonan, President, is hereby ordered to pay the seven
(7) affected workers of their Salary Differential,
Underpayment of 13th Month Pay, Five (5) days Service
Incentive Leave Pay, Rest Day Premium Pay and
Holiday Premium Pay in the total amount of SEVEN
HUNDRED FIFTY-NINE THOUSAND SEVEN
HUNDRED FIFTY-TWO PESOS (P759,752.00),
Philippine Currency as indicated in the Annex A hereof
and to submit proof of compliance to the Department of
 Labor and Employment, Regional Office No. XII,
Cotabato City within ten (10) calendar days from
receipt of this Order.[7]
Petitioners appealed their case to then DOLE
Secretary Sto. Tomas. However, this appeal was dismissed
in an Order dated November 8, 2004 wherein the Secretary
ruled that, contrary to their claim, petitioners were not
denied due process as they were given reasonable
opportunity to present evidence in support of their defense in
the administrative proceeding before the Regional Director
of DOLE Region XII Office. The dispositive portion of the
said Order follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
appeal by DXCP Radio Station and Engr. Gauvain
Benzonan is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The
Order dated May 24, 2004 of the Regional Director,
directing appellants to pay the nine (9) appellees the
aggregate amount of Seven Hundred Fifty-Nine
Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty-Two Pesos
(Php759,752.00), representing their claims for wage
differentials, 13th month pay differentials, service
incentive leave pay, holiday premium and rest day
premium, is AFFIRMED.[8]
Undeterred, petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration with the DOLE Secretary but this was
denied in an Order dated February 24, 2005, the dispositive
portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
Motion for Reconsideration filed by DXCP Radio
Station and Engr. Gauvain Benzonan, is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Our Order dated
November 8, 2004, affirming the Order dated May 20,
2004 of the OIC-Director, Regional Office No. 12,
directing appellants to pay Rolando Fabrigar and eight
(8) others, the aggregate amount of Seven Hundred
Fifty-Nine Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty-Two Pesos
(Php759,752.00), representing their claims for wage
and 13th month pay differentials, service incentive leave
pay, holiday pay and rest day premium,
is AFFIRMED.[9]
In light of this setback, petitioners elevated their case
to the Court of Appeals but their petition was dismissed in
the assailed Court of Appeals Resolution dated July 20,
2005 because of several procedural infirmities that were
explicitly cited in the same, to wit:
1. The petition was not properly verified and the
Certification of Non-Forum Shopping was not executed
by the plaintiff or principal party in violation of
Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as the affiant therein was not duly
authorized to represent the corporation. Such
procedural lapse renders the entire pleading of no legal
effect and is dismissible. Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 7 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provide:
 SEC. 4. Verification. Except
when otherwise specifically required by
law or rule, pleadings need not be under
oath, verified or accompanied by
affidavit.
A pleading is verified by an affidavit
that the affiant has read the pleadings
and that the allegations therein are true
and correct of his personal knowledge or
based on authentic records.
A pleading required to be verified
which contains a verification based on
information and belief or upon
knowledge, information and belief or
lacks a proper verification, shall be
treated as an unsigned pleading. x x x.
SEC. 5. Certification against
forum shopping. The plaintiff or
principal party shall certify under
oath in the complaint or other
initiatory pleading asserting a claim
for relief, or in a sworn certification
annexed thereto and simultaneously
filed therewith:
xxxx
Failure to comply with the
foregoing requirements shall not be
curable by mere amendment of the
complaint or other initiatory pleading
but shall be cause for the dismissal of
the case without prejudice, unless
otherwise provided, upon motion and
after hearing. The submission of a false
certification or non-compliance with any
of the undertakings therein shall
constitute indirect contempt of court,
without prejudice to the corresponding
administrative and criminal actions. If
the acts of the party or his counsel
clearly constitute willful and deliberate
forum shopping, the same shall be
ground for summary dismissal with
prejudice and shall constitute direct
contempt, as well as a cause for
administrative sanctions. x x x.
2. Annexes A, B, C, E and its attachments and F
are not certified true copies contrary to Section 1, Rule
65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which
provides:
SECTION 1. Petition for
Certiorari. x x x
xxxx
The petition shall be accompanied by
a certified true copy of the judgment,
order or resolution subject thereof,
copies of all pleadings and documents
relevant and pertinent thereto, and a
sworn certification of non-forum
shopping as provided in the third
paragraph of section 3, Rule 46. x x x.
3. Petitioners counsel failed to indicate the date
of issue of his IBP Official Receipt. As provided for
under Bar Matter 287 dated September 26, 2000:
All pleadings, motions and
papers filed in court whether
personally or by mail shall bear
counsels current IBP official receipt
number and date of issue otherwise,
 such pleadings, motions and paper
may not be acted upon by the court,
without prejudice to whatever
disciplinary action the court may take
against the erring counsel who shall
likewise be required to comply with the
such (sic) requirement within five (5)
days from notice. Failure to comply with
such requirement shall be ground for
further disciplinary sanction and for
contempt of court. x x x.[10]
Petitioners then filed a Motion for Reconsideration
and the Court of Appeals ruled in its assailed Resolution
dated May 22, 2006 that petitioners subsequent submission
made them substantially comply with the second and third
procedural errors that were mentioned in the Court of
Appeals Resolution dated July 20, 2005. However, the Court
of Appeals also ruled that, with regard to the first procedural
error, petitioners justification does not deserve merit
reasoning that [w]hile it may be true that there are two (2)
petitioners and that petitioner Gauvain Benzonan signed the
verification and the certificate of non-forum shopping of the
petition, the records show that petitioner Gauvain Benzonan
did not initiate the petition in his own capacity to protect his
personal interest in the case but was, in fact, only acting for
and in the corporations behalf as its president.[11] Thus, the
Court of Appeals noted that [h]aving acted in the
corporations behalf, petitioner Benzonan should have been
clothed with the corporations board resolution authorizing
him to institute the petition.[12]
The Court of Appeals likewise ruled that petitioners
attachment of a Secretarys Certificate to their Motion for
Reconsideration (purportedly to remedy the first procedural
mistake in their petition for certiorari under Rule 65) was
insufficient since their submission merely authorized
petitioner Benzonan to represent the corporation and cause
the preparation and filing of a Motion for Reconsideration
before the Court of Appeals.[13]
Consequently, petitioners filed the instant petition
wherein they raised the following issues:
a. Whether the Court of Appeals committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it dismissed the
Petition for Certiorari and denied the Motion for
Reconsideration on its finding that the petition
was not properly verified and the certification of
non-forum shopping was not executed by the
principal party allegedly in violation of Sections
4 and 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure?
b. Whether petitioners were denied due process of
law in the proceedings before the Regional
Director and the Office of the Secretary, both of
the Department of Labor and Employment?
 c. Whether there was sufficient basis in the Order
issued by the Regional Director, DOLE,
Regional Office No. XII, dated May 20,
2004?[14]
Anent the first procedural issue, the Court had
summarized the jurisprudential principles on the matter
in Cagayan Valley Drug Corporation v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue.[15] In said case, we held that a President of
a corporation, among other enumerated corporate officers
and employees, can sign the verification and certification
against of non-forum shopping in behalf of the said
corporation without the benefit of a board resolution. We
quote the pertinent portion of the decision here:
It must be borne in mind that Sec. 23, in relation
to Sec. 25 of the Corporation Code, clearly enunciates
that all corporate powers are exercised, all business
conducted, and all properties controlled by the board of
directors. A corporation has a separate and distinct
personality from its directors and officers and can only
exercise its corporate powers through the board of
directors. Thus, it is clear that an individual corporate
officer cannot solely exercise any corporate power
pertaining to the corporation without authority from the
board of directors. This has been our constant holding
in cases instituted by a corporation.
In a slew of cases, however, we have recognized
the authority of some corporate officers to sign the
verification and certification against forum shopping.
In Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. CA,
we recognized the authority of a general manager or
acting general manager to sign the verification and
certificate against forum shopping; in Pfizer v. Galan,
we upheld the validity of a verification signed by an
employment specialist who had not even presented any
proof of her authority to represent the company;
in Novelty Philippines, Inc. v. CA, we ruled that a
personnel officer who signed the petition but did not
attach the authority from the company is authorized to
sign the verification and non-forum shopping
certificate; and in Lepanto Consolidated Mining
Company v. WMC Resources International Pty.
Ltd. (Lepanto), we ruled that the Chairperson of the
Board and President of the Company can sign the
verification and certificate against non-forum
shopping even without the submission of the boards
authorization.
In sum, we have held that the following officials
or employees of the company can sign the verification
and certification without need of a board resolution: (1)
the Chairperson of the Board of Directors,
(2) the President of a corporation, (3) the General
Manager or Acting General Manager, (4) Personnel
Officer, and (5) an Employment Specialist in a labor
case.
While the above cases do not provide a
complete listing of authorized signatories to the
verification and certification required by the rules, the
determination of the sufficiency of the authority was
done on a case to case basis. The rationale applied in
the foregoing cases is to justify the authority of
corporate officers or representatives of the corporation
to sign the verification or certificate against forum
shopping, being in a position to verify the truthfulness
and correctness of the allegations in the
petition.[16] (Emphases supplied.)

It must be stressed, however, that the Cagayan ruling
qualified that the better procedure is still to append a board
resolution to the complaint or petition to obviate questions
regarding the authority of the signatory of the verification
and certification.[17]
Nonetheless, under the circumstances of this case, it
bears reiterating that the requirement of the certification of
non-forum shopping is rooted in the principle that a party-
litigant shall not be allowed to pursue simultaneous
remedies in different fora, as this practice is detrimental to
an orderly judicial procedure. However, the Court has
relaxed, under justifiable circumstances, the rule requiring
the submission of such certification considering that,
although it is obligatory, it is not jurisdictional. Not being
jurisdictional, it can be relaxed under the rule of substantial
compliance.[18]
In the case at bar, the Court holds that there has been
substantial compliance with Sections 4 and 5, Rule 7 of the
1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure on the petitioners
part in consonance with our ruling in the Lepanto
Consolidated Mining Company v. WMC Resources
International PTY LTD.[19] that we laid down in 2003 with
the rationale that the President of petitioner-corporation is in
a position to verify the truthfulness and correctness of the
allegations in the petition. Petitioner Benzonan clearly
satisfies the aforementioned jurisprudential requirement
because he is the President of petitioner South Cotabato
Communications Corporation. Moreover, he is also named
as co-respondent of petitioner-corporation in the labor case
which is the subject matter of the special civil action
for certiorari filed in the Court of Appeals.
Clearly, it was error on the part of the Court of
Appeals to dismiss petitioners special civil action
for certiorari despite substantial compliance with the rules
on procedure. For unduly upholding technicalities at the
expense of a just resolution of the case, normal procedure
dictates that the Court of Appeals should be tasked with
properly disposing the petition, a second time around, on
the merits.
The Court is mindful of previous rulings which
instructs us that when there is enough basis on which a
proper evaluation of the merits can be made, we may
dispense with the time-consuming procedure in order to
prevent further delays in the disposition of the
case.[20] However, based on the nature of the two
remaining issues propounded before the Court which
involve factual issues and given the inadequacy of the
records, pleadings, and other evidence available before us
to properly resolve those questions, we are constrained to
refrain from passing upon them.
After all, the Court has stressed that its jurisdiction in
a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court is limited to reviewing only errors of law, not
of fact, unless the findings of fact complained of are devoid
of support by the evidence on record, or the assailed
judgment is based on the misapprehension of facts.[21]
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY
GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions of the Court of Appeals
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to
the Court of Appeals for proper disposition of CA-G.R. SP
No. 00179-MIN.
Emmanuel Babas et. al. v Lorenzo Shipping Corporation
(G.R. No. 186091)
FACTS:
Lorenzo Shipping Corporation (LSC) is a duly
organized domestic corporation engaged in the shipping
industry. LSC entered into a General Equipment
Maintenance Repair and Management Services
Agreement (Agreement) with Best Manpower Services,
Inc. (BMSI). Under the Agreement, BMSI undertook to
provide maintenance and repair services to LSC’s
container vans, heavy equipment, trailer chassis, and
generator sets. BMSI further undertook to provide
checkers to inspect all containers received for loading to
and/or unloading from its vessels.
Simultaneous with the execution of the Agreement, LSC
leased its equipment, tools, and tractors to BMSI. The
period of lease was coterminous with the Agreement.
BMSI then hired petitioners on various dates to work
at LSC as checkers, welders, utility men, clerks, forklift
operators, motor pool and machine shop workers,
technicians, trailer drivers, and mechanics.
In September 2003, petitioners filed with the Labor Arbiter
(LA) a complaint for regularization against LSC and BMSI.
On October 1, 2003, LSC terminated the Agreement,
effective October 31, 2003. Consequently, petitioners lost
their employment.
BMSI asserted that it is an independent contractor. It
averred that it was willing to regularize petitioners;
however, some of them lacked the requisite qualifications
for the job. LSC averred that petitioners were employees
of BMSI and were assigned to LSC by virtue of the
Agreement. BMSI is an independent job contractor with
substantial capital or investment in the form of tools,
equipment, and machinery necessary in the conduct of its
business. The Agreement between LSC and BMSI
constituted legitimate job contracting. Thus, petitioners
were employees of BMSI and not of LSC.
 The Labor Arbiter dismissed petitioners’ complaint on
the ground that petitioners were employees of BMSI. It
was BMSI which hired petitioners, paid their wages, and
exercised control over them. The NLRC reversed the Labor
Arbiter
Issue:
Whether or not respondent was engaged in
labor-only contracting
Held:
Yes. In De Los Santos v. NLRC, the character of the
business, i.e., whether as labor-only contractor or as job
contractor, should be measured in terms of, and
determined by, the criteria set by statute. The parties
cannot dictate by the mere expedience of a unilateral
declaration in a contract the character of their business.
The Court has observed that:
First, petitioners worked at LSC’s premises, and nowhere
else. Other than the provisions of the Agreement, there
was no showing that it was BMSI which established
petitioners’ working procedure and methods, which
supervised petitioners in their work, or which evaluated the
same. There was absolute lack of evidence that BMSI
exercised control over them or their work.
Second, LSC was unable to present proof that BMSI had
substantial capital. There was no proof pertaining to the
contractor’s capitalization, nor to its investment in tools,
equipment, or implements actually used in the
performance or completion of the job, work, or service
that it was contracted to render. What is clear was that
the equipment used by BMSI were owned by, and merely
rented from, LSC.
Third, petitioners performed activities which were
directly related to the main business of LSC. The work of
petitioners as checkers, welders, utility men, drivers, and
mechanics could only be characterized as part of, or at
least clearly related to, and in the pursuit of, LSC’s business.
Lastly, BMSI had no other client except for LSC, and neither
BMSI nor LSC refuted this finding, thereby bolstering the
NLRC finding that BMSI is a labor-only contractor.
The CA erred in considering BMSI’s Certificate of
Registration as sufficient proof that it is an independent
contractor. Jurisprudence states that a Certificate of
Registration issued by the Department of Labor and
Employment is not conclusive evidence of such status. The
fact of registration simply prevents the legal presumption
of being a mere labor-only contractor from arising.
*LSC is ordered to reinstate the petitioners to their former
positions. Petitioners are declared as regular employees of
LSC.
NOTES:
Labor-only contracting -a prohibited act
- is an arrangement where the contractor or
subcontractor merely recruits, supplies, or places workers
to perform a job, work, or service for a principal.
- Elements:
(a) the contractor or subcontractor does not have
substantial capital or investment to actually perform the
job, work, or service under its own account and
responsibility

(b) the employees recruited, supplied, or placed by such

contractor or subcontractor perform activities which are
directly related to the main business of the principal.

Permissible job contracting or subcontracting – an

arrangement whereby a principal agrees to put out or
farm out with the contractor or subcontractor the
performance or completion of a specific job, work, or
service within a definite or predetermined period,
regardless of whether such job, work, or service is to be
performed or completed within or outside the premises of
the principal.

Conditions:

(a) The contractor carries on a distinct and independent

business and undertakes the contract work on his account
under his own responsibility according to his own manner
and method, free from the control and direction of his
employer or principal in all matters connected with the
performance of his work except as to the results thereof;

(b) The contractor has substantial capital or investment;

and

(c) The agreement between the principal and the

contractor or subcontractor assures the contractual
employees' entitlement to all labor and occupational
safety and health standards, free exercise of the right to
self-organization, security of tenure, and social welfare
benefits