Torts and Damages

6th Meeting

IV. Vicarious/Primary/Solidary Liabilty

1. Vicarious Liability

Art. 2180. It is the "doctrine of imputed negligence" under Anglo-American tort law. Vicarious liability
The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only occurs when a person is not only liable for torts committed by him, but also for torts committed
for one's own acts or omissions, by others with whom he has certain relationship and for whom he is responsible.
but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
The basis of vicarious liability is explained in the case of Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co.
The father and,
in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, With respect to extra contractual obligation arising from negligence, whether of act or omission,
are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children it is competent for the legislature to elect - and our Legislature has so elected - whom such an
who live in their company. obligation is imposed is morally culpable, or on the contrary, for reasons of public policy, to extend
that liability, withouot regard to the lack of moral culpability, so as to include responsibility for
Guardians are liable for damages the negligence of those persons whose acts or omissions are imputable, by a legal fiction,
caused by the minors or to others who are ina position to exercise an absolute or limited control over them. The
incapacitated persons legislature which adopted our Civil Code has elected tolimit extra-contractual liability - with certain
who are under their authority and well defined exceptions - to cases which moral culpability can be directly imputed to the persons
live in their company. to be charged. This moral responsibility may consist in having failed to exercise due care in
the selection and control of one's agents or servants, or in the control of persons, who, by
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are reason of their status, occupy a position of dependency with respect to the person made
likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees liable for their conduct."
in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or
on the occasion of their functions.
1. Person Liable Person Negligent Requisites
Employers shall be liable for the damages 1. Father / Mother Minor Minor must be living in the parents’
caused by their employees and household helpers company
acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, 2. Court-appointed guardian Minor 1. Under the authority/custody of
even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. Incapacitated person liable
person 2. Living in the guardian’s company
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; 3. Owner / Manager of Employee 1. Circumstance
but not when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done establishment or a. in the service of brance where
properly pertains, enterprise person negligent is employed
in which case what is provided in Article 2176 shall be applicable. b. In occasion of the negligent
person’s functions
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades 2. Employer-employee relationship
shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, 4. Employer Employee Acting within scope of the negligent
so long as they remain in their custody. Household helpers persons assigned tasks
NOTE: This applies even though
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease employer is not engaged in any
when the persons herein mentioned prove business
that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. 5. State Special Agent 1. Definite order to do task
(1903a) 2. Foreign to usual functions
6. Teachers Apprentice Person negligent must be under the
Head of Establishments teacher or head of the establishment’s
custody

CUADRA v. MONFORT
DOCTRINE:
Article 2180 provides that the father, in case of his incapacity
or death, the mother, is responsible for the damages caused
by the minor children who live in their company. The basis of
this vicarious, although primary, liability is fault or negligence,
which is presumed from that which accompanied the
causative act or omission. The presumption is merely prima
facie and may therefore be rebutted. This is the clear and
1
logical inference that may be drawn from the last paragraph
of Article 2180, which states “that the responsibility treated
of in this Article shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a
good father of a family to prevent damage.”
SPOUSES CRESENCIO LIBI v. INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT, ET AL.
DOCTRINE: The diligence required by law in a parent-child
relationship consists of the instruction and supervision of the
child. An owner of a firearm should make sure that the firearm
is not within reach of the child in order to meet the diligence
required of the law. The liability of parents who are found
vicariously liable is primary and not subsidiary.
2 that he was an agent of the Anti-Narcotics Unit and that
Facts
Maria Teresa Cuadra (12) and Maria Teresa Monfort (13),
classmates, and were asked by their teacher to weed the
school premises. Maria Monfort found a headband and
jokingly said that she found an earthworm. Evidently to
frighten Maria Cuadra, Monfort tossed the headband in the
foremore's direction. At that precise moment, Cuadra turned
to her friend, which resulted with her right eye getting hit by
the headband. Cuadra had to undergo surgical operations
but still lost the sight of her right eye. The parents of Monfort,
in behalf of their minor daughter, filed a civil action against
Alfonso Monfort, Maria Teresa Mnofort's father. Alfonso was
ordered to pay damages.
Julie Ann Gotiong (18 yo) and Wendell Libi (18-19 yo) were
sweethearts until Julie decided to break up. Wendell
pestered Julie to reconcile but Julie consistently refused. One
month after the break up, Julie and Wendell were found dead:
each from a single gunshot wound inflicted with the same
firearm licensed in the name of Cresencio Libi (Wendell's
father). Julie's parents believe that Wendell is the assailant
and subsequently committed suicide. Hence, they filed an
action to recover damages arising from the Wendell's
parents' vicarious liability under Art. 2180.
The firearm was kept in a safety deposit box and the 2 keys
thereto were only with Cresencio and Amelita (Wendell's
mother). Amelita always kept her copy in her bag, which fact
was known to Wendell. A photograph of Wendell holding the
firearm show that Wendell already had possession of the
firearm at least a month before the incident. Wendell was
working as a narcotics informer of the Constabulary Anti-
Narcotics Unit which might explain why he took his father's
firearm, the trial court thought.
Held/Issue
Issue: W/N the parents of Monfort may be held liable. No.
Article 2180 does not apply in this case.
There is nothing from which it may be inferred that Alfonso
could have prevented the damage caused by the observance
of due care or that he was remiss in the exercise of parental
authority in failing to foresee such damage or the act which
caused it. Monfort was at school and under the care and
supervision of the teacher. And the act which caused the
injury was an innocent prank not unusual among children at
play and which no parent, however careful, would have no
reason to anticipate or much less guard against. It did not
reveal any mischievous propensity or indeed any trait in the
child’s character which would reflect unfavorably on her
upbringing and for which the blame could be attributed to her
parents.
Although the victim deserves sympathy, the defendant has
no obligation to compensate her suffering. If the defendant is
at all to compensate her, it will not be based on any legal
sanction but only on moral compulsion and of good
conscience.
Did Wendell's parents exercise the due diligence of a
good father of a family to relieve them from civil liability
for the crime committed by their minor son? NO.
The diligence required by law in a parent-child relationship
consists of the instruction and supervision of the child.
Wendell's parents were remiss in their duties as parents in
not diligently supervising the activities of their son, despite
his minority and immaturity, so much so that it was only at
the time of Wendell's death that they allegedly discovered
Cresencio's gun was missing from the safety deposit box.
Both parents were wanting in their duty and responsibility in
monitoring and knowing the activities of their children who
may be engaged in dangerous work such as being drug
informers.
Had the parents been diligent in supervision and in keeping
the said firearm from reach, they could have prevented
Wendell from killing Julie. Therefore, they are liable under
Article 2180 which provide "the father, and in case of his
 death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the
damages caused by their minor children who live in their
company." The parents failed to exercise all the diligence of
a good father of the family in preventing their minor son from
committing this crime by menas of the gun of Cresencio
which was freely accessible to Wendell for they have not
regularly checked whether said gun was still under lock, but
learned that it was missing from the safety deposit box only
after the crime had been committed.

EXCONDE v. CAPUNO Dante Capuno, son of Delfin Capuno, driving a jeep with
some companions when the accident occurred. Dante was
DOCTRINE: found guilty of homicide through reckless imprudence for the
The father, and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, death of Isidoro Caperina and Amado Ticzon. Dante was 15
are liable for any damages caused by the minor any children years old when he committed the crime. The mother of the
who live with them. deceased reserved her right to bring a separate civil action
for damages. The mother then filed the present action against
Delfin Capuno and his son Dante Capuno asking for or
damages for the death of her son. Defendants set up the
3 defense that if anyone should be held liable, it is Dante
Capuno and not his father Delfin because at the time of the
accident, the former was not under the control, supervision
and custody, of the latter.
WON Delfin Capuno may be held subsidiarily liable with
his son Dante - YES.
Plaintiff contends that defendant Delfin Capuno is liable for
the damages in question jointly and severally with his son
Dante because at the time the latter committed the negligent
act which resulted in the death of the victim, he was a minor
and was then living with his father, and inasmuch as these
facts are not disputed, the civil liability of the father is evident.
The civil liability which the law impose upon the father, and,
in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, for any
damages that may be caused by the minor children who live
with them, is obvious. This is necessary consequence of the
parental authority they exercise over them which imposes
upon the parents the "duty of supporting them, keeping them
in their company, educating them and instructing them in
proportion to their means", while, on the other hand, gives
them the "right to correct and punish them in moderation".

SALEN v. BALCE
DOCTRINE:
The father and, in case of his death and incapacity, the
mother, are responsible for damages caused by the minor
children who lived in their company.
4 for the payment of indemnity but it was returned unsatisfied
Plaintiffs are the legitimate parents of Carlos Salen, who died
single from wounds caused by Gumersindo Balce, a
legitimate son of defendant. At that time, Gumersindo Balce
was also single, a minor below 18 years of age, and was living
with defendant. As a result of Carlos Salen’s death,
Gumersindo Balce was accused and convicted of homicide
and was sentenced to imprisonment and asked to pay the
heirs of the deceased an indemnity. Upon petition of plaintiff,
the only heirs of the deceased, a writ of execution was issued
because Gumersindo Balce was insolvent and had no
property in his name. Thereupon, plaintiffs demanded upon
defendant, father of Gumersindo, the payment of the
indemnity the latter has failed to pay, but defendant refused,
thus causing plaintiffs to institute the present action.
Defendant, in his answer, set up the defense that the law
which plaintiffs predicate their right to recover does not here
WON the defendant-appellee may be held subsidiary
liable. YES.
While we agree with the theory that, as a rule, the civil liability
arising from a crime shall be governed by the provisions of
the Revised Penal Code, we disagree with the contention that
the subsidiary liability of persons for acts of those who are
under their custody should likewise be governed by the same
Code even in the absence of any provision governing the
case, for that would leave the transgression of certain rights
without any punishment or sanction in the law. Such would
be the case if we would uphold the theory of appellee as
sustained by the trial court.
It is true that under Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code, a
father is made civilly liable for the acts committed by his son
only if the latter is an imbecile, an insane, under 9 years of
age, or over 9 but under 15 years of age, who acts without

CANLAS v. CHAN LIN PO
DOCTRINE:
Absent proof substantiating the relationship, the co-
defendants cannot be held subsidiarily liable (Under Art. 103
of the RPC) nor primarily liable (Under Art. 2180 of the Civil
Code).
5 because he’s the son of Chan Lim Po and Remedios Diala.
apply for the reason that the law refers to quasi-delicts and
not to criminal cases.
Juanito Chan was driving a truck along Rizal Ave. Extension,
Manila. For driving in a reckless and imprudent manner, he
ran over Nicolas Paras (65 y/o) and run over his head,
crushing it flat, resulting to Paras Canlas's death. Juanito
Chan was charged with homicide through reckless
imprudence but the civil aspect was reserved by Paras's
heirs. Chan was convicted by the CFI for imprisonment and
a subsidiary penalty of 5,000 which was affirmed but
modified by the CA as to the imprisonment.
In the civil case, petitioner heirs of Canlas filed an action for
damages Lim Koo (owner of the truck when the accident
happened), Chan Lim Po and Remedios Diala (parents of
Juanito Chan), and Juanito Chan. The heirs of Canlas argue
that the defendant operators are imprudent in employing
Juanito Chan because he had no license for violating multiple
traffic violations and he was merely given an accommodation
Defendants answer that: 1) The vehicle, at the date of the
incident, was owned by defendant Lim Koo; 2) That the truck
was subsequently bought by Remedios Diala 3) Defendant
Chan Lin never became the co-owner 4) that Juanito Chan
was not employed when the mishap happened. The trial court
dismissed the civil complaint.
discernment, unless it appears that there is no fault or
negligence on his part. This is because a son who commits
the act under any of those conditions is by law exempt from
criminal liability (Article 12, subdivisions 1, 2 and 3, Revised
Penal Code). The idea is not to leave the act entirely
unpunished but to attach certain civil liability to the person
who has the delinquent minor under his legal authority or
control. But a minor over 15 who acts with discernment is not
exempt from criminal liability, for which reason the Code is
silent as to the subsidiary liability of his parents should he
stand convicted. In that case, resort should be had to the
general law which is our Civil Code. The particular law that
governs this case is Article 2180.
Whether the CA erred in ruling that the petitioners did not
present any evidence as to the liability of the defendant
appellees. – NO.
There is absence of proof that the accused Juanito Chan y
Diala was an employee (as driver) of defendant Lim Koo at
the time of the mishap on June 11, 1951, or that the latter, as
his employer was at the time engaged in a business or
industry. Plaintiff’s evidence does not categorically prove that
Juanito Chan was indeed an employee of the defendant at
the time of the mishap.
And, as observed by the trial court in the present case, “no
evidence having been presented against the codefendants of
Juanito Chan y Diala, not even with respect to the relationship
of said Juanito Chan y Diala with his co-defendants, it is not
seen how this action can prosper.” Hence, defendant Lim
Koo can not be held subsidiarily liable to appellant under
Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. Neither could he be
held primarily responsible to appellant under paragraph 5,
Article 2180 of the New Civil Code.
As already stated, there is no evidence as to the accused’s
relationship to said defendant. Furthermore, it was not shown
that the accused, even as employee of Lim Koo, acted within
the scope of his assigned task at the time of the mishap.
Likewise, defendants Chan Lin Po and Remedios Diala (father
and mother of accused) can not be held answerable under
paragraph 2, Article 2180 of said Code, there being no proof
that said accused was, at the time of the mishap, a minor
living in the company of his parents. In fact, there is the
finding in the decision of the Court of Appeals (Exhibit B) that
he (accused) was at the time of the mishap a married man. In

TAMARGO v. COURT OF APPEALS
DOCTRINE:
No presumption of parental dereliction on the part of the
adopting parents could arise if the adopted was not in fact
subject to their control at the time the tort was committed.
6
SALBANERA v. BALCE (not in the book)
DOCTRINE:
Art. 2180 provides that the father and, in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother, are responsible for damages caused
by the minor children who lived in their company. To limit the
application of this provision to obligations arising from quasi-
delicts and not to obligations arising from criminal offense
would result in the absurdity that while for an act where mere
negligence intervenes the father or mother may stand
subsidiarily liable for the damage cause by his or her son, no
liability would attach if the damage is caused with criminal
7 intent.
On October 20, 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, who was then 10
years old, shot Jennifer Tamargo (victim) with an air rifle
causing injuries which resulted to her death. Both the
adopting parent and natural parents of the victim filed a civil
complaint for damages against Adelberto's natural parents,
sps. Bundoc, with whom he was living at the time of the
incident.
On December 10, 1981 [prior to the incident], Sps. Rapisura
filed for a petition to adopt Adelberto. The petition was
granted on November 18, 1982 [after the incident].
Sps. Bundoc (natural parents) were asserting that sps.
Rapisura (adopting parents) were indispensable parties to the
action since the parental authority had shifted to the adopting
parents of Adelberto from the moment the successful petition
for adoption was filed.
Plaintiffs Severino Salen and Elena Salbanera are the
legitimate parents of Carlos Salen who died single from
wounds caused by Gumersindo Balce, the legitmate son of
Jose Balce. At that time, Gumersindo was a minor below 18
and was living with defendant. Gumersindo was convicted of
homicide and was sentenced to pay the heirs of Carlos an
indemnity of P2,000. A writ of execution was issued upon
petition of plaintiffs but it was returned unsatisfied because
Gumersindo was insolvent and hand no property in his name.
Plaintiffs demanded upon defendant, the father of
Gumersindo but he refused.
the circumstances, the dismissal of the present action by trial
court was proper.
WON the effects of adoption, insofar as parental authority is
concerned, may be given retroactive effect so as to make
adopting parents the indispensable parties in a damage case
against their adopted child WHEN ACTUAL CUSTODY WAS
YET LODGED WITH THE BIOLOGICAL PARENTS. - NO.
The shooting of the victim by Adelberto with an air rifle
occurred with parental authority still lodged in respondent
Bundoc spouses, the natural parents of the minor Adelberto.
It would thus follow that the natural parents who had thena
ctual custody of the minor Adelberto, are indispensable
parties to the suit for damages.
The court does not considered that retroactive effect may be
given to the decree of adoption so as to impose a liability
upon the adoptiong parents accruing at a time when
adopting parents had no actual or physical custody over the
adopted child.
Whether appellee can be held subsidiary liable to pay the
indemnity of P2,000.00 which his son was sentenced to
pay in the criminal case filed against him. – YES.
Art. 101 provides that a father is made civilly liable for the acts
committed by his son only if the latter is an imbecile, an
insane, under 9 years of age, or over 9 but under 15 years of
age, who acts without discernment, unless it appears that
there is no fault or negligence on his part. This is because a
son who commits the act under any of those conditions is by
law exempt from criminal liability. This is to attach civil liability
to the person who has the delinquent minor under his legal
authority or control. However, a minor over 15 who acts with
discernment is not exempt from criminal liability. The RPC is
silent as to the subsidiary liability of his parents. In that case,
resort should be had to the Civil Code.
Art. 2180 provides that the father and, in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother, are responsible for damages caused
by the minor children who lived in their company. To limit the
application of this provision to obligations arising from quasi-
delicts and not to obligations arising from criminal offense
would result in the absurdity that while for an act where mere
negligence intervenes the father or mother may stand
subsidiarily liable for the damage cause by his or her son, no
liability would attach if the damage is caused with criminal
intent.
 PALEYAN v. BANGKILI (not in the book)
DOCTRINE:
Vicarious liability also attaches to deicts and crimes.
8
FUELLAS v. CADANA (not in the book)
DOCTRINE:
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother,
are responsible for the damages caused by the minor
children who live in their company.
9
LIBI v. ORTIZ (not in the book)
10
DOCTRINE: The civil liability of parents for quasi-delicts of
their minor children as contemplated in Article 2180 is
Carlos Bangkili, 19, living with his mother, was convicted for
the death of Carlo Paleyan. The children and widow of Carlo
filed a case against Carlos and his mother, Victoria for
damages. The heirs are claiming damages from Victoria
under Art. 2180. Victoria argues that art 101 of the RPC
cannot apply since Carlos is already 19; and Art 2180 cannot
apply since it is only for quasi-delict.
Pepito Cadano and Rico Fuellas, son of defendant-appellant
Agapito Fuellas, were both 13 years old.
They were classmates at St. Mary's High School, Dansalan
City. In the afternoon of September 16, 1954, while Pepito
was studying his lessons in the classroom, Rico took the
pencil of one Ernesto Cabanok and surreptitiously placed it
inside the pocket of Pepito.
When Ernesto asked Rico to return the pencil, it was Pepito
who returned the same, an act which angered Rico, who held
the neck of Pepito and pushed him to the floor. Villamira, a
teacher, separated Rico and Pepito and told them to go
home.
Rico went ahead, with Pepito following. When Pepito had just
gone down of the schoolhouse, he was met by Rico, still in
an angry mood. A classmate, told the two to shake hands.
Pepito extended his hand to Rico. Instead of accepting the
proffer to shake hands, Rico held Pepito by the neck and with
his leg, placed Pepito out of balance and pushed him to the
ground. Pepito fell on his right side with his right arm under
his body. Pepito suddenly cried out "My arm is broken." Rico
then got up and went away. Pepito was helped by others to
go home. That same evening Pepito was brought to the
Lanao General Hospital for treatment. An X-Ray taken
showed that there was a complete fracture of the radius and
ulna of the right forearm which necessitated plaster casting.
Spouses Felipe and Shirley Gotiong are the legitimate
parents of Julie Ann who is an 18 y.o. first year commerce
student of the University of San Carlos. Spouses Libi are the
parents of Wendell Libi then a minor (between 18-19 y.o.).
Both Julie Anne and Wendell died in the same event and on
W/N Art 2180 would be applicable to Delicts therefore
holding the mother liable? YES.
Art 2180 is applicable to delicts since it is illogical not to. in
this case 2180 is applicable, but submits that its application
should be relaxed, considering that her son, although living
with her, was already 19 years of age and hence mature
enough to have a mind of his own. This fact is not a legal
defense, however, and does not exempt the appellant from
her responsibility as parent and natural guardian. Article
2180 does not provide for any exemption except proof
that the defendant parent “observed all the diligence of a
good father of a family to prevent damage.” There is no
such proof in this case.
W/N the father is liable for damages for the deliberate
criminal act of his minor son. – YES.
The civil liability which the law imposes upon the father and,
in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, for any
damages that may be caused by the minor children who live
with them, is obvious. This is a necessary consequence of
the parental authority they exercise over them which imposes
upon the parents the "duty of supporting them, keeping them
in their company, educating them in proportion to their
means", while on the other hand, gives them the "right to
correct and punish them in moderation." The only way by
which they can relieve themselves of this liability is if they
prove that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of
a family to prevent the damage.
Moreover, the case at bar was decided by the Court of
Appeals on the basis of the evidence submitted therein by
both parties, independently of the criminal case. And
responsibility for fault or negligence under Article 2176 upon
which the action in the present case was instituted, is entirely
separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from fault
of negligence under the Penal Code (Art. 2177).
WON Spouses Libi is liable for the death of Julie Ann.
YES.
The spouses failed to exercise the diligence of a good father
of a family bu safely locking the fatal gun away Wendell could
 primary and not subsidiary. Furthermore the liability of the
parents for felonies committed by their minor children is
likewise primary, not subsidiary.
B. Owners and Managers of Establishments
Art. 2180
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are
likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees
in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or
on the occasion of their functions.
1 HEIRS OF AMPARO DE LOS SANTOS V. COURT OF
APPEALS
DOCTRINE: Owing to the nature of their business and for
reasons of public policy, common carriers are tasked to
observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the
goods and for the safety of its passengers.
the same day. Julie Ann and Wendell were sweethearts. Julie
Ann broke up her relationship with Wndell after she
supposedly found him to be sadistic and irresponsible.
Wendell kept pastering Julie Ann with demands for
reconciliation but the latter persisted in her refusal, prompting
the former to resort to threats against her. Julie Ann and
Wendell died each from a single gunshot wound inflicted with
the same firearm owned by Spouses Libi.
Requisites for an Owner or Manager of an establishment or enterprise to be liable:
1. The act must have been done in the service of a branch where s/he is employed or in
occassion of his/her functions;
2. There must be an employer-employee relationship between them.
Facts
The M/V Mindoro owned by Compania Maritima was bound
for New Washington, Aklan. In the wee hours of the morning,
the vessel met typhoon “Welming” on the Sibuyan Sea,
Aklan. The vessel sank, as a result of which, many of the
passengers drowned. In a decision of the Board of Marine
Inquiry, it was found that the captain and some members of
the crew were negligent in operating the vessel. The Board
imposed upon them a penalty of suspension and/or
revocation of their license. However, the decision could not
be executed against the captain who perished with the
vessel.
The heirs of the passengers and some of the survivors filed
an action for damages against Compania Maritima.
The RTC and CA absolved Compania from liability. The CA
found that that although there was concurring negligence on
the part of the captain, Compania cannot be held liable based
on the principle of limited liability of the shipowner or ship
agent under Article 587 of the Code of Commerce.
not have gotten hold of the gun unless one of the keys to the
safety deposit box was negligently left lying around or he had
access to the bag of his mother where the other key was.
Spouses Libi were also remiss in their duties as parents in not
diligently supervising the activities of their son, despite his
minority and immaturity. Spouses Libi should be held
primarily liable for civil liabilities for the crime committed by
their son.
Held/Issue
Whether Compania Maritima should be held liable for
damages. YES.
There is no dispute as to the finding of the captain’s
negligence. The controversy centers on the negligence of
Compania Maritimia and the application of Article 587 of the
Code of Commerce.
In cases where the shipowner is likewise to be blamed
(besides the captain), Article 587 does not apply. The
situation will instead be covered by the provisions of the Civil
Code on Common Carriers.
Common carriers are tasked to observe extraordinary
diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of
its passengers. Whenever death or injury to a passenger
occurs, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault
or to have acted negligently unless they prove that they
observed extraordinary diligence.
In this case, Compania Maritima itself was negligent since it:
1. Allowed the ship to depart in spite of typhoon advisories.
In doing so, Maritima displayed lack of foresight and
minimum concern for the safety of its passengers.

2 ST. FRANCIS HIGH SCHOOL V. COURT OF APPEALS
DOCTRINE: Before an employer may be held liable for the
negligence of his employee, the act or omission which
caused damage or prejudice must have occurred while an
employee was in the performance of his assigned tasks.
3 GO, ET AL. V. INTERMEDIATE APPELATE COURT, ET AL.
DOCTRINE: Banks are responsible for the acts of its
Ferdinand Castillo was a 13 year old freshman student. He
wanted to join a school picnic in Talaan Beach. His parents,
respondent spouses Castillo, did not allow him to join, but
merely allowed him to bring food to the teachers for the
picnic, with the directive that he should go back home after
doing so. However, because of persuasion of the teachers,
Ferdinand went on with them to the beach. During the picnic,
one of the female teachers was drowing, and some students
including Ferdinand, came to her rescue, but in the process,
it was Ferdinand himself who drowned. His body was
recovered but efforts to resuscitate him ashore failed.
Respondent spouses filed a complaint against St. Francis
High School and the teachers for damages, contending that
the death of their son was due to the failure of the petitioners
to exercise the proper diligence of a good father of the family
in preventing their son's drowning
Floverto Jazmin, an American citizen and a US Federal Govt.
pensionado (retired employee), had been residing at 34
Maravilla St., Mangatarem, Pangasinan. As pensionado, he
received annuity checks through the Mangatarem post office
and encashed them at Prudential Bank in Clark Air Base. In
2. The captain was held negligent for overloading the ship,
but Maritima shared in this negligence for it could have
prevented the overloading if it exercised a closer supervision.
3. It allowed the ship to leave Manila later than its schedule.
If it had made the ship leave earlier, the encounter with the
typhoon could have been avoided.
4. While the ship was seaworthy and had lifesaving
equipment, Maritima failed to show evidence that it had
installed radar which could have allowed the vessel to
navigate safely for shelter during a storm.
Since the foregoing shows the lack of extraordinary diligence
and the negligence of Maritima, it is liable for damages.
Whether or not Art. 2180, in relation to Art. 2176 of the
New Civil Code is applicable to the case at bar – NO
Held: Before an employer may be held liable for the
negligence of his employee, the act or omission which
caused damage or prejudice must have occurred while
an employee was in the performance of his assigned
tasks. In the case at bar, the teachers/petitioners were not in
the actual performance of their assigned tasks. The incident
happened not within the school premises, not on a school
day and most importantly while the teachers and students
were holding a purely private affair, a picnic. This picnic had
no permit from the school head or its principal, because this
picnic is not a school sanctioned activity neither is it
considered as an extra-curricular activity. Mere knowledge
by petitioner/principal Illumin of the planning of the picnic by
the students and their teachers does not in any way or in any
manner show acquiescence or consent to the holding of the
same.
Finally, no negligence could be attributable to the petitioners-
teachers to warrant the award of damages to the
respondents-spouses. The class adviser did her best and
exercised diligence of a good father of a family to prevent any
untoward incident or damages to all the students who joined
the picnic. She invited co-petitioners who had knowledge of
First Aid and could swim. They also brought life savers in
case of emergency. They did all what is humanly possible to
save the child.
1. WON Jazmin is entitled to damages – YES.
Had Go exercised the diligence expected of him as a bank
officer & employee, he would have noticed the glaring
 employee unless there is proof that they exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage.
4 PSBA V. COURT OF APPEALS
DOCTRINE: A contractual relation is a condition sine qua non
to the school's liability.
Jan. 1975, he was issued a substitute check since he failed
to receive one of the checks on time. He encashed it in the
same bank.
On Apr. 22, 1975, Agustin Go, Solidbank (w/c later became
Consolidated Bank and Trust Corp.) branch manager in
Baguio City, allowed a person named “Floverto Jazmin” to
open a Savings Account. 2 US treasury checks were
deposited, both payable to the order of Floverto Jasmin of
Maranilla St., Mangatarem, Pangasinan and drawn on the
First National City Bank, Manila. Go required the depositor to
fill up the information sheet for new accounts – the
depositor’s personal circumstances indicated that he was
Floverto Jazmin with mailing address at Mangatarem,
Pangasinan and home address at Maravilla St.,
Mangatarem, Pangasinan. The depositor’s signature
specimens were also taken. Thereafter, the deposited checks
were sent to the drawee bank for clearance. Inasmuch as
Solidbank did not receive any word from the drawee bank,
after 3 weeks, it allowed the depositor to withdraw the
amount indicated in the checks. More than a year later, both
checks were returned to Solidbank with the notation that the
amounts were altered. Go reported the matter to the Phil.
Constabulary in Baguio.
Jazmin was required to appear before the Phil. Constabulary
headquarters for the investigation regarding the complaint
filed by Go against him for estafa by passing altered dollar
checks. Jazmin denied the allegation and it was eventually
found that the “Floverto Jazmin” that Go encountered was an
impostor. Jazmin filed a complaint against Go and
Consolidated Bank and Trust Corp. for moral and exemplary
damages plus attorney’s fees.
Carlitos Bautista was stabbed to death within the premises
of PSBA. Parents of Carlitos filed a suit for damages against
PSBA and its corporate officers.
Carlitos was a junior commerce student, while assailants
were not members of the school's academic community
(outsiders). Parents allege negligence, recklessness and lack
of security precautions, means and methods before, during
and after the attack on the victim.
Lt. M. Soriano terminated relationships with the school by
resigning from his position in school. Defendants deny
liability as jurisprudence on the subject states that
academic institution are beyond the ambit of the 2180.
disparity between the payee’s name and address on the
checks and those appearing in the bank records. The errors
were very patent and could not have escaped the trained
eyes of bank officers & employees. The bank, through its
employees (including tellers who allegedly conducted an
identification check on the depositor) was grossly negligent
in handling the business transaction. In crimes and quasi-
delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all damages which
are the natural and probable consequences of the act or
omission complained of. It is not necessary that such
damages have been foreseen or could have reasonably been
foreseen. Go is liable for damages as his negligence was the
root cause of the complained inconvenience, humiliation and
embarrassment.
2. WON the employer bank may be held “co-equally
liable” to pay nominal damages in the absence of proof
that it was negligent in the selection of and supervision
over the employee – YES.
Article 2180 (5) of the Civil Code, “Employers shall be liable
for the damages caused by their employees… acting within
the scope of their assigned tasks.” The bank is responsible
for the acts of its employees unless there is proof that it
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
the damage. Hence, the burden of proof lies upon the bank
and it cannot now disclaim liability given its failure to prove
not only that it exercised due diligence to prevent damage
but that it was not negligent in the selection and supervision
of its employees.
ISSUE: (1) W/N the school and teachers may be held
vicariously liable based on Art. 2180 of the Civil Code- NO
(2) If not liable, W/N it will still be liable based on the
contract of enrolment and on Art. 21 of the Civil Code -
YES
(1)2180 in conjuntion with 2176 establishes loco parentis.
However, damages should have been caused by students or
pupils of the educational institution sought to be held liable
for the acts of its pupils/students whil in its custory. In this
case, this material situation does not exists, the assailants
were outsiders. The rules on quasi-delict do not govern.
(2) When an academic institution accepts enrollees, there is
a contract established between them, resulting in bilateral
obligations whick both parties are bound to comply with.

5 JOSE V. COURT OF APPEALS
DOCTRINE: The responsibility of employers is premised
upon the presumption of negligence of their employees.
6 FRANCISCO ET AL. V. CHEMICAL BULK CARRIERS, INC.
DOCTRINE:
General principle is that a seller without title cannot transfer
a better title than he has.32 Only the owner of the goods or
one authorized by the owner to sell can transfer title to the
buyer.33 Therefore, a person can sell only what he owns or
is authorized to sell and the buyer can, as a consequence,
acquire no more than what the seller can legally transfer.
Exception: Doctrine of estoppel where the owner of the
goods is precluded from denying the sellers authority to sell.
Petitioner Manila Central Bus Lines Corp. (MCL) owned Bus
203. Bus 203 was being driven by Armando Jose, when it
collided with a red Ford Escort along MacArthur Highway.
The Ford Escort was at the opposite lane. As a result of the
collision, the left side of the car's hood was damaged and the
driver and passenger were severly injured. They were
rushed to the hospital, but the driver died.
The passenger of the Ford Escort, represented by his
father, filed a case for damages against the bus driver and
MCL. In a separate suit, the heirs of the driver filed a case
for damages against MCL only. On the other hand, MCL
filed a 3rd party complaint against the registered owner of the
Ford Escort. The RTC dismissed the civil cases against MCL,
but upheld the 3rd party complaint against the Escort owner.
CA reversed the desicion and ruled that MCL and Jose are
solidarily liable to pay the the respondents.
Francisco bought diesel fuel from a certain Bacsa who
allegedly was the agent of Chemical Bulk Carriers. Deliveries
were then made. Later on, Chemical Bulk Carriers wrote a
demand letter to Francisco demanding the latter payment for
the diesel fuels it delivered. Francisco refused to pay alleging
that it already paid to Bacsa as evidenced by the invoice
issued by CBCI and a receipt with no letter head whatsoever
issued by Bacsa to him.
However, there is no finding yet if the school breached the
contract thru negligence in providing security measures.
Record is bereft of materials, only the trial court can
determine from the evidence to be presented.
1) W/N driver of the bus is the one at fault for the collision
of the 2 vehicles – NO.
2) W/N the registered owner of the Ford Escort is liable to
Petitioner MCL? – NO.
*SC dismissed the case.
1)No, the responsibility of employers is premised upon
the presumption of negligence of their employees. While
the allegations of negligence against the employee and that
of an employer-employee relation in the complaint are
enough to make out a case of quasi-delict under Art. 2180 of
the Civil Code, the failure to prove the employee's
negligence during the trial is fatal to proving the
employers vicarious liability. In this case, private
respondents (Escort passenger and heirs of Escort driver)
failed to prove their allegation of negligence against
driver Armando Jose who, in fact, was acquitted in the case
for criminal negligence arising from the same incident.
2)No, Article 2180 of the Civil Code makes the persons
specified therein responsible for the quasi-delicts of others.
The burden is upon MCL to prove that the car's registered
owner is one of those specified persons who are vicariously
liable for the negligence of the deceased driver. Nowhere was
it alleged that the driver was a relative or employee of the car
owner. As the "authorized driver" of the car, he merely drove
the Ford Escort with the permission of the registered owner.
Issue:
Whether or not CBCI gave Bacsa the authority to sell its
fuel thus precluding the former from denying the
transactions made by the latter
Held:
The owner of the goods who has been unlawfully deprived of
it may recover it even from a purchaser in good faith. Thus,
the purchaser of property which has been stolen from the
owner has been held to acquire no title to it even though he
purchased for value and in good faith.
In this case, it is clear that Bacsa was not the owner of the
 But in order that there may be estoppel, the owner must, by
word or conduct, have caused or allowed it to appear that
title or authority to sell is with the seller and the buyer must
have been misled to his damage.
7 ONG V. METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT (not in the
book)
DOCTRINE:
Defendant owns and operates three recreational swimming
pools at its Balara filters, Diliman, Quezon City
Dominador Ong, and his brothers Ruben and Eusebio, went
to defendant's swimming pools
After paying the requisite admission fee, they immediately
went to one of the small pools where the water was shallow.
Dominador Ong told his brothers that he was going to the
locker room in an adjoining building to drink a bottle of coke.
Upon hearing this, Ruben and Eusebio went to the bigger
pool leaving Dominador in the small pool and so they did not
see the latter when he left the pool to get a bottle of coke. In
that afternoon, there were two lifeguards on duty in the pool
compound, namely, Manuel Abaño and Mario Villanueva.
After some time, someone informed lifeguard Manuel Abaño
that a boy had been swimming under water for a long time
and Abaño immediately jumped into the big swimming pool
and retrieved the apparently lifeless body of Dominador Ong
from the bottom.
diesel fuel. Francisco was aware of this but he claimed that
Bacsa was authorized by CBCI to sell the diesel fuel.
However, Franciscos claim that Bacsa was authorized is not
supported by any evidence except his self-serving testimony.
First, Francisco did not even confirm with CBCI if it was
indeed selling its diesel fuel since it is not one of the oil
companies known in the market to be selling petroleum
products. This fact alone should have put Francisco on
guard. Second, it does not appear that CBCI, by some direct
and equivocal act, has clothed Bacsa with the indicia of
ownership or apparent authority to sell CBCIs diesel fuel.
Francisco did not state if the identification card presented by
Bacsa indicated that he was CBCIs agent or a mere
employee. Third, the receipt issued by Bacsa was typewritten
on a half sheet of plain bond paper. There was no letterhead
or any indication that it came from CBCI. We agree with the
Court of Appeals that this was a personal receipt issued by
Bacsa and not an official receipt issued by CBCI.
Consequently, CBCI is not precluded by its conduct from
denying Bacsas authority to sell. CBCI did not hold out Bacsa
or allow Bacsa to appear as the owner or one with apparent
authority to dispose of the diesel fuel.
The issue posed in this appeal is whether the death of
minor Dominador Ong can be attributed to the negligence
of defendant and/or its employees so as to entitle
plaintiffs to recover damages
There is sufficient evidence to show that appellee has taken
all necessary precautions to avoid danger to the lives of its
patrons or prevent accident which may cause their death.
Thus, it has been shown that the swimming pools of appellee
are provided with a ring buoy, toy roof, towing line, oxygen
resuscitator and a first aid medicine kit. The bottom of the
pools is painted with black colors so as to insure clear
visibility. There is on display in a conspicuous place within
the area certain rules and regulations governing the use of
the pools. Appellee employs six lifeguards who are all trained
as they had taken a course for that purpose and were issued
certificates of proficiency. These lifeguards work on schedule
prepared by their chief and arranged in such a way as to have
two guards at a time on duty to look after the safety of the
bathers. There is a male nurse and a sanitary inspector with
a clinic provided with oxygen resuscitator. And there are
security guards who are available always in case of
emergency.
The record also shows that when the body of minor Ong was
retrieved from the bottom of the pool, the employees of
appellee did everything possible to bring him back to life.
Thus, after he was placed at the edge of the pool, lifeguard

C. Employers
Art. 2180.
Employers shall be liable for the damages
caused by their employees and household helpers
acting within the scope of their assigned tasks,
even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
Requisites for the Employers to be liable:
1. An employer-employee relationship;
2. Employee is acting within the scope of his assigned task when the act was committed
The liability imposed by these provisions upon owners, managers and employers is based on
their own negligence in the selection of ther employees or in the supervision of their
employees.
The case of Martin v. Court of Appeals states the necessity to first establish the employment
relationship and upon doing so, the plaintiff must show that the employee was acting within
the scope of his assigned task when the tort complained of was committed. The case then
says, "It is only then that the defendant, as employer, may find it necessary to interpose the
defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee."
There should be a criminal action where employee's negligence is proved. Failure to prove
employee's negligence is fata to proving the employer's vicarious liability.
A case further explains the responsibility given to the employers:
"The responsibility imposed by this article arises by virtue of a presumption juris tantum of
negligence on the part of the persons made responsible under the article, derived from their
failure to exercise due care and vigilance over the acts of subordinates to prevent them from
causing damage. Negligence is imputed to them by law, unless they prove the contrary. Thus,
the last paragraph of the article says that such responsibility ceases if is proved that the
persons who might be held responsible under it exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family (diligentissimi patris familias) to prevent damage. It is clear, therefore, that it is not
representation, nor interest, nor even the necessity of having somebody else answer for the
Abaño immediately gave him manual artificial respiration.
Soon thereafter, nurse Armando Rule arrived, followed by
sanitary inspector Iluminado Vicente who brought with him
an oxygen resuscitator. When they found that the pulse of the
boy was abnormal, the inspector immediately injected him
with camphorated oil. When the manual artificial respiration
proved ineffective they applied the oxygen resuscitator until
its contents were exhausted. And while all these efforts were
being made, they sent for Dr. Ayuyao from the University of
the Philippines who however came late because upon
examining the body found him to be already dead. All of the
foregoing shows that appellee has done what is humanly
possible under the circumstances to restore life to minor Ong
and for that reason it is unfair to hold it liable for his death.
Distinction between 4th and 5th paragraphs of Article 2180:
Clarifying the difference between 4th and 5th paragraphs of Article 2180, the Supreme Court
states:
"A distinction must be made between the two provisions to determine what is applicable.
Both provisions apply to employers: the fourth paragraph, to owners and managers of an
establishment or enterprise; and the fifth paragraph, to employers in general, whether or not
engaged in any business or industry. The fourth paragraph covers negligent acts of
employees committed either in the service of the branches or on the occasion of their
functions, while the fifth paragraph encompasses negligent acts of employees acting within
the scope of their assigned task. The latter is an expansion of the former in both employer
coverage and acts included. Negligent acts of employees, whether or not the employer is
engaged in a business or industry, are covered so long as they were acting within the scope
of their assigned task, even though committed neither in the service of the branches nor on
the occasion of their functions. For, admittedly, employees oftentimes wear different hats.
They perform functions which are beyond their office, title or designation but which,
nevertheless, are still within the call of duty."
Definition of "within the scope of his assigned tasks"
In the case if Filamer Christian Institute v. IAC, the Court held that acts done within the scope
of the employee's assigned tasks include any act done by an employee in furtherance of the
interests of the employer or for the account of the employer at the time of the infliction of the
injury or damages.
 damages caused by the persons devoid of personality, but it is the non-performance of certain
duties of precaution and prudence imposed upon the persons who become responsible by
civil bond uniting the actor to them, which forms the foundation of such responsibility."
FREDERICO FRANCO V. INTERMEDIATE APPEALTE
COURT
DOCTRINE:
Under Article 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code, liability is
basedon culpa aquiliana which holds the employer
primarily liable for tortuous acts if its employees subject,
however, to the defense that the former exercised all the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of his employees.
1 passengers. it further alleged that as a result of the collision, the
AGUSTIN GO, ET AL. V. INTERMEDIATE APPELATE
COURT, ET AL.
DOCTRINE:
5th paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code,
2
"(E)mployers shall be liable for the damages caused by
their employees . . . acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks." Pursuant to this provision, the bank is
responsible for the acts of its employee unless there is
proof that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent the damage.
Facts
Macario Yuro, driver of Franco bus, swerved to the left to avoid
hitting a parked trailer truck. This caused him to occupy the
opposite lane and hit an incoming Isuzu Mini Bus (southbound).
As a result, the mini bus was a total wreck and the bus was
damaged. It also resulted in the instant death of both drivers and
two passengers of the mini bus. The owner of the mini bus and
the relatives of the deceased filed an action for damages through
reckless imprudence agains the Spouses Federico as the owners
and operators of the bus company. The complaint alleged that
the recklessness and imprudence of the bus driver caused the
the collision which resulted in the death of the drivers and other
mini bus became a total wreck, resulting in damages.
Floverto Jazmin was a retired employee of US Federal Gov't and
an American citizen. He failed to received his pension forcing him
to go to Clark Air Base, Prudential Bank branch to check.
Meanwhile Agustin Go was a branch manager of Solidbank
Baguio. He allowed a person purporting to be Floverto to open
savings account and deposit treasury checks $1810 and
$913.40. The depositor indicated therein that he was Floverto
Jazmin with mailing address at Mangatarem, Pangasinan and
home address at Maravilla St., Mangatarem, Pangasinan; that he
was a Filipino citizen and a security officer of the US Army with
the rank of a sergeant bearing AFUS Car No. H-2711659; that he
was married to Milagros Bautista; and that his initial deposit was
P3,565.3.
Issue/Held
WON the action for recovery of damages instituted was
predicated upon crime or quasi-delict – YES.
There is a difference between the liability of an employer under
the RPC (subsidiary liability) and the employer's liability under
the Civil Code (primary liability) which is quasi-delictual or
tortious in character. Under the RPC, a criminal action to
prove the employee's criminal negligence must first be
instituted before the employer's subsidiary liability can be
proceeded against. In this case, there was no criminal action
because the defendant (driver of the bus) died. Thus,
petitioner's subsidiary liability has no leg to stand on
considering that their liability is only secondary. Logically
therefore, recourse under this remedy is not possible.
On the other hand, Article 2716 and 2180 (culpa aquiliana)
holds the employer primarily liable for the acts of its
employees subject to the defense that it exrcised the diligence
of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of
its employees. Spouses Federico failed to prove that it
exercise the diligence required in supervising its employees,
especially with regard to their driving habits and reaction to
actual traffic conditions.
WON CA erred in holding Go and bank co-equally liable?
No.
Go and the bank interposed the instant petition for review on
certiorari arguing primarily that the employer bank may not be
held "co-equally liable" to pay nominal damages in the
absence of proof that it was negligent in the selection of and
supervision over its employee. In crimes and quasi-delicts, the
defendant shall be liable for all damages which are the natural
and probable consequences of the act or omission
complained of. It is not necessary that such damages have
been foreseen or could have reasonably been foreseen by the
defendant.10 As Go's negligence was the root cause of the
complained inconvenience, humiliation and embarrassment,

MAXIMINO SOLIMAN, JR. V. HON. JUDGE RAMON
TUAZON
DOCTRINE:
The general rule is that the client (principal) is not liable for
employees of its contractor. There is no employee-
employer relationship between the principal and the
employee-security guards just because the principal
issues guidelines to the latter.
3 not apply, since the paragraph holds that teachers and heads of
The checks returned with notification that said checks were
altered. Go notified Baguio Philippine Constabulary. The
Constabulary invited Jazmin to Benguet camp for investigation.
Jazmin denied that he was the person whose name appeared on
the checks; that he received the same and that the signature on
the indorsement was his. He likewise denied that he opened an
account with Solidbank or that he deposited and encashed
therein the said checks. Eventually, the investigators found that
the person named "Floverto Jazmin" who made the deposit and
withdrawal with Solidbank was an impostor.
As a result, Jazmin filed a case in Pangasinan against Go and
Consolidated Bank and Trust (Solidbank). Defendants claim that
they act in good faith by reporting the incident to the
constabulary. Lower court found the bank and GO liable. The
defendants appealed to the IAC. IAC finding as evident
negligence Go's failure to notice the substantial difference in the
identity of the depositor and the payee in the check, concluded
that Go's negligence in the performance of his duties was "the
proximate cause why appellant bank was swindled" and that
denouncing the crime to the constabulary authorities "merely
aggravated the situation."
It ruled that there was a cause of action against the defendants
although Jazmin had nothing to do with the alteration of the
checks, because he suffered damages due to the negligence of
Go. Hence, under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the bank shall
be held liable for its manager's negligence.
Soliman was a student of Republic Central Colleges. While he
was in campus, Jimmy Solomon (a security guard under the
employment of RL Security Agency) shot him in the chest. He
was hospitalized and could not go to school for 4 months. After,
he filed a complaint against Solomon, RL Security Agency, and
the SCHOOL.
The school filed a motion to dismiss arguing that it is free from
any liability for Soliman’s injuries since the school was not the
security guard’s employer. It further argued that Art 2180 (7) did
establishment are liable for damages caused by their pupils or
apprentices. The security guard was not a pupil/ apprentice. The
trial court granted the motion to dismiss.
Go is liable to private respondents for damages.
Anent petitioner bank's claim that it is not "co-equally liable"
with Go for damages, under the fifth paragraph of Article 2180
of the Civil Code, "(E)mployers shall be liable for the damages
caused by their employees . . . acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks." Pursuant to this provision, the bank is
responsible for the acts of its employee unless there is proof
that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent the damage.11 Hence, the burden of proof lies upon
the bank and it cannot now disclaim liability in view of its own
failure to prove not only that it exercised due diligence to
prevent damage but that it was not negligent in the selection
and supervision of its employees. SC affirmed CA. Go as
branch manager and Solidbank as employer of Go are liable
to Jazmin.
WON the school can be held liable for Solomon’s acts (NO)
As a general rule, a client or customer of a security agency has
no hand in selecting who among the pool of security guards
or watchmen employed by the agency shall be assigned to it;
the duty to observe the diligence of a good father of a family
in the selection of the guards cannot, in the ordinary course of
events, be demanded from the client whose premises or
property are protected by the security guards. The fact that a
client company may give instructions or directions to the
security guards assigned to it, does not, by itself, render the
client responsible as an employer of the security guards
concerned and liable for their wrongful acts or omissions.
Those instructions or directions are ordinarily no more than
requests commonly envisaged in the contract for services
entered into with the security agency. There being no
employer-employee relationship between the Colleges and
Jimmy Solomon, petitioner student cannot impose vicarious
liability upon the Colleges for the acts of security guard
Solomon. Neither can 2180 apply since the security guard is

CASTILEX INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION vs. VASQUEZ
and CEBU DOCTORS HOSPITAL, INC.
DOCTRINE:
Whether or not engaged in any business or industry, an
employer is liable for the torts committed by employees
within the scope of his assigned tasks. But it is necessary
to establish the employer-employee relationship; once
this is done, the plaintiff must show, to hold the employer
liable, that the employee was acting within the scope of
his assigned task when the tort complained of was
committed. It is only then that the employer may find it
4
necessary to interpose the defense of due diligence in the
selection and supervision of the employee.
ARMANDO JOSE VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
DOCTRINE: Before the presumption of the employer's
negligence in the selection and supervision of its
employees can arise, the negligence of the employee
must first be established.
5 of the Ford Escort survived, but he became blind on the left eye
At around 1:30 to 2am, Romeo Vasquez was counterflow driving
a Honda motorcycle around Osmeña Rotunda. Benjamin Abad,
manager of Castillex Industrial, was driving a company owned
Toyota Hi-Lux. He drove the company car out of the parking lot
of Goldie’s Restaurant where he ate snacks with some friends
and then counterflowed around Osmeña Rotunda as well.
Vasquez and Abad collided with each other causing severe
injuries to the Vasquez. Abad brought him to the hospital but he
later died.
The parents of Vasquez instituted an action for damages against
Abad and Castillex.
A bus owned by operator Manila Central Bus Lines Corp (MCL)
and driven by Jose collided with a red Ford Escort driven by
Macarubo on MacArthur Highway in Valenzuela. The bus was
bound for Muntinlupa, while the Ford Escort was bound for
Malanday on the opposite lane. The left side of the Ford Escort's
hood was damaged while Macarubo and a passenger were
seriously injured. Jose rushed the two to the hospital but
Macarubo fell into a coma and died 5 days later. The passenger
which had to be removed. He also had a fracture on the forehead
and multiple lacerations on his face. Cases were filed against
MCL but all were dismissed.
neither a pupil or apprentice of the school. [However, the SC
remanded the case because even if Art 2180 does not apply,
the school may be liable based on its contractual obligation to
its student, see PSBA v CA]
WON Castillex should be vicariously liable with Abad. NO
The mere fact that Abad was using a company vehicle at the
time of the accident is not sufficient to charge Castillex with
liability for the negligence of its employee unless it appears
that he was operating the vehicle within the course or scope
of his employment.
In this case, prior to the accident Abad went to Goldie’s
Restaurant, 7km away from Castillex’s office, to have snacks
and chat with friends. The accident also happened around
2am, way beyond the normal working hours. Thus Abad was
engaged in affairs of his own or was carrying out a personal
purpose not in line with his duties at the time of the accident;
being in Goldie’s Restaurant—which was known to be a haven
for prostitutes, pimps, drug pushers and addicts—has no
connection to Castillex’s business nor Abad's duties as a
manager. In fact using the company vehicle for personal
purposes was only a form of a fringe benefit or one of the
perks attached to his position.
Since there is no evidence that Abad was acting within the
scope of the functions entrusted to him, Castillex had no duty
to show that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family. Thus Castillex is relieved of vicarious liability for the
consequences of the negligence of Abad.
Is MCL liable? No.
Contrary to the passenger's position, the bus was in its proper
lane. After coming from a party, the Ford Escort broke down
before reaching the Highway because of a detached cross-
joint which controls the manueverability of the vehicle. The
cross-joint was not replaced, it was just welded together.
Given such fact, the likelihood is that while the Ford Escort
might not have been overtaking another vehicle, it actually
strayed into the bus lane because of the defective cross-joint,
causing its driver to lose control of the vehicle.
Before the presumption of the employer's negligence in the
selection and supervision of its employees can arise, the
negligence of the employee must first be established. In this
case, private respondents failed to prove their allegation of
negligence against driver Armando Jose who, in fact, was

VICTORY LINER, INC. v. HEIRS OF ANDRES
MALECDAN
DOCTRINE: Employer has the burden of proof to show
that it exercised due diligence in the selection and
supervision of employees. In selection of prospective
employees, employers are required to examine them as to
their qualifications, experience and service records. With
respect to the supervision of employees, employers must
formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their
implementation and impose disciplinary measures for
6 breaches thereof. Concrete proofmust be shown including
documentary evidence.
DELSAN TRANSPORT LINES VS. C& A M/V Delsan Express, a ship owned and operated by Delsan
CONSTRUCTION
DOCTRINE: Employers shall be liable for the damages
caused by their employees and household helpers acting
within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the
former are not engaged in any business or industry.
Whenever an employees negligence causes damage or
injury to another, there instantly arises a presumption juris
tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi
patris families in the selection (culpa in eligiendo) or
7
supervision (culpa in vigilando) of its employees. To avoid
liability for a quasi-delict committed by his employee, an
employer must overcome the presumption by presenting
convincing proof that he exercised the care and diligence
of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision
of his employee.
Andres Malecdan was a 75 year-old farmer in Isabela. On July
15, 1994, while Andres was crossing the National Highway on his
way home from the farm, a Dalin Liner bus on the southbound
lane stopped to allow him and his carabao to pass. However, as
Andres was crossing the highway, a bus of petitioner Victory
Liner, driven by Ricardo C. Joson, Jr., bypassed the Dalin bus.
In so doing, respondent hit the old man and the carabao on
which he was riding. As a result, Andres Malecdan was thrown
off the carabao, while the beast toppled over. The Victory Liner
bus sped past the old man, while the Dalin bus proceeded to its
destination without helping him.
Transport Lines, is anchored at the Navotas Fish Port for the
purpose of installing a cargo pump and clearing the cargo oil
tank. At 12am, Capt. Jusep received a report that a typhoon is
going to hit Manila in 8 hours. At 8:15am they tried to seek shelter
in North Harbor but could not enter the area because it was
congested. Thus, at 10am, he decided to just drop the anchor
near Vitas, Tondo Manila (where the deflector wall construected
by C&A Construction is located). When the waves got to 10 feet,
Capt. Jusep decided to to go full ahead towards the Napocor
power barge. To avoid collision , Jusep ordered a full stop and
succeeded in avoinding the barge. However, when they re-
started the ship, the ship manuevered full stern and hit the
deflector wall. Capt. Jusep now uses as defense the emergency
rule to avoid paying for damages to C&A Construction.
acquitted in the case for criminal negligence arising from the
same incident.
Whether Victory Liner is liable for the employee's
negligent act.
Yes, Victory Liner is liable. The bus company presented
results of Joson, Jr.s written examination, actual driving tests,
x-ray examination,psychological examination, NBI clearance,
physical examination, hematology examination, urinalysis,
student driver training, shop training, birth certificate, high
school diploma and reports from the General Maintenance
Manager and the Personnel Manager showing that he had
passed all the tests and training sessions and was ready to
work as a professional driver. However, as the trial court
noted, petitioner did not present proof that Joson, Jr. had nine
years of driving experience.Petitioner also presented
testimonial evidence that drivers of the company were given
seminars on driving safety at least twice a year. Again,
however, as the trial court noted there is no record of Joson,
Jr. ever attending such a seminar. Petitioner likewise failed to
establish the speed of its buses during its daily trips or to
submit in evidence the trip tickets, speed meters and reports
of field inspectors. The finding of the trial court that petitioners
bus was running at a very fast speed when it overtook the
Dalin bus and hit the deceased was not disputed by petitioner.
1. W/N Capt. Jusep is negligent? YES
2. W/N Delsan Transport Lines, as employer, is solidarily liable
with Capt. Jusep? YES
1. Capt. Jusep is negligent for only deciding to take shelter 8
hours after receiving a report that a typhoon would hit Manila
in 8 hours. When he ignored the weather report
notwithstanding reasonable foresight of harm, Capt. Jusep
showed an inexcusable lack of care and caution which an
ordinary prudent person would have observed in the same
situation. Had he moved the vessel earlier, he could have had
greater chances of finding a space at the North Harbor
considering that the Navotas Port where they docked was
very near North Harbor. Clearly, the emergency rule is not
applicable to the instant case because the danger where Capt.
Jusep found himself was caused by his own negligence.
2. M/V Delsan Express raised the defense was that it
exercised due diligence in the selection of Capt. Jusep
because the latter is a licensed and competent Master
Mariner. It should be stressed, however, that the required

CEREZO v. TUAZON
DOCTRINE:
The responsibility of two or more persons for a quasi-
delict is solidary. Where there is a solidary obligation on
the part of debtors, each debtor is liable for the entire
obligation. Hence, each debtor is liable to pay for the
obligation in full.
8
An employer’s liability based on a quasi-delict is primary
and direct, while his liability based on a delict is merely
subsidiary. The words “primary and direct”, as contrasted
with “subsidiary,” refer to the remedy provided by law for
enforcing the obligation rather than the character and
limits of obligation. Altho liability under Art. 2180
originates from negligent act of employee, the aggrieved
party may sure employer directly.
YAMBAO VS. ZUNIGA
DOCTRINE: When an employee, while performing his
duties, causes damage to persons or property due to his
own negligence, there arises the juris tantum presumption
that the employer is negligent, either in the selection of the
employee or in the supervision over him after the
9
selection. For the employer to avoid the solidary liability
for a tort committed by his employee, an employer must
rebut the presumption by presenting adequate and
convincing proof that in the selection and supervision of
his employee, he or she exercises the care and diligence
of a good father of a family.
A Country Bus lines passenger bus driven by Foronda collided
with the tricycle driven by plaintiff Tuazon in Pampanga. Plaintiff
was driving on the right lane while Foronda drove the bus without
regard to the traffic rules and regulation, there being a sign “slow
down.” Plaintiff’s thumb and middle fingers were cut.
Cecilia Yambao is the registered owner of the passenger bus
being driven by Venturina which bumped Zuiga, a pedestrian.
Zuiga died.
Private respondents, as heirs of the victim, filed a Complaint
against Yambao and Venturina for damages alleging that
Venturina drove the bus in a reckless, careless and imprudent
manner, in violation of traffic rules and regulations, without due
regard to public safety.
Yambao answered that she was not liable for any damages
because as an employer, she exercised the proper diligence of a
good father of a family, in the selection and supervision of her
bus driver.
diligence of a good father of a family pertains not only to the
selection, but also to the supervision of employees. It is not
enough that the employees chosen be competent and
qualified, inasmuch as the employer is still required to exercise
due diligence in supervising its employees. The petitioner
presented no evidence that it formulated rules/guidelines for
the proper performance of functions of its employees and that
it strictly implemented and monitored compliance therewith.
Failing to discharge the burden, petitioner should therefore be
held liable for the negligent act of Capt. Jusep.
W/N Cerezo (bus owner) is liable under Art. 2180 - YES.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of
their assigned tasks even though the former are not engaged
in a business/industry. (Mention 1st par. doctrine) HENCE,
MRS. CEREZO IS LIALE TO PAY THE ENTIRE OBLIGATION
IN FULL. Tuazon may collect damages from Mrs. Cerezi alone.
(Mention par. 2 of doctrine) The law presumes that the
employer himself committed an act of negligence in not
preventing or avoiding the damage. Also, there’s no need for
the court to acquire jurisdiction over Mrs. Cerezo.
WON Yambao is liable? – Yes
*DOCTRINE
Yambao has failed to rebut the presumption of negligence.
She failed to present convincing proof that she went to this
extent of verifying Venturina's qualifications, safety record,
and driving history.
She did not present any proof that she drafted and
implemented training programs and guidelines on road safety
for her employees, or required them to attend periodic
seminars on road safety and traffic efficiency.
 SPS. HERNANDEZ and JUAN GONZALES vs. SPS.
DOLOR, et al.
DOCTRINE:
If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions
of Article 2180 are applicable. The obligation imposed by
Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible. Employers shall be liable for the damages
caused by their employees and huousehold helpers acting
within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the
former are not engaged in any business or industry.
10
ERNESTO MARTIN VS. COURT OF APPEALS
DOCTRINE:
It necessary to establish emloyer-employee relationship
before an employer may be held liable for the acts of his
employees within the latter's scope of assigned task
11
An owner-type jeepney owned by Boyet Dolor, Jr was traversing
the road of Batangas when it collided with a passenger jeepney
driven by Juan Gonzales and owned by Francisco Gonzales. As
a result of the collission, the owner-type jeepney was totally
wrecked and resulted in the death of Boyet Dolor Jr and his
passenger Oscar Valmocina with several injuries to 3
passengers. Likewise, several passengers of the passenger
jeepney also suffered physical injuries.
The accident prompted the filing of an action against the
Hernandez spouses alleging negligence and lack of care in the
selection and supervision of their employees. Spouses Gonzales
countered claiming that Gonzales was not their driver-employee
as he only leased the passenger jeepney on a daily basis, hence
they were not liable.
During the trial, the following were established:
- The owner type jeep was travelling at a moderate speed
- The passenger jeepney was travelling fast when it bumped into
the owner
- Petitioner Juan Gonzales obtained his professional driver’s
license only 3 monthes before the accident occurred.
- Hernandez spouses leases the jeep to the driver on a daily
basis.
Ernesto Martin was the owner of a private car. One day, while the
said car was being driven by a certain Nestor Mendoza, it
crashed into a Meralco electric post on Valley Golf, Antipolo
Rizal. The car was wrecked and the pole was severely damaged.
Meralco then demanded reparation from Ernesto, but the latter
denied refused to pay.
Whether Hernandez Spouses are solidarily liable with
Gonzales, although they were not in the passenger
jeepney driven by the latter when the accident occured? –
YES
Even though they were not in the jeep during the accident,
they are still answerable under several provisions of the Civil
Code namely:
Article 2180… employers shall be liable for the damages
caused by their employees and household helpers acting
within the scope of their assigned tasks, even thought eh
former are not engaged in any business or activity
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for
the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a
quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter
While the above provisions do not expressly provide for the
solidary liability, they should be read in consonance with
Article 2180 – one can be liable for the acts or omission of
another whom he is responsible for, meaning that an employer
is accountable for the actions of his employees. Article 2194
categorically states that responsibility of two or more persons
who are liable for quasi-delict is solidary. The Hernandez
spouses maintained that Julian Gonzales is not their employee
because the latter pays them daily for the use of the jeepney.
They argued that they are practicing a lease agreement using
the “boundary system”. SC held that there exists an employer-
employee relationship because by agreeing to the Hernandez,
there would be a villation of the Public Service Law and we are
going to place the riding public at the mercy of reckless and
irresponsible drivers because most drivers are in no position
to pay for damages when accidents occur.
Whether Ernesto may deemed liable, as an employer, for
the acts of Nestor—No
Ernesto may not be held liable for the acts of Nestor, because
there was no showing that an employee-employer relationship
existed.
The employer, under Art. 2180, is liable for the torts committed
by his employees within the scope of their assigned task
whether or not engaged in any business or industry. But it is
necessary first to establish the employment relationship.
Once proven to exist, the plaintiff must show, to hold the
employer liable, that the employee was acting within the

FILAMER CHRISTIAN INSTITUTE V. COURT OF
APPEALS
DOCTRINE:
There is no employer-employee relationship between
students on the one hand, and schools.. on the other,
where students work for the latter in exchange for the
privilege to study free of charge.
12
Potenciano Kapunan, Sr., 82 yrs old retired schoolteacher (now
deceased) was struck by the jeep owned by petitioner Filamer
and driven by its alleged employee, Funtecha as Kapunan Sr was
walking along Roxas Avenue, Roxas City at 6:30pm of Oct 20,
1977. Funtecha was a working student at the Filamer Christian
Institute. He was assigned as the school janitor. As a result of
the accident, Kapunan was hopitalized for a total of 20 days. At
the time of accident, the jeep only had one headlight functioning
and that Funtecha only had a student driver's permit.
Meralco then sued Ernesto for damages in the RTC alleging
among others that he was liable because he was the employer
of Nestor Martin. The RTC ruled in favor of Meralco. Now,
Ernesto contends that Nestor was not his employee, hence we
was not liable for the damages caused by Nestor.
scope of his assigned task when the tort complained of was
committed.
In the case at bar, no evidence was adduced by Meralco to
show that the defendant was the employer of Nestor at the
time of the accident. The trial court merely presumed the
existence of the employer-employee relationship and held that
the petitioner had not refuted that presumption.
The employer-employee relationship cannot be presumed, it
was necessary for Meralco to establish it by evidence.
Meralco had the burden of proof, or the duty to present
evidence on the fact in issue necessary to establish his claim.
It was enough for Ernesto to deny the alleged employer
relationship, without more, for he was not under obligation to
prove this negative averment.
W/N Filamer is liable as Funtecha's employer - No.
Filamer is not liable. Art 2180 provides that "xxx Employers
shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned
tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry."
In disclaiming responsibility, Filamer invoked Section 14, Rule
X of Book III of Labor Code which reads:
Sec 14. Working Scholars - There is no employer-employee
relationship between students on the one hand, and schools..
on the other, where students work for the latter in exchange
for the privilege to study free of charge..."
Thus, Filamer cannot be considered as Funtecha's employer.
Funtecha belongs to the category of students who render
service to the school in exchange for free tuition. Funtecha
worker for petitioner for 2 hrs daily for 5 days a week and
assigned to clean the school passageways from 4-6am with
sufficient time to prepare for his 730am classes. He was not
included in the company payroll. Moreover, at the time of
accident, he was not acting within the scope of his supposed
employment. Taking the wheels of jeep was not within the
ambit of the janitorial serevices for which he was employed.
Note: This ruling was reversed in Filamer v IAC (1992) - Filamer
is liable.He need not have an official appointment for a driver's
position in order that petitioner may be held responsible for
his grossly negligent aact, it being sufficient that the act of
driving at the time of the incident was for the benefit of the
petitioner.
 METRO MANILA TRANSIT CORP. VS. COURT OF
APPEALS
DOCTRINE: In order that the defense of due diligence in
the selection and supervision of employees may be
deemed sufficient and plausible, it is not enough to
emptily invoke the existence of said company guidelines
and policies on hiring and supervision. As the negligence
if the employees gives rise to the presumption of
negligence on the part of the employer, the latter has the
burden of proving that it has been diligent not only in the
selection of employees but also in the actual supervision
of their work. The mere allegation of the existence of hiring
procedures and supervisory policies, without anything
more, is decidedly not sufficient to overcome
presumption.
13
FILIPINAS BROADCASTING SYSTEM VS. AMEC-
BCCM DOCTRINE: Joint torfteasors are all persons who
command, instigate, promote, encourage, advise,
countenance. cooperate in, aid or abet the commission
of a tort or who approve of it after it is done, if done for
14 their benefit. The corporation which operates the radio
station, and who 18 the employer of the radio hosts, is
solidarily [fable to pay for damages arising from libelous
broadcasts.
At about 6 o’clock in the morning of August 28, 1979, Nenita
Custodia boarded as a paying passenger a public utility jeepney,
then driven by Agudo Calebag and owned by Victoriyano
Lamayo, bound for her work at Dynetics Incorporated located in
Bicutan, Taguig, Manila, where she then worked as a machine
operator. While the Jeepney was travelling at (a) fast clip along
DBP Avenue, another fast moving behicle, a Metro Manila Transit
Corp. (MMTC , for short) bus driven by Gedofredo Leonardo was
negotiating Honeydew Road, Manila bound for its terminal in
Bicutan. As both vehicles approached the intersection of DBP
Avenue and Honeydew Road they failed to slow down; neither
did they blow their horns to warn approaching vehicles. As a
consequence, Custodia sustained physical injuries and she was
brought to Medical City Hospital where she regained
consciousness only after 1 week. She was then confined and
was unable to work for 3 and a half months. Thus, a complaint
for damages was filed by Custodia, who being a minor was
assisted by her parents, against all the defendants following their
refusal to pay expenses incurred by the former as a result of the
collision. The court held that both drivers of the colliding vehicles
concurrently negligent for non-observance of appropriate traffic
rules and regulations and for failure to take the usual precautions
when approaching an intersection. As joint tortfeasors, both
drivers, as well as defendant Lamayo, were held solidarily liable
for damages sustained by plaintiff Custodio. It also dismissed the
complaint against MMTC on the ground that it was not only
careful and diligent in choosing and screening applicants for job
openings but was also strict and diligent in supervising its
employees.
Carmelo Rima (Rima) and Hermogenes Alegre (Alegre) host a
radio documentary wherein they exposed various alleged
complaints from students, teachers and parents against the Ago
Medical and Educational Center-Bicol Christian College of
Medicine (AMEC) and its administrators. Claiming that the
broadcasts were defamatory, AMEC and Angelita Ago (Ago),
Dean of AMEC’S College of Medicine, filed a complaint for
damages against Rima, Alegre and Filipinas Broadcasting
Network, Inc. (FBNI). AMEC and Ago included FBNI as defendant
for allegedly failing to exercise due diligence in the selection and
supervision of its employees, particularly Rima and Alegre. FBNI
WON MMTC exercised due diligence and would absolved
them from vicarious liability
Ruling:
No, MMTC failed to prove that it exercised due diligence in the
selection and supervision of its employees. Hence, not
absolved from vicarious liability. The law provides that
employers shall be liable for damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of
their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged
in any business or industry. This responsibility shall cease
when it is approved that they observed all the diligence of a
good father of a family to prevent damage.
In order that the defense of due diligence in the selection and
supervision of employees may be deemed sufficient and
plausible, it is not enough to emptily invoke the existence of
said company guidelines and policies on hiring and
supervision. As the negligence of the employee gives rise to
the presumption of negligence on the part of the employer, the
latter has the burden of proving that it has been diligent not
only in the selection of employees but also in the actual
supervision of their work. The mere allegation of the existence
of hiring procedures and supervisory policies, without
anything more, is decidedly not sufficient to overcome
presumption. In the case at hand, the petitioner’s attempt to
prove its diligentissimi patris familias in the selection and
supervision of employees through oral evidence must fail as it
was unable to buttress the same with any other evidence,
object or documentary, which might obviate the apparent
biased nature of the testimony. There is not enough evidence
on record as would overturn the presumption of negligence,
and for failure to submit all evidence within its control.
Assuming the putative existence thereof, petitioner MMTC
must suffer the consequences of its own inaction and
indifference.
ISSUE: WON FBNI is solidarily liable with Rima and Alegre
for payment of moral damages, attorney’s fees and costs
of suit.
HELD: YES. As operator of DZRC-AM and employer of Rima
and Alegre, FBNI is solidarily liable to pay for damages arising
from the libelous broadcasts. An employer and employee are
solidarily liable for a defamatory statement by the employee
within the course and scope of his or her employment. Also,
there is insufficient evidence on record that FBNI exercised
due diligence in the selection and supervision of its

ESTACION vs. BERNARDO
DOCTRINE:
For an employer to have exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family, the mere possession of a professional
drivers license will not suffice. There must be an
examination of the qualifications, experience and record
of service. In addition, supervison must show the
formulation of training programs and guidelines on road
15
safety for the driver.
MERCURY DRUG CORP. AND DEL ROSARIO VS.
SPOUSES HUANG
DOCTRINE: The liability of the employer under Art. 2180
of the Civil Code is direct or immediate – it is not
conditioned on a prior recourse against the negligent
employee, or a prior showing of insolvency of such
employee. It is also joint and solidary with the employee.
16
filed a separate Answer claiming that it exercised due diligence
in the selection and supervision of Rima and Alegre. FBNI
claimed that before hiring a broadcaster, the broadcaster should
(1) file an application; (2) be interviewed; and (3) undergo an
apprenticeship and training program after passing the interview.
FBNI likewise claimed that it always reminds its broadcasters to
observe truth, fairness and objectivity in their' broadcasts and to
refrain from using libelous and indecent language. Moreover,
FBNI requires all broadcasters to pass the Kapisanan ng mga
Brodkaster sa Pilipinas (KBP) accreditation test and to secure a
KBP permit.
Noe boarded a Ford Fiera passenger jeepney driven by
Quinquillera, owned by Bandoquillo, and sat on an extension
seat. He offered his seat when a woman rode the jeepney and
since it was full, he hung or stood on the left rear carrier of the
vehicle. When again the jeepney attempted to pick up
passengers, an Isuzu cargo truck, owned and driven by
Gerosano, hit the rear end portion of the Fiera. It smashed Noe
against the Fiera crushing his legs and feet resulting to the
amputation of his lower left leg. The MCTC found Gerosano liable
for reckless imprudence in a criminal case. The RTC found
Gerosano and Estacion, the registered owner of the truck, jointly
and solidarily liable for damages in a civil case.
Huang was driving his car when he got into an accident with the
truck of Mercury Drug driven by Del Rosario. Huang’s car was on
the left innermost lane while the truck was on the next lane to his
right. The truck swerved to its left and slammed the front right
side of the car. As a consequence, the car was wrecked and
Huang incurred serious injuries. Despite a series of operations,
Stephen Huang became paralyzed from chest down.
At the time of the accident, Del Rosario had only a traffic violation
receipt (TVR) because his license was confiscated for reckless
driving. The parents of Stephen Huang faulted Del Rosario for
committing gross negligence and reckless imprudence, and
Mercury Drug for failing to exercise the diligence of a good father
of a family in the selection and supervision of its driver.
employees, particularly Rima and Alegre. FBNI merely showed
that it exercised diligence in the selection of its broadcasters
without introducing any evidence to prove that it observed the
same diligence in the supervision of Rima and Alegre.
The proximate cause was the negligent driving of Gerosano
because of the speed and faulty brake. However, Noe’s act of
standing on the rear carrier amounts to a contributory
negligence by exposing himself to bodily injury. In addition,
Quinquillera, the Fiera driver, is also negligent because of
overloading and allowing a passenger to stand on the rear
portion. This raises a presumption of negligence on the part of
his employer, Bandoquillo who is primarily and solidarily liable
for the quasi-delict committed by the driver. There was a
failure to show also that he examined driver’s qualifications,
experience and service records, and the fact that the driver
was efficient when he joined the driver in his first two trips
would not conclusively establish the absence of recklessness.
Considering the contributory negligence, damages must
therefore be distributed in a 20-80 ratio; hence from the award
of the court, 20% should be deducted and the 80% is to be
paid by Gerosano, Estacion, Bandoquillo and Quinquillera
jointly and solidarily.
WON Mercury Drug is liable jointly and solidarily as
employer of Del Rosario? – YES.
Mercury Drug is jointly and solidarily liable with Del Rosario as
an employer. In order to be relieved of such liability, Mercury
should have exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family, both in the selection and supervision of the employee
in the performance of his duties. Mercury Drug failed in both
aspects.
In this case, it was shown that Del Rosario did not take a
driving test and a psychological exam when he applied for the
position of a truck driver. Mercury also did not present Del
Rosario’s NBI and police clearances. The last seminar
attended by the driver was 12 years ago before the accident.
Lastly, Mercury did not have a back-up driver for long trips.
When the accident happened, Del Rosario has been out on
the road for more than 13 hours.
 WALTER SMITH CO. v. CADWALLER GIBSON
LUMBER CO. (not in the book)
DOCTRINE: When an injury is caused by the negligence
of a servant or employee, there arises a presumption that
there was negligence on the part of the master or
employer whether in the selection of the servant or
employee, or in supervision over him after the selection or
both. The presumption may be rebutted. It follows
necessarily that if the employer shows to the satisfaction
of the court that in selection and supervision he has
exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a
family, the presumption is overcome and he is relieved
from liability.
17
MAXION v. MANILA RAILROAD CO. (not in the book)
DOCTRINE: The acts done by Ramirez (the employee),
which caused the damages, were in effect approved by
his superiors, in representation of the company itself, and
that so far from exercising the diligence of a good father
of a family to avert the threatened damage to the plaintiff's
crops after the dam was destroyed, no steps were taken
by the company to avert that damage, and the persons
most interested were not themselves permitted to repair
18
the dam. The responsibility of the company must therefore
be considered not to be affected by the circumstance that
due care had been used in the original choice of the agent.
In the course of its maneuvers to moor at Walter Smith's wharf,
the steamer belonging to Cadwallader struck said wharf partially
demolishing it and throwing the timber piled thereon onto the
water. This led Smith to bring an action for damages against
Cadwallader for partial demoltion of the wharf.
The trial court held that Cadwallader is not liable for the collapse
of the wharf since the partial demolition was due to the excessive
weight of the timber piled thereon and bad conditions of the
wharf. Evidence shows that the wharf was repaired in 1925. The
repairs consisted in replacing 6 bents of piles leaving more than
9 old bents of piles without being replaced. It held that the mere
fact that it was hit by the steamer does not necessarily mean that
the destruction of the wharf was caused by the strong impact.
Smith contends that there was negligence on the part of the
captain of the ship.
This action was instituted by the plaintiff, Demetrio Maxion, to
recover a sum of money of the defendant, the Manila Railroad
Company, for damage alleged to have been incurred by the
plaintiff in the years 1911-1912, from the destruction of an intake
dam on the Bued River and the consequent diversion of water
from an irrigation system supplying the plaintiff's lands. The court
found the issues of the controversy favorably to the plaintiff,
and awarded to him the sum of P1,250, as damages to be
recovered of the Manila Railroad Company, with interest from
December 23, 1921, until paid. From the judgment the defendant
appealed.
Prior to September 18, 1911, an irrigation system known as the
Binday System has been used for supplying water to the lands
in San Fabian Pangasinan. The inhabitants of Binday have built
a crude but efficient wingdam to divert the necessary amount of
water from the Bued River to the canal. This allowed for a
sufficienty quantity of water from the river to the irrigation canal
for seasos when irrigation is needed.
During the afternoon and night of September 17, 1911, an
unusually heavy rainfall occurred in the watershed of the Bued
WON Cadwallader as employer is liable for damages? NO.
Cadwallader is not liable for damages. In case of an extra-
contractual liability, some fault personally imputable to the
defendant must exist. When injury is caused by the negligence
of an employee, there instantly arises a presumption that there
was negligence on the part of the employer whether in the
selection of the employee or supervision over him after the
selection, or both. The presumption, however, may be
rebutted. If the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court
in the selection and supervision that he has exercised the care
and diligence of a good father of a family, then the
presumption is overcome and he is relieved from liability. In
this case, the presumption is rebutted. The captain and all
officers of the steamer were duly licensed and authorized to
hold their respective positions at the time when the wharf
collapsed and that said captain, officers an all members of the
crew have been chosen for their reputed skill in directing and
navigating the steamer Helen C, safely, carefully, and
efficiently. The evidence shows that Captain Lasa at the time
the plaintiff's wharf collapse was a duly licensed captain,
authorized to navigate and direct a vessel of any tonnage, and
that the appellee contracted his services because of his
reputation as a captain, according to Cadwallader. This being
so, we are of opinion that the presumption of liability against
the defendant has been overcome by the exercise of the care
and diligence of a good father of a family in selecting Captain
Lasa, and the defendant is therefore absolved from all liability.
W/N Manila Railroad is liable to Maxion for the acts of Jose
Ramirez. - YES.
The supposed liability of the defendant company is derived
from acts done by Jose D. Ramirez, an employee of the
company of proven experience and long service; and it is
insisted that the defendant company had used due precaution
in placing him in the responsible position occupied by him at
the time those acts were done.
From this it is insisted that the company is entitled to the
benefit of the last paragraph of article 1903 of the Civil Code,
which provides that the responsibility of the master for the
negligent acts and omissions of his servant shall cease when
the master has exercised all the diligence of a good father of
a family to prevent the damage.
We are of the opinion, however, that the point is not well taken;
for it affirmatively appears in this case that the acts done by
Ramirez, which caused the damages, were in effect
approved by his superiors, in representation of the
company itself, and that so far from exercising the
River; as a result the river rose, overflowed the dam, and began
to undermine the buttresses of the bridge, threatening disaster
to the structure and serious damage to the railroad line. Because
of this, on the morning of September 1911, inspector Jose D.
Ramirez repaired to the place with 50 workment to look after the
bridge and take necessary measures to avoid further injury.
Ramirez then realized that if a breach were made in the center of
the dam, a greater quantity of water might find a vent in that
direction and the pressure against the bridge and embankment
would be relieved. He sent three men to the river to make an
opening in the damn near its center. When the opening was
made and the three stakes were removed, the water flowed
poured and the aperature widened until the whole dam was sept
away. The pressure against the bridge was releived and the
strucutre was saved from injury. The damage done to the bridge
and embankment was sufficent to keep a large gang of workent
at work for a period of about three weeks.
diligence of a good father of a family to avert the
threatened damage to the plaintiff's crops after the dam
was destroyed, no steps were taken by the company to
avert that damage, and the persons most interested were not
themselves permitted to repair the dam. The responsibility of
the company must therefore be considered not to be
affected by the circumstance that due care had been used
in the original choice of the agent.
From what has been said it results that the judgment appealed
from must be affirmed; and it is so ordered, with costs against
the appellant.

'As soon as the inhabitants of the barrio became aware of the

destruction of the dam, measures were at once taken to replace
it, as soon as the flood should abate, in conformity with the
custom of making repairs after floods. To this end material was
collected and brought to the spot, ready to be placed in position
for the reconstruction of the dam; but when the time came for
the work to begin, Jose D. Ramirez effectually opposed it, in the
belief no doubt that to replace the dam would again create a
danger to the bridge, in case of the occurrence of another flood.
As a result of this opposition on the part of the railroad
authorities, the inhabitants of Binday were compelled to desist
from the reconstruction of the dam.

There were witnesses to the act of Jose D. Ramirez in making

an opening in the dam and although Ramirez himself denies the
act, in which position he is supported by a few of his employees,
the great and even overwhelming preponderance of the evidence
shows that the dam was destroyed in the manner stated. There
is an equally great preponderance of proof showing that the
efforts of the inhabitants of Binday to reconstruct the dam were
opposed and thwarted by Jose D. Ramirez, with the approval of
higher officials of the company.

Among the lands dependent upon the Binday system for water
were three parcels belonging to the plaintiff, and upon which the
plaintiff had planted a crop of palay during the months of July
and August, and from which he would in all reasonable
probability have received a return of 250 betecs of palay. At the
prices then prevailing this quantity of palay would have given a
return of approximately P1,250. As this crop was completely
destroyed for lack of water, the trial judge awarded to the plaintiff
the sum of P1,250, as damages, to be recovered of the
defendant company, with interest from the date of the judgment
 ANURAN v. BUÑO (not in the book) In 1958, a passenger jeepney owned by Pedro Gahol and Luisa
Alcantara and driven by Pepito Buño, which was overloaded with
DOCTRINE: The principle about the "last clear chance" 14 passengers (the jeep was only designed to carry 11 people,
would call for application in a suit between the owners and the driver included), was parked on the road to Taal, Batangas in
drivers of the two colliding vehicles. It does not arise order to let a passenger alight. However, 1/2 of the jeepney was
where a passenger demands responsibility from the on the asphalted road, and a speeding motor truck owned by
carrier to enforce its contractual obligations. Maligaya and driven by Razon negligently bumped it from
behind, with such violence that three passengers died and two
others suffered injuries that required their confinement at the
Provincial Hospital for many days. Suits were instituted by the
representatives of the dead and of the injured, to recover
19 consequently damages against the driver and the owners of the
truck and also against the driver and the owners of the jeepney.
Both the Trial Court and CA exonerated the owners and driver of
the jeepney, holding liable only the owners and driver of the
truck.
GENSON v. ADARLE (not in the book) Arbatin was the successful bidder in a public auction of junk and
other unserviceable government property in the Highway District
DOCTRINE: Engineer’s Office of Roxas City. Arbatin then employed Adarle to
help him haul the junk. On a non-working day, when Adarle and
The Master-Servant doctrine in tort law cannot apply in Buensalido, the driver of the payloader, were at the site
the case at bar, since despite the fact that Buensalido, continuing to gather the junk, a bucket from the payloader fell
Genson’s employee, was “moonlighting” on a non- and injuredAdarle to the point of paralyzing his lower extremities.
working holiday, Buensalido’s arrangement with Arbatin Adarle instituted an action against Arbatin, Buensalido,
was purely private in nature, and had nothing to do with Marcelino (Civil Engineer), and Genson (Highway District
his being employed under Genson. Engineer).
Thus, absent the showing of malice, bad faith or gross RTC ruled in favor of Adarle.
negligence on the part of Genson, he cannot be held liable
20 for the acts committed by Buensalido and Arbatin. IAC modified the previous ruling, absolving Marcelino from
liability, and averring that the liability of Genson is based on fault,
by allowing Arbatin and his men to work on the premises on a
non-working day, in contravention of his office’s policy.
Petitioner Genson then appealed the decision to the SC, stating
that the facts upon which the IAC declared that his liability is
based on fault by allowing the men to work on a non-working
holiday is without basis. Furthermore, he contends that by filing
a suit against him, Adarle is then filing a suit against the Republic,
which violates the non-suability of the State.
Issue: W/N the owners and driver of the jeepney should also
be held liable to those who suffered injuries as a result of the
incident
YES. It must be remembered that the obligation of the carrier
to transport its passengers safely is such that the New Civil
Code requires "utmost diligence" from the carriers (Art. 1755)
who are "presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently, unless they prove that they have observed
extraordinary diligence" (Art. 1756). In this instance, this legal
presumption of negligence is confirmed by the Court of
Appeals' finding that the driver of the jeepney in question was
at fault in parking the vehicle improperly. It must follow that
the driver — and the owners — of the jeepney must answer
for injuries to its passengers.
The principle about the "last clear chance" would call for
application in a suit between the owners and drivers of the two
colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger
demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its
contractual obligations. For it would be inequitable to exempt
the negligent driver of the jeepney and its owners on the
ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence.
Whether or not Genson should be held liable, personally
or officially?
NO. With regard to the non-suability contention, Adarle filed a
suit against Genson personally, in his capacity as the Highway
District Engineer, and not the State or his office. As for the
main issue, there was no evidence to prove Genson’s
presence when the accident occurred, nor was there any
basis for the lower courts to hold that Genson was at fault by
authorizing Arbatin and his men to work on a non-working day.
It might even be proven that working on a Saturday for the
specific purpose of hauling junk would be the time when the
most work can be done, as it has less traffic. The Master-
Servant doctrine in tort law cannot apply either, since
despite the fact that Buensalido, Genson’s employee, was
“moonlighting” on a non-working holiday, Buensalido’s
arrangement with Arbatin was purely private in nature, and
had nothing to do with his being employed under Genson.
As to whether a public official may be liable in his personal
private capacity, it is only as to whatever damage he may
have caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith
beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction.
Examining the allegations of the complaint and reviewing the
evidence it would indeed be correct to say that petitioner was
sued in his official capacity, and that the most that was
imputed to him is act of culpable neglect, inefficiency and

MARTIN v. COURT OF APPEALS (not in the book)
DOCTRINE:
"HE WHO ALLEGES MUST PROVE - Employer-employee
relationship must be proven in an action under Art 2180"
The action was based on tort under Article 2180 of the
Civil Code, providing in part that: Employers shall be liable
for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged
in any business or industry. The above rule is applicable
only if there is an employer-employee relationship
although it is not necessary that the employer be
engaged in any business or industry. It differs in this
sense from Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, which
requires that the employer be engaged in an industry to
be subsidiarily liable for the felony committed by his
employee in the course of his employment.
21
gross indifference in the performance of his official duties.
Verily, this is not imputation of bad faith or malice, and what is
more was not convincingly proven." At any rate, there was no
malice, bad faith, or gross negligence on the part of Genson
to hold him liable for the acts of Buensalido and Arbatin.
1) Ernesto Martin was the owner of a private car. ISSUE: WON Existence of Employer-employee relationship
has to be proved under Art. 2180? YES
2) At around 2 o'clock in the morning of May 11, 1982, while
being driven by Nestor Martin, it crashed into a Meralco electric Held:
post on Valley Gold Road, in Antipolo, Rizal. 1) It is important to stress that the complaint for damages was
3)The car was wrecked and the pole severely damaged. Meralco filed by the private respondent against only Ernesto Martin as
subsequently demanded reparation from Ernesto Martin, but the alleged employer of Nestor Martin, the driver of the car at the
demand was rejected. time of the accident. Nestor Martin was not impleaded.
4) It thereupon sued him for damages in the Regional 2) The action was based on tort under Article 2180 of the Civil
Trial Court of Pasig, alleging inter alia that he was liable to it in Code, providing in part that:
the sum of P17,352.00 plus attorney's fees and litigation costs Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
as the employer of Nestor Martin. employees and household helpers acting within the
scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not
5) The trial court presumed that Nestor Martin was an employee engaged in any business or industry.
of Ernesto Martin
6) The petitioner's main defense was that Nestor Martin was not 3) The above rule is applicable only if there is an employer-
his employee. employee relationship although it is not necessary that the
employer be engaged in any business or industry. It differs in
this sense from Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, which
requires that the employer be engaged in an industry to be
subsidiarily liable for the felony committed by his employee in
the course of his employment.
Whether or not engaged in any business or industry, the
employer under Article 2180 is liable for the torts committed
by his employees within the scope of their assigned task.
4) But it is necessary first to establish the employment
relationship. Once this is done, the plaintiff must show, to hold
the employer liable, that the employee was acting within the
scope of his assigned task when the tort complained of was
committed. It is only then that the defendant, as employer,
may find it necessary to interpose the defense of due diligence
in the selection and supervision of the employee as allowed in
that article.
5) In the present case, the more plausible assumption is that
Nestor Martin is a close relative of Ernesto Martin and on the
date in question borrowed the car for some private purpose.
Nestor would probably not have been accommodated if he
were a mere employee for employees do not usually enjoy the
use of their employer's car at two o'clock in the morning.
As the employment relationship between Ernesto Martin and

VALENZUELA v. COURT OF APPEALS (not in the book)
DOCTRINE:
22
CUISON v. NORTON HARRISON CO. (not in the book)
DOCTRINE:
A contractor proved to be NOT an INDEPENDENT
CONTRACTOR will still be subject to the rule on vicarious
liability due to the fact that the contractor's performance
23
of his duties are still controlled by the employer.
Lourdes Valenzuela sustained injuries in a vehicular accident.
The accident arose when she was driving a blue Mitsubishi
Lancer from her restaurant. She was travelling along Aurora Blvd.
with her companion, Cecilia Ramon, heading towards the
direction of Manila. She noticed that she had a flat tire so she
parked along the sidewalk about 1 1/2 feet away and put on her
emergency lights and seekd help. When she was standing at the
left side of the rear of her car, she was suddenly bumped by a
1987 Mitsubishi Lancer driven by defendant Richard Li and
registered in the name of defendant Alexander Commercial, Inc.
As a result, Lourdes' left elg was severed up to the middle of her
thigh and needed a traumatic amputation. Li's defense was he
was driving at 55kph.
On the afternoon of August 9, 1928, Moises Cuison was on his
way to school when some pieces of lumber on a truck which
stopped fell on the boy and killed him. This truck was owned by
Antonio Ora and was driven by Felix Jose, Telesforo Binoya and
Francisco Bautista, the latter two being minors. The truck was
rented by Ora from Norton & Harrison Co. and he had the task of
loading and transporting lumber. The accident occured when the
lumber had become loosened and the same fell on the boy. It is
notable in this case Ora is merely a contractor of Norton &
Harrison as gleamed from the testimony presented in the case.
Nestor Martin could not be presumed, it was necessary for the
plaintiff to establish it by evidence. Meralco had the
burden of proof, or the duty "to present evidence on the fact
in issue necessary to establish his claim" as required by Rule
131, Section 1 of the Revised Rules ofCourt. Failure to do this
was fatal to its action.
Whether or not Alexander Commercial, Inc. as Li's
employer should be held liable. (YES)
The relationship in question is not based on the principle of
respondeat superior, which holds the master liable for acts of
the servant, but that of pater familias, in which the liability
ultimately falls upon the employer, for his failure to exercise
the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and
supervision of his employees. It is up to this point, however,
that out agreement with the respondent ends. Utilizing the
bonus pater familias standard expressed in Article 2180 of the
Civil Code, we are of the opinion that Li's employer, Alexander
Commercial, Inc. is jointly and solidarily liable for the damage
caused by the accident. Ordinarily, evidence demosntrating
that the employer has exercised diligent supervision of its
employee during the performance of the latter's assigned
tasks would be enough to relieve him of the liability imposed
by Article 2180 in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code. The
employer is not expected to exercise supervision over either
the employee's private activities or during the performance of
tasks either unsanctioned by the former or unrelated to the
employee's tasks. The case at bench presents a situation of a
different character, involving a practice utilized by large
companies with either their employees of managerial rank or
their representatives. Alexander Commercial, inc. has not
demonstrated, to our satisfaction, that it exercised the care
and diligence of a good father of the family in entrusting its
company car to Li.
W/N N&H (the employer of Ora) may be held liable for the
death of Cuison. YES. The basis of civil law liability is not
respondent superior but the relationship of panterfamilias.
This theory bases the liability of the master ultimately on his
own negligence and not on that of his servant. The defense of
independent contractor would be a valid one in the Philippines
just as it would be in the United States. However, in this case,
it was proven that Ora was not an INDEPENDENT
CONTRACTOR but a contractor nonetheless as it was shown
that the employer retained the power of directing and
controlling Ora's method of work. On the facts and the law,
Ora was not an independent contractor but was the servant of

DULAY v. COURT OF APPEALS (not in the book)
DOCTRINE: The liability of the employer under Article
2180 is direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon
prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior
showing of the insolvency of such employee. Therefore, it
is incumbent upon the private respondents to prove that
they exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in
the selection and supervision of their employee.
Furthermore, Article 2176 on quasi delicts does not only
24
cover acts of negligence but also acts that are intentional
and voluntary.
UYEHARA v. THE MANILA RAILROAD, CO. AND
BACHRACH GARAGE & TAXICAB, CO. (not in the book)
DOCTRINE: Where an injury is caused by the negligence
of a servant or employee of a public enterprise, there
instantly arises a presumption of law that there was
negligence on the part of the master or employer either in
the selection of the servant or employee or in supervision
over him after the selection, or both. But that presumption
may be rebutted. If, in such a case, the employer shows
to the satisfaction of the court that in the selection of the
employee and in his supervision over him he has
25 exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a
family, the presumption of negligence on his part is
overcome and he is relieved from liability. The Civil Code
bases the responsibility of the master in such cases
ultimately on his own negligence and not on that of his
servant.
In 1988, there was an ongoing carnival inside Alabang Village,
Muntinlupa called "Big Bang sa Alabang." Inside the carnival, an
altercation between Security Guard Torzuela and Atty. Dulay
occured. Torzuela shot and killed Dulay. Dulay's widow filed for
damages against Torzuela and SUPERGUARD, the employers of
Torzuela. SUPERGUARD filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that
Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay was beyond the scope of his
duties.
In January 1913, Yamada et al hired a taxi owned and operated
by Bachrach Garage so that they may travel to Cavite Viejo. The
trip was safe going to said place but when they were going back
from said place the taxi was hit by a train owned by Manila
Railroad. Yamada et al sued the driver, Bachrach, and Manila
Railroad. They claimed that the driver was negligent as he did
not slow down while he was approaching the railroad tracks. The
driver said there was no way for him to see the train coming
because of the tall growing bushes and trees. Bachrach said that
it is not liable as an employer because prior to hiring the driver,
the driver has been of good record for 5 years and had had no
traffic infractions prior to the collision; and that the negligence of
the driver is also imputable to Yamada et al they being the ones
in control of the vehicle; that Yamada et al should have controlled
the driver and instructed him to slow down. Manila Railroad said
that it is not liable as well because its engineers provided proper
warning signals on their approach and that there were no tall
trees or bushes at the time of the accident.
Yamada’s counsel presented the president of Bachrach who
alleged that all their drivers habitually drove their taxis over
railroad crossings without slowing down or investigating whether
a train is coming – such practice being allowed and tolerated by
Bachrach.
the defendant, and for his negligence defendant was
responsible.
WON SUPERGUARD is liable to the heirs of Dulay. YES.
The instant action is not ex-delicto (arising from the crime) but
an independent civil action based on Article 33. Thus, having
established this, the heirs of Dulay may proceed directly
against Torzuela and SAFEGUARD. Under Article 2180 of the
New Civil Code as aforequoted, when an injury is caused by
the negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a
presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of
the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or
employee, or in supervision over him after selection or both.
The liability of the employer under Article 2180 is direct and
immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior recourse against
the negligent employee and a prior showing of the insolvency
of such employee. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the private
respondents to prove that they exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their
employee. Furthermore, Article 2176 on quasi delicts does not
only cover acts of negligence but also acts that are intentional
and voluntary.
WON Bachrach Garage Manila railroad should be liable?
YES
It was established that the driver was negligent. A prudent
driver should have slowed down approaching a railroad
crossing regardless if he could see a train or not
regardless of the presence of tall bushes. Manila Railroad
and its employees are not negligent as showed by the
evidence which were uncontroverted hence no liability
can be had against them.
Bachrach Garage however is liable for damages as an
employer. Although they did establish that they have done
their diligence in properly selecting their driver and in
providing said driver with a good car, they have failed to
provide proper supervision and control over their
employee. Bachrach Garage did not perform its full duty
when it furnished a safe and proper car and a driver with
a long and satisfactory record. It failed to comply with one
of the essential requirements of the law of negligence in
this jurisdiction, that of supervision and instruction,
including the promulgation of proper rules and regulations
and the formulation and publication of proper instructions

BALIWAG TRANSIT v. COURT OF APPEALS (1996) (not
in the book)
DOCTRINE: Art. 1759. Common carriers are liable for the
death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence
or willfull acts of the former's employees, although such
employees may have acted beyond the scope of their
authority or in violation of the orders of the common
carriers.
This liability of the common carriers do not cease upon
proof that they exercised all the diligence of a good father
of a family in the selection or supervision of their
employees.
26
Garcia, and her five-year old son, Allan boarded Baliwag Transit
Bus bound for Cabanatuan City driven by Santiago. At about
7:30 PM, in Nueva Ecija, the bus passengers saw a cargo truck
parked at the shoulder of the national highway. Its left rear
portion jutted to the outer lane, as the shoulder of the road was
too narrow to accommodate the whole truck. A kerosene lamp
appeared at the edge of the road obviously to serve as a warning
device. The truck driver, Julio Recontique, and his helper, Arturo
Escala, were then replacing a flat tire. The truck is owned by
respondent A & J Trading. Bus driver Santiago was driving at an
inordinately fast speed and failed to notice the truck and the
kerosene lamp at the edge of the road. Santiago’s passengers
urged him to slow down but he paid them no heed. Santiago
even carried animated conversations with his co-employees
while driving. When the danger of collision became imminent, the
bus passengers shouted “Babangga tayo!.” Santiago stepped on
the brake, but it was too late. His bus rammed into the stalled
cargo truck. It caused the instant death of Santiago and Escala,
and injury to several others. Leticia and Allan were among the
injured passengers. The trial court and CA found all the
defendants liable.
for their guidance in cases where such rules and
regulations and instructions are necessary.
Whether Baliwag is Liable? YES
As a common carrier, Baliwag breached its contract of
carriage when it failed to deliver its passengers, Leticia and
Allan Garcia to their destination safe and sound. A common
carrier is bound to carry its passengers safely as far as human
care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of
a very cautious person, with due regard for all the
circumstances. In a contract of carriage, it is presumed that
the common carrier was at fault or was negligent when a
passenger dies or is injured. Unless the presumption is
rebutted, the court need not even make an express finding of
fault or negligence on the part of the common carrier. This
statutory presumption may only be overcome by evidence that
the carrier exercised extraordinary diligence as prescribed in
Articles 1733 and 1755 of the Civil Code. The records are
bereft of any proof to show that Baliwag exercised
extraordinary diligence. On the contrary, the evidence
demonstrates its driver's recklessness. Leticia Garcia testified
that the bus was running at a very high speed despite the
drizzle and the darkness of the highway. The passengers
pleaded for its driver to slow down, but their plea was ignored.
Leticia also revealed that the driver was smelling of liquor. She
could smell him as she was seated right behind the driver.
Another passenger, Felix Cruz testified that immediately
before the collision, the bus driver was conversing with a co-
employee. All these prove the bus driver's wanton disregard
for the physical safety of his passengers, which make Baliwag
as a common carrier liable for damages under Article 1759 of
the Civil Code.