Commentary

Abstract This commentary focuses on Cross’s (2010, this issue)

work as an opportunity to elaborate upon how to study narrative-
dialogical processes from the perspective of complexity. We start
by elaborating on the notion that narrative development is a
multidimensional activity that extends through several
organizational levels and on the limitations of conventional
research methods for narrative analysis. Following this, we focus
on our experience of research on narrative change in
psychotherapy in order to exemplify this point. From our
perspective, clients’ problematic self-narratives can be challenged
by the emergence of innovative ways of thinking and behaving
that the client narrates during the therapeutic conversation
(innovative moments or i-moments). Our results suggest that the
reconstruction of a person’s self-narrative depends on the
structure of relations between i-moments, rather than on the mere
accumulation of i-moments. Therefore, we are particularly
interested in looking at how clusters of i-moments create a
pattern, which we call protonarrative. We are interested in the
dynamic processes between former self-narrative, i-moments,
protonarratives and new emergent self-narratives. Hence, we
have developed a research strategy that allows tracking these
different levels of narrative development in psychotherapy. In the
remaining of our commentary we will briefly present our research
strategy.

Key Words antenarrative, dynamic systems, innovative

moments, narrative, protonarrative

António P. Ribeiro
University of Minho, Braga, Portugal
Tiago Bento
CINEICC/ISMAI, Maia, Portugal
Miguel M. Gonçalves
University of Minho, Braga, Portugal
João Salgado
CINEICC/ISMAI, Maia, Portugal

Self-Narrative Reconstruction in
Psychotherapy: Looking at Different
Levels of Narrative Development

Copyright © The Author(s), 2010. Reprints and permissions:

http://www.sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav
http://cap.sagepub.com/ Vol. 16(2): 195–212 [DOI: 10.1177/1354067X10361400]
Culture & Psychology 16(2)

Cross’s (2010) task is an ambitious one: to study narrative-dialogical

processes from the perspective of complexity. She makes a very good
point in highlighting the limitations of ‘conventional research
methods’ for psychological narratological analysis. From our perspec-
tive, these methods generally present two main limitations: a) they
tend to focus on content, privileging it over process; and b) they focus
on narratives abstracted from the conversational context that originates
them. Instead, a methodological toolbox aimed at studying narrative
processes within dialogical activity should a) focus on the micro-
analytical level of small meaning units; b) enable researchers to identify
and describe patterning and change processes along time; c) relate
them with contextual processes; and d) position narrative elements in
the context of communicational processes. These issues are at the
centre of Cross’s work and they will serve as general reference points
for our reflection upon studying narrative change processes.

Levels of Narrative Development

We are surrounded by a social and material world to which we
constantly adapt. This ever-changing surrounding poses challenges on
human experiencing and meaning-making processes that can only be
answered through an organizational activity of the organism (Valsiner,
2001). Several authors have claimed that human organization takes the
form of narratives (e.g., Bruner, 1986; McAdams, 1993; White & Epston,
1990).
Within this general framework, the idea that narrative development
is a multidimensional activity that extends through several organiz-
ational levels with different characteristics and functions is receiving
increasing attention (e.g., Salvatore, Dimaggio, & Semerari, 2004).
Globally, these proposals suggest a hierarchy from micro to molar-
levels of different narrative structures.

Organizational Narratives
As Vaihinger’s (1935) seminal work convincingly shows, our relation-
ship with the world has a fictional and practical nature. In this sense,
human experience is inexorably the realm of ‘as if’ since ‘the structure
of our relationship with things is always figurative’ (Marcos, 2001,
p. 21). In this largely undetermined figurative process of internal and
external worlds our experiences become condensed in the images
produced. However, these images, or representations, do not refer
exclusively to themselves or to the things they represent but, as they
refer to, or associate with, other images in a process that unfolds

196
 Ribeiro et al. Levels of Narrative Development in Psychotherapy

throughout time they become integrated in figurative networks that

constitute the structure of our experience. This basic and fundamen-
tally associative and pragmatic level may be conceptualized as a level
of ‘organizational narratives’ which Prado (1984, p. 118) describes as

the level at which there is a pre-conceptual sensuous manifold and a level

at which there is minimal objectification, one may also speak of a level at
which there is initial organization of the objectified elements. And that
organization may be spoken of as consisting of the phenomenological promi-
nence attained by some of those objectified elements of awareness.

In this sense, narrative is, first and foremost, a pragmatic and associ-
ative basic activity of human beings by which experiential domain gets
organized and may become meaningful. Association is, at this level, an
arbitrary process which, along experiential time, produces elementary
narratives. These elementary, non-linguistic associative narratives
become the basis for individual actions and so they will acquire their
meaning by their enactment in individual activity towards the world
or in the context of interpersonal communicational actions. It is their
pragmatic value that determines their extinction or substitution, or, on
the contrary, their expansion and transformation into more conceptual
and complex narratives (Mendes, 2001).

Antenarratives
Organizational narratives become more complex as they are used in
individual practices or communicational interactions. In this process
they can develop into more conceptual and linguistic narrative
elements. However, these narrative elements are not full-fledged narra-
tives yet since they do not meet the usual criteria for what constitutes
a complete narrative, as required by narrative theorists (e.g., Mandler,
1984). Several authors have postulated different notions of narrative
that seem to correspond broadly to this second level of narrative
organization. For instance, these narrative elements do not posses
‘temporal causal connections’ (Sundararajan, 2008, p. 246), nor
temporal closure given by the succession of a beginning, middle and
end (Boje, 2004). Boje, Rosile, Durant, and Luhman (2004) use the
concept of ‘antenarratives’ to refer to these ‘pre-stories that interweave
in complex and chaotic ways’ (p. 752). Antenarratives are ‘an account
of incidents or events, but narrative comes after and adds more “plot”
and tighter “coherence” to the story line’ (Boje, 2001, p. 293).
By the same token, antenarratives do not have any fixed or
‘determined meaning as they haven’t crystallized into a particular
experiential configuration’ (Lewin, 1997, p. 1). At this level, Boje and

197
Culture & Psychology 16(2)

Rosile (2003) emphasize the dynamicity of antenarratives, their

constant process of clustering and interconnection. In this process,
centripetal and centrifugal movements continually bring close to or
distance the narrative elements. Therefore, antenarratives call for an
analytic focus that is sensitive to their potential for plurivocality and
polissemy (Boje, 2004; Sundararajan, 2008).

Self-Narratives
The previous antenarratives act within the narrative texture of
complete and overarching narratives that globally condense and
organize individuals’ multiple experiences of themselves and the
world. These more global narratives, which constitute the third level,
emerge through the elaboration of narrative threads that plot together
otherwise disperse antenarratives (Lewin, 1997). These more complex
narrative forms have fixed and generalized meanings which constrain
the expression of other possible narrative threads.
Therefore, at this most molar level, we will find self-narratives,
which Neimeyer (2004) defined as ‘an overarching cognitive-
affective-behavioural structure that organizes the “micro-narratives” of
everyday life into a “macro-narrative” that consolidates our self-
understanding, establishes our characteristic range of emotions and
goals, and guides our performance on the stage of the social world’
(pp. 53–54).
Although, for the sake of brevity of argument, we have been
addressing the process of narrative development by focusing on the
individual narrative processes, we must underline that our involve-
ment with cultural narrative and semiotic resources, since infancy
(Nelson, 2000), brings to the core of selfhood processes cultural narra-
tive elements (Gone, Miller, & Rappaport, 1999; Rasmussen, 1999)
which become crucial for the organizational function of narrative
development.

Levels of Narrative Development in Psychotherapy

The sketch of organizational levels of narrative development presented
above was intended to underline the complexity of different narrative
elements and processes involved in narrative functioning. Given this
complexity and multitude it seems very likely that no specific level will
give us a complete account of the ‘role of narrative within ongoing
identity formation’ (Cross, 2010). In fact, it seems very likely that an
overemphasis on a particular level will obscure the function of other
levels, giving us an oversimplified version of narrative functioning.

198
 Ribeiro et al. Levels of Narrative Development in Psychotherapy

Our experience of research on narrative processes of change in

psychotherapy will help us exemplify this point. Our research program
started from the analysis of change within re-authoring narrative
therapy (White & Epston, 1990; White, 2007). In this therapeutic model
it is proposed that problematic self-narratives involve most of the time
problem saturated self-narratives. These are ‘impoverished’ narratives
(Dimaggio & Semerari, 2001; Salvatore, Dimaggio, & Semerari, 2004) in
the sense that they are characterized by rigidity and a limited and
dominant number of recurrent themes, usually related to the problem
the person is facing, which block the emergence of alternative meanings
or narrative possibilities. In this sense, White (White & Epston, 1990;
White, 2007) argues that people who seek therapy are usually subju-
gated by these problematic self-narrative(s) that ‘colonize’ individuals’
sense of self, constricting their options and, thus, their experiences. As
we see, these narratives correspond to the more general and molar level
to which we previously alluded. But the question arises as to what
processes mediate this transformation of one self-narrative into another?
The problematic self-narrative can be challenged by the emergence
of innovative ways of thinking and behaving that the client narrates in
the therapeutic conversation. We consider these narrative elements
exceptions to the problematic self-narrative—which we call Innovative
Moments (or i-moments)—as emergent meanings that have the latent
power to promote self-narrative reconstruction (Gonçalves, Matos, &
Santos, 2009; Gonçalves, Santos, et al., in press; Gonçalves, Ribeiro,
Matos, Santos, & Mendes, in press; Matos, Santos, Gonçalves, &
Martins, 2009).
The concept of i-moment is akin to what Boje (2001) calls ante-
narratives, since they constitute a clear example of temporally
unbounded narrative elements, which meaning potential is undeter-
mined. In fact, as we have been observing, at the beginning of therapy
i-moments seem to be devoid of any meaning for clients. They tend to
overlook them and disregard the difference they represent towards the
problematic self-narrative. This suggests that although these narrative
elements are present in the person’s narrative they do not meaning-
fully achieve the level of self-narrative.
This seems consistent with Cross’s observation that the beginning of
the discussion was characterized by a ‘convergent use of narrative’. In
a similar way, at the beginning of therapy, narrative processes maintain
problematic self-narrative’s integrity and consequently meanings
divergent to that self-narrative tend to be disregarded.
Across therapeutic process the meaning potential of i-moments is
explored in the context of communicational interaction between client

199
Culture & Psychology 16(2)

and therapist. However, top-down processes always constrain the

meaning potential of i-moments which, therefore, may remain
contained and lead to poor outcome (see Gonçalves, Ribeiro, Stiles,
Conde, Santos, et al., 2009, for a further elaboration on this topic;
see also Ribeiro & Gonçalves, 2010). In good outcome cases, the
exploration of the potential meaning of i-moments tends to expand the
range of internal states, relational and behavioural possibilities avail-
able to the person. As the client becomes more and more aware of
several potential meanings of different i-moments, also more and more
previously unacknowledged behaviours, emotions, and thoughts are
made available for narrative elaboration. As this process unfolds in
time i-moments are included in new narrative threads that ultimately
provoke change in self-narrative. This last part of therapeutic change
process has recently captured our attention.

An Example from a Successful Therapy

We conceptualize narrative as a dynamic system and thus we claim,
along with Salvatore, Gelo, Gennaro, Manzo, and Al-Radaideh (in
press), that ‘meaning-making is a matter of pattern modification, rather
than of cumulative changes of single independent elements’ (p. 6).
Along these lines, we have suggested that the reconstruction of a
person’s self-narrative depends on the structure of relations between
i-moments, rather than on the mere accumulation of i-moments
(Gonçalves et al., 2009). Therefore, we are particularly interested in
looking at how antenarratives get extended as they aggregate around
themes; that is, how clusters of i-moments create a pattern, which we
call alternative protonarrative.1 Protonarratives are aggregates of ante-
narratives in developmental transition, and the ongoing process of
transformation, in which antenarratives are in the process of becoming
self-narratives, should be highlighted. Thus, it is more the process of
sewing narrative threads which tie together different antenarratives,
creating intermediate and unstable forms.
Protonarratives are not self-narratives yet and they precede the
emergence of new self-narrative. These alternative protonarratives are
usually noticeable by the emergence of recurrent themes, different from
the ones present in the problematic narrative.
Let us clarify this concept by presenting a hypothetical example.
Imagine that a client’s problematic narrative is centred on the rule of
‘pleasing the others under all circumstances’. Initially, i-moments (level
of antenarrative) could be focused on acknowledging his or her needs,
being assertive or expressing his or her anger toward those who

200
 Ribeiro et al. Levels of Narrative Development in Psychotherapy

neglected her needs over time (e.g., his or her parents) and avoiding
contact with them. At a given moment, i-moments focused on express-
ing anger could start to recurrently emerge. The redundancy around
this theme may mirror the emergence of a pattern or protonarrative
that could be named as ‘resentment’.
This alternative protonarrative could be transitory, giving place to a
new one centred on ‘accepting that others did the best they could and
trying to establish a new kind of relation with them, by asserting his
or her own needs’. This protonarrative could be named as ‘acceptance’
(Figure 1).
From our perspective, alternative protonarratives are an emergent
quality of patterns of i-moments and encapsulate their latent power to
promote change. The distinction between protonarratives and the ante-
narratives or self-narratives is only dependent on a developmental
look of the process. Thus, it is a processual distinction and not a formal
distinction—it is more a matter of how, instead of a matter of what.
From our point of view, these alternative protonarratives mediate the
development of new i-moments, acting as attractors (Figure 2). In turn,
these new i-moments operate upon the protonarrative promoting its
development and progressive differentiation.
We are interested in the dynamic processes between problematic
self-narrative i-moments, protonarratives and new emergent self-
narratives. It is our hypothesis that several protonarratives may
emerge in a given psychotherapeutic process. Some of them may
develop into a new self-narrative, others may disappear. Besides, we

Time
Resentment Acceptance

Figure 1. An example of protonarratives’ development throughout therapy

201
Culture & Psychology 16(2)

Therapy evolution
Problematic
self-narrative

i-moments

Protonarrative

New i-moments

Alternative
self-narrative

Figure 2. Different levels of narrative development

propose that i-moments and protonarratives in a given case may

interact with each other in different ways, throughout the process,
leading to different outcomes in terms of self-narrative reconstruction.
The alternative self-narrative may emerge from the dominance of a
specific protonarrative. Instead, it can also emerge from the coalition
or interaction between of two or more protonarratives.
Hence, we have developed a research strategy to track the alterna-
tive protonarratives and analyse their development throughout time.
In the remaining of our comment we will briefly present our research
strategy and a case example.
Our research strategy involves three major steps of analysis:
(1) identifying i-moments; (2) identifying alternative protonarratives;

202
 Ribeiro et al. Levels of Narrative Development in Psychotherapy

and (3) depicting and explaining the relation between these proto-
narratives and i-moments throughout the therapeutic process.

Identifying i-Moments
In the first step we use the Innovative Moments Coding System (IMCS;
Gonçalves, Ribeiro et al., 2009) to identify i-moments. IMCS allows
identifying five types of i-moments of different natures and functions
in the change process: action, reflection, protest, re-conceptualization
and performing change (see Table 1). For the purpose of this work, it
is sufficient to say that when coders are identifying i-moments from
transcripts, video or audio recording of sessions they need to bear in
mind what the main features of the problematic self-narrative (the rule)

Table 1. Examples of the Five Types of i-Moment

Type Contents Examples
(Problematic self-narrative: depression)
Action
• New coping behaviours facing C: Yesterday, I went to the cinema for
anticipated or existent obstacles; the first time in months!
• Effective resolution of unsolved
problem(s);
• Active exploration of solutions;
• Restoring autonomy and self-control;
• Searching for information about the
problem(s).
Reflection
Creating distance from the problem(s)
• Comprehension – Reconsidering C: I realize that what I was doing was
problem(s)’ causes and/or awareness just, not humanly possible because I was
of its effects; pushing myself and I never allowed
• New problem(s) formulations; myself any free time, uh, to myself . . .
• Adaptive self instructions and thoughts; and it’s more natural and more healthy
• Intention to fight problem(s)’ demands, to let some of these extra activities go. . .
references of self-worth and/or feelings
of well-being.
Centred on the change
• Therapeutic Process – Reflecting about C: I believe that our talks, our sessions,
the therapeutic process; have proven fruitful, I felt like going
• Change Process – Considering the back to old times a bit, it was good, I felt
process and strategies; implemented to good, I felt it was worth it.
overcome the problem(s); references of
self-worth and/or feelings of well-being
(as consequences of change);
• New positions – references to
new/emergent identity versions in face
of the problem(s).

203
Culture & Psychology 16(2)
Table 1. continued
Type Contents
Protest
Criticizing the problem(s)
• Repositioning oneself towards the
problem(s).
Emergence of new positions
• Positions of assertiveness and
empowerment.
Re-conceptualization
Re-conceptualization always involve two
dimensions:
• Description of the shift between two
positions (past and present);
• The process underlying this
transformation.
Performing Change
• Generalization into the future and other
life dimensions of good outcome;
• Problematic experience as a resource to
new situations;
• Investment in new projects as a result of
the process of change;
• Investment in new relationships as a
result of the process of change;
• Performance of change: New skills;
• Re-emergence of neglected or forgotten
self-versions.
Note. From The Innovative Moments Coding System: A coding procedure for tracking changes
in psychotherapy, by M.M. Gonçalves, A.P. Ribeiro, et al. (in press). Adapted with
permission.
204
Examples
(Problematic self-narrative: depression)
C: What am I becoming after all? Is this
where I’ll be getting to? Am I going to
stagnate here!?
C: I am an adult and I am responsible
for my life, and, and, I want to
acknowledge these feelings and I´m
going to let them out! I want to
experience life, I want to grow and it
feels good to be in charge of my own
life.
C: You know. . . when I was there at the
museum, I thought to myself: you really
are different. . . A year ago you wouldn’t
be able to go to the supermarket! Ever
since I started going out, I started
feeling less depressed. . . it is also
related to our conversations and
changing jobs. . .
T: How did you have this idea of going
to the museum?
C: I called my dad and told him: we’re
going out today!
T: This is new, isn’t it?
C: Yes, it’s like I tell you. . . I sense that
I’m different. . .
T: You seem to have so many projects for
the future now!
C: Yes, you’re right. I want to do all the
things that were impossible for me to do
while I was dominated by depression. I
want to work again and to have the time
to enjoy my life with my children. I
want to have friends again. The loss of
all the friendships from the past is
something that still hurts me really
deeply. I want to have friends again, to
have people to talk to, to share
experiences and to feel the complicity in
my life again.
 Ribeiro et al. Levels of Narrative Development in Psychotherapy

are in order to enable the identification of the exceptions toward that

rule (i.e., identification of i-moments). This step is guided by the
question: ‘What is the central rule/framework of understanding?’ (See
Gonçalves, Ribeiro, et al., in press, for a complete description of the
steps involved.)

Identifying Protonarratives
Keeping this definition in mind, we analyse the first i-moment and
consensually define the protonarrative underneath it. This step is
guided by the question: ‘What is the potential counter-rule/framework of
understanding present in this i-moment? or in a different but equivalent
formulation: ‘If this i-moment expands itself to a new self-narrative, what
would be the rule that shapes this new narrative?’ We shall try to obtain the
answer to this question in the form of a sentence or a word. This defi-
nition must be linked with the verbal material; that is, close to client’s
narrative. Each new i-moment is then compared to the existing
protonarrative, looking for convergences and divergences. Whenever
strong convergences are found, the focused i-moment is understood as
sharing the existing protonarrative. On the contrary, whenever strong
divergences are found, a new protonarrative is formulated in order to
incorporate new meanings.
Along this process, the emergent protonarratives constantly undergo
modification to incorporate new meanings and are continually inter-
rogated for coherence and explanatory capacity. This process ceases
when the emergent protonarratives are dense and complex enough to
capture all of the variations in participants’ i-moments (Fassinger, 2005).

Depicting Relation between Protonarratives and i-Moments

This third step involves the Space State Grid. State Space Grid is a
method, consistent with dynamic systems theory, developed by Lewis
(Lewis, Lamey, & Douglas, 1999; Lewis, Zimmerman, Hollenstein, &
Lamey, 2004) in the context of developmental psychology. This method
intends to provide a two-dimensional topographic representation of
system behavior along time. Figure 3 shows four examples of grids that
represent the development of system behaviour (i-moments –
protonarratives) in the sixth, seventh, eighth and ninth sessions. Each
circle represents an i-moment and hollow circles represent the first
i-moment in each of the sessions presented. The size of the circles
represents the duration (in seconds) of each i-moment. The lines repre-
sent transitions from one i-moment to the next i-moment and the
arrows represent the direction of that transition.

205
206
Culture & Psychology 16(2)

Figure 3. Examples of State Space Grids for the case depicted

 Ribeiro et al. Levels of Narrative Development in Psychotherapy

A Case Example
Caroline was a 20-year-old woman at the time of her psychotherapy
process, who reported as her main problems feelings of sadness, hope-
lessness and worthlessness which impaired her interpersonal relation-
ships and her academic functioning. Caroline was attended in brief and
individual constructivist therapy focused on implicative dilemmas
(Fernandes, Senra, & Feixas, 2009) for 12 sessions and 1 follow-up
session, at her university’s clinic.
Caroline’s problematic self-narrative was defined as the ‘pessimism’
rule, that is, the idea that whatever the efforts she would be engaged
in she would never achieve positive results, and that she was not
worthy (see Ribeiro, Bento, Salgado, Stiles, & Gonçalves, 2010, for a
complete description of this case).
In this case three protonarratives were identified which were named
Optimism, Achievement, and Balance. Optimism protonarrative
emerged in second session; Achievement appeared later in session 4
and Balance in session 6. We would like to highlight that narrative
processes in psychotherapy seem to unfold as a spiral in which each
newer protonarrative seems to expand at each turn and incorporate
the characteristics of previous protonarratives. Thus Balance was
constructed from the previous two protonarratives (and the problem-
atic narrative), Achievement was constructed from Optimism, and
clearly this last one was a direct reaction to the problematic narrative,
challenging it by constructing the opposite meaning. However, this
progressive movement is not a straight and cumulative one as the
interplay between newer and older protonarratives seems to be
essential to the unfolding of this global process. The characteristics
emergent in new protonarratives become integrated in older ones and
expand them; this expansion in older protonarratives, by its turn,
promotes the appearance of yet new features in newer proto-
narratives. This process of mutual expansion of protonarratives
emergent from their interaction becomes clear if we observe the way
i-moments emerge in the different protonarratives. For example,
action i-moments emerge for the first time in the therapeutic process
in the context of Achievement protonarrative (session 6) and become
more frequent and expanded in session 7 within the same proto-
narrative. In session 8 action i-moments emerge for the first time in
the context of Optimism protonarrative. Until session 8 Optimism
protonarrative was characterized exclusively by protest and reflection
i-moments. Re-conceptualization is yet another example of this
process. It emerges for the first time in session 6 in the context of
Balance protonarrative, in session 9 it surges for the first time in the

207
Culture & Psychology 16(2)

context of Achievement protonarrative and in the next session in the

context of Optimism for the first time.
Protonarratives also seem to vary in terms of the type of i-moments
that constitute them. In terms of development across therapeutic
process the last protonarrative to emerge is constituted by more types
of i-moments and by the types that are more complex and related to
future prospects (re-conceptualization and performing change). This
suggests that protonarratives have different structures and constituents
and that they change across time. As we have said, protonarratives are
narratives-in-change. For example, Optimism protonarrative starts with
a structure characterized by protest and reflection i-moments and, as
action i-moments emerged in the context of Achievement protonarra-
tive, its structure also changed to include action i-moments, and it
changed again to include re-conceptualization, after these i-moments
had emerged in the context of Balance protonarratives. A similar
process takes place for the other protonarratives.
This description exemplifies not only the interaction between
i-moments and protonarratives but also the interaction between
protonarratives and the structure of these interactions. In light of the
observations briefly sketched above, protonarratives are hypothesized
to operate by aggregating and consolidating the meanings of
i-moments that are negotiated in the communicational interaction
between therapist and client. These aggregates may be conceived as
possible narrative threads that are alternatives to problematic self-
narrative. In this sense, protonarratives gain value as repositories of
meaning possibilities that become available for further development
of i-moments’ potential meaning. Protonarratives also seem to be
unstable and with flexible boundaries separating them. In another way,
we may say that although protonarratives temporarily stabilize
meaning from i-moments, they maintain their openness towards
change.

Conclusion
Our commentary on Cross (2010) focused on some of her contributions
to the study of narrative-dialogical processes from the perspective of
complexity. This was the departure point for reflecting upon the way
self-narrative reconstruction occurs in the context of psychotherapy
and to present a research strategy to address this issue.
Although performing research in different domains, we share the
same theoretical frameworks—narrative theory, dialogism, and
dynamic systems theory—and roughly the same general empirical

208
 Ribeiro et al. Levels of Narrative Development in Psychotherapy

questions: the ‘role of narratives within ongoing identity formation’

and the processes of ‘narrative functioning in dialogical activity’, to put
it in Cross’s terms.
Narrative theory, dialogism, and dynamic systems theory operate as
centrifugal or divergent forces that are changing the ways psy-
chologists think about and explore the phenomena they face. They are
essentially theoretical and metatheoretical reactions to traditional
convergent forces in psychology. As such, at the same time they
promote theoretical innovation, they highlight the inadequateness of
traditional methodological paraphernalia to the empirical work with
such theories. Moreover, given their theoretical nature, theoretical
development occurs faster than its methodological counterpart and
this opens the space for the entrance of traditional methods, thus
limiting further theoretical and methodological development. In this
way, the discrepancy between theory and method may constitute a
conservative force to centrifugal forces.
Cross’s (2010) analysis of students’ discussion clearly shows the
limitations of the traditional conceptualization of narrative as a repre-
sentational device that organizes experience and makes it meaningful,
for the study of narrative processes within dialogical activity. This
conclusion is gaining increasing strength as several authors (e.g.,
Mageo, 2002) are underlining the dynamic interplay between cultural
and individual narrative elements and the intertextuality inherent to
protonarratives that constitute psychological domain.
Congruently with these authors’ efforts, we have developed a
systematic research strategy to analyse different levels of narrative
development in the context of the dialogical exchanges between the
therapist and the client, in a dynamic way. This strategy involves
identifying i-moments, identifying protonarratives and depicting the
relations between i-moments and protonarratives. Further research is
needed to test its empirical potential. Besides, some questions need to
be addressed, namely, how to grasp the relation between proto-
narratives along the therapeutic process, and how to depict the relation
between protonarratives and the emergent alternative self-narrative.

Acknowledgments
This article was supported by the Portuguese Foundation for Science and
Technology (FCT), by Grant PTDC/PSI/72846/2006 (Narrative Processes in
Psychotherapy, 2007–2010) and by PhD Grants SFRH/BD/46189/2008 and
SFRH/BD/48266/2008. Correspondence concerning this article should be
addressed to Miguel M. Gonçalves, School of Psychology, University of
Minho, 4710 Braga, Portugal. Email: mgoncalves@iep.uminho.pt

209
Culture & Psychology 16(2)

Note
1. It is important to note that different authors have suggested different
concepts under the name of protonarrative. For instance, Salvatore,
Dimaggio, and Semerari (2004) define protonarrative as ‘micro-sequences
of mental images continuously occupying our Consciousness’ (p. 236).
Instead, according to Turner (1996, p. 13, as quoted by Sundararajan, 2008,
p. 244) protonarrative refers to as ‘small stories, background events that are
seemingly neutral in affect’ (p. 13).

References
Boje, D. (2001). Narrative methods for organizational and communicational research.
London: Sage.
Boje, D. (2004). Antenarratives, narratives, and anaemic stories. Paper presented
at the meeting of the Academy of Management, August 9, 2004,
New Orleans, LA.
Boje, D., & Rosile, G. (2003). Life imitates art: Enron’s epic and tragic
narration. Management Communication Quarterly, 17, 85–125.
Boje, D., Rosile, G., Durant, R., & Luhman, J. (2004). Enron spectacles:
A critical dramaturgical analysis. Organization Studies, 25(5), 751–774.
Bruner, J. (1986). Actual minds, possible worlds. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
Cross, B. (2010). The interface work of narrative. Culture & Psychology, 16(2).
Dimaggio, G., & Semerari, A. (2001). Psychopathological narrative forms.
Journal of Constructivist Psychology, 14, 1–23.
Fassinger, R. (2005). Paradigms, praxis, problems, and promise: Grounded
theory in counseling psychology research. Journal of Counseling Psychology,
52, 156–166.
Fernandes, E., Senra, E., & Feixas, G. (2009). Terapia construtivista centrada em
dilemas implicativos [Constructivist psychotherapy focused on implicative
dilemmas]. Braga: Psiquilíbrios.
Gonçalves, M.M., Matos, M., & Santos, A. (2009). Narrative therapy and the
nature of ‘innovative moments’ in the construction of change. Journal of
Constructivist Psychology, 22, 1–23.
Gonçalves, M.M., Ribeiro, A.P., Matos, M., Santos, A., & Mendes, I. (in press).
The Innovative Moments Coding System: A coding procedure for tracking
changes in psychotherapy. In S. Salvatore, J. Valsiner, S. Strout, & J. Clegg
(Eds.), YIS: Yearbook of idiographic science 2009 – Volume 2. Rome: Firera
Publishing Group.
Gonçalves, M.M., Ribeiro, A.P., Stiles, W.B., Conde, T., Santos, A., Matos, M., &
Martins, C. (2009). The role of mutual in-feeding in maintaining problematic
self-narratives. Manuscript in preparation.
Gonçalves, M.M., Santos, A., Salgado, J., Matos, M., Mendes, I., Ribeiro, A.P.,
Cunha, C., & Gonçalves, J. (in press). Innovations in psychotherapy:
Tracking the narrative construction of change. In J. D. Raskin, S.K. Bridges,

210
 Ribeiro et al. Levels of Narrative Development in Psychotherapy

& R. Neimeyer (Eds.), Studies in meaning 4: Constructivist perspectives on

theory, practice, and social justice. New York: Pace University Press.
Gone, J., Miller, P., & Rappaport, J. (1999). Conceptual self as normatively
oriented: The suitability of past personal narrative for the study of cultural
identity. Culture & Psychology, 5, 371–398.
Lewin, P. (1997, November). The ethical self in the play of affect and voice. Paper
presented at the After Postmodernism conference, University of Chicago.
Available at http://www.focusing.org/Lewin.html
Lewis, M.D., Lamey, A.V., & Douglas, L. (1999). A new dynamic systems
method for the analysis of early socioemotional development. Developmental
Science, 2, 458–476.
Lewis, M.D., Zimmerman, S., Hollenstein, T., & Lamey, A.V. (2004).
Reorganization in coping behavior at 1 1/2 years: Dynamic systems and
normative change. Developmental Science, 7, 56–73.
McAdams, D.P. (1993). The stories we live by: Personal myths and the making of the
self. New York: William Morrow.
Mageo, J. (2002). Intertextual interpretation, fantasy and Samoan dreams.
Culture & Psychology, 8, 417–448.
Mandler, J. (1984). Scripts, stories, and scenes: Aspects of schema theory. Hillsdale,
NJ: Erlbaum.
Marcos, M. (2001). Sujeito e comunicação: Perspectiva tensional da alteridade
[Subject and communication: A tensional perspective on alterity]. Coimbra,
Portugal: Campo das Letras.
Matos, M., Santos, A., Gonçalves, M.M., & Martins, C. (2009). Innovative
moments and change in narrative therapy. Psychotherapy Research, 19, 68–80.
Mendes, J. (2001). Porquê tantas histórias: O lugar do ficcional na aventura humana
[Why so many stories: The place of the fictional in human adventure]. Coimbra,
Portugal: Minerva.
Neimeyer, R.A. (2004). Fostering posttraumatic growth: A narrative
contribution. Psychological Inquiry, 15, 53–59.
Nelson, K. (2000). Narrative, time, and the emergence of the encultured self.
Culture & Psychology, 6, 183–196.
Prado, C. (1984). Making believe: Philosophical reflection on fiction. Connecticut:
Greenwood Press.
Rasmussen, S. (1999). Culture, personhood and narrative: The problem of
norms and agency. Culture & Psychology, 5, 399–412.
Ribeiro, A.P., Bento, T., Salgado, J., Stiles, W.B., & Gonçalves, M.M. (2009).
A dynamic look at narrative change in psychotherapy: A case-study
tracking innovative moments and protonarratives using State-Space Grids.
Manuscript in preparation.
Ribeiro, A.P., & Gonçalves, M.M. (2010). Innovation and stability within the
dialogical self: The centrality of ambivalence. Culture & Psychology, 16(1),
116–126.
Salvatore, G., Dimaggio, G., & Semerari, A. (2004). A model of narrative
development: Implications for understanding psychopathology and
guiding therapy. Psychology and Psychotherapy: Theory, Research and Practice,
77, 231–254.
Salvatore, S., Gelo, O., Gennaro, A., Manzo, S., Al-Radaideh, A. (in press).

211
Culture & Psychology 16(2)

Looking at the psychotherapy process as an intersubjective dynamic of

meaning-making. A case study with Discourse Flow Analysis. Journal of
Constructivist Psychology.
Sundararajan, L. (2008). The plot thickens – or not: Protonarratives of
emotions and the Chinese principle of savouring. Journal of Humanistic
Psychology, 48, 243–263.
Turner, M. (1996). The literary mind: The origins of thought and language. New
York: Oxford University Press.
Vaihinger, H. (1935). The philosophy of ‘As if ‘. London: Kegan Paul, Trench &
Trubner.
Valsiner, J. (2001). Process structure of semiotic mediation in human
development. Human Development, 44, 84–97.
White, M. (2007). Maps of narrative practice. New York: Norton.
White, M., & Epston, D. (1990). Narrative means to therapeutic ends. New York:
Norton.

Biographies
ANTÓNIO P. RIBEIRO is a student of the PhD Program in Clinical
Psychology at University of Minho (Braga, Portugal) with a PhD scholarship
from the Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia (FCT—Portuguese Foundation
for Science and Technology: reference SFRH/BD/46189/2008). His current
research interests are theoretically focused in narrative and dialogical
perspectives and their application to change processes in psychotherapy.

TIAGO BENTO is a PhD student in Clinical Psychology at CINEICC/ISMAI

(Maia, Portugal) with a PhD grant from the Portuguese Foundation for
Science and Technology (FCT; reference SFRH/BD/48266/2008). His research
interests are narrative and dialogical selfhood processes and their application
to psychotherapy change processes.

MIGUEL M. GONÇALVES is Associate Professor at the School of Psychology

in the University of Minho (Braga, Portugal). He has been interested in
dialogical and narrative studies of the self and in narrative psychotherapy. He
is presently developing a research project on the role that narrative
innovations play in the promotion of psychotherapeutic change. ADDRESS:
Miguel M. Gonçalves, University of Minho, Portugal, School of Psychology,
Campus de Gualtar, Braga, P-4700, Portugal.
[email: mgoncalves@iep.uminho.pt]

JOÃO SALGADO is the Director of the Masters’ Degree in Clinical and Health
Psychology at ISMAI, Portugal. He is also a psychotherapist and the Director
of the Counseling Service of his University. His main research interests are
associated with the theoretical and methodological developments of a
dialogical perspective within psychology, and with the applications of this
framework to the field of psychotherapy and clinical psychology.

212