[G.R. NO.

174153 : October 25, 2006]

RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO, TOGETHER WITH 6,327,952 REGISTERED VOTERS,Petitioners, v. THE
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
DECISION

CARPIO, J.:
The Case
These are consolidated petitions on the Resolution dated 31 August 2006 of the Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") denying due course to
an initiative petition to amend the 1987 Constitution.

Antecedent Facts
On 15 February 2006, petitioners in G.R. No. 174153, namely Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado ("Lambino Group"), with other
groups1 and individuals, commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution. On 25 August 2006, the
Lambino Group filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under Section 5(b) and (c)2 and
Section 73of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act ("RA 6735").

The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at least twelve per centum (12%) of all
registered voters, with each legislative district represented by at least three per centum (3%) of its registered voters. The Lambino Group also
claimed that COMELEC election registrars had verified the signatures of the 6.3 million individuals.

The Lambino Group's initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI (Legislative Department)4 and
Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive Department)5 and by adding Article XVIII entitled "Transitory Provisions."6 These proposed changes will
shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government. The Lambino Group prayed that after due
publication of their petition, the COMELEC should submit the following proposition in a plebiscite for the voters' ratification:
DO YOU APPROVE THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, CHANGING THE FORM OF
GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL TO A UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM, AND
PROVIDING ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM TO THE OTHER?
On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition with the COMELEC indicating modifications in the proposed Article XVIII
(Transitory Provisions) of their initiative.7

The Ruling of the COMELEC

On 31 August 2006, the COMELEC issued its Resolution denying due course to the Lambino Group's petition for lack of an enabling law
governing initiative petitions to amend the Constitution. The COMELEC invoked this Court's ruling in Santiago v. Commission on
Elections8 declaring RA 6735 inadequate to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution.9

In G.R. No. 174153, the Lambino Group prays for the issuance of the writs of certiorari and mandamus to set aside the COMELEC Resolution of
31 August 2006 and to compel the COMELEC to give due course to their initiative petition. The Lambino Group contends that the COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to their petition since Santiago is not a binding precedent. Alternatively, the Lambino
Group claims that Santiago binds only the parties to that case, and their petition deserves cognizance as an expression of the "will of the
sovereign people."

In G.R. No. 174299, petitioners ("Binay Group") pray that the Court require respondent COMELEC Commissioners to show cause why they
should not be cited in contempt for the COMELEC's verification of signatures and for "entertaining" the Lambino Group's petition despite the
permanent injunction in Santiago. The Court treated the Binay Group's petition as an opposition-in-intervention.

In his Comment to the Lambino Group's petition, the Solicitor General joined causes with the petitioners, urging the Court to grant the petition
despite the Santiago ruling. The Solicitor General proposed that the Court treat RA 6735 and its implementing rules "as temporary devises to
implement the system of initiative."

Various groups and individuals sought intervention, filing pleadings supporting or opposing the Lambino Group's petition. The supporting
intervenors10 uniformly hold the view that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in relying on Santiago. On the other hand, the
opposing intervenors11 hold the contrary view and maintain that Santiago is a binding precedent. The opposing intervenors also challenged (1)
the Lambino Group's standing to file the petition; (2) the validity of the signature gathering and verification process; (3) the Lambino Group's
compliance with the minimum requirement for the percentage of voters supporting an initiative petition under Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987
Constitution;12 (4) the nature of the proposed changes as revisions and not mere amendments as provided under Section 2, Article XVII of the
1987 Constitution; and (5) the Lambino Group's compliance with the requirement in Section 10(a) of RA 6735 limiting initiative petitions to only
one subject.

The Court heard the parties and intervenors in oral arguments on 26 September 2006. After receiving the parties' memoranda, the Court
considered the case submitted for resolution.

The Issues
The petitions raise the following issues:
1. Whether the Lambino Group's initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on amendments to the
Constitution through a people's initiative;
 2. Whether this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 "incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and
conditions" to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution; and
3. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to the Lambino Group's petition.

The Ruling of the Court

There is no merit to the petition.

The Lambino Group miserably failed to comply with the basic requirements of the Constitution for conducting a people's initiative. Thus, there is
even no need to revisit Santiago, as the present petition warrants dismissal based alone on the Lambino Group's glaring failure to comply with
the basic requirements of the Constitution. For following the Court's ruling in Santiago, no grave abuse of discretion is attributable to the
Commision on Elections.
1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct Proposal by the People
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing constitutional provision that allows a people's initiative to propose amendments to
the Constitution. This section states:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least
twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of
the registered voters therein. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission vividly explain the meaning of an amendment "directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition," thus:
MR. RODRIGO: Let us look at the mechanics. Let us say some voters want to propose a constitutional amendment. Is the draft of the proposed
constitutional amendment ready to be shown to the people when they are asked to sign?

MR. SUAREZ: That can be reasonably assumed, Madam President.

MR. RODRIGO: What does the sponsor mean? The draft is ready and shown to them before they sign. Now, who prepares the draft?

MR. SUAREZ: The people themselves, Madam President.

MR. RODRIGO: No, because before they sign there is already a draft shown to them and they are asked whether or not they want to
propose this constitutional amendment.

MR. SUAREZ: As it is envisioned, any Filipino can prepare that proposal and pass it around for signature.13 (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the framers of the Constitution intended that the "draft of the proposed constitutional amendment" should be "ready and shown" to
the people "before" they sign such proposal. The framers plainly stated that "before they sign there is already a draft shown to them." The
framers also "envisioned" that the people should sign on the proposal itself because the proponents must "prepare that proposal and pass it
around for signature."

The essence of amendments "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition" is that the entire proposal on its face is a
petition by the people. This means two essential elements must be present. First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No
agent or representative can sign on their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition.

These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first shown to the people who express their assent by
signing such complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an amendment is "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition" only if the people sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments.

The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written on the face of the petition, or attached to it. If so attached, the petition must state
the fact of such attachment. This is an assurance that every one of the several millions of signatories to the petition had seen the full text of the
proposed amendments before signing. Otherwise, it is physically impossible, given the time constraint, to prove that every one of the millions of
signatories had seen the full text of the proposed amendments before signing.

The framers of the Constitution directly borrowed 14 the concept of peopleï ¿ ½s initiative from the United States where various State
constitutions incorporate an initiative clause. In almost all States15 which allow initiative petitions, the unbending requirement is that the
people must first see the full text of the proposed amendments before they sign to signify their assent, and that the people must sign on an
initiative petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments.16

The rationale for this requirement has been repeatedly explained in several decisions of various courts. Thus, in Capezzuto v. State Ballot
Commission, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, affirmed by the First Circuit Court of Appeals, declared:
[A] signature requirement would be meaningless if the person supplying the signature has not first seen what it is that he or she is
signing. Further, and more importantly, loose interpretation of the subscription requirement can pose a significant potential for fraud. A person
permitted to describe orally the contents of an initiative petition to a potential signer, without the signer having actually examined the petition,
could easily mislead the signer by, for example, omitting, downplaying, or even flatly misrepresenting, portions of the petition that might not be
to the signer's liking. This danger seems particularly acute when, in this case, the person giving the description is the drafter of the
petition, who obviously has a vested interest in seeing that it gets the requisite signatures to qualify for the ballot.17 (Boldfacing and
underscoring supplied)
Likewise, in Kerr v. Bradbury,18 the Court of Appeals of Oregon explained:
The purposes of "full text" provisions that apply to amendments by initiative commonly are described in similar terms. x x x (The purpose of the
full text requirement is to provide sufficient information so that registered voters can intelligently evaluate whether to sign the initiative
petition."); x x x (publication of full text of amended constitutional provision required because it is "essential for the elector to have x x x the
section which is proposed to be added to or subtracted from. If he is to vote intelligently, he must have this knowledge. Otherwise in many
instances he would be required to vote in the dark.") (Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, "an initiative signer must be informed at the time of signing of the nature and effect of that which is proposed" and failure to do so is
"deceptive and misleading" which renders the initiative void.19

Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution does not expressly state that the petition must set forth the full text of the proposed amendments.
However, the deliberations of the framers of our Constitution clearly show that the framers intended to adopt the relevant American jurisprudence
on people's initiative. In particular, the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission explicitly reveal that the framers intended that the people
must first see the full text of the proposed amendments before they sign, and that the people must sign on a petition containing such full
text. Indeed, Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 6735, the Initiative and Referendum Act that the Lambino Group invokes as valid, requires that
the people must sign the "petition x x x as signatories."

The proponents of the initiative secure the signatures from the people. The proponents secure the signatures in their private capacity and not as
public officials. The proponents are not disinterested parties who can impartially explain the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed
amendments to the people. The proponents present favorably their proposal to the people and do not present the arguments against their proposal.
The proponents, or their supporters, often pay those who gather the signatures.

Thus, there is no presumption that the proponents observed the constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures. The proponents bear the
burden of proving that they complied with the constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures - that the petition contained, or
incorporated by attachment, the full text of the proposed amendments.

The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition with this Court a copy of the paper that the people signed as their initiative petition.
The Lambino Group submitted to this Court a copy of a signature sheet20after the oral arguments of 26 September 2006 when they filed their
Memorandum on 11 October 2006. The signature sheet with this Court during the oral arguments was the signature sheet attached21 to the
opposition in intervention filed on 7 September 2006 by intervenor Atty. Pete Quirino-Quadra.

The signature sheet attached to Atty. Quadra's opposition and the signature sheet attached to the Lambino Group's Memorandum are the same.
We reproduce below the signature sheet in full:
Province: City/Municipality: No. of Verified Signatures:
Legislative District: Barangay:

PROPOSITION: "DO YOU APPROVE OF THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, CHANGING
THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL TO A UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY
SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT, IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE GREATER EFFICIENCY, SIMPLICITY AND ECONOMY IN GOVERNMENT;
AND PROVIDING AN ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM TO
ANOTHERï ¿ ½"

I hereby APPROVE the proposed amendment to the 1987 Constitution. My signature herein which shall form part of the petition for initiative to
amend the Constitution signifies my support for the filing thereof.
Name
Birthdate
PrecinctNumber Last Name, First Address Signature Verification
MM/DD/YY
Name, M.I.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

___________________ __________________
___________________
Witness Witness
Barangay Official
(Print Name and Sign) (Print Name and Sign)
(Print Name and Sign)
There is not a single word, phrase, or sentence of text of the Lambino Group's proposed changes in the signature sheet. Neither does the
signature sheet state that the text of the proposed changes is attached to it. Petitioner Atty. Raul Lambino admitted this during the oral
arguments before this Court on 26 September 2006.
The signature sheet merely asks a question whether the people approve a shift from the Bicameral-Presidential to the Unicameral-Parliamentary
system of government. The signature sheet does not show to the people the draft of the proposed changes before they are asked to sign the
signature sheet.Clearly, the signature sheet is not the "petition" that the framers of the Constitution envisioned when they formulated the
initiative clause in Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.

Petitioner Atty. Lambino, however, explained that during the signature-gathering from February to August 2006, the Lambino Group circulated,
together with the signature sheets, printed copies of the Lambino Group's draft petition which they later filed on 25 August 2006 with the
COMELEC. When asked if his group also circulated the draft of their amended petition filed on 30 August 2006 with the COMELEC, Atty.
Lambino initially replied that they circulated both. However, Atty. Lambino changed his answer and stated that what his group circulated was the
draft of the 30 August 2006 amended petition, not the draft of the 25 August 2006 petition.

The Lambino Group would have this Court believe that they prepared the draft of the 30 August 2006 amended petition almost seven months
earlier in February 2006 when they started gathering signatures. Petitioner Erico B. Aumentado's "Verification/Certification" of the 25 August
2006 petition, as well as of the 30 August 2006 amended petition, filed with the COMELEC, states as follows:
I have caused the preparation of the foregoing [Amended] Petition in my personal capacity as a registered voter, for and on behalf of the Union
of Local Authorities of the Philippines, as shown by ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 hereto attached, and as representative of the mass of
signatories hereto. (Emphasis supplied)
The Lambino Group failed to attach a copy of ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 to the present petition. However, the "Official Website of the
Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines"22 has posted the full text of Resolution No. 2006-02, which provides:
RESOLUTION NO. 2006-02

RESOLUTION SUPPORTING THE PROPOSALS OF THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION ON CHARTER CHANGE
THROUGH PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM AS A MODE OF AMENDING THE 1987 CONSTITUTION

WHEREAS, there is a need for the Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines (ULAP) to adopt a common stand on the approach to support
the proposals of the People's Consultative Commission on Charter Change;

WHEREAS, ULAP maintains its unqualified support to the agenda of Her Excellency President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo for constitutional
reforms as embodied in the ULAP Joint Declaration for Constitutional Reforms signed by the members of the ULAP and the majority coalition of
the House of Representatives in Manila Hotel sometime in October 2005;

WHEREAS, the People's Consultative Commission on Charter Change created by Her Excellency to recommend amendments to the 1987
Constitution has submitted its final report sometime in December 2005;

WHEREAS, the ULAP is mindful of the current political developments in Congress which militates against the use of the expeditious form of
amending the 1987 Constitution;

WHEREAS, subject to the ratification of its institutional members and the failure of Congress to amend the Constitution as a constituent
assembly, ULAP has unanimously agreed to pursue the constitutional reform agenda through People's Initiative and Referendum without
prejudice to other pragmatic means to pursue the same;

WHEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, THAT ALL THE MEMBER-LEAGUES OF THE UNION OF
LOCAL AUTHORITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (ULAP) SUPPORT THE PORPOSALS (SIC) OF THE PEOPLE'S
CONSULATATIVE (SIC) COMMISSION ON CHARTER CHANGE THROUGH PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM AS
A MODE OF AMENDING THE 1987 CONSTITUTION;

DONE, during the ULAP National Executive Board special meeting held on 14 January 2006 at the Century Park Hotel, Manila. 23 (Underscoring
supplied)
ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 does not authorize petitioner Aumentado to prepare the 25 August 2006 petition, or the 30 August 2006
amended petition, filed with the COMELEC. ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 "support(s) the porposals (sic) of the Consulatative (sic)
Commission on Charter Change through people's initiative and referendum as a mode of amending the 1987 Constitution." The proposals of
the Consultative Commission24 are vastly different from the proposed changes of the Lambino Group in the 25 August 2006 petition or 30
August 2006 amended petition filed with the COMELEC.

For example, the proposed revisions of the Consultative Commission affect all provisions of the existing Constitution, from the Preamble to
the Transitory Provisions. The proposed revisions have profound impact on the Judiciary and the National Patrimony provisions of the existing
Constitution, provisions that the Lambino Group's proposed changes do not touch. The Lambino Group's proposed changes purport to affect only
Articles VI and VII of the existing Constitution, including the introduction of new Transitory Provisions.

The ULAP adopted Resolution No. 2006-02 on 14 January 2006 or more than six months before the filing of the 25 August 2006 petition or the
30 August 2006 amended petition with the COMELEC. However, ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 does not establish that ULAP or the Lambino
Group caused the circulation of the draft petition, together with the signature sheets, six months before the filing with the COMELEC. On the
contrary, ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 casts grave doubt on the Lambino Group's claim that they circulated the draft petition together with the
signature sheets. ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 does not refer at all to the draft petition or to the Lambino Group's proposed changes.
In their Manifestation explaining their amended petition before the COMELEC, the Lambino Group declared:
After the Petition was filed, Petitioners belatedly realized that the proposed amendments alleged in the Petition, more specifically, paragraph 3 of
Section 4 and paragraph 2 of Section 5 of the Transitory Provisions were inaccurately stated and failed to correctly reflect their proposed
amendments.
The Lambino Group did not allege that they were amending the petition because the amended petition was what they had shown to the people
during the February to August 2006 signature-gathering. Instead, the Lambino Group alleged that the petition of 25 August 2006 "inaccurately
stated and failed to correctly reflect their proposed amendments."

The Lambino Group never alleged in the 25 August 2006 petition or the 30 August 2006 amended petition with the COMELEC that they
circulated printed copies of the draft petition together with the signature sheets. Likewise, the Lambino Group did not allege in their present
petition before this Court that they circulated printed copies of the draft petition together with the signature sheets. The signature sheets do not
also contain any indication that the draft petition is attached to, or circulated with, the signature sheets.

It is only in their Consolidated Reply to the Opposition-in-Interventions that the Lambino Group first claimed that they circulated the "petition for
initiative filed with the COMELEC," thus:
[T]here is persuasive authority to the effect that "(w)here there is not (sic) fraud, a signer who did not read the measure attached to a
referendum petition cannot question his signature on the ground that he did not understand the nature of the act." [82 C.J.S. S128h. Mo.
State v. Sullivan, 224, S.W. 327, 283 Mo. 546.] Thus, the registered voters who signed the signature sheets circulated together with the
petition for initiative filed with the COMELEC below, are presumed to have understood the proposition contained in the petition. (Emphasis
supplied)
The Lambino Group's statement that they circulated to the people "the petition for initiative filed with the COMELEC" appears an
afterthought, made after the intervenors Integrated Bar of the Philippines (Cebu City Chapter and Cebu Province Chapters) and Atty. Quadra had
pointed out that the signature sheets did not contain the text of the proposed changes. In their Consolidated Reply, the Lambino Group alleged
that they circulated "the petition for initiative" but failed to mention the amended petition. This contradicts what Atty. Lambino finally stated
during the oral arguments that what they circulated was the draft of the amended petition of 30 August 2006.

The Lambino Group cites as authority Corpus Juris Secundum, stating that "a signer who did not read the measure attached to a referendum
petition cannot question his signature on the ground that he did not understand the nature of the act." The Lambino Group quotes an authority
that cites a proposed change attached to the petition signed by the people. Even the authority the Lambino Group quotes requires that the
proposed change must be attached to the petition. The same authority the Lambino Group quotes requires the people to sign on the petition itself.

Indeed, it is basic in American jurisprudence that the proposed amendment must be incorporated with, or attached to, the initiative petition signed
by the people. In the present initiative, the Lambino Group's proposed changes were not incorporated with, or attached to, the signature sheets.
The Lambino Group's citation of Corpus Juris Secundum pulls the rug from under their feet.

It is extremely doubtful that the Lambino Group prepared, printed, circulated, from February to August 2006 during the signature-gathering
period, the draft of the petition or amended petition they filed later with the COMELEC. The Lambino Group are less than candid with this Court
in their belated claim that they printed and circulated, together with the signature sheets, the petition or amended petition. Nevertheless,
even assuming the Lambino Group circulated the amended petition during the signature-gathering period, the Lambino Group admitted
circulating only very limited copies of the petition.

During the oral arguments, Atty. Lambino expressly admitted that they printed only 100,000 copies of the draft petition they filed more
than six months later with the COMELEC. Atty. Lambino added that he also asked other supporters to print additional copies of the draft
petition but he could not state with certainty how many additional copies the other supporters printed. Atty. Lambino could only assure this
Court of the printing of 100,000 copies because he himself caused the printing of these 100,000 copies.

Likewise, in the Lambino Group's Memorandum filed on 11 October 2006, the Lambino Group expressly admits that "petitioner Lambino
initiated the printing and reproduction of 100,000 copies of the petition for initiative x x x."25This admission binds the Lambino Group
and establishes beyond any doubt that the Lambino Group failed to show the full text of the proposed changes to the great majority of
the people who signed the signature sheets.

Thus, of the 6.3 million signatories, only 100,000 signatories could have received with certainty one copy each of the petition, assuming a 100
percent distribution with no wastage. If Atty. Lambino and company attached one copy of the petition to each signature sheet, only 100,000
signature sheets could have circulated with the petition. Each signature sheet contains space for ten signatures. Assuming ten people signed each
of these 100,000 signature sheets with the attached petition, the maximum number of people who saw the petition before they signed the
signature sheets would not exceed 1,000,000.

With only 100,000 printed copies of the petition, it would be physically impossible for all or a great majority of the 6.3 million signatories to have
seen the petition before they signed the signature sheets. The inescapable conclusion is that the Lambino Group failed to show to the 6.3
million signatories the full text of the proposed changes. If ever, not more than one million signatories saw the petition before they signed the
signature sheets.

In any event, the Lambino Group's signature sheets do not contain the full text of the proposed changes, either on the face of the signature sheets,
or as attachment with an indication in the signature sheet of such attachment. Petitioner Atty. Lambino admitted this during the oral
arguments, and this admission binds the Lambino Group. This fact is also obvious from a mere reading of the signature sheet. This
omission is fatal. The failure to so include the text of the proposed changes in the signature sheets renders the initiative void for non-compliance
with the constitutional requirement that the amendment must be "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition." The
signature sheet is not the "petition" envisioned in the initiative clause of the Constitution.

For sure, the great majority of the 6.3 million people who signed the signature sheets did not see the full text of the proposed changes before
signing. They could not have known the nature and effect of the proposed changes, among which are:
1. The term limits on members of the legislature will be lifted and thus members of Parliament can be re-elected indefinitely;26
2. The interim Parliament can continue to function indefinitely until its members, who are almost all the present members of Congress,
decide to call for new parliamentary elections. Thus, the members of the interim Parliament will determine the expiration of their
own term of office; 27
3. Within 45 days from the ratification of the proposed changes, the interim Parliament shall convene to propose further
amendments or revisions to the Constitution.28
These three specific amendments are not stated or even indicated in the Lambino Group's signature sheets. The people who signed the signature
sheets had no idea that they were proposing these amendments. These three proposed changes are highly controversial. The people could not have
inferred or divined these proposed changes merely from a reading or rereading of the contents of the signature sheets.

During the oral arguments, petitioner Atty. Lambino stated that he and his group assured the people during the signature-gathering that the
elections for the regular Parliament would be held during the 2007 local elections if the proposed changes were ratified before the 2007 local
elections. However, the text of the proposed changes belies this.

The proposed Section 5(2), Article XVIII on Transitory Provisions, as found in the amended petition, states:
Section 5(2). The interim Parliament shall provide for the election of the members of Parliament, which shall be synchronized and held
simultaneously with the election of all local government officials. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Section 5(2) does not state that the elections for the regular Parliament will be held simultaneously with the 2007 local elections. This section
merely requires that the elections for the regular Parliament shall be held simultaneously with the local elections without specifying the year.

Petitioner Atty. Lambino, who claims to be the principal drafter of the proposed changes, could have easily written the word "next" before the
phrase "election of all local government officials." This would have insured that the elections for the regular Parliament would be held in the next
local elections following the ratification of the proposed changes. However, the absence of the word "next" allows the interim Parliament to
schedule the elections for the regular Parliament simultaneously with any future local elections.

Thus, the members of the interim Parliament will decide the expiration of their own term of office. This allows incumbent members of the House
of Representatives to hold office beyond their current three-year term of office, and possibly even beyond the five-year term of office of regular
members of the Parliament. Certainly, this is contrary to the representations of Atty. Lambino and his group to the 6.3 million people who
signed the signature sheets. Atty. Lambino and his group deceived the 6.3 million signatories, and even the entire nation.

This lucidly shows the absolute need for the people to sign an initiative petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments to avoid
fraud or misrepresentation. In the present initiative, the 6.3 million signatories had to rely on the verbal representations of Atty. Lambino and
his group because the signature sheets did not contain the full text of the proposed changes. The result is a grand deception on the 6.3 million
signatories who were led to believe that the proposed changes would require the holding in 2007 of elections for the regular Parliament
simultaneously with the local elections.

The Lambino Group's initiative springs another surprise on the people who signed the signature sheets. The proposed changes mandate the
interim Parliament to make further amendments or revisions to the Constitution. The proposed Section 4(4), Article XVIII on Transitory
Provisions, provides:
Section 4(4). Within forty-five days from ratification of these amendments, the interim Parliament shall convene to propose amendments to, or
revisions of, this Constitutionconsistent with the principles of local autonomy, decentralization and a strong bureaucracy. (Emphasis supplied)
During the oral arguments, Atty. Lambino stated that this provision is a "surplusage" and the Court and the people should simply ignore it. Far
from being a surplusage, this provision invalidates the Lambino Group's initiative.

Section 4(4) is a subject matter totally unrelated to the shift from the Bicameral-Presidential to the Unicameral-Parliamentary system. American
jurisprudence on initiatives outlaws this as logrolling - when the initiative petition incorporates an unrelated subject matter in the same petition.
This puts the people in a dilemma since they can answer only either yes or no to the entire proposition, forcing them to sign a petition that
effectively contains two propositions, one of which they may find unacceptable.

Under American jurisprudence, the effect of logrolling is to nullify the entire proposition and not only the unrelated subject matter. Thus,
in Fine v. Firestone,29 the Supreme Court of Florida declared:
Combining multiple propositions into one proposal constitutes "logrolling," which, if our judicial responsibility is to mean anything, we
cannot permit. The very broadness of the proposed amendment amounts to logrolling because the electorate cannot know what it is voting on -
the amendment's proponents' simplistic explanation reveals only the tip of the iceberg. x x x x The ballot must give the electorate fair notice of
the proposed amendment being voted on. x x x x The ballot language in the instant case fails to do that. The very broadness of the proposal makes
it impossible to state what it will affect and effect and violates the requirement that proposed amendments embrace only one subject. (Emphasis
supplied)
Logrolling confuses and even deceives the people. In Yute Air Alaska v. McAlpine,30 the Supreme Court of Alaska warned against "inadvertence,
stealth and fraud" in logrolling:
Whenever a bill becomes law through the initiative process, all of the problems that the single-subject rule was enacted to prevent are
exacerbated. There is a greater danger of logrolling, or the deliberate intermingling of issues to increase the likelihood of an initiative's passage,
and there is a greater opportunity for "inadvertence, stealth and fraud" in the enactment-by-initiative process. The drafters of an initiative
operate independently of any structured or supervised process. They often emphasize particular provisions of their proposition, while remaining
silent on other (more complex or less appealing) provisions, when communicating to the public. x x x Indeed, initiative promoters typically use
simplistic advertising to present their initiative to potential petition-signers and eventual voters. Many voters will never read the full text of
the initiative before the election. More importantly, there is no process for amending or splitting the several provisions in an initiative proposal.
These difficulties clearly distinguish the initiative from the legislative process. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the present initiative appears merely a preliminary step for further amendments or revisions to be undertaken by the interim Parliament as a
constituent assembly. The people who signed the signature sheets could not have known that their signatures would be used to propose an
amendment mandating the interim Parliament to propose further amendments or revisions to the Constitution.

Apparently, the Lambino Group inserted the proposed Section 4(4) to compel the interim Parliament to amend or revise again the Constitution
within 45 days from ratification of the proposed changes, or before the May 2007 elections. In the absence of the proposed Section 4(4), the
interim Parliament has the discretion whether to amend or revise again the Constitution. With the proposed Section 4(4), the initiative proponents
want the interim Parliament mandated to immediately amend or revise again the Constitution.

However, the signature sheets do not explain the reason for this rush in amending or revising again so soon the Constitution. The signature sheets
do not also explain what specific amendments or revisions the initiative proponents want the interim Parliament to make, and why there is a need
for such further amendments or revisions. The people are again left in the dark to fathom the nature and effect of the proposed
changes. Certainly, such an initiative is not "directly proposed by the people" because the people do not even know the nature and effect of the
proposed changes.

There is another intriguing provision inserted in the Lambino Group's amended petition of 30 August 2006. The proposed Section 4(3) of the
Transitory Provisions states:
Section 4(3). Senators whose term of office ends in 2010 shall be members of Parliament until noon of the thirtieth day of June 2010.
After 30 June 2010, not one of the present Senators will remain as member of Parliament if the interim Parliament does not schedule elections for
the regular Parliament by 30 June 2010. However, there is no counterpart provision for the present members of the House of Representatives even
if their term of office will all end on 30 June 2007, three years earlier than that of half of the present Senators. Thus, all the present members of
the House will remain members of the interim Parliament after 30 June 2010.

The term of the incumbent President ends on 30 June 2010. Thereafter, the Prime Minister exercises all the powers of the President. If the interim
Parliament does not schedule elections for the regular Parliament by 30 June 2010, the Prime Minister will come only from the present members
of the House of Representatives to the exclusion of the present Senators.

The signature sheets do not explain this discrimination against the Senators. The 6.3 million people who signed the signature sheets could not
have known that their signatures would be used to discriminate against the Senators. They could not have known that their signatures
would be used to limit, after 30 June 2010, the interim Parliament's choice of Prime Minister only to members of the existing House of
Representatives.

An initiative that gathers signatures from the people without first showing to the people the full text of the proposed amendments is most likely a
deception, and can operate as a gigantic fraud on the people. That is why the Constitution requires that an initiative must be "directly proposed
by the people x x x in a petition" - meaning that the people must sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments. On so
vital an issue as amending the nation's fundamental law, the writing of the text of the proposed amendments cannot be hidden from the
people under a general or special power of attorney to unnamed, faceless, and unelected individuals.

The Constitution entrusts to the people the power to directly propose amendments to the Constitution. This Court trusts the wisdom of the people
even if the members of this Court do not personally know the people who sign the petition. However, this trust emanates from a fundamental
assumption: the full text of the proposed amendment is first shown to the people before they sign the petition, not after they have signed
the petition.

In short, the Lambino Group's initiative is void and unconstitutional because it dismally fails to comply with the requirement of Section 2, Article
XVII of the Constitution that the initiative must be "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition."
2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing Revision through Initiatives
A people's initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an amendment of the Constitution and not to its revision. In contrast, Congress or a
constitutional convention can propose both amendments and revisions to the Constitution. Article XVII of the Constitution provides:

ARTICLE XVII
AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS

Sec. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members, or
(2) A constitutional convention.
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Article XVII of the Constitution speaks of three modes of amending the Constitution. The first mode is through Congress upon three-fourths vote
of all its Members. The second mode is through a constitutional convention. The third mode is through a people's initiative.

Section 1 of Article XVII, referring to the first and second modes, applies to "[A]ny amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution." In
contrast, Section 2 of Article XVII, referring to the third mode, applies only to "[A]mendments to this Constitution." This distinction
was intentional as shown by the following deliberations of the Constitutional Commission:
MR. SUAREZ: Thank you, Madam President.

May we respectfully call the attention of the Members of the Commission that pursuant to the mandate given to us last night, we submitted this
afternoon a complete Committee Report No. 7 which embodies the proposed provision governing the matter of initiative. This is now covered by
Section 2 of the complete committee report. With the permission of the Members, may I quote Section 2:
The people may, after five years from the date of the last plebiscite held, directly propose amendments to this Constitution thru initiative upon
petition of at least ten percent of the registered voters.
This completes the blanks appearing in the original Committee Report No. 7. This proposal was suggested on the theory that this matter of
initiative, which came about because of the extraordinary developments this year, has to be separated from the traditional modes of amending the
Constitution as embodied in Section 1. The committee members felt that this system of initiative should be limited to amendments to the
Constitution and should not extend to the revision of the entire Constitution, so we removed it from the operation of Section 1 of the
proposed Article on Amendment or Revision. x x x x
xxxx

MS. AQUINO: [I] am seriously bothered by providing this process of initiative as a separate section in the Article on Amendment. Would the
sponsor be amenable to accepting an amendment in terms of realigning Section 2 as another subparagraph (c) of Section 1, instead of setting it up
as another separate section as if it were a self-executing provision?

MR. SUAREZ: We would be amenable except that, as we clarified a while ago, this process of initiative is limited to the matter of
amendment and should not expand into a revision which contemplates a total overhaul of the Constitution. That was the sense that was
conveyed by the Committee.

MS. AQUINO: In other words, the Committee was attempting to distinguish the coverage of modes (a) and (b) in Section 1 to include the
process of revision; whereas, the process of initiation to amend, which is given to the public, would only apply to amendments?

MR. SUAREZ: That is right. Those were the terms envisioned in the Committee.

MS. AQUINO: I thank the sponsor; and thank you, Madam President.
xxxx

MR. MAAMBONG: My first question: Commissioner Davide's proposed amendment on line 1 refers to "amendments." Does it not cover
the word "revision" as defined by Commissioner Padilla when he made the distinction between the words "amendments" and
"revision"?

MR. DAVIDE: No, it does not, because "amendments" and "revision" should be covered by Section 1. So insofar as initiative is
concerned, it can only relate to "amendments" not "revision."

MR. MAAMBONG: Thank you.31 (Emphasis supplied)

There can be no mistake about it. The framers of the Constitution intended, and wrote, a clear distinction between "amendment" and "revision"
of the Constitution. The framers intended, and wrote, that only Congress or a constitutional convention may propose revisions to the
Constitution. The framers intended, and wrote, that a people's initiative may propose only amendments to the Constitution. Where the intent and
language of the Constitution clearly withhold from the people the power to propose revisions to the Constitution, the people cannot propose
revisions even as they are empowered to propose amendments.

This has been the consistent ruling of state supreme courts in the United States. Thus, in McFadden v. Jordan,32 the Supreme Court of California
ruled:
The initiative power reserved by the people by amendment to the Constitution x x x applies only to the proposing and the adopting or
rejecting of "laws and amendments to the Constitution" and does not purport to extend to a constitutional revision. x x x x It is thus clear
that a revision of the Constitution may be accomplished only through ratification by the people of a revised constitution proposed by a convention
called for that purpose as outlined hereinabove. Consequently if the scope of the proposed initiative measure (hereinafter termed "the measure")
now before us is so broad that if such measure became law a substantial revision of our present state Constitution would be effected, then the
measure may not properly be submitted to the electorate until and unless it is first agreed upon by a constitutional convention, and the writ sought
by petitioner should issue. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Likewise, the Supreme Court of Oregon ruled in Holmes v. Appling:33
It is well established that when a constitution specifies the manner in which it may be amended or revised, it can be altered by those who favor
amendments, revision, or other change only through the use of one of the specified means. The constitution itself recognizes that there is a
difference between an amendment and a revision; and it is obvious from an examination of the measure here in question that it is not an
amendment as that term is generally understood and as it is used in Article IV, Section 1. The document appears to be based in large part on the
revision of the constitution drafted by the "Commission for Constitutional Revision" authorized by the 1961 Legislative Assembly, x x x and
submitted to the 1963 Legislative Assembly. It failed to receive in the Assembly the two-third's majority vote of both houses required by Article
XVII, Section 2, and hence failed of adoption, x x x.

While differing from that document in material respects, the measure sponsored by the plaintiffs is, nevertheless, a thorough overhauling of the
present constitution x x x.

To call it an amendment is a misnomer.

Whether it be a revision or a new constitution, it is not such a measure as can be submitted to the people through the initiative. If a revision, it is
subject to the requirements of Article XVII, Section 2(1); if a new constitution, it can only be proposed at a convention called in the manner
provided in Article XVII, Section 1. x x x x
Similarly, in this jurisdiction there can be no dispute that a people's initiative can only propose amendments to the Constitution since the
Constitution itself limits initiatives to amendments. There can be no deviation from the constitutionally prescribed modes of revising the
Constitution. A popular clamor, even one backed by 6.3 million signatures, cannot justify a deviation from the specific modes prescribed in the
Constitution itself.

As the Supreme Court of Oklahoma ruled in In re Initiative Petition No. 364:34

It is a fundamental principle that a constitution can only be revised or amended in the manner prescribed by the instrument itself, and
that any attempt to revise a constitution in a manner other than the one provided in the instrument is almost invariably treated as extra-
constitutional and revolutionary. x x x x "While it is universally conceded that the people are sovereign and that they have power to adopt a
constitution and to change their own work at will, they must, in doing so, act in an orderly manner and according to the settled principles of
constitutional law. And where the people, in adopting a constitution, have prescribed the method by which the people may alter or amend it, an
attempt to change the fundamental law in violation of the self-imposed restrictions, is unconstitutional." x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
This Court, whose members are sworn to defend and protect the Constitution, cannot shirk from its solemn oath and duty to insure compliance
with the clear command of the Constitution that a people's initiative may only amend, never revise, the Constitution.

The question is, does the Lambino Group's initiative constitute an amendment or revision of the Constitution? If the Lambino Group's initiative
constitutes a revision, then the present petition should be dismissed for being outside the scope of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.

Courts have long recognized the distinction between an amendment and a revision of a constitution. One of the earliest cases that recognized the
distinction described the fundamental difference in this manner:
[T]he very term "constitution" implies an instrument of a permanent and abiding nature, and the provisions contained therein for its revision
indicate the will of the people that the underlying principles upon which it rests, as well as the substantial entirety of the instrument, shall
be of a like permanent and abiding nature. On the other hand, the significance of the term "amendment" implies such an addition or change within
the lines of the original instrument as will effect an improvement, or better carry out the purpose for which it was framed. 35 (Emphasis supplied)
Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the constitution, like altering the principle of separation of powers or the
system of checks-and-balances. There is also revision if the change alters the substantial entirety of the constitution, as when the change
affects substantial provisions of the constitution. On the other hand, amendment broadly refers to a change that adds, reduces, or
deletes without altering the basic principle involved. Revision generally affects several provisions of the constitution, while amendment
generally affects only the specific provision being amended.

In California where the initiative clause allows amendments but not revisions to the constitution just like in our Constitution, courts have
developed a two-part test: the quantitative test and the qualitative test. The quantitative test asks whether the proposed change is "so extensive in
its provisions as to change directly the 'substantial entirety' of the constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous existing
provisions."36 The court examines only the number of provisions affected and does not consider the degree of the change.

The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the proposed change in the constitution. The main inquiry is whether the change will
"accomplish such far reaching changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a revision." 37 Whether there is an alteration in
the structure of government is a proper subject of inquiry. Thus, "a change in the nature of [the] basic governmental plan" includes "change in its
fundamental framework or the fundamental powers of its Branches."38 A change in the nature of the basic governmental plan also includes
changes that "jeopardize the traditional form of government and the system of check and balances." 39

Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino Group's initiative is a revision and not merely an amendment. Quantitatively, the
Lambino Group's proposed changes overhaul two articles - Article VI on the Legislature and Article VII on the Executive - affecting a total of
105 provisions in the entire Constitution.40Qualitatively, the proposed changes alter substantially the basic plan of government, from presidential
to parliamentary, and from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature.

A change in the structure of government is a revision of the Constitution, as when the three great co-equal branches of government in the present
Constitution are reduced into two. This alters the separation of powers in the Constitution. A shift from the present Bicameral-Presidential
system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system is a revision of the Constitution. Merging the legislative and executive branches is a radical change
in the structure of government.

The abolition alone of the Office of the President as the locus of Executive Power alters the separation of powers and thus constitutes a revision
of the Constitution. Likewise, the abolition alone of one chamber of Congress alters the system of checks-and-balances within the legislature and
constitutes a revision of the Constitution.

By any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a shift from a Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system, involving the
abolition of the Office of the President and the abolition of one chamber of Congress, is beyond doubt a revision, not a mere amendment. On the
face alone of the Lambino Group's proposed changes, it is readily apparent that the changes will radically alter the framework of government
as set forth in the Constitution. Father Joaquin Bernas, S.J., a leading member of the Constitutional Commission, writes:
An amendment envisages an alteration of one or a few specific and separable provisions. The guiding original intention of an amendment is to
improve specific parts or to add new provisions deemed necessary to meet new conditions or to suppress specific portions that may have become
obsolete or that are judged to be dangerous. In revision, however, the guiding original intention and plan contemplates a re-examination of the
entire document, or of provisions of the document which have over-all implications for the entire document, to determine how and to what extent
they should be altered. Thus, for instance a switch from the presidential system to a parliamentary system would be a revision because of
its over-all impact on the entire constitutional structure. So would a switch from a bicameral system to a unicameral system be because
of its effect on other important provisions of the Constitution. 41 (Emphasis supplied)
In Adams v. Gunter,42 an initiative petition proposed the amendment of the Florida State constitution to shift from a bicameral to a unicameral
legislature. The issue turned on whether the initiative "was defective and unauthorized where [the] proposed amendment would x x x affect
several other provisions of [the] Constitution." The Supreme Court of Florida, striking down the initiative as outside the scope of the initiative
clause, ruled as follows:
The proposal here to amend Section 1 of Article III of the 1968 Constitution to provide for a Unicameral Legislature affects not only many
other provisions of the Constitution but provides for a change in the form of the legislative branch of government, which has been in
existence in the United States Congress and in all of the states of the nation, except one, since the earliest days. It would be difficult to visualize
a more revolutionary change. The concept of a House and a Senate is basic in the American form of government. It would not only radically
change the whole pattern of government in this state and tear apart the whole fabric of the Constitution, but would even affect the
physical facilities necessary to carry on government.

x x x x

We conclude with the observation that if such proposed amendment were adopted by the people at the General Election and if the Legislature at
its next session should fail to submit further amendments to revise and clarify the numerous inconsistencies and conflicts which would result, or
if after submission of appropriate amendments the people should refuse to adopt them, simple chaos would prevail in the government of this
State. The same result would obtain from an amendment, for instance, of Section 1 of Article V, to provide for only a Supreme Court and Circuit
Courts-and there could be other examples too numerous to detail. These examples point unerringly to the answer.

The purpose of the long and arduous work of the hundreds of men and women and many sessions of the Legislature in bringing about the
Constitution of 1968 was to eliminate inconsistencies and conflicts and to give the State a workable, accordant, homogenous and up-to-date
document. All of this could disappear very quickly if we were to hold that it could be amended in the manner proposed in the initiative petition
here.43 (Emphasis supplied)
The rationale of the Adams decision applies with greater force to the present petition. The Lambino Group's initiative not only seeks a shift from
a bicameral to a unicameral legislature, it also seeks to merge the executive and legislative departments. The initiative in Adams did not even
touch the executive department.

In Adams, the Supreme Court of Florida enumerated 18 sections of the Florida Constitution that would be affected by the shift from a bicameral
to a unicameral legislature. In the Lambino Group's present initiative, no less than 105 provisions of the Constitution would be affected based
on the count of Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr.44 There is no doubt that the Lambino Group's present initiative seeks far more radical
changes in the structure of government than the initiative in Adams.

The Lambino Group theorizes that the difference between "amendment" and "revision" is only one of procedure, not of substance. The
Lambino Group posits that when a deliberative body drafts and proposes changes to the Constitution, substantive changes are called "revisions"
because members of the deliberative body work full-time on the changes. However, the same substantive changes, when proposed through an
initiative, are called "amendments" because the changes are made by ordinary people who do not make an "occupation, profession, or
vocation" out of such endeavor.

Thus, the Lambino Group makes the following exposition of their theory in their Memorandum:
99. With this distinction in mind, we note that the constitutional provisions expressly provide for both "amendment" and "revision" when
it speaks of legislators and constitutional delegates, while the same provisions expressly provide only for "amendment" when it speaks
of the people. It would seem that the apparent distinction is based on the actual experience of the people, that on one hand the common
people in general are not expected to work full-time on the matter of correcting the constitution because that is not their occupation,
profession or vocation; while on the other hand, the legislators and constitutional convention delegates are expected to work full-time
on the same matter because that is their occupation, profession or vocation. Thus, the difference between the
words "revision" and "amendment" pertain only to the process or procedure of coming up with the corrections, for purposes of
interpreting the constitutional provisions.
100. Stated otherwise, the difference between "amendment" and "revision" cannot reasonably be in the substance or extent of the
correction. x x x x (Underlining in the original; boldfacing supplied)
The Lambino Group in effect argues that if Congress or a constitutional convention had drafted the same proposed changes that the Lambino
Group wrote in the present initiative, the changes would constitute a revision of the Constitution. Thus, the Lambino Group concedes that the
proposed changes in the present initiative constitute a revision if Congress or a constitutional convention had drafted the
changes. However, since the Lambino Group as private individuals drafted the proposed changes, the changes are merely amendments to the
Constitution. The Lambino Group trivializes the serious matter of changing the fundamental law of the land.

The express intent of the framers and the plain language of the Constitution contradict the Lambino Group's theory. Where the intent of the
framers and the language of the Constitution are clear and plainly stated, courts do not deviate from such categorical intent and language.45 Any
theory espousing a construction contrary to such intent and language deserves scant consideration. More so, if such theory wreaks havoc by
creating inconsistencies in the form of government established in the Constitution. Such a theory, devoid of any jurisprudential mooring and
inviting inconsistencies in the Constitution, only exposes the flimsiness of the Lambino Group's position. Any theory advocating that a proposed
change involving a radical structural change in government does not constitute a revision justly deserves rejection.

The Lambino Group simply recycles a theory that initiative proponents in American jurisdictions have attempted to advance without any success.
In Lowe v. Keisling,46 the Supreme Court of Oregon rejected this theory, thus:
Mabon argues that Article XVII, section 2, does not apply to changes to the constitution proposed by initiative. His theory is that Article XVII,
section 2 merely provides a procedure by which the legislature can propose a revision of the constitution, but it does not affect proposed
revisions initiated by the people.

Plaintiffs argue that the proposed ballot measure constitutes a wholesale change to the constitution that cannot be enacted through the initiative
process. They assert that the distinction between amendment and revision is determined by reviewing the scope and subject matter of the
proposed enactment, and that revisions are not limited to "a formal overhauling of the constitution." They argue that this ballot measure proposes
far reaching changes outside the lines of the original instrument, including profound impacts on existing fundamental rights and radical
restructuring of the government's relationship with a defined group of citizens. Plaintiffs assert that, because the proposed ballot measure "will
refashion the most basic principles of Oregon constitutional law," the trial court correctly held that it violated Article XVII, section 2, and cannot
appear on the ballot without the prior approval of the legislature.

We first address Mabon's argument that Article XVII, section 2(1), does not prohibit revisions instituted by initiative. In Holmes v. Appling, x x x,
the Supreme Court concluded that a revision of the constitution may not be accomplished by initiative, because of the provisions of Article XVII,
section 2. After reviewing Article XVII, section1, relating to proposed amendments, the court said:
"From the foregoing it appears that Article IV, Section 1, authorizes the use of the initiative as a means of amending the Oregon Constitution, but
it contains no similar sanction for its use as a means of revising the constitution." x x x x
It then reviewed Article XVII, section 2, relating to revisions, and said: "It is the only section of the constitution which provides the means for
constitutional revision and it excludes the idea that an individual, through the initiative, may place such a measure before the electorate." x x x x

Accordingly, we reject Mabon's argument that Article XVII, section 2, does not apply to constitutional revisions proposed by
initiative. (Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, this Court must reject the Lambino Group's theory which negates the express intent of the framers and the plain language of the
Constitution.

We can visualize amendments and revisions as a spectrum, at one end green for amendments and at the other end red for revisions. Towards the
middle of the spectrum, colors fuse and difficulties arise in determining whether there is an amendment or revision. The present initiative is
indisputably located at the far end of the red spectrum where revision begins. The present initiative seeks a radical overhaul of the existing
separation of powers among the three co-equal departments of government, requiring far-reaching amendments in several sections and articles of
the Constitution.

Where the proposed change applies only to a specific provision of the Constitution without affecting any other section or article, the change may
generally be considered an amendment and not a revision. For example, a change reducing the voting age from 18 years to 15 years47 is an
amendment and not a revision. Similarly, a change reducing Filipino ownership of mass media companies from 100 percent to 60 percent is an
amendment and not a revision.48 Also, a change requiring a college degree as an additional qualification for election to the Presidency is an
amendment and not a revision.49

The changes in these examples do not entail any modification of sections or articles of the Constitution other than the specific provision being
amended. These changes do not also affect the structure of government or the system of checks-and-balances among or within the three branches.
These three examples are located at the far green end of the spectrum, opposite the far red end where the revision sought by the present petition is
located.

However, there can be no fixed rule on whether a change is an amendment or a revision. A change in a single word of one sentence of the
Constitution may be a revision and not an amendment. For example, the substitution of the word "republican" with "monarchic" or "theocratic" in
Section 1, Article II50 of the Constitution radically overhauls the entire structure of government and the fundamental ideological basis of the
Constitution. Thus, each specific change will have to be examined case-by-case, depending on how it affects other provisions, as well as how it
affects the structure of government, the carefully crafted system of checks-and-balances, and the underlying ideological basis of the existing
Constitution.

Since a revision of a constitution affects basic principles, or several provisions of a constitution, a deliberative body with recorded
proceedings is best suited to undertake a revision. A revision requires harmonizing not only several provisions, but also the altered principles
with those that remain unaltered. Thus, constitutions normally authorize deliberative bodies like constituent assemblies or constitutional
conventions to undertake revisions. On the other hand, constitutions allow people's initiatives, which do not have fixed and identifiable
deliberative bodies or recorded proceedings, to undertake only amendments and not revisions.

In the present initiative, the Lambino Group's proposed Section 2 of the Transitory Provisions states:
Section 2. Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice President, with the exception of Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which shall hereby be amended and Sections 18 and 24 which shall be deleted, all other Sections of Article VI
are hereby retained and renumbered sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatim up to 26, unless they are inconsistent with the Parliamentary system
of government, in which case, they shall be amended to conform with a unicameral parliamentary form of government; x x x x (Emphasis
supplied)
The basic rule in statutory construction is that if a later law is irreconcilably inconsistent with a prior law, the later law prevails. This rule also
applies to construction of constitutions. However, the Lambino Group's draft of Section 2 of the Transitory Provisions turns on its head this rule
of construction by stating that in case of such irreconcilable inconsistency, the earlier provision "shall be amended to conform with a unicameral
parliamentary form of government." The effect is to freeze the two irreconcilable provisions until the earlier one "shall be amended," which
requires a future separate constitutional amendment.

Realizing the absurdity of the need for such an amendment, petitioner Atty. Lambino readily conceded during the oral arguments that the
requirement of a future amendment is a "surplusage." In short, Atty. Lambino wants to reinstate the rule of statutory construction so that the later
provision automatically prevails in case of irreconcilable inconsistency. However, it is not as simple as that.

The irreconcilable inconsistency envisioned in the proposed Section 2 of the Transitory Provisions is not between a provision in Article VI of the
1987 Constitution and a provision in the proposed changes. The inconsistency is between a provision in Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and
the "Parliamentary system of government," and the inconsistency shall be resolved in favor of a "unicameral parliamentary form of
government."

Now, what "unicameral parliamentary form of government" do the Lambino Group's proposed changes refer to - the Bangladeshi,
Singaporean, Israeli, or New Zealand models, which are among the few countries with unicameral parliaments? The proposed changes
could not possibly refer to the traditional and well-known parliamentary forms of government - the British, French, Spanish, German, Italian,
Canadian, Australian, or Malaysian models, which have all bicameral parliaments. Did the people who signed the signature sheets realize that
they were adopting the Bangladeshi, Singaporean, Israeli, or New Zealand parliamentary form of government?

This drives home the point that the people's initiative is not meant for revisions of the Constitution but only for amendments. A shift from the
present Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system requires harmonizing several provisions in many articles of the
Constitution. Revision of the Constitution through a people's initiative will only result in gross absurdities in the Constitution.

In sum, there is no doubt whatsoever that the Lambino Group's initiative is a revision and not an amendment. Thus, the present initiative is void
and unconstitutional because it violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution limiting the scope of a people's initiative to "[A]mendments
to this Constitution."
3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary
The present petition warrants dismissal for failure to comply with the basic requirements of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on the
conduct and scope of a people's initiative to amend the Constitution. There is no need to revisit this Court's ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735
"incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions" to cover the system of initiative to amend the Constitution. An affirmation
or reversal ofSantiago will not change the outcome of the present petition. Thus, this Court must decline to revisit Santiago which effectively
ruled that RA 6735 does not comply with the requirements of the Constitution to implement the initiative clause on amendments to the
Constitution.

This Court must avoid revisiting a ruling involving the constitutionality of a statute if the case before the Court can be resolved on some other
grounds. Such avoidance is a logical consequence of the well-settled doctrine that courts will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute if the
case can be resolved on some other grounds.51

Nevertheless, even assuming that RA 6735 is valid to implement the constitutional provision on initiatives to amend the Constitution, this will not
change the result here because the present petition violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution. To be a valid initiative, the present
initiative must first comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution even before complying with RA 6735.

Even then, the present initiative violates Section 5(b) of RA 6735 which requires that the "petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must
have at least twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters as signatories." Section 5(b) of RA 6735 requires that the people
must sign the "petition x x x as signatories."

The 6.3 million signatories did not sign the petition of 25 August 2006 or the amended petition of 30 August 2006 filed with the
COMELEC. Only Atty. Lambino, Atty. Demosthenes B. Donato, and Atty. Alberto C. Agra signed the petition and amended petition as
counsels for "Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado, Petitioners." In the COMELEC, the Lambino Group, claiming to act "together
with" the 6.3 million signatories, merely attached the signature sheets to the petition and amended petition. Thus, the petition and amended
petition filed with the COMELEC did not even comply with the basic requirement of RA 6735 that the Lambino Group claims as valid.

The Lambino Group's logrolling initiative also violates Section 10(a) of RA 6735 stating, "No petition embracing more than one (1) subject
shall be submitted to the electorate; x x x." The proposed Section 4(4) of the Transitory Provisions, mandating the interim Parliament to
propose further amendments or revisions to the Constitution, is a subject matter totally unrelated to the shift in the form of government. Since
the present initiative embraces more than one subject matter, RA 6735 prohibits submission of the initiative petition to the electorate. Thus, even
if RA 6735 is valid, the Lambino Group's initiative will still fail.
4. The COMELEC Did Not Commit Grave Abuse of Discretion in Dismissing the Lambino Group's Initiative
In dismissing the Lambino Group's initiative petition, the COMELEC en banc merely followed this Court's ruling in Santiago and People's
Initiative for Reform, Modernization and Action (PIRMA) v. COMELEC.52 For following this Court's ruling, no grave abuse of discretion is
attributable to the COMELEC. On this ground alone, the present petition warrants outright dismissal. Thus, this Court should reiterate
its unanimous ruling in PIRMA:
The Court ruled, first, by a unanimous vote, that no grave abuse of discretion could be attributed to the public respondent COMELEC in
dismissing the petition filed by PIRMA therein, it appearing that it only complied with the dispositions in the Decisions of this Court in G.R. No.
127325, promulgated on March 19, 1997, and its Resolution of June 10, 1997.
5. Conclusion
The Constitution, as the fundamental law of the land, deserves the utmost respect and obedience of all the citizens of this nation. No one can
trivialize the Constitution by cavalierly amending or revising it in blatant violation of the clearly specified modes of amendment and revision laid
down in the Constitution itself.

To allow such change in the fundamental law is to set adrift the Constitution in unchartered waters, to be tossed and turned by every dominant
political group of the day. If this Court allows today a cavalier change in the Constitution outside the constitutionally prescribed modes,
tomorrow the new dominant political group that comes will demand its own set of changes in the same cavalier and unconstitutional fashion. A
revolving-door constitution does not augur well for the rule of law in this country.

An overwhelming majority- 16,622,111 voters comprising 76.3 percent of the total votes cast 53 - approved our Constitution in a national
plebiscite held on 11 February 1987. That approval is the unmistakable voice of the people, the full expression of the people's sovereign
will. That approval included the prescribed modes for amending or revising the Constitution.

No amount of signatures, not even the 6,327,952 million signatures gathered by the Lambino Group, can change our Constitution contrary to the
specific modes that the people, in their sovereign capacity, prescribed when they ratified the Constitution. The alternative is an extra-
constitutional change, which means subverting the people's sovereign will and discarding the Constitution. This is one act the Court cannot
and should never do. As the ultimate guardian of the Constitution, this Court is sworn to perform its solemn duty to defend and protect the
Constitution, which embodies the real sovereign will of the people.

Incantations of "people's voice," "people's sovereign will," or "let the people decide" cannot override the specific modes of changing the
Constitution as prescribed in the Constitution itself. Otherwise, the Constitution the people's fundamental covenant that provides enduring
stability to our society becomes easily susceptible to manipulative changes by political groups gathering signatures through false promises. Then,
the Constitution ceases to be the bedrock of the nation's stability.

The Lambino Group claims that their initiative is the "people's voice." However, the Lambino Group unabashedly states in ULAP Resolution No.
2006-02, in the verification of their petition with the COMELEC, that "ULAP maintains its unqualified support to the agenda of Her Excellency
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo for constitutional reforms." The Lambino Group thus admits that their "people's" initiative is an
"unqualified support to the agenda" of the incumbent President to change the Constitution. This forewarns the Court to be wary of incantations
of "people's voice" or "sovereign will" in the present initiative.

This Court cannot betray its primordial duty to defend and protect the Constitution. The Constitution, which embodies the people's sovereign will,
is the bible of this Court. This Court exists to defend and protect the Constitution. To allow this constitutionally infirm initiative, propelled by
deceptively gathered signatures, to alter basic principles in the Constitution is to allow a desecration of the Constitution. To allow such alteration
and desecration is to lose this Court's raison d'etre.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition in G.R. No. 174153.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 18351 October 14, 2008

THE PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO, duly represented by GOVERNOR JESUS SACDALAN and/or VICE-GOVERNOR
EMMANUEL PIÑOL, for and in his own behalf, petitioners,
vs.
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES PEACE PANEL ON ANCESTRAL DOMAIN (GRP), represented
by SEC. RODOLFO GARCIA, ATTY. LEAH ARMAMENTO, ATTY. SEDFREY CANDELARIA, MARK RYAN SULLIVAN and/or
GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR., the latter in his capacity as the present and duly-appointed Presidential Adviser on the Peace
Process (OPAPP) or the so-called Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process, respondents.
DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Subject of these consolidated cases is the extent of the powers of the President in pursuing the peace process.While the facts surrounding this
controversy center on the armed conflict in Mindanao between the government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the legal issue
involved has a bearing on all areas in the country where there has been a long-standing armed conflict. Yet again, the Court is tasked to perform a
delicate balancing act. It must uncompromisingly delineate the bounds within which the President may lawfully exercise her discretion, but it
must do so in strict adherence to the Constitution, lest its ruling unduly restricts the freedom of action vested by that same Constitution in the
Chief Executive precisely to enable her to pursue the peace process effectively.

I. FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE PETITIONS

On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the MILF, through the Chairpersons of their respective peace
negotiating panels, were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli
Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
The MILF is a rebel group which was established in March 1984 when, under the leadership of the late Salamat Hashim, it splintered from the
Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) then headed by Nur Misuari, on the ground, among others, of what Salamat perceived to be the
manipulation of the MNLF away from an Islamic basis towards Marxist-Maoist orientations.1
The signing of the MOA-AD between the GRP and the MILF was not to materialize, however, for upon motion of petitioners, specifically those
who filed their cases before the scheduled signing of the MOA-AD, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the GRP from
signing the same.
The MOA-AD was preceded by a long process of negotiation and the concluding of several prior agreements between the two parties beginning
in 1996, when the GRP-MILF peace negotiations began. On July 18, 1997, the GRP and MILF Peace Panels signed the Agreement on General
Cessation of Hostilities. The following year, they signed the General Framework of Agreement of Intent on August 27, 1998.
The Solicitor General, who represents respondents, summarizes the MOA-AD by stating that the same contained, among others, the commitment
of the parties to pursue peace negotiations, protect and respect human rights, negotiate with sincerity in the resolution and pacific settlement of
the conflict, and refrain from the use of threat or force to attain undue advantage while the peace negotiations on the substantive agenda are on-
going.2
Early on, however, it was evident that there was not going to be any smooth sailing in the GRP-MILF peace process. Towards the end of 1999 up
to early 2000, the MILF attacked a number of municipalities in Central Mindanao and, in March 2000, it took control of the town hall of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.3 In response, then President Joseph Estrada declared and carried out an "all-out-war" against the MILF.
When President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo assumed office, the military offensive against the MILF was suspended and the government sought a
resumption of the peace talks. The MILF, according to a leading MILF member, initially responded with deep reservation, but when President
Arroyo asked the Government of Malaysia through Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad to help convince the MILF to return to the negotiating
table, the MILF convened its Central Committee to seriously discuss the matter and, eventually, decided to meet with the GRP. 4
The parties met in Kuala Lumpur on March 24, 2001, with the talks being facilitated by the Malaysian government, the parties signing on the
same date the Agreement on the General Framework for the Resumption of Peace Talks Between the GRP and the MILF. The MILF thereafter
suspended all its military actions.5
Formal peace talks between the parties were held in Tripoli, Libya from June 20-22, 2001, the outcome of which was the GRP-MILF Tripoli
Agreement on Peace (Tripoli Agreement 2001) containing the basic principles and agenda on the following aspects of the
negotiation: Security Aspect, Rehabilitation Aspect, and Ancestral Domain Aspect. With regard to the Ancestral Domain Aspect, the parties in
Tripoli Agreement 2001 simply agreed "that the same be discussed further by the Parties in their next meeting."
A second round of peace talks was held in Cyberjaya, Malaysia on August 5-7, 2001 which ended with the signing of the Implementing
Guidelines on the Security Aspect of the Tripoli Agreement 2001 leading to a ceasefire status between the parties. This was followed by the
Implementing Guidelines on the Humanitarian Rehabilitation and Development Aspects of the Tripoli Agreement 2001, which was signed on
May 7, 2002 at Putrajaya, Malaysia. Nonetheless, there were many incidence of violence between government forces and the MILF from 2002 to
2003.
Meanwhile, then MILF Chairman Salamat Hashim passed away on July 13, 2003 and he was replaced by Al Haj Murad, who was then the chief
peace negotiator of the MILF. Murad's position as chief peace negotiator was taken over by Mohagher Iqbal. 6
In 2005, several exploratory talks were held between the parties in Kuala Lumpur, eventually leading to the crafting of the draft MOA-AD in its
final form, which, as mentioned, was set to be signed last August 5, 2008.

II. STATEMENT OF THE PROCEEDINGS

Before the Court is what is perhaps the most contentious "consensus" ever embodied in an instrument - the MOA-AD which is assailed
principally by the present petitions bearing docket numbers 183591, 183752, 183893, 183951 and 183962.
Commonly impleaded as respondents are the GRP Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain 7 and the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (PAPP)
Hermogenes Esperon, Jr.
On July 23, 2008, the Province of North Cotabato8 and Vice-Governor Emmanuel Piñol filed a petition, docketed as G.R. No. 183591, for
Mandamus and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. 9 Invoking the right
to information on matters of public concern, petitioners seek to compel respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies
of the MOA-AD including its attachments, and to prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD, pending the disclosure of the contents of the
MOA-AD and the holding of a public consultation thereon. Supplementarily, petitioners pray that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional.10
This initial petition was followed by another one, docketed as G.R. No. 183752, also for Mandamus and Prohibition11 filed by the City of
Zamboanga,12 Mayor Celso Lobregat, Rep. Ma. Isabelle Climaco and Rep. Erico Basilio Fabian who likewise pray for similar injunctive reliefs.
Petitioners herein moreover pray that the City of Zamboanga be excluded from the Bangsamoro Homeland and/or Bangsamoro Juridical Entity
and, in the alternative, that the MOA-AD be declared null and void.
By Resolution of August 4, 2008, the Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order commanding and directing public respondents and their agents
to cease and desist from formally signing the MOA-AD.13 The Court also required the Solicitor General to submit to the Court and petitioners the
official copy of the final draft of the MOA-AD,14 to which she complied.15
Meanwhile, the City of Iligan16 filed a petition for Injunction and/or Declaratory Relief, docketed as G.R. No. 183893, praying that respondents
be enjoined from signing the MOA-AD or, if the same had already been signed, from implementing the same, and that the MOA-AD be declared
unconstitutional. Petitioners herein additionally implead Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita as respondent.
The Province of Zamboanga del Norte,17 Governor Rolando Yebes, Vice-Governor Francis Olvis, Rep. Cecilia Jalosjos-Carreon, Rep. Cesar
Jalosjos, and the members18 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Zamboanga del Norte filed on August 15, 2008 a petition for Certiorari,
Mandamus and Prohibition,19 docketed as G.R. No. 183951. They pray, inter alia, that the MOA-AD be declared null and void and without
operative effect, and that respondents be enjoined from executing the MOA-AD.
On August 19, 2008, Ernesto Maceda, Jejomar Binay, and Aquilino Pimentel III filed a petition for Prohibition, 20docketed as G.R. No.
183962, praying for a judgment prohibiting and permanently enjoining respondents from formally signing and executing the MOA-AD and or
any other agreement derived therefrom or similar thereto, and nullifying the MOA-AD for being unconstitutional and illegal. Petitioners
herein additionally implead as respondent the MILF Peace Negotiating Panel represented by its Chairman Mohagher Iqbal.
Various parties moved to intervene and were granted leave of court to file their petitions-/comments-in-intervention. Petitioners-in-Intervention
include Senator Manuel A. Roxas, former Senate President Franklin Drilon and Atty. Adel Tamano, the City of Isabela 21 and Mayor Cherrylyn
Santos-Akbar, the Province of Sultan Kudarat22 and Gov. Suharto Mangudadatu, the Municipality of Linamon in Lanao del Norte, 23 Ruy Elias
Lopez of Davao City and of the Bagobo tribe, Sangguniang Panlungsod member Marino Ridao and businessman Kisin Buxani, both of Cotabato
City; and lawyers Carlo Gomez, Gerardo Dilig, Nesario Awat, Joselito Alisuag, Richalex Jagmis, all of Palawan City. The Muslim Legal
Assistance Foundation, Inc. (Muslaf) and the Muslim Multi-Sectoral Movement for Peace and Development (MMMPD) filed their respective
Comments-in-Intervention.
By subsequent Resolutions, the Court ordered the consolidation of the petitions. Respondents filed Comments on the petitions, while some of
petitioners submitted their respective Replies.
Respondents, by Manifestation and Motion of August 19, 2008, stated that the Executive Department shall thoroughly review the MOA-AD and
pursue further negotiations to address the issues hurled against it, and thus moved to dismiss the cases. In the succeeding exchange of pleadings,
respondents' motion was met with vigorous opposition from petitioners.
The cases were heard on oral argument on August 15, 22 and 29, 2008 that tackled the following principal issues:
1. Whether the petitions have become moot and academic
(i) insofar as the mandamus aspect is concerned, in view of the disclosure of official copies of the final draft of the
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA); and
(ii) insofar as the prohibition aspect involving the Local Government Units is concerned, if it is considered that
consultation has become fait accompli with the finalization of the draft;
2. Whether the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe for adjudication;
3. Whether respondent Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction when it negotiated and initiated the MOA vis-à-vis ISSUES Nos. 4 and 5;
4. Whether there is a violation of the people's right to information on matters of public concern (1987 Constitution, Article III, Sec. 7)
under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (1987 Constitution, Article II, Sec. 28) including
public consultation under Republic Act No. 7160 (LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991)[;]
If it is in the affirmative, whether prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is an appropriate remedy;
5. Whether by signing the MOA, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines would be BINDING itself
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a juridical, territorial or political
subdivision not recognized by law;
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA;
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral domain in violation of Republic
Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997), particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII
(DELINEATION, RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)[;]
If in the affirmative, whether the Executive Branch has the authority to so bind the Government of the Republic of the Philippines;
6. Whether the inclusion/exclusion of the Province of North Cotabato, Cities of Zamboanga, Iligan and Isabela, and the Municipality
of Linamon, Lanao del Norte in/from the areas covered by the projected Bangsamoro Homeland is a justiciable question; and
7. Whether desistance from signing the MOA derogates any prior valid commitments of the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines.24
The Court, thereafter, ordered the parties to submit their respective Memoranda. Most of the parties submitted their memoranda on time.

III. OVERVIEW OF THE MOA-AD

As a necessary backdrop to the consideration of the objections raised in the subject five petitions and six petitions-in-intervention against the
MOA-AD, as well as the two comments-in-intervention in favor of the MOA-AD, the Court takes an overview of the MOA.
The MOA-AD identifies the Parties to it as the GRP and the MILF.
Under the heading "Terms of Reference" (TOR), the MOA-AD includes not only four earlier agreements between the GRP and MILF, but also
two agreements between the GRP and the MNLF: the 1976 Tripoli Agreement, and the Final Peace Agreement on the Implementation of the
1976 Tripoli Agreement, signed on September 2, 1996 during the administration of President Fidel Ramos.
The MOA-AD also identifies as TOR two local statutes - the organic act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)25 and the
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA),26 and several international law instruments - the ILO Convention No. 169 Concerning Indigenous and
Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries in relation to the UN Declaration on the Rights of the Indigenous Peoples, and the UN Charter, among
others.
The MOA-AD includes as a final TOR the generic category of "compact rights entrenchment emanating from the regime of dar-ul-mua'hada (or
territory under compact) and dar-ul-sulh (or territory under peace agreement) that partakes the nature of a treaty device."
During the height of the Muslim Empire, early Muslim jurists tended to see the world through a simple dichotomy: there was the dar-ul-
Islam (the Abode of Islam) and dar-ul-harb (the Abode of War). The first referred to those lands where Islamic laws held sway, while the second
denoted those lands where Muslims were persecuted or where Muslim laws were outlawed or ineffective. 27 This way of viewing the world,
however, became more complex through the centuries as the Islamic world became part of the international community of nations.
As Muslim States entered into treaties with their neighbors, even with distant States and inter-governmental organizations, the classical division
of the world into dar-ul-Islam and dar-ul-harb eventually lost its meaning. New terms were drawn up to describe novel ways of perceiving non-
Muslim territories. For instance, areas like dar-ul-mua'hada (land of compact) and dar-ul-sulh (land of treaty) referred to countries which, though
under a secular regime, maintained peaceful and cooperative relations with Muslim States, having been bound to each other by treaty or
agreement. Dar-ul-aman (land of order), on the other hand, referred to countries which, though not bound by treaty with Muslim States,
maintained freedom of religion for Muslims.28
It thus appears that the "compact rights entrenchment" emanating from the regime of dar-ul-mua'hada and dar-ul-sulh simply refers to all other
agreements between the MILF and the Philippine government - the Philippines being the land of compact and peace agreement - that partake of
the nature of a treaty device, "treaty" being broadly defined as "any solemn agreement in writing that sets out understandings, obligations, and
benefits for both parties which provides for a framework that elaborates the principles declared in the [MOA-AD]."29
The MOA-AD states that the Parties "HAVE AGREED AND ACKNOWLEDGED AS FOLLOWS," and starts with its main body.
The main body of the MOA-AD is divided into four strands, namely, Concepts and Principles, Territory, Resources, and Governance.

A. CONCEPTS AND PRINCIPLES

This strand begins with the statement that it is "the birthright of all Moros and all Indigenous peoples of Mindanao to identify themselves and be
accepted as ‘Bangsamoros.'" It defines "Bangsamoro people" as the natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent islands
including Palawan and the Sulu archipelago at the time of conquest or colonization, and their descendants whether mixed or of full
blood, including their spouses.30
Thus, the concept of "Bangsamoro," as defined in this strand of the MOA-AD, includes not only "Moros" as traditionally understood even by
Muslims,31 but all indigenous peoples of Mindanao and its adjacent islands. The MOA-AD adds that the freedom of choice of indigenous peoples
shall be respected. What this freedom of choice consists in has not been specifically defined.
The MOA-AD proceeds to refer to the "Bangsamoro homeland," the ownership of which is vested exclusively in the Bangsamoro people by
virtue of their prior rights of occupation.32 Both parties to the MOA-AD acknowledge that ancestral domain does not form part of the public
domain.33
The Bangsamoro people are acknowledged as having the right to self-governance, which right is said to be rooted on ancestral territoriality
exercised originally under the suzerain authority of their sultanates and the Pat a Pangampong ku Ranaw. The sultanates were described as states
or "karajaan/kadatuan" resembling a body politic endowed with all the elements of a nation-state in the modern sense.34
The MOA-AD thus grounds the right to self-governance of the Bangsamoro people on the past suzerain authority of the sultanates. As gathered,
the territory defined as the Bangsamoro homeland was ruled by several sultanates and, specifically in the case of the Maranao, by the Pat a
Pangampong ku Ranaw, a confederation of independent principalities (pangampong) each ruled by datus and sultans, none of whom was supreme
over the others.35
The MOA-AD goes on to describe the Bangsamoro people as "the ‘First Nation' with defined territory and with a system of government having
entered into treaties of amity and commerce with foreign nations."
The term "First Nation" is of Canadian origin referring to the indigenous peoples of that territory, particularly those known as Indians. In
Canada, each of these indigenous peoples is equally entitled to be called "First Nation," hence, all of them are usually described collectively by
the plural "First Nations."36 To that extent, the MOA-AD, by identifying the Bangsamoro people as "the First Nation" - suggesting its exclusive
entitlement to that designation - departs from the Canadian usage of the term.
The MOA-AD then mentions for the first time the "Bangsamoro Juridical Entity" (BJE) to which it grants the authority and jurisdiction over
the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral Lands of the Bangsamoro.37

B. TERRITORY
The territory of the Bangsamoro homeland is described as the land mass as well as the maritime, terrestrial, fluvial and alluvial domains,
including the aerial domain and the atmospheric space above it, embracing the Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan geographic region.38
More specifically, the core of the BJE is defined as the present geographic area of the ARMM - thus constituting the following areas: Lanao del
Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Basilan, and Marawi City. Significantly, this core also includes certain municipalities of Lanao del Norte
that voted for inclusion in the ARMM in the 2001 plebiscite.39
Outside of this core, the BJE is to cover other provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, which are grouped into two categories, Category A
and Category B. Each of these areas is to be subjected to a plebiscite to be held on different dates, years apart from each other. Thus, Category A
areas are to be subjected to a plebiscite not later than twelve (12) months following the signing of the MOA-AD.40 Category B areas, also called
"Special Intervention Areas," on the other hand, are to be subjected to a plebiscite twenty-five (25) years from the signing of a separate agreement
- the Comprehensive Compact.41
The Parties to the MOA-AD stipulate that the BJE shall have jurisdiction over all natural resources within its "internalwaters," defined as
extending fifteen (15) kilometers from the coastline of the BJE area; 42 that the BJE shall also have "territorial waters," which shall stretch beyond
the BJE internal waters up to the baselines of the Republic of the Philippines (RP) south east and south west of mainland Mindanao; and
that within these territorial waters, the BJE and the "Central Government" (used interchangeably with RP) shall exercise joint jurisdiction,
authority and management over all natural resources.43 Notably, the jurisdiction over the internal waters is not similarly described as "joint."
The MOA-AD further provides for the sharing of minerals on the territorial waters between the Central Government and the BJE, in favor of the
latter, through production sharing and economic cooperation agreement.44 The activities which the Parties are allowed to conduct on
the territorial waters are enumerated, among which are the exploration and utilization of natural resources, regulation of shipping and fishing
activities, and the enforcement of police and safety measures. 45 There is no similar provision on the sharing of minerals and allowed activities
with respect to the internal waters of the BJE.

C. RESOURCES
The MOA-AD states that the BJE is free to enter into any economic cooperation and trade relations with foreign countries and shall have the
option to establish trade missions in those countries. Such relationships and understandings, however, are not to include aggression against the
GRP. The BJE may also enter into environmental cooperation agreements.46
The external defense of the BJE is to remain the duty and obligation of the Central Government. The Central Government is also bound to "take
necessary steps to ensure the BJE's participation in international meetings and events" like those of the ASEAN and the specialized agencies of
the UN. The BJE is to be entitled to participate in Philippine official missions and delegations for the negotiation of border agreements or
protocols for environmental protection and equitable sharing of incomes and revenues involving the bodies of water adjacent to or between the
islands forming part of the ancestral domain.47
With regard to the right of exploring for, producing, and obtaining all potential sources of energy, petroleum, fossil fuel, mineral oil and natural
gas, the jurisdiction and control thereon is to be vested in the BJE "as the party having control within its territorial jurisdiction." This right carries
the proviso that, "in times of national emergency, when public interest so requires," the Central Government may, for a fixed period and under
reasonable terms as may be agreed upon by both Parties, assume or direct the operation of such resources. 48
The sharing between the Central Government and the BJE of total production pertaining to natural resources is to be 75:25 in favor of the BJE.49
The MOA-AD provides that legitimate grievances of the Bangsamoro people arising from any unjust dispossession of their territorial and
proprietary rights, customary land tenures, or their marginalization shall be acknowledged. Whenever restoration is no longer possible, reparation
is to be in such form as mutually determined by the Parties.50
The BJE may modify or cancel the forest concessions, timber licenses, contracts or agreements, mining concessions, Mineral Production and
Sharing Agreements (MPSA), Industrial Forest Management Agreements (IFMA), and other land tenure instruments granted by the Philippine
Government, including those issued by the present ARMM.51

D. GOVERNANCE
The MOA-AD binds the Parties to invite a multinational third-party to observe and monitor the implementation of the Comprehensive Compact.
This compact is to embody the "details for the effective enforcement" and "the mechanisms and modalities for the actual implementation" of the
MOA-AD. The MOA-AD explicitly provides that the participation of the third party shall not in any way affect the status of the relationship
between the Central Government and the BJE.52
The "associative" relationship
between the Central Government
and the BJE
The MOA-AD describes the relationship of the Central Government and the BJE as "associative," characterized by shared authority and
responsibility. And it states that the structure of governance is to be based on executive, legislative, judicial, and administrative institutions with
defined powers and functions in the Comprehensive Compact.
The MOA-AD provides that its provisions requiring "amendments to the existing legal framework" shall take effect upon signing of the
Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the aforesaid amendments, with due regard to the non-derogation of prior agreements and within
the stipulated timeframe to be contained in the Comprehensive Compact. As will be discussed later, much of the present controversy hangs on
the legality of this provision.
The BJE is granted the power to build, develop and maintain its own institutions inclusive of civil service, electoral, financial and banking,
education, legislation, legal, economic, police and internal security force, judicial system and correctional institutions, the details of which shall
be discussed in the negotiation of the comprehensive compact.
As stated early on, the MOA-AD was set to be signed on August 5, 2008 by Rodolfo Garcia and Mohagher Iqbal, Chairpersons of the Peace
Negotiating Panels of the GRP and the MILF, respectively. Notably, the penultimate paragraph of the MOA-AD identifies the signatories as "the
representatives of the Parties," meaning the GRP and MILF themselves, and not merely of the negotiating panels.53 In addition, the signature
page of the MOA-AD states that it is "WITNESSED BY" Datuk Othman Bin Abd Razak, Special Adviser to the Prime Minister of Malaysia,
"ENDORSED BY" Ambassador Sayed Elmasry, Adviser to Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) Secretary General and Special Envoy
for Peace Process in Southern Philippines, and SIGNED "IN THE PRESENCE OF" Dr. Albert G. Romulo, Secretary of Foreign Affairs of RP
and Dato' Seri Utama Dr. Rais Bin Yatim, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia, all of whom were scheduled to sign the Agreement last August
5, 2008.
Annexed to the MOA-AD are two documents containing the respective lists cum maps of the provinces, municipalities, and barangays under
Categories A and B earlier mentioned in the discussion on the strand on TERRITORY.

IV. PROCEDURAL ISSUES

A. RIPENESS
The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversies. 54 Courts decline to issue advisory opinions or to resolve hypothetical or
feigned problems, or mere academic questions.55 The limitation of the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies defines the role
assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power, to assure that the courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of
government.56
An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as
distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. There must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced
on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence. 57 The Court can decide the constitutionality of an act or treaty only when a proper case between
opposing parties is submitted for judicial determination.58
Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being
challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it.59 For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite
that something had then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, 60 and the petitioner must
allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to itself as a result of the challenged action.61 He must show that he has sustained or is
immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained of. 62
The Solicitor General argues that there is no justiciable controversy that is ripe for judicial review in the present petitions, reasoning that
The unsigned MOA-AD is simply a list of consensus points subject to further negotiations and legislative enactments as well as
constitutional processes aimed at attaining a final peaceful agreement. Simply put, the MOA-AD remains to be a proposal that does
not automatically create legally demandable rights and obligations until the list of operative acts required have been duly complied
with. x x x
xxxx
In the cases at bar, it is respectfully submitted that this Honorable Court has no authority to pass upon issues based on hypothetical or
feigned constitutional problems or interests with no concrete bases. Considering the preliminary character of the MOA-AD, there are
no concrete acts that could possibly violate petitioners' and intervenors' rights since the acts complained of are mere contemplated
steps toward the formulation of a final peace agreement. Plainly, petitioners and intervenors' perceived injury, if at all, is merely
imaginary and illusory apart from being unfounded and based on mere conjectures. (Underscoring supplied)
The Solicitor General cites63 the following provisions of the MOA-AD:
TERRITORY
xxxx
2. Toward this end, the Parties enter into the following stipulations:
xxxx
d. Without derogating from the requirements of prior agreements, the Government stipulates to conduct and deliver, using all possible
legal measures, within twelve (12) months following the signing of the MOA-AD, a plebiscite covering the areas as enumerated in the
list and depicted in the map as Category A attached herein (the "Annex"). The Annex constitutes an integral part of this framework
agreement. Toward this end, the Parties shall endeavor to complete the negotiations and resolve all outstanding issues on the
Comprehensive Compact within fifteen (15) months from the signing of the MOA-AD.
 xxxx
GOVERNANCE
xxxx
7. The Parties agree that mechanisms and modalities for the actual implementation of this MOA-AD shall be spelt out in the
Comprehensive Compact to mutually take such steps to enable it to occur effectively.
Any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the existing legal framework shall come into force upon the signing of a
Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the necessary changes to the legal framework with due regard to non-derogation of prior
agreements and within the stipulated timeframe to be contained in the Comprehensive Compact. 64 (Underscoring supplied)
The Solicitor General's arguments fail to persuade.
Concrete acts under the MOA-AD are not necessary to render the present controversy ripe. In Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre,65 this Court held:
x x x [B]y the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged action, the dispute is said to have ripened into a
judicial controversy even without any other overt act. Indeed, even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to
awaken judicial duty.
xxxx
By the same token, when an act of the President, who in our constitutional scheme is a coequal of Congress, is seriously alleged to
have infringed the Constitution and the laws x x x settling the dispute becomes the duty and the responsibility of the courts.66
In Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe,67 the United States Supreme Court held that the challenge to the constitutionality of the school's
policy allowing student-led prayers and speeches before games was ripe for adjudication, even if no public prayer had yet been led under the
policy, because the policy was being challenged as unconstitutional on its face. 68
That the law or act in question is not yet effective does not negate ripeness. For example, in New York v. United States,69 decided in 1992, the
United States Supreme Court held that the action by the State of New York challenging the provisions of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Policy Act was ripe for adjudication even if the questioned provision was not to take effect until January 1, 1996, because the parties agreed that
New York had to take immediate action to avoid the provision's consequences.70
The present petitions pray for Certiorari,71 Prohibition, and Mandamus. Certiorari and Prohibition are remedies granted by law when any tribunal,
board or officer has acted, in the case of certiorari, or is proceeding, in the case of prohibition, without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 72 Mandamus is a remedy granted by law when any tribunal, corporation,
board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust,
or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use or enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled.73 Certiorari, Mandamus
and Prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and
executive officials.74
The authority of the GRP Negotiating Panel is defined by Executive Order No. 3 (E.O. No. 3), issued on February 28, 2001.75 The said executive
order requires that "[t]he government's policy framework for peace, including the systematic approach and the administrative structure for
carrying out the comprehensive peace process x x x be governed by this Executive Order." 76
The present petitions allege that respondents GRP Panel and PAPP Esperon drafted the terms of the MOA-AD without consulting the local
government units or communities affected, nor informing them of the proceedings. As will be discussed in greater detail later, such omission, by
itself, constitutes a departure by respondents from their mandate under E.O. No. 3.
Furthermore, the petitions allege that the provisions of the MOA-AD violate the Constitution. The MOA-AD provides that "any provisions of the
MOA-AD requiring amendments to the existing legal framework shall come into force upon the signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon
effecting the necessary changes to the legal framework," implying an amendment of the Constitution to accommodate the MOA-AD. This
stipulation, in effect, guaranteed to the MILF the amendment of the Constitution. Such act constitutes another violation of its authority. Again,
these points will be discussed in more detail later.
As the petitions allege acts or omissions on the part of respondent that exceed their authority, by violating their duties under E.O. No. 3 and the
provisions of the Constitution and statutes, the petitions make a prima facie case for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus, and an actual case or
controversy ripe for adjudication exists. When an act of a branch of government is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it
becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute.77

B. LOCUS STANDI
For a party to have locus standi, one must allege "such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."78
Because constitutional cases are often public actions in which the relief sought is likely to affect other persons, a preliminary question frequently
arises as to this interest in the constitutional question raised.79
When suing as a citizen, the person complaining must allege that he has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is
lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of.80 When the issue
concerns a public right, it is sufficient that the petitioner is a citizen and has an interest in the execution of the laws. 81
For a taxpayer, one is allowed to sue where there is an assertion that public funds are illegally disbursed or deflected to an illegal purpose, or that
there is a wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.82 The Court retains discretion whether or not to
allow a taxpayer's suit.83
In the case of a legislator or member of Congress, an act of the Executive that injures the institution of Congress causes a derivative but
nonetheless substantial injury that can be questioned by legislators. A member of the House of Representatives has standing to maintain inviolate
the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in his office. 84
An organization may be granted standing to assert the rights of its members,85 but the mere invocation by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or
any member of the legal profession of the duty to preserve the rule of law does not suffice to clothe it with standing. 86
As regards a local government unit (LGU), it can seek relief in order to protect or vindicate an interest of its own, and of the other LGUs. 87
Intervenors, meanwhile, may be given legal standing upon showing of facts that satisfy the requirements of the law authorizing
intervention,88 such as a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties.
In any case, the Court has discretion to relax the procedural technicality on locus standi, given the liberal attitude it has exercised, highlighted in
the case of David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,89 where technicalities of procedure were brushed aside, the constitutional issues raised being of
paramount public interest or of transcendental importance deserving the attention of the Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as
precedents.90 The Court's forbearing stance on locus standi on issues involving constitutional issues has for its purpose the protection of
fundamental rights.
In not a few cases, the Court, in keeping with its duty under the Constitution to determine whether the other branches of government have kept
themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and have not abused the discretion given them, has brushed aside technical rules of
procedure.91
In the petitions at bar, petitioners Province of North Cotabato (G.R. No. 183591) Province of Zamboanga del Norte (G.R. No. 183951), City
of Iligan (G.R. No. 183893) and City of Zamboanga (G.R. No. 183752) and petitioners-in-intervention Province of Sultan Kudarat, City of
Isabela and Municipality of Linamon have locus standi in view of the direct and substantial injury that they, as LGUs, would suffer as their
territories, whether in whole or in part, are to be included in the intended domain of the BJE. These petitioners allege that they did not vote for
their inclusion in the ARMM which would be expanded to form the BJE territory. Petitioners' legal standing is thus beyond doubt.
In G.R. No. 183962, petitioners Ernesto Maceda, Jejomar Binay and Aquilino Pimentel III would have no standing as citizens and taxpayers
for their failure to specify that they would be denied some right or privilege or there would be wastage of public funds. The fact that they are a
former Senator, an incumbent mayor of Makati City, and a resident of Cagayan de Oro, respectively, is of no consequence. Considering their
invocation of the transcendental importance of the issues at hand, however, the Court grants them standing.
Intervenors Franklin Drilon and Adel Tamano, in alleging their standing as taxpayers, assert that government funds would be expended for the
conduct of an illegal and unconstitutional plebiscite to delineate the BJE territory. On that score alone, they can be given legal standing. Their
allegation that the issues involved in these petitions are of "undeniable transcendental importance" clothes them with added basis for their
personality to intervene in these petitions.
With regard to Senator Manuel Roxas, his standing is premised on his being a member of the Senate and a citizen to enforce compliance by
respondents of the public's constitutional right to be informed of the MOA-AD, as well as on a genuine legal interest in the matter in litigation, or
in the success or failure of either of the parties. He thus possesses the requisite standing as an intervenor.
With respect to Intervenors Ruy Elias Lopez, as a former congressman of the 3rd district of Davao City, a taxpayer and a member of the Bagobo
tribe; Carlo B. Gomez, et al., as members of the IBP Palawan chapter, citizens and taxpayers; Marino Ridao, as taxpayer, resident and member
of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cotabato City; and Kisin Buxani, as taxpayer, they failed to allege any proper legal interest in the present
petitions. Just the same, the Court exercises its discretion to relax the procedural technicality on locus standi given the paramount public interest
in the issues at hand.
Intervening respondents Muslim Multi-Sectoral Movement for Peace and Development, an advocacy group for justice and the attainment of
peace and prosperity in Muslim Mindanao; and Muslim Legal Assistance Foundation Inc., a non-government organization of Muslim lawyers,
allege that they stand to be benefited or prejudiced, as the case may be, in the resolution of the petitions concerning the MOA-AD, and prays for
the denial of the petitions on the grounds therein stated. Such legal interest suffices to clothe them with standing.

B. MOOTNESS
Respondents insist that the present petitions have been rendered moot with the satisfaction of all the reliefs prayed for by petitioners and the
subsequent pronouncement of the Executive Secretary that "[n]o matter what the Supreme Court ultimately decides[,] the government will not
sign the MOA."92
In lending credence to this policy decision, the Solicitor General points out that the President had already disbanded the GRP Peace Panel. 93
In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,94 this Court held that the "moot and academic" principle not being a magical formula that automatically dissuades
courts in resolving a case, it will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if it finds that (a) there is a grave violation of the Constitution; 95 (b)
the situation is of exceptional character and paramount public interest is involved;96 (c) the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of
controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public;97 and (d) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.98
Another exclusionary circumstance that may be considered is where there is a voluntary cessation of the activity complained of by the defendant
or doer. Thus, once a suit is filed and the doer voluntarily ceases the challenged conduct, it does not automatically deprive the tribunal of power
to hear and determine the case and does not render the case moot especially when the plaintiff seeks damages or prays for injunctive relief against
the possible recurrence of the violation.99
The present petitions fall squarely into these exceptions to thus thrust them into the domain of judicial review. The grounds cited above
in David are just as applicable in the present cases as they were, not only in David, but also in Province of Batangas v. Romulo100 and Manalo v.
Calderon101 where the Court similarly decided them on the merits, supervening events that would ordinarily have rendered the same moot
notwithstanding.
Petitions not mooted
Contrary then to the asseverations of respondents, the non-signing of the MOA-AD and the eventual dissolution of the GRP Peace Panel did not
moot the present petitions. It bears emphasis that the signing of the MOA-AD did not push through due to the Court's issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order.
Contrary too to respondents' position, the MOA-AD cannot be considered a mere "list of consensus points," especially given its nomenclature,
the need to have it signed or initialed by all the parties concerned on August 5, 2008, and the far-reaching Constitutional implications of
these "consensus points," foremost of which is the creation of the BJE.
In fact, as what will, in the main, be discussed, there is a commitment on the part of respondents to amend and effect necessary changes to
the existing legal framework for certain provisions of the MOA-AD to take effect. Consequently, the present petitions are not confined to the
terms and provisions of the MOA-AD, but to other on-going and future negotiations and agreements necessary for its realization. The petitions
have not, therefore, been rendered moot and academic simply by the public disclosure of the MOA-AD,102 the manifestation that it will not be
signed as well as the disbanding of the GRP Panel not withstanding.
Petitions are imbued with paramount public interest
There is no gainsaying that the petitions are imbued with paramount public interest, involving a significant part of the country's territory and the
wide-ranging political modifications of affected LGUs. The assertion that the MOA-AD is subject to further legal enactments including
possible Constitutional amendments more than ever provides impetus for the Court to formulate controlling principles to guide the
bench, the bar, the public and, in this case, the government and its negotiating entity.
Respondents cite Suplico v. NEDA, et al.103 where the Court did not "pontificat[e] on issues which no longer legitimately constitute an actual case
or controversy [as this] will do more harm than good to the nation as a whole."
The present petitions must be differentiated from Suplico. Primarily, in Suplico, what was assailed and eventually cancelled was a stand-alone
government procurement contract for a national broadband network involving a one-time contractual relation between two parties-the
government and a private foreign corporation. As the issues therein involved specific government procurement policies and standard principles
on contracts, the majority opinion in Suplico found nothing exceptional therein, the factual circumstances being peculiar only to the transactions
and parties involved in the controversy.
The MOA-AD is part of a series of agreements
In the present controversy, the MOA-AD is a significant part of a series of agreements necessary to carry out the Tripoli Agreement 2001. The
MOA-AD which dwells on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of said Tripoli Agreement is the third such component to be undertaken following the
implementation of the Security Aspect in August 2001 and the Humanitarian, Rehabilitation and Development Aspect in May 2002.
Accordingly, even if the Executive Secretary, in his Memorandum of August 28, 2008 to the Solicitor General, has stated that "no matter what the
Supreme Court ultimately decides[,] the government will not sign the MOA[-AD]," mootness will not set in in light of the terms of the Tripoli
Agreement 2001.
Need to formulate principles-guidelines
Surely, the present MOA-AD can be renegotiated or another one will be drawn up to carry out the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the Tripoli
Agreement 2001, in another or in any form, which could contain similar or significantly drastic provisions. While the Court notes the word of the
Executive Secretary that the government "is committed to securing an agreement that is both constitutional and equitable because that is the only
way that long-lasting peace can be assured," it is minded to render a decision on the merits in the present petitions to formulate controlling
principles to guide the bench, the bar, the public and, most especially, the government in negotiating with the MILF regarding Ancestral
Domain.
Respondents invite the Court's attention to the separate opinion of then Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban in Sanlakas v. Reyes104 in which he
stated that the doctrine of "capable of repetition yet evading review" can override mootness, "provided the party raising it in a proper case has
been and/or continue to be prejudiced or damaged as a direct result of their issuance." They contend that the Court must have jurisdiction over the
subject matter for the doctrine to be invoked.
The present petitions all contain prayers for Prohibition over which this Court exercises original jurisdiction. While G.R. No. 183893 (City of
Iligan v. GRP) is a petition for Injunction and Declaratory Relief, the Court will treat it as one for Prohibition as it has far reaching implications
and raises questions that need to be resolved.105 At all events, the Court has jurisdiction over most if not the rest of the petitions.
Indeed, the present petitions afford a proper venue for the Court to again apply the doctrine immediately referred to as what it had done in a
number of landmark cases.106 There is a reasonable expectation that petitioners, particularly the Provinces of North Cotabato, Zamboanga del
Norte and Sultan Kudarat, the Cities of Zamboanga, Iligan and Isabela, and the Municipality of Linamon, will again be subjected to the same
problem in the future as respondents' actions are capable of repetition, in another or any form.
It is with respect to the prayers for Mandamus that the petitions have become moot, respondents having, by Compliance of August 7, 2008,
provided this Court and petitioners with official copies of the final draft of the MOA-AD and its annexes. Too, intervenors have been furnished,
or have procured for themselves, copies of the MOA-AD.

V. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
As culled from the Petitions and Petitions-in-Intervention, there are basically two SUBSTANTIVE issues to be resolved, one relating to
the manner in which the MOA-AD was negotiated and finalized, the other relating to its provisions, viz:
1. Did respondents violate constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation and the right to information when they negotiated and
later initialed the MOA-AD?
2. Do the contents of the MOA-AD violate the Constitution and the laws?

ON THE FIRST SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE

Petitioners invoke their constitutional right to information on matters of public concern, as provided in Section 7, Article III on the Bill of
Rights:
Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to
documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for
policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.107
As early as 1948, in Subido v. Ozaeta,108 the Court has recognized the statutory right to examine and inspect public records, a right which was
eventually accorded constitutional status.
The right of access to public documents, as enshrined in both the 1973 Constitution and the 1987 Constitution, has been recognized as a self-
executory constitutional right.109
In the 1976 case of Baldoza v. Hon. Judge Dimaano,110 the Court ruled that access to public records is predicated on the right of the people to
acquire information on matters of public concern since, undoubtedly, in a democracy, the pubic has a legitimate interest in matters of social and
political significance.
x x x The incorporation of this right in the Constitution is a recognition of the fundamental role of free exchange of information in a democracy.
There can be no realistic perception by the public of the nation's problems, nor a meaningful democratic decision-making if they are denied
access to information of general interest. Information is needed to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of the times. As has
been aptly observed: "Maintaining the flow of such information depends on protection for both its acquisition and its dissemination since, if
either process is interrupted, the flow inevitably ceases." x x x111
In the same way that free discussion enables members of society to cope with the exigencies of their time, access to information of general
interest aids the people in democratic decision-making by giving them a better perspective of the vital issues confronting the nation 112 so that they
may be able to criticize and participate in the affairs of the government in a responsible, reasonable and effective manner. It is by ensuring an
unfettered and uninhibited exchange of ideas among a well-informed public that a government remains responsive to the changes desired by the
people.113
The MOA-AD is a matter of public concern
That the subject of the information sought in the present cases is a matter of public concern114 faces no serious challenge. In fact, respondents
admit that the MOA-AD is indeed of public concern.115 In previous cases, the Court found that the regularity of real estate transactions entered in
the Register of Deeds,116 the need for adequate notice to the public of the various laws, 117 the civil service eligibility of a public employee,118 the
proper management of GSIS funds allegedly used to grant loans to public officials, 119 the recovery of the Marcoses' alleged ill-gotten
wealth,120 and the identity of party-list nominees,121 among others, are matters of public concern. Undoubtedly, the MOA-AD subject of the
present cases is of public concern, involving as it does the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State, which directly affects the lives of the
public at large.
Matters of public concern covered by the right to information include steps and negotiations leading to the consummation of the contract. In not
distinguishing as to the executory nature or commercial character of agreements, the Court has categorically ruled:
 x x x [T]he right to information "contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the consummation of the transaction." Certainly,
a consummated contract is not a requirement for the exercise of the right to information. Otherwise, the people can never exercise the
right if no contract is consummated, and if one is consummated, it may be too late for the public to expose its defects.
Requiring a consummated contract will keep the public in the dark until the contract, which may be grossly disadvantageous to the
government or even illegal, becomes fait accompli. This negates the State policy of full transparency on matters of public concern, a
situation which the framers of the Constitution could not have intended. Such a requirement will prevent the citizenry from
participating in the public discussion of any proposed contract, effectively truncating a basic right enshrined in the Bill of Rights. We
can allow neither an emasculation of a constitutional right, nor a retreat by the State of its avowed "policy of full disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest."122 (Emphasis and italics in the original)
Intended as a "splendid symmetry"123 to the right to information under the Bill of Rights is the policy of public disclosure under Section 28,
Article II of the Constitution reading:
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest.124
The policy of full public disclosure enunciated in above-quoted Section 28 complements the right of access to information on matters of public
concern found in the Bill of Rights. The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand information, while Section 28
recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands.125
The policy of public disclosure establishes a concrete ethical principle for the conduct of public affairs in a genuinely open democracy, with the
people's right to know as the centerpiece. It is a mandate of the State to be accountable by following such policy.126 These provisions are vital to
the exercise of the freedom of expression and essential to hold public officials at all times accountable to the people.127
Whether Section 28 is self-executory, the records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission so disclose:
MR. SUAREZ. And since this is not self-executory, this policy will not be enunciated or will not be in force and effect until after
Congress shall have provided it.
MR. OPLE. I expect it to influence the climate of public ethics immediately but, of course, the implementing law will have to be
enacted by Congress, Mr. Presiding Officer.128
The following discourse, after Commissioner Hilario Davide, Jr., sought clarification on the issue, is enlightening.
MR. DAVIDE. I would like to get some clarifications on this. Mr. Presiding Officer, did I get the Gentleman correctly as having said
that this is not a self-executing provision? It would require a legislation by Congress to implement?
MR. OPLE. Yes. Originally, it was going to be self-executing, but I accepted an amendment from Commissioner Regalado, so that the
safeguards on national interest are modified by the clause "as may be provided by law"
MR. DAVIDE. But as worded, does it not mean that this will immediately take effect and Congress may provide for reasonable
safeguards on the sole ground national interest?
MR. OPLE. Yes. I think so, Mr. Presiding Officer, I said earlier that it should immediately influence the climate of the conduct
of public affairs but, of course, Congress here may no longer pass a law revoking it, or if this is approved, revoking this principle,
which is inconsistent with this policy.129 (Emphasis supplied)
Indubitably, the effectivity of the policy of public disclosure need not await the passing of a statute. As Congress cannot revoke this
principle, it is merely directed to provide for "reasonable safeguards." The complete and effective exercise of the right to information necessitates
that its complementary provision on public disclosure derive the same self-executory nature. Since both provisions go hand-in-hand, it is absurd
to say that the broader130 right to information on matters of public concern is already enforceable while the correlative duty of the State to disclose
its transactions involving public interest is not enforceable until there is an enabling law. Respondents cannot thus point to the absence of an
implementing legislation as an excuse in not effecting such policy.
An essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a continuing dialogue or process of communication between the government and the
people. It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end that the government may perceive
and be responsive to the people's will.131Envisioned to be corollary to the twin rights to information and disclosure is the design for feedback
mechanisms.
MS. ROSARIO BRAID. Yes. And lastly, Mr. Presiding Officer, will the people be able to participate? Will the government
provide feedback mechanisms so that the people can participate and can react where the existing media facilities are not able
to provide full feedback mechanisms to the government? I suppose this will be part of the government implementing
operational mechanisms.
MR. OPLE. Yes. I think through their elected representatives and that is how these courses take place. There is a message and a
feedback, both ways.
xxxx
MS. ROSARIO BRAID. Mr. Presiding Officer, may I just make one last sentence?
I think when we talk about the feedback network, we are not talking about public officials but also network of private business
o[r] community-based organizations that will be reacting. As a matter of fact, we will put more credence or credibility on the
private network of volunteers and voluntary community-based organizations. So I do not think we are afraid that there will be another
OMA in the making.132(Emphasis supplied)
The imperative of a public consultation, as a species of the right to information, is evident in the "marching orders" to respondents. The
mechanics for the duty to disclose information and to conduct public consultation regarding the peace agenda and process is manifestly provided
by E.O. No. 3.133 The preambulatory clause of E.O. No. 3 declares that there is a need to further enhance the contribution of civil society to the
comprehensive peace process by institutionalizing the people's participation.
One of the three underlying principles of the comprehensive peace process is that it "should be community-based, reflecting the sentiments,
values and principles important to all Filipinos" and "shall be defined not by the government alone, nor by the different contending groups only,
but by all Filipinos as one community."134 Included as a component of the comprehensive peace process is consensus-building and empowerment
for peace, which includes "continuing consultations on both national and local levels to build consensus for a peace agenda and process, and the
mobilization and facilitation of people's participation in the peace process."135
Clearly, E.O. No. 3 contemplates not just the conduct of a plebiscite to effectuate "continuing" consultations, contrary to respondents'
position that plebiscite is "more than sufficient consultation."136
Further, E.O. No. 3 enumerates the functions and responsibilities of the PAPP, one of which is to "[c]onduct regular dialogues with the National
Peace Forum (NPF) and other peace partners to seek relevant information, comments, recommendations as well as to render appropriate and
timely reports on the progress of the comprehensive peace process."137 E.O. No. 3 mandates the establishment of the NPF to be "the principal
forum for the PAPP to consult with and seek advi[c]e from the peace advocates, peace partners and concerned sectors of society on both national
and local levels, on the implementation of the comprehensive peace process, as well as for government[-]civil society dialogue and consensus-
building on peace agenda and initiatives."138
In fine, E.O. No. 3 establishes petitioners' right to be consulted on the peace agenda, as a corollary to the constitutional right to
information and disclosure.
PAPP Esperon committed grave abuse of discretion
The PAPP committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to carry out the pertinent consultation. The furtive process by which the MOA-
AD was designed and crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive,
arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof.
The Court may not, of course, require the PAPP to conduct the consultation in a particular way or manner. It may, however, require him to
comply with the law and discharge the functions within the authority granted by the President.139
Petitioners are not claiming a seat at the negotiating table, contrary to respondents' retort in justifying the denial of petitioners' right to be
consulted. Respondents' stance manifests the manner by which they treat the salient provisions of E.O. No. 3 on people's participation. Such
disregard of the express mandate of the President is not much different from superficial conduct toward token provisos that border on classic lip
service.140 It illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined.
As for respondents' invocation of the doctrine of executive privilege, it is not tenable under the premises. The argument defies sound reason when
contrasted with E.O. No. 3's explicit provisions on continuing consultation and dialogue on both national and local levels. The executive order
even recognizes the exercise of the public's right even before the GRP makes its official recommendations or before the government proffers
its definite propositions.141 It bear emphasis that E.O. No. 3 seeks to elicit relevant advice, information, comments and recommendations from the
people through dialogue.
AT ALL EVENTS, respondents effectively waived the defense of executive privilege in view of their unqualified disclosure of the official copies
of the final draft of the MOA-AD. By unconditionally complying with the Court's August 4, 2008 Resolution, without a prayer for the document's
disclosure in camera, or without a manifestation that it was complying therewith ex abundante ad cautelam.
Petitioners' assertion that the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991 declares it a State policy to "require all national agencies and offices to
conduct periodic consultations with appropriate local government units, non-governmental and people's organizations, and other concerned
sectors of the community before any project or program is implemented in their respective jurisdictions" 142 is well-taken. The LGC chapter on
intergovernmental relations puts flesh into this avowed policy:
Prior Consultations Required. - No project or program shall be implemented by government authorities unlessthe consultations
mentioned in Sections 2 (c) and 26 hereof are complied with, and prior approval of the sanggunian concerned is obtained: Provided,
That occupants in areas where such projects are to be implemented shall not be evicted unless appropriate relocation sites have been
provided, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.143 (Italics and underscoring supplied)
In Lina, Jr. v. Hon. Paño,144 the Court held that the above-stated policy and above-quoted provision of the LGU apply only to national programs
or projects which are to be implemented in a particular local community. Among the programs and projects covered are those that are critical to
the environment and human ecology including those that may call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in the locality where
these will be implemented.145 The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast
territory to the Bangsamoro people,146 which could pervasively and drastically result to the diaspora or displacement of a great number
of inhabitants from their total environment.
With respect to the indigenous cultural communities/indigenous peoples (ICCs/IPs), whose interests are represented herein by petitioner Lopez
and are adversely affected by the MOA-AD, the ICCs/IPs have, under the IPRA, the right to participate fully at all levels of decision-making in
matters which may affect their rights, lives and destinies.147 The MOA-AD, an instrument recognizing ancestral domain, failed to justify its non-
compliance with the clear-cut mechanisms ordained in said Act,148 which entails, among other things, the observance of the free and prior
informed consent of the ICCs/IPs.
Notably, the IPRA does not grant the Executive Department or any government agency the power to delineate and recognize an ancestral domain
claim by mere agreement or compromise. The recognition of the ancestral domain is the raison d'etre of the MOA-AD, without which all other
stipulations or "consensus points" necessarily must fail. In proceeding to make a sweeping declaration on ancestral domain, without complying
with the IPRA, which is cited as one of the TOR of the MOA-AD, respondents clearly transcended the boundaries of their authority. As it
seems, even the heart of the MOA-AD is still subject to necessary changes to the legal framework. While paragraph 7 on Governance suspends
the effectivity of all provisions requiring changes to the legal framework, such clause is itself invalid, as will be discussed in the following
section.
Indeed, ours is an open society, with all the acts of the government subject to public scrutiny and available always to public cognizance. This has
to be so if the country is to remain democratic, with sovereignty residing in the people and all government authority emanating from them.149
ON THE SECOND SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE
With regard to the provisions of the MOA-AD, there can be no question that they cannot all be accommodated under the present Constitution and
laws. Respondents have admitted as much in the oral arguments before this Court, and the MOA-AD itself recognizes the need to amend the
existing legal framework to render effective at least some of its provisions. Respondents, nonetheless, counter that the MOA-AD is free of any
legal infirmity because any provisions therein which are inconsistent with the present legal framework will not be effective until the necessary
changes to that framework are made. The validity of this argument will be considered later. For now, the Court shall pass upon how
The MOA-AD is inconsistent with the Constitution and laws as presently worded.
In general, the objections against the MOA-AD center on the extent of the powers conceded therein to the BJE. Petitioners assert that the powers
granted to the BJE exceed those granted to any local government under present laws, and even go beyond those of the present ARMM. Before
assessing some of the specific powers that would have been vested in the BJE, however, it would be useful to turn first to a general idea that
serves as a unifying link to the different provisions of the MOA-AD, namely, the international law concept of association. Significantly, the
MOA-AD explicitly alludes to this concept, indicating that the Parties actually framed its provisions with it in mind.
Association is referred to in paragraph 3 on TERRITORY, paragraph 11 on RESOURCES, and paragraph 4 on GOVERNANCE. It is in the last
mentioned provision, however, that the MOA-AD most clearly uses it to describe the envisioned relationship between the BJE and the Central
Government.
4. The relationship between the Central Government and the Bangsamoro juridical entity shall be associative characterized by
shared authority and responsibility with a structure of governance based on executive, legislative, judicial and administrative
institutions with defined powers and functions in the comprehensive compact. A period of transition shall be established in a
 comprehensive peace compact specifying the relationship between the Central Government and the BJE. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
The nature of the "associative" relationship may have been intended to be defined more precisely in the still to be forged Comprehensive
Compact. Nonetheless, given that there is a concept of "association" in international law, and the MOA-AD - by its inclusion of international law
instruments in its TOR- placed itself in an international legal context, that concept of association may be brought to bear in understanding the use
of the term "associative" in the MOA-AD.
Keitner and Reisman state that
[a]n association is formed when two states of unequal power voluntarily establish durable links. In the basic model, one state, the
associate, delegates certain responsibilities to the other, the principal, while maintaining its international status as a state. Free
associations represent a middle ground between integration and independence. x x x150 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
For purposes of illustration, the Republic of the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), formerly part of the U.S.-
administered Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands,151 are associated states of the U.S. pursuant to a Compact of Free Association. The currency in
these countries is the U.S. dollar, indicating their very close ties with the U.S., yet they issue their own travel documents, which is a mark of their
statehood. Their international legal status as states was confirmed by the UN Security Council and by their admission to UN membership.
According to their compacts of free association, the Marshall Islands and the FSM generally have the capacity to conduct foreign affairs in their
own name and right, such capacity extending to matters such as the law of the sea, marine resources, trade, banking, postal, civil aviation, and
cultural relations. The U.S. government, when conducting its foreign affairs, is obligated to consult with the governments of the Marshall Islands
or the FSM on matters which it (U.S. government) regards as relating to or affecting either government.
In the event of attacks or threats against the Marshall Islands or the FSM, the U.S. government has the authority and obligation to defend them as
if they were part of U.S. territory. The U.S. government, moreover, has the option of establishing and using military areas and facilities within
these associated states and has the right to bar the military personnel of any third country from having access to these territories for military
purposes.
It bears noting that in U.S. constitutional and international practice, free association is understood as an international association between
sovereigns. The Compact of Free Association is a treaty which is subordinate to the associated nation's national constitution, and each party may
terminate the association consistent with the right of independence. It has been said that, with the admission of the U.S.-associated states to the
UN in 1990, the UN recognized that the American model of free association is actually based on an underlying status of independence.152
In international practice, the "associated state" arrangement has usually been used as a transitional device of former colonies on their way to full
independence. Examples of states that have passed through the status of associated states as a transitional phase are Antigua, St. Kitts-Nevis-
Anguilla, Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Grenada. All have since become independent states. 153
Back to the MOA-AD, it contains many provisions which are consistent with the international legal concept of association, specifically the
following: the BJE's capacity to enter into economic and trade relations with foreign countries, the commitment of the Central Government to
ensure the BJE's participation in meetings and events in the ASEAN and the specialized UN agencies, and the continuing responsibility of the
Central Government over external defense. Moreover, the BJE's right to participate in Philippine official missions bearing on negotiation of
border agreements, environmental protection, and sharing of revenues pertaining to the bodies of water adjacent to or between the islands forming
part of the ancestral domain, resembles the right of the governments of FSM and the Marshall Islands to be consulted by the U.S. government on
any foreign affairs matter affecting them.
These provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the status of an associated state or, at any
rate, a status closely approximating it.
The concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution
No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having an "associative" relationship with the national
government. Indeed, the concept implies powers that go beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local or regional government. It
also implies the recognition of the associated entity as a state. The Constitution, however, does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other
than the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence.
Even the mere concept animating many of the MOA-AD's provisions, therefore, already requires for its validity the amendment of constitutional
provisions, specifically the following provisions of Article X:
SECTION 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and
barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided.
SECTION 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities,
municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures,
and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial
integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.
The BJE is a far more powerful
entity than the autonomous region
recognized in the Constitution
It is not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its relationship with the national government being fundamentally different from
that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all but name as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo
Convention,154 namely, a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and a capacity to enter into relations with other states.
Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily sever any portion of Philippine territory, the spirit animating it - which has
betrayed itself by its use of the concept of association - runs counter to the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic.
The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national government and the BJE being itself contrary to the present
Constitution, it is not surprising that many of the specific provisions of the MOA-AD on the formation and powers of the BJE are in
conflict with the Constitution and the laws.
Article X, Section 18 of the Constitution provides that "[t]he creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a majority of
the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting
favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region." (Emphasis supplied)
As reflected above, the BJE is more of a state than an autonomous region. But even assuming that it is covered by the term "autonomous region"
in the constitutional provision just quoted, the MOA-AD would still be in conflict with it. Under paragraph 2(c) on TERRITORY in relation to
2(d) and 2(e), the present geographic area of the ARMM and, in addition, the municipalities of Lanao del Norte which voted for inclusion in the
ARMM during the 2001 plebiscite - Baloi, Munai, Nunungan, Pantar, Tagoloan and Tangkal - are automatically part of the BJE without need of
another plebiscite, in contrast to the areas under Categories A and B mentioned earlier in the overview. That the present components of the
ARMM and the above-mentioned municipalities voted for inclusion therein in 2001, however, does not render another plebiscite unnecessary
under the Constitution, precisely because what these areas voted for then was their inclusion in the ARMM, not the BJE.
The MOA-AD, moreover, would not
comply with Article X, Section 20 of
the Constitution
since that provision defines the powers of autonomous regions as follows:
SECTION 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national laws, the organic act of
autonomous regions shall provide for legislative powers over:
(1) Administrative organization;
(2) Creation of sources of revenues;
(3) Ancestral domain and natural resources;
(4) Personal, family, and property relations;
(5) Regional urban and rural planning development;
(6) Economic, social, and tourism development;
(7) Educational policies;
(8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and
(9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of the people of the region. (Underscoring
supplied)
Again on the premise that the BJE may be regarded as an autonomous region, the MOA-AD would require an amendment that would expand the
above-quoted provision. The mere passage of new legislation pursuant to sub-paragraph No. 9 of said constitutional provision would not suffice,
since any new law that might vest in the BJE the powers found in the MOA-AD must, itself, comply with other provisions of the Constitution. It
would not do, for instance, to merely pass legislation vesting the BJE with treaty-making power in order to accommodate paragraph 4 of the
strand on RESOURCES which states: "The BJE is free to enter into any economic cooperation and trade relations with foreign countries:
provided, however, that such relationships and understandings do not include aggression against the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines x x x." Under our constitutional system, it is only the President who has that power. Pimentel v. Executive Secretary155 instructs:
In our system of government, the President, being the head of state, is regarded as the sole organ and authority in external relations
and is the country's sole representative with foreign nations. As the chief architect of foreign policy, the President acts as the
country's mouthpiece with respect to international affairs. Hence, the President is vested with the authority to deal with foreign
states and governments, extend or withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic relations, enter into treaties, and otherwise transact
the business of foreign relations. In the realm of treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to negotiate with other
states. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Article II, Section 22 of the Constitution must also be amended if the scheme envisioned in the MOA-AD is to be effected. That
constitutional provision states: "The State recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous cultural communities within the framework
of national unity and development." (Underscoring supplied) An associative arrangement does not uphold national unity. While there may be a
semblance of unity because of the associative ties between the BJE and the national government, the act of placing a portion of Philippine
territory in a status which, in international practice, has generally been a preparation for independence, is certainly not conducive
to national unity.
Besides being irreconcilable with the Constitution, the MOA-AD is also inconsistent with prevailing statutory law, among which are R.A.
No. 9054156 or the Organic Act of the ARMM, and the IPRA.157
Article X, Section 3 of the Organic Act of the ARMM is a bar to the adoption of the definition of "Bangsamoro people" used in the MOA-
AD. Paragraph 1 on Concepts and Principles states:
1. It is the birthright of all Moros and all Indigenous peoples of Mindanao to identify themselves and be accepted as
"Bangsamoros". The Bangsamoro people refers to those who are natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent
islands including Palawan and the Sulu archipelago at the time of conquest or colonization of its descendants whether mixed or of full
blood. Spouses and their descendants are classified as Bangsamoro. The freedom of choice of the Indigenous people shall be
respected. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
This use of the term Bangsamoro sharply contrasts with that found in the Article X, Section 3 of the Organic Act, which, rather than lumping
together the identities of the Bangsamoro and other indigenous peoples living in Mindanao, clearly distinguishes between Bangsamoro people
and Tribal peoples, as follows:
"As used in this Organic Act, the phrase "indigenous cultural community" refers to Filipino citizens residing in the autonomous
region who are:
(a) Tribal peoples. These are citizens whose social, cultural and economic conditions distinguish them from other sectors of the
national community; and
(b) Bangsa Moro people. These are citizens who are believers in Islam and who have retained some or all of their own social,
economic, cultural, and political institutions."
Respecting the IPRA, it lays down the prevailing procedure for the delineation and recognition of ancestral domains. The MOA-AD's manner of
delineating the ancestral domain of the Bangsamoro people is a clear departure from that procedure. By paragraph 1 of Territory, the Parties
simply agree that, subject to the delimitations in the agreed Schedules, "[t]he Bangsamoro homeland and historic territory refer to the land mass
as well as the maritime, terrestrial, fluvial and alluvial domains, and the aerial domain, the atmospheric space above it, embracing the Mindanao-
Sulu-Palawan geographic region."
Chapter VIII of the IPRA, on the other hand, lays down a detailed procedure, as illustrated in the following provisions thereof:
SECTION 52. Delineation Process. - The identification and delineation of ancestral domains shall be done in accordance with the
following procedures:
xxxx
b) Petition for Delineation. - The process of delineating a specific perimeter may be initiated by the NCIP with the consent of the
ICC/IP concerned, or through a Petition for Delineation filed with the NCIP, by a majority of the members of the ICCs/IPs;
c) Delineation Proper. - The official delineation of ancestral domain boundaries including census of all community members therein,
shall be immediately undertaken by the Ancestral Domains Office upon filing of the application by the ICCs/IPs concerned.
Delineation will be done in coordination with the community concerned and shall at all times include genuine involvement and
participation by the members of the communities concerned;
 d) Proof Required. - Proof of Ancestral Domain Claims shall include the testimony of elders or community under oath, and other
documents directly or indirectly attesting to the possession or occupation of the area since time immemorial by such ICCs/IPs in the
concept of owners which shall be any one (1) of the following authentic documents:
1) Written accounts of the ICCs/IPs customs and traditions;
2) Written accounts of the ICCs/IPs political structure and institution;
3) Pictures showing long term occupation such as those of old improvements, burial grounds, sacred places and old
villages;
4) Historical accounts, including pacts and agreements concerning boundaries entered into by the ICCs/IPs concerned with
other ICCs/IPs;
5) Survey plans and sketch maps;
6) Anthropological data;
7) Genealogical surveys;
8) Pictures and descriptive histories of traditional communal forests and hunting grounds;
9) Pictures and descriptive histories of traditional landmarks such as mountains, rivers, creeks, ridges, hills, terraces and the
like; and
10) Write-ups of names and places derived from the native dialect of the community.
e) Preparation of Maps. - On the basis of such investigation and the findings of fact based thereon, the Ancestral Domains Office of
the NCIP shall prepare a perimeter map, complete with technical descriptions, and a description of the natural features and landmarks
embraced therein;
f) Report of Investigation and Other Documents. - A complete copy of the preliminary census and a report of investigation, shall be
prepared by the Ancestral Domains Office of the NCIP;
g) Notice and Publication. - A copy of each document, including a translation in the native language of the ICCs/IPs concerned shall
be posted in a prominent place therein for at least fifteen (15) days. A copy of the document shall also be posted at the local,
provincial and regional offices of the NCIP, and shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation once a week for two (2)
consecutive weeks to allow other claimants to file opposition thereto within fifteen (15) days from date of such publication: Provided,
That in areas where no such newspaper exists, broadcasting in a radio station will be a valid substitute: Provided, further, That mere
posting shall be deemed sufficient if both newspaper and radio station are not available;
h) Endorsement to NCIP. - Within fifteen (15) days from publication, and of the inspection process, the Ancestral Domains Office
shall prepare a report to the NCIP endorsing a favorable action upon a claim that is deemed to have sufficient proof. However, if the
proof is deemed insufficient, the Ancestral Domains Office shall require the submission of additional evidence: Provided, That the
Ancestral Domains Office shall reject any claim that is deemed patently false or fraudulent after inspection and verification: Provided,
further, That in case of rejection, the Ancestral Domains Office shall give the applicant due notice, copy furnished all concerned,
containing the grounds for denial. The denial shall be appealable to the NCIP: Provided, furthermore, That in cases where there are
conflicting claims among ICCs/IPs on the boundaries of ancestral domain claims, the Ancestral Domains Office shall cause the
contending parties to meet and assist them in coming up with a preliminary resolution of the conflict, without prejudice to its full
adjudication according to the section below.
xxxx
To remove all doubts about the irreconcilability of the MOA-AD with the present legal system, a discussion of not only the Constitution and
domestic statutes, but also of international law is in order, for
Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution states that the Philippines "adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part
of the law of the land."
Applying this provision of the Constitution, the Court, in Mejoff v. Director of Prisons,158 held that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is
part of the law of the land on account of which it ordered the release on bail of a detained alien of Russian descent whose deportation order had
not been executed even after two years. Similarly, the Court in Agustin v. Edu159 applied the aforesaid constitutional provision to the 1968 Vienna
Convention on Road Signs and Signals.
International law has long recognized the right to self-determination of "peoples," understood not merely as the entire population of a State but
also a portion thereof. In considering the question of whether the people of Quebec had a right to unilaterally secede from Canada, the Canadian
Supreme Court in REFERENCE RE SECESSION OF QUEBEC160 had occasion to acknowledge that "the right of a people to self-determination
is now so widely recognized in international conventions that the principle has acquired a status beyond ‘convention' and is considered a general
principle of international law."
Among the conventions referred to are the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 161 and the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights162 which state, in Article 1 of both covenants, that all peoples, by virtue of the right of self-determination, "freely
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural development."
The people's right to self-determination should not, however, be understood as extending to a unilateral right of secession. A distinction should be
made between the right of internal and external self-determination. REFERENCE RE SECESSION OF QUEBEC is again instructive:
"(ii) Scope of the Right to Self-determination
126. The recognized sources of international law establish that the right to self-determination of a people is normally fulfilled
through internal self-determination - a people's pursuit of its political, economic, social and cultural development within the
framework of an existing state. A right to external self-determination (which in this case potentially takes the form of the
assertion of a right to unilateral secession) arises in only the most extreme of cases and, even then, under carefully defined
circumstances. x x x
External self-determination can be defined as in the following statement from the Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra, as
The establishment of a sovereign and independent State, the free association or integration with an independent State or the
emergence into any other political status freely determined by a peopleconstitute modes of implementing the right of self-
determination by that people. (Emphasis added)
127. The international law principle of self-determination has evolved within a framework of respect for the territorial
integrity of existing states. The various international documents that support the existence of a people's right to self-determination
also contain parallel statements supportive of the conclusion that the exercise of such a right must be sufficiently limited to prevent
threats to an existing state's territorial integrity or the stability of relations between sovereign states.
x x x x (Emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)
The Canadian Court went on to discuss the exceptional cases in which the right to external self-determination can arise, namely, where a people
is under colonial rule, is subject to foreign domination or exploitation outside a colonial context, and - less definitely but asserted by a number of
commentators - is blocked from the meaningful exercise of its right to internal self-determination. The Court ultimately held that the population
of Quebec had no right to secession, as the same is not under colonial rule or foreign domination, nor is it being deprived of the freedom to make
political choices and pursue economic, social and cultural development, citing that Quebec is equitably represented in legislative, executive and
judicial institutions within Canada, even occupying prominent positions therein.
The exceptional nature of the right of secession is further exemplified in the REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF JURISTS
ON THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE AALAND ISLANDS QUESTION. 163 There, Sweden presented to the Council of the League of Nations
the question of whether the inhabitants of the Aaland Islands should be authorized to determine by plebiscite if the archipelago should remain
under Finnish sovereignty or be incorporated in the kingdom of Sweden. The Council, before resolving the question, appointed an International
Committee composed of three jurists to submit an opinion on the preliminary issue of whether the dispute should, based on international law, be
entirely left to the domestic jurisdiction of Finland. The Committee stated the rule as follows:
x x x [I]n the absence of express provisions in international treaties, the right of disposing of national territory is essentially an
attribute of the sovereignty of every State. Positive International Law does not recognize the right of national groups, as such,
to separate themselves from the State of which they form part by the simple expression of a wish, any more than it recognizes
the right of other States to claim such a separation. Generally speaking, the grant or refusal of the right to a portion of its
population of determining its own political fate by plebiscite or by some other method, is, exclusively, an attribute of the
sovereignty of every State which is definitively constituted. A dispute between two States concerning such a question, under normal
conditions therefore, bears upon a question which International Law leaves entirely to the domestic jurisdiction of one of the States
concerned. Any other solution would amount to an infringement of sovereign rights of a State and would involve the risk of creating
difficulties and a lack of stability which would not only be contrary to the very idea embodied in term "State," but would also
endanger the interests of the international community. If this right is not possessed by a large or small section of a nation, neither can
it be held by the State to which the national group wishes to be attached, nor by any other State. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The Committee held that the dispute concerning the Aaland Islands did not refer to a question which is left by international law to the domestic
jurisdiction of Finland, thereby applying the exception rather than the rule elucidated above. Its ground for departing from the general rule,
however, was a very narrow one, namely, the Aaland Islands agitation originated at a time when Finland was undergoing drastic political
transformation. The internal situation of Finland was, according to the Committee, so abnormal that, for a considerable time, the conditions
required for the formation of a sovereign State did not exist. In the midst of revolution, anarchy, and civil war, the legitimacy of the Finnish
national government was disputed by a large section of the people, and it had, in fact, been chased from the capital and forcibly prevented from
carrying out its duties. The armed camps and the police were divided into two opposing forces. In light of these circumstances, Finland was not,
during the relevant time period, a "definitively constituted" sovereign state. The Committee, therefore, found that Finland did not possess the
right to withhold from a portion of its population the option to separate itself - a right which sovereign nations generally have with respect to their
own populations.
Turning now to the more specific category of indigenous peoples, this term has been used, in scholarship as well as international, regional, and
state practices, to refer to groups with distinct cultures, histories, and connections to land (spiritual and otherwise) that have been forcibly
incorporated into a larger governing society. These groups are regarded as "indigenous" since they are the living descendants of pre-invasion
inhabitants of lands now dominated by others. Otherwise stated, indigenous peoples, nations, or communities are culturally distinctive groups that
find themselves engulfed by settler societies born of the forces of empire and conquest. 164 Examples of groups who have been regarded as
indigenous peoples are the Maori of New Zealand and the aboriginal peoples of Canada.
As with the broader category of "peoples," indigenous peoples situated within states do not have a general right to independence or secession
from those states under international law,165 but they do have rights amounting to what was discussed above as the right to internal self-
determination.
In a historic development last September 13, 2007, the UN General Assembly adopted the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples (UN DRIP) through General Assembly Resolution 61/295. The vote was 143 to 4, the Philippines being included among
those in favor, and the four voting against being Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the U.S. The Declaration clearly recognized the right of
indigenous peoples to self-determination, encompassing the right to autonomy or self-government, to wit:
Article 3
Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely
pursue their economic, social and cultural development.
Article 4
Indigenous peoples, in exercising their right to self-determination, have the right to autonomy or self-government in matters
relating to their internal and local affairs, as well as ways and means for financing their autonomous functions.
Article 5
Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen their distinct political, legal, economic, social and cultural institutions,
while retaining their right to participate fully, if they so choose, in the political, economic, social and cultural life of the State.
Self-government, as used in international legal discourse pertaining to indigenous peoples, has been understood as equivalent to "internal self-
determination."166 The extent of self-determination provided for in the UN DRIP is more particularly defined in its subsequent articles, some of
which are quoted hereunder:
Article 8
1. Indigenous peoples and individuals have the right not to be subjected to forced assimilation or destruction of their culture.
2. States shall provide effective mechanisms for prevention of, and redress for:
(a) Any action which has the aim or effect of depriving them of their integrity as distinct peoples, or of their cultural values or
ethnic identities;
(b) Any action which has the aim or effect of dispossessing them of their lands, territories or resources;
(c) Any form of forced population transfer which has the aim or effect of violating or undermining any of their rights;
(d) Any form of forced assimilation or integration;
(e) Any form of propaganda designed to promote or incite racial or ethnic discrimination directed against them.
Article 21
1. Indigenous peoples have the right, without discrimination, to the improvement of their economic and social conditions, including,
inter alia, in the areas of education, employment, vocational training and retraining, housing, sanitation, health and social security.
 2. States shall take effective measures and, where appropriate, special measures to ensure continuing improvement of their economic
and social conditions. Particular attention shall be paid to the rights and special needs of indigenous elders, women, youth, children
and persons with disabilities.
Article 26
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to the lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally owned, occupied or
otherwise used or acquired.
2. Indigenous peoples have the right to own, use, develop and control the lands, territories and resources that they possess by reason of
traditional ownership or other traditional occupation or use, as well as those which they have otherwise acquired.
3. States shall give legal recognition and protection to these lands, territories and resources. Such recognition shall be conducted with
due respect to the customs, traditions and land tenure systems of the indigenous peoples concerned.
Article 30
1. Military activities shall not take place in the lands or territories of indigenous peoples, unless justified by a relevant public interest
or otherwise freely agreed with or requested by the indigenous peoples concerned.
2. States shall undertake effective consultations with the indigenous peoples concerned, through appropriate procedures and in
particular through their representative institutions, prior to using their lands or territories for military activities.
Article 32
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to determine and develop priorities and strategies for the development or use of their lands or
territories and other resources.
2. States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples concerned through their own representative institutions
in order to obtain their free and informed consent prior to the approval of any project affecting their lands or territories and other
resources, particularly in connection with the development, utilization or exploitation of mineral, water or other resources.
3. States shall provide effective mechanisms for just and fair redress for any such activities, and appropriate measures shall be taken to
mitigate adverse environmental, economic, social, cultural or spiritual impact.
Article 37
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to the recognition, observance and enforcement of treaties, agreements and other constructive
arrangements concluded with States or their successors and to have States honour and respect such treaties, agreements and other
constructive arrangements.
2. Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as diminishing or eliminating the rights of indigenous peoples contained in treaties,
agreements and other constructive arrangements.
Article 38
States in consultation and cooperation with indigenous peoples, shall take the appropriate measures, including legislative measures, to
achieve the ends of this Declaration.
Assuming that the UN DRIP, like the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, must now be regarded as embodying customary international law
- a question which the Court need not definitively resolve here - the obligations enumerated therein do not strictly require the Republic to grant
the Bangsamoro people, through the instrumentality of the BJE, the particular rights and powers provided for in the MOA-AD. Even the more
specific provisions of the UN DRIP are general in scope, allowing for flexibility in its application by the different States.
There is, for instance, no requirement in the UN DRIP that States now guarantee indigenous peoples their own police and internal security force.
Indeed, Article 8 presupposes that it is the State which will provide protection for indigenous peoples against acts like the forced dispossession of
their lands - a function that is normally performed by police officers. If the protection of a right so essential to indigenous people's identity is
acknowledged to be the responsibility of the State, then surely the protection of rights less significant to them as such peoples would also be the
duty of States. Nor is there in the UN DRIP an acknowledgement of the right of indigenous peoples to the aerial domain and atmospheric space.
What it upholds, in Article 26 thereof, is the right of indigenous peoples to the lands, territories and resources which they
have traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired.
Moreover, the UN DRIP, while upholding the right of indigenous peoples to autonomy, does not obligate States to grant indigenous peoples the
near-independent status of an associated state. All the rights recognized in that document are qualified in Article 46 as follows:
1. Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, people, group or person any right to engage in any
activity or to perform any act contrary to the Charter of the United Nations or construed as authorizing or encouraging any action
which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent
States.
Even if the UN DRIP were considered as part of the law of the land pursuant to Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution, it would not suffice to
uphold the validity of the MOA-AD so as to render its compliance with other laws unnecessary.
It is, therefore, clear that the MOA-AD contains numerous provisions that cannot be reconciled with the Constitution and the laws as
presently worded. Respondents proffer, however, that the signing of the MOA-AD alone would not have entailed any violation of law or grave
abuse of discretion on their part, precisely because it stipulates that the provisions thereof inconsistent with the laws shall not take effect until
these laws are amended. They cite paragraph 7 of the MOA-AD strand on GOVERNANCE quoted earlier, but which is reproduced below for
convenience:
7. The Parties agree that the mechanisms and modalities for the actual implementation of this MOA-AD shall be spelt out in the
Comprehensive Compact to mutually take such steps to enable it to occur effectively.
Any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the existing legal framework shall come into force upon signing of a
Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the necessary changes to the legal framework with due regard to non derogation of prior
agreements and within the stipulated timeframe to be contained in the Comprehensive Compact.
Indeed, the foregoing stipulation keeps many controversial provisions of the MOA-AD from coming into force until the necessary changes to the
legal framework are effected. While the word "Constitution" is not mentioned in the provision now under consideration or anywhere else
in the MOA-AD, the term "legal framework" is certainly broad enough to include the Constitution.
Notwithstanding the suspensive clause, however, respondents, by their mere act of incorporating in the MOA-AD the provisions thereof
regarding the associative relationship between the BJE and the Central Government, have already violated the Memorandum of Instructions From
The President dated March 1, 2001, which states that the "negotiations shall be conducted in accordance with x x x the principles of the
sovereignty and territorial integrityof the Republic of the Philippines." (Emphasis supplied) Establishing an associative relationship between the
BJE and the Central Government is, for the reasons already discussed, a preparation for independence, or worse, an implicit acknowledgment of
an independent status already prevailing.
Even apart from the above-mentioned Memorandum, however, the MOA-AD is defective because the suspensive clause is invalid, as discussed
below.
The authority of the GRP Peace Negotiating Panel to negotiate with the MILF is founded on E.O. No. 3, Section 5(c), which states that there shall
be established Government Peace Negotiating Panels for negotiations with different rebel groups to be "appointed by the President as her official
emissaries to conduct negotiations, dialogues, and face-to-face discussions with rebel groups." These negotiating panels are to report to the
President, through the PAPP on the conduct and progress of the negotiations.
It bears noting that the GRP Peace Panel, in exploring lasting solutions to the Moro Problem through its negotiations with the MILF, was not
restricted by E.O. No. 3 only to those options available under the laws as they presently stand. One of the components of a comprehensive peace
process, which E.O. No. 3 collectively refers to as the "Paths to Peace," is the pursuit of social, economic, and political reforms which may
require new legislation or even constitutional amendments. Sec. 4(a) of E.O. No. 3, which reiterates Section 3(a), of E.O. No. 125,167 states:
SECTION 4. The Six Paths to Peace. - The components of the comprehensive peace process comprise the processes known as the
"Paths to Peace". These component processes are interrelated and not mutually exclusive, and must therefore be pursued
simultaneously in a coordinated and integrated fashion. They shall include, but may not be limited to, the following:
a. PURSUIT OF SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL REFORMS. This component involves the vigorous implementation of
various policies, reforms, programs and projects aimed at addressing the root causes of internal armed conflicts and social
unrest. This may require administrative action, new legislation or even constitutional amendments.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
The MOA-AD, therefore, may reasonably be perceived as an attempt of respondents to address, pursuant to this provision of E.O. No. 3, the root
causes of the armed conflict in Mindanao. The E.O. authorized them to "think outside the box," so to speak. Hence, they negotiated and were set
on signing the MOA-AD that included various social, economic, and political reforms which cannot, however, all be accommodated within the
present legal framework, and which thus would require new legislation and constitutional amendments.
The inquiry on the legality of the "suspensive clause," however, cannot stop here, because it must be asked whether the President herself may
exercise the power delegated to the GRP Peace Panel under E.O. No. 3, Sec. 4(a).
The President cannot delegate a power that she herself does not possess. May the President, in the course of peace negotiations, agree to pursue
reforms that would require new legislation and constitutional amendments, or should the reforms be restricted only to those solutions which the
present laws allow? The answer to this question requires a discussion of the extent of the President's power to conduct peace negotiations.
That the authority of the President to conduct peace negotiations with rebel groups is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution does not mean
that she has no such authority. In Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary,168 in issue was the authority of the President to declare a state of rebellion - an
authority which is not expressly provided for in the Constitution. The Court held thus:
"In her ponencia in Marcos v. Manglapus, Justice Cortes put her thesis into jurisprudence. There, the Court, by a slim 8-7 margin,
upheld the President's power to forbid the return of her exiled predecessor. The rationale for the majority's ruling rested on the
President's
. . . unstated residual powers which are implied from the grant of executive power and which are necessary for her
to comply with her duties under the Constitution. The powers of the President are not limited to what are expressly
enumerated in the article on the Executive Department and in scattered provisions of the Constitution. This is so,
notwithstanding the avowed intent of the members of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 to limit the powers of the
President as a reaction to the abuses under the regime of Mr. Marcos, for the result was a limitation of specific powers of
the President, particularly those relating to the commander-in-chief clause, but not a diminution of the general grant of
executive power.
Thus, the President's authority to declare a state of rebellion springs in the main from her powers as chief executive and, at the
same time, draws strength from her Commander-in-Chief powers. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Similarly, the President's power to conduct peace negotiations is implicitly included in her powers as Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief.
As Chief Executive, the President has the general responsibility to promote public peace, and as Commander-in-Chief, she has the more specific
duty to prevent and suppress rebellion and lawless violence.169
As the experience of nations which have similarly gone through internal armed conflict will show, however, peace is rarely attained by simply
pursuing a military solution. Oftentimes, changes as far-reaching as a fundamental reconfiguration of the nation's constitutional structure is
required. The observations of Dr. Kirsti Samuels are enlightening, to wit:
x x x [T]he fact remains that a successful political and governance transition must form the core of any post-conflict peace-building
mission. As we have observed in Liberia and Haiti over the last ten years, conflict cessation without modification of the political
environment, even where state-building is undertaken through technical electoral assistance and institution- or capacity-building, is
unlikely to succeed. On average, more than 50 percent of states emerging from conflict return to conflict. Moreover, a substantial
proportion of transitions have resulted in weak or limited democracies.
The design of a constitution and its constitution-making process can play an important role in the political and governance transition.
Constitution-making after conflict is an opportunity to create a common vision of the future of a state and a road map on how to get
there. The constitution can be partly a peace agreement and partly a framework setting up the rules by which the new democracy will
operate.170
In the same vein, Professor Christine Bell, in her article on the nature and legal status of peace agreements, observed that the typical way that
peace agreements establish or confirm mechanisms for demilitarization and demobilization is by linking them to new constitutional
structures addressing governance, elections, and legal and human rights institutions. 171
In the Philippine experience, the link between peace agreements and constitution-making has been recognized by no less than the framers of the
Constitution. Behind the provisions of the Constitution on autonomous regions 172 is the framers' intention to implement a particular peace
agreement, namely, the Tripoli Agreement of 1976 between the GRP and the MNLF, signed by then Undersecretary of National Defense
Carmelo Z. Barbero and then MNLF Chairman Nur Misuari.
MR. ROMULO. There are other speakers; so, although I have some more questions, I will reserve my right to ask them if they are not
covered by the other speakers. I have only two questions.
I heard one of the Commissioners say that local autonomy already exists in the Muslim region; it is working very well; it has, in
fact, diminished a great deal of the problems. So, my question is: since that already exists, why do we have to go into something
new?
MR. OPLE. May I answer that on behalf of Chairman Nolledo. Commissioner Yusup Abubakar is right that certain definite steps
have been taken to implement the provisions of the Tripoli Agreement with respect to an autonomous region in Mindanao.
 This is a good first step, but there is no question that this is merely a partial response to the Tripoli Agreement itself and to the
fuller standard of regional autonomy contemplated in that agreement, and now by state policy. 173(Emphasis supplied)
The constitutional provisions on autonomy and the statutes enacted pursuant to them have, to the credit of their drafters, been partly successful.
Nonetheless, the Filipino people are still faced with the reality of an on-going conflict between the Government and the MILF. If the President is
to be expected to find means for bringing this conflict to an end and to achieve lasting peace in Mindanao, then she must be given the leeway to
explore, in the course of peace negotiations, solutions that may require changes to the Constitution for their implementation. Being uniquely
vested with the power to conduct peace negotiations with rebel groups, the President is in a singular position to know the precise nature of their
grievances which, if resolved, may bring an end to hostilities.
The President may not, of course, unilaterally implement the solutions that she considers viable, but she may not be prevented from submitting
them as recommendations to Congress, which could then, if it is minded, act upon them pursuant to the legal procedures for constitutional
amendment and revision. In particular, Congress would have the option, pursuant to Article XVII, Sections 1 and 3 of the Constitution, to
propose the recommended amendments or revision to the people, call a constitutional convention, or submit to the electorate the question of
calling such a convention.
While the President does not possess constituent powers - as those powers may be exercised only by Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or
the people through initiative and referendum - she may submit proposals for constitutional change to Congress in a manner that does not involve
the arrogation of constituent powers.
In Sanidad v. COMELEC,174 in issue was the legality of then President Marcos' act of directly submitting proposals for constitutional amendments
to a referendum, bypassing the interim National Assembly which was the body vested by the 1973 Constitution with the power to propose such
amendments. President Marcos, it will be recalled, never convened the interim National Assembly. The majority upheld the President's act,
holding that "the urges of absolute necessity" compelled the President as the agent of the people to act as he did, there being no interim National
Assembly to propose constitutional amendments. Against this ruling, Justices Teehankee and Muñoz Palma vigorously dissented. The Court's
concern at present, however, is not with regard to the point on which it was then divided in that controversial case, but on that which was not
disputed by either side.
Justice Teehankee's dissent,175 in particular, bears noting. While he disagreed that the President may directly submit proposed constitutional
amendments to a referendum, implicit in his opinion is a recognition that he would have upheld the President's action along with the majority had
the President convened the interim National Assembly and coursed his proposals through it. Thus Justice Teehankee opined:
"Since the Constitution provides for the organization of the essential departments of government, defines and delimits the powers of
each and prescribes the manner of the exercise of such powers, and the constituent power has not been granted to but has been
withheld from the President or Prime Minister, it follows that the President's questioned decrees proposing and submitting
constitutional amendments directly to the people (without the intervention of the interim National Assembly in whom the power
is expressly vested) are devoid of constitutional and legal basis."176 (Emphasis supplied)
From the foregoing discussion, the principle may be inferred that the President - in the course of conducting peace negotiations - may validly
consider implementing even those policies that require changes to the Constitution, but she may not unilaterally implement them without the
intervention of Congress, or act in any way as if the assent of that body were assumed as a certainty.
Since, under the present Constitution, the people also have the power to directly propose amendments through initiative and referendum, the
President may also submit her recommendations to the people, not as a formal proposal to be voted on in a plebiscite similar to what President
Marcos did in Sanidad, but for their independent consideration of whether these recommendations merit being formally proposed through
initiative.
These recommendations, however, may amount to nothing more than the President's suggestions to the people, for any further involvement in the
process of initiative by the Chief Executive may vitiate its character as a genuine "people's initiative." The only initiative recognized by the
Constitution is that which truly proceeds from the people. As the Court stated in Lambino v. COMELEC:177
"The Lambino Group claims that their initiative is the ‘people's voice.' However, the Lambino Group unabashedly states in ULAP
Resolution No. 2006-02, in the verification of their petition with the COMELEC, that ‘ULAP maintains its unqualified support to the
agenda of Her Excellency President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo for constitutional reforms.' The Lambino Group thus admits that their
‘people's' initiative is an ‘unqualified support to the agenda' of the incumbent President to change the Constitution. This forewarns
the Court to be wary of incantations of ‘people's voice' or ‘sovereign will' in the present initiative."
It will be observed that the President has authority, as stated in her oath of office, 178 only to preserve and defend the Constitution. Such
presidential power does not, however, extend to allowing her to change the Constitution, but simply to recommend proposed amendments or
revision. As long as she limits herself to recommending these changes and submits to the proper procedure for constitutional amendments and
revision, her mere recommendation need not be construed as an unconstitutional act.
The foregoing discussion focused on the President's authority to propose constitutional amendments, since her authority to propose
new legislation is not in controversy. It has been an accepted practice for Presidents in this jurisdiction to propose new legislation. One of the
more prominent instances the practice is usually done is in the yearly State of the Nation Address of the President to Congress. Moreover, the
annual general appropriations bill has always been based on the budget prepared by the President, which - for all intents and purposes - is a
proposal for new legislation coming from the President.179
The "suspensive clause" in the MOA-AD viewed in light of the above-discussed standards
Given the limited nature of the President's authority to propose constitutional amendments, she cannot guaranteeto any third party that the
required amendments will eventually be put in place, nor even be submitted to a plebiscite. The most she could do is submit these proposals as
recommendations either to Congress or the people, in whom constituent powers are vested.
Paragraph 7 on Governance of the MOA-AD states, however, that all provisions thereof which cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution
and laws "shall come into force upon signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the necessary changes to the legal framework."
This stipulation does not bear the marks of a suspensive condition - defined in civil law as a future and uncertain event - but of a term. It is not a
question of whether the necessary changes to the legal framework will be effected, but when. That there is no uncertainty being contemplated is
plain from what follows, for the paragraph goes on to state that the contemplated changes shall be "with due regard to non derogation of prior
agreements and within the stipulated timeframe to be contained in the Comprehensive Compact."
Pursuant to this stipulation, therefore, it is mandatory for the GRP to effect the changes to the legal framework contemplated in the MOA-AD -
which changes would include constitutional amendments, as discussed earlier. It bears noting that,
By the time these changes are put in place, the MOA-AD itself would be counted among the "prior agreements" from which there could
be no derogation.
What remains for discussion in the Comprehensive Compact would merely be the implementing details for these "consensus points" and, notably,
the deadline for effecting the contemplated changes to the legal framework.
Plainly, stipulation-paragraph 7 on GOVERNANCE is inconsistent with the limits of the President's authority to propose constitutional
amendments, it being a virtual guarantee that the Constitution and the laws of the Republic of the Philippines will certainly be adjusted to
conform to all the "consensus points" found in the MOA-AD. Hence, it must be struck down as unconstitutional.
A comparison between the "suspensive clause" of the MOA-AD with a similar provision appearing in the 1996 final peace agreement between
the MNLF and the GRP is most instructive.
As a backdrop, the parties to the 1996 Agreement stipulated that it would be implemented in two phases. Phase Icovered a three-year transitional
period involving the putting up of new administrative structures through Executive Order, such as the Special Zone of Peace and Development
(SZOPAD) and the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD), while Phase II covered the establishment of the new
regional autonomous government through amendment or repeal of R.A. No. 6734, which was then the Organic Act of the ARMM.
The stipulations on Phase II consisted of specific agreements on the structure of the expanded autonomous region envisioned by the parties. To
that extent, they are similar to the provisions of the MOA-AD. There is, however, a crucial difference between the two agreements. While the
MOA-AD virtually guarantees that the "necessary changes to the legal framework" will be put in place, the GRP-MNLF final peace
agreement states thus: "Accordingly, these provisions [on Phase II] shall be recommended by the GRP to Congress for incorporation in the
amendatory or repealing law."
Concerns have been raised that the MOA-AD would have given rise to a binding international law obligation on the part of the Philippines to
change its Constitution in conformity thereto, on the ground that it may be considered either as a binding agreement under international law, or a
unilateral declaration of the Philippine government to the international community that it would grant to the Bangsamoro people all the
concessions therein stated. Neither ground finds sufficient support in international law, however.
The MOA-AD, as earlier mentioned in the overview thereof, would have included foreign dignitaries as signatories. In addition, representatives
of other nations were invited to witness its signing in Kuala Lumpur. These circumstances readily lead one to surmise that the MOA-AD would
have had the status of a binding international agreement had it been signed. An examination of the prevailing principles in international law,
however, leads to the contrary conclusion.
The Decision on Challenge to Jurisdiction: Lomé Accord Amnesty180 (the Lomé Accord case) of the Special Court of Sierra Leone is
enlightening. The Lomé Accord was a peace agreement signed on July 7, 1999 between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary
United Front (RUF), a rebel group with which the Sierra Leone Government had been in armed conflict for around eight years at the time of
signing. There were non-contracting signatories to the agreement, among which were the Government of the Togolese Republic, the Economic
Community of West African States, and the UN.
On January 16, 2002, after a successful negotiation between the UN Secretary-General and the Sierra Leone Government, another agreement was
entered into by the UN and that Government whereby the Special Court of Sierra Leone was established. The sole purpose of the Special Court,
an international court, was to try persons who bore the greatest responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra
Leonean law committed in the territory of Sierra Leone since November 30, 1996.
Among the stipulations of the Lomé Accord was a provision for the full pardon of the members of the RUF with respect to anything done by
them in pursuit of their objectives as members of that organization since the conflict began.
In the Lomé Accord case, the Defence argued that the Accord created an internationally binding obligation not to prosecute the beneficiaries of
the amnesty provided therein, citing, among other things, the participation of foreign dignitaries and international organizations in the finalization
of that agreement. The Special Court, however, rejected this argument, ruling that the Lome Accord is not a treaty and that it can only create
binding obligations and rights between the parties in municipal law, not in international law. Hence, the Special Court held, it is ineffective in
depriving an international court like it of jurisdiction.
"37. In regard to the nature of a negotiated settlement of an internal armed conflict it is easy to assume and to argue with some
degree of plausibility, as Defence counsel for the defendants seem to have done, that the mere fact that in addition to the
parties to the conflict, the document formalizing the settlement is signed by foreign heads of state or their representatives and
representatives of international organizations, means the agreement of the parties is internationalized so as to create
obligations in international law.
xxxx
40. Almost every conflict resolution will involve the parties to the conflict and the mediator or facilitator of the settlement, or persons
or bodies under whose auspices the settlement took place but who are not at all parties to the conflict, are not contracting parties and
who do not claim any obligation from the contracting parties or incur any obligation from the settlement.
41. In this case, the parties to the conflict are the lawful authority of the State and the RUF which has no status of statehood
and is to all intents and purposes a faction within the state. The non-contracting signatories of the Lomé Agreement
were moral guarantors of the principle that, in the terms of Article XXXIV of the Agreement, "this peace agreement is
implemented with integrity and in good faith by both parties". The moral guarantors assumed no legal obligation. It is recalled
that the UN by its representative appended, presumably for avoidance of doubt, an understanding of the extent of the agreement to be
implemented as not including certain international crimes.
42. An international agreement in the nature of a treaty must create rights and obligations regulated by international law so that a
breach of its terms will be a breach determined under international law which will also provide principle means of enforcement. The
Lomé Agreement created neither rights nor obligations capable of being regulated by international law. An agreement such as
the Lomé Agreement which brings to an end an internal armed conflict no doubt creates a factual situation of restoration of
peace that the international community acting through the Security Council may take note of. That, however, will not convert
it to an international agreement which creates an obligation enforceable in international, as distinguished from municipal,
law. A breach of the terms of such a peace agreement resulting in resumption of internal armed conflict or creating a threat to peace in
the determination of the Security Council may indicate a reversal of the factual situation of peace to be visited with possible legal
consequences arising from the new situation of conflict created. Such consequences such as action by the Security Council pursuant to
Chapter VII arise from the situation and not from the agreement, nor from the obligation imposed by it. Such action cannot be
regarded as a remedy for the breach. A peace agreement which settles an internal armed conflict cannot be ascribed the same
status as one which settles an international armed conflict which, essentially, must be between two or more warring States.
The Lomé Agreement cannot be characterised as an international instrument. x x x" (Emphasis, italics and underscoring
supplied)
Similarly, that the MOA-AD would have been signed by representatives of States and international organizations not parties to the Agreement
would not have sufficed to vest in it a binding character under international law.
In another vein, concern has been raised that the MOA-AD would amount to a unilateral declaration of the Philippine State, binding under
international law, that it would comply with all the stipulations stated therein, with the result that it would have to amend its Constitution
accordingly regardless of the true will of the people. Cited as authority for this view is Australia v. France,181 also known as the Nuclear Tests
Case, decided by the International Court of Justice (ICJ).
In the Nuclear Tests Case, Australia challenged before the ICJ the legality of France's nuclear tests in the South Pacific. France refused to appear
in the case, but public statements from its President, and similar statements from other French officials including its Minister of Defence, that its
1974 series of atmospheric tests would be its last, persuaded the ICJ to dismiss the case. 182 Those statements, the ICJ held, amounted to a legal
undertaking addressed to the international community, which required no acceptance from other States for it to become effective.
Essential to the ICJ ruling is its finding that the French government intended to be bound to the international community in issuing its public
statements, viz:
43. It is well recognized that declarations made by way of unilateral acts, concerning legal or factual situations, may have the effect of
creating legal obligations. Declarations of this kind may be, and often are, very specific. When it is the intention of the State
making the declaration that it should become bound according to its terms, that intention confers on the declaration the
character of a legal undertaking, the State being thenceforth legally required to follow a course of conduct consistent with the
declaration. An undertaking of this kind, if given publicly, and with an intent to be bound, even though not made within the context
of international negotiations, is binding. In these circumstances, nothing in the nature of a quid pro quo nor any subsequent acceptance
of the declaration, nor even any reply or reaction from other States, is required for the declaration to take effect, since such a
requirement would be inconsistent with the strictly unilateral nature of the juridical act by which the pronouncement by the State was
made.
44. Of course, not all unilateral acts imply obligation; but a State may choose to take up a certain position in relation to a
particular matter with the intention of being bound-the intention is to be ascertained by interpretation of the act. When States
make statements by which their freedom of action is to be limited, a restrictive interpretation is called for.
xxxx
51. In announcing that the 1974 series of atmospheric tests would be the last, the French Government conveyed to the world at
large, including the Applicant, its intention effectively to terminate these tests. It was bound to assume that other States might
take note of these statements and rely on their being effective. The validity of these statements and their legal consequences
must be considered within the general framework of the security of international intercourse, and the confidence and trust which
are so essential in the relations among States. It is from the actual substance of these statements, and from the circumstances
attending their making, that the legal implications of the unilateral act must be deduced. The objects of these statements are
clear and they were addressed to the international community as a whole, and the Court holds that they constitute an
undertaking possessing legal effect. The Court considers *270 that the President of the Republic, in deciding upon the effective
cessation of atmospheric tests, gave an undertaking to the international community to which his words were addressed. x x x
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As gathered from the above-quoted ruling of the ICJ, public statements of a state representative may be construed as a unilateral declaration only
when the following conditions are present: the statements were clearly addressed to the international community, the state intended to be bound to
that community by its statements, and that not to give legal effect to those statements would be detrimental to the security of international
intercourse. Plainly, unilateral declarations arise only in peculiar circumstances.
The limited applicability of the Nuclear Tests Case ruling was recognized in a later case decided by the ICJ entitled Burkina Faso v. Mali,183 also
known as the Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute. The public declaration subject of that case was a statement made by the President of Mali, in
an interview by a foreign press agency, that Mali would abide by the decision to be issued by a commission of the Organization of African Unity
on a frontier dispute then pending between Mali and Burkina Faso.
Unlike in the Nuclear Tests Case, the ICJ held that the statement of Mali's President was not a unilateral act with legal implications. It clarified
that its ruling in the Nuclear Tests case rested on the peculiar circumstances surrounding the French declaration subject thereof, to wit:
40. In order to assess the intentions of the author of a unilateral act, account must be taken of all the factual circumstances in which the
act occurred. For example, in the Nuclear Tests cases, the Court took the view that since the applicant States were not the only
ones concerned at the possible continuance of atmospheric testing by the French Government, that Government's unilateral
declarations had ‘conveyed to the world at large, including the Applicant, its intention effectively to terminate these
tests‘ (I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 269, para. 51; p. 474, para. 53). In the particular circumstances of those cases, the French
Government could not express an intention to be bound otherwise than by unilateral declarations. It is difficult to see how it
could have accepted the terms of a negotiated solution with each of the applicants without thereby jeopardizing its contention
that its conduct was lawful. The circumstances of the present case are radically different. Here, there was nothing to hinder
the Parties from manifesting an intention to accept the binding character of the conclusions of the Organization of African
Unity Mediation Commission by the normal method: a formal agreement on the basis of reciprocity. Since no agreement of this
kind was concluded between the Parties, the Chamber finds that there are no grounds to interpret the declaration made by Mali's head
of State on 11 April 1975 as a unilateral act with legal implications in regard to the present case. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Assessing the MOA-AD in light of the above criteria, it would not have amounted to a unilateral declaration on the part of the Philippine State to
the international community. The Philippine panel did not draft the same with the clear intention of being bound thereby to the international
community as a whole or to any State, but only to the MILF. While there were States and international organizations involved, one way or
another, in the negotiation and projected signing of the MOA-AD, they participated merely as witnesses or, in the case of Malaysia, as facilitator.
As held in the Lomé Accord case, the mere fact that in addition to the parties to the conflict, the peace settlement is signed by representatives of
states and international organizations does not mean that the agreement is internationalized so as to create obligations in international law.
Since the commitments in the MOA-AD were not addressed to States, not to give legal effect to such commitments would not be detrimental to
the security of international intercourse - to the trust and confidence essential in the relations among States.
In one important respect, the circumstances surrounding the MOA-AD are closer to that of Burkina Faso wherein, as already discussed, the Mali
President's statement was not held to be a binding unilateral declaration by the ICJ. As in that case, there was also nothing to hinder the Philippine
panel, had it really been its intention to be bound to other States, to manifest that intention by formal agreement. Here, that formal agreement
would have come about by the inclusion in the MOA-AD of a clear commitment to be legally bound to the international community, not just the
MILF, and by an equally clear indication that the signatures of the participating states-representatives would constitute an acceptance of that
commitment. Entering into such a formal agreement would not have resulted in a loss of face for the Philippine government before the
international community, which was one of the difficulties that prevented the French Government from entering into a formal agreement with
other countries. That the Philippine panel did not enter into such a formal agreement suggests that it had no intention to be bound to the
international community. On that ground, the MOA-AD may not be considered a unilateral declaration under international law.
The MOA-AD not being a document that can bind the Philippines under international law notwithstanding, respondents' almost consummated act
of guaranteeing amendments to the legal framework is, by itself, sufficient to constitute grave abuse of discretion. The grave abuse lies not
in the fact that they considered, as a solution to the Moro Problem, the creation of a state within a state, but in their brazen willingness
to guarantee that Congress and the sovereign Filipino people would give their imprimatur to their solution. Upholding such an act would
amount to authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers vested only in Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people themselves
through the process of initiative, for the only way that the Executive can ensure the outcome of the amendment process is through an undue
influence or interference with that process.
The sovereign people may, if it so desired, go to the extent of giving up a portion of its own territory to the Moros for the sake of peace, for it can
change the Constitution in any it wants, so long as the change is not inconsistent with what, in international law, is known as Jus
Cogens.184 Respondents, however, may not preempt it in that decision.
SUMMARY
The petitions are ripe for adjudication. The failure of respondents to consult the local government units or communities affected constitutes a
departure by respondents from their mandate under E.O. No. 3. Moreover, respondents exceeded their authority by the mere act of guaranteeing
amendments to the Constitution. Any alleged violation of the Constitution by any branch of government is a proper matter for judicial review.
As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of paramount public interest or of transcendental importance, the Court grants the
petitioners, petitioners-in-intervention and intervening respondents the requisite locus standi in keeping with the liberal stance adopted in David
v. Macapagal-Arroyo.
Contrary to the assertion of respondents that the non-signing of the MOA-AD and the eventual dissolution of the GRP Peace Panel mooted the
present petitions, the Court finds that the present petitions provide an exception to the "moot and academic" principle in view of (a) the grave
violation of the Constitution involved; (b) the exceptional character of the situation and paramount public interest; (c) the need to formulate
controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (d) the fact that the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
The MOA-AD is a significant part of a series of agreements necessary to carry out the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace signed by the
government and the MILF back in June 2001. Hence, the present MOA-AD can be renegotiated or another one drawn up that could contain
similar or significantly dissimilar provisions compared to the original.
The Court, however, finds that the prayers for mandamus have been rendered moot in view of the respondents' action in providing the Court and
the petitioners with the official copy of the final draft of the MOA-AD and its annexes.
The people's right to information on matters of public concern under Sec. 7, Article III of the Constitution is in splendid symmetry with the state
policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest under Sec. 28, Article II of the Constitution. The right to
information guarantees the right of the people to demand information, while Section 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information
even if nobody demands. The complete and effective exercise of the right to information necessitates that its complementary provision on public
disclosure derive the same self-executory nature, subject only to reasonable safeguards or limitations as may be provided by law.
The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public concern involving public interest in the highest order. In declaring that the right to
information contemplates steps and negotiations leading to the consummation of the contract, jurisprudence finds no distinction as to the
executory nature or commercial character of the agreement.
An essential element of these twin freedoms is to keep a continuing dialogue or process of communication between the government and the
people. Corollary to these twin rights is the design for feedback mechanisms. The right to public consultation was envisioned to be a species of
these public rights.
At least three pertinent laws animate these constitutional imperatives and justify the exercise of the people's right to be consulted on relevant
matters relating to the peace agenda.
One, E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on both national and local levels and for a principal forum for
consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process to conduct regular dialogues to seek relevant
information, comments, advice, and recommendations from peace partners and concerned sectors of society.
Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 requires all national offices to conduct consultations before any project or
program critical to the environment and human ecology including those that may call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in
such locality, is implemented therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast
territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and drastically result to the diaspora or displacement of a great number of
inhabitants from their total environment.
Three, Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 provides for clear-cut procedure for the recognition and delineation
of ancestral domain, which entails, among other things, the observance of the free and prior informed consent of the Indigenous Cultural
Communities/Indigenous Peoples. Notably, the statute does not grant the Executive Department or any government agency the power to delineate
and recognize an ancestral domain claim by mere agreement or compromise.
The invocation of the doctrine of executive privilege as a defense to the general right to information or the specific right to consultation is
untenable. The various explicit legal provisions fly in the face of executive secrecy. In any event, respondents effectively waived such defense
after it unconditionally disclosed the official copies of the final draft of the MOA-AD, for judicial compliance and public scrutiny.
In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to carry out the pertinent consultation
process, as mandated by E.O. No. 3, Republic Act No. 7160, and Republic Act No. 8371. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was
designed and crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and
despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined.
The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions but the very concept underlying
them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the
associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to independence.
While there is a clause in the MOA-AD stating that the provisions thereof inconsistent with the present legal framework will not be effective until
that framework is amended, the same does not cure its defect. The inclusion of provisions in the MOA-AD establishing an associative
relationship between the BJE and the Central Government is, itself, a violation of the Memorandum of Instructions From The President dated
March 1, 2001, addressed to the government peace panel. Moreover, as the clause is worded, it virtually guarantees that the necessary
amendments to the Constitution and the laws will eventually be put in place. Neither the GRP Peace Panel nor the President herself is authorized
to make such a guarantee. Upholding such an act would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers vested only in Congress, a
Constitutional Convention, or the people themselves through the process of initiative, for the only way that the Executive can ensure the outcome
of the amendment process is through an undue influence or interference with that process.
While the MOA-AD would not amount to an international agreement or unilateral declaration binding on the Philippines under international law,
respondents' act of guaranteeing amendments is, by itself, already a constitutional violation that renders the MOA-AD fatally defective.

WHEREFORE, respondents' motion to dismiss is DENIED. The main and intervening petitions are GIVEN DUE COURSE and hereby
GRANTED.
The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 is declared contrary to
law and the Constitution. SO ORDERED.

[G.R No. 187167 : August 16, 2011]

PROF. MERLIN M. MAGALLONA et.al, petitioners, VS. HON. EDUARDO ERMITA et.al, respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This original action for the writs of certiorari and prohibition assails the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9522 [1] (RA 9522) adjusting the
country's archipelagic baselines and classifying the baseline regime of nearby territories.

The Antecedents

In 1961, Congress passed Republic Act No. 3046 (RA 3046)[2] demarcating the maritime baselines of the Philippines as an archipelagic
State.[3] This law followed the framing of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone in 1958 (UNCLOS I),[4] codifying,
among others, the sovereign right of States parties over their "territorial sea," the breadth of which, however, was left undetermined. Attempts to
fill this void during the second round of negotiations in Geneva in 1960 (UNCLOS II) proved futile. Thus, domestically, RA 3046 remained
unchanged for nearly five decades, save for legislation passed in 1968 (Republic Act No. 5446 [RA 5446]) correcting typographical errors and
reserving the drawing of baselines around Sabah in North Borneo.

In March 2009, Congress amended RA 3046 by enacting RA 9522, the statute now under scrutiny. The change was prompted by the need to
make RA 3046 compliant with the terms of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III),[5] which the Philippines ratified
on 27 February 1984.[6] Among others, UNCLOS III prescribes the water-land ratio, length, and contour of baselines of archipelagic States like
the Philippines[7] and sets the deadline for the filing of application for the extended continental shelf.[8] Complying with these requirements, RA
9522 shortened one baseline, optimized the location of some basepoints around the Philippine archipelago and classified adjacent territories,
namely, the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal, as "regimes of islands" whose islands generate their own applicable
maritime zones.

Petitioners, professors of law, law students and a legislator, in their respective capacities as "citizens, taxpayers or x x x legislators,"[9] as the case
may be, assail the constitutionality of RA 9522 on two principal grounds, namely: (1) RA 9522 reduces Philippine maritime territory, and
logically, the reach of the Philippine state's sovereign power, in violation of Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution,[10] embodying the terms of the
Treaty of Paris[11] and ancillary treaties,[12] and (2) RA 9522 opens the country's waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all
vessels and aircrafts, undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security, contravening the country's nuclear-free policy, and damaging
marine resources, in violation of relevant constitutional provisions.[13]

In addition, petitioners contend that RA 9522's treatment of the KIG as "regime of islands" not only results in the loss of a large maritime area but
also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen.[14] To buttress their argument of territorial diminution, petitioners facially attack RA 9522
for what it excluded and included - its failure to reference either the Treaty of Paris or Sabah and its use of UNCLOS III's framework of regime of
islands to determine the maritime zones of the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal.

Commenting on the petition, respondent officials raised threshold issues questioning (1) the petition's compliance with the case or controversy
requirement for judicial review grounded on petitioners' alleged lack of locus standi and (2) the propriety of the writs of certiorari and prohibition
to assail the constitutionality of RA 9522. On the merits, respondents defended RA 9522 as the country's compliance with the terms of UNCLOS
III, preserving Philippine territory over the KIG or Scarborough Shoal. Respondents add that RA 9522 does not undermine the country's security,
environment and economic interests or relinquish the Philippines' claim over Sabah.

Respondents also question the normative force, under international law, of petitioners' assertion that what Spain ceded to the United States under
the Treaty of Paris were the islands and all the watersfound within the boundaries of the rectangular area drawn under the Treaty of Paris.

We left unacted petitioners' prayer for an injunctive writ.

The Issues
The petition raises the following issues:

1. Preliminarily -

1. Whether petitioners possess locus standi to bring this suit; and

2. Whether the writs of certiorari and prohibition are the proper remedies to assail the constitutionality of RA 9522.

2. On the merits, whether RA 9522 is unconstitutional.

The Ruling of the Court

On the threshold issues, we hold that (1) petitioners possess locus standi to bring this suit as citizens and (2) the writs of certiorari and prohibition
are proper remedies to test the constitutionality of RA 9522. On the merits, we find no basis to declare RA 9522 unconstitutional.

On the Threshold Issues

Petitioners Possess Locus Standi as Citizens
Petitioners themselves undermine their assertion of locus standi as legislators and taxpayers because the petition alleges neither infringement of
legislative prerogative[15] nor misuse of public funds,[16]occasioned by the passage and implementation of RA 9522. Nonetheless, we recognize
petitioners' locus standi as citizens with constitutionally sufficient interest in the resolution of the merits of the case which undoubtedly raises
issues of national significance necessitating urgent resolution. Indeed, owing to the peculiar nature of RA 9522, it is understandably difficult to
find other litigants possessing "a more direct and specific interest" to bring the suit, thus satisfying one of the requirements for granting
citizenship standing.[17]

The Writs of Certiorari and Prohibition

Are Proper Remedies to Test the Constitutionality of Statutes

In praying for the dismissal of the petition on preliminary grounds, respondents seek a strict observance of the offices of the writs of certiorari
and prohibition, noting that the writs cannot issue absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial powers on the part of respondents and resulting prejudice on the part of petitioners.[18]

Respondents' submission holds true in ordinary civil proceedings. When this Court exercises its constitutional power of judicial review, however,
we have, by tradition, viewed the writs of certiorari and prohibition as proper remedial vehicles to test the constitutionality of statutes, [19] and
indeed, of acts of other branches of government.[20] Issues of constitutional import are sometimes crafted out of statutes which, while having no
bearing on the personal interests of the petitioners, carry such relevance in the life of this nation that the Court inevitably finds itself constrained
to take cognizance of the case and pass upon the issues raised, non-compliance with the letter of procedural rules notwithstanding. The statute
sought to be reviewed here is one such law.

RA 9522 is Not Unconstitutional

RA 9522 is a Statutory Tool to Demarcate the Country's Maritime Zones and Continental Shelf Under UNCLOS III, not to Delineate
Philippine Territory

Petitioners submit that RA 9522 "dismembers a large portion of the national territory"[21] because it discards the pre-UNCLOS III demarcation of
Philippine territory under the Treaty of Paris and related treaties, successively encoded in the definition of national territory under the 1935, 1973
and 1987 Constitutions. Petitioners theorize that this constitutional definition trumps any treaty or statutory provision denying the Philippines
sovereign control over waters, beyond the territorial sea recognized at the time of the Treaty of Paris, that Spain supposedly ceded to the United
States. Petitioners argue that from the Treaty of Paris' technical description, Philippine sovereignty over territorial waters extends hundreds of
nautical miles around the Philippine archipelago, embracing the rectangular area delineated in the Treaty of Paris. [22]

Petitioners' theory fails to persuade us.

UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition (or loss) of territory. It is a multilateral treaty regulating, among others, sea-use rights over
maritime zones (i.e., the territorial waters [12 nautical miles from the baselines], contiguous zone [24 nautical miles from the baselines],
exclusive economic zone [200 nautical miles from the baselines]), and continental shelves that UNCLOS III delimits.[23]UNCLOS III was the
culmination of decades-long negotiations among United Nations members to codify norms regulating the conduct of States in the world's oceans
and submarine areas, recognizing coastal and archipelagic States' graduated authority over a limited span of waters and submarine lands along
their coasts.

On the other hand, baselines laws such as RA 9522 are enacted by UNCLOS III States parties to mark-out specific basepoints along their coasts
from which baselines are drawn, either straight or contoured, to serve as geographic starting points to measure the breadth of the maritime zones
and continental shelf. Article 48 of UNCLOS III on archipelagic States like ours could not be any clearer:

Article 48. Measurement of the breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf. - The
breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf shall be measured from archipelagic
baselines drawn in accordance with article 47. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III States parties to delimit with precision the extent of their maritime
zones and continental shelves. In turn, this gives notice to the rest of the international community of the scope of the maritime space and
submarine areas within which States parties exercise treaty-based rights, namely, the exercise of sovereignty over territorial waters (Article 2), the
jurisdiction to enforce customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws in the contiguous zone (Article 33), and the right to exploit the living and
non-living resources in the exclusive economic zone (Article 56) and continental shelf (Article 77).

Even under petitioners' theory that the Philippine territory embraces the islands and all the waters within the rectangular area delimited in the
Treaty of Paris, the baselines of the Philippines would still have to be drawn in accordance with RA 9522 because this is the only way to draw the
baselines in conformity with UNCLOS III. The baselines cannot be drawn from the boundaries or other portions of the rectangular area
delineated in the Treaty of Paris, but from the "outermost islands and drying reefs of the archipelago."[24]

UNCLOS III and its ancillary baselines laws play no role in the acquisition, enlargement or, as petitioners claim, diminution of territory. Under
traditional international law typology, States acquire (or conversely, lose) territory through occupation, accretion, cession and prescription,[25] not
by executing multilateral treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting statutes to comply with the treaty's terms to delimit maritime
zones and continental shelves. Territorial claims to land features are outside UNCLOS III, and are instead governed by the rules on general
international law.[26]

RA 9522's Use of the Framework Of Regime of Islands to Determine the Maritime Zones of the KIG and the Shoal, not Inconsistent with the
Philippines 'Claim of Sovereignty Over these Areas

Petitioners next submit that RA 9522's use of UNCLOS III's regime of islands framework to draw the baselines, and to measure the breadth of the
applicable maritime zones of the KIG, "weakens our territorial claim" over that area.[27] Petitioners add that the KIG's (and Scarborough Shoal's)
exclusion from the Philippine archipelagic baselines results in the loss of "about 15,000 square nautical miles of territorial waters," prejudicing
the livelihood of subsistence fishermen.[28] A comparison of the configuration of the baselines drawn under RA 3046 and RA 9522 and the extent
of maritime space encompassed by each law, coupled with a reading of the text of RA 9522 and its congressional deliberations, vis-Ã -vis the
Philippines' obligations under UNCLOS III, belie this view.

The configuration of the baselines drawn under RA 3046 and RA 9522 shows that RA 9522 merely followed the basepoints mapped by RA 3046,
save for at least nine basepoints that RA 9522 skipped to optimize the location of basepoints and adjust the length of one baseline (and thus
comply with UNCLOS III's limitation on the maximum length of baselines). Under RA 3046, as under RA 9522, the KIG and the Scarborough
Shoal lie outside of the baselines drawn around the Philippine archipelago. This undeniable cartographic fact takes the wind out of petitioners'
argument branding RA 9522 as a statutory renunciation of the Philippines' claim over the KIG, assuming that baselines are relevant for this
purpose.

Petitioners' assertion of loss of "about 15,000 square nautical miles of territorial waters" under RA 9522 is similarly unfounded both in fact and
law. On the contrary, RA 9522, by optimizing the location of basepoints, increased the Philippines' total maritime space (covering its internal
waters, territorial sea and exclusive economic zone) by 145,216 square nautical miles, as shown in the table below: [29]
Extent of maritime area using RA Extent of maritime area using RA 9522,
3046, as amended, taking into account taking into account UNCLOS III (in
the Treaty of Paris' delimitation (in square nautical miles)
square nautical miles)

Internal or archipelagic 166,858 171,435

waters

Territorial Sea 274,136 32,106

Exclusive Economic Zone 382,669

TOTAL 440,994 586,210

Thus, as the map below shows, the reach of the exclusive economic zone drawn under RA 9522 even extends way beyond the waters covered by
the rectangular demarcation under the Treaty of Paris. Of course, where there are overlapping exclusive economic zones of opposite or adjacent
States, there will have to be a delineation of maritime boundaries in accordance with UNCLOS III. [30]

Further, petitioners' argument that the KIG now lies outside Philippine territory because the baselines that RA 9522 draws do not enclose the KIG
is negated by RA 9522 itself. Section 2 of the law commits to text the Philippines' continued claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction over the KIG
and the Scarborough Shoal:

SEC. 2. The baselines in the following areas over which the Philippines likewise exercises sovereignty and jurisdiction shall be determined as
"Regime of Islands" under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with Article 121 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS):

a) The Kalayaan Island Group as constituted under Presidential Decree No. 1596 and

b) Bajo de Masinloc, also known as Scarborough Shoal. (Emphasis supplied)

Had Congress in RA 9522 enclosed the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as part of the Philippine archipelago, adverse legal effects would have
ensued. The Philippines would have committed a breach of two provisions of UNCLOS III. First, Article 47 (3) of UNCLOS III requires that
"[t]he drawing of such baselines shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago." Second, Article 47
(2) of UNCLOS III requires that "the length of the baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical miles," save for three per cent (3%) of the total number
of baselines which can reach up to 125 nautical miles.[31]

Although the Philippines has consistently claimed sovereignty over the KIG [32] and the Scarborough Shoal for several decades, these outlying
areas are located at an appreciable distance from the nearest shoreline of the Philippine archipelago,[33] such that any straight baseline loped
around them from the nearest basepoint will inevitably "depart to an appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago."

The principal sponsor of RA 9522 in the Senate, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago, took pains to emphasize the foregoing during the Senate
deliberations:

What we call the Kalayaan Island Group or what the rest of the world call[] the Spratlys and the Scarborough Shoal are outside our archipelagic
baseline because if we put them inside our baselines we might be accused of violating the provision of international law which states: "The
drawing of such baseline shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago." So sa loob ng ating
baseline, dapat magkalapit ang mga islands. Dahil malayo ang Scarborough Shoal, hindi natin masasabing malapit sila sa atin although we are
still allowed by international law to claim them as our own.

This is called contested islands outside our configuration. We see that our archipelago is defined by the orange line which [we] call[] archipelagic
baseline. Ngayon, tingnan ninyo ang maliit na circle doon sa itaas, that is Scarborough Shoal, itong malaking circle sa ibaba, that is Kalayaan
Group or the Spratlys. Malayo na sila sa ating archipelago kaya kung ilihis pa natin ang dating archipelagic baselines para lamang masama
itong dalawang circles, hindi na sila magkalapit at baka hindi na tatanggapin ng United Nations because of the rule that it should follow the
natural configuration of the archipelago.[34](Emphasis supplied)

Similarly, the length of one baseline that RA 3046 drew exceeded UNCLOS III's limits. The need to shorten this baseline, and in addition, to
optimize the location of basepoints using current maps, became imperative as discussed by respondents:

[T]he amendment of the baselines law was necessary to enable the Philippines to draw the outer limits of its maritime zones including the
extended continental shelf in the manner provided by Article 47 of [UNCLOS III]. As defined by R.A. 3046, as amended by R.A. 5446, the
baselines suffer from some technical deficiencies, to wit:

1. The length of the baseline across Moro Gulf (from Middle of 3 Rock Awash to Tongquil Point) is 140.06 nautical miles x x
x. This exceeds the maximum length allowed under Article 47(2) of the [UNCLOS III], which states that "The length of
such baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical miles, except that up to 3 per cent of the total number of baselines enclosing
any archipelago may exceed that length, up to a maximum length of 125 nautical miles."

2. The selection of basepoints is not optimal. At least 9 basepoints can be skipped or deleted from the baselines system. This
will enclose an additional 2,195 nautical miles of water.

3. Finally, the basepoints were drawn from maps existing in 1968, and not established by geodetic survey methods.
Accordingly, some of the points, particularly along the west coasts of Luzon down to Palawan were later found to be
located either inland or on water, not on low-water line and drying reefs as prescribed by Article 47. [35]

Hence, far from surrendering the Philippines' claim over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal, Congress' decision to classify the KIG and the
Scarborough Shoal as "`Regime[s] of Islands' under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with Article 121" [36] of UNCLOS III manifests the
Philippine State's responsible observance of its pacta sunt servanda obligation under UNCLOS III. Under Article 121 of UNCLOS III, any
"naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide," such as portions of the KIG, qualifies under the category
of "regime of islands," whose islands generate their own applicable maritime zones. [37]

Statutory Claim Over Sabah under RA 5446 Retained

Petitioners' argument for the invalidity of RA 9522 for its failure to textualize the Philippines' claim over Sabah in North Borneo is also
untenable. Section 2 of RA 5446, which RA 9522 did not repeal, keeps open the door for drawing the baselines of Sabah:
Section 2. The definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the Philippine Archipelago as provided in this Act is without prejudice to the
delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of Sabah, situated in North Borneo, over which the Republic of the
Philippines has acquired dominion and sovereignty. (Emphasis supplied)

UNCLOS III and RA 9522 not Incompatible with the Constitution's Delineation of Internal Waters

As their final argument against the validity of RA 9522, petitioners contend that the law unconstitutionally "converts" internal waters into
archipelagic waters, hence subjecting these waters to the right of innocent and sea lanes passage under UNCLOS III, including overflight.
Petitioners extrapolate that these passage rights indubitably expose Philippine internal waters to nuclear and maritime pollution hazards, in
violation of the Constitution.[38]

Whether referred to as Philippine "internal waters" under Article I of the Constitution[39] or as "archipelagic waters" under UNCLOS III (Article
49 [1]), the Philippines exercises sovereignty over the body of water lying landward of the baselines, including the air space over it and the
submarine areas underneath. UNCLOS III affirms this:

Article 49. Legal status of archipelagic waters, of the air space over archipelagic waters and of their bed and subsoil. -

1. The sovereignty of an archipelagic State extends to the waters enclosed by the archipelagic baselines drawn in
accordance with article 47, described as archipelagic waters, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast.

2. This sovereignty extends to the air space over the archipelagic waters, as well as to their bed and subsoil, and the
resources contained therein.

xxxx

4. The regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage established in this Part shall not in other respects affect the status of the
archipelagic waters, including the sea lanes, or the exercise by the archipelagic State of its sovereignty over such
waters and their air space, bed and subsoil, and the resources contained therein.

(Emphasis supplied)

The fact of sovereignty, however, does not preclude the operation of municipal and international law norms subjecting the territorial sea or
archipelagic waters to necessary, if not marginal, burdens in the interest of maintaining unimpeded, expeditious international navigation,
consistent with the international law principle of freedom of navigation. Thus, domestically, the political branches of the Philippine government,
in the competent discharge of their constitutional powers, may pass legislation designating routes within the archipelagic waters to regulate
innocent and sea lanes passage.[40] Indeed, bills drawing nautical highways for sea lanes passage are now pending in Congress.[41]

In the absence of municipal legislation, international law norms, now codified in UNCLOS III, operate to grant innocent passage rights over the
territorial sea or archipelagic waters, subject to the treaty's limitations and conditions for their exercise.[42] Significantly, the right of innocent
passage is a customary international law,[43] thus automatically incorporated in the corpus of Philippine law. [44] No modern State can validly
invoke its sovereignty to absolutely forbid innocent passage that is exercised in accordance with customary international law without risking
retaliatory measures from the international community.

The fact that for archipelagic States, their archipelagic waters are subject to both the right of innocent passage and sea lanes passage[45] does not
place them in lesser footing vis-Ã -vis continental coastal States which are subject, in their territorial sea, to the right of innocent passage and the
right of transit passage through international straits. The imposition of these passage rights through archipelagic waters under UNCLOS III was a
concession by archipelagic States, in exchange for their right to claim all the waters landward of their baselines, regardless of their depth or
distance from the coast, as archipelagic waters subject to their territorial sovereignty. More importantly, the recognition of archipelagic States'
archipelago and the waters enclosed by their baselines as one cohesive entity prevents the treatment of their islands as separate islands under
UNCLOS III.[46] Separate islands generate their own maritime zones, placing the waters between islands separated by more than 24 nautical miles
beyond the States' territorial sovereignty, subjecting these waters to the rights of other States under UNCLOS III.[47]

Petitioners' invocation of non-executory constitutional provisions in Article II (Declaration of Principles and State Policies) [48] must also fail. Our
present state of jurisprudence considers the provisions in Article II as mere legislative guides, which, absent enabling legislation, "do not embody
judicially enforceable constitutional rights x x x."[49] Article II provisions serve as guides in formulating and interpreting implementing
legislation, as well as in interpreting executory provisions of the Constitution. Although Oposa v. Factoran[50] treated the right to a healthful and
balanced ecology under Section 16 of Article II as an exception, the present petition lacks factual basis to substantiate the claimed constitutional
violation. The other provisions petitioners cite, relating to the protection of marine wealth (Article XII, Section 2, paragraph 2 [51]) and subsistence
fishermen (Article XIII, Section 7[52]), are not violated by RA 9522.

In fact, the demarcation of the baselines enables the Philippines to delimit its exclusive economic zone, reserving solely to the Philippines the
exploitation of all living and non-living resources within such zone. Such a maritime delineation binds the international community since the
delineation is in strict observance of UNCLOS III. If the maritime delineation is contrary to UNCLOS III, the international community will of
course reject it and will refuse to be bound by it.

UNCLOS III favors States with a long coastline like the Philippines. UNCLOS III creates a sui generismaritime space - the exclusive economic
zone - in waters previously part of the high seas. UNCLOS III grants new rights to coastal States to exclusively exploit the resources found within
this zone up to 200 nautical miles.[53] UNCLOS III, however, preserves the traditional freedom of navigation of other States that attached to this
zone beyond the territorial sea before UNCLOS III.

RA 9522 and the Philippines' Maritime Zones

[54]
Petitioners hold the view that, based on the permissive text of UNCLOS III, Congress was not bound to pass RA 9522. We have looked at the
relevant provision of UNCLOS III[55] and we find petitioners' reading plausible. Nevertheless, the prerogative of choosing this option belongs to
Congress, not to this Court. Moreover, the luxury of choosing this option comes at a very steep price. Absent an UNCLOS III compliant baselines
law, an archipelagic State like the Philippines will find itself devoid of internationally acceptable baselines from where the breadth of its maritime
zones and continental shelf is measured. This is recipe for a two-fronted disaster: first, it sends an open invitation to the seafaring powers to freely
enter and exploit the resources in the waters and submarine areas around our archipelago; and second, it weakens the country's case in any
international dispute over Philippine maritime space. These are consequences Congress wisely avoided.

The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for the Philippine archipelago and adjacent areas, as embodied in RA 9522, allows an
internationally-recognized delimitation of the breadth of the Philippines' maritime zones and continental shelf. RA 9522 is therefore a most vital
step on the part of the Philippines in safeguarding its maritime zones, consistent with the Constitution and our national interest.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-32052 July 25, 1975

PHILIPPINE VIRGINIA TOBACCO ADMINISTRATION, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, et. al, respondents.

FERNANDO, J.:

The principal issue that calls for resolution in this appeal by certiorari from an order of respondent Court of Industrial Relations is one of
constitutional significance. It is concerned with the expanded role of government necessitated by the increased responsibility to provide for the
general welfare. More specifically, it deals with the question of whether petitioner, the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration, discharges
governmental and not proprietary functions. The landmark opinion of the then Justice, row Chief Justice, Makalintal in Agricultural Credit and
Cooperative Financing Administration v. Confederation of Unions in Government Corporations and offices, points the way to the right
answer.1 It interpreted the then fundamental law as hostile to the view of a limited or negative state. It is antithetical to the laissez faire concept.
For as noted in an earlier decision, the welfare state concept "is not alien to the philosophy of [the 1935] Constitution." 2 It is much more so under
the present Charter, which is impressed with an even more explicit recognition of social and economic rights. 3 There is manifest, to recall Laski,
"a definite increase in the profundity of the social conscience," resulting in "a state which seeks to realize more fully the common good of its
members."4 It does not necessarily follow, however, just because petitioner is engaged in governmental rather than proprietary functions, that the
labor controversy was beyond the jurisdiction of the now defunct respondent Court. Nor is the objection raised that petitioner does not come
within the coverage of the Eight-Hour Labor Law persuasive.5 We cannot then grant the reversal sought. We affirm.
The facts are undisputed. On December 20, 1966, claimants, now private respondents, filed with respondent Court a petition wherein they alleged
their employment relationship, the overtime services in excess of the regular eight hours a day rendered by them, and the failure to pay them
overtime compensation in accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 444. Their prayer was for the differential between the amount actually paid
to them and the amount allegedly due them.6 There was an answer filed by petitioner Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration denying the
allegations and raising the special defenses of lack of a cause of action and lack of jurisdiction. 7 The issues were thereafter joined, and the case set
for trial, with both parties presenting their evidence.8 After the parties submitted the case for decision, the then Presiding Judge Arsenio T.
Martinez of respondent Court issued an order sustaining the claims of private respondents for overtime services from December 23, 1963 up to
the date the decision was rendered on March 21, 1970, and directing petitioner to pay the same, minus what it had already paid.9 There was a
motion for reconsideration, but respondent Court en banc denied the same. 10 Hence this petition for certiorari.
Petitioner Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration, as had been noted, would predicate its plea for the reversal of the order complained of on
the basic proposition that it is beyond the jurisdiction of respondent Court as it is exercising governmental functions and that it is exempt from the
operation of Commonwealth Act No. 444. 11 While, to repeat, its submission as to the governmental character of its operation is to be given
credence, it is not a necessary consequence that respondent Court is devoid of jurisdiction. Nor could the challenged order be set aside on the
additional argument that the Eight-Hour Labor Law is not applicable to it. So it was, at the outset, made clear.

1. A reference to the enactments creating petitioner corporation suffices to demonstrate the merit of petitioner's plea that it performs
governmental and not proprietary functions. As originally established by Republic Act No. 2265, 12 its purposes and objectives were set forth
thus: "(a) To promote the effective merchandising of Virginia tobacco in the domestic and foreign markets so that those engaged in the industry
will be placed on a basis of economic security; (b) To establish and maintain balanced production and consumption of Virginia tobacco and its
manufactured products, and such marketing conditions as will insure and stabilize the price of a level sufficient to cover the cost of production
plus reasonable profit both in the local as well as in the foreign market; (c) To create, establish, maintain, and operate processing, warehousing
and marketing facilities in suitable centers and supervise the selling and buying of Virginia tobacco so that the farmers will enjoy reasonable
prices that secure a fair return of their investments; (d) To prescribe rules and regulations governing the grading, classifying, and inspecting of
Virginia tobacco; and (e) To improve the living and economic conditions of the people engaged in the tobacco industry." 13The amendatory
statute, Republic Act No. 4155, 14 renders even more evident its nature as a governmental agency. Its first section on the declaration of policy
reads: "It is declared to be the national policy, with respect to the local Virginia tobacco industry, to encourage the production of local Virginia
tobacco of the qualities needed and in quantities marketable in both domestic and foreign markets, to establish this industry on an efficient and
economic basis, and, to create a climate conducive to local cigarette manufacture of the qualities desired by the consuming public, blending
imported and native Virginia leaf tobacco to improve the quality of locally manufactured cigarettes." 15 The objectives are set forth thus: "To
attain this national policy the following objectives are hereby adopted: 1. Financing; 2. Marketing; 3. The disposal of stocks of the Agricultural
Credit Administration (ACA) and the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration (PVTA) at the best obtainable prices and conditions in order
that a reinvigorated Virginia tobacco industry may be established on a sound basis; and 4. Improving the quality of locally manufactured
cigarettes through blending of imported and native Virginia leaf tobacco; such importation with corresponding exportation at a ratio of one kilo of
imported to four kilos of exported Virginia tobacco, purchased by the importer-exporter from the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration." 16
It is thus readily apparent from a cursory perusal of such statutory provisions why petitioner can rightfully invoke the doctrine announced in the
leading Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration decision 17 and why the objection of private respondents with its overtones
of the distinction between constituent and ministrant functions of governments as set forth in Bacani v. National Coconut Corporation 18 if futile.
The irrelevance of such a distinction considering the needs of the times was clearly pointed out by the present Chief Justice, who took note,
speaking of the reconstituted Agricultural Credit Administration, that functions of that sort "may not be strictly what President Wilson described
as "constituent" (as distinguished from "ministrant"),such as those relating to the maintenance of peace and the prevention of crime, those
regulating property and property rights, those relating to the administration of justice and the determination of political duties of citizens, and
those relating to national defense and foreign relations. Under this traditional classification, such constituent functions are exercised by the State
as attributes of sovereignty, and not merely to promote the welfare, progress and prosperity of the people — these latter functions being
ministrant, the exercise of which is optional on the part of the government." 19Nonetheless, as he explained so persuasively: "The growing
complexities of modern society, however, have rendered this traditional classification of the functions of government quite unrealistic, not to say
obsolete. The areas which used to be left to private enterprise and initiative and which the government was called upon to enter optionally, and
only "because it was better equipped to administer for the public welfare than is any private individual or group of individuals", continue to lose
their well-defined boundaries and to be absorbed within activities that the government must undertake in its sovereign capacity if it is to meet the
increasing social challenges of the times. Here as almost everywhere else the tendency is undoubtedly towards a greater socialization of economic
forces. Here of course this development was envisioned, indeed adopted as a national policy, by the Constitution itself in its declaration of
principle concerning the promotion of social justice." 20 Thus was laid to rest the doctrine in Bacani v. National Coconut Corporation, 21 based on
the Wilsonian classification of the tasks incumbent on government into constituent and ministrant in accordance with the laissez faire principle.
That concept, then dominant in economics, was carried into the governmental sphere, as noted in a textbook on political science, 22 the first
edition of which was published in 1898, its author being the then Professor, later American President, Woodrow Wilson. He took pains to
emphasize that what was categorized by him as constituent functions had its basis in a recognition of what was demanded by the "strictest
[concept of] laissez faire, [as they] are indeed the very bonds of society." 23 The other functions he would minimize as ministrant or optional.
It is a matter of law that in the Philippines, the laissez faire principle hardly commanded the authoritative position which at one time it held in the
United States. As early as 1919, Justice Malcolm in Rubi v. Provincial Board 24 could affirm: "The doctrines of laissez faire and of unrestricted
freedom of the individual, as axioms of economic and political theory, are of the past. The modern period has shown a widespread belief in the
amplest possible demonstration of government activity." 25 The 1935 Constitution, as was indicated earlier, continued that approach. As noted
in Edu v. Ericta:26 "What is more, to erase any doubts, the Constitutional Convention saw to it that the concept of laissez-faire was rejected. It
entrusted to our government the responsibility of coping with social and economic problems with the commensurate power of control over
economic affairs. Thereby it could live up to its commitment to promote the general welfare through state action." 27 Nor did the opinion in Edu
stop there: "To repeat, our Constitution which took effect in 1935 erased whatever doubts there might be on that score. Its philosophy is a
repudiation of laissez-faire. One of the leading members of the Constitutional Convention, Manuel A. Roxas, later the first President of the
Republic, made it clear when he disposed of the objection of Delegate Jose Reyes of Sorsogon, who noted the "vast extensions in the sphere of
governmental functions" and the "almost unlimited power to interfere in the affairs of industry and agriculture as well as to compete with existing
business" as "reflections of the fascination exerted by [the then] current tendencies' in other jurisdictions. He spoke thus: "My answer is that this
constitution has a definite and well defined philosophy, not only political but social and economic.... If in this Constitution the gentlemen will
find declarations of economic policy they are there because they are necessary to safeguard the interest and welfare of the Filipino people because
we believe that the days have come when in self-defense, a nation may provide in its constitution those safeguards, the patrimony, the freedom to
grow, the freedom to develop national aspirations and national interests, not to be hampered by the artificial boundaries which a constitutional
provision automatically imposes." 28
It would be then to reject what was so emphatically stressed in the Agricultural Credit Administration decision about which the observation was
earlier made that it reflected the philosophy of the 1935 Constitution and is even more in consonance with the expanded role of government
accorded recognition in the present Charter if the plea of petitioner that it discharges governmental function were not heeded. That path this Court
is not prepared to take. That would be to go backward, to retreat rather than to advance. Nothing can thus be clearer than that there is no
constitutional obstacle to a government pursuing lines of endeavor, formerly reserved for private enterprise. This is one way, in the language of
Laski, by which through such activities, "the harsh contract which [does] obtain between the levels of the rich and the poor" may be
minimized. 29 It is a response to a trend noted by Justice Laurel in Calalang v. Williams 30 for the humanization of laws and the promotion of the
interest of all component elements of society so that man's innate aspirations, in what was so felicitously termed by the First Lady as "a
compassionate society" be attained. 31

2. The success that attended the efforts of petitioner to be adjudged as performing governmental rather than proprietary functions cannot militate
against respondent Court assuming jurisdiction over this labor dispute. So it was mentioned earlier. As far back as Tabora v. Montelibano, 32 this
Court, speaking through Justice Padilla, declared: The NARIC was established by the Government to protect the people against excessive or
unreasonable rise in the price of cereals by unscrupulous dealers. With that main objective there is no reason why its function should not be
deemed governmental. The Government owes its very existence to that aim and purpose — to protect the people." 33 In a subsequent case, Naric
Worker's Union v. Hon. Alvendia, 34 decided four years later, this Court, relying on Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions v. Tan, 35 which
specified the cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations, included among which is one that involves hours of
employment under the Eight-Hour Labor Law, ruled that it is precisely respondent Court and not ordinary courts that should pass upon that
particular labor controversy. For Justice J. B. L. Reyes, the ponente, the fact that there were judicial as well as administrative and executive
pronouncements to the effect that the Naric was performing governmental functions did not suffice to confer competence on the then respondent
Judge to issue a preliminary injunction and to entertain a complaint for damages, which as pointed out by the labor union, was connected with an
unfair labor practice. This is emphasized by the dispositive portion of the decision: "Wherefore, the restraining orders complained of, dated May
19, 1958 and May 27, 1958, are set aside, and the complaint is ordered dismissed, without prejudice to the National Rice and Corn Corporation's
seeking whatever remedy it is entitled to in the Court of Industrial Relations." 36 Then, too, in a case involving petitioner itself, Philippine
Virginia Tobacco Administration, 37 where the point in dispute was whether it was respondent Court or a court of first instance that is possessed
of competence in a declaratory relief petition for the interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement, one that could readily be thought of as
pertaining to the judiciary, the answer was that "unless the law speaks clearly and unequivocally, the choice should fall on the Court of Industrial
Relations." 38 Reference to a number of decisions which recognized in the then respondent Court the jurisdiction to determine labor controversies
by government-owned or controlled corporations lends to support to such an approach. 39 Nor could it be explained only on the assumption that
proprietary rather than governmental functions did call for such a conclusion. It is to be admitted that such a view was not previously bereft of
plausibility. With the aforecited Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration decision rendering obsolete the Bacani doctrine, it
has, to use a Wilsonian phrase, now lapsed into "innocuous desuetude." 40 Respondent Court clearly was vested with jurisdiction.

3. The contention of petitioner that the Eight-Hour Labor Law 41 does not apply to it hardly deserves any extended consideration. There is an air
of casualness in the way such an argument was advanced in its petition for review as well as in its brief. In both pleadings, it devoted less than a
full page to its discussion. There is much to be said for brevity, but not in this case. Such a terse and summary treatment appears to be a reflection
more of the inherent weakness of the plea rather than the possession of an advocate's enviable talent for concision. It did cite Section 2 of the Act,
but its very language leaves no doubt that "it shall apply to all persons employed in any industry or occupation, whether public or private ...
." 42 Nor are private respondents included among the employees who are thereby barred from enjoying the statutory benefits. It cited Marcelo v.
Philippine National Red Cross 43 and Boy Scouts of the Philippines v. Araos.44 Certainly, the activities to which the two above public corporations
devote themselves can easily be distinguished from that engaged in by petitioner. A reference to the pertinent sections of both Republic Acts
2265 and 2155 on which it relies to obtain a ruling as to its governmental character should render clear the differentiation that exists. If as a result
of the appealed order, financial burden would have to be borne by petitioner, it has only itself to blame. It need not have required private
respondents to render overtime service. It can hardly be surmised that one of its chief problems is paucity of personnel. That would indeed be a
cause for astonishment. It would appear, therefore, that such an objection based on this ground certainly cannot suffice for a reversal. To repeat,
respondent Court must be sustained.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Order of March 21, 1970 and the Resolution of respondent Court en banc of May 8, 1970 denying a motion for
reconsideration are hereby affirmed. The last sentence of the Order of March 21, 1970 reads as follows: "To find how much each of them [private
respondents] is entitled under this judgment, the Chief of the Examining Division, or any of his authorized representative, is hereby directed to
make a reexamination of records, papers and documents in the possession of respondent PVTA pertinent and proper under the premises and to
submit his report of his findings to the Court for further disposition thereof." Accordingly, as provided by the New Labor Code, this case is
referred to the National Labor Relations Commission for further proceedings conformably to law. No costs.

G.R. No. L-9959 December 13, 1916

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, represented by the Treasurer of the Philippine Islands,plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EL MONTE DE PIEDAD Y CAJA DE AHORRAS DE MANILA, defendant-appellant.

TRENT, J.:
About $400,000, were subscribed and paid into the treasury of the Philippine Islands by the inhabitants of the Spanish Dominions of the relief of
those damaged by the earthquake which took place in the Philippine Islands on June 3, 1863. Subsequent thereto and on October 6 of that year, a
central relief board was appointed, by authority of the King of Spain, to distribute the moneys thus voluntarily contributed. After a thorough
investigation and consideration, the relief board allotted $365,703.50 to the various sufferers named in its resolution, dated September 22, 1866,
and, by order of the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, a list of these allotments, together with the names of those entitled thereto, was
published in the Official Gazette of Manila dated April 7, 1870. There was later distributed, inaccordance with the above-mentioned allotments,
the sum of $30,299.65, leaving a balance of S365,403.85 for distribution. Upon the petition of the governing body of the Monte de Piedad, dated
February 1, 1833, the Philippine Government, by order dated the 1st of that month, directed its treasurer to turn over to the Monte de Piedad the
sum of $80,000 of the relief fund in installments of $20,000 each. These amounts were received on the following dates: February 15, March 12,
April 14, and June 2, 1883, and are still in the possession of the Monte de Piedad. On account of various petitions of the persons, and heirs of
others to whom the above-mentioned allotments were made by the central relief board for the payment of those amounts, the Philippine Islands to
bring suit against the Monte de Piedad a recover, "through the Attorney-General and in representation of the Government of the Philippine
Islands," the $80.000, together with interest, for the benefit of those persons or their heirs appearing in the list of names published in the Official
Gazette instituted on May 3, 1912, by the Government of the Philippine Islands, represented by the Insular Treasurer, and after due trial,
judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of $80,000 gold or its equivalent in Philippine currency, together with legal interest
from February 28, 1912, and the costs of the cause. The defendant appealed and makes the following assignment of errors:
1. The court erred in not finding that the eighty thousand dollars ($80,000), give to the Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros, were so
given as a donation subject to one condition, to wit: the return of such sum of money to the Spanish Government of these Islands,
within eight days following the day when claimed, in case the Supreme Government of Spain should not approve the action taken by
the former government.
2. The court erred in not having decreed that this donation had been cleared; said eighty thousand dollars ($80,000) being at present
the exclusive property of the appellant the Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros.
3. That the court erred in stating that the Government of the Philippine Islands has subrogated the Spanish Government in its rights, as
regards an important sum of money resulting from a national subscription opened by reason of the earthquake of June 3, 1863, in these
Island.
4. That the court erred in not declaring that Act Numbered 2109, passed by the Philippine Legislature on January 30, 1912, is
unconstitutional.
5. That the court erred in holding in its decision that there is no title for the prescription of this suit brought by the Insular Government
against the Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros for the reimbursement of the eighty thousand dollars ($80,000) given to it by the late
Spanish Government of these Islands.
6. That the court erred in sentencing the Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros to reimburse the Philippine Government in the sum of
eighty thousand dollars ($80,000) gold coin, or the equivalent thereof in the present legal tender currency in circulation, with legal
interest thereon from February 28th, 1912, and the costs of this suit.
In the royal order of June 29, 1879, the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands was directed to inform the home Government in what manner
the indemnity might be paid to which, by virtue of the resolutions of the relief board, the persons who suffered damage by the earthquake might
be entitled, in order to perform the sacred obligation which the Government of Spain had assumed toward the donors.
The next pertinent document in order is the defendant's petition, dated February 1, 1883, addressed to the Governor-General of the Philippine
Islands, which reads:
Board of Directors of the Monte de Piedad of Manila Presidencia.
Excellency: The Board of Directors of the Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros of Manila informs your Excellency, First: That the
funds which it has up to the present been able to dispose of have been exhausted in loans on jewelry, and there only remains the sum
of one thousand and odd pesos, which will be expended between to-day and day after tomorrow. Second: That, to maintain the credit
of the establishment, which would be greatly injured were its operations suspended, it is necessary to procure money. Third: That your
Excellency has proposed to His Majesty's Government to apply to the funds of the Monte de Piedad a part of the funds held in the
treasury derived form the national subscription for the relief of the distress caused by the earthquake of 1863. Fourth: That in the
 public treasury there is held at the disposal of the central earthquake relief board over $1090,000 which was deposited in the said
treasury by order of your general Government, it having been transferred thereto from the Spanish-Filipino Bank where it had been
held. fifth: That in the straightened circumstances of the moment, your Excellency can, to avert impending disaster to the Monte de
Piedad, order that, out of that sum of one hundred thousand pesos held in the Treasury at the disposal of the central relief board, there
be transferred to the Monte de Piedad the sum of $80,000, there to be held under the same conditions as at present in the Treasury, to
wit, at the disposal of the Relief Board. Sixth: That should this transfer not be approved for any reason, either because of the failure of
His Majesty's Government to approve the proposal made by your Excellency relative to the application to the needs of the Monte de
Piedad of a pat of the subscription intended to believe the distress caused by the earthquake of 1863, or for any other reason, the board
of directors of the Monte de Piedad obligates itself to return any sums which it may have received on account of the eighty thousand
pesos, or the whole thereof, should it have received the same, by securing a loan from whichever bank or banks may lend it the money
at the cheapest rate upon the security of pawned jewelry. — This is an urgent measure to save the Monte de Piedad in the present
crisis and the board of directors trusts to secure your Excellency's entire cooperation and that of the other officials who have take part
in the transaction.
The Governor-General's resolution on the foregoing petition is as follows:
GENERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES.
MANILA, February 1, 1883.
In view of the foregoing petition addressed to me by the board of directors of the Monte de Piedad of this city, in which it is stated that
the funds which the said institution counted upon are nearly all invested in loans on jewelry and that the small account remaining will
scarcely suffice to cover the transactions of the next two days, for which reason it entreats the general Government that, in pursuance
of its telegraphic advice to H. M. Government, the latter direct that there be turned over to said Monte de Piedad $80,000 out of the
funds in the public treasury obtained from the national subscription for the relief of the distress caused by the earthquake of 1863, said
board obligating itself to return this sum should H. M. Government, for any reason, not approve the said proposal, and for this purpose
it will procure funds by means of loans raised on pawned jewelry; it stated further that if the aid so solicited is not furnished, it will be
compelled to suspend operations, which would seriously injure the credit of so beneficient an institution; and in view of the report
upon the matter made by the Intendencia General de Hacienda; and considering the fact that the public treasury has on hand a much
greater sum from the source mentioned than that solicited; and considering that this general Government has submitted for the
determination of H. M. Government that the balance which, after strictly applying the proceeds obtained from the subscription
referred to, may remain as a surplus should be delivered to the Monte de Piedad, either as a donation, or as a loan upon the security of
the credit of the institution, believing that in so doing the wishes of the donors would be faithfully interpreted inasmuch as those
wishes were no other than to relieve distress, an act of charity which is exercised in the highest degree by the Monte de Piedad, for it
liberates needy person from the pernicious effects of usury; and
Considering that the lofty purposes that brought about the creation of the pious institution referred to would be frustrated, and that the
great and laudable work of its establishment, and that the great and laudable and valuable if the aid it urgently seeks is not granted,
since the suspension of its operations would seriously and regrettably damage the ever-growing credit of the Monte de Piedad; and
Considering that if such a thing would at any time cause deep distress in the public mind, it might be said that at the present juncture it
would assume the nature of a disturbance of public order because of the extreme poverty of the poorer classes resulting from the late
calamities, and because it is the only institution which can mitigate the effects of such poverty; and
Considering that no reasonable objection can be made to granting the request herein contained, for the funds in question are
sufficiently secured in the unlikely event that H> M. Government does not approve the recommendation mentioned, this general
Government, in the exercise of the extraordinary powers conferred upon it and in conformity with the report of the Intendencia de
Hacienda, resolves as follows:
First. Authority is hereby given to deliver to the Monte de Piedad, out of the sum held in the public treasury of these Islands obtained
from the national subscription opened by reason of the earthquakes of 1863, amounts up to the sum $80,000, as its needs may require,
in installments of $20,000.
Second. The board of directors of the Monte de Piedad is solemnly bound to return, within eight days after demand, the sums it may
have so received, if H. M. Government does not approve this resolution.
Third. The Intendencia General de Hacienda shall forthwith, and in preference to all other work, proceed to prepare the necessary
papers so that with the least possible delay the payment referred to may be made and the danger that menaces the Monte de Piedad of
having to suspend its operations may be averted.
H. M. Government shall be advised hereof.lawphi1.net
(Signed) P. DE RIVERA.
By the royal order of December 3, 1892, the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands was ordered to "inform this ministerio what is the total
sum available at the present time, taking into consideration the sums delivered to the Monte de Piedad pursuant to the decree issued by your
general Government on February 1, 1883," and after the rights of the claimants, whose names were published in the Official Gazette of Manila on
April 7, 1870, and their heirs had been established, as therein provided, as such persons "have an unquestionable right to be paid the donations
assigned to them therein, your general Government shall convoke them all within a reasonable period and shall pay their shares to such as shall
identify themselves, without regard to their financial status," and finally "that when all the proceedings and operations herein mentioned have
been concluded and the Government can consider itself free from all kinds of claims on the part of those interested in the distribution of the funds
deposited in the vaults of the Treasury, such action may be taken as the circumstances shall require, after first consulting the relief board and your
general Government and taking account of what sums have been delivered to the Monte de Piedad and those that were expended in 1888 to
relieve public calamities," and "in order that all the points in connection with the proceedings had as a result of the earthquake be clearly
understood, it is indispensable that the offices hereinbefore mentioned comply with the provisions contained in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the royal
order of June 25, 1879." On receipt of this Finance order by the Governor-General, the Department of Finance was called upon for a report in
reference to the $80,000 turned over to the defendant, and that Department's report to the Governor-General dated June 28, 1893, reads:
Intendencia General de Hacienda de Filipinas (General Treasury of the Philippines) — Excellency. — By Royal Order No. 1044 of
December 3, last, it is provided that the persons who sustained losses by the earthquakes that occurred in your capital in the year 1863
shall be paid the amounts allotted to them out of the sums sent from Spain for this purpose, with observance of the rules specified in
the said royal order, one of them being that before making the payment to the interested parties the assets shall be reduced to money.
These assets, during the long period of time that has elapsed since they were turned over to the Treasury of the Philippine Islands,
were used to cover the general needs of the appropriation, a part besides being invested in the relief of charitable institutions and
 another part to meet pressing needs occasioned by public calamities. On January 30, last, your Excellency was please to order the
fulfillment of that sovereign mandate and referred the same to this Intendencia for its information and the purposes desired (that is, for
compliance with its directions and, as aforesaid, one of these being the liquidation, recovery, and deposit with the Treasury of the
sums paid out of that fund and which were expended in a different way from that intended by the donors) and this Intendencia
believed the moment had arrived to claim from the board of directors of the Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros the sum of 80,000
pesos which, by decree of your general Government of the date of February 1, 1883, was loaned to it out of the said funds, the (Monte
de Piedad) obligating itself to return the same within the period of eight days if H. M. Government did not approve the delivery. On
this Intendencia's demanding from the Monte de Piedad the eighty thousand pesos, thus complying with the provisions of the Royal
Order, it was to be supposed that no objection to its return would be made by the Monte de Piedad for, when it received the loan, it
formally engaged itself to return it; and, besides, it was indisputable that the moment to do so had arrived, inasmuch as H. M.
Government, in ordering that the assets of the earthquake relief fund should he collected, makes express mention of the 80,000 pesos
loaned to the Monte de Piedad, without doubt considering as sufficient the period of ten years during which it has been using this large
sum which lawfully belongs to their persons. This Intendencia also supposed that the Monte de Piedad no longer needed the amount
of that loan, inasmuch as, far from investing it in beneficient transactions, it had turned the whole amount into the voluntary deposit
funds bearing 5 per cent interests, the result of this operation being that the debtor loaned to the creditor on interest what the former
had gratuitously received. But the Monte de Piedad, instead of fulfilling the promise it made on receiving the sum, after repeated
demands refused to return the money on the ground that only your Excellency, and not the Intendencia (Treasury), is entitled to order
the reimbursement, taking no account of the fact that this Intendencia was acting in the discharge of a sovereign command, the
fulfillment of which your Excellency was pleased to order; and on the further ground that the sum of 80,000 pesos which it received
from the fund intended for the earthquake victims was not received as a loan, but as a donation, this in the opinion of this Intendencia,
erroneously interpreting both the last royal order which directed the apportionment of the amount of the subscription raised in the year
1863 and the superior decree which granted the loan, inasmuch as in this letter no donation is made to the Monte de Piedad of the
80,000 pesos, but simply a loan; besides, no donation whatever could be made of funds derived from a private subscription raised for a
specific purpose, which funds are already distributed and the names of the beneficiaries have been published in the Gaceta, there
being lacking only the mere material act of the delivery, which has been unduly delayed. In view of the unexpected reply made by
the Monte de Piedad, and believing it useless to insist further in the matter of the claim for the aforementioned loan, or to argue in
support thereof, this Intendencia believes the intervention of your Excellency necessary in this matter, if the royal Order No. 1044 of
December 3, last, is to be complied with, and for this purpose I beg your Excellency kindly to order the Monte de Piedad to reimburse
within the period of eight days the 80,000 which it owes, and that you give this Intendencia power to carry out the provisions of the
said royal order. I must call to the attention of your Excellency that the said pious establishment, during the last few days and after
demand was made upon it, has endorsed to the Spanish-Filipino Bank nearly the whole of the sum which it had on deposit in the
general deposit funds.
The record in the case under consideration fails to disclose any further definite action taken by either the Philippine Government or the Spanish
Government in regard to the $80,000 turned over to the Monte de Piedad.
In the defendant's general ledger the following entries appear: "Public Treasury: February 15, 1883, $20,000; March 12, 1883, $20,000; April 14,
1883, $20,000; June 2, 1883, $20,000, total $80,000." The book entry for this total is as follows: "To the public Treasury derived from the
subscription for the earthquake of 1863, $80,000 received from general Treasury as a returnable loan, and without interest." The account was
carried in this manner until January 1, 1899, when it was closed by transferring the amount to an account called "Sagrada Mitra," which latter
account was a loan of $15,000 made to the defendant by the Archbishop of Manila, without interest, thereby placing the "Sagrada Mitra" account
at $95,000 instead of $15,000. The above-mentioned journal entry for January 1, 1899, reads: "Sagrada Mitra and subscription, balance of these
two account which on this date are united in accordance with an order of the Exmo. Sr. Presidente of the Council transmitted verbally to
the Presidente Gerente of these institutions, $95,000."
On March 16, 1902, the Philippine government called upon the defendant for information concerning the status of the $80,000 and received the
following reply:
MANILA, March 31, 1902.
To the Attorney-General of the Department of Justice of the Philippine Islands.
SIR: In reply to your courteous letter of the 16th inst., in which you request information from this office as to when and for what
purpose the Spanish Government delivered to the Monte de Piedad eighty thousand pesos obtained from the subscription opened in
connection with the earthquake of 1863, as well as any other information that might be useful for the report which your office is called
upon to furnish, I must state to your department that the books kept in these Pious Institutions, and which have been consulted for the
purpose, show that on the 15th of February, 1883, they received as a reimbursable loan and without interest, twenty thousand pesos,
which they deposited with their own funds. On the same account and on each of the dates of March 12, April 14 and June 2 of the said
year, 1883, they also received and turned into their funds a like sum of twenty thousand pesos, making a total of eighty thousand
pesos. — (Signed) Emilio Moreta.
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a literal copy of that found in the letter book No. 2 of those Pious Institutions.
Manila, November 19, 1913
(Sgd.) EMILIO LAZCANOTEGUI,
Secretary
(Sgd.) O. K. EMILIO MORETA,
Managing Director.
The foregoing documentary evidence shows the nature of the transactions which took place between the Government of Spain and the Philippine
Government on the one side and the Monte de Piedad on the other, concerning the $80,000. The Monte de Piedad, after setting forth in its
petition to the Governor-General its financial condition and its absolute necessity for more working capital, asked that out of the sum of $100,000
held in the Treasury of the Philippine Islands, at the disposal of the central relief board, there be transferred to it the sum of $80,000 to be held
under the same conditions, to wit, "at the disposal of the relief board." The Monte de Piedad agreed that if the transfer of these funds should not
be approved by the Government of Spain, the same would be returned forthwith. It did not ask that the $80,000 be given to it as a donation. The
Governor-General, after reciting the substance of the petition, stated that "this general Government has submitted for the determination of H. M.
Government that the balance which, after strictly applying the proceeds obtained from the subscription referred to, may remain as a surplus,
should be delivered to the Monte de Piedad, either as a donation, or as a loan upon the security of the credit of the institution," and "considering
that no reasonable objection can be made to granting the request herein contained," directed the transfer of the $80,000 to be made with the
understanding that "the Board of Directors of the Monte de Piedad is solemnly bound to return, within eight days after demand, the sums it may
have so received, if H. M. Government does not approve this resolution." It will be noted that the first and only time the word "donation" was
used in connection with the $80,000 appears in this resolution of the Governor-General. It may be inferred from the royal orders that the Madrid
Government did tacitly approve of the transfer of the $80,000 to the Monte de Piedad as a loan without interest, but that Government certainly did
not approve such transfer as a donation for the reason that the Governor-General was directed by the royal order of December 3, 1892, to inform
the Madrid Government of the total available sum of the earthquake fund, "taking into consideration the sums delivered to the Monte de
Piedad pursuant to the decree issued by your general Government on February 1, 1883." This language, nothing else appearing, might admit of
the interpretation that the Madrid Government did not intend that the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands should include the $80,000 in
the total available sum, but when considered in connection with the report of the Department of Finance there can be no doubt that it was so
intended. That report refers expressly to the royal order of December 3d, and sets forth in detail the action taken in order to secure the return of
the $80,000. The Department of Finance, acting under the orders of the Governor-General, understood that the $80,000 was transferred to
the Monte de Piedad well knew that it received this sum as a loan interest." The amount was thus carried in its books until January, 1899, when it
was transferred to the account of the "Sagrada Mitra" and was thereafter known as the "Sagrada Mitra and subscription account." Furthermore,
the Monte de Piedad recognized and considered as late as March 31, 1902, that it received the $80,000 "as a returnable loan, and without
interest." Therefore, there cannot be the slightest doubt the fact that the Monte de Piedad received the $80,000 as a mere loan or deposit and not
as a donation. Consequently, the first alleged error is entirely without foundation.
Counsel for the defendant, in support of their third assignment of error, say in their principal brief that:
The Spanish nation was professedly Roman Catholic and its King enjoyed the distinction of being deputy ex officio of the Holy See
and Apostolic Vicar-General of the Indies, and as such it was his duty to protect all pious works and charitable institutions in his
kingdoms, especially those of the Indies; among the latter was the Monte de Piedad of the Philippines, of which said King and his
deputy the Governor-General of the Philippines, as royal vice-patron, were, in a special and peculiar manner, the protectors; the latter,
as a result of the cession of the Philippine Islands, Implicitly renounced this high office and tacitly returned it to the Holy See, now
represented by the Archbishop of Manila; the national subscription in question was a kind of foundation or pious work, for a charitable
purpose in these Islands; and the entire subscription not being needed for its original purpose, the royal vice-patron, with the consent
of the King, gave the surplus thereof to an analogous purpose; the fulfillment of all these things involved, in the majority, if not in all
cases, faithful compliance with the duty imposed upon him by the Holy See, when it conferred upon him the royal patronage of the
Indies, a thing that touched him very closely in his conscience and religion; the cessionary Government though Christian, was not
Roman Catholic and prided itself on its policy of non-interference in religious matters, and inveterately maintained a complete
separation between the ecclesiastical and civil powers.
In view of these circumstances it must be quite clear that, even without the express provisions of the Treaty of Paris, which apparently
expressly exclude such an idea, it did not befit the honor of either of the contracting parties to subrogate to the American Government
in lieu of the Spanish Government anything respecting the disposition of the funds delivered by the latter to the Monte de Piedad. The
same reasons that induced the Spanish Government to take over such things would result in great inconvenience to the American
Government in attempting to do so. The question was such a delicate one, for the reason that it affected the conscience, deeply
religious, of the King of Spain, that it cannot be believed that it was ever his intention to confide the exercise thereof to a Government
like the American. (U. S. vs. Arredondo, 6 Pet. [U. S.], 711.)
It is thus seen that the American Government did not subrogate the Spanish Government or rather, the King of Spain, in this regard;
and as the condition annexed to the donation was lawful and possible of fulfillment at the time the contract was made, but became
impossible of fulfillment by the cession made by the Spanish Government in these Islands, compliance therewith is excused and the
contract has been cleared thereof.
The contention of counsel, as thus stated, in untenable for two reason, (1) because such contention is based upon the erroneous theory that the
sum in question was a donation to the Monte de Piedad and not a loan, and (2) because the charity founded by the donations for the earthquake
sufferers is not and never was intended to be an ecclesiastical pious work. The first proposition has already been decided adversely to the
defendant's contention. As to the second, the record shows clearly that the fund was given by the donors for a specific and definite purpose — the
relief of the earthquake sufferers — and for no other purpose. The money was turned over to the Spanish Government to be devoted to that
purpose. The Spanish Government remitted the money to the Philippine Government to be distributed among the suffers. All officials, including
the King of Spain and the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, who took part in the disposal of the fund, acted in their purely civil, official
capacity, and the fact that they might have belonged to a certain church had nothing to do with their acts in this matter. The church, as such, had
nothing to do with the fund in any way whatever until the $80,000 reached the coffers of the Monte de Piedad (an institution under the control of
the church) as a loan or deposit. If the charity in question had been founded as an ecclesiastical pious work, the King of Spain and the Governor-
General, in their capacities as vicar-general of the Indies and as royal vice-patron, respectively, would have disposed of the fund as such and not
in their civil capacities, and such functions could not have been transferred to the present Philippine Government, because the right to so act
would have arisen out of the special agreement between the Government of Spain and the Holy See, based on the union of the church and state
which was completely separated with the change of sovereignty.
And in their supplemental brief counsel say:
By the conceded facts the money in question is part of a charitable subscription. The donors were persons in Spain, the trustee was the
Spanish Government, the donees, the cestuis que trustent, were certain persons in the Philippine Islands. The whole matter is one of
trusteeship. This is undisputed and indisputable. It follows that the Spanish Government at no time was the owner of the fund. Not
being the owner of the fund it could not transfer the ownership. Whether or not it could transfer its trusteeship it certainly never
has expressly done so and the general terms of property transfer in the Treaty of Paris are wholly insufficient for such a purpose even
could Spain have transferred its trusteeship without the consent of the donors and even could the United States, as a Government, have
accepted such a trust under any power granted to it by the thirteen original States in the Constitution, which is more than doubtful. It
follows further that this Government is not a proper party to the action. The only persons who could claim to be damaged by this
payment to the Monte, if it was unlawful, are the donors or the cestuis que trustent, and this Government is neither.
If "the whole matter is one of trusteeship," and it being true that the Spanish Government could not, as counsel say, transfer the ownership of the
fund to the Monte de Piedad, the question arises, who may sue to recover this loan? It needs no argument to show that the Spanish or Philippine
Government, as trustee, could maintain an action for this purpose had there been no change of sovereignty and if the right of action has not
prescribed. But those governments were something more than mere common law trustees of the fund. In order to determine their exact status with
reference to this fund, it is necessary to examine the law in force at the time there transactions took place, which are the law of June 20, 1894, the
royal decree of April 27. 1875, and the instructions promulgated on the latter date. These legal provisions were applicable to the Philippine
Islands (Benedicto vs. De la Rama, 3 Phil. Rep., 34)
The funds collected as a result of the national subscription opened in Spain by royal order of the Spanish Government and which were remitted to
the Philippine Government to be distributed among the earthquake sufferers by the Central Relief Board constituted, under article 1 of the law of
June 20, 1894, and article 2 of the instructions of April 27, 1875, a special charity of a temporary nature as distinguished from a permanent public
charitable institution. As the Spanish Government initiated the creation of the fund and as the donors turned their contributions over to that
Government, it became the duty of the latter, under article 7 of the instructions, to exercise supervision and control over the moneys thus
collected to the end that the will of the donors should be carried out. The relief board had no power whatever to dispose of the funds confided to
its charge for other purposes than to distribute them among the sufferers, because paragraph 3 of article 11 of the instructions conferred the power
upon the secretary of the interior of Spain, and no other, to dispose of the surplus funds, should there be any, by assigning them to some other
charitable purpose or institution. The secretary could not dispose of any of the funds in this manner so long as they were necessary for the specific
purpose for which they were contributed. The secretary had the power, under the law above mentioned to appoint and totally or partially change
the personnel of the relief board and to authorize the board to defend the rights of the charity in the courts. The authority of the board consisted
only in carrying out the will of the donors as directed by the Government whose duty it was to watch over the acts of the board and to see that the
funds were applied to the purposes for which they were contributed .The secretary of the interior, as the representative of His Majesty's
Government, exercised these powers and duties through the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands. The Governments of Spain and of the
Philippine Islands in complying with their duties conferred upon them by law, acted in their governmental capacities in attempting to carry out
the intention of the contributors. It will this be seen that those governments were something more, as we have said, than mere trustees of the fund.
It is further contended that the obligation on the part of the Monte de Piedad to return the $80,000 to the Government, even considering it a loan,
was wiped out on the change of sovereignty, or inn other words, the present Philippine Government cannot maintain this action for that reason.
This contention, if true, "must result from settled principles of rigid law," as it cannot rest upon any title to the fund in the Monte de
Piedad acquired prior to such change. While the obligation to return the $80,000 to the Spanish Government was still pending, war between the
United States and Spain ensued. Under the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898, the Archipelago, known as the Philippine Islands, was ceded to
the United States, the latter agreeing to pay Spain the sum of $20,000,000. Under the first paragraph of the eighth article, Spain relinquished to
the United States "all buildings, wharves, barracks, forts, structures, public highways, and other immovable property which, in conformity with
law, belonged to the public domain, and as such belonged to the crown of Spain." As the $80,000 were not included therein, it is said that the
right to recover this amount did not, therefore, pass to the present sovereign. This, in our opinion, does not follow as a necessary consequence, as
the right to recover does not rest upon the proposition that the $80,000 must be "other immovable property" mentioned in article 8 of the treaty,
but upon contractual obligations incurred before the Philippine Islands were ceded to the United States. We will not inquire what effect his
cession had upon the law of June 20, 1849, the royal decree of April 27, 1875, and the instructions promulgated on the latter date. In
Vilas vs.Manila (220 U. S., 345), the court said:
That there is a total abrogation of the former political relations of the inhabitants of the ceded region is obvious. That all laws
theretofore in force which are in conflict with the political character, constitution, or institutions of the substituted sovereign, lose their
force, is also plain. (Alvarez y Sanchez vs. United States, 216 U. S., 167.) But it is equally settled in the same public law that the great
body of municipal law which regulates private and domestic rights continues in force until abrogated or changed by the new ruler.
If the above-mentioned legal provisions are in conflict with the political character, constitution or institutions of the new sovereign, they became
inoperative or lost their force upon the cession of the Philippine Islands to the United States, but if they are among "that great body of municipal
law which regulates private and domestic rights," they continued in force and are still in force unless they have been repealed by the present
Government. That they fall within the latter class is clear from their very nature and character. They are laws which are not political in any sense
of the word. They conferred upon the Spanish Government the right and duty to supervise, regulate, and to some extent control charities and
charitable institutions. The present sovereign, in exempting "provident institutions, savings banks, etc.," all of which are in the nature of
charitable institutions, from taxation, placed such institutions, in so far as the investment in securities are concerned, under the general
supervision of the Insular Treasurer (paragraph 4 of section 111 of Act No. 1189; see also Act No. 701).
Furthermore, upon the cession of the Philippine Islands the prerogatives of he crown of Spain devolved upon he United States. In
Magill vs. Brown (16 Fed. Cas., 408), quoted with approval in Mormon Charch vs. United States (136 U. S.,1, 57), the court said:
The Revolution devolved on the State all the transcendent power of Parliament, and the prerogative of the crown, and gave their Acts
the same force and effect.
In Fontain vs. Ravenel (17 Hw., 369, 384), Mr. Justice McLean, delivering the opinion of the court in a charity case, said:
When this country achieved its independence, the prerogatives of the crown devolved upon the people of the States. And this power
still remains with them except so fact as they have delegated a portion of it to the Federal Government. The sovereign will is made
known to us by legislative enactment. The State as a sovereign, is the parens patriae.
Chancelor Kent says:
In this country, the legislature or government of the State, as parens patriae, has the right to enforce all charities of public nature, by
virtue of its general superintending authority over the public interests, where no other person is entrusted with it. (4 Kent Com., 508,
note.)
The Supreme Court of the United States in Mormon Church vs. United States, supra, after approving also the last quotations, said:
This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every State, whether that power is lodged in a royal person or
in the legislature, and has no affinity to those arbitrary powers which are sometimes exerted by irresponsible monarchs to the great
detriment of the people and the destruction of their liberties. On the contrary, it is a most beneficient functions, and often necessary to
be exercised in the interest of humanity, and for the prevention of injury to those who cannot protect themselves.
The court in the same case, after quoting from Sohier vs. Mass. General Hospital (3 Cush., 483, 497), wherein the latter court held that it is
deemed indispensible that there should be a power in the legislature to authorize the same of the estates of in facts, idiots, insane persons, and
persons not known, or not in being, who cannot act for themselves, said:
These remarks in reference to in facts, insane persons and person not known, or not in being, apply to the beneficiaries of charities,
who are often in capable of vindicating their rights, and justly look for protection to the sovereign authority, acting as parens patriae.
They show that this beneficient functions has not ceased t exist under the change of government from a monarchy to a republic; but
that it now resides in the legislative department, ready to be called into exercise whenever required for the purposes of justice and
right, and is a clearly capable of being exercised in cases of charities as in any other cases whatever.
In People vs. Cogswell (113 Cal. 129, 130), it was urged that the plaintiff was not the real party in interest; that the Attorney-General had no
power to institute the action; and that there must be an allegation and proof of a distinct right of the people as a whole, as distinguished from the
rights of individuals, before an action could be brought by the Attorney-General in the name of the people. The court, in overruling these
contentions, held that it was not only the right but the duty of the Attorney-General to prosecute the action, which related to charities, and
approved the following quotation from Attorney-General vs. Compton (1 Younge & C. C., 417):
Where property affected by a trust for public purposes is in the hands of those who hold it devoted to that trust, it is the privilege of the
public that the crown should be entitled to intervene by its officers for the purpose of asserting, on behalf on the public generally, the
public interest and the public right, which, probably, no individual could be found effectually to assert, even if the interest were such
as to allow it. (2 Knet's Commentaries, 10th ed., 359; Lewin on Trusts, sec. 732.)
It is further urged, as above indicated, that "the only persons who could claim to be damaged by this payment to the Monte, if it was unlawful, are
the donors or the cestuis que trustent, and this Government is neither. Consequently, the plaintiff is not the proper party to bring the action." The
earthquake fund was the result or the accumulation of a great number of small contributions. The names of the contributors do not appear in the
record. Their whereabouts are unknown. They parted with the title to their respective contributions. The beneficiaries, consisting of the original
sufferers and their heirs, could have been ascertained. They are quite numerous also. And no doubt a large number of the original sufferers have
died, leaving various heirs. It would be impracticable for them to institute an action or actions either individually or collectively to recover the
$80,000. The only course that can be satisfactorily pursued is for the Government to again assume control of the fund and devote it to the object
for which it was originally destined.
The impracticability of pursuing a different course, however, is not the true ground upon which the right of the Government to maintain the
action rests. The true ground is that the money being given to a charity became, in a measure, public property, only applicable, it is true, to the
specific purposes to which it was intended to be devoted, but within those limits consecrated to the public use, and became part of the public
resources for promoting the happiness and welfare of the Philippine Government. (Mormon Church vs. U. S., supra.) To deny the Government's
right to maintain this action would be contrary to sound public policy, as tending to discourage the prompt exercise of similar acts of humanity
and Christian benevolence in like instances in the future.
As to the question raised in the fourth assignment of error relating to the constitutionality of Act No. 2109, little need be said for the reason that
we have just held that the present Philippine Government is the proper party to the action. The Act is only a manifestation on the part of the
Philippine Government to exercise the power or right which it undoubtedly had. The Act is not, as contended by counsel, in conflict with the fifth
section of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, because it does not take property without due process of law. In fact, the defendant is not the
owner of the $80,000, but holds it as a loan subject to the disposal of the central relief board. Therefor, there can be nothing in the Act which
transcends the power of the Philippine Legislature.
In Vilas vs. Manila, supra, the plaintiff was a creditor of the city of Manila as it existed before the cession of the Philippine Islands to the United
States by the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898. The action was brought upon the theory that the city, under its present charter from the
Government of the Philippine Islands, was the same juristic person, and liable upon the obligations of the old city. This court held that the present
municipality is a totally different corporate entity and in no way liable for the debts of the Spanish municipality. The Supreme Court of the
United States, in reversing this judgment and in holding the city liable for the old debt, said:
The juristic identity of the corporation has been in no wise affected, and, in law, the present city is, in every legal sense, the successor
of the old. As such it is entitled to the property and property rights of the predecessor corporation, and is, in law, subject to all of its
liabilities.
In support of the fifth assignment of error counsel for the defendant argue that as the Monte de Piedad declined to return the $80,000 when
ordered to do so by the Department of Finance in June, 1893, the plaintiff's right of action had prescribed at the time this suit was instituted on
May 3, 1912, citing and relying upon article 1961, 1964 and 1969 of the Civil Code. While on the other hand, the Attorney-General contends that
the right of action had not prescribed (a) because the defense of prescription cannot be set up against the Philippine Government, (b) because the
right of action to recover a deposit or trust funds does not prescribe, and (c) even if the defense of prescription could be interposed against the
Government and if the action had, in fact, prescribed, the same was revived by Act No. 2109.
The material facts relating to this question are these: The Monte de Piedad received the $80,000 in 1883 "to be held under the same conditions as
at present in the treasury, to wit, at the disposal of the relief board." In compliance with the provisions of the royal order of December 3, 1892, the
Department of Finance called upon the Monte de Piedadin June, 1893, to return the $80,000. The Monte declined to comply with this order upon
the ground that only the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands and not the Department of Finance had the right to order the reimbursement.
The amount was carried on the books of the Monte as a returnable loan until January 1, 1899, when it was transferred to the account of the
"Sagrada Mitra." On March 31, 1902, the Monte, through its legal representative, stated in writing that the amount in question was received as a
reimbursable loan, without interest. Act No. 2109 became effective January 30, 1912, and the action was instituted on May 3rd of that year.
Counsel for the defendant treat the question of prescription as if the action was one between individuals or corporations wherein the plaintiff is
seeking to recover an ordinary loan. Upon this theory June, 1893, cannot be taken as the date when the statute of limitations began to run, for the
reason that the defendant acknowledged in writing on March 31, 1902, that the $80,000 were received as a loan, thereby in effect admitting that it
still owed the amount. (Section 50, Code of Civil Procedure.) But if counsels' theory is the correct one the action may have prescribed on May 3,
1912, because more than ten full years had elapsed after March 31, 1902. (Sections 38 and 43, Code of Civil Procedure.)
Is the Philippine Government bound by the statute of limitations? The Supreme Court of the United States in U. S. vs. Nashville, Chattanooga &
St. Louis Railway Co. (118 U. S., 120, 125), said:
It is settled beyond doubt or controversy — upon the foundation of the great principle of public policy, applicable to all governments
alike, which forbids that the public interests should be prejudiced by the negligence of the officers or agents to whose care they are
confided — that the United States, asserting rights vested in it as a sovereign government, is not bound by any statute of limitations,
unless Congress has clearly manifested its intention that it should be so bound. (Lindsey vs. Miller, 6 Pet. 666; U. S. vs. Knight, 14
Pet., 301; Gibson vs. Chouteau, 13 Wall., 92; U. S. vs. Thompson, 98 U. S., 486; Fink vs. O'Neil, 106 U. S., 272, 281.)
In Gibson vs. Choteau, supra, the court said:
It is a matter of common knowledge that statutes of limitation do not run against the State. That no laches can be imputed to the King,
and that no time can bar his rights, was the maxim of the common laws, and was founded on the principle of public policy, that as he
was occupied with the cares of government he ought not to suffer from the negligence of his officer and servants. The principle is
applicable to all governments, which must necessarily act through numerous agents, and is essential to a preservation of the interests
and property of the public. It is upon this principle that in this country the statutes of a State prescribing periods within which rights
must be prosecuted are not held to embrace the State itself, unless it is expressly designated or the mischiefs to be remedied are of
such a nature that it must necessarily be included. As legislation of a State can only apply to persons and thing over which the State
has jurisdiction, the United States are also necessarily excluded from the operation of such statutes.
In 25 Cyc., 1006, the rule, supported by numerous authorities, is stated as follows:
 In the absence of express statutory provision to the contrary, statute of limitations do not as a general rule run against the sovereign or
government, whether state or federal. But the rule is otherwise where the mischiefs to be remedied are of such a nature that the state
must necessarily be included, where the state goes into business in concert or in competition with her citizens, or where a party seeks
to enforces his private rights by suit in the name of the state or government, so that the latter is only a nominal party.
In the instant case the Philippine Government is not a mere nominal party because it, in bringing and prosecuting this action, is exercising its
sovereign functions or powers and is seeking to carry out a trust developed upon it when the Philippine Islands were ceded to the United States.
The United States having in 1852, purchased as trustee for the Chickasaw Indians under treaty with that tribe, certain bonds of the State of
Tennessee, the right of action of the Government on the coupons of such bonds could not be barred by the statute of limitations of Tennessee,
either while it held them in trust for the Indians, or since it became the owner of such coupons. (U. S. vs. Nashville, etc., R. Co., supra.) So where
lands are held in trust by the state and the beneficiaries have no right to sue, a statute does not run against the State's right of action for trespass on
the trust lands. (Greene Tp. vs. Campbell, 16 Ohio St., 11; see also Atty.-Gen. vs. Midland R. Co., 3 Ont., 511 [following Reg. vs. Williams, 39
U. C. Q. B., 397].)
These principles being based "upon the foundation of the great principle of public policy" are, in the very nature of things, applicable to the
Philippine Government.
Counsel in their argument in support of the sixth and last assignments of error do not question the amount of the judgment nor do they question
the correctness of the judgment in so far as it allows interest, and directs its payment in gold coin or in the equivalent in Philippine currency.
For the foregoing reasons the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellant. So ordered.

G.R. No. 164785 April 29, 2009

ELISEO F. SORIANO, Petitioner,
vs.
MA. CONSOLIZA P. LAGUARDIA, et.al, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 165636 April 29, 2009
ELISEO F. SORIANO Petitioner,
vs.
MOVIE AND TELEVISION REVIEW AND CLASSIFICATION BOARD, et.al, Respondents.
DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

In these two petitions for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65, petitioner Eliseo F. Soriano seeks to nullify and set aside an order and a
decision of the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB) in connection with certain utterances he made in his television
show, Ang Dating Daan.
Facts of the Case
On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., petitioner, as host of the program Ang Dating Daan, aired on UNTV 37, made the following remarks:
Lehitimong anak ng demonyo; sinungaling;
Gago ka talaga Michael, masahol ka pa sa putang babae o di ba. Yung putang babae ang gumagana lang doon yung ibaba, [dito] kay Michael
ang gumagana ang itaas, o di ba! O, masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sabi ng lola ko masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sobra ang
kasinungalingan ng mga demonyong ito.1 x x x
Two days after, before the MTRCB, separate but almost identical affidavit-complaints were lodged by Jessie L. Galapon and seven other private
respondents, all members of the Iglesia ni Cristo (INC),2 against petitioner in connection with the above broadcast. Respondent Michael M.
Sandoval, who felt directly alluded to in petitioner’s remark, was then a minister of INC and a regular host of the TV program Ang Tamang
Daan.3 Forthwith, the MTRCB sent petitioner a notice of the hearing on August 16, 2004 in relation to the alleged use of some cuss words in the
August 10, 2004 episode of Ang Dating Daan.4
After a preliminary conference in which petitioner appeared, the MTRCB, by Order of August 16, 2004, preventively suspended the showing of
Ang Dating Daan program for 20 days, in accordance with Section 3(d) of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1986, creating the MTRCB, in relation
to Sec. 3, Chapter XIII of the 2004 Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of PD 1986 and Sec. 7, Rule VII of the MTRCB Rules of
Procedure.5 The same order also set the case for preliminary investigation.
The following day, petitioner sought reconsideration of the preventive suspension order, praying that Chairperson Consoliza P. Laguardia and
two other members of the adjudication board recuse themselves from hearing the case. 6 Two days after, however, petitioner sought to
withdraw7 his motion for reconsideration, followed by the filing with this Court of a petition for certiorari and prohibition, 8 docketed as G.R. No.
164785, to nullify the preventive suspension order thus issued.
On September 27, 2004, in Adm. Case No. 01-04, the MTRCB issued a decision, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, a Decision is hereby rendered, finding respondent Soriano liable for his utterances and thereby
imposing on him a penalty of three (3) months suspension from his program, "Ang Dating Daan".
Co-respondents Joselito Mallari, Luzviminda Cruz and UNTV Channel 37 and its owner, PBC, are hereby exonerated for lack of evidence.
SO ORDERED.9
Petitioner then filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for injunctive relief, docketed as G.R. No. 165636.
In a Resolution dated April 4, 2005, the Court consolidated G.R. No. 164785 with G.R. No. 165636.
In G.R. No. 164785, petitioner raises the following issues:
THE ORDER OF PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION PROMULGATED BY RESPONDENT [MTRCB] DATED 16 AUGUST 2004 AGAINST
THE TELEVISION PROGRAM ANG DATING DAAN x x x IS NULL AND VOID FOR BEING ISSUED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
(A) BY REASON THAT THE [IRR] IS INVALID INSOFAR AS IT PROVIDES FOR THE ISSUANCE OF
PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION ORDERS;
(B) BY REASON OF LACK OF DUE HEARING IN THE CASE AT BENCH;
(C) FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF EQUAL PROTECTION UNDER THE LAW;
 (D) FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF FREEDOM OF RELIGION; AND
(E) FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXPRESSION. 10
In G.R. No. 165636, petitioner relies on the following grounds:
SECTION 3(C) OF [PD] 1986, IS PATENTLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND ENACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION x
x x CONSIDERING THAT:
I
SECTION 3(C) OF [PD] 1986, AS APPLIED TO PETITIONER, UNDULY INFRINGES ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE OF
FREEDOM OF RELIGION, SPEECH, AND EXPRESSION AS IT PARTAKES OF THE NATURE OF A SUBSEQUENT PUNISHMENT
CURTAILING THE SAME; CONSEQUENTLY, THE IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS, RULES OF PROCEDURE, AND
OFFICIAL ACTS OF THE MTRCB PURSUANT THERETO, I.E. DECISION DATED 27 SEPTEMBER 2004 AND ORDER DATED 19
OCTOBER 2004, ARE LIKEWISE CONSTITUTIONALLY INFIRM AS APPLIED IN THE CASE AT BENCH;
II
SECTION 3(C) OF [PD] 1986, AS APPLIED TO PETITIONER, UNDULY INFRINGES ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE OF
DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND EQUAL PROTECTION UNDER THE LAW; CONSEQUENTLY, THE [IRR], RULES OF PROCEDURE,
AND OFFICIAL ACTS OF THE MTRCB PURSUANT THERETO, I.E., DECISION DATED 27 SEPTEMBER 2004 AND ORDER DATED
19 OCTOBER 2004, ARE LIKEWISE CONSTITUTIONALLY INFIRM AS APPLIED IN THE CASE AT BENCH; AND
III
[PD] 1986 IS NOT COMPLETE IN ITSELF AND DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR A SUFFICIENT STANDARD FOR ITS IMPLEMENTATION
THEREBY RESULTING IN AN UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER BY REASON THAT IT DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR
THE PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS OF ITS PROVISIONS. CONSEQUENTLY, THE [IRR], RULES OF PROCEDURE, AND OFFICIAL
ACTS OF THE MTRCB PURSUANT THERETO, I.E. DECISION DATED 27 SEPTEMBER 2004 AND ORDER DATED 19 OCTOBER
2004, ARE LIKEWISE CONSTITUTIONALLY INFIRM AS APPLIED IN THE CASE AT BENCH 11
G.R. No. 164785
We shall first dispose of the issues in G.R. No. 164785, regarding the assailed order of preventive suspension, although its implementability had
already been overtaken and veritably been rendered moot by the equally assailed September 27, 2004 decision.
It is petitioner’s threshold posture that the preventive suspension imposed against him and the relevant IRR provision authorizing it are invalid
inasmuch as PD 1986 does not expressly authorize the MTRCB to issue preventive suspension.
Petitioner’s contention is untenable.
Administrative agencies have powers and functions which may be administrative, investigatory, regulatory, quasi-legislative, or quasi-judicial, or
a mix of the five, as may be conferred by the Constitution or by statute. 12 They have in fine only such powers or authority as are granted or
delegated, expressly or impliedly, by law.13 And in determining whether an agency has certain powers, the inquiry should be from the law itself.
But once ascertained as existing, the authority given should be liberally construed.14
A perusal of the MTRCB’s basic mandate under PD 1986 reveals the possession by the agency of the authority, albeit impliedly, to issue the
challenged order of preventive suspension. And this authority stems naturally from, and is necessary for the exercise of, its power of regulation
and supervision.
Sec. 3 of PD 1986 pertinently provides the following:
Section 3. Powers and Functions.—The BOARD shall have the following functions, powers and duties:
xxxx
c) To approve or disapprove, delete objectionable portions from and/or prohibit the x x x production, x x x exhibition and/or television broadcast
of the motion pictures, television programs and publicity materials subject of the preceding paragraph, which, in the judgment of the board
applying contemporary Filipino cultural values as standard, are objectionable for being immoral, indecent, contrary to law and/or good customs,
injurious to the prestige of the Republic of the Philippines or its people, or with a dangerous tendency to encourage the commission of violence or
of wrong or crime such as but not limited to:
xxxx
vi) Those which are libelous or defamatory to the good name and reputation of any person, whether living or dead;
xxxx
(d) To supervise, regulate, and grant, deny or cancel, permits for the x x x production, copying, distribution, sale, lease, exhibition, and/or
television broadcast of all motion pictures, television programs and publicity materials, to the end that no such pictures, programs and materials
as are determined by the BOARD to be objectionable in accordance with paragraph (c) hereof shall be x x x produced, copied, reproduced,
distributed, sold, leased, exhibited and/or broadcast by television;
xxxx
k) To exercise such powers and functions as may be necessary or incidental to the attainment of the purposes and objectives of this Act x x x.
(Emphasis added.)
The issuance of a preventive suspension comes well within the scope of the MTRCB’s authority and functions expressly set forth in PD 1986,
more particularly under its Sec. 3(d), as quoted above, which empowers the MTRCB to "supervise, regulate, and grant, deny or cancel, permits
for the x x x exhibition, and/or television broadcast of all motion pictures, television programs and publicity materials, to the end that no such
pictures, programs and materials as are determined by the BOARD to be objectionable in accordance with paragraph (c) hereof shall be x x x
exhibited and/or broadcast by television."
Surely, the power to issue preventive suspension forms part of the MTRCB’s express regulatory and supervisory statutory mandate and its
investigatory and disciplinary authority subsumed in or implied from such mandate. Any other construal would render its power to regulate,
supervise, or discipline illusory.
Preventive suspension, it ought to be noted, is not a penalty by itself, being merely a preliminary step in an administrative investigation.15 And the
power to discipline and impose penalties, if granted, carries with it the power to investigate administrative complaints and, during such
investigation, to preventively suspend the person subject of the complaint. 16
To reiterate, preventive suspension authority of the MTRCB springs from its powers conferred under PD 1986. The MTRCB did not, as petitioner
insinuates, empower itself to impose preventive suspension through the medium of the IRR of PD 1986. It is true that the matter of imposing
preventive suspension is embodied only in the IRR of PD 1986. Sec. 3, Chapter XIII of the IRR provides:
Sec. 3. PREVENTION SUSPENSION ORDER.––Any time during the pendency of the case, and in order to prevent or stop further violations or
for the interest and welfare of the public, the Chairman of the Board may issue a Preventive Suspension Order mandating the preventive x x x
suspension of the permit/permits involved, and/or closure of the x x x television network, cable TV station x x x provided that the
temporary/preventive order thus issued shall have a life of not more than twenty (20) days from the date of issuance.
But the mere absence of a provision on preventive suspension in PD 1986, without more, would not work to deprive the MTRCB a basic
disciplinary tool, such as preventive suspension. Recall that the MTRCB is expressly empowered by statute to regulate and supervise television
programs to obviate the exhibition or broadcast of, among others, indecent or immoral materials and to impose sanctions for violations and,
corollarily, to prevent further violations as it investigates. Contrary to petitioner’s assertion, the aforequoted Sec. 3 of the IRR neither amended
PD 1986 nor extended the effect of the law. Neither did the MTRCB, by imposing the assailed preventive suspension, outrun its authority under
the law. Far from it. The preventive suspension was actually done in furtherance of the law, imposed pursuant, to repeat, to the MTRCB’s duty of
regulating or supervising television programs, pending a determination of whether or not there has actually been a violation. In the final analysis,
Sec. 3, Chapter XIII of the 2004 IRR merely formalized a power which PD 1986 bestowed, albeit impliedly, on MTRCB.
Sec. 3(c) and (d) of PD 1986 finds application to the present case, sufficient to authorize the MTRCB’s assailed action. Petitioner’s restrictive
reading of PD 1986, limiting the MTRCB to functions within the literal confines of the law, would give the agency little leeway to operate,
stifling and rendering it inutile, when Sec. 3(k) of PD 1986 clearly intends to grant the MTRCB a wide room for flexibility in its operation. Sec.
3(k), we reiterate, provides, "To exercise such powers and functions as may be necessary or incidental to the attainment of the purposes and
objectives of this Act x x x." Indeed, the power to impose preventive suspension is one of the implied powers of MTRCB. As distinguished from
express powers, implied powers are those that can be inferred or are implicit in the wordings or conferred by necessary or fair implication of the
enabling act.17 As we held in Angara v. Electoral Commission, when a general grant of power is conferred or a duty enjoined, every particular
power necessary for the exercise of one or the performance of the other is also conferred by necessary implication. 18 Clearly, the power to impose
preventive suspension pending investigation is one of the implied or inherent powers of MTRCB.
We cannot agree with petitioner’s assertion that the aforequoted IRR provision on preventive suspension is applicable only to motion pictures and
publicity materials. The scope of the MTRCB’s authority extends beyond motion pictures. What the acronym MTRCB stands for would suggest
as much. And while the law makes specific reference to the closure of a television network, the suspension of a television program is a far less
punitive measure that can be undertaken, with the purpose of stopping further violations of PD 1986. Again, the MTRCB would regretfully be
rendered ineffective should it be subject to the restrictions petitioner envisages.
Just as untenable is petitioner’s argument on the nullity of the preventive suspension order on the ground of lack of hearing. As it were, the
MTRCB handed out the assailed order after petitioner, in response to a written notice, appeared before that Board for a hearing on private
respondents’ complaint. No less than petitioner admitted that the order was issued after the adjournment of the hearing, 19 proving that he had
already appeared before the MTRCB. Under Sec. 3, Chapter XIII of the IRR of PD 1986, preventive suspension shall issue "[a]ny time during the
pendency of the case." In this particular case, it was done after MTRCB duly apprised petitioner of his having possibly violated PD 198620 and of
administrative complaints that had been filed against him for such violation. 21
At any event, that preventive suspension can validly be meted out even without a hearing. 22
Petitioner next faults the MTRCB for denying him his right to the equal protection of the law, arguing that, owing to the preventive suspension
order, he was unable to answer the criticisms coming from the INC ministers.
Petitioner’s position does not persuade. The equal protection clause demands that "all persons subject to legislation should be treated alike, under
like circumstances and conditions both in the privileges conferred and liabilities imposed." 23 It guards against undue favor and individual
privilege as well as hostile discrimination.24 Surely, petitioner cannot, under the premises, place himself in the same shoes as the INC ministers,
who, for one, are not facing administrative complaints before the MTRCB. For another, he offers no proof that the said ministers, in their TV
programs, use language similar to that which he used in his own, necessitating the MTRCB’s disciplinary action. If the immediate result of the
preventive suspension order is that petitioner remains temporarily gagged and is unable to answer his critics, this does not become a deprivation
of the equal protection guarantee. The Court need not belabor the fact that the circumstances of petitioner, as host of Ang Dating Daan, on one
hand, and the INC ministers, as hosts of Ang Tamang Daan, on the other, are, within the purview of this case, simply too different to even
consider whether or not there is a prima facie indication of oppressive inequality.
Petitioner next injects the notion of religious freedom, submitting that what he uttered was religious speech, adding that words like "putang
babae" were said in exercise of his religious freedom.
The argument has no merit.
The Court is at a loss to understand how petitioner’s utterances in question can come within the pale of Sec. 5, Article III of the 1987 Constitution
on religious freedom. The section reads as follows:
No law shall be made respecting the establishment of a religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of
religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the
exercise of civil or political rights.
There is nothing in petitioner’s statements subject of the complaints expressing any particular religious belief, nothing furthering his avowed
evangelical mission. The fact that he came out with his statements in a televised bible exposition program does not automatically accord them the
character of a religious discourse. Plain and simple insults directed at another person cannot be elevated to the status of religious speech. Even
petitioner’s attempts to place his words in context show that he was moved by anger and the need to seek retribution, not by any religious
conviction. His claim, assuming its veracity, that some INC ministers distorted his statements respecting amounts Ang Dating Daan owed to a TV
station does not convert the foul language used in retaliation as religious speech. We cannot accept that petitioner made his statements in defense
of his reputation and religion, as they constitute no intelligible defense or refutation of the alleged lies being spread by a rival religious group.
They simply illustrate that petitioner had descended to the level of name-calling and foul-language discourse. Petitioner could have chosen to
contradict and disprove his detractors, but opted for the low road.
Petitioner, as a final point in G.R. No. 164785, would have the Court nullify the 20-day preventive suspension order, being, as insisted, an
unconstitutional abridgement of the freedom of speech and expression and an impermissible prior restraint. The main issue tendered respecting
the adverted violation and the arguments holding such issue dovetails with those challenging the three-month suspension imposed under the
assailed September 27, 2004 MTRCB decision subject of review under G.R. No. 165636. Both overlapping issues and arguments shall be jointly
addressed.
G.R. No. 165636
Petitioner urges the striking down of the decision suspending him from hosting Ang Dating Daan for three months on the main ground that the
decision violates, apart from his religious freedom, his freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under Sec. 4, Art. III of the Constitution,
which reads:
No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and
petition the government for redress of grievance.
He would also have the Court declare PD 1986, its Sec. 3(c) in particular, unconstitutional for reasons articulated in this petition.
We are not persuaded as shall be explained shortly. But first, we restate certain general concepts and principles underlying the freedom of speech
and expression.
It is settled that expressions by means of newspapers, radio, television, and motion pictures come within the broad protection of the free speech
and expression clause.25 Each method though, because of its dissimilar presence in the lives of people and accessibility to children, tends to
present its own problems in the area of free speech protection, with broadcast media, of all forms of communication, enjoying a lesser degree of
protection.26 Just as settled is the rule that restrictions, be it in the form of prior restraint, e.g., judicial injunction against publication or threat of
cancellation of license/franchise, or subsequent liability, whether in libel and damage suits, prosecution for sedition, or contempt proceedings, are
anathema to the freedom of expression. Prior restraint means official government restrictions on the press or other forms of expression in advance
of actual publication or dissemination.27 The freedom of expression, as with the other freedoms encased in the Bill of Rights, is, however, not
absolute. It may be regulated to some extent to serve important public interests, some forms of speech not being protected. As has been held, the
limits of the freedom of expression are reached when the expression touches upon matters of essentially private concern. 28 In the oft-quoted
expression of Justice Holmes, the constitutional guarantee "obviously was not intended to give immunity for every possible use of
language."29 From Lucas v. Royo comes this line: "[T]he freedom to express one’s sentiments and belief does not grant one the license to vilify in
public the honor and integrity of another. Any sentiments must be expressed within the proper forum and with proper regard for the rights of
others."30
Indeed, as noted in Chaplinsky v. State of New Hampshire,31 "there are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech that are
harmful, the prevention and punishment of which has never been thought to raise any Constitutional problems." In net effect, some forms of
speech are not protected by the Constitution, meaning that restrictions on unprotected speech may be decreed without running afoul of the
freedom of speech clause.32 A speech would fall under the unprotected type if the utterances involved are "no essential part of any exposition of
ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step of truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social
interest in order and morality."33 Being of little or no value, there is, in dealing with or regulating them, no imperative call for the application of
the clear and present danger rule or the balancing-of-interest test, they being essentially modes of weighing competing values, 34 or, with like
effect, determining which of the clashing interests should be advanced.
Petitioner asserts that his utterance in question is a protected form of speech.
The Court rules otherwise. It has been established in this jurisdiction that unprotected speech or low-value expression refers to libelous
statements, obscenity or pornography, false or misleading advertisement, insulting or "fighting words", i.e., those which by their very utterance
inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of peace and expression endangering national security.
The Court finds that petitioner’s statement can be treated as obscene, at least with respect to the average child. Hence, it is, in that context,
unprotected speech. In Fernando v. Court of Appeals, the Court expressed difficulty in formulating a definition of obscenity that would apply to
all cases, but nonetheless stated the ensuing observations on the matter:
There is no perfect definition of "obscenity" but the latest word is that of Miller v. California which established basic guidelines, to wit: (a)
whether to the average person, applying contemporary standards would find the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b)
whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c)
whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. But, it would be a serious misreading of Miller to
conclude that the trier of facts has the unbridled discretion in determining what is "patently offensive." x x x What remains clear is that obscenity
is an issue proper for judicial determination and should be treated on a case to case basis and on the judge’s sound discretion.35
Following the contextual lessons of the cited case of Miller v. California,36 a patently offensive utterance would come within the pale of the term
obscenity should it appeal to the prurient interest of an average listener applying contemporary standards.
A cursory examination of the utterances complained of and the circumstances of the case reveal that to an average adult, the utterances "Gago ka
talaga x x x, masahol ka pa sa putang babae x x x. Yung putang babae ang gumagana lang doon yung ibaba, [dito] kay Michael ang gumagana
ang itaas, o di ba!" may not constitute obscene but merely indecent utterances. They can be viewed as figures of speech or merely a play on
words. In the context they were used, they may not appeal to the prurient interests of an adult. The problem with the challenged statements is that
they were uttered in a TV program that is rated "G" or for general viewership, and in a time slot that would likely reach even the eyes and ears of
children.
While adults may have understood that the terms thus used were not to be taken literally, children could hardly be expected to have the same
discernment. Without parental guidance, the unbridled use of such language as that of petitioner in a television broadcast could corrupt
impressionable young minds. The term "putang babae" means "a female prostitute," a term wholly inappropriate for children, who could look it
up in a dictionary and just get the literal meaning, missing the context within which it was used. Petitioner further used the terms, "ang gumagana
lang doon yung ibaba," making reference to the female sexual organ and how a female prostitute uses it in her trade, then stating that Sandoval
was worse than that by using his mouth in a similar manner. Children could be motivated by curiosity and ask the meaning of what petitioner
said, also without placing the phrase in context. They may be inquisitive as to why Sandoval is different from a female prostitute and the reasons
for the dissimilarity. And upon learning the meanings of the words used, young minds, without the guidance of an adult, may, from their end,
view this kind of indecent speech as obscene, if they take these words literally and use them in their own speech or form their own ideas on the
matter. In this particular case, where children had the opportunity to hear petitioner’s words, when speaking of the average person in the test for
obscenity, we are speaking of the average child, not the average adult. The average child may not have the adult’s grasp of figures of speech, and
may lack the understanding that language may be colorful, and words may convey more than the literal meaning. Undeniably the subject speech
is very suggestive of a female sexual organ and its function as such. In this sense, we find petitioner’s utterances obscene and not entitled to
protection under the umbrella of freedom of speech.
Even if we concede that petitioner’s remarks are not obscene but merely indecent speech, still the Court rules that petitioner cannot avail himself
of the constitutional protection of free speech. Said statements were made in a medium easily accessible to children. With respect to the young
minds, said utterances are to be treated as unprotected speech.
No doubt what petitioner said constitutes indecent or offensive utterances. But while a jurisprudential pattern involving certain offensive
utterances conveyed in different mediums has emerged, this case is veritably one of first impression, it being the first time that indecent speech
communicated via television and the applicable norm for its regulation are, in this jurisdiction, made the focal point. Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) v. Pacifica Foundation,37 a 1978 American landmark case cited in Eastern Broadcasting Corporation v. Dans,
Jr.38 and Chavez v. Gonzales,39 is a rich source of persuasive lessons. Foremost of these relates to indecent speech without prurient appeal
component coming under the category of protected speech depending on the context within which it was made, irresistibly suggesting that, within
a particular context, such indecent speech may validly be categorized as unprotected, ergo, susceptible to restriction.
In FCC, seven of what were considered "filthy" words40 earlier recorded in a monologue by a satiric humorist later aired in the afternoon over a
radio station owned by Pacifica Foundation. Upon the complaint of a man who heard the pre-recorded monologue while driving with his son,
FCC declared the language used as "patently offensive" and "indecent" under a prohibiting law, though not necessarily obscene. FCC added,
however, that its declaratory order was issued in a "special factual context," referring, in gist, to an afternoon radio broadcast when children were
undoubtedly in the audience. Acting on the question of whether the FCC could regulate the subject utterance, the US Supreme Court ruled in the
affirmative, owing to two special features of the broadcast medium, to wit: (1) radio is a pervasive medium and (2) broadcasting is uniquely
accessible to children. The US Court, however, hastened to add that the monologue would be protected speech in other contexts, albeit it did not
expound and identify a compelling state interest in putting FCC’s content-based regulatory action under scrutiny.
The Court in Chavez41 elucidated on the distinction between regulation or restriction of protected speech that is content-based and that which is
content-neutral. A content-based restraint is aimed at the contents or idea of the expression, whereas a content-neutral restraint intends to regulate
the time, place, and manner of the expression under well-defined standards tailored to serve a compelling state interest, without restraint on the
message of the expression. Courts subject content-based restraint to strict scrutiny.
With the view we take of the case, the suspension MTRCB imposed under the premises was, in one perspective, permissible restriction. We make
this disposition against the backdrop of the following interplaying factors: First, the indecent speech was made via television, a pervasive medium
that, to borrow from Gonzales v. Kalaw Katigbak, 42easily "reaches every home where there is a set [and where] [c]hildren will likely be among
the avid viewers of the programs therein shown"; second, the broadcast was aired at the time of the day when there was a reasonable risk that
children might be in the audience; and third, petitioner uttered his speech on a "G" or "for general patronage" rated program. Under Sec. 2(A) of
Chapter IV of the IRR of the MTRCB, a show for general patronage is "[s]uitable for all ages," meaning that the "material for television x x x in
the judgment of the BOARD, does not contain anything unsuitable for children and minors, and may be viewed without adult guidance or
supervision." The words petitioner used were, by any civilized norm, clearly not suitable for children. Where a language is categorized as
indecent, as in petitioner’s utterances on a general-patronage rated TV program, it may be readily proscribed as unprotected speech.
A view has been advanced that unprotected speech refers only to pornography, 43 false or misleading advertisement,44 advocacy of imminent
lawless action, and expression endangering national security. But this list is not, as some members of the Court would submit, exclusive or carved
in stone. Without going into specifics, it may be stated without fear of contradiction that US decisional law goes beyond the aforesaid general
exceptions. As the Court has been impelled to recognize exceptions to the rule against censorship in the past, this particular case constitutes yet
another exception, another instance of unprotected speech, created by the necessity of protecting the welfare of our children. As unprotected
speech, petitioner’s utterances can be subjected to restraint or regulation.
Despite the settled ruling in FCC which has remained undisturbed since 1978, petitioner asserts that his utterances must present a clear and
present danger of bringing about a substantive evil the State has a right and duty to prevent and such danger must be grave and imminent.45
Petitioner’s invocation of the clear and present danger doctrine, arguably the most permissive of speech tests, would not avail him any relief, for
the application of said test is uncalled for under the premises. The doctrine, first formulated by Justice Holmes, accords protection for utterances
so that the printed or spoken words may not be subject to prior restraint or subsequent punishment unless its expression creates a clear and present
danger of bringing about a substantial evil which the government has the power to prohibit. 46 Under the doctrine, freedom of speech and of press
is susceptible of restriction when and only when necessary to prevent grave and immediate danger to interests which the government may
lawfully protect. As it were, said doctrine evolved in the context of prosecutions for rebellion and other crimes involving the overthrow of
government.47 It was originally designed to determine the latitude which should be given to speech that espouses anti-government action, or to
have serious and substantial deleterious consequences on the security and public order of the community. 48 The clear and present danger rule has
been applied to this jurisdiction.49 As a standard of limitation on free speech and press, however, the clear and present danger test is not a magic
incantation that wipes out all problems and does away with analysis and judgment in the testing of the legitimacy of claims to free speech and
which compels a court to release a defendant from liability the moment the doctrine is invoked, absent proof of imminent catastrophic
disaster.50 As we observed in Eastern Broadcasting Corporation, the clear and present danger test "does not lend itself to a simplistic and all
embracing interpretation applicable to all utterances in all forums."51
To be sure, the clear and present danger doctrine is not the only test which has been applied by the courts. Generally, said doctrine is applied to
cases involving the overthrow of the government and even other evils which do not clearly undermine national security. Since not all evils can be
measured in terms of "proximity and degree" the Court, however, in several cases—Ayer Productions v. Capulong52 and Gonzales v.
COMELEC,53 applied the balancing of interests test. Former Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, in Gonzales v. COMELEC, elucidated in his
Separate Opinion that "where the legislation under constitutional attack interferes with the freedom of speech and assembly in a more generalized
way and where the effect of the speech and assembly in terms of the probability of realization of a specific danger is not susceptible even of
impressionistic calculation,"54 then the "balancing of interests" test can be applied.
The Court explained also in Gonzales v. COMELEC the "balancing of interests" test:
When particular conduct is regulated in the interest of public order, and the regulation results in an indirect, conditional, partial abridgment of
speech, the duty of the courts is to determine which of the two conflicting interests demands the greater protection under the particular
circumstances presented. x x x We must, therefore, undertake the "delicate and difficult task x x x to weigh the circumstances and to appraise the
substantiality of the reasons advanced in support of the regulation of the free enjoyment of rights x x x.
In enunciating standard premised on a judicial balancing of the conflicting social values and individual interests competing for ascendancy in
legislation which restricts expression, the court in Douds laid the basis for what has been called the "balancing-of-interests" test which has found
application in more recent decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court. Briefly stated, the "balancing" test requires a court to take conscious and detailed
consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation or type of situation.
xxxx
Although the urgency of the public interest sought to be secured by Congressional power restricting the individual’s freedom, and the social
importance and value of the freedom so restricted, "are to be judged in the concrete, not on the basis of abstractions," a wide range of factors are
necessarily relevant in ascertaining the point or line of equilibrium. Among these are (a) the social value and importance of the specific aspect of
the particular freedom restricted by the legislation; (b) the specific thrust of the restriction, i.e., whether the restriction is direct or indirect,
whether or not the persons affected are few; (c) the value and importance of the public interest sought to be secured by the legislation––the
reference here is to the nature and gravity of the evil which Congress seeks to prevent; (d) whether the specific restriction decreed by Congress is
reasonably appropriate and necessary for the protection of such public interest; and (e) whether the necessary safeguarding of the public interest
involved may be achieved by some other measure less restrictive of the protected freedom.55
This balancing of interest test, to borrow from Professor Kauper,56 rests on the theory that it is the court’s function in a case before it when it finds
public interests served by legislation, on the one hand, and the free expression clause affected by it, on the other, to balance one against the other
and arrive at a judgment where the greater weight shall be placed. If, on balance, it appears that the public interest served by restrictive legislation
is of such nature that it outweighs the abridgment of freedom, then the court will find the legislation valid. In short, the balance-of-interests theory
rests on the basis that constitutional freedoms are not absolute, not even those stated in the free speech and expression clause, and that they may
be abridged to some extent to serve appropriate and important interests.57 To the mind of the Court, the balancing of interest doctrine is the more
appropriate test to follow.
In the case at bar, petitioner used indecent and obscene language and a three (3)-month suspension was slapped on him for breach of MTRCB
rules. In this setting, the assertion by petitioner of his enjoyment of his freedom of speech is ranged against the duty of the government to protect
and promote the development and welfare of the youth.
After a careful examination of the factual milieu and the arguments raised by petitioner in support of his claim to free speech, the Court rules that
the government’s interest to protect and promote the interests and welfare of the children adequately buttresses the reasonable curtailment and
valid restraint on petitioner’s prayer to continue as program host of Ang Dating Daan during the suspension period.
No doubt, one of the fundamental and most vital rights granted to citizens of a State is the freedom of speech or expression, for without the
enjoyment of such right, a free, stable, effective, and progressive democratic state would be difficult to attain. Arrayed against the freedom of
speech is the right of the youth to their moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social being which the State is constitutionally tasked to promote and
protect. Moreover, the State is also mandated to recognize and support the vital role of the youth in nation building as laid down in Sec. 13, Art. II
of the 1987 Constitution.
The Constitution has, therefore, imposed the sacred obligation and responsibility on the State to provide protection to the youth against illegal or
improper activities which may prejudice their general well-being. The Article on youth, approved on second reading by the Constitutional
Commission, explained that the State shall "extend social protection to minors against all forms of neglect, cruelty, exploitation, immorality, and
practices which may foster racial, religious or other forms of discrimination."58
Indisputably, the State has a compelling interest in extending social protection to minors against all forms of neglect, exploitation, and immorality
which may pollute innocent minds. It has a compelling interest in helping parents, through regulatory mechanisms, protect their children’s minds
from exposure to undesirable materials and corrupting experiences. The Constitution, no less, in fact enjoins the State, as earlier indicated, to
promote and protect the physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being of the youth to better prepare them fulfill their role in the
field of nation-building.59 In the same way, the State is mandated to support parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the
development of moral character.60
Petitioner’s offensive and obscene language uttered in a television broadcast, without doubt, was easily accessible to the children. His statements
could have exposed children to a language that is unacceptable in everyday use. As such, the welfare of children and the State’s mandate to
protect and care for them, as parens patriae,61 constitute a substantial and compelling government interest in regulating petitioner’s utterances in
TV broadcast as provided in PD 1986.
FCC explains the duty of the government to act as parens patriae to protect the children who, because of age or interest capacity, are susceptible
of being corrupted or prejudiced by offensive language, thus:
[B]roadcasting is uniquely accessible to children, even those too young to read. Although Cohen’s written message, ["Fuck the Draft"], might
have been incomprehensible to a first grader, Pacifica’s broadcast could have enlarged a child’s vocabulary in an instant. Other forms of
offensive expression may be withheld from the young without restricting the expression at its source. Bookstores and motion picture theaters, for
example, may be prohibited from making indecent material available to children. We held in Ginsberg v. New York that the government’s
interest in the "well-being of its youth" and in supporting "parents’ claim to authority in their own household" justified the regulation of otherwise
protected expression. The ease with which children may obtain access to broadcast material, coupled with the concerns recognized in Ginsberg,
amply justify special treatment of indecent broadcasting.
Moreover, Gonzales v. Kalaw Katigbak likewise stressed the duty of the State to attend to the welfare of the young:
x x x It is the consensus of this Court that where television is concerned, a less liberal approach calls for observance. This is so because unlike
motion pictures where the patrons have to pay their way, television reaches every home where there is a set. Children then will likely will be
among the avid viewers of the programs therein shown. As was observed by Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Jerome Frank, it is hardly the
concern of the law to deal with the sexual fantasies of the adult population. It cannot be denied though that the State as parens patriae is called
upon to manifest an attitude of caring for the welfare of the young.62
The compelling need to protect the young impels us to sustain the regulatory action MTRCB took in the narrow confines of the case. To reiterate,
FCC justified the restraint on the TV broadcast grounded on the following considerations: (1) the use of television with its unique accessibility to
children, as a medium of broadcast of a patently offensive speech; (2) the time of broadcast; and (3) the "G" rating of the Ang Dating Daan
program. And in agreeing with MTRCB, the court takes stock of and cites with approval the following excerpts from FCC:
It is appropriate, in conclusion, to emphasize the narrowness of our holding. This case does not involve a two-way radio conversation between a
cab driver and a dispatcher, or a telecast of an Elizabethan comedy. We have not decided that an occasional expletive in either setting would
justify any sanction. x x x The [FFC’s] decision rested entirely on a nuisance rationale under which context is all important. The concept requires
consideration of a host of variables. The time of day was emphasized by the [FFC]. The content of the program in which the language is used will
affect the composition of the audience x x x. As Mr. Justice Sutherland wrote a ‘nuisance may be merely a right thing in the wrong place, like a
pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard.’ We simply hold that when the [FCC] finds that a pig has entered the parlor, the exercise of its
regulatory power does not depend on proof that the pig is obscene. (Citation omitted.)
There can be no quibbling that the remarks in question petitioner uttered on prime-time television are blatantly indecent if not outright obscene. It
is the kind of speech that PD 1986 proscribes necessitating the exercise by MTRCB of statutory disciplinary powers. It is the kind of speech that
the State has the inherent prerogative, nay duty, to regulate and prevent should such action served and further compelling state interests. One who
utters indecent, insulting, or offensive words on television when unsuspecting children are in the audience is, in the graphic language of FCC, a
"pig in the parlor." Public interest would be served if the "pig" is reasonably restrained or even removed from the "parlor."
Ergo, petitioner’s offensive and indecent language can be subjected to prior restraint.
Petitioner theorizes that the three (3)-month suspension is either prior restraint or subsequent punishment that, however, includes prior restraint,
albeit indirectly.
After a review of the facts, the Court finds that what MTRCB imposed on petitioner is an administrative sanction or subsequent punishment for
his offensive and obscene language in Ang Dating Daan.
To clarify, statutes imposing prior restraints on speech are generally illegal and presumed unconstitutional breaches of the freedom of speech. The
exceptions to prior restraint are movies, television, and radio broadcast censorship in view of its access to numerous people, including the young
who must be insulated from the prejudicial effects of unprotected speech. PD 1986 was passed creating the Board of Review for Motion Pictures
and Television (now MTRCB) and which requires prior permit or license before showing a motion picture or broadcasting a TV program. The
Board can classify movies and television programs and can cancel permits for exhibition of films or television broadcast.lavvphi1.net
The power of MTRCB to regulate and even impose some prior restraint on radio and television shows, even religious programs, was upheld in
Iglesia Ni Cristo v. Court of Appeals. Speaking through Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, the Court wrote:
We thus reject petitioner’s postulate that its religious program is per se beyond review by the respondent Board. Its public broadcast on TV of its
religious program brings it out of the bosom of internal belief. Television is a medium that reaches even the eyes and ears of children. The Court
iterates the rule that the exercise of religious freedom can be regulated by the State when it will bring about the clear and present danger of some
substantive evil which the State is duty bound to prevent, i.e., serious detriment to the more overriding interest of public health, public morals, or
public welfare. x x x
xxxx
While the thesis has a lot to commend itself, we are not ready to hold that [PD 1986] is unconstitutional for Congress to grant an administrative
body quasi-judicial power to preview and classify TV programs and enforce its decision subject to review by our courts. As far back as 1921, we
upheld this setup in Sotto vs. Ruiz, viz:
"The use of the mails by private persons is in the nature of a privilege which can be regulated in order to avoid its abuse. Persons possess no
absolute right to put into the mail anything they please, regardless of its character."63
Bernas adds:
Under the decree a movie classification board is made the arbiter of what movies and television programs or parts of either are fit for public
consumption. It decides what movies are "immoral, indecent, contrary to law and/or good customs, injurious to the prestige of the Republic of the
Philippines or its people," and what "tend to incite subversion, insurrection, rebellion or sedition," or "tend to undermine the faith and confidence
of the people in their government and/or duly constituted authorities," etc. Moreover, its decisions are executory unless stopped by a court.64
Moreover, in MTRCB v. ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation,65 it was held that the power of review and prior approval of MTRCB extends to
all television programs and is valid despite the freedom of speech guaranteed by the Constitution. Thus, all broadcast networks are regulated by
the MTRCB since they are required to get a permit before they air their television programs. Consequently, their right to enjoy their freedom of
speech is subject to that requirement. As lucidly explained by Justice Dante O. Tinga, government regulations through the MTRCB became "a
necessary evil" with the government taking the role of assigning bandwidth to individual broadcasters. The stations explicitly agreed to this
regulatory scheme; otherwise, chaos would result in the television broadcast industry as competing broadcasters will interfere or co-opt each
other’s signals. In this scheme, station owners and broadcasters in effect waived their right to the full enjoyment of their right to freedom of
speech in radio and television programs and impliedly agreed that said right may be subject to prior restraint—denial of permit or subsequent
punishment, like suspension or cancellation of permit, among others.
The three (3) months suspension in this case is not a prior restraint on the right of petitioner to continue with the broadcast of Ang Dating Daan as
a permit was already issued to him by MTRCB for such broadcast. Rather, the suspension is in the form of permissible administrative sanction or
subsequent punishment for the offensive and obscene remarks he uttered on the evening of August 10, 2004 in his television program, Ang
Dating Daan. It is a sanction that the MTRCB may validly impose under its charter without running afoul of the free speech clause. And the
imposition is separate and distinct from the criminal action the Board may take pursuant to Sec. 3(i) of PD 1986 and the remedies that may be
availed of by the aggrieved private party under the provisions on libel or tort, if applicable. As FCC teaches, the imposition of sanctions on
broadcasters who indulge in profane or indecent broadcasting does not constitute forbidden censorship. Lest it be overlooked, the sanction
imposed is not per se for petitioner’s exercise of his freedom of speech via television, but for the indecent contents of his utterances in a "G" rated
TV program.
More importantly, petitioner is deemed to have yielded his right to his full enjoyment of his freedom of speech to regulation under PD 1986 and
its IRR as television station owners, program producers, and hosts have impliedly accepted the power of MTRCB to regulate the broadcast
industry.
Neither can petitioner’s virtual inability to speak in his program during the period of suspension be plausibly treated as prior restraint on future
speech. For viewed in its proper perspective, the suspension is in the nature of an intermediate penalty for uttering an unprotected form of speech.
It is definitely a lesser punishment than the permissible cancellation of exhibition or broadcast permit or license. In fine, the suspension meted
was simply part of the duties of the MTRCB in the enforcement and administration of the law which it is tasked to implement. Viewed in its
proper context, the suspension sought to penalize past speech made on prime-time "G" rated TV program; it does not bar future speech of
petitioner in other television programs; it is a permissible subsequent administrative sanction; it should not be confused with a prior restraint on
speech. While not on all fours, the Court, in MTRCB, 66sustained the power of the MTRCB to penalize a broadcast company for exhibiting/airing
a pre-taped TV episode without Board authorization in violation of Sec. 7 of PD 1986.
Any simplistic suggestion, however, that the MTRCB would be crossing the limits of its authority were it to regulate and even restrain the prime-
time television broadcast of indecent or obscene speech in a "G" rated program is not acceptable. As made clear in Eastern Broadcasting
Corporation, "the freedom of television and radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope than the freedom accorded to newspaper and print
media." The MTRCB, as a regulatory agency, must have the wherewithal to enforce its mandate, which would not be effective if its punitive
actions would be limited to mere fines. Television broadcasts should be subject to some form of regulation, considering the ease with which they
can be accessed, and violations of the regulations must be met with appropriate and proportional disciplinary action. The suspension of a
violating television program would be a sufficient punishment and serve as a deterrent for those responsible. The prevention of the broadcast of
petitioner’s television program is justified, and does not constitute prohibited prior restraint. It behooves the Court to respond to the needs of the
changing times, and craft jurisprudence to reflect these times.
Petitioner, in questioning the three-month suspension, also tags as unconstitutional the very law creating the MTRCB, arguing that PD 1986, as
applied to him, infringes also upon his freedom of religion. The Court has earlier adequately explained why petitioner’s undue reliance on the
religious freedom cannot lend justification, let alone an exempting dimension to his licentious utterances in his program. The Court sees no need
to address anew the repetitive arguments on religious freedom. As earlier discussed in the disposition of the petition in G.R. No. 164785, what
was uttered was in no way a religious speech. Parenthetically, petitioner’s attempt to characterize his speech as a legitimate defense of his religion
fails miserably. He tries to place his words in perspective, arguing evidently as an afterthought that this was his method of refuting the alleged
distortion of his statements by the INC hosts of Ang Tamang Daan. But on the night he uttered them in his television program, the word simply
came out as profane language, without any warning or guidance for undiscerning ears.
As to petitioner’s other argument about having been denied due process and equal protection of the law, suffice it to state that we have at length
debunked similar arguments in G.R. No. 164785. There is no need to further delve into the fact that petitioner was afforded due process when he
attended the hearing of the MTRCB, and that he was unable to demonstrate that he was unjustly discriminated against in the MTRCB
proceedings.
Finally, petitioner argues that there has been undue delegation of legislative power, as PD 1986 does not provide for the range of imposable
penalties that may be applied with respect to violations of the provisions of the law.
The argument is without merit.
In Edu v. Ericta, the Court discussed the matter of undue delegation of legislative power in the following wise:
It is a fundamental principle flowing from the doctrine of separation of powers that Congress may not delegate its legislative power to the two
other branches of the government, subject to the exception that local governments may over local affairs participate in its exercise. What cannot
be delegated is the authority under the Constitution to make laws and to alter and repeal them; the test is the completeness of the statute in all its
term and provisions when it leaves the hands of the legislature. To determine whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative power, the
inquiry must be directed to the scope and definiteness of the measure enacted. The legislature does not abdicate its functions when it describes
what job must be done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of his authority. For a complex economy, that may indeed be the only way in which
the legislative process can go forward. A distinction has rightfully been made between delegation of power to make laws which necessarily
involves a discretion as to what it shall be, which constitutionally may not be done, and delegation of authority or discretion as to its execution to
be exercised under and in pursuance of the law, to which no valid objection can be made. The Constitution is thus not to be regarded as denying
the legislature the necessary resources of flexibility and practicability.
To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the very least that the legislature itself determines matters of
principle and lays down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be hard to repel. A standard thus defines
legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which
the legislative command is to be effected. It is the criterion by which legislative purpose may be carried out. Thereafter, the executive or
administrative office designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and regulations.67
Based on the foregoing pronouncements and analyzing the law in question, petitioner’s protestation about undue delegation of legislative power
for the sole reason that PD 1986 does not provide for a range of penalties for violation of the law is untenable. His thesis is that MTRCB, in
promulgating the IRR of PD 1986, prescribing a schedule of penalties for violation of the provisions of the decree, went beyond the terms of the
law.
Petitioner’s posture is flawed by the erroneous assumptions holding it together, the first assumption being that PD 1986 does not prescribe the
imposition of, or authorize the MTRCB to impose, penalties for violators of PD 1986. As earlier indicated, however, the MTRCB, by express and
direct conferment of power and functions, is charged with supervising and regulating, granting, denying, or canceling permits for the exhibition
and/or television broadcast of all motion pictures, television programs, and publicity materials to the end that no such objectionable pictures,
programs, and materials shall be exhibited and/or broadcast by television. Complementing this provision is Sec. 3(k) of the decree authorizing the
MTRCB "to exercise such powers and functions as may be necessary or incidental to the attainment of the purpose and objectives of [the law]."
As earlier explained, the investiture of supervisory, regulatory, and disciplinary power would surely be a meaningless grant if it did not carry with
it the power to penalize the supervised or the regulated as may be proportionate to the offense committed, charged, and proved. As the Court said
in Chavez v. National Housing Authority:
x x x [W]hen a general grant of power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the
performance of the other is also conferred. x x x [W]hen the statute does not specify the particular method to be followed or used by a
government agency in the exercise of the power vested in it by law, said agency has the authority to adopt any reasonable method to carry out its
function.68
Given the foregoing perspective, it stands to reason that the power of the MTRCB to regulate and supervise the exhibition of TV programs carries
with it or necessarily implies the authority to take effective punitive action for violation of the law sought to be enforced. And would it not be
logical too to say that the power to deny or cancel a permit for the exhibition of a TV program or broadcast necessarily includes the lesser power
to suspend?
The MTRCB promulgated the IRR of PD 1986 in accordance with Sec. 3(a) which, for reference, provides that agency with the power "[to]
promulgate such rules and regulations as are necessary or proper for the implementation of this Act, and the accomplishment of its purposes and
objectives x x x." And Chapter XIII, Sec. 1 of the IRR providing:
Section 1. VIOLATIONS AND ADMINISTRATIVE SANCTIONS.––Without prejudice to the immediate filing of the appropriate criminal
action and the immediate seizure of the pertinent articles pursuant to Section 13, any violation of PD 1986 and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations governing motion pictures, television programs, and related promotional materials shall be penalized with suspension or cancellation
of permits and/or licenses issued by the Board and/or with the imposition of fines and other administrative penalty/penalties. The Board
recognizes the existing Table of Administrative Penalties attached without prejudice to the power of the Board to amend it when the need arises.
In the meantime the existing revised Table of Administrative Penalties shall be enforced. (Emphasis added.)
This is, in the final analysis, no more than a measure to specifically implement the aforequoted provisions of Sec. 3(d) and (k). Contrary to what
petitioner implies, the IRR does not expand the mandate of the MTRCB under the law or partake of the nature of an unauthorized administrative
legislation. The MTRCB cannot shirk its responsibility to regulate the public airwaves and employ such means as it can as a guardian of the
public.
In Sec. 3(c), one can already find the permissible actions of the MTRCB, along with the standards to be applied to determine whether there have
been statutory breaches. The MTRCB may evaluate motion pictures, television programs, and publicity materials "applying contemporary
Filipino cultural values as standard," and, from there, determine whether these audio and video materials "are objectionable for being immoral,
indecent, contrary to law and/or good customs, [etc.] x x x" and apply the sanctions it deems proper. The lawmaking body cannot possibly
provide for all the details in the enforcement of a particular statute. 69 The grant of the rule-making power to administrative agencies is a relaxation
of the principle of separation of powers and is an exception to the non-delegation of legislative powers.70 Administrative regulations or
"subordinate legislation" calculated to promote the public interest are necessary because of "the growing complexity of modern life, the
multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulations, and the increased difficulty of administering the law." 71 Allowing the MTRCB some
reasonable elbow-room in its operations and, in the exercise of its statutory disciplinary functions, according it ample latitude in fixing, by way of
an appropriate issuance, administrative penalties with due regard for the severity of the offense and attending mitigating or aggravating
circumstances, as the case may be, would be consistent with its mandate to effectively and efficiently regulate the movie and television industry.
But even as we uphold the power of the MTRCB to review and impose sanctions for violations of PD 1986, its decision to suspend petitioner
must be modified, for nowhere in that issuance, particularly the power-defining Sec. 3 nor in the MTRCB Schedule of Administrative Penalties
effective January 1, 1999 is the Board empowered to suspend the program host or even to prevent certain people from appearing in television
programs. The MTRCB, to be sure, may prohibit the broadcast of such television programs or cancel permits for exhibition, but it may not
suspend television personalities, for such would be beyond its jurisdiction. The MTRCB cannot extend its exercise of regulation beyond what the
law provides. Only persons, offenses, and penalties clearly falling clearly within the letter and spirit of PD 1986 will be considered to be within
the decree’s penal or disciplinary operation. And when it exists, the reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor of the person charged with
violating the statute and for whom the penalty is sought. Thus, the MTRCB’s decision in Administrative Case No. 01-04 dated September 27,
2004 and the subsequent order issued pursuant to said decision must be modified. The suspension should cover only the television program on
which petitioner appeared and uttered the offensive and obscene language, which sanction is what the law and the facts obtaining call for.
In ending, what petitioner obviously advocates is an unrestricted speech paradigm in which absolute permissiveness is the norm. Petitioner’s
flawed belief that he may simply utter gutter profanity on television without adverse consequences, under the guise of free speech, does not lend
itself to acceptance in this jurisdiction. We repeat: freedoms of speech and expression are not absolute freedoms. To say "any act that restrains
speech should be greeted with furrowed brows" is not to say that any act that restrains or regulates speech or expression is per se invalid. This
only recognizes the importance of freedoms of speech and expression, and indicates the necessity to carefully scrutinize acts that may restrain or
regulate speech.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the MTRCB in Adm. Case No. 01-04 dated September 27, 2004 is hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION of limiting the suspension to the program Ang Dating Daan. As thus modified, the fallo of the MTRCB shall read as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, a Decision is hereby rendered, imposing a penalty of THREE (3) MONTHS SUSPENSION on the
television program, Ang Dating Daan, subject of the instant petition.
Co-respondents Joselito Mallari, Luzviminda Cruz, and UNTV Channel 37 and its owner, PBC, are hereby exonerated for lack of evidence.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 177728 July 31, 2009

JENIE SAN JUAN DELA CRUZ and minor CHRISTIAN DELA CRUZ "AQUINO," represented by JENIE SAN JUAN DELA
CRUZ, Petitioners,
vs.
RONALD PAUL S. GRACIA, in his capacity as City Civil Registrar of Antipolo City, Respondent.
DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

For several months in 2005, then 21-year old petitioner Jenie San Juan Dela Cruz (Jenie) and then 19-year old Christian Dominique Sto. Tomas
Aquino (Dominique) lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. They resided in the house of Dominique’s parents
Domingo B. Aquino and Raquel Sto. Tomas Aquino at Pulang-lupa, Dulumbayan, Teresa, Rizal.
On September 4, 2005, Dominique died.1 After almost two months, or on November 2, 2005, Jenie, who continued to live with Dominique’s
parents, gave birth to her herein co-petitioner minor child Christian Dela Cruz "Aquino" at the Antipolo Doctors Hospital, Antipolo City.
Jenie applied for registration of the child’s birth, using Dominique’s surname Aquino, with the Office of the City Civil Registrar, Antipolo City,
in support of which she submitted the child’s Certificate of Live Birth, 2 Affidavit to Use the Surname of the Father3 (AUSF) which she had
executed and signed, and Affidavit of Acknowledgment executed by Dominique’s father Domingo Butch Aquino.4 Both affidavits attested, inter
alia, that during the lifetime of Dominique, he had continuously acknowledged his yet unborn child, and that his paternity had never been
questioned. Jenie attached to the AUSF a document entitled "AUTOBIOGRAPHY" which Dominique, during his lifetime, wrote in his own
handwriting, the pertinent portions of which read:
AQUINO, CHRISTIAN DOMINIQUE S.T.
AUTOBIOGRAPHY
I’M CHRISTIAN DOMINIQUE STO. TOMAS AQUINO, 19 YEARS OF AGE TURNING 20 THIS COMING OCTOBER 31, 2005. 5 I
RESIDE AT PULANG-LUPA STREET BRGY. DULUMBAYAN, TERESA, RIZAL. I AM THE YOUNGEST IN OUR FAMILY. I HAVE
ONE BROTHER NAMED JOSEPH BUTCH STO. TOMAS AQUINO. MY FATHER’S NAME IS DOMINGO BUTCH AQUINO AND MY
MOTHER’S NAME IS RAQUEL STO. TOMAS AQUINO. x x x.
xxxx
AS OF NOW I HAVE MY WIFE NAMED JENIE DELA CRUZ. WE MET EACH OTHER IN OUR HOMETOWN, TEREZA RIZAL. AT
FIRST WE BECAME GOOD FRIENDS, THEN WE FELL IN LOVE WITH EACH OTHER, THEN WE BECAME GOOD
COUPLES. AND AS OF NOW SHE IS PREGNANT AND FOR THAT WE LIVE TOGETHER IN OUR HOUSE NOW. THAT’S
ALL.6 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
By letter dated November 11, 2005,7 the City Civil Registrar of Antipolo City, Ronald Paul S. Gracia (respondent), denied Jenie’s application for
registration of the child’s name in this wise:
7. Rule 7 of Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 2004 (Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9255 ["An Act Allowing
Illegitimate Children to Use the Surname of their Father, Amending for the Purpose, Article 176 of Executive Order No. 209, otherwise Known
as the ‘Family Code of the Philippines’"]) provides that:
Rule 7. Requirements for the Child to Use the Surname of the Father
7.1 For Births Not Yet Registered
7.1.1 The illegitimate child shall use the surname of the father if a public document is executed by the father, either at the back of the Certificate
of Live Birth or in a separate document.
7.1.2 If admission of paternity is made through a private handwritten instrument, the child shall use the surname of the father, provided the
registration is supported by the following documents:
a. AUSF8
b. Consent of the child, if 18 years old and over at the time of the filing of the document.
c. Any two of the following documents showing clearly the paternity between the father and the child:
1. Employment records
2. SSS/GSIS records
3. Insurance
4. Certification of membership in any organization
5. Statement of Assets and Liability
6. Income Tax Return (ITR)
In summary, the child cannot use the surname of his father because he was born out of wedlock and the father unfortunately died prior to his birth
and has no more capacity to acknowledge his paternity to the child (either through the back of Municipal Form No. 102 – Affidavit of
Acknowledgment/Admission of Paternity – or the Authority to Use the Surname of the Father). (Underscoring supplied)
Jenie and the child promptly filed a complaint 9 for injunction/registration of name against respondent before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo
City, docketed as SCA Case No. 06-539, which was raffled to Branch 73 thereof. The complaint alleged that, inter alia, the denial of registration
of the child’s name is a violation of his right to use the surname of his deceased father under Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9255,10 which provides:
Article 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in
conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate children may use the surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by
the father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument
is made by the father. Provided, the father has the right to institute an action before the regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime.
The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
They maintained that the Autobiography executed by Dominique constitutes an admission of paternity in a "private handwritten instrument"
within the contemplation of the above-quoted provision of law.
For failure to file a responsive pleading or answer despite service of summons, respondent was declared in default.
Jenie thereupon presented evidence ex-parte. She testified on the circumstances of her common-law relationship with Dominique and affirmed
her declarations in her AUSF that during his lifetime, he had acknowledged his yet unborn child. 11 She offered Dominique’s handwritten
Autobiography (Exhibit "A") as her documentary evidence-in-chief.12 Dominique’s lone brother, Joseph Butch S.T. Aquino, also testified,
corroborating Jenie’s declarations.13
By Decision14 of April 25, 2007, the trial court dismissed the complaint "for lack of cause of action" as the Autobiography was unsigned, citing
paragraph 2.2, Rule 2 (Definition of Terms) of Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 1, Series of 2004 (the Rules and Regulations Governing the
Implementation of R.A. 9255) which defines "private handwritten document" through which a father may acknowledge an illegitimate child as
follows:
2.2 Private handwritten instrument – an instrument executed in the handwriting of the father and duly signed by him where he expressly
recognizes paternity to the child. (Underscoring supplied)
The trial court held that even if Dominique was the author of the handwritten Autobiography, the same does not contain any express recognition
of paternity.1avvphi1
Hence, this direct resort to the Court via Petition for Review on Certiorari raising this purely legal issue of:
WHETHER OR NOT THE UNSIGNED HANDWRITTEN STATEMENT OF THE DECEASED FATHER OF MINOR CHRISTIAN DELA
CRUZ CAN BE CONSIDERED AS A RECOGNITION OF PATERNITY IN A "PRIVATE HANDWRITTEN INSTRUMENT" WITHIN THE
CONTEMPLATION OF ARTICLE 176 OF THE FAMILY CODE, AS AMENDED BY R.A. 9255, WHICH ENTITLES THE SAID MINOR
TO USE HIS FATHER’S SURNAME.15(Underscoring supplied)
Petitioners contend that Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended, does not expressly require that the private handwritten instrument
containing the putative father’s admission of paternity must be signed by him. They add that the deceased’s handwritten Autobiography, though
unsigned by him, is sufficient, for the requirement in the above-quoted paragraph 2.2 of the Administrative Order that the admission/recognition
must be "duly signed" by the father is void as it "unduly expanded" the earlier-quoted provision of Article 176 of the Family Code.16
Petitioners further contend that the trial court erred in not finding that Dominique’s handwritten Autobiography contains a "clear and
unmistakable" recognition of the child’s paternity.17
In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submits that respondent’s position, as affirmed by the trial court, is in consonance with
the law and thus prays for the dismissal of the petition. It further submits that Dominique’s Autobiography "merely acknowledged Jenie’s
pregnancy but not [his] paternity of the child she was carrying in her womb."18
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by R.A. 9255, permits an illegitimate child to use the surname of his/her father if the latter had
expressly recognized him/her as his offspring through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or through an admission made in a public
or private handwritten instrument. The recognition made in any of these documents is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the
child’s paternity; hence, no separate action for judicial approval is necessary.19
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended, does not, indeed, explicitly state that the private handwritten instrument acknowledging the child’s
paternity must be signed by the putative father. This provision must, however, be read in conjunction with related provisions of the Family Code
which require that recognition by the father must bear his signature, thus:
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
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Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
That a father who acknowledges paternity of a child through a written instrument must affix his signature thereon is clearly implied in Article 176
of the Family Code. Paragraph 2.2, Rule 2 of A.O. No. 1, Series of 2004, merely articulated such requirement; it did not "unduly expand" the
import of Article 176 as claimed by petitioners.
In the present case, however, special circumstances exist to hold that Dominique’s Autobiography, though unsigned by him, substantially satisfies
the requirement of the law.
First, Dominique died about two months prior to the child’s birth. Second, the relevant matters in the Autobiography, unquestionably handwritten
by Dominique, correspond to the facts culled from the testimonial evidence Jenie proffered. 20 Third, Jenie’s testimony is corroborated by the
Affidavit of Acknowledgment of Dominique’s father Domingo Aquino and testimony of his brother Joseph Butch Aquino whose hereditary
rights could be affected by the registration of the questioned recognition of the child. These circumstances indicating Dominique’s paternity of
the child give life to his statements in his Autobiography that "JENIE DELA CRUZ" is "MY WIFE" as "WE FELL IN LOVE WITH EACH
OTHER" and "NOW SHE IS PREGNANT AND FOR THAT WE LIVE TOGETHER."
In Herrera v. Alba,21 the Court summarized the laws, rules, and jurisprudence on establishing filiation, discoursing in relevant part:
Laws, Rules, and Jurisprudence
Establishing Filiation
The relevant provisions of the Family Code provide as follows:
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
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ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
 (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
The Rules on Evidence include provisions on pedigree. The relevant sections of Rule 130 provide:
SEC. 39. Act or declaration about pedigree. — The act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of
another person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship
between the two persons is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word "pedigree" includes relationship, family genealogy,
birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places where these facts occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family
history intimately connected with pedigree.
SEC. 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree. — The reputation or tradition existing in a family previous to the controversy, in
respect to the pedigree of any one of its members, may be received in evidence if the witness testifying thereon be also a member of the family,
either by consanguinity or affinity. Entries in family bibles or other family books or charts, engraving on rings, family portraits and the like, may
be received as evidence of pedigree.
This Court's rulings further specify what incriminating acts are acceptable as evidence to establish filiation. In Pe Lim v. CA, a case petitioner
often cites, we stated that the issue of paternity still has to be resolved by such conventional evidence as the relevant incriminating verbal and
written acts by the putative father. Under Article 278 of the New Civil Code, voluntary recognition by a parent shall be made in the record of
birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing. To be effective, the claim of filiation must be made by the putative
father himself and the writing must be the writing of the putative father. A notarial agreement to support a child whose filiation is admitted by the
putative father was considered acceptable evidence. Letters to the mother vowing to be a good father to the child and pictures of the putative
father cuddling the child on various occasions, together with the certificate of live birth, proved filiation. However, a student permanent record, a
written consent to a father's operation, or a marriage contract where the putative father gave consent, cannot be taken as authentic writing.
Standing alone, neither a certificate of baptism nor family pictures are sufficient to establish filiation. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
In the case at bar, there is no dispute that the earlier quoted statements in Dominique’s Autobiography have been made and written by him. Taken
together with the other relevant facts extant herein – that Dominique, during his lifetime, and Jenie were living together as common-law spouses
for several months in 2005 at his parents’ house in Pulang-lupa, Dulumbayan, Teresa, Rizal; she was pregnant when Dominique died on
September 4, 2005; and about two months after his death, Jenie gave birth to the child – they sufficiently establish that the child of Jenie is
Dominique’s.
In view of the pronouncements herein made, the Court sees it fit to adopt the following rules respecting the requirement of affixing the signature
of the acknowledging parent in any private handwritten instrument wherein an admission of filiation of a legitimate or illegitimate child is made:
1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence submitted to prove filiation, there should be strict
compliance with the requirement that the same must be signed by the acknowledging parent; and
2) Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and competent evidence, it suffices that the claim of
filiation therein be shown to have been made and handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such other
evidence.
Our laws instruct that the welfare of the child shall be the "paramount consideration" in resolving questions affecting him. 22 Article 3(1) of the
United Nations Convention on the Rights of a Child of which the Philippines is a signatory is similarly emphatic:
Article 3
1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities
or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.23(Underscoring supplied)
It is thus "(t)he policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the investigation of the paternity and filiation of children, especially of
illegitimate children x x x."24 Too, "(t)he State as parens patriae affords special protection to children from abuse, exploitation and other
conditions prejudicial to their development."25
In the eyes of society, a child with an unknown father bears the stigma of dishonor. It is to petitioner minor child’s best interests to allow him to
bear the surname of the now deceased Dominique and enter it in his birth certificate.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The City Civil Registrar of Antipolo City is DIRECTED to immediately enter the surname of the
late Christian Dominique Sto. Tomas Aquino as the surname of petitioner minor Christian dela Cruz in his Certificate of Live Birth,
and record the same in the Register of Births.

SO ORDERED.