REPUBLIC v. NLRC, GR No.

174747, 2016-03-09

Facts:

Asset Privatization Trust was a government entity created under Proclamation No. 50 dated
December 8, 1986 for the purpose of conserving, provisionally managing, and disposing of assets
that have been identified for privatization or disposition. NACUSIP/BISUDECO Chapter is the
exclusive bargaining agent for the rank-and-file employees of Bicolandia Sugar Development
Corporation, a corporation engaged in milling and producing sugar.

Under Proclamation No. 50

Philippine National Bank ceded its rights and interests over Bicolandia Sugar Development
Corporation's loans to the government through Asset Privatization Trust.[

On November 18, 1988, Bicolandia Sugar Development Corporation, with the conformity of Asset
Privatization Trust, entered into a Supervision and Financing Agreement[13] with Philippine
Sugar Corporation for the latter to operate and manage the mill until August 31, 1992.

Due to Bicolandia Sugar Development Corporation's continued failure to pay its loan obligations,
Asset Privatization Trust filed a Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Bicolandia Sugar
Development Corporation's mortgaged properties on March 26, 1990. There being no other
qualified bidder, Asset Privatization Trust was issued a certificate of sale upon payment of
P1,725,063,044.00.[

Sometime in 1992, the Asset Privatization Trust, pursuant to its mandate to dispose of government
properties for privatization, decided to sell the assets and properties of Bicolandia Sugar
Development Corporation. On September 1, 1992, it issued a Notice of Termination to Bicolandia
Sugar Development Corporation's employees, advising them that their services would be
terminated within 30 days. NASUCIP/BISUDECO Chapter received the Notice under protest.

After the employees' dismissal from service, Bicolandia Sugar Development Corporation's assets
and properties were sold to Bicol Agro-Industrial Producers Cooperative, Incorporated-
Peñafrancia Sugar Mill.[19

Issues:

As a result, several members of the NACUSIP/BISUDECO Chapter[20] filed a Complaint dated

April 24, 1996 charging Asset Privatization Trust, Bicolandia Sugar Development Corporation,
Philippine Sugar Corporation, and Bicol Agro-Industrial Producers Cooperative, Incorporated-
Peñafrancia Sugar Mill with unfair labor practice, union busting, and claims for labor standard
benefits.

Second, whether Bicolandia Sugar Development Corporation's closure could be considered

serious business losses that would exempt petitioner from payment of separation benefit

Ruling:

Petitioner proposes that even if it is found liable for separation benefits, it cannot be made to pay
since Bicolandia Sugar Development Corporation's closure was due to serious business losses.An
employer may terminate employment to prevent business losses. Article 298[64] of the Labor
Code allows the termination of employees provided that the employer pays the affected employees
separation pay of one month or at least one-half month for every month of pay, whichever is
higher. T

The employer is exempted from having to pay separation pay if the closure was due to serious
business losses.[65] A business suffers from serious business losses when it has operated at a loss
for such a period of time that its financial standing is unlikely to improve in the future.

Bicolandia Sugar Development Corporation incurred heavy loans from Philippine National Bank
in the 1980s to cover its losses. The Corporation's losses were substantial. When Philippine
National Bank transferred its interests over the Corporation's loans to petitioner, it effectively
transferred all of the Corporation's assets. Petitioner eventually sold these assets and properties to
a private company, pursuant to its mandate to dispose of government's non-performing assets.

Bicolandia Sugar Development Corporation's financial standing when petitioner took over as its
conservator clearly showed that it was suffering from serious business losses and would have been
exempted from paying its terminated employees their separation pay. This exemption, however,
only applies to employers. It does not apply to petitioner.

the exemption would still not apply if the employer voluntarily assumes the obligation to pay
terminated employees, regardless of the employer's financial situation.

Ocampo v. Enriquez G.R. No. 225973, November 08, 2016 with former C.J. Sereno’s Dissenting
Opinion
AUGUST 20, 2018
FACTS:

Public respondent Secretary of National Defense Delfin N. Lorenzana issued a Memorandum to

the public respondent Chief of Staff of the AFP, General Ricardo R. Visaya, regarding the
interment of Marcos at the Libingan Ng Mga Bayani (LNMB) in reference to the Verbal Order of
President Duterte.

Respondent AFP Rear Admiral Ernesto C. Enriquez issued directives to the Philippine Army (PA)
Commanding General for the Funeral Honors and Service to former President Marcos.
Dissatisfied with the said issuance, the following were filed by petitioners:

1. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Saturnino Ocampo and several others, in their
capacities as human rights advocates or human rights violations victims as defined under Section 3
(c) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10368 (Human Rights Victims Reparation and Recognition Act of
2013).

2. Petition for Certiorari-in-Intervention filed by Rene A.V. Saguisag, Sr. and his son, as members
of the Bar and human rights lawyers, and his grandchild.

3. Petition for Prohibition filed by Representative Edcel C. Lagman, in his personal capacity, as
member of the House of Representatives and as Honorary Chairperson of Families of Victims of
Involuntary Disappearance (FIND), a duly-registered corporation and organization of victims and
families of enforced disappearance, mostly during the martial law regime of the former President
Marcos, and several others, in their official capacities as duly-elected Congressmen of the House
of Representatives of the Philippines.

4. Petition for Prohibition filed by Loretta Ann Pargas-Rosales, former Chairperson of the
Commission on Human Rights, and several others, suing as victims of State-sanctioned human
rights violations during the martial law regime of Marcos.

5. Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition filed by Heherson T. Alvarez, former Senator of the
Republic of the Philippines, who fought to oust the dictatorship of Marcos, and several others, as
concerned Filipino citizens and taxpayers.

6. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Zaira Patricia B. Baniaga and several others, as
concerned Filipino citizens and taxpayers.

7. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Algamar A. Latiph, former Chairperson of the
Regional Human Rights Commission, Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, by himself and
on behalf of the Moro who are victims of human rights during the martial law regime of Marcos.

8. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Leila M. De Lima as member of the Senate of the
Republic of the Philippines, public official and concerned citizen.

ISSUES:

1. Whether President Duterte’s determination to have the remains of Marcos interred at the LNMB
poses a justiciable controversy.

2. Whether petitioners have locus standi to file the instant petitions.

3. Whether petitioners violated the doctrines of exhaustion of administrative remedies and
hierarchy of courts.

4. Whether the Issuance and implementation of the assailed memorandum and directive violate the
Constitution, domestic and international laws.

RULING:

Justiciable controversy

It is well settled that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or

governmental act may be heard and decided by the Court unless the following requisites for
judicial inquiry are present:

(a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;

(b) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act
or issuance;

(c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and

(d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

In this case, the absence of the first two requisites, which are the most essential, renders the
discussion of the last two superfluous.

An “actual case or controversy” is one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of
opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or
abstract difference or dispute.

Moreover, the limitation on the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies carries
the assurance that the courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of
government. Those areas pertain to questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by
the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government.cralawred As they are
concerned with questions of policy and issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a
particular measure, political questions used to be beyond the ambit of judicial review.

The Court agrees with the OSG that President Duterte’s decision to have the remains of Marcos
interred at the LNMB involves a political question that is not a justiciable controversy.

In the exercise of his powers under the Constitution and E.O. No. 292 (Administrative Code of
1987) to allow the interment of Marcos at the LNMB, which is a land of the public domain
devoted for national military cemetery and military shrine purposes, President Duterte decided a
question of policy based on his wisdom that it shall promote national healing and forgiveness.

Locus standi

Locus standi, a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question, requires that a party
alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions.

Unless a person has sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining an injury as a result of an act
complained of, such proper party has no standing.

Petitioners, who filed their respective petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, in their
capacities as citizens, human rights violations victims, legislators, members of the Bar and
taxpayers, have no legal standing to file such petitions because they failed to show that they have
suffered or will suffer direct and personal injury as a result of the interment of Marcos at the
LNMB.

Taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed
or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted
through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. In this case, what is essentially
being assailed is the wisdom behind the decision of the President to proceed with the interment of
Marcos at the LNMB. As taxpayers, petitioners merely claim illegal disbursement of public funds,
without showing that Marcos is disqualified to be interred at the LNMB by either express or
implied provision of the Constitution, the laws or jurisprudence.

As concerned citizens, petitioners are also required to substantiate that the issues raised are of
transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public
interest.

Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party is allowed to seek the
intervention of the court, one should have availed first of all the means of administrative processes
available. If resort to a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be made by giving the
administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his
jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before the court’s judicial power can be
sought.

For reasons of comity and convenience, courts of justice shy away from a dispute until the system
of administrative redress has been completed and complied with, so as to give the administrative
agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and dispose of the case.

While there are exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, petitioners
failed to prove the presence of any of those exceptions.

Hierarchy of Courts

In the same vein, while direct resort to the Court through petitions for the extraordinary writs of
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are allowed under exceptional cases, which are lacking in
this case, petitioners cannot simply brush aside the doctrine of hierarchy of courts that requires
such petitions to be filed first with the proper RTC. The RTC is not just a trier of facts, but can
also resolve questions of law in the exercise of its original and concurrent jurisdiction over
petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, and has the power to issue restraining order
and injunction when proven necessary.

Constitutionality

The President’s decision to bury Marcos at the LNMB is in accordance with the Constitution, the
law or jurisprudence.
Petitioners argue that the burial of Marcos at the LNMB should not be allowed because it has the
effect of not just rewriting history as to the Filipino people’s act of revolting against an
authoritarian ruler but also condoning the abuses committed during the Martial Law, thereby
violating the letter and spirit of the 1987 Constitution, which is a “post-dictatorship charter” and a
“human rights constitution.” For them, the ratification of the Constitution serves as a clear
condemnation of Marcos’ alleged “heroism.” To support their case, petitioners invoke Sections 2,
11, 13, 23, 26, 27 and 28 of Article II, Sec. 17 of Art. VII, Sec. 3(2) of Art. XIV, Sec. 1 of Art. XI,
and Sec. 26 of Art. XVII of the Constitution.
There is no merit to the contention.

As the OSG logically reasoned out, while the Constitution is a product of our collective history as
a people, its entirety should not be interpreted as providing guiding principles to just about
anything remotely related to the Martial Law period such as the proposed Marcos burial at the
LNMB.

Tañada v. Angara already ruled that the provisions in Article II of the Constitution are not self-
executing. Thus:

By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a “declaration of principles and state policies.”
The counterpart of this article in the 1935 Constitution is called the “basic political creed of the
nation” by Dean Vicente Sinco. These principles in Article II are not intended to be self-executing
principles ready for enforcement through the courts. They are used by the judiciary as aids or as
guides in the exercise of its power of judicial review, and by the legislature in its enactment of
laws.

As held in the leading case of Kilosbayan, Incorporated vs. Morato, the principles and state
policies enumerated in Article II x x x are not “self-executing provisions, the disregard of which
can give rise to a cause of action in the courts. They do not embody judicially enforceable
constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation.”
xxx

The petitions must be dismissed.

Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v. Health Secretary and Ors.

Court:
Supreme Court of the Republic of the Philippines

Date:
9 October 2007

CRC Provisions:
Article 24: Health and health services

Other International Provisions:

International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
Universal Declaration of Human Rights
International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS)

Domestic Provisions:
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines 1987
Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code)
Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 2006-0012 entitled, Revised Implementing Rules and
Regulations of Executive Order No. 51, Otherwise Known as The “Milk Code,” Relevant
International Agreements, Penalizing Violations Thereof, and for Other Purposes (RIRR)

Case Summary:
Background:
This case concerns a petition challenging the validity of a Department of Health (DOH)
Administrative Order (RIRR), claiming that it contained provisions, including a ban on the
advertising of breastmilk substitutes, that were not constitutional and went beyond the scope of the
law it was supposed to implement (Milk Code). The Milk Code gave effect to the International
Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the World Health
Assembly (WHA). The WHA had since adopted several Resolutions to the effect that
breastfeeding should be supported, promoted and protected.

Issue and resolution:

Constitutionality of the provisions of the RIRR. The Court partially granted the petition, declaring
certain provisions of the RIRR that prohibited the advertising and promotion of breastmilk
substitutes and provided for administrative sanctions not found in the Milk Code in contravention
of the Milk Code, and therefore null and void.
Court reasoning:
The Court considered whether certain international instruments are part of the law of the
Philippines. The Court noted that the CRC does not contain specific provisions regarding the use
or marketing of breastmilk substitutes. Instead, the relevant provisions are contained in the
ICMBS and various WHA Resolutions. The ICMBS had been transformed into domestic law
through local legislation, the Milk Code, and consequently it is the Milk Code that has the force
and effect of law in the Philippines, and not the ICMBS per se. However, the Milk Code did not
adopt the provision in the ICMBS absolutely prohibiting advertising of breastmilk substitutes, but
instead created the Inter-Agency Committee to regulate such advertising. By contrast, the
subsequent WHA Resolutions specifically prohibiting advertisements and promotions of
breastmilk substitutes have not been adopted as domestic law. Moreover, such Resolutions do not
form part of customary international law. Instead, they may constitute “soft law” or non-binding
norms, principles and practices that influence state behavior (such as the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights).

On the issue of whether the the RIRR is in accordance with the Milk Code, the Court found that
sections 4(f) and 11 (prohibition on the advertising and promotion of breastmilk substitutes) and
46 (providing for administrative sanctions that are not found in the Milk Code) went beyond the
DOH’s authority and contravened the Milk Code, and were therefore null and avoid. The Court
found that the rest of the provisions of the RIRR are consistent with the Milk Code. Finally, the
Court dismissed the petitioner’s argument that the RIRR is unnecessary and oppressive, and
offensive to the due process clause of the Constitution insofar as it amounts to a restraint of trade,
because trade must be subjected to some form of regulation for the public good and public
interests must trump business interests.

Excerpts citing CRC and other relevant human rights instruments:

In 1990, the Philippines ratified the International Convention on the Rights of the Child. Article 24
of said instrument provides that State Parties should take appropriate measures to diminish infant
and child mortality, and ensure that all segments of society, specially parents and children, are
informed of the advantages of breastfeeding. [...]

First, the Court will determine if pertinent international instruments adverted to by respondents are
part of the law of the land.

Petitioner assails the RIRR for allegedly going beyond the provisions of the Milk Code, thereby
amending and expanding the coverage of said law. The defense of the DOH is that the RIRR
implements not only the Milk Code but also various international instruments regarding infant and
young child nutrition. It is respondents' position that said international instruments are deemed
part of the law of the land and therefore the DOH may implement them through the RIRR.

The Court notes that the following international instruments invoked by respondents, namely: (1)
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child; (2) The International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; and (3) the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, only provide in general terms that steps must be taken by State
Parties to diminish infant and child mortality and inform society of the advantages of
breastfeeding, ensure the health and well-being of families, and ensure that women are provided
with services and nutrition in connection with pregnancy and lactation. Said instruments do not
contain specific provisions regarding the use or marketing of breastmilk substitutes. [...]

“Soft law” does not fall into any of the categories of international law set forth in Article 38,
Chapter III of the 1946 Statute of the International Court of Justice. It is, however, an expression
of non-binding norms, principles, and practices that influence state behavior. Certain declarations
and resolutions of the UN General Assembly fall under this category. The most notable is the UN
Declaration of Human Rights, which this Court has enforced in various cases, specifically,
Government of Hongkong Special Administrative Region v. Olalia, Mejoff v. Director of Prisons,
Mijares v. Rañadaand Shangri-la International Hotel Management, Ltd. v. Developers Group of
Companies, Inc. [...]

CRIN Comments:
CRIN believes that this decision is consistent with the CRC. Although the CRC was found to be
not directly relevant to this case as the Convention does not specifically address the use or
marketing of breastmilk substitutes, CRIN emphasises children’s right to health under Article 24,
which includes the obligation of the state to ensure that all segments of society, in particular
parents and children, are informed of the advantages of breastfeeding.

Citation:
Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v. Health Secretary and Ors. G.R.
NO. 173034

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES v.

HON. PAQUITO OCHOA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,

ET AL.

G.R. No. 204605, 19 July 2016, EN BANC (Bersamin, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The registration of trademarks and copyrights have been the subject of

executive agreements entered into without the concurrence of the Senate.

Some executive agreements have been concluded in conformity with the

policies declared in the acts of Congress with respect to the general subject
matter.

FACTS

The Madrid System for the International Registration of Marks (Madrid

System), which is the centralized system providing a one-stop solution for

registering and managing marks worldwide, allows the trademark owner to file

one application in one language, and to pay one set of fees to protect his

mark in the territories of up to 97 member-states. The Madrid System is

governed by the Madrid Agreement, concluded in 1891, and the Madrid

Protocol, concluded in 1989. The Madrid Protocol has two objectives, namely:

(1) to facilitate securing protection for marks; and (2) to make the

management of the registered marks easier in different countries.

In 2004, the Intellectual Property Office of the Philippines (IPOPHL),

began considering the country's accession to the Madrid Protocol. After a

campaign for information dissemination, and a series of consultations with

stakeholders, IPOPHL ultimately arrived at the conclusion that accession

would benefit the country and help raise the level of competitiveness for

Filipino brands. Hence, it recommended to the Department of Foreign Affairs

(DFA) that the Philippines should accede to the Madrid Protocol. After its own

review, the DFA endorsed to the President the country's accession to the

Madrid Protocol. The DFA determined that the Madrid Protocol was an

executive agreement.
 On March 27, 2012, President Benigno C. Aquino III ratified the Madrid

Protocol through an instrument of accession, which was deposited with the

Director General of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) on

April 25, 2012. The Madrid Protocol entered into force in the Philippines on

July 25, 2012.

Thus, the Intellectual Property Association of the Philippines (IPAP)

commenced this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition to challenge

the validity of the President's accession to the Madrid Protocol without the

concurrence of the Senate. According to the IPAP, the Madrid Protocol is a

treaty, not an executive agreement; hence, respondent DFA Secretary Albert

Del Rosario acted with grave abuse of discretion in determining the Madrid

Protocol as an executive agreement. Also, the IPAP has argued that the

implementation of the Madrid Protocol in the Philippines; specifically the

processing of foreign trademark applications, conflicts with the Intellectual

Property Code of the Philippines.

ISSUE

Is the Madrid Protocol unconstitutional for lack of concurrence by the

Senate?

RULING

NO. The Court finds and declares that the President’s ratification is valid and
constitutional because the Madrid Protocol, being an executive agreement as

determined by the Department of Foreign Affairs, does not require the

concurrence of the Senate.

Under prevailing jurisprudence, the registration of trademarks and copyrights

have been the subject of executive agreements entered into without the

concurrence of the Senate. Some executive agreements have been

concluded in conformity with the policies declared in the acts of Congress with

respect to the general subject matter.

Accordingly, DFA Secretary Del Rosario’s determination and treatment

of the Madrid Protocol as an executive agreement; being in apparent

contemplation of the express state policies on intellectual property as well as

within his power under Executive Order No. 459, are upheld.

The Court observed that there are no hard and fast rules on the

propriety of entering into a treaty or an executive agreement on a given

subject as an instrument of international relations. The primary consideration

in the choice of the form of agreement is the parties’ intent and desire to craft

their international agreement in the form they so wish to further their

respective interests. The matter of form takes a back seat when it comes to

effectiveness and binding effect of the enforcement of a treaty or an executive

agreement; inasmuch as all the parties; regardless of the form, become

obliged to comply conformably with the time-honored principle of pacta sunt

servanda. The principle binds the parties to perform in good faith their parts in
the agreements.

Gudani vs. Senga

GR No. 170165, August 15, 2006 [Article VI Sec. 22: Congress' Power of Inquiry; Legislative
Investigation]

FACTS:
The Senate invited Gen. Gudani and Lt. Col. Balutan to clarify allegations of 2004 election fraud
and the surfacing of the “Hello Garci” tapes. PGMA issued EO 464 enjoining officials of the
executive department including the military establishment from appearing in any legislative
inquiry without her consent. AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Senga issued a Memorandum, prohibiting
Gen. Gudani, Col. Balutan et al from appearing before the Senate Committee without Presidential
approval. However, the two appeared before the Senate in spite the fact that a directive has been
given to them. As a result, the two were relieved of their assignments for allegedly violating the
Articles of War and the time honoured principle of the “Chain of Command.” Gen. Senga ordered
them to be subjected before the General Court Martial proceedings for willfuly violating an order
of a superior officer.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the President has the authority to issue an order to the members of the AFP
preventing them from testifying before a legislative inquiry.

RULING:
Yes. The SC hold that President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power as
commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is
liable under military justice. At the same time, any chamber of Congress which seeks the
appearance before it of a military officer against the consent of the President has adequate
remedies under law to compel such attendance. Any military official whom Congress summons to
testify before it may be compelled to do so by the President. If the President is not so inclined, the
President may be commanded by judicial order to compel the attendance of the military officer.
Final judicial orders have the force of the law of the land which the President has the duty to
faithfully execute.
SC ruled in Senate v. Ermita that the President may not issue a blanket requirement of prior
consent on executive officials summoned by the legislature to attend a congressional hearing. In
doing so, the Court recognized the considerable limitations on executive privilege, and affirmed
that the privilege must be formally invoked on specified grounds. However, the ability of the
President to prevent military officers from testifying before Congress does not turn on executive
privilege, but on the Chief Executive’s power as commander-in-chief to control the actions and
speech of members of the armed forces. The President’s prerogatives as commander-in-chief are
not hampered by the same limitations as in executive privilege.

At the same time, the refusal of the President to allow members of the military to appear before
Congress is still subject to judicial relief. The Constitution itself recognizes as one of the
legislature’s functions is the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation. Inasmuch as it is ill-advised
for Congress to interfere with the President’s power as commander-in-chief, it is similarly
detrimental for the President to unduly interfere with Congress’s right to conduct legislative
inquiries. The impasse did not come to pass in this petition, since petitioners testified anyway
despite the presidential prohibition. Yet the Court is aware that with its pronouncement today that
the President has the right to require prior consent from members of the armed forces, the clash
may soon loom or actualize.

The duty falls on the shoulders of the President, as commander-in-chief, to authorize the
appearance of the military officers before Congress. Even if the President has earlier disagreed
with the notion of officers appearing before the legislature to testify, the Chief Executive is
nonetheless obliged to comply with the final orders of the courts.

206 SCRA 290 – Political Law – Control Power – Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency

In 1990, Republic Act No. 6975 entitled “AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL POLICE UNDER A REORGANIZED DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES” was passed. Antonio Carpio, as a
member of the bar and a defender of the Constitution, assailed the constitutionality of the said law
as he averred that it only interferes with the control power of the president.

He advances the view that RA 6975 weakened the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM)
by limiting its power “to administrative control” over the PNP thus, “control” remained with the
Department Secretary under whom both the NPC and the PNP were placed; that the system of
letting local executives choose local police heads also undermine the power of the president.

ISSUE: Whether or not the president abdicated its control power over the PNP and NPC by virtue
of RA 6975.

HELD: No. The President has control of all executive departments, bureaus, and offices. This
presidential power of control over the executive branch of government extends over all executive
officers from Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest clerk. Equally well accepted, as a corollary rule to
the control powers of the President, is the “Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency”. As the
President cannot be expected to exercise his control powers all at the same time and in person, he
will have to delegate some of them to his Cabinet members.Under this doctrine, which recognizes
the establishment of a single executive, “all executive and administrative organizations are
adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are
assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is
required by the Constitution or law to act in person on the exigencies of the situation demand that
he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive
are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such
departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless
disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.”

Thus, and in short, “the President’s power of control is directly exercised by him over the
members of the Cabinet who, in turn, and by his authority, control the bureaus and other offices
under their respective jurisdictions in the executive department.”

Additionally, the circumstance that the NAPOLCOM and the PNP are placed under the
reorganized DILG is merely an administrative realignment that would bolster a system of
coordination and cooperation among the citizenry, local executives and the integrated law
enforcement agencies and public safety agencies created under the assailed Act, the funding of the
PNP being in large part subsidized by the national government.

Saguisag v. Exec Secretary Ochoa July 26, 2016 G.R. No. 212426 EDCA, Treaty, Executive
Agreement, International Agreement
AUGUST 22, 2018
FACTS:

This is a Resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration seeking to reverse the Decision of this
Court in Saguisag et. al., v. Executive Secretary dated 12 January 2016.

Petitioners claim this Court erred when it ruled that the Enhanced Defense Cooperation
Agreement (EDCA) between the Philippines and the US was not a treaty. In connection to this,
petitioners move that EDCA must be in the form of a treaty in order to comply with the
constitutional restriction under Section 25, Article· XVIII of the 1987 Constitution on foreign
military bases, troops, and facilities. Additionally, they reiterate their arguments on the issues of
telecommunications, taxation, and nuclear weapons.

The principal reason for the Motion for Reconsideration is evidently petitioners’ disagreement
with the Decision that EDCA implements the VFA and Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT).

Petitioners argue that EDCA’s provisions fall outside the allegedly limited scope of the VFA and
MDT because it provides a wider arrangement than the VFA for military bases, troops, and
facilities, and it allows the establishment of U.S. military bases.

ISSUE:

Whether or not EDCA is a treaty.

RULING:

Petitioners detail their objections to EDCA in a similar way to their original petition, claiming that
the VFA and MDT did not allow EDCA to contain the following provisions:
1. Agreed Locations

2. Rotational presence of personnel

3. U.S. contractors

4. Activities of U.S. contractors

We ruled in Saguisag, et. al. that the EDCA is not a treaty despite the presence of these provisions.
The very nature of EDCA, its provisions and subject matter, indubitably categorize it as an
executive agreement – a class of agreement that is not covered by the Article XVIII Section 25
restriction – in painstaking detail. To partially quote the Decision:

Executive agreements may dispense with the requirement of Senate concurrence because of the
legal mandate with which they are concluded.

As culled from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, past Supreme Court Decisions,
and works of noted scholars, executive agreements merely involve arrangements on the
implementation of existing policies, rules, laws, or agreements.

They are concluded

(1) to adjust the details of a treaty;

(2) pursuant to or upon confirmation by an act of the Legislature; or

(3) in the exercise of the President’s independent powers under the Constitution.

The raison d’etre of executive agreements hinges on prior constitutional or legislative

authorizations.

The special nature of an executive agreement is not just a domestic variation in international
agreements.

International practice has accepted the use of various forms and designations of international
agreements, ranging from the traditional notion of a treaty – which connotes a formal, solemn
instrument – to engagements concluded in modern, simplified forms that no longer necessitate
ratification.

An international agreement may take different forms: treaty, act, protocol, agreement, concordat,
compromis d’arbitrage, convention, covenant, declaration, exchange of notes, statute, pact,
charter, agreed minute, memorandum of agreement, modus vivendi, or some other form.

Consequently, under international law, the distinction between a treaty and an international
agreement or even an executive agreement is irrelevant for purposes of determining international
rights and obligations.

However, this principle does not mean that the domestic law distinguishing treaties, international
agreements, and executive agreements is relegated to a mere variation in form, or that the
constitutional requirement of Senate concurrence is demoted to an optional constitutional
directive. There remain two very important features that distinguish treaties from executive
agreements and translate them into terms of art in the domestic setting.

First, executive agreements must remain traceable to an express or implied authorization under the
Constitution, statutes, or treaties. The absence of these precedents puts the validity and effectivity
of executive agreements under serious question for the main function of the Executive is to
enforce the Constitution and the laws enacted by the Legislature, not to defeat or interfere in the
performance of these rules. In turn, executive agreements cannot create new international
obligations that are not expressly allowed or reasonably implied in the law they purport to
implement.

Second, treaties are, by their very nature, considered superior to executive agreements. Treaties
are products of the acts of the Executive and the Senate unlike executive agreements, which are
solely executive actions. Because of legislative participation through the Senate, a treaty is
regarded as being on the same level as a statute. If there is an irreconcilable conflict, a later law or
treaty takes precedence over one that is prior. An executive agreement is treated differently.
Executive agreements that are inconsistent with either a law or a treaty are considered ineffective.
Both types of international agreement are nevertheless subject to the supremacy of the
Constitution.

Subsequently, the Decision goes to great lengths to illustrate the source of EDCA’s validity, in that
as an executive agreement it fell within the parameters of the VFA and MDT, and seamlessly
merged with the whole web of Philippine law. We need not restate the arguments here. It suffices
to state that this Court remains unconvinced that EDCA deserves treaty status under the law.

We find no reason for EDCA to be declared unconstitutional. It fully conforms to the Philippines’
legal regime through the MDT and VFA. It also fully conforms to the government’s continued
policy to enhance our military capability in the face of various military and humanitarian issues
that may arise.

Dismissal by Reason of Pregnancy in the Airline Industry - Valid or Not?

Being a flight attendant in an international airline company has its perks. Just imagine, your work
office is high up in the air at 41,000 feet above ground. But just like any work place,
discrimination is still present in this occupation. In a previous post, we tackled a labor issue
concerning the dismissal of an employee by reason of pregnancy. This 2015 case tackles on
discrimination of women in the airline industry.
The Facts of the Case.
In this case, Respondents (complainants before the Labor Arbiter) were recruited and hired by
Saudia as Temporary Flight Attendants with the accreditation and approval of the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration. After undergoing seminars required by the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration for deployment overseas, as well as training modules
offered by Saudia (e.g., initial flight attendant/training course and transition training), and after
working as Temporary Flight Attendants, respondents became Permanent Flight Attendants. They
then entered into Cabin Attendant contracts with Saudia: Ma. Jopette M. Rebesencio (Ma. Jopette)
on May 16, 1990; Montassah B. Sacar-Adiong (Montassah) and Rouen Ruth A. Cristobal (Rouen
Ruth) on May 22, 1993; and Loraine Schneider-Cruz (Loraine) on August 27, 1995.

Respondents continued their employment with Saudia until they were separated from service on
various dates in 2006. Respondents contended that the termination of their employment was
illegal. They alleged that the termination was made solely because they were pregnant.

Saudia anchored its disapproval of respondents’ maternity leaves and demand for their resignation
on its “Unified Employment Contract for Female Cabin Attendants” (Unified Contract). Under the
Unified Contract, the employment of a Flight Attendant who becomes pregnant is rendered void. It
provides:

(H) Due to the essential nature of the Air Hostess functions to be physically fit on board to provide
various services required in normal or emergency cases on both domestic/international flights
beside her role in maintaining continuous safety and security of passengers, and since she will not
be able to maintain the required medical fitness while at work in case of pregnancy, accordingly, if
the Air Hostess becomes pregnant at any time during the term of this contract, this shall render her
employment contract as void and she will be terminated due to lack of medical fitness.(Emphasis
supplied)

On November 8, 2007, respondents filed a Complaint against Saudia and its officers for illegal
dismissal and for underpayment of salary, overtime pay, premium pay for holiday, rest day,
premium, service incentive leave pay, 13th month pay, separation pay, night shift differentials,
medical expense reimbursements, retirement benefits, illegal deduction, lay-over expense and
allowances, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees.

The issue to be resolved in the instant case is whether or not there was an illegal dismissal of the
respondents?

The Supreme Court's Decision.

Yes, the respondents were illegally dismissed.

The initial issue here was whether or not the Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the case.
Petitioner Saudia states that the Philippine courts have no jurisdiction and that the law that should
be applied in the instant case is Saudi Arabia law. The Court stated that this is incorrect. The Court
has jurisdiction in this case.
The Court stated in the case;
Saudia asserts that stipulations set in the Cabin Attendant contracts require the application of the
laws of Saudi Arabia. It insists that the need to comply with these stipulations calls into operation
the doctrine of forum non conveniens and, in turn, makes it necessary for Philippine tribunals to
refrain from exercising jurisdiction. Forum non conveniens, like the rules of forum shopping, litis
pendentia, and res judicata, is a means of addressing the problem of parallel litigation. While the
rules of forum shopping, litis pendentia, and res judicata are designed to address the problem of
parallel litigation within a single jurisdiction, forum non conveniens is a means devised to address
parallel litigation arising in multiple jurisdictions.

On the matter of pleading forum non conveniens, we state the rule, thus: Forum non conveniens
must not only be clearly pleaded as a ground for dismissal; it must be pleaded as such at the
earliest possible opportunity. Otherwise, it shall be deemed waived.

It further stated:
Forum non conveniens finds no application and does not operate to divest Philippine tribunals of
jurisdiction and to require the application of foreign law. Saudia invokes forum non conveniens to
supposedly effectuate the stipulations of the Cabin Attendant contracts that require the application
of the laws of Saudi Arabia.

xxx

So informed and animated, we emphasize the glaringly discriminatory nature of Saudia’s policy.
As argued by respondents, Saudia’s policy entails the termination of employment of flight
attendants who become pregnant. At the risk of stating the obvious, pregnancy is an occurrence
that pertains specifically to women. Saudia’s policy excludes from and restricts employment on
the basis of no other consideration but sex.

We do not lose sight of the reality that pregnancy does present physical limitations that may render
difficult the performance of functions associated with being a flight attendant. Nevertheless, it
would be the height of iniquity to view pregnancy as a disability so permanent and immutable that
it must entail the termination of one’s employment. It is clear to us that any individual, regardless
of gender, may be subject to exigencies that limit the performance of functions. However, we fail
to appreciate how pregnancy could be such an impairing occurrence that it leaves no other
recourse but the complete termination of the means through which a woman earns a living.

Oddly enough, the petitioner Saudia themselves stated that the Saudi law does not allow the
termination of employment of women who take maternity leaves;

Consistent with lex loci intentionis, to the extent that it is proper and practicable (i.e., “to make an
intelligent decision”), Philippine tribunals may apply the foreign law selected by the parties. In
fact, (albeit without meaning to make a pronouncement on the accuracy and reliability of
respondents’ citation) in this case, respondents themselves have made averments as to the laws of
Saudi Arabia. In their Comment, respondents write:

Under the Labor Laws of Saudi Arabia and the Philippines[,] it is illegal and unlawful to terminate
the employment of any woman by virtue of pregnancy. The law in Saudi Arabia is even more
harsh and strict [sic] in that no employer can terminate the employment of a female worker or give
her a warning of the same while on Maternity Leave, the specific provision of Saudi Labor Laws
on the matter is hereto quoted as follows: “An employer may not terminate the employment of a
female worker or give her a warning of the same while on maternity leave.” (Article 155, Labor
Law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Royal Decree No. M/51.)

The Court then decided:

WHEREFORE, with the MODIFICATIONS that first, petitioner Brenda J. Betia is not solidarily
liable with petitioner Saudi Arabian Airlines, and second, that petitioner Saudi Arabian Airlines is
liable for moral and exemplary damages. The June 16, 2011 Decision and the September 13, 2011
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 113006 are hereby AFFIRMED in all
other respects. Accordingly, petitioner Saudi Arabian Airlines is ordered to pay respondents:
( 1) Full backwages and all other benefits computed from the respective dates in which each of the
respondents were illegally terminated until the finality of this Decision;
(2) Separation pay computed from the respective dates in which each of the respondents
commenced employment until the finality of this Decision at the rate of one ( 1) month's salary for
every year of service, with a fraction of a year of at least six ( 6) months being counted as one ( 1)
whole year;
(3) Moral damages in the amount of Pl00,000.00 per respondent;
(4) Exemplary damages in th~ amount of P200,000.00 per
respondent; and
(5) Attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the total award. Interest of 6% per annum shall likewise
be imposed on the total judgment award from the finality of this Decision until full satisfaction
thereof.

This. case is REMANDED. to the Labor Arbiter to make a detailed computation of the amounts
due to respondents which petitioner Saudi Arabian Airlines should pay without delay.

IMBONG VS OCHOA

G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014

JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, for themselves and in behalf of their
minor children, LUCIA CARLOS IMBONG and BERNADETTE CARLOS IMBONG and
MAGNIFICAT CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary,
Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture
and Sports and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, Respondents.

Facts:

Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and
Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.

Challengers from various sectors of society are questioning the constitutionality of the said Act.
The petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the following grounds:

SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES:

The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn.

The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous products.
The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom.
The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude.
The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law.
The RH Law violates the right to free speech.
The RH Law is “void-for-vagueness” in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution.
The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one’s family protected by the Constitution

PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the
controversy.

Power of Judicial Review

Actual Case or Controversy
Facial Challenge
Locus Standi
Declaratory Relief
One Subject/One Title Rule

Issue/s:

SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES:

Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional for violating
the:

Right to life
Right to health
Freedom of religion and right to free speech
Right to privacy (marital privacy and autonomy)
Freedom of expression and academic freedom
Due process clause
Equal protection clause
Prohibition against involuntary servitude

PROCEDURAL:

Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.

Actual Case or Controversy

Facial Challenge
Locus Standi
Declaratory Relief
One Subject/One Title Rule

Discussions:

PROCEDURAL

Judicial Review Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of judicial review is limited
by four exacting requisites: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) the petitioners
must possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.

Actual Controversy: An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is
appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court
would amount to an advisory opinion. It must concern a real, tangible and not merely a theoretical
question or issue. There ought to be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of specific
relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the
law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts. Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or
controversy is the requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being
challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. For a case to be
considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has then been accomplished or
performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must
allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged
action. He must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct
injury as a result of the act complained of

Facial Challenge: A facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment Challenge, is one that is
launched to assail the validity of statutes concerning not only protected speech, but also all other
rights in the First Amendment. These include religious freedom, freedom of the press, and the
right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances. After all, the fundamental right to religious freedom, freedom of the press and
peaceful assembly are but component rights of the right to one’s freedom of expression, as they
are modes which one’s thoughts are externalized.

Locus Standi: Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest in a
case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged
governmental act. It requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure the
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.

Transcendental Importance: the Court leans on the doctrine that “the rule on standing is a matter
of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers,
and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental
importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest.”

One Subject-One Title: The “one title-one subject” rule does not require the Congress to employ in
the title of the enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the
contents and the minute details therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is
comprehensive enough as to include the general object which the statute seeks to effect, and
where, as here, the persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and consequences of the
proposed law and its operation. Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather than
technical construction of the rule “so as not to cripple or impede legislation.” The one subject/one
title rule expresses the principle that the title of a law must not be “so uncertain that the average
person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its
contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where another or
different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the real
subject or scope of the act.”

Declaration of Unconstitutionality: Orthodox view: An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers

no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal
contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed. Modern view: Under this view,
the court in passing upon the question of constitutionality does not annul or repeal the statute if it
finds it in conflict with the Constitution. It simply refuses to recognize it and determines the rights
of the parties just as if such statute had no existence. But certain legal effects of the statute prior to
its declaration of unconstitutionality may be recognized. Requisites for partial unconstitutionality:
(1) The Legislature must be willing to retain the valid portion(s), usually shown by the presence of
a separability clause in the law; and (2) The valid portion can stand independently as law.

Ruling/s:
SUBSTANTIAL

Majority of the Members of the Court believe that the question of when life begins is a scientific
and medical issue that should not be decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and evidence.
However, they agreed that individual Members could express their own views on this matter.
Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution states: “The State recognizes the sanctity of family life
and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall
equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception.”

In its plain and ordinary meaning (a canon in statutory construction), the traditional meaning of
“conception” according to reputable dictionaries cited by the ponente is that life begins at
fertilization. Medical sources also support the view that conception begins at fertilization.

The framers of the Constitution also intended for (a) “conception” to refer to the moment of
“fertilization” and (b) the protection of the unborn child upon fertilization. In addition, they did
not intend to ban all contraceptives for being unconstitutional; only those that kill or destroy the
fertilized ovum would be prohibited. Contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male
sperm and female ovum, and those that similarly take action before fertilization should be deemed
non-abortive, and thus constitutionally permissible.

The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting the life of the unborn child was to
prevent the Legislature from passing a measure prevent abortion. The Court cannot interpret this
otherwise. The RH Law is in line with this intent and actually prohibits abortion. By using the
word “or” in defining abortifacient (Section 4(a)), the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or devices
that prevent implantation but also those that induce abortion and induce the destruction of a fetus
inside the mother’s womb. The RH Law recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and
that the State has a bounded duty to protect it.

However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused their office when they redefined the meaning of
abortifacient by using the term “primarily”. Recognizing as abortifacients only those that
“primarily induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s womb or the
prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother’s womb” (Sec. 3.01(a)
of the IRR) would pave the way for the approval of contraceptives that may harm or destroy the
life of the unborn from conception/fertilization. This violates Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution. For the same reason, the definition of contraceptives under the IRR (Sec 3.01(j)),
which also uses the term “primarily”, must be struck down.

The RH Law does not intend to do away with RA 4729 (1966). With RA 4729 in place, the Court
believes adequate safeguards exist to ensure that only safe contraceptives are made available to the
public. In fulfilling its mandate under Sec. 10 of the RH Law, the DOH must keep in mind the
provisions of RA 4729: the contraceptives it will procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store
or pharmaceutical company and that the actual distribution of these contraceptive drugs and
devices will be done following a prescription of a qualified medical practitioner.
Meanwhile, the requirement of Section 9 of the RH Law is to be considered “mandatory” only
after these devices and materials have been tested, evaluated and approved by the FDA. Congress
cannot determine that contraceptives are “safe, legal, non-abortificient and effective”.

The Court cannot determine whether or not the use of contraceptives or participation in support of
modern RH measures (a) is moral from a religious standpoint; or, (b) right or wrong according to
one’s dogma or belief. However, the Court has the authority to determine whether or not the RH
Law contravenes the Constitutional guarantee of religious freedom.
The State may pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon the policies of
any one religion. To allow religious sects to dictate policy or restrict other groups would violate
Article III, Section 5 of the Constitution or the Establishment Clause. This would cause the State
to adhere to a particular religion, and thus, establishes a state religion. Thus, the State can enhance
its population control program through the RH Law even if the promotion of contraceptive use is
contrary to the religious beliefs of e.g. the petitioners.

Section 23A (2)(i) of the RH Law, which permits RH procedures even with only the consent of the
spouse undergoing the provision (disregarding spousal content), intrudes into martial privacy and
autonomy and goes against the constitutional safeguards for the family as the basic social
institution. Particularly, Section 3, Article XV of the Constitution mandates the State to defend: (a)
the right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the
demands of responsible parenthood and (b) the right of families or family associations to
participate in the planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect them. The RH
Law cannot infringe upon this mutual decision-making, and endanger the institutions of marriage
and the family.
The exclusion of parental consent in cases where a minor undergoing a procedure is already a
parent or has had a miscarriage (Section 7 of the RH Law) is also anti-family and violates Article
II, Section 12 of the Constitution, which states: “The natural and primary right and duty of parents
in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall
receive the support of the Government.” In addition, the portion of Section 23(a)(ii) which reads
“in the case of minors, the written consent of parents or legal guardian or, in their absence, persons
exercising parental authority or next-of-kin shall be required only in elective surgical procedures”
is invalid as it denies the right of parental authority in cases where what is involved is “non-
surgical procedures.”

However, a minor may receive information (as opposed to procedures) about family planning
services. Parents are not deprived of parental guidance and control over their minor child in this
situation and may assist her in deciding whether to accept or reject the information received. In
addition, an exception may be made in life-threatening procedures.

The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of Section 14 of the RH Law, which mandates
the State to provide Age-and Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health Education. Although
educators might raise their objection to their participation in the RH education program, the Court
reserves its judgment should an actual case be filed before it.
Any attack on its constitutionality is premature because the Department of Education has not yet
formulated a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health education.
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution places more importance on the role of parents in the
development of their children with the use of the term “primary”. The right of parents in
upbringing their youth is superior to that of the State.

The provisions of Section 14 of the RH Law and corresponding provisions of the IRR supplement
(rather than supplant) the right and duties of the parents in the moral development of their
children.

By incorporating parent-teacher-community associations, school officials, and other interest

groups in developing the mandatory RH program, it could very well be said that the program will
be in line with the religious beliefs of the petitioners.

The RH Law does not violate the due process clause of the Constitution as the definitions of
several terms as observed by the petitioners are not vague.
The definition of “private health care service provider” must be seen in relation to Section 4(n) of
the RH Law which defines a “public health service provider”. The “private health care institution”
cited under Section 7 should be seen as synonymous to “private health care service provider.

The terms “service” and “methods” are also broad enough to include providing of information and
rendering of medical procedures. Thus, hospitals operated by religious groups are exempted from
rendering RH service and modern family planning methods (as provided for by Section 7 of the
RH Law) as well as from giving RH information and procedures.

The RH Law also defines “incorrect information”. Used together in relation to Section 23 (a)(1),
the terms “incorrect” and “knowingly” connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or
misrepresent the public as to the nature and effect of programs and services on reproductive
health.

To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government’s RH program is not a violation
of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution,
which states that the State shall prioritize the needs of the underprivileged, sick elderly, disabled,
women, and children and that it shall endeavor to provide medical care to paupers.
The RH Law does not only seek to target the poor to reduce their number, since Section 7 of the
RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility issues and
desire to have children. In addition, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of children a
couple may have and does not impose conditions upon couples who intend to have children. The
RH Law only seeks to provide priority to the poor.

The exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory RH education program under
Section 14 is valid. There is a need to recognize the academic freedom of private educational
institutions especially with respect to religious instruction and to consider their sensitivity towards
the teaching of reproductive health education
The requirement under Sec. 17 of the RH Law for private and non-government health care service
providers to render 48 hours of pro bonoRH services does not amount to involuntary servitude, for
two reasons. First, the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public interest that it is both
the power and a duty of the State to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the
public welfare. Second, Section 17 only encourages private and non-government RH service
providers to render pro bono Besides the PhilHealth accreditation, no penalty is imposed should
they do otherwise.
However, conscientious objectors are exempt from Sec. 17 as long as their religious beliefs do not
allow them to render RH service, pro bono or otherwise

PROCEDURAL

In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that the same is
ripe for judicial determination. Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules have
already taken effect and that budgetary measures to carry out the law have already been passed, it
is evident that the subject petitions present a justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when an
action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it not only
becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute.
Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical practitioners or medical
providers are in danger of being criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for vague violations
thereof, particularly public health officers who are threatened to be dismissed from the service
with forfeiture of retirement and other benefits. They must, at least, be heard on the matter now.

In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been generally
maintained, albeit with some modifications. While the Court has withheld the application of facial
challenges to strictly penal statues, it has expanded its scope to cover statutes not only regulating
free speech, but also those involving religious freedom, and other fundamental rights. The
underlying reason for this modification is simple. For unlike its counterpart in the U.S., this Court,
under its expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law not only to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. Verily, the framers of
Our Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with its duty to maintain the
supremacy of the Constitution.
Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the
constitutional human rights to life, speech and religion and other fundamental rights mentioned
above have been violated by the assailed legislation, the Court has authority to take cognizance of
these kindred petitions and to determine if the RH Law can indeed pass constitutional scrutiny. To
dismiss these petitions on the simple expedient that there exist no actual case or controversy,
would diminish this Court as a reactive branch of government, acting only when the Fundamental
Law has been transgressed, to the detriment of the Filipino people.

Even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed through an “as-applied challenge,
still, the Court has time and again acted liberally on the locus standi requirement. It has accorded
certain individuals standing to sue, not otherwise directly injured or with material interest affected
by a Government act, provided a constitutional issue of transcendental importance is invoked. The
rule on locus standi is, after all, a procedural technicality which the Court has, on more than one
occasion, waived or relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens,
taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit they may not have been directly
injured by the operation of a law or any other government act.
The present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the transcendental
importance of the issues involved in this case warrants that the Court set aside the technical
defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One cannot deny that the issues
raised herein have potentially pervasive influence on the social and moral well being of this
nation, specially the youth; hence, their proper and just determination is an imperative need. This
is in accordance with the well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools
designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their strict
and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than
promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed.

Most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and so the Court would just consider them
as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65, over which it has original jurisdiction. Where the case
has far-reaching implications and prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider them as
petitions for prohibition under Rule 65.
The RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. In this case, a textual analysis of the
various provisions of the law shows that both “reproductive health” and “responsible parenthood”
are interrelated and germane to the overriding objective to control the population growth. As
expressed in the first paragraph of Section 2 of the RH Law:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all
persons including their right to equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to
sustainable human development, the right to health which includes reproductive health, the right
to education and information, and the right to choose and make decisions for themselves in
accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of
responsible parenthood.

Considering the close intimacy between “reproductive health” and “responsible parenthood”
which bears to the attainment of the goal of achieving “sustainable human development” as stated
under its terms, the Court finds no reason to believe that Congress intentionally sought to deceive
the public as to the contents of the assailed legislation.

Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with
respect to the following provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require private
health facilities and non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a
religious group to refer patients, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under
Republic Act No. 8344, to another health facility which is conveniently accessible; and b) allow
minor-parents or minors who have suffered a miscarriage access to modem methods of family
planning without written consent from their parents or guardian/s;

2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24
thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and or refuses to
disseminate information regarding programs and services on reproductive health regardless of his
or her religious beliefs.

3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a
married individual, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act
No. 8344, to undergo reproductive health procedures without the consent of the spouse;

4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit the
requirement of parental consent only to elective surgical procedures.

5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24
thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and/or refuses to refer a
patient not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to
another health care service provider within the same facility or one which is conveniently
accessible regardless of his or her religious beliefs;

6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24
thereof, insofar as they punish any public officer who refuses to support reproductive health
programs or shall do any act that hinders the full implementation of a reproductive health
program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs;

7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro
bona reproductive health service in so far as they affect the conscientious objector in securing
PhilHealth accreditation; and

8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier “primarily” in
defining abortifacients and contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and, therefore, null and void for
contravening Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.

Cruz vs Secretary of DENR

Natural Resources and Environmental Law; Constitutional Law; IPRA; Regalian Doctrine

GR. No. 135385, Dec. 6, 2000

FACTS:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens
and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371,
otherwise known as the Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its implementing
rules and regulations (IRR). The petitioners assail certain provisions of the IPRA and its IRR on
the ground that these amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the
public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian
doctrine embodied in section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.

ISSUE:
Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?

HELD:
No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining the IPRA, there is
nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources within their
ancestral domain. Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral domains remains with the
State and the rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their
ancestral domains merely gives them, as owners and occupants of the land on which the resources
are found, the right to the small scale utilization of these resources, and at the same time, a priority
in their large scale development and exploitation.

Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public domain.
They are private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title, which is a concept of private
land title that existed irrespective of any royal grant from the State. However, the right of
ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a limited form of
ownership and does not include the right to alienate the same.
IDEALS vs PSALM (2012)
MeNameizGrace
1 year ago
Law on Natural Resources| Foreign-owned Corporation| Government Agreements| Water Code

Background of the case. A petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to permanently enjoin the
sale of the Angat Hydro-Electric Power Plant (AHEPP) to Korea Water Resources Corporation
(K-Water) which won the public bidding conducted by the Power Sector Assets and Liabilities
Management Corporation (PSALM).

FACTS:

Respondent PSALM is a government-owned and controlled corporation created by virtue of RA

9136, also known as the “Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001” (EPIRA). The EPIRA
provided a framework for the restructuring of the electric power industry, including the
privatization of the assets of the NAPOCOR, the transition to the desired competitive structure,
and the definition of the responsibilities of the various government agencies and private entities.
PSALM is mandated to manage the orderly sale, disposition, and privatization of NPC generation
assets, real estate and other disposable assets, and Independent Power Producer (IPP) contracts
with the objective of liquidating all NPC financial obligations and stranded contract costs in an
optimal manner, which liquidation is to be completed within PSALM’s 25-year term of existence.

On 2005, PSALM commenced the privatization of the 246-megawatt hydro electric power plant
located in San Lorenzo, Norzagaray, Bulacan, which will form part of the Angat Complex which
includes the Angat Dam, Angat Reservoir and the outlying watershed area.

On 2009, PSALM’s Board of Directors approved the Bidding Procedures for the privatization of
the Hydro Electric Power Plant. An Invitation to Bid was published in three major national
newspapers where six competing firms enjoined, namely:

K-Water US$ 440,880,000.00

First Gen Northern Energy 365,000,678.00
San Miguel Corporation 312,500,000.00
Aboitiz Power-Pangasinan, Inc. 256,000,000.00
Trans-Asia Oil & Energy Dev. Com 237,000,000.00
DMCI Power Corporation 188,890,000.00
After a post-bid evaluation, PSALM approved and confirmed the issuance of a Notice of Award to
the highest bidder, K-Water.

Contention of the petitioner:

That the participation in the bidding of and award of contract to K-Water which is a foreign
corporation, PSALM clearly violated the constitutional provisions on the appropriation and
utilization of water as a natural resource, as implemented by the Water Code of the Philippines
limiting water rights to Filipino citizens and corporations which are at least 60% Filipino-owned.
Further considering the importance of the Angat Dam which is the source of 97% of Metro
Manila’s water supply, as well as irrigation for farmlands in 20 municipalities and towns in
Pampanga and Bulacan, petitioners assert that PSALM should prioritize such domestic and
community use of water over that of power generation.

ISSUE:

Whether PSALM violated Sec. 2, Art. XII of the Constitution and the Water Code provisions on
the grant of water rights.

RULING:

It is clear that the law limits the grant of water rights only to Filipino citizens and juridical entities
duly qualified by law to exploit and develop water resources, including private corporations with
sixty percent of their capital owned by Filipinos.
Under the Water Code concept of appropriation, a foreign company may not be said to be
“appropriating” our natural resources if it utilizes the waters collected in the dam and converts the
same into electricity through artificial devices. Since the NPC remains in control of the operation
of the dam by virtue of water rights granted to it, as determined under DOJ Opinion No. 122, s.
1998, there is no legal impediment to foreign-owned companies undertaking the generation of
electric power using waters already appropriated by NPC, the holder of water permit. Such was
the situation of hydropower projects under the BOT contractual arrangements whereby foreign
investors are allowed to finance or undertake construction and rehabilitation of infrastructure
projects and/or own and operate the facility constructed. However, in case the facility requires a
public utility franchise, the facility operator must be a Filipino corporation or at least 60% owned
by Filipino.

Foreign ownership of a hydropower facility is not prohibited under existing laws. The
construction, rehabilitation and development of hydropower plants are among those infrastructure
projects which even wholly-owned foreign corporations are allowed to undertake under the
Amended Build-Operate-Transfer (Amended BOT) Law (R.A. No. 7718).

Villafuerte vs Robredo

SUMMARY: Villafuerte filed a petition assailing the three memorandum

circulars issued by Robredo. The circulars pertain to full disclosure of local
budget and finances and other guidelines regarding budget. Villafuerte argues
that the circulars violate the principles of local and fiscal autonomy of the LGU.
The Court ruled that the circulars merely reiterated what was already provided
in the law and that the order on public disclosure is consistent with the policy of
promoting good governance through transparency, accountability and
participation.
DOCTRINE: The Constitution is now replete with numerous provisions directing
the adoption of measures to uphold transparency and accountability in
government, with a view of protecting the nation from repeating its atrocious
past. It commands the strict adherence to full disclosure of information on all
matters relating to official transactions and those involving public interest.

FACTS:
On February 21, 2011, Villafuerte, then Governor of Camarines Sur, joined by
the Provincial Government of Camarines Sur, filed the instant petition for
certiorari, seeking to nullify the three issuances of Robredo for being
unconstitutional and having been issued with grave abuse of discretion:
MC No. 2010-83 entitled “Full Disclosure of Local Budget and
Finances, and Bids and Public Offerings,” which aims to promote
good governance through enhanced transparency and accountability of
LGUs.
Legal and Administrative Authority: Section 352 of LGC of 1991
requires the posting within 30 days from end of each fiscal year in at
 least 3 publicly accessible and conspicuous places in the LGU a
summary of all revenues collected and funds including the
appropriations and disbursements of such funds during the preceding
fiscal year. RA No 984 (Government Procurement Reform Act) calles
for the posting of the Invitation to Bid, Notice of Award, Notice to
Proceed and Approved Contract in the procuring entity’s premises, in
newspapers of general circulation, the Philippine Govt Electronic
Procurement System and the website of procuring entity.
Responsibility of Local Chief Executive: All Provincial Governors, City
Mayors, and Municipal Myors, are directed to faithfully comply with
the abovecited provisions of laws, and existing national policy, by
posting in conspicuous places within public buildings in the locality, or
in print media of community or general circulation, and in their
websites
MC No 2010-138 reiterating that 20% component of the IRA shall be
utilized for desirable social, economic, and environmental outcomes
essential to the attainment of the constitutional objective of life for all.
MC No 2011-08 directing for the strict adherence to Section 90 of RA
No 10147 of the General Appropriations Act of 2011.
Legal and Administrative Authority: Section 90 stipulates that “the
amount appropriated for the LGU’s share in the IRA shall be used in
accordance with Sections 17(g) and 287 of RA No 7160. The annual
budgets of LGUs shall be prepared in accordance with the forms,
procedures, and schedules prescribed by the Department of Budget
and Management and those jointly issued with the Commission on
Audit.
Sanctions: Section 60. Grounds for Disciplinary Actions - An elective
local official may be disciplined, suspended, or removed from office
on: (c) Dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office, gross
negligence, or dereliction of duty

RULING: Petition denied.

Whether or not the assailed memorandum circulars violate the principles

of local and fiscal autonomy enshired in the Constitution and the LGC? –
NO
Petitioners: assailed issuances interfere with the local and fiscal autonomy of
LGUs embodied in the Constitution and the LGC.

MC 2010-138 transgressed these constitutionally-protected liberties when

it restricted the meaning of “development” and enumerated activities
which the local government must finance from the 20% development fund
component of the IRA and provided sanctions for local authorities who
shall use the said component of the fund for the excluded purposes stated
 therein.

Robredo cannot substitute his own discretion with that of the local
legislative council in enacting its annual budget and specifying the
development projects that the 20% component of its IRA should fund.

Court: Petitioners’ arguments are untenable.

The Constitution has expressly adopted the policy of ensuring the

autonomy of LGUs (Article X of Constitution)

It is also pursuant to the mandate of the Constitution that enhancing local

autonomy that the LGC was enacted.

Local autonomy means a more responsive and accountable local

government structure instituted through a system of decentralization.

Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or

decentralization of power. There is decentralization of administration
when the central government delegates administrative powers to
political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government
power and in the process to make local governments “more responsive
and accountable,” and “ensure their fullest development as self-reliant
communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of
national development and social progress.” (Limbona v Mangelin)

To safeguard the state policy on local autonomy, the Constitution

confines the power of the President over LGUs to mere supervision.
“The President exercises ‘general supervision’ over them, but only to
‘ensure that local affairs are administered according to law.’ He has no
control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their
judgments with his own. (Section 4, Article X of Constitution)

It is petitioners’ contention that Robredo went beyond the confined of his

supervisory powers, as alter ego of the President, when he issued MC No
2010-138. They argue that the mandatory nature of the circular, with the
threat of imposition of sanctions for non-compliance, evinces a clear desire
to exercise control over LGUs. However, the Court perceives otherwise.

A reading of MC No. 2010-138 shows that it is a mere reiteration of an

existing provision in the LGC. It was plainly intended to remind LGUs to
faithfully observe the directive stated in Section 287 of the LGC to utilize
the 20% portion of the IRA for development projects. The assailed circular
was issued in response to the report of the COA that a substantial portion
of the 20% development fund of some LGUs was not actually utilized for
development projects but was diverted to expenses more properly
categorized as MOOE, in violation of Section 287 of the LGC.
 The issuance of MC No. 2010-138 was brought about by the report of the
COA that the development fund was not being utilized accordingly. To curb
the alleged misuse of the development fund, the respondent deemed it
proper to remind LGUs of the nature and purpose of the provision for the
IRA through MC No. 2010-138.

The enumeration in the circular was not meant to restrict the discretion of
the LGUs in the utilization of their funds. It was incorporated in the
assailed circular in order to guide them in the proper disposition of the
IRA and avert further misuse of the fund by citing current practices which
seemed to be incompatible with the purpose of the fund. LGUs remain at
liberty to map out their development plans based on their own discretion
and utilize their IRAs accordingly, with the only restriction that 20%
thereof be expended for development projects.

The local autonomy granted LGU does not completely severe them from the
national government or turn them into impenetrable states. Thus,
notwithstanding the local fiscal autonomy being enjoyed by LGUs, they are
still under the supervision of the President and maybe held accountable for
malfeasance or violations of existing laws.

Answering petitioners’ claim that the requirement to post other documents in

the issuances went beyond the provisions in LGC and RA No 9184: It is well
to remember that fiscal autonomy does not leave LGUs with unbridled
discretion in the disbursement of public funds. They remain accountable to
their constituency.

The assailed issuances of the respondent, MC Nos. 2010-83 and 2011-08, are
but implementation of this avowed policy of the State to make public officials
accountable to the people. They are amalgamations of existing laws, rules
and regulation designed to give teeth to the constitutional mandate of
transparency and accountability.

Public office is a public trust. It must be discharged by its holder not for his
own personal gain but for the benefit of the public for whom he holds it in
trust. By demanding accountability and service with responsibility, integrity,
loyalty, efficiency, patriotism and justice, all government officials and
employees have the duty to be responsive to the needs of the people they are
called upon to serve. (ABAKADA GURO Party List v Purisima)

The Constitution strongly summoned the State to adopt and

implement a policy of full disclosure of all transactions involving
public interest and provide the people with the right to access public
information. Section 352 of the LGC and RA No 9184 are responses to this
call for transparency and both laws establish a system of transparency in
procurement process in government agencies.
The publication of budgets, expenditures, contracts and loans and
procurement plans of LGUs required in the assailed issuances could not have
infringed on the local fiscal autonomy of LGUs.

The issuances do not interfere with the discretion of the LGUs in the
specification of their priority projects and the allocation of their budgets.
The posting requirements are mere transparency measures.

Section 352 of the LGC that is being invoked by the petitioners does not
exclude the requirement for the posting of the additional documents
stated in MC Nos. 2010-83 and 2011-08. The additional requirement for
the posting of budgets, expenditures, contracts and loans, and
procurement plans are well-within the contemplation of Section 352 of
the LGC considering they are documents necessary for an accurate
presentation of a summary of appropriations and disbursements that an
LGU is required to publish.

The supervisory powers of the President are broad enough to embrace the
power to require the publication of certain documents as a mechanism of
transparency. The President, by constitutional fiat, is the head of the
economic and planning agency of the government, primarily responsible
for formulating and implementing continuing, coordinated and integrated
social and economic policies, plans and programs for the entire country.
(Pimentel v Aguirre)

The Constitution, which was drafted after long years of dictatorship

and abuse of power, is now replete with numerous provisions directing
the adoption of measures to uphold transparency and accountability
in government, with a view of protecting the nation from repeating its
atrocious past. It commands the strict adherence to full disclosure of
information on all matters relating to official transactions and those
involving public interest. (Section 28, Article II and Section 7, Article
III)

The assailed issuances were issued pursuant to the policy of promoting good
governance through transparency, accountability and participation. The
action of the respondent is certainly within the constitutional bounds of his
power as alter ego of the President.

The power to govern is a delegated authority from the people who hailed the
public official to office through the democratic process of election. He must
not frown upon accountability checks which aim to show how well he is
performing his delegated power. For, it is through these mechanisms of
transparency and accountability that he is able to prove to his constituency
that he is worthy of the continued privilege. <3
MMDA v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay (CASE DIGEST)

GR No. 171947-48

18 December 2008

TOPIC: Environmental Law, Mandamus, PD1152

FACTS:

Respondents filed a complaint before the RTC against several government agencies, among them
the petitioners, for the cleanup, rehabilitation, and protection of the Manila Bay. The complaint
alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way below the allowable standards set
by law, specifically PD 1152. Respondents, as plaintiffs, prayed that petitioners be ordered to
clean the Manila Bay and submit to the RTC a concerted concrete plan of action for the purpose.

RTC rendered a Decision in favor of respondents, ordering the defendant-government agencies to

clean up and rehabilitate Manila Bay.

Petitioners, before the CA, argued that PD 1152 relates only to the cleaning of specific pollution
incidents and do not cover cleaning in general. Apart from raising concerns about the lack of
funds, petitioners also asserted that the cleaning of the Manila Bay is not a ministerial act, which
can be compelled by mandamus.

The CA denied petitioners’ appeal and affirmed the Decision of the RTC in toto. Hence, this
petition.

ISSUES:

Does PD 1152 include a cleanup in general or is it limited only to the cleanup of specific pollution
incidents?
Whether or not petitioners may be compelled by mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate the
Manila Bay?
RULING:

Issue 1:

PD 1152 does not in any way state that the government agencies concerned ought to confine
themselves to the containment, removal, and cleaning operations when a specific pollution
incident occurs. The underlying duty to upgrade the quality of water is not conditional on the
occurrence of any pollution incident.

Even assuming the absence of a categorical legal provision specifically prodding petitioners to
clean up the bay, they and the men and women representing them cannot escape their obligation to
future generations of Filipinos to keep the waters of the Manila Bay clean and clear as humanly as
possible.

Issue 2:

Yes, petitioners may be compelled.

The MMDA’s duty in the area of solid waste disposal is set forth not only in the Environment
Code (PD 1152) and RA 9003, but in its charter as well. This duty of putting up a proper waste
disposal system cannot be characterised as discretionary, for, as earlier stated, discretion
presupposes the power or right given by law to public functionaries to act officially according to
their judgment or conscience.

A perusal of other petitioners’ respective charters would yield to the conclusion that these
government agencies are enjoined, as a matter of statutory obligation, to perform certain functions
relating directly or indirectly to the cleanup, rehabilitation, protection, and preservation of the
Manila Bay. They are precluded from choosing not to perform these duties.

The petition is DENIED.

G.R. No. 210761, June 28, 2016

KILUSANG MAYO UNO, REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRPERSON, ELMER LABOG;

NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR UNIONS-KILUSANG MAYO UNO, REPRESENTED
BY ITS VICE-PRESIDENTS, REDEN ALCANTARA AND ARNOLD DELA CRUZ, CENTER
FOR TRADE UNION AND HUMAN RIGHTS (CTUHR), REPRESENTED BY ITS
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR DAISY ARAGO, VIRGINIA FLORES AND VIOLETA ESPIRITU,
Petitioners, v. HON. BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III, AND PHILIPPINE HEALTH
INSURANCE CORPORATION (PHIC), Respondents,

MIGRANTE INTERNATIONAL, REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRPERSON GARRY

MARTINEZ, CONNIE BRAGAS-REGALADO, PARALUMAN CATUIRA, UNITED
FILIPINOS IN HONGKONG (UNIFIL-HK), AND SOLEDAD PILLAS, Petitioners-in-
Intervention.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari assailing PhilHealth Circular Nos. 0027,10025,2and 0024,3all
series of 2013. The circulars, which adjusted the premium contribution rates for the National
Health Insurance Program, were allegedly issued with grave abuse of discretion.
ANTECEDENTS

In the 1987 Constitution, the State adopted an integrated and comprehensive approach to health
development.4 It also undertook to make essential goods and medical services available to the
public at a low cost, and to provide free medical care to paupers.

On February 7, 1995, Congress passed Republic Act No. 7875, the National Health Insurance Act
(NHIA), establishing the National Health Insurance Program (NHIP/the Program) and creating the
Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (the Corporation/PhilHealth) to administer the Program.
The Program covers all citizens of the Philippines in accordance with the principles of universality
and compulsory coverage.5chanrobleslaw

PhilHealth is a government corporation attached to the Department of Health (DOH) for policy
coordination and guidance.6 Among its notable powers and functions
are:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
SEC. 16 Powers and Functions. - The Corporation shall have the following powers and functions:
to administer the National Health Insurance Program;

to formulate and promulgate policies for the sound administration of the Program;

to set standards, rules, and regulations necessary to ensure quality of care, appropriate utilization
of services, fund viability, member satisfaction, and overall accomplishment of Program
objectives;

to formulate and implement guidelines on contributions and benefits; portability of benefits, cost
containment and quality assurance; and health care provider arrangements, payment methods, and
referral systems;7 x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Its President and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) is directly appointed by the President of the
Republic while its Board of Directors (the Board) is composed of several cabinet secretaries (or
their permanent representatives) and representatives of different stakeholders.8chanrobleslaw

At the start of respondent President Benigno Simeon Aquino III's administration in 2010, the DOH
launched the Aquino Health Agenda (AHA/the Agenda)9 The objective was to implement
comprehensive reform in the health sector and, ultimately, to provide universal access to health
care for all Filipinos including the poor.

In line with the Agenda for a truly Universal Health Care program, PhilHealth adopted a new
mission "to ensure adequate financial access of every Filipino to quality health care services
through the effective and efficient administration of the National Health Insurance
Program."10chanrobleslaw

The Board, through Resolution No. 1571, Series of 2011, approved increases in annual premium
contributions for the Calendar Year (CY) 2012 to enhance the NHIP benefit packages and to
support the implementation of the Universal Health Care program.11chanrobleslaw
The minimum annual contribution of members in the Individually Paying Program (IPP) and
Overseas Workers Programs (OWP) was increased to Php2,400.00. However, members who paid
their contributions within the first semester of CY 2012 or signed a policy contract within the first
semester of 2012 and committed to pay their contributions for two consecutive years would have
their annual premium contribution computed at only Php1,200.00.

For the Employed Sector, the premium rate was to be computed at 3% of the salary base with the
lowest salary bracket12 pegged at a monthly salary base of Php7,000.00. Thus, the minimum
annual contribution was computed at Php2,520.00. Finally, the monthly salary ceiling was pegged
at Php50,000.00.

Lastly, the annual contribution of all National Household Targeting System for Poverty Reduction
(NHTS-PR) poor families identified by the Department of Social Welfare and Development
(DSWD) under the Sponsored Program was set at Php2,400.00 effective January 1, 2012.

The new rates for the IPP, and the OWP were scheduled to take effect on July 1, 2012 while the
new rate for the Employed Sector was scheduled to take effect on January 1, 2013.

On February 21, 2012, PhilHealth moved the effectivity date of the new rates for the OWP
Program to January 1, 2013.13 The deferral was made at the request of civil society groups and
non-government organizations in the light of the global crisis that affected a number of Overseas
Filipino Workers (OFWs).

On June 27, 2012, PhilHealth also deferred the effectivity date of the new rates for the IPP
program to October 1, 2012.14 The move was made to allow further consultation in response to
various sectors' opposition to the increase.

On September 25, 2012, the Corporation further postponed the premium increase to January 1,
2013, after a series of dialogues with informal sector groups.15chanrobleslaw

On November 22, 2012, PhilHealth made a partial deferral of the premium rate increase until the
end of CY 2013.16 From January to December 2013, the minimum annual premium contribution
rate for IPP and OWP members was pegged at Php1,800.00, instead of the full Php2,400.00.

For the members enrolled in the Employed Sector, the premium rate was computed at 2.5% of the
salary base. Because the lowest salary base was pegged at Php7,000.00, the minimum annual
premium contribution was computed at Php2,100.00. Finally, the monthly salary bracket ceiling
was pegged at a salary base of Php35,000.00.

On September 2013, PhilHealth issued the three assailed circulars fully implementing the new
premium rates for 2014:
PhilHealth Circular No. 0024, s. 201317 was issued on September 30, 2013, increasing the
minimum annual premium rate for the IPP to Php2,400.00 for members with a monthly income of
Php25,000.00 and below.

PhilHealth Circular No. 0025, s. 201318 was issued on September 30, 2013, adjusting the annual
premium rate for the OWP to Php2,400.00 for all land-based OFWs, whether documented or
undocumented.

PhilHealth Circular No. 0027, s. 201319 was also issued on September 30, 2013, for the
Employed Sector. It retained 2.5% at the premium rate and the Php35,000.00 salary bracket
ceiling. However, it consolidated the two lowest salary brackets20 resulting in a minimum annual
rate of Php2,400.00.
Thus, the Corporation adjusted the minimum rates for members to Php2,400.00 to ensure financial
sustainability of the Program.

On January 30, 2014, petitioners Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), National Federation of Labor
Unions - KMU (NAFLU-KMU), Violeta Espiritu, and Virginia Flores filed the present petition for
certiorari with an application for a Temporary Restraining Order and/or a Preliminary Injunction
against the implementation of the new rates.21 The petitioners impleaded President Aquino and
the Corporation as respondents.

On March 14, 2014, Migrante International, Connie Bragas-Regalado, Paraluman Catuira, United
Filipinos in Hong Kong (UNIFIL-HK), and Soledad Pillas filed a petition-in-
intervention.22chanrobleslaw

THE PETITIONS

The petitioners (KMU, et al.) claim that the assailed circulars were issued with grave abuse of
discretion, arguing: (1) that PhilHealth breached the limits to its delegated rule-making power
because the new contribution schedule is neither reasonable, equitable, nor progressive as
prescribed by the NHIA;23 (2) that the rate increase is unduly oppressive and not reasonably
necessary to attain the purpose sought;24 and (3) that the new rates were determined without an
actuarial study as required by the NHIA.25cralawredchanrobleslaw

The petitioners allege that according to the Commission on Audit (COA), PhilHealth awarded
Php1.5 billion in bonuses to its top officials and employees in 2012.26 They further allege that the
Corporation gave hefty bonuses to its contractors and failed to prosecute fraudulent claims. They
argue that increasing contribution rates would be completely unnecessary if the Corporation used
its funds more judiciously.

The Petitioners-in-Intervention (Migrante, et al.) adopt all of the petitioners' arguments. They add
that Circular No. 0025, s. 2013 violated the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act27 which
prescribed the non-increase of fees charged by any government office on Overseas Filipino
Workers (OFWs).28chanrobleslaw

THE COUNTER ARGUMENTS

The President, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), invokes his immunity from suit
as a sitting Head of State and moved that he be dropped as a party-respondent.29chanrobleslaw

PhilHealth, through the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC), claims that the
increases in premium contributions were supported by three actuarial studies conducted in
2010,30 2011,31 and 2012.32 Moreover, it consulted World Bank representatives33 and the
affected stakeholders before implementing the increase.

The Php2,400.00 minimum annual contribution for all members is equivalent to the amount that
the Government annually incurs to maintain coverage for the poorest of the poor. Php1,000.00 is
allotted for drugs and medicine, Php300.00 for administrative costs, Php500.00 for consultation,
and Php600.00 for in-patient services.34chanrobleslaw

As the premium rate for "the poorest of the poor" was set at Php2,400.00, the rates for the
Employed Sector, the OWP, and the IPP were likewise increased to avoid a situation where the
poorest would contribute a premium higher than that contributed by an employed member, an
OFW, or an individually paying member.35chanrobleslaw

PhilHealth counters that not only did it defer the rate increase to relieve the public of the
simultaneous burden of increases in fees, tolls, taxes, and social security contributions, but it even
introduced the corresponding enhancements in the benefit packages in 2012 before the premium
rates were increased.36chanrobleslaw

With respect to the allegations of outrageously unconscionable bonuses, PhilHealth argues that
these have no logical relation to the increase in premiums. In any case, COA's disallowance of
these items are presently under appeal and sub-judice.37chanrobleslaw

Lastly, PhilHealth prays for the dismissal of the petition arguing: (1) that it was filed out of
time;38 (2) that it failed to state the material dates as required by Rule 46, Section 3 of the Rules
of Court;39 (3) that the petitioners have no legal standing;40 (4) that the petitioners disregarded
the hierarchy of courts because the issue was not of transcendental importance;41 and (5) that the
petition has neither basis nor merit.42chanrobleslaw

OUR RULING

We DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.

At the outset, we stress the settled principle that a sitting head of state enjoys immunity from suit
during his actual tenure.43 The events that gave rise to the present action and the filing of the case
occurred during the incumbency of President Aquino. Moreover, the petition contains no
allegations as to any specific presidential act or omission that amounted to grave abuse of
discretion. Therefore, it is only proper to drop the President as a party-respondent.
Under the NHIA, all citizens of the Philippines are required to enroll in the Program; membership
is mandatory.44 In other words, the NHIP covers all Filipinos in accordance with the principles of
universality and compulsory coverage.45 Ultimately, every Filipino is affected by an increase in
the premium rates. Thus, the petitioners have sufficient legal standing to file the present suit.

Nevertheless, the petitioners availed of the wrong remedy in coming to this Court. Certiorari is a
remedy of last resort available only when there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.46chanrobleslaw

An administrative agency's exercise of quasi-legislative powers may be questioned and prohibited

through an ordinary action for injunction before the Regional Trial Court (RTC).47 The petitioners
failed to explain their premature resort to certiorari and their disregard for the hierarchy of courts,
these procedural grounds warrant the outright dismissal of their petition.

Even if the procedural issues are disregarded, the petitions still failed to show that PhilHealth
gravely abused its discretion in issuing the assailed circulars. On the contrary, PhilHealth acted
with reasonable prudence and sensitivity to the public's needs. It postponed the rate increase
several times to relieve the public of the burden of simultaneous rate and price increases. It
accommodated the stakeholders and heard them through consultation. In the end, it even retained a
lower salary bracket ceiling (Php35,000.00 instead of Php50,000.00) and a lower rate (2.5% rather
than the planned 3%).

The term "grave abuse of discretion" has a specific and well-defined meaning in established
jurisprudence. It is not an amorphous concept that can be shaped or manipulated to suit a litigant's
purpose.48 Grave abuse of discretion is present when there is such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction,49 or where power is exercised
arbitrarily or in a despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility amounting
to an evasion of positive duty, or to a virtual refusal to perform a legal duty or act at all in
contemplation of law.50chanrobleslaw
Other than a sweeping allegation of grave abuse of discretion under its Nature of the Petition
section,51 the petition is devoid of substantial basis.

PhilHealth has the mandate of realizing the State's vision of affordable and accessible health
services for all Filipinos, especially the poor.52 To realize this vision and effectively administer
the Program, PhilHealth is empowered to promulgate its policies, and to formulate a contribution
schedule that can realistically support its programs.

PhilHealth justified the increase in annual premium rates with the enhanced benefits and the
expanded coverage of medical conditions.53 This reasonable decision to widen the coverage of
the program - which led to increased premium rates - is a business judgment that this Court cannot
interfere with.

This Court does not have administrative supervision over administrative agencies, nor is it an
entity engaged in making business decisions. We cannot interfere in purely administrative matters
nor substitute administrative policies and business decisions with our own. This would amount to
judicial overreach. The courts' only concern is the legality, not the wisdom, of an agency's actions.
Policy matters should be left to policy makers.

The petitioners argue that the new schedule does not conform to the NHIA's standard of a
reasonable, equitable, and progressive schedule.54 Therefore, PhilHealth acted ultra vires.
However, the new contribution schedule for the Employed Sector55 shows
otherwise:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibraryThe new schedule merged the 7,999-and-below salary
bracket with the former 8,000-8,999 bracket to create the current lowest salary bracket. While the
merger primarily impacts on the members of the former 7,999-and-below bracket, the Corporation
explained that the current minimum annual contribution corresponds to the amount necessary to
retain coverage for even the poorest of the poor. The Corporation broke down this amount
(Php2,400.00) as: Php1,000.00 for drugs and other medicine, Php300.00 for administrative costs,
Php500.00 for consultation, and Php600.00 for in-patient services.56 This new amount is neither
unreasonable nor unconscionable.

Moreover, the contribution schedule, as a whole, remains equitable and progressive. The salary
base and the premium contributions increase as a member's actual salary increases. A member who
earns Php9,000.00 is required to contribute much less than a member who earns Php31,000.00 but
they both enjoy the same coverage. This satisfies the standard of a reasonable, equitable, and
progressive contribution schedule.

Section 36 of the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act does not apply to premium
contributions under the National Health Insurance Program.

The NHIP is a social insurance program. It is the government's means to allow the healthy to help
pay for the care of the sick, and for those who can afford medical care to provide subsidy to those
who cannot.57 The premium collected from members is neither a fee nor an expense but an
enforced contribution to the common insurance fund.

From this perspective, the petitioners-in-intervention cannot invoke the non-increase clause under
Section 36 of the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act. There is no valid distinction
between migrant workers and the rest of the population that would justify a lower premium rate
for the former. It would unduly burden the other PhilHealth contributors in favor of Overseas
Filipino Workers.

Any distinctions between OFWs and all the other sectors are not germane to the NHIA's purpose
of ensuring affordable, acceptable, available, and accessible health care services for all citizens of
the Philippines.58 Therefore, the application of Section 36 of the Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipinos Act to obstruct the increase of premiums under the NHIP amounts to an unreasonable
classification, in violation of the equal protection clause.

Furthermore, the premium rate for indigent members was pegged at Php2,400.00 - the lowest in
the salary bracket for the Employed Sector. Pursuant to Section 28 of the NHIA, contributions
made in behalf of indigent members cannot exceed the minimum contributions for employed
members.59 A non-increase in the minimum premium contribution of OFWs would create a
ridiculous situation where the poorest of the poor are required to contribute more than a member
employed abroad. This violates the standard of a progressive and equitable contribution scheme.

This Court cannot encroach on the Commission on Audit's jurisdiction.

The petitioners' allegations of unconscionable bonuses to PhilHealth executives and their unethical
expenditure of funds, if true, are reprehensible. However, it is equally objectionable for the
petitioners to make such allegations without substantiating them. That they did not even bother to
annex any document to support their factual claims, is very irresponsible.

Further, even if the allegations were true, this Court does not have the power to audit the
expenditures of the Government or any of its agencies and instrumentalities. The Constitution saw
fit to vest this power on an independent Constitutional body: the Commission on Audit (COA).60
The COA alone has the power to disallow unnecessary and extravagant government spending.

The Separation of Powers doctrine, so fundamental in our system of government, precludes this
Court from encroaching on the powers and functions of an independent constitutional body. Our
participation in the audit process is limited to determining whether the COA committed grave
abuse of discretion in rendering its audit decisions. We will not overstep the bounds of our
jurisdiction.

Moreover, the alleged improprieties pertain to PhilHealth's manner of spending its funds, not to
the assailed act of raising the premium rates. While the alleged improprieties may constitute grave
abuse of discretion, it does not follow that PhilHealth gravely abused its discretion in issuing the
assailed circulars. The argument is a non sequitur.

Finally, there is no reason to consider the allegation that the premium rates were increased without
conducting an actuarial study. Again, the petitioners simply made bare allegations and did not
bother to cite their bases or justifications; while PhilHealth produced the three actuarial studies
they used.

In sum, all things being considered, we see no basis to grant the writ of certiorari prayed for.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Abakada guro vs executive secretary

Facts:

Petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List challenged the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9337
particularly Sections 4, 5 and 6, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108, respectively, of the National
Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). These questioned provisions contain a uniform proviso
authorizing the President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, to raise the VAT rate
to 12%, effective January 1, 2006, after any of the following conditions have been satisfied, to wit:

. . . That the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, shall, effective
January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-added tax to twelve percent (12%), after any of the
following conditions has been satisfied:

(i) Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous
year exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%); or

(ii) National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and one-
half percent (1 ½%).

Petitioners argue that the law is unconstitutional, as it constitutes abandonment by Congress of its
exclusive authority to fix the rate of taxes under Article VI, Section 28(2) of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution. They further argue that VAT is a tax levied on the sale or exchange of goods and
services and cannot be included within the purview of tariffs under the exemption delegation since
this refers to customs duties, tolls or tribute payable upon merchandise to the government and
usually imposed on imported/exported goods. They also said that the President has powers to
cause, influence or create the conditions provided by law to bring about the conditions precedent.
Moreover, they allege that no guiding standards are made by law as to how the Secretary of
Finance will make the recommendation. They claim, nonetheless, that any recommendation of the
Secretary of Finance can easily be brushed aside by the President since the former is a mere alter
ego of the latter, such that, ultimately, it is the President who decides whether to impose the
increased tax rate or not.

Issues:

Whether or not R.A. No. 9337 has violated the provisions in Article VI, Section 24, and Article
VI, Section 26 (2) of the Constitution.
Whether or not there was an undue delegation of legislative power in violation of Article VI Sec
28 Par 1 and 2 of the Constitution.
Whether or not there was a violation of the due process and equal protection under Article III Sec.
1 of the Constitution.

Discussions:

Basing from the ruling of Tolentino case, it is not the law, but the revenue bill which is required by
the Constitution to “originate exclusively” in the House of Representatives, but Senate has the
power not only to propose amendments, but also to propose its own version even with respect to
bills which are required by the Constitution to originate in the House. the Constitution simply
means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the
public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from the House of
Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House
can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. On the other hand, the
senators, who are elected at large, are expected to approach the same problems from the national
perspective. Both views are thereby made to bear on the enactment of such laws.
In testing whether a statute constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual
to inquire whether the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the hands of
the legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment of any other appointee or delegate of the
legislature.
The equal protection clause under the Constitution means that “no person or class of persons shall
be deprived of the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in
the same place and in like circumstances.”

Rulings:

R.A. No. 9337 has not violated the provisions. The revenue bill exclusively originated in the
House of Representatives, the Senate was acting within its constitutional power to introduce
amendments to the House bill when it included provisions in Senate Bill No. 1950 amending
corporate income taxes, percentage, excise and franchise taxes. Verily, Article VI, Section 24 of
the Constitution does not contain any prohibition or limitation on the extent of the amendments
that may be introduced by the Senate to the House revenue bill.
There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the execution of
a law. This is constitutionally permissible. Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly
delegate power when it describes what job must be done, who must do it, and what is the scope of
his authority; in our complex economy that is frequently the only way in which the legislative
process can go forward.
Supreme Court held no decision on this matter. The power of the State to make reasonable and
natural classifications for the purposes of taxation has long been established. Whether it relates to
the subject of taxation, the kind of property, the rates to be levied, or the amounts to be raised, the
methods of assessment, valuation and collection, the State’s power is entitled to presumption of
validity. As a rule, the judiciary will not interfere with such power absent a clear showing of
unreasonableness, discrimination, or arbitrariness.

by Mary Jashmin Serquina

JAIME N. SORIANO v. SECRETARY OF FINANCE, GR No. 184450, 2017-01-24

Facts:

On 19 May 2008, the Senate filed its Senate Committee Report No. 53 on Senate Bill No. (S.B.)
2293. On 21 May 2008, former President Gloria M. Arroyo certified the passage of the bill as
urgent through a letter addressed to then Senate President Manuel Villar. On the same day, the bill
was passed on second reading IN the Senate and, on 27 May 2008, on third reading. The following
day, 28 May 2008, the Senate sent S.B. 2293 to the House of Representatives for the latter's
concurrence.

On 17 June 2008, R.A. 9504 entitled "An Act Amending Sections 22, 24, 34, 35, 51, and 79 of
Republic Act No. 8424, as Amended, Otherwise Known as the National Internal Revenue Code of
1997," was approved and signed into law by President Arroyo

The following are the salient features of the new law:It increased the basic personal exemption
from P20,000 for a single individual, P25,000 for the head of the family, and P32,000 for a
married individual to P50,000 for each individual.It increased the additional exemption for each
dependent not exceeding four from P8,000 to P25,000.It raised the Optional Standard Deduction
(OSD) for individual taxpayers from 10% of gross income to 40% of the gross receipts or gross
sales.It introduced the OSD to corporate taxpayers at no more than 40% of their gross income.It
granted MWEs exemption from payment of income tax on their minimum wage, holiday pay,
overtime pay, night shift differential pay and hazard pay.[1]

Accordingly, R.A. 9504 was published in the Manila Bulletin and Malaya on 21 June 2008. On 6
July 2008, the end of the 15-day period, the law took effect.

Petitioners Jaime N. Soriano et al. primarily assail Section 3 of RR 10-2008 providing for the
prorated application of the personal and additional exemptions for taxable year 2008 to begin only
effective 6 July 2008 for being contrary to Section 4 of Republic Act No. 9504.[2]Petitioners
argue that the prorated application of the personal and additional exemptions under RR 10-2008 is
not "the legislative intendment in this jurisdiction."[3] They stress that Congress has always
maintained a policy of "full taxable year treatment"[4] as regards the application of tax exemption
laws. They allege further that R.A. 9504 did not provide for a prorated application of the new set
of personal and additional exemptions.[5]

Then Senator Manuel Roxas, as principal author of R.A. 9504, also argues for a full taxable year
treatment of the income tax benefits of the new law. He relies on what he says is clear legislative
intent In his "Explanatory Note of Senate Bill No. 103," he stresses "the very spirit of enacting the
subject tax exemption law

Petitioner Trade Union Congress of the Philippine contends that the provisions of R.A. 9504
provide for the application of the tax exemption for the full calendar year 2008. It also espouses
the interpretation that R.A. 9504 provides for the unqualified tax exemption of the income of
MWEs regardless of the other benefits they receive.[14] In conclusion, it says that RR 10-2008,
which is only an implementing rule, amends the original intent of R.A. 9504, which is the
substantive law, and is thus null and void.

Petitioners Senator Francis Joseph Escudero, the Tax Management Association of the Philippines,
Inc., and Ernesto Ebro allege that R.A. 9504 unconditionally grants MWEs exemption from
income tax on their taxable income, as wel1 as increased personal and additional exemptions for
other individual taxpayers, for the whole year 2008. They note that the assailed RR 10-2008
restricts the start of the exemptions to 6 July 2008 and provides that those MWEs who received
"other benefits" in excess of P30,000 are not exempt from income taxation. Petitioners believe this
RR is a "patent nullity"[15] and therefore voiD
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Consolidated Comment[16] and took the
position that the application of R.A. 9504 was intended to be prospective, and not retroactive. This
was supposedly the general rule under the rules of statutory construction: law will only be applied
retroactively if it clearly provides for retroactivity, which is not provided in this instance

The OSG further argues that the legislative intent of non-retroactivity was effectively confirmed
by the "Conforme" of Senator Escudero, Chairperson of the Senate Committee on Ways and
Means, on the draft revenue regulation that became RR 10-2008.

Issues:

First, whether the increased personal and additional exemptions provided by R.A. 9504 should be
applied to the entire taxable year 2008 or prorated, considering that R.A. 9504 took effect only on
6 July 2008.Second, whether an MWE is exempt for the entire taxable year 2008 or from 6 July
2008 only.Third, whether Sections 1 and 3 of RR 10-2008 are consistent with the law in providing
that an MWE who receives other benefits in excess of the statutory limit of P30,000[19] is no
longer entitled to the exemption provided by R.A. 9504.

Ruling:

the policy of full taxable year treatment is established, not by the amendments introduced by R.A.
9504, but by the provisions of the 1997 Tax Code, which adopted the policy from as early as 1969.

Principles:

This Court ruled in the affirmative, considering that the increased exemptions were already
available on or before 15 April 1992, the date for the filing of individual income tax returns.
Further, the law itself provided that the new set of personal and additional exemptions would be
immediately available upon its effectivity. While R.A. 7167 had not yet become effective during
calendar year 1991, the Court found that it was a piece of social legislation that was in part
intended to alleviate the economic plight of the lower-income taxpayers. For that purpose, the new
law provided for adjustments "to the poverty threshold level" prevailing at the time of the
enactment of the law
T]he Court is of the considered view that Rep. Act 7167 should cover or extend to compensation
income earned or received during calendar year 1991

In sum, R.A. 9504, like R.A. 7167 in Umali, was a piece of social legislation clearly intended to
afford immediate tax relief to individual taxpayers, particularly low-income compensation earners.
Indeed, if R.A. 9504 was to take effect beginning taxable year 2009 or half of the year 2008 only,
then the intent of Congress to address the increase in the cost of living in 2008 would have been
negated.

The NIRC is clear on these matters. The taxable income of an individual taxpayer shall be
computed on the basis of the calendar year.[30] The taxpayer is required to fi1e an income tax
return on the 15th of April of each year covering income of the preceding taxable year.[31] The
tax due thereon shall be paid at the time the return is filed

In the present case, the increased exemptions were already available much earlier than the
required time of filing of the return on 15 April 2009. R.A. 9504 came into law on 6 July 2008,
more than nine months before the deadline for the filing of the income tax return for taxable year
2008. Hence, individual taxpayers were entitled to claim the increased amounts for the entire year
2008. This was true despite the fact that incomes were already earned or received prior to the law's
effectivity on 6 July 2008.

We find the facts of this case to be substantially identical to those of Umali.First, both cases
involve an amendment to the prevailing tax code. The present petitions call for the interpretation
of the effective date of the increase in personal and additional exemptions. Otherwise stated, the
present case deals with an amendment (R.A. 9504) to the prevailing tax code (R.A. 8424 or the
1997 Tax Code). Like the present case, Umali involved an amendment to the then prevailing tax
code - it interpreted the effective date of R.A. 7167, an amendment to the 1977 NIRC, which also
increased personal and additional exemptions.Second, the amending law in both cases reflects an
intent to make the new set of personal and additional exemptions immediately available after the
effectivity of the law. As already pointed out, in Umali, R.A. 7167 involved social legislation
intended to adjust personal and additional exemptions. The adjustment was made in keeping with
the poverty threshold level prevailing at the time.Third, both cases involve social legislation
intended to cure a social evil - R.A. 7167 was meant to adjust personal and additional exemptions
in relation to the poverty threshold level, while R.A. 9504 was geared towards addressing the
impact of the global increase in the price of goods.Fourth, in both cases, it was clear that the intent
of the legislature was to hasten the enactment of the law to make its beneficial relief immediately
available.