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Mijares vs Ranada

Facts: Ten Filipino citizens who each alleged having suffered human rights abuses such as arbitrary
detention, torture and rape in the hands of police or military forces during the Marcos regime, filed with
the US District Court, Hawaii, against the Estate Ferdinand E. Marcos. Trial ensued, and subsequently
a jury rendered a Final Judgment and an award of compensatory and exemplary damages in favor of
the plaintiff class with an award of a total of One Billion Nine Hundred Sixty Four Million Five Thousand
Eight Hundred Fifty Nine Dollars and Ninety Cents ($1,964,005,859.90). The present petitioners
filed Complaint with the Makati RTC for the enforcement of the Final Judgment. Respondent Judge
Ranada of the Makati RTC issued the subject Order dismissing the complaint without prejudice.

ISSUE: May petitioners successfully invoke Art 3 Sec 11 of the Constitution?


Ruling: Section 11, Article III of the Constitution, which states that [F]ree access to the courts and
quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of
poverty. Since the provision is among the guarantees ensured by the Bill of Rights, it certainly gives
rise to a demandable right. However, now is not the occasion to elaborate on the parameters of this
constitutional right. Given our preceding discussion, it is not necessary to utilize this provision in order
to grant the relief sought by the petitioners. It is axiomatic that the constitutionality of an act will not be
resolved by the courts if the controversy can be settled on other grounds unless the resolution thereof
is indispensable for the determination of the case.
Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Org vs. PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC. and
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.
Facts: PBMEO decided to stage a mass demonstration in front of Malacañang to express their
grievances against the alleged abuses of the Pasig Police. Philippine Blooming Mills Inc., called for a
meeting with the leaders of the PBMEO. During the meeting, the planned demonstration was
confirmed by the union. But it was stressed out that the demonstration was not a strike against the
company but was in fact an exercise of the laborers' inalienable constitutional right to freedom of
expression, freedom of speech and freedom for petition for redress of grievances. A second meeting
took place where the company reiterated their appeal that while the workers may be allowed to
participate, those from the 1st and regular shifts should not absent themselves to participate,
otherwise, they would be dismissed. Since it was too late to cancel the plan, the rally took place and
the officers of the PBMEO were eventually dismissed for a violation of the ‘No Strike and No Lockout’
clause of their Collective Bargaining Agreement.
Issue: Whether or not the workers who joined the strike violated the CBA?
Held: No. While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights over
property rights is recognized. Because these freedoms are "delicate and vulnerable, as well as
supremely precious in our society" and the "threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as
potently as the actual application of sanctions," they "need breathing space to survive,"
permitting government regulation only "with narrow specificity." Property and property rights can be
lost thru prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights
to freedom of expression and of assembly occupy a preferred position as they are essential to the
preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions; and such priority "gives these liberties the
sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious intrusions."
Tupas vs CA
Facts: Petitioners received a copy of the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City on April 3,
1989, and that the motion for reconsideration thereof was filed on April 17, 1989, or fourteen days
later. The order of May 3, 1989, denying the motion was received by the petitioners' counsel on May
9, 1989. Instead of filing the petition for review with the Court of Appeals within the remainder of the
15-day reglementary period, that is, on May 10, 1989, the petitioner did so only on May 23, 1989, or
14 days later. The petition was therefore clearly tardy.
Issue: WON the respondent court erred in dismissing the petitioners' appeal on the ground of
tardiness.
Held: No. Rules of procedure are intended to ensure the orderly administration of justice and the
protection of substantive rights in judicial and extrajudicial proceedings. It is a mistake to suppose that
substantive law and adjective law are contradictory to each other or, as has often been suggested,
that enforcement of procedural rules should never be permitted if it will result in prejudice to the
substantive rights of the litigants. This is not exactly true; the concept is much misunderstood. As a
matter of fact, the policy of the courts is to give effect to both kinds of law, as complementing each
other, in the just and speedy resolution of the dispute between the parties. Observance of both
substantive and procedural rights is equally guaranteed by due process, whatever the source of such
rights, be it the Constitution itself or only a statute or a rule of court.

Banco Espanol 37 P 921

Facts: Engracio Palanca was indebted to El Banco and he had his parcel of land as security to his
debt. His debt amounted to P218,294.10. His property is worth 75k more than what he owe. Due to
the failure of Engracio to make his payments, El Banco executed an instrument to mortgage
Engracio‟s property. Engracio however left for China and he never returned til he died. Since Engracio
is a non resident El Banco has to notify Engracio about their intent to sue him by means of publication
using a newspaper. The lower court further orderdd the clerk of court to furnish Engracio a copy and
that it be sent to Amoy, China. The court eventually granted El Banco petition to execute
Engracio‟s property. 7 years thereafter, Vicente surfaced on behalf of Engracio as his administrator
to petition for the annulment of the ruling. Vicente averred that there had been no due process as
Engracio never received the summons.
Issue: Whether or not the procedural aspect of the right to due process has been prejudiced.
Held: The essential of procedural fairness in judicial proceedings are:

1. There must be a COURT or TRIBUNAL clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the
matter before it;
2. JURISDICTION must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the property
which is the subject of the proceeding;
3. The defendant must be given the OPPORTUNITY to be heard; and

4. Judgment must be rendered upon lawful HEARING.


Conclusions stated by the court indicated that the judgment appealed from is without error, and the
same is accordingly affirmed.
Ang Tibay vs CIR
Facts: Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay, a leather company which supplies the Philippine
Army. Due to alleged shortage of leather, Toribio caused the layoff of members of National Labor
Union (NLU). NLU averred that Toribio’s act is not valid. The CIR, decided the case and elevated it to
the SC, but a motion for new trial was raised by the NLU. But Ang Tibay filed a motion for opposing
the said motion.
ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a due process of law.
HELD: The SC ruled that there should be a new trial in favor of NLU. The SC ruled that all
administrative bodies cannot ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due
process. That the The CIR is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the law of its
creation which is the Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an administrative board than a part of
the integrated judicial system of the nation. The CIR is free from rigidity of certain procedural
requirements, but this not mean that it can in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or
disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an
administrative character. There are cardinal primary rights which must be respected even
in proceedings of this character:

(1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one’s cause and submit evidence in
support thereof;
(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
(3) The decision must have something to support itself;
(4) The evidence must be substantial;
(5) The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing; or at least contained in the
record and disclosed to the parties affected;
(6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own independent consideration of the law
and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate;
(7) The Board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such manner that the
parties to the proceeding can know the various Issue involved, and the reason for the decision rendered.

Shu vs Dee

Facts: Petitioner filed a complaint before the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) charging the
respondents of falsification of two deeds of real estate mortgage submitted to Metrobank. Both deeds
of real estate mortgage were allegedly signed by the petitioner, one in his own name while the other
was on behalf of 3A Apparel Corporation. NBI filed a complaint with the City Prosecutor of Makati
charging the respondents of the crime of forgery and falsification of public documents. The
respondents argued in their counter-affidavits that they were denied their right to due process during
the NBI investigation because the agency never required them and Metrobank to submit the standard
sample signatures of the petitioner for comparison. The findings contained in the questioned
documents report only covered the sample signatures unilaterally submitted by the petitioner as
compared with the signatures appearing on the two deeds of real estate mortgage. An examination of
the signatures of the petitioner which appear in several documents in Metrobank’s possession
revealed that his signatures in the questioned deeds are genuine.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents were denied of their right to due process during the NBI
investigation.
HELD: NO. The Court held that the functions of this agency are merely investigatory
and informational in nature. It has no judicial or quasi-judicial powers and is incapable of granting any
relief to any party. It cannot even determine probable cause. The NBI is an investigative agency
whose findings are merely recommendatory. It undertakes investigation of crimes upon its
own initiative or as public welfare may require in accordance with its mandate. There was no denial of
the respondents’ due process right could have taken place as the NBI’s findings were still subject to
the prosecutor’s and the Secretary of Justice’s actions for purposes of finding the existence of probable
cause. The respondents were not likewise denied their right to due process when the NBI issued the
questioned documents report. There was no categorical finding in the questioned documents report
that the respondents falsified the documents.

GMA NETWORK, INC., et al v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS


Facts: Resolution 9615 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) changed the airtime limitations
for political campaign from “per station” basis, as used during the 2007 and 2010 elections, to a “total
aggregate” basis for the 2013. Various broadcast networks questioned the interpretation of the
COMELEC on the ground that the provisions are oppressive and violative of the constitutional
guarantees of freedom of expression and of the press. Collectively, they question the constitutionality
of Section 9 (a), which provides for an “aggregate total” airtime instead of the previous “per station”
airtime for political campaigns or advertisements, and also required prior COMELEC approval for
candidates' television and radio guestings and appearances.
ISSUE: Does Section 9(a) of Comelec Resolution No. 9615 on airtime limit violate the constitutional
guaranty of freedom of expression, of speech and of the press?
RULING: Yes, Section 9(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615, with its adoption of the “aggregate-
based” airtime limits unreasonably restricts the guaranteed freedom of speech and of the press. The
assailed rule on “aggregate-based” airtime limits is unreasonable and arbitrary as it unduly restricts
and constrains the ability of candidates and political parties to reach out and communicate with the
people. Here, the adverted reason for imposing the “aggregate-based” airtime limits – leveling the
playing field – does not constitute a compelling state interest which would justify such a substantial
restriction on the freedom of candidates and political parties to communicate their ideas, philosophies,
platforms and programs of government.

Gov’t of Hongkong vs Olalia


FACTS: Respondent Muñoz was charged of 3 counts of offences of “accepting an advantage as
agent”, and 7 counts of conspiracy to defraud, punishable by the common law of Hongkong. The
Hongkong Depoartment of Justice requested DOJ for the provisional arrest of respondent Muñoz; the
DOJ forward the request to the NBI then to RTC. On the same day, NBI agents arrested him.
Respondent filed with the CA a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with application for
preliminary mandatory injunction and writ of habeas corpus questioning the validity of the order of
arrest. The CA declared the arrest void. Hence this petition by the Hongkong Department of Justice
thru DOJ. DOJ filed a petition for certiorari in this Court and sustained the validity of the arrest.
Hongkong Administrative Region then filed in the RTC petition for extradition and arrest of respondent.
Meanwhile, respondent filed a petition for bail, which was opposed by the petitioner, initially the RTC
denied the petition holding that there is no Philippine Law granting bail in extradition cases and that
private responded is a “flight risk”. Motion for reconsideration was filed by the respondent, which was
granted. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not right to bail can be avail in extradition cases.
HELD: EXTRADITION, is defined as the removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object
of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or government to
hold him in connection with criminal investigation directed against him or execution of a penalty
imposed on him under the penal and criminal law of the requesting state or government. Thus
characterized as the right of the a foreign power, created by treaty to demand the surrender of one
accused or convicted of a crimes within its territorial jurisdiction, and the correlative obligation of the
other state to surrender him to the demanding state. The extradited may be subject to detention as
may be necessary step in the process of extradition, but the length of time in the detention should be
reasonable. Records show that the respondent, Muñoz has been detained for 2 years without being
convicted in Hongkong. The Philippines has the obligation of ensuring the individual his right to liberty
and due process and should not therefor deprive the extraditee of his right to bail PROVIDED that
certain standards for the grant is satisfactorily met. In other words there should be “CLEAR AND
CONVINCING EVIDENCE”. However in the case at bar, the respondent was not able to show and
clear and convincing evidence that he be entitled to bail. Thus the case is remanded in the court for
the determination and otherwise, should order the cancellation of his bond and his immediate
detention.
THE UNITED STATES v. LUIS TORIBIO
G.R. No. L-5060 - January 26, 1910
FACTS: Sections 30 and 32 of the Act No. 1147 are as follows:

SEC. 30. No large cattle shall be slaughtered or killed for food at the municipal slaughterhouse except
upon permit secured from the municipal treasure…
SEC. 31. No permit to slaughter has been carabaos shall be granted by the municipal treasurer unless
such animals are unfit for agricultural work or for draft purposes, and in no event shall a permit be
given to slaughter for food any animal of any kind which is not fit for human consumption.
It appears however that in the town of Carmen, in the Province of Bohol, wherein the animal was
slaughtered there is no municipal slaughterhouse. It appears that the defendant did in fact apply for a
permit to slaughter his carabao, and that it was denied him on the ground that the animal was not unfit
"for agricultural work or for draft purposes." Counsel that the statute is unconstitutional and in violation
of the terms of section 5 of the Philippine Bill, which provides that "no law shall be enacted which shall
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law."
ISSUES
1. Does the act of obtaining a license prior to slaughter of carabaos for human consumption constitute
taking?
2. Do Sections 30, 31, 32, and 33 of Act No. 1147 violates due process of law?
HELD

1. No. the restrain placed by the law on the slaughter for human consumption of carabaos fit for
agricultural work and draft purpose is not an appropriation of property interests to a "public use," and
is not, therefore, within the principle of the exercise by the State of the right of eminent domain. It is
fact a mere restriction or limitation upon a private use, which the legislature deemed to be determental
to the public welfare.
2. No. It is clear that the enactment of the provisions of the statute under consideration was required
by "the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class;" and that the
prohibition of the slaughter of carabaos for human consumption, so long as these animals are fit for
agricultural work or draft purposes was a "reasonably necessary" limitation on private ownership, to
protect the community from the loss of the services of such animals by their slaughter by improvident
owners, tempted either by greed of momentary gain, or by a desire to enjoy the luxury of animal food,
even when by so doing the productive power of the community may be measurably and dangerously
affected.

FRANCIS A. CHURCHILL and STEWART TAIT v. JAMES J. RAFFERTY


G.R. No. L-10572 December 21, 1915
FACTS: The judgment appealed from in this case perpetually restrains and prohibits the defendant
and his deputies from collecting and enforcing against the plaintiffs and their property the annual tax
mentioned and described in subsection (b) of section 100 of Act No. 2339, effective July 1, 1914, and
from destroying or removing any sign, signboard, or billboard, the property of the plaintiffs, for the sole
reason that such sign, signboard, or billboard is, or may be, offensive to the sight.
ISSUE: Can the Collector of Internal Revenue be prohibited from collecting the annual tax and from
removing or destroying any sign, signboard, or billboard, the property of the plaintiffs?
HELD: As to the collection of taxes: No. It is he settled law in the United States that "due process of
law" does not always require, in respect to the Government, the same process that is required between
citizens, though it generally implies and includes regular allegations, opportunity to answer, and a trial
according to some well settled course of judicial proceedings. A citizen's property, both real and
personal, may be taken, and usually is taken, by the government in payment of its taxes without any
judicial proceedings whatever. This must necessarily be the course, because it is upon taxation that
the Government chiefly relies to obtain the means to carry on its operations.

As to the removal of any sign, signboard, or billboard, the property of the plaintiffs: No. There can be
no doubt that the exercise of the police power belongs to the Legislature. An Act of the Legislature
which interferes with the ordinary enjoyment of property would be held to be invalid. But where the Act
is reasonably within a proper consideration of and care for the public health, safety, or comfort, it
should not be disturbed by the courts. The advertising industry is a legitimate one. Billboard
advertising, as it is now conducted, is a comparatively recent form of advertising. It is conducted out
of doors and along the arteries of travel, and compels attention by the strategic locations of the boards,
which obstruct the range of vision at points where travelers are most likely to direct their eyes. Beautiful
landscapes are marred or may not be seen at all by the traveler because of the gaudy array of posters.
Outdoor life must lose much of its charm and pleasure if this form of advertising is permitted to continue
unhampered until it converts the streets and highways into veritable canyons through which the world
must travel in going to work or in search of outdoor pleasure.

The success of billboard advertising depends not so much upon the use of private property as it does
upon the use of the channels of travel used by the general public. Ostensibly located on private
property, the real and sole value of the billboard is its proximity to the public thoroughfares. Hence,
the regulation of billboards and their restriction is not so much a regulation of private property as it is
a regulation of the use of the streets and other public thoroughfares.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JUAN F. FAJARDO, ET AL.

G.R. No. L-12172 August 29, 1958

FACTS: The defendants filed a written request with the incumbent municipal mayor for a permit to
construct a building located along the national highway and separated from the public plaza by a creek.
The request was however denied, for the reason among others that the proposed building would
destroy the view or beauty of the public plaza. Nonetheless, appellants proceeded with the
construction of the building without a permit, because they needed a place of residence very badly,
their former house having been destroyed by a typhoon and hitherto they had been living on leased
property. Thus, they were convicted of a violation of Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1950 for having
constructed without a permit from the municipal mayor a building that destroys the view of the public
plaza.

ISSUE: Is the conviction of the defendants proper?

HELD: No. A first objection to the validity of the ordinance in question is that under it the mayor has
absolute discretion to issue or deny a permit. The ordinance fails to state any policy, or to set up any
standard to guide or limit the mayor's action. No purpose to be attained by requiring the permit is
expressed; no conditions for its grant or refusal are enumerated. It is not merely a case of deficient
standards; standards are entirely lacking. The ordinance thus confers upon the mayor arbitrary and
unrestricted power to grant or deny the issuance of building permits, and it is a settled rule that such
an undefined and unlimited delegation of power to allow or prevent an activity, per se lawful, is invalid

The ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive, in that it operates to permanently deprive appellants
of the right to use their own property; hence, it oversteps the bounds of police power, and amounts to
a taking of appellants’ property without just compensation. While property may be regulated in the
interest of the general welfare, and in its pursuit, the State may prohibit structures offensive to the
sight, the State may not, under the guise of police power, permanently divest owners of the beneficial
use of their property and practically confiscate them solely to preserve or assure the aesthetic
appearance of the community. If the questioned ordinance will be upheld as constitutional, the
appellants would, in effect, be constrained to let their land remain idle and unused for the obvious
purpose for which it is best suited, being urban in character. To legally achieve that result, the
municipality must give appellants just compensation and an opportunity to be heard.

ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., HOTEL DEL MAR
INC. and GO CHIU v. THE HONORABLE CITY MAYOR OF MANILA

G.R. No. L-24693 July 31, 1967

FACTS: Ordinance No. 4760 was enacted by the Municipal Board of the City of Manila. Thereafter a
petition for prohibition was filed against the respondent Mayor of the City of Manila. There was the
assertion of its being beyond the powers of the Municipal Board of the City of Manila to enact insofar:
1. As it would regulate motels, on the ground that in the revised charter of the City of Manila or in any
other law, no reference is made to motels; 2. That Section 1 of the challenged ordinance is
unconstitutional and void for being unreasonable and violative of due process insofar as it would
impose P6,000.00 fee per annum for first class motels and P4,500.00 for second class motels; 3. That
guests would fill up a form specifying their personal information before a hotel, motel, or lodging house
to refrain from entertaining or accepting any guest or customer or letting any room or other quarter to
any person or persons; 4. That the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging houses
would be open for inspection either by the City Mayor, or the Chief of Police, or their duly authorized
representatives; 5. That Section 2 of the challenged ordinance classifying motels into two classes and
requiring the maintenance of certain minimum facilities in first class motels; 6. That the provision of
Section 2 of the challenged ordinance prohibiting a person less than 18 years old from being accepted
in such hotels, motels, lodging houses, tavern or common inn unless accompanied by parents or a
lawful guardian and making it unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized
representative of such establishments to lease any room or portion thereof more than twice every 24
hours. And that such ordinance is unconstitutional and void on due process grounds, not only for being
arbitrary, unreasonable or oppressive but also for being vague, indefinite and uncertain, and likewise
for the alleged invasion of the right to privacy and the guaranty against self-incrimination.

ISSUE: Is the questioned ordinance unconstitutional?

HELD No. The constitutionality of the ordinance must be upheld in the absence of any evidence to
offset the presumption of validity that attaches to a challenged statute or ordinance. There is no
question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful
to public morals. The explanatory note of the Councilor Astorga speaks of the alarming increase in the
rate of prostitution, adultery and fornication in Manila traceable in great part to the existence of motels,
which "provide a necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit" and thus become
the "ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill-seekers." The challenged ordinance then proposes to check
the clandestine harboring of transients and guests of these establishments by requiring these
transients and guests to fill up a registration form, prepared for the purpose, in a lobby open to public
view at all times, and by introducing several other amendatory provisions calculated to shatter the
privacy that characterizes the registration of transients and guests." Moreover, the increase in the
licensed fees was intended to discourage "establishments of the kind from operating for purpose other
than legal" and at the same time, to increase "the income of the city government." It would appear
therefore that the stipulation of facts, far from sustaining any attack against the validity of the
ordinance, argues eloquently for it.

We are thus led to considering the insistent, almost shrill tone, in which the objection is raised to the
question of due process. Due process is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to
the dictates of justice. To satisfy the due process requirement, official action must not outrun the
bounds of reason and result in sheer oppression. Due process is thus hostile to any official action
marred by lack of reasonableness. Correctly it has been identified as freedom from arbitrariness. As
to the present case, there is no showing that the Municipal Board of the City of Manila acted with
arbitrariness. Nor does the restriction on the freedom to contract, insofar as the challenged ordinance
makes it unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of any hotel, motel,
lodging house, tavern, common inn or the like, to lease or rent room or portion thereof more than twice
every 24 hours, with a proviso that in all cases full payment shall be charged, call for a different
conclusion. Again, such a limitation cannot be viewed as a transgression against the command of due
process. It is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary. Precisely it was intended to curb the opportunity for
the immoral or illegitimate use to which such premises could be, and, according to the explanatory
note, are being devoted.

RESTITUTO YNOT v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987

FACTS: Pursuant to Executive Order No. 626-A, “no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical
condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another. The carabao
or carabeef transported in violation of this Executive Order shall be subject to confiscation and
forfeiture by the government, to be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as
the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and
to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of
carabaos.” The petitioner had transported six carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo, when they were
confiscated by the police station commander for violation of the above executive order.

ISSUE: Is the executive order is unconstitutional?

HELD: Procedural due process: Yes. The minimum requirements of due process are notice and
hearing which, generally speaking, may not be dispensed with because they are intended as a
safeguard against official arbitrariness. This is not to say that notice and hearing are imperative in
every case for, to be sure, there are a number of admitted exceptions. The conclusive presumption,
for example, bars the admission of contrary evidence as long as such presumption is based on human
experience or there is a rational connection between the fact proved and the fact ultimately presumed
therefrom. It is also conceded that summary action may be validly taken in administrative proceedings
as procedural due process is not necessarily judicial only. In the exceptional cases accepted, however,
there is a justification for the omission of the right to a previous hearing, to wit, the immediacy of the
problem sought to be corrected and the urgency of the need to correct it, which is not present in this
case.

Substantive due process: Yes. Similar to US v. Toribio, the carabao has a direct relevance to the
public welfare and so is a lawful subject of EO No. 626. However, it does not comply with the second
requirement, viz., that there be a lawful method. EO No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on
the slaughter of the carabaos but on their movement. The prohibition of the inter-provincial transport
of carabaos cannot prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed
anywhere. As for the carabeef it could be easily circumvented by simply killing the animal. Further,
under the challenged measure, no trial is prescribed (unlike the Toribio case), and the property being
transported is immediately impounded by the police and declared, by the measure itself, as forfeited
to the government. In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station
commander. The measure struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a chance
to be heard, thus denying him the centuries-old guaranty of elementary fair play.

CARLOS BALACUIT, LAMBERTO TAN and SERGIO YU CARCEL v. COURT OF FIRST


INSTANCE OF AGUSAN DEL NORTE AND BUTUAN CITY and the CITY OF BUTUAN

G.R. No. L-38429 June 30, 1988

FACTS: Ordinance No. 640 passed by the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan making it unlawful
for any person, group of persons, entity, or corporation engaged in the business of selling admission
tickets to any movie or other public exhibitions, games, contests, or other performances to require
children between seven (7) and twelve (12) years of age to pay full payment for admission tickets
intended for adults but should charge only one-half of the value of the said tickets.Thus, the present
petition alleging that the subject ordinance is unconstitutional for invalid exercise of police power and,
therefore, void and unenforceable.

ISSUE: Is the subject ordinance is unconstitutional for invalid exercise of police power?

HELD: Yes. To invoke the exercise of police power, not only must it appear that the interest of the
public generally requires an interference with private rights (lawful subject), but the means adopted
must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals (lawful means). In this jurisdiction, it is already settled that the operation of theaters,
cinematographs and other places of public exhibition are subject to regulation by the municipal council
in the exercise of delegated police power by the local government. However, the ordinance (lowering
admission tickets for children) is not justified by any necessity for the public interest. The police power
legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist
between purposes and means. The evident purpose of the ordinance is to help ease the burden of
cost on the part of parents; however, the petitioners are the ones made to bear the cost of these
savings. The ordinance does not only make the petitioners suffer the loss of earnings but it likewise
penalizes them for failure to comply with it. Furthermore there will be difficulty in its implementation
because as already experienced by petitioners, children over 12 years of age tried to pass off their
age as below 12 years in order to avail of the benefit of the ordinance. The suggestion that birth
certificates be exhibited to prove the age of children is not practicable, and thus, the ordinance is
clearly unreasonable if not unduly oppressive upon the business of petitioners. Moreover, there is no
discernible relation between the ordinance and the promotion of public health, safety, morals and the
general welfare.

Lastly, while legislation had been passed controlling the prices of goods during periods of emergency
as a matter of national policy in the interest of public health and safety, economic security and the
general welfare of the people, the same could not be said of theaters, cinematographs and other
exhibitions as they are not public utilities. The State has not found it appropriate as a national policy
to interfere with the admission prices to these performances.

MAYOR PABLO P. MAGTAJAS & THE CITY OF CAGAYAN DE ORO v. PRYCE PROPERTIES
CORPORATION, INC. & PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION

G.R. No. 111097 July 20, 1994


FACTS: When PAGCOR announced the opening of a casino in Cagayan de Oro City,the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City thereafter enacted an ordinance prohibiting the issuance of
business permit and cancelling existing business permit to any establishment for the using and
allowing to be used its premises or portion thereof for the operation of casino.

Thus, Pryce and PAGCOR assailed the constitutionality of the said ordinance. Petitioner however,
contends that is has the power to enact the said ordinance pursuant to the as the General Welfare
Clause embodied in Section 16 of the Local Government Code. Petitioners also attack gambling as
intrinsically harmful and cite various provisions of the Constitution and several decisions of this Court
expressive of the general and official disapprobation of the vice.

ISSUE: Is the ordinance enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City invalid?

HELD: Yes. The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held that
to be valid, an ordinance must conform to the following substantive requirements: 1) it must not
contravene the constitution or any statute; 2) It must not be unfair or oppressive; 3) It must not be
partial or discriminatory; 4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade; 5) It must be general and
consistent with public policy; 6) It must not be unreasonable.

Gambling is not illegal per se. There is nothing in the Constitution categorically proscribing or
penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even mentioning it at all. It is left to Congress to deal with the
activity as it sees fit. The legislature may prohibit gambling altogether or allow it without limitation or it
may prohibit some forms of gambling and allow others for whatever reasons it may consider sufficient.

Sec. 458 of the Local Government Code, local government units are authorized to prevent or suppress,
among others, "gambling and other prohibited games of chance." Obviously, this provision excludes
games of chance which are not prohibited but are in fact permitted by law. There are indeed two kinds
of gambling, to wit, the illegal and those authorized by law. The petitioners' suggestion that the Code
authorizes them to prohibit all kinds of gambling would erase the distinction between these two forms
of gambling without a clear indication that this is the will of the legislature.

PAGCOR, which was created to operate casinos "on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of
the Philippines are deemed to be permitted by law. There is also no showing that the PAGCOR charter
has not been repealed by the Local Government Code to render the operation of PAGCOR inutile and
submissive to the will of a local government unit.

People v. Siton 18 Sept. 2009


Facts: Respondents Evangeline Siton and Krystel Kate Sagarano were charged with
vagrancy pursuant to Art. 202 (2) of the RPC in two separate Informations. Accused were
found wandering and loitering around San Pedro and Legaspi Streets of Davao City,
without any visible means to support herself nor lawful and justifiable purpose.
Respondents filed separate Motions to Quash on the ground that Art. 202 (2) is
unconstitutional for being vague and overboard. The municipal trial court denied the
motions, directed respondents to file their respective counter-affidavits, and declared that
the law on vagrancy was enacted pursuant to the State’s police power (or the power of
promoting public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property) and
justified by the Latin maxim “salus populi est suprema lex” (which calls for the
subordination of individual benefit to the interest of the greater number). Respondents
filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the RTC challenging the constitutionality
of the anti-vagrancy law and claiming that Art 202 (2) violated the equal protection clause.
The RTC granted the petition of the herein respondents and declared Art. 202 (2)
unconstitutional.

Issue: Does Article 202 (2), RPC on vagrancy violate the equal protection clause?

Ruling: No. Article 202 (2) of the RPC does not violate the equal protection clause; neither
does it discriminate against the poor and the unemployed. Offenders of public order laws
are punished not for their status, as for being poor or unemployed, but for conducting
themselves under such circumstances as to endanger the public peace or cause alarm and
apprehension in the community. Being poor or unemployed is not a license or a
justification to act indecently or to engage in immoral conduct.

League of Cities v. Comelec 18 November 2008

Facts: During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law RA 9009 amending Section 450
of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual income requirement for conversion
of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million to restrain the “mad rush” of
municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger share in the Internal Revenue
Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable of fiscal independence. Prior to its
enactment, a total of 57 municipalities had cityhood bills pending in Congress. Congress
did not act on 24 cityhood bills during the 11th Congress. During the 12th Congress, the
House of Representatives adopted Joint Resolution No. 29. This Resolution reached the
Senate. However, the 12th Congress adjourned without the Senate approving Joint
Resolution No. 29. During the 13th Congress, 16 of the 24 municipalities mentioned in the
unapproved Joint Resolution No. 29 filed between November and December of 2006,
through their respective sponsors in Congress, individual cityhood bills containing a
common provision, as follows: Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009. - The City of x x x
shall be exempted from the income requirement prescribed under Republic Act No. 9009.
These cityhood bills lapsed into law on various dates from March to July 2007 after
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo failed to sign them.
Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional
for violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal
protection clause. Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of municipalities
into cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because
more cities will share the same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under
Section 285 of the Local Government Code.

Issue: Whether or not the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution
and the equal protection clause
Ruling: Yes, the Cityhood Laws violate both the Constitution and the equal protection
clause.

Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides:


No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided, merged, abolished
or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. (Emphasis supplied)
The Constitution is clear. The creation of local government units must follow
the criteria established in the Local Government Code and not in any other law. There
is only one Local Government Code. The Constitution requires Congress to stipulate in the
Local Government Code all the criteria necessary for the creation of a city, including the
conversion of a municipality into a city. Congress cannot write such criteria in any other
law, like the Cityhood Laws.

Section 450 of the Local Government Code provides:

Section 450. Requisites for Creation. – (a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may
be converted into a component city if it has a locallygenerated average annual income,
as certified by the Department of Finance, of at least One hundred million pesos
(P100,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 2000 constant
prices, and if it has either of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers, as certified by the
Land Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as
certified by the National Statistics Office.
The creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population and income of the original
unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed
herein.
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly identified by metes
and bounds. The requirement on land area shall not apply where the city proposed to be
created is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territory need not be contiguous if it
comprises two (2) or more islands.
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund,
exclusive of special funds, transfers, and non-recurring income.
Thus, RA 9009 increased the income requirement for conversion of a municipality
into a city from P20 million toP100 million. Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as
amended by RA 9009, does not provide any exemption from the increased income
requirement.
The equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution permits a valid
classification under the following conditions:
1. The classification must rest on substantial distinctions;
2. The classification must be germane to the purpose of the law;
3. The classification must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
4. The classification must apply equally to all members of the same class.
Limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities violates the requirement that
the classification must apply to all similarly situated. Municipalities with the same income
as the 16 respondent municipalities cannot convert into cities, while the 16 respondent
municipalities can. Clearly,as worded the exemption provision found in the Cityhood Laws,
even if it were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, would still be
unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.

Quinto and Tolentino v. Comelec 22 February 2010

Facts:
The court declared as unconstitutional the second provisio in the third paragraph of sec 13
of RA 9369, Sec 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Sec 4 of the COMELEC Resolution
8679 that they violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

On Dec 1, 2009 The Court declared the second provisio in the third paragraph of sec 13 of
RA 9369, Sec 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Sec 4 of the COMELEC Resolution 8679
as unconstitutional.
Dec 14, 2009 COMELEC filed the motion for reconsideration.
The second provisio in the third paragraph of sec 13 of RA 9369, Sec 66 of the Omnibus
Election Code and Sec 4 of the COMELEC Resolution 8679: “Any person holding a public
appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
and officers and employees in GOCCs shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office
upon filling of his certificate of candidacy“

Issue: Whether or not the second provisio in the third paragraph of sec 13 of RA 9369, Sec
66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Sec 4 of the COMELEC Resolution 8679, violate the
equal protection clause of the constitution.

Ruling: The Court reversed their previous decision and declared the second provisio in the
third paragraph of sec 13 of RA 9369, Sec 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Sec 4 of the
COMELEC Resolution 8679 as constitutional.

These laws and regulations implement Sec 2 Art IX-B of the 1987 Constitution which
prohibits civil service officers and employees from engaging in any electioneering or
partisan political campaign.
The intention to impose a strict limitation on the participation of civil service officers and
employees in partisan political campaign is unmistakable.
The equal protection of the law clause in the constitution is not absolute, but is subject to
reasonable classification if the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that
make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated different from the other.
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class
privelege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended
to prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by
territory within which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among
residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike under like circumstances
and conditions both as to priveleges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal
protection clause is not enfringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling
within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class and reasonable
ground exists for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those
who do not.
Substantial distinctions clearly exists between elective officials and appointive officials.
Elective officials occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. Appointive
officials hold their office by virtue of their designation by an appointing authority.

People v. Jumawan 21 April 2014

Facts:
Accused-appellant and his wife, KKK, were married and have four children.
On February 19, 1999, KKK executed a Complaint-Affidavit, alleging that her
husband, the accused-appellant, raped her at 3 :00 a.m. of December 3, 1998 at their
residence in Cagayan de Oro City, and that on December 12, 1998, the accused-appellant
boxed her shoulder for refusing to have sex with him.
As to the charge of rape according to KKK, conjugal intimacy did not really cause
marital problems between her and the accused-appellant. It was, in fact, both frequent and
fulfilling. He treated her well and she, of course, responded with equal degree of
enthusiasm. However, in 1997, he started to be brutal in bed. He would immediately
remove her panties and, sans any foreplay, insert her penis in her vagina.
His abridged method of lovemaking was physically painful for her so she would resist his
sexual ambush but he would threaten her into submission.
One night, in the spouse’s bedroom, KKK changed into a duster and fixed the
matrimonial bed but she did not lie thereon with the accused-appellant and instead, rested
separately in a cot near the bed. Her reclusive behavior prompted him to ask angrily: “Why
are you lying on the cot?”, and to instantaneously order: “You transfer here to our bed.”
KKK insisted to stay on the cot and explained that she had headache
and abdominal pain due to her forthcoming menstruation. Her reasons did not appease
him and he got angrier. He rose from the bed, lifted the cot and threw it against the wall
causing KKK to fall on the floor. Terrified, KKK stood up from where she fell, took her
pillow and transferred to the bed.
The accused-appellant then lay beside KKK and not before long, expressed his desire
to copulate with her by tapping his fingers on her lap. She politely declined by warding off
his hand and reiterating that she was not feeling well.
The accused-appellant again asserted his sexual yearning and when KKK tried to
resist by holding on to her panties, he pulled them down so forcefully they tore on the
sides. KKK stayed defiant by refusing to bend her legs.
The accused-appellant then raised KKK’s duster, stretched her legs apart and rested
his own legs on them. She tried to wrestle him away but he held her hands and succeeded
in penetrating her. As he was carrying out his carnal desires, KKK continued to protest by
desperately shouting: “Don ‘t do that to me because I’m not feeling well.”
Accused raised the defense of denial and alleged that KKK merely fabricated the
rape charges as her revenge because he took over the control and management of their
businesses, and to cover up her extra-marital affairs.

Issue: Whether or not there can be a marital rape.

Ruling: YES. The Supreme Court held that husbands do not have property rights over their
wives’ bodies. Sexual intercourse, albeit within the realm of marriage, if not consensual, is
rape.

Violation of equal protection clause


The Court ruled that to treat marital rape cases differently from non-marital rape
cases in terms of the elements that constitute the crime and in the rules for their proof,
infringes on the equal protection clause.
The Court found that there is no rational basis for distinguishing between marital
rape and non-marital rape. The various rationales which have been asserted in defense of
the exemption are either based upon archaic notions about the consent and property rights
incident to marriage or are simply unable to withstand even the slightest scrutiny.
The Court declared the marital exemption for rape in the New York statute to be
unconstitutional.
Said exemption states that a husband was endowed with absolute immunity from
prosecution for the rape of his wife. The privilege was personal and pertained to him alone.
He had the marital right to rape his wife but he will be liable when he aids or abets another
person in raping her.
Moreover, Section 1 of RA 8353 (Anti-Rape Law) penalizes the crime without regard
to the rapist’s legal relationship with his victim.

Villanueva v. JBC 7 April 2015

Facts: After about a year from being appointed as a MCTC judge, Judge Villanueva applied
for the vacant position of presiding judge in some RTC branches. The JBC however
informed him that he was not included in the list of candidates for such position because
the JBC’s long-standing policy requires 5 years of service as judge of first-level courts before
one can apply as judge for second-level courts. Before the SC, he assailed via Rule 65 and
Rule 63 with prayer for TRO and preliminary injunction the policy of JBC on the ground
that it is unconstitutional and was issued with grave abuse of discretion. Allegedly, the
policy also violates procedural due process for lack of publication and non-submission to
the UP Law Center Office of the National Administrative Register (ONAR), adding that the
policy should have been published because it will affect all applying judges.
On the other hand, one of the JBC’s arguments was that the writ of certiorari and
prohibition cannot issue to prevent the JBC from performing its principal function under
the Constitution to recommend appointees to the Judiciary because the JBC is not a
tribunal exercising judicial or quasi-judicial function.

Issue: Whether or not the JBC violates the equal protection clause.

Ruling: No. The equal protection clause is not violated because the classification created
by the challenged policy satisfies the rational basis test.

Substantial distinctions do exist between lower court judges with five year experience and
those with less than five years of experience, like the petitioner, and the classification
enshrined in the assailed policy is reasonable and relevant to its legitimate purpose. The
assailed criterion or consideration for promotion to a second-level court, which is five years’
experience as judge of a first-level court, is a direct adherence to the qualities prescribed
by the Constitution. Placing a premium on many years of judicial experience, the JBC is
merely applying one of the stringent constitutional standards requiring that a member of
the judiciary be of “proven competence.” In determining competence, the JBC considers,
among other qualifications, experience and performance.

Ferrer v. Bautista 30 June 2015

Facts:
The City of Quezon passed two ordinances namely:
 The first one was the Socialized Housing Tax of QC allowing the imposition of
special assessment (1/2 of the assessed valued of land in excess of P100k)
 The second one was Ordinance No. SP-2235, S-2013 on Garbage Collection Fees
imposing fees depending on the amount of the land or floor area).

Jose Ferrer, as a property owner and taxpayer in Quezon City questioned the validity of the
city ordinances.
According to Ferrer:
 The city has no power to impose the tax.
 The SHT violates the rule on equality because it burdens real property owners
with expenses to provide funds for the housing of informal settlers.
 The SHT is confiscatory or oppressive.

Section 3 of SP-2095 provides:


SECTION 3. IMPOSITION. A special assessment equivalent to one-half percent (0.5%) on
the assessed value of land in excess of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php100,000.00) shall
be collected by the City Treasurer which shall accrue to the Socialized Housing Programs
of the Quezon City Government. The special assessment shall accrue to the General Fund
under a special account to be established for the purpose (i.e., programs and projects for
low-cost housing and other mass dwellings).

On the other hand, Ordinance No. SP-2235, S-2013 on garbage collection places the rates
of the imposable fee dependent on the land or floor area and whether the payee is an
occupant of a lot, condominium, social housing project or apartment.

Issue: WON SP-2235, S-2013 on Garbage Fee violates the rule on equality.

Ruling: Yes, SP-2235 violates the rule on equality.

For the purpose of garbage collection, there is, in fact, no substantial distinction between an
occupant of a lot, on one hand, and an occupant of a unit in a condominium, socialized housing
project or apartment, on the other hand. Most likely, garbage output produced by these types of
occupants is uniform and does not vary to a large degree; thus, a similar schedule of fee is both just
and equitable.

The rates being charged by the ordinance are unjust and inequitable: a resident of a 200 sq. m. unit
in a condominium or socialized housing project has to pay twice the amount than a resident of a
lot similar in size; unlike unit occupants, all occupants of a lot with an area of 200 sq. m. and less
have to pay a fixed rate of Php100.00; and the same amount of garbage fee is imposed regardless of
whether the resident is from a condominium or from a socialized housing project.

Indeed, the classifications under Ordinance No. S-2235 are not germane to its declared purpose of
“promoting shared responsibility with the residents to attack their common mindless attitude in
over-consuming the present resources and in generating waste.” Instead of simplistically
categorizing the payee into land or floor occupant of a lot or unit of a condominium, socialized
housing project or apartment, respondent City Council should have considered factors that could
truly measure the amount of wastes generated and the appropriate fee for its collection. Factors
include, among others, household age and size, accessibility to waste collection, population density
of the barangay or district, capacity to pay, and actual occupancy of the property.

1-Utak v. Comelec 14 April 2015

Facts: On January 15, 2013, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 9615, which provided for
the rules implementing R.A. No. 9006 in connection with the May 13, 2013 national and local
elections and subsequent elections. Section 7 thereof, which enumerates the prohibited forms of
election propaganda, pertinently provides:

SEC. 7. Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda. – During the campaign period, it is unlawful:

xxxx
(f) To post, display or exhibit any election campaign or propaganda material outside of authorized
common poster areas, in public places, or in private properties without the consent of the owner
thereof.

(g) Public places referred to in the previous subsection (f) include any of the following:

xxxx

5. Public utility vehicles such as buses, jeepneys, trains, taxi cabs, ferries, pedicabs and tricycles,
whether motorized or not;

6. Within the premises of public transport terminals, such as bus terminals, airports, seaports,
docks, piers, train stations, and the like.

The violation of items [5 and 6] under subsection (g) shall be a cause for the revocation of the public
utility franchise and will make the owner and/or operator of the transportation service and/or
terminal liable for an election offense under Section 9 of Republic Act No. 9006 as implemented by
Section 18 (n) of these Rules.

Petitioner sought for clarification from COMELEC as regards the application of REsolution No. 9615
particularly Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), vis-à-vis privately owned
public utility vehicles (PUVs) and transport terminals. The petitioner then requested the
COMELEC to reconsider the implementation of the assailed provisions and allow private owners of
PUVs and transport terminals to post election campaign materials on their vehicles and transport
terminals.

The COMELEC en banc issued Minute Resolution No. 13-0214, which denied the petitioner’s
request to reconsider the implementation of Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section
7(f), of ResolutionNo. 9615.

Issue: Whether or not Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No.
9615 are constitutional.

Ruling: No. Prohibiting owners of PUVs and transport terminals from posting election
campaign materials violates the equal protection clause.

The assailed prohibition on posting election campaign materials is an invalid content-


neutral regulation repugnant to the free speech clause.

A content-neutral regulation, i.e., which is merely concerned with the incidents of the
speech, or one that merely controls the time, place or manner, and under well-defined standards,
is constitutionally permissible, even if it restricts the right to free speech, provided that the
following requisites concur:

1. The government regulation is within the constitutional power of the Government;

2. It furthers an important or substantial governmental interest;

3. The governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and


4. The incidental restriction on freedom of expression is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest.

Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 are content-neutral regulations since
they merely control the place where election campaign materials may be posted. However, the
prohibition is still repugnant to the free speech clause as it fails to satisfy all of the
requisites for a valid content-neutral regulation.

Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615 violate the free
speech clause; they are content-neutral regulations, which are not within the constitutional power
of the COMELEC issue and are not necessary to further the objective of ensuring equal time, space
and opportunity to the candidates. The posting of election campaign material on vehicles used for
public transport or on transport terminals is not only a form of political expression, but also an act
of ownership – it has nothing to do with the franchise or permit to operate the PUV or transport
terminal.

The questioned provisions are not only repugnant to the free speech clause, but are also violative
of the equal protection clause, as there is no substantial distinction between owners of PUV s and
transport terminals and owners of private vehicles and other properties.

MHP Garments v. CA

G.R. No. 86720

Facts: MHP Garments had the exclusive franchise to sell and distribute official Boy Scouts uniforms,
supplies, badges, and insignias. When MHP Garments received information that Agnes Villa Cruz, Mirasol
Lugatiman, and Gertrudes Gonzales were selling Boy Scouts items and paraphernalia without any
authority, Larry de Guzman, an employee of MHP Garments, together with members of the police
constabulary, went to the stores of Cruz, Lugatiman, and Gonzales at the Marikina Public Market and
seized a number of items. The seizure caused a commotion to the embarrassment of Cruz, Lugatiman and
Gonzales.MHP Garments instituted a criminal complaint for unfair competition against the vendors. The
Provincial fiscal dismissed the complaint and ordered the return of the seized items. Cruz, Lugatiman and
Gonzales instituted an action for sums of money and damages against MHP Garments and de Guzman.
MHP Garments contend that they should not be made liable for damages since they did not commit the
act of seizure.

Issue: Whether the search and seizure that was conducted was valid?

Held: No. The search and seizure were clearly illegal. There was no probable cause for the seizure.
Probable cause for a search has been defined as “such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects
sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.” These facts and
circumstances were not in any way shown by the petitioners to justify their warrantless search and
seizure. Indeed, after a preliminary investigation, the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal dismissed their complaint
for unfair competition and later ordered the return of the seized goods. Article III, Section 2, of the
Constitution protects our people from unreasonable search and seizures. This provision protects not only
those who appear to be innocent but also those who appear to be guilty but are nevertheless to be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. In the case at bench, the seizure was made without any
warrant. Under the Rules of Court, a warrantless search can only be undertaken under the following
circumstance: “SEC. 12. Search incident to a lawful arrest.—A person lawfully arrested may be searched
for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without
a search warrant.” Furthermore, the Supreme Court holds that the evidence did not justify the warrantless
search and seizure of private respon-dents’ goods. Petitioner corporation received information that
private respondents were illegally selling Boy Scouts items and paraphernalia in October 1983. The specific
date and time are not established in the evidence adduced by the parties. Petitioner de Guzman then
made a surveillance of the stores of private respondents. They reported to the Philippine Constabulary
and on October 25, 1983, the raid was made on the stores of private respondents and the supposed illicit
goods were seized. The progression of time between the receipt of the information and the raid of the
stores of private respondents shows there was sufficient time for petitioners and the PC raiding party to
apply for a judicial warrant. Despite the sufficiency of time, they did not apply for a warrant and seized
the goods of private respondents. In doing so, they took the risk of a suit for damages in case the seizure
would be proved to violate the right of private respondents against unreasonable search and seizure.

People v. CFI of Rizal

G.R. No. L-41686

Facts: The Regional Anti-Smuggling Action Center (RASAC) was informed by an undisclosed Informer that
a shipment of highly dutiable goods would be transported to Manila from Angeles City on a blue Dodge
car. Spurred by such lead, RASAC Agents stationed themselves in the vicinity where the blue Dodge car
would pass. Upon seeing the said vehicle, the RASAC agents immediately chased it and eventually
succeeded in blocking the said car. Manuel and Sabado who were in civilian clothes showed their
Identification cards to respondents and introduced themselves as RASAC agents. Thereafter, the car was
the brought to Camp Aguinaldo and after searching it, the agents found eleven (11) sealed boxes. The
contents of the boxes revealed some 4,441 more or less wrist watches of assorted brands; 1,075 more or
less watch bracelets of assorted brands (based on a later inventory), supposedly untaxed. As consequence,
thereof, ASAC Chairman General Pelagio Cruz requested the Bureau of Customs to issue a Warrant of
Seizure and Detention against the articles including the Dodge car. The Collector of Customs did issue the
same. It was admitted, however, that when the apprehending agents arrested respondents and brought
them together with the seized articles to the ASAC Office in Camp Aguinaldo, the former were not armed
with a warrant of arrest and seizure. Upon arraignment, respondents pleaded not guilty. Trial commenced
and while the prosecution was adducing as evidence the pictures of the 11 boxes containing the assorted
watches and watch bracelets, counsel for respondents objected to the presentation of the pictures and
the subject articles on the ground that they were seized without the benefit of warrant, and therefore
inadmissible in evidence under Section 4(2), Article IV of the New Constitution.

Issue: Whether the seizure of the merchandise in a moving vehicle by authorized agents
commissioned to enforce customs laws without warrant of seizure breaches the constitutional
immunity against unreasonable search and seizure and therefore, said merchandise are
inadmissible in evidence?
Held: No. We have already seen that what they did was a faithful performance of a duty
authorized under the Tariff and Customs Code directing them as authorized agents to retrieve
articles reasonably suspected of having been possessed, issued or procured in violation of the
tariff laws for which the government has a direct interest. The official capacity of the agents has
never been questioned by respondents. Neither did respondents raise an issue on the
constitutionality of the law giving the agents the power to act as mandated. There is no question
that the Agents have not exceeded their authority nor have they acted so licentiously to bear
upon respondent’s moral embarrassment or substantial prejudice beyond what is necessary. The
purpose of the search and seizure is more than clear to Us, hence, We rule out the suspicion that
the intention is only to elicit evidence to be used against respondents. In Boyd v. US, it was stated
that, “The search and seizure of stolen or forfeited goods, or goods liable to duties and concealed
to avoid the payment thereof, are totally different things from a search for and seizure of a man's
private books and papers for the purpose of obtaining information therein contained, or of using
them as evidence against him, The two things differ in toto coelo. In the one case, the
government is entitled to the possession of the property; in the other it is not. The seizure of
stolen goods is authorized by the common law; and the seizure of goods forfeited for a breach of
the revenue laws or concealed to avoid the duties payable on them, has been authorized by
English statutes for at least two centuries past; and the like seizure have been authorized by our
revenue acts from the commencement of the government. The first statute passed by Congress
to regulate the collection of duties, contains provisions to this effect. As this act was passed by
the same Congress which proposed for adoption the original Amendments to the Constitution, it
is clear that the members of that body did not regard searches and seizures of this kind as
'unreasonable' and they are not embraced within the prohibition of the Amendment. So also the
supervision authorized to be exercised by officers of the revenue over the manufacture of
custody of excisable articles, and the entries thereof in books required by law to be kept for their
inspection, are necessarily excepted out of the category of unreasonable searches and seizures.
So also the laws which provide for the search and seizure of articles and things which it is unlawful
for a person to have in his possession for the purpose of issue or disposition, such as counterfeit
coin, lottery tickets, implements of gambling, etc. are not within this category. Many other things
of this character might be enumerated.” It is not for this Court to do less than it can to implement
and enforce the mandates of the customs and revenue laws. The evils associated with tax evasion
must be stamped out without any disregard, it is to be affirmed, of any constitutional right. The
circumstances of the case at bar undoubtedly fall squarely within the privileged area where
search and seizure may lawfully be effected without the need of a warrant.

Roan v. Gonzales

G.R. No. 71410

Facts: Josefino Roan’s house was searched by virtue of a search warrant. However, the application of said
search warrant was based on the accounts of two witnesses. The applicant did not have personal
knowledge of said firearm. The search was performed by the military authorities and despite none of the
articles listed in the warrant were discovered, the officers who conducted the search found one Colt
Magnum revolver and 18 live bullets which they confiscated. The said items served as bases for the charge
of illegal possession of firearms against the petitioner

Issue: Whether the search warrant issued was valid?

Held: No. To be valid, a search warrant must be supported by probable cause to be determined by the
judge or some authorized officer after examining the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce. There must be a specific description of the place to be searched and the things to be seized, to
prevent arbitrary and indiscriminate use of the warrant. Probable cause, as described by Justice Escolin in
Burgos v. Chief of Staff, refers to “such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet
and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.” The probable cause must refer to
only one specific offense. It is axiomatic that the magistrate must be probing and exhaustive,
not merely routinary or pro-forma, if the claimed probable cause is to be established. The examining
magistrate must not simply rehash the contents of the affidavit but must make his own inquiry on the
intent and justification of the application. By his own account, all he did was question Captain Quillosa on
the contents of his affidavit only “to ascertain, among others, if he knew and understood the same,” and
only because “the application was not yet subscribed and sworn to.” The suggestion is that he would not
have asked any questions at all if the affidavit had already been completed when it was submitted to him.
In any case, he did not ask his own searching questions. He limited himself to the contents of the affidavit.
He did not take the applicant’s deposition in writing and attach them to the record, together with the
affidavit presented to him. Furthermore, an application for search warrant if based on hearsay cannot,
standing alone, justify issuance of that writ. In other words, the applicant was asking for the issuance of
the search warrant on the basis of mere hearsay and not of information personally known to him, as
required by settled jurisprudence. The rationale of the requirement, of course, is to provide a ground for
a prosecution for perjury in case the applicant’s declarations are found to be false. His application,
standing alone, was insufficient to justify the issuance of the warrant sought. It was therefore necessary
for the witnesses themselves, by their own personal information, to establish the applicant’s claims.

Additionally, the Ulterior motive of applicant’s witnesses to application for search warrant should alert
the judge to possible misrepresentations. A study of the depositions taken from witnesses Esmael Morada
and Jesus Tohilida, who both claimed to be “intelligence informers,” shows that they were in the main a
mere restatement of their allegations in their affidavits, except that they were made in the form of
answers to the questions put to them by the respondent judge. Significantly, the meaningful remark made
by Tohilida that they were suspicious of the petitioner because he was a follower of the opposition
candidate in the forthcoming election (a “Lecarista”) did not excite the respondent judge’s own suspicions.
This should have put him on guard as to the motivations of the witnesses and alerted him to possible
misrepresentations from them. The judge should inquire into how the deponents were able to know even
the caliber of the guns and the number of guns and bullets that are allegedly being kept in the place to be
searched. 0ne may well wonder why it did not occur to the respondent judge to ask how the witness could
be so certain even as to the caliber of the guns, or how far he was from the window, or whether it was on
the first floor or a second floor, or why his presence was not noticed at all, or if the acts related were really
done openly, in the full view of the witnesses, considering that these acts were against the law. These
would have been judicious questions but they were injudiciously omitted. Instead, the declarations of the
witnesses were readily accepted and the search warrant sought was issued forthwith. The above-
discussed defects have rendered the search warrant invalid. Nonetheless, the Solicitor General argues
that whatever defect there was, was waived when the petitioner voluntarily submitted to the search and
manifested his conformity in writing. To this, We do not agree. What we see here is pressure exerted by
the military authorities, who practically coerced the petitioner to sign the supposed waiver as a guaranty
against a possible challenge later to the validity of the search they were conducting. Confronted with the
armed presence of the military and the presumptive authority of a judicial writ, the petitioner had no
choice but to submit. This was not, as we held in a previous case, the manifestation merely of our
traditional Filipino hospitality and respect for authority. Given the repressive atmosphere of the Marcos
regime, there was here, as we see it, an intimidation that the petitioner could not resist.

People v. Malmstedt

G.R. No. 91107

Facts: Captain Alen Vasco, the commanding officer of the first regional command (NARCOM)
stationed at camp Dangwa, ordered his men to set up a temporary checkpoint for the purpose
of checking all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region. The order to establish a checkpoint
was prompted by persistent reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting
marijuana and other prohibited drugs. And an information also was received about a Caucasian
coming from Sagada had in his possession prohibited drugs. In the afternoon, the bus where
accused was riding stopped. Sgt. Fider and CIC Galutan boarded the bus and announced that they
were members of the NARCOM and that they would conduct an inspection. During the inspection
CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on accused waist. Suspecting the bulge on accused waist to be a gun,
the officer asked for accused’s passport and other identification papers. When accused failed to
comply, the officer required him to bring out whatever it was that was bulging o his waist. And it
turned out to be a pouched bag and when accused opened the same bag the officer noticed four
suspicious looking objects wrapped in brown packing tape. It contained hashish, a derivative of
marijuana. Thereafter, the accused was invited outside the bus for questioning. But before he
alighted from the bus accused stopped to get two travelling bags. The officer inspects the bag. It
was only after the officers had opened the bags that the accused finally presented his passport.
The two bags contained a stuffed toy each, upon inspection the stuff toy contained also hashish.

Issue: Whether there was a violation of the constitutional right against unreasonable search and
seizure?

Held: No. Where the search is made pursuant to a lawful arrest, there is no need to obtain a
search warrant. Circumstances where a lawful arrest without a warrant may be made by a peace
officer or a private person. The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. However,
where the search is made pursuant to a lawful arrest, there is no need to obtain a search warrant.
A lawful arrest without a warrant may be made by a peace officer or a private person under the
following circumstances. “SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.––A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to
be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b)
When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be
arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving
final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another. In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b)
hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police
station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7. The
search made upon the personal effects of the accused falls squarely under paragraph (1) of the
foregoing provisions of law allowing warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest; Case at bar.
Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs (hashish). A crime was
actually being committed by the accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto. While it is true
that the NARCOM officers were not armed with a search warrant when the search was made
over the personal effects of accused, however, under the circumstances of the case, there was
sufficient probable cause for said officers to believe that accused was then and there committing
a crime. Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which could lead a
reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that
the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. The
required probable cause that will justify a warrantless search and seizure is not determined by
any fixed formula but is resolved according to the facts of each case.

Posadas v. CA
G.R. No. 89139

Facts: Members of the Integrated National Police (INP) of the Davao Metrodiscom assigned with the
Intelligence Task Force, Pat. Ursicio Ungab and Pat. Umbra Umpar conducted surveillance along
Magallanes Street, Davao City. While in the vicinity of Rizal Memorial Colleges they spotted petitioner
carrying a "buri" bag and they noticed him to be acting suspiciously. They approached the petitioner and
identified themselves as members of the INP. Petitioner attempted to flee but his attempt to get
away was unsuccessful. They then checked the "buri" bag of the petitioner where they found one (1)
caliber .38 Smith & Wesson revolver with Serial No. 770196, two (2) rounds of live ammunition for a .38
caliber gun, a smoke (tear gas) grenade, and two (2) live ammunitions for a .22 caliber gun. They brought
the petitioner to the police station for further investigation. In the course of the same, the petitioner was
asked to show the necessary license or authority to possess firearms and ammunitions found in his
possession but he failed to do so. He was then taken to the Davao Metrodiscom office and the prohibited
articles were recovered from him. Thereafter, said articles were indorsed to M/Sgt. Didoy. He was then
prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions.

Issue: Whether the warrantless search was valid?

Held: Yes. In justifying the warrantless search of the buri bag, petitioner argues that under Section 12,
Rule 136 of the Rules of Court a person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or
anything used as proof of a commission of an offense without a search warrant. It is further alleged that
the arrest without a warrant of the petitioner was lawful under the circumstances. From the foregoing
provision of the law, it is clear that an arrest without a warrant may be effected by a peace officer or
private person, among others, when in his presence the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; of when an offense has in fact just been committed,
and he has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person arrested has committed it.
However, there are many instances where a warrant and seizure can be effected without necessarily being
preceded by an arrest, foremost of which is the "stop and search" without a search warrant at military or
police checkpoints, the constitutionality or validity of which has been upheld by this Court in Valmonte
vs. de Villa. Thus, as between a warrantless search and seizure conducted at military or police checkpoints
and the search thereat in the case at bar, there is no question that, indeed, the latter is more reasonable
considering that unlike in the former, it was effected on the basis of a probable cause. The probable cause
is that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri bag there was a
probable cause that he was concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty of the
police officers to inspect the same. It is too much indeed to require the police officers to search the bag
in the possession of the petitioner only after they shall have obtained a search warrant for the purpose.
Such an exercise may prove to be useless, futile and much too late. Clearly, the search in the case at bar
can be sustained under the exceptions heretofore discussed, and hence, the constitutional guarantee
against unreasonable searches and seizures has not been violated.

Aniag v. Comelec
G.R. No. 104961

Facts: In preparation for the scheduled synchronized elections, COMELEC issued a Gun
Ban resolution. Ceding to the request of the House of Representatives Sergeant-at-Arms to
return the firearms issued to him, petitioner instructed his driver to pick up the firearms from his
house and to bring the same to Congress. The driver was then apprehended at a checkpoint after
the policemen found the firearms in a bag in the truck of the car.

Issue: Whether the warrantless search was valid?

Held: No. As a rule, a valid search must be authorized by a search warrant duly issued by an
appropriate authority. However, this is not absolute. Aside from a search incident to a lawful arrest,
a warrantless search had been upheld in cases of moving vehicles and the seizure of evidence in
plain view, as well as the search conducted at police or military checkpoints which we declared
are not illegal per se, and stressed that the warrantless search is not violative of the Constitution
for as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the
inspection of the vehicle is merely limited to a visual search. Petitioner contends that the guns were
not tucked in Arellano’s waist nor placed within his reach, and that they were neatly packed in gun
cases and placed inside a bag at the back of the car. Significantly, COMELEC did not rebut this
claim. The records do not show that the manner by which the package was bundled led the PNP to
suspect that it contained firearms. There was no mention either of any report regarding any
nervous, suspicious or unnatural reaction from Arellano when the car was stopped and searched.
Given these circumstances and relying on its visual observation, the PNP could not thoroughly
search the car lawfully as well as the package without violating the constitutional injunction. An
extensive search without warrant could only be resorted to if the officers conducting the search
had reasonable or probable cause to believe before the search that either the motorist was a law
offender or that they would find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to the commission of a
crime in the vehicle to be searched. The existence of probable cause justifying the warrantless
search is determined by the facts of each case. In the case at bench, we find that the checkpoint
was set up twenty (20) meters from the entrance to the Batasan Complex to enforce Resolution
No. 2327. There was no evidence to show that the policemen were impelled to do so because of a
confidential report leading them to reasonably believe that certain motorists matching the
description furnished by their informant were engaged in gunrunning, transporting firearms or in
organizing special strike forces. Nor, as adverted to earlier, was there any indication from the
package or behavior of Arellano that could have triggered the suspicion of the policemen. Absent
such justifying circumstances specifically pointing to the culpability of petitioner and Arellano,
the search could not be valid. The action then of the policemen unreasonably intruded into
petitioner’s privacy and the security of his property, in violation of Sec. 2, Art. III, of the
Constitution. Consequently, the firearms obtained in violation of petitioner’s right against
warrantless search cannot be admitted for any purpose in any proceeding. Furthermore, “Consent”
given under intimidating or coercive circumstances is no consent within the purview of the
constitutional guaranty. In the face of fourteen (14) armed policemen conducting the operation,
driver Arellano being alone and a mere employee of petitioner could not have marshalled the
strength and the courage to protest against the extensive search conducted in the vehicle. In such
scenario, the “implied acquiescence,” if there was any, could not be more than a mere passive
conformity on Arellano’s part to the search.

Warrantless searches and seizures.


People v. Aruta – 288 SCRA 626 [1998]
FACTS: On Dec. 13, 1988, P/Lt. Abello was tipped off by his informant that a certain “Aling
Rosa” will be arriving from Baguio City with a large volume of marijuana and assembled a team.
The next day, at the Victory Liner Bus terminal they waited for the bus coming from Baguio,
when the informer pointed out who “Aling Rosa” was, the team approached her and
introduced themselves as NARCOM agents. When Abello asked “Aling Rosa” about the contents
of her bag, the latter handed it out to the police. They found dried marijuana leaves packed in a
plastic bag marked “cash katutak”.

Instead of presenting its evidence, the defense filed a demurrer to evidence alleging the
illegality of the search and seizure of the items. In her testimony, the accused claimed that she
had just come from Choice theatre where she watched a movie “Balweg”. While about to cross
the road an old woman asked her for help in carrying a shoulder bag, when she was later on
arrested by the police. She has no knowledge of the identity of the old woman and the woman
was nowhere to be found. Also, no search warrant was presented. The trial court convicted the
accused in violation of the dangerous drugs of 1972.
ISSUE: Whether the warrantless search resulting to the arrest of accused-appellant violated the
latter’s constitutional rights.
RULING: Yes. In the instant case, the NARCOM agents were admittedly not armed with a
warrant of arrest. To legitimize the warrantless search and seizure of accused-appellant’s bag,
accused-appellant must have been validly arrested under Section 5 of Rule 113 which provides
that: Sec. 5: Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
Accused-appellant Aruta cannot be said to be committing a crime. Neither was she about to
commit one nor had she just committed a crime. Accused-appellant was merely crossing the
street and was not acting in any manner that would engender a reasonable ground for the
NARCOM agents to suspect and conclude that she was committing a crime. It was only when
the informant pointed to accused-appellant and identified her to the agents as the carrier of
the marijuana that she was singled out as the suspect. The NARCOM agents would not have
apprehended accused-appellant were it not for the furtive finger of the informant because, as
clearly illustrated by the evidence on record, there was no reason whatsoever for them to
suspect that accused-appellant was committing a crime, except for the pointing finger of the
informant. This the Court could neither sanction nor tolerate as it is a clear violation of the
constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure. Neither was there any
semblance of any compliance with the rigid requirements of probable cause and warrantless
arrests. Consequently, there was no legal basis for the NARCOM agents to effect a warrantless
search of accused-appellant’s bag, there being no probable cause and the accused-appellant
not having been lawfully arrested. Stated otherwise, the arrest being incipiently illegal, it
logically follows that the subsequent search was similarly illegal, it being not incidental to a
lawful arrest. The constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure must
perforce operate in favor of accused-appellant. As such, the articles seized could not be used
as evidence against accused-appellant for these are “fruits of a poisoned tree” and, therefore,
must be rejected, pursuant to Article III, Sec. 3(2) of the Constitution.
Asuncion v. CA – GR 125959 February 1, 1999
FACTS: On 6 December 1993, in compliance with the order of the Malabon Municipal Mayor to
intensify campaign against illegal drugs particularly at Barangay Tañong, the Chief of the
Malabon Police Anti-Narcotics Unit ordered his men to conduct patrol on the area with specific
instruction to look for a certain vehicle with a certain plate number and watch out for a certain
drug pusher named Vic Vargas. Pursuant thereto, SPO1 Advincula, PO3 Parcon, PO3 Pilapil and
a police aide were dispatched at around 11:45 p.m..
The team proceeded to Barangay Tañong where they were joined by their confidential
informant and the latter informed them that a gray Nissan car is always parked therein for the
purpose of selling shabu. While patrolling along Leoño Street, the confidential informant
pointed the gray Nissan car to the policemen and told them that the occupant thereof has
shabu in his possession. The policemen immediately flagged down the said car along First Street
and approached the driver, who turned out to be Jose Maria Asuncion y Marfori, a movie actor
using the screen name Vic Vargas and who is also known as Binggoy. Advincula then asked
Asuncion if they can inspect the vehicle. As Asuncion acceded thereto, Advincula conducted a
search on the vehicle and he found a plastic packet containing white substance suspected to be
methamphetamine hydrochloride beneath the driver's seat. Asuncion told the policemen that
he just borrowed the said car and he is not the owner thereof. Asuncion was thereafter taken
at the police headquarters for the purpose of taking his identification. However, when he was
frisked by Advincula at the headquarters, the latter groped something protruding from his
underwear, which when voluntarily taken out by the accused turned out to be a plastic packet
containing white substance suspected to be met hamphetamine hydrochloride.
A press conference was conducted the following day presided by Northern Police District
Director Pureza during which Asuncion admitted that the methamphetamine hydrochloride
were for his personal use in his shooting. On the other hand, Asuncion denied the charges
against him. He claimed that on that day, "between 8:00 and 9:00 p.m., he was abducted at gun
point in front of the house where his son lives by men who turned out to be members of the
Malabon Police Anti-Narcotics Unit; that he was told to board at the back seat by the policemen
who took over the wheels; that he acceded to be brought at the Pagamutang Bayan ng
Malabon for drug test but only his blood pressure was checked in the said hospital; that he was
thereafter brought at the Office of the Malabon Police Anti-Narcotics Unit; and that he is not
aware of what happened at 11:45 p.m. as he was then sleeping at the said office."
On 14 June 1994, a decision was rendered by the trial court finding Asuncion guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense charged, and sentenced him to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of 1 year 8 months and 20 days as minimum, to 3 years 6 months and 20 days, as
maximum, and to pay a fine of P3,000.00. On 29 June 1994, a Notice of Appeal was filed and
the records of the case were transmitted by the trial court to the Court of Appeals. On 30 April
1996 a decision was rendered by the appellate court, modifying the penalty imposed (reducing
the sentence to 6 months of arresto mayor in its maximum period as minimum to 4 years and 2
months of prision correccional in its medium period as maximum and deleting the fine of
P3,000.00 imposed on Asuncion). On 6 August 1996, the Court of Appeals denied the MR filed
by Asuncion. Asuncion filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether the search upon Asuncion s vehicle is valid.
RULING: Well-entrenched is the rule that no arrest, search and seizure can be made without a
valid warrant issued by competent judicial authority. So sacred is this right that no less than the
fundamental law of the land ordains it. However, the rule that search and seizure must be
supported by a valid warrant is not absolute. The search of a moving vehicle is one of the
doctrinally accepted exceptions to the Constitutional mandate that no search or seizure shall be
made except by virtue of a warrant issued by a judge after personally determining the existence
of probable cause. The prevalent circumstances of the case undoubtedly bear out the fact that
the search in question was made as regards a moving vehicle. Asuncion's vehicle was "flagged
down" by the apprehending officers upon identification. Therefore, the police authorities were
justified in searching Asuncion's automobile without a warrant since the situation demanded
immediate action. The apprehending officers even sought the permission of petitioner to
search the car, to which the latter agreed. As such, since the shabu was discovered by virtue of
a valid warrantless search and Asuncion himself freely gave his consent to said search, the
prohibited drugs found as a result were admissible in evidence
People v. Canton, GR 148825, Dec. 27, 2002
FACTS: Appellant Susan Canton was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City with
the violation of Section 16 of Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Republic Act No.
6425), as amended, under an Information whose accusatory portion reads as follows: That on
February 12, 1998 at the NAIA, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above
named accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously has in her possession
(998.2809) GRAMS of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug, without the
corresponding prescription or license.
Unsatisfied with the decision of the trial court, SUSAN imputing to the trial court the following
errors: (1) in justifying the warrantless search against her based on the alleged existence of
probable cause; (2) in holding that she was caught flagrante delicto and that the warrantless
search was incidental to a lawful arrest; (3) in not ruling that the frisker went beyond the limits
of the “Terry search” doctrine; (4) in not ruling that SUSAN was under custodial investigation
without counsel; (5) in admitting to the records of the case the report of Dr. Ma. Bernadette
Arcena, which was not testified on or offered in evidence, and using the same in determining
her guilt; (6) in justifying under the rule on judicial notice its cognizance of the medical report
that has not been offered in evidence; and (7) in applying the ruling in People v. Johnson.
ISSUE: Whether the warrantless search and subsequent seizure of the regulated drugs, as well
as the arrest of Susan were violative of her constitutional rights.
RULING: No, the search was made pursuant to routine airport security procedure, which is
allowed under Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6235, “ Every ticket issued to a passenger by the
airline or air carrier concerned shall contain among others the following condition printed
thereon: “Holder hereof and his hand-carried luggage(s) are subject to search for , and seizure
of, prohibited materials or substances. Holder refusing to be searched shall not be allowed to
board the aircraft,” which shall constitute a part of the contract between the passenger and the
air carrier.
Disini v. Sec. of Justice, GR 203335, February 18, 2014
FACTS: The case arises out of consolidated petitions to the Supreme Court of the Philippines on
the constitutionality of several provisions of the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, Act No.
10175. The Petitioners argued that even though the Act is the government’s platform in
combating illegal cyberspace activities, 21 separate sections of the Act violate their
constitutional rights. Among the challenged sections is Section 19 which authorizes the
Department of Justice to restrict or block access to a computer data found to be in violation of
the Act. The Petitioners argued that this section also violated the right to freedom of
expression, as well as the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.
In February 2013, the Supreme Court extended the duration of a temporary restraining order
against the government to halt enforcement of the Act until the adjudication of the issues.
ISSUE: Whether Section 19 of the Cybercrime Prevention Act is unconstitutional
RULING: The Court first recognized that computer data constitutes a personal property, entitled
to protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. Also, the Philippines’ Constitution
requires the government to secure a valid judicial warrant when it seeks to seize a personal
property or to block a form of expression. Because Section 19 precluded any judicial
intervention, the Court found it unconstitutional.
NOTE: Other sections held as unconstitutional: Section 4(c)(3) prohibits the transmission of unsolicited
commercial electronic communications, commonly known as “spams”. The Court first noted that spams
are a category of commercial speech, which does not receive the same level of protection as other
constitutionally guaranteed forms of expression ,”but is nonetheless entitled to protection.” It ruled
that the prohibition on transmitting unsolicited communications “would deny a person the right to read
his emails, even unsolicited commercial ads addressed to him.”

Section 12 authorizes the law enforcement without a court warrant “to collect or record traffic data in
real-time associated with specified communications transmitted by means of a computer system.” Even
though the Court ruled that real-time traffic data under Section 12 does not enjoy the objective
reasonable expectation of privacy, the existence of enough data may reveal the personal information of
its sender or recipient, against which the Section fails to provide sufficient safeguard. The Court viewed
the law as “virtually limitless, enabling law enforcement authorities to engage in “fishing expedition,”
choosing whatever specified communication they want,” hence, Section 12 was struck down for lack of
specificity and definiteness as to ensure respect for the right to privacy.

Searches and seizures “of whatever nature and for whatever purpose.”
Material Distributors v. Natividad - 84 PHIL. 127 (1967, decided under the 1935 Constitution)
FACTS: The respondent judge, under authority of Rule 27, issued a subpoena duces tecum for
the production and inspection of among others, the books and papers of Material Distributors
(Phil.) Inc. The company questioned the issuance of the subpoena on the ground that it violated
the search and seizure clause.
ISSUE: Whether there is violation of the search and seizure clause.
RULING: No. The SC held that a subpoena duces tecum "pertain to a civil procedure that cannot
be identified or confused with unreasonable searches prohibited by the Constitution." Such was
a perplexing conclusion on the part of the Court to make, as though the search and seizure
clause applied only to criminal cases.
NOTE: Article IV, Section 3 of the 1973 Constitution, unlike its counterpart in the 1935 Constitution, has
introduced the clause made applicable to searches and seizures "of whatever nature and for any
purpose." The explicit extension of the clause to search and seizure "of whatever nature and for any
purpose" extends the constitutional protection to constructive searches like a subpoena duces tecum or
an order for the production of books and papers under Rule 27 of the Rules of Court. Thus, the ruling in
Material Distributors v. Natividad, which was made under the 1935 Constitution certainly requires a
re-examination under the 1973 Constitution.

Camara v. Municipal Court - 387 US 523 (1967)


FACTS: Appellant (Camara) was charged with violating the San Francisco Housing Code for
refusing, after three efforts by city housing inspectors to secure his consent, to allow a
warrantless inspection of the ground-floor quarters which he leased and residential use of
which allegedly violated the apartment building's occupancy permit. Claiming the inspection
ordinance unconstitutional for failure to require a warrant for inspections, appellant while
awaiting trial, sued in a State Superior Court for a writ of prohibition, which the court denied.
Relying on Frank v. Maryland, 359 U. S. 360, and similar cases, the District Court of Appeal
affirmed, holding that the ordinance did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The State Supreme
Court denied a petition for hearing.
ISSUE: Whether administrative inspection programs, as presently authorized and conducted,
violate Fourth Amendment rights as those rights are enforced against the States through the
Fourteenth Amendment
RULING: Yes. The Fourth Amendment bars prosecution of a person who has refused to permit a
warrantless code enforcement inspection of his personal residence.
Probable cause upon the basis of which warrants are to be issued for area code enforcement
inspections is not dependent on the inspector's belief that a particular dwelling violates the
code, but on the reasonableness of the enforcement agency's appraisal of conditions in the
area as a whole. The standards to guide the magistrate in the issuance of such search warrants
will necessarily vary with the municipal program being enforced. Search warrants which are
required in non-emergency situations should normally be sought only after entry is refused. In
the non-emergency situation here, appellant had a right to insist that the inspectors obtain a
search warrant.
NOTE: SC was careful not to limit all searches in emergency circumstances. It observed: “Since our
holding emphasizes the controlling standard of reasonableness, nothing we say today is intended to
foreclose prompt inspections, even without a warrant, that the law has traditionally upheld in
emergency situations. On the other hand, in the case of most routine area inspections, there is no
compelling urgency to inspect at a particular time or on a particular day. Moreover, most citizens allow
inspections of their property without a warrant. Thus, as a practical matter and in light of the Fourth
Amendment’s requirement that a warrant specify the property to be searched, it seems likely that
warrants should normally be sought only after entry is refused unless there has been a citizen complaint
or there is other satisfactory reason for securing immediate entry. Similarly, the requirement of a
warrant procedure does not suggest any change in what seems to be the prevailing local policy, in most
situations, of authorizing entry, but not entry by force, to inspect.”

Warrantless arrests
Harvey v. Defensor-Santiago - 162 SCRA 840 (1988)
FACTS: American nationals Andrew Harvey, 52 and John Sherman 72, Dutch Citizen Adrian Van
Den Elshout, 58, and 19 other foreigners residing at Pagsanjan, Laguna were apprehended at
their residences. The ―Operation Report of the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation
(CID) read that Harvey, Sherman and Van Den Elshout, et. al. were suspected pedophiles.
Andrew Harvey was found together with two young boys. Richard Sherman was found with two
naked boys inside his room. While Van Den Elshout in the ―after Mission Report read that two
children of ages 14 and 16 has been under his care and living with him. Seized during their
apprehension were rolls of photo negatives and photos of suspected child prostitutes shown in
scandalous poses as well as boys and girls engaged in sex. Posters and other literature
advertising the child prostitutes were also found. The petitioners were apprehended after close
surveillance for 3 month of the CID. Deportation proceedings were then instituted against and
warrants of arrest were issued for violation of the Immigration Act.
ISSUE: Whether the deportation proceedings and warrants of arrest issued are valid.
RULING: Yes. The arrest of petitioners was based on the probable cause determined after close
surveillance of 3 months. The existence of probable cause justified the arrest and seizure of
articles linked to the offense. The articles were seized as an incident to a lawful arrest;
therefore the articles are admissible evidences.
The deportation charges instituted by the Commissioner of Immigration are in accordance with
the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, provides that aliens shall be arrested and deported
upon warrant after a determination of the existence of a ground for deportation against them.
The state has the inherent power to exclude aliens from its territory upon such grounds as it
may deem proper for its self-preservation or public interest. The power to deport aliens is an
act of State, an act done by or under the authority of the sovereign power. It is a police
measure against undesirable aliens whose continued presence in the country is found to be
injurious to the public good and the domestic tranquility of the people. Particularly so in this
case where the State has expressly committed itself to defend the right of children to assistance
and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other
conditions prejudicial to their development.