HEARSAY RULE

ALEJANDRO FUENTES, JR., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF

THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DECISION

BELLOSILLO, J.:

Still professing innocence and insisting that he is a victim of mistaken identity, petitioner
Alejandro Fuentes, Jr., seeks reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming his
conviction for murder.[1]

MAIN FACT

At four o clock in the morning of 24 June 1989 Julieto Malaspina together with Godofredo
Llames, Honorio Osok and Alberto Toling, was at a benefit dance at Dump Site, Tudela, Trento,
Agusan del Sur. Petitioner called Malaspina and placed his right arm on the shoulder of the latter
saying, Before, I saw you with a long hair but now you have a short hair.[2] Suddenly petitioner
stabbed Malaspina in the abdomen with a hunting knife. Malaspina fell to the ground and his
companions rushed to his side. Petitioner fled. Before the victim succumbed to the gaping wound
on his abdomen he muttered that Alejandro Fuentes, Jr., stabbed him.[3]

Dr. Porfirio L. Salubre, the Rural Health Physician who autopsied the cadaver of Julieto
Malaspina on 24 July 1989, reported that death was due to stab wound at left lumbar region I V2
in. in length with extracavitation of the small and large intestines.[4]

Petitioner claims on the other hand that it was his cousin Zoilo Fuentes, Jr., alias Jonie who
knifed Malaspina; that when the victim was killed he was conversing with him; that he was
compelled to run away when he heard that somebody with a bolo and spear would kill all those
from San Isidro because Jonie, the killer, was from that place; that since he was also from San
Isidro he sought refuge in his brothers house where he met Jonie; that Jonie admitted
spontaneously that he stabbed Malaspina because after a boxing match before the latter untied
his gloves and punched him; that as there were many persons milling around the house Jonie
jumped out and escaped through the window; that he was arrested at eight oclock in the morning
of 24 June 1989 while he was in a store in the barangay.[5]

The Regional Trial Court of Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur, found petitioner guilty of
murder qualified by treachery and imposed on him an indeterminate prison term of ten (10)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months
of reclusion temporal as maximum, to indemnify the heirs of the victim Julieto Malaspina the
amount of P50,000.00 and to pay P8,300.00 as actual damages plus costs.[6]

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court; hence, this petition for
review.
Petitioner contends that the appellate court erred when it held that petitioner was positively and
categorically identified as the killer of Malaspina, in affirming the judgment of conviction and in
holding petitioner liable for damages to the heirs of the victim.

Petitioner points to an alleged inconsistency between the testimonies of prosecution witnesses

Alberto Toling and Honorio Osok to the effect that they saw petitioner stab Malaspina on the
right lumbar region, and the testimony of the attending physician that the victim was stabbed on
the left lumbar region.

This discrepancy is inconsequential. What is material is that Malaspina was stabbed to death
and that three (3) prosecution witnesses positively identified petitioner as the knife wielder. It
must be stressed that these witnesses had known petitioner for quite some time and never had
any personal misunderstanding nor altercation with the latter as to create any suspicion that they
were impelled by ill motives to falsely implicate him.

That it was another person who committed the offense is too incredible. No less than petitioners
own witness, Nerio Biscocho who claimed he also saw the killing, testified that Alejandro
Fuentes, Jr., the petitioner, and Jonie Fuentes are one and the same person. Thus -

COURT:

Q. Who is this Joni Fuentes and Alejandro Fuentes?

A. That Joni Fuentes is the same of that or the accused Alejandro Fuentes. I do not know his
real name but he is called as Joni, sir, x x x[7]

On cross-examination witness Biscocho further admitted that he himself would call petitioner
Alejandro Fuentes, Jr., as Joni or Jonie Fuentes, as some of his friends did, but victim Malaspina
occasionally called petitioner Junior.[8]

Petitioner would make much of the alleged confession of Zoilo Fuentes, Jr., since it is a
declaration against penal interest and therefore an exception to the hearsay rule. The so-called
confession of Zoilo was allegedly given to Felicisimo Fuentes, the uncle of petitioner and Zoilo,
who in turn relayed the matter to P/Sgt. Benjamin Conde, Jr. Felicisimo testified that on 24 June
1989 while he was at Barangay San Isidro, Zoilo Fuentes, Jr., confessed that he killed Malaspina
in retaliation; that he even showed him the knife he used and asked his help in finding a lawyer,
in securing bail and, if possible, in working out a settlement with the relatives of the deceased.
The following day however he learned that the self-confessed killer was gone and that petitioner
had been arrested for a crime he did not commit.[9]

For his part, Station Commander P/Sgt. Conde, Jr., testified that after the criminal information
for murder was filed on 26 July 1989, petitioner met Felicisimo who informed him of the
disclosure by Zoilo. Conde then advised Felicisimo that if it was true that it was Zoilo who
fatally stabbed Malaspina Felicisimo must persuade Zoilo to surrender. Conde then personally
went to Barangay San Isidro to investigate. There he was told by the townsfolk that Zoilo had
already fled).[10]
One of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule is that pertaining to declarations made
against interest. Sec. 38 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that (t)he declaration made
by a person deceased, or unable to testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted
in the declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary to declarants own interest, that a
reasonable man in his position would not have made the declaration unless he believed it to be
true, may be received in evidence against himself or his successors in interest and against third
persons. The admissibility in evidence of such declaration is grounded on necessity and
trustworthiness.[11]

There are three (3) essential requisites for the admissibility of a declaration against interest: (a)
the declarant must not be available to testify; (b) the declaration must concern a fact cognizable
by the declarant; and (c) the circumstances must render it improbable that a motive to falsify
existed.

In the instant case, we find that the declaration particularly against penal interest
attributed to Zoilo Fuentes Jr. is not admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay
rule. We are not unaware of People Toledo,[12] a 1928 case, where Justice Malcolm writing for
the Court endeavored to reexamine the declaration of third parties made contrary to their penal
interest. In that case, the protagonists Holgado and Morales engaged in a bob duel. Morales was
killed almost instantly. Holgado who was seriously wounded gave a sworn statement (Exh. 1)
before the municipal president declaring that when he and Morales fought there was nobody else
present. One (1) month later Holgado died from his wounds. While the Court was agreed that
Toledo, who reportedly intervened in the fight and dealt the mortal blow, should be exonerated
on reasonable doubt, the members did not reach an accord on the admissibility of Exh. 1. One
group would totally disregard Exh. 1 since there was ample testimonial evidence to support an
acquittal. The second group considered Exh. 1 as part of the res gestae as it was made on the
same morning when the fight occurred. A third group, to which Justice Malcolm belonged,
opined that the court below erred in not admitting Exh. 1 as the statement of a fact against penal
interest.

For all its attempt to demonstrate the arbitrariness behind the rejection in certain cases of
declarations against penal interest, the Toledo case cannot be applied in the instant case which is
remarkably different. Consider this factual scenario: the alleged declarant Zoilo Fuentes Jr., a
cousin of accused-appellant, verbally admitted to the latter, and later to their common uncle
Felicisimo Fuentes, that he (Zoilo) killed the victim because of a grudge, after which he
disappeared. One striking feature that militates against the acceptance of such a statement is its
patent untrustworthiness. Zoilo who is related to accused-appellant had every motive to
prevaricate. The same can be said of accused-appellant and his uncle Felicisimo. Secondly, we
need not resort to legal rhetorics to find that the admission of such a statement may likewise be,
according to Wigmore, shocking to the sense of justice.[13] Let us assume that the trial court did
admit the statement of Zoilo and on that basis acquitted accused-appellant. Let us assume further
that Zoilo was subsequently captured and upon being confronted with his admission of guilt
readily repudiated the same. There is nothing, absolutely nothing, that can bind Zoilo legally to
that statement.
But more importantly, the far weightier reason why the admission against penal interest
cannot be accepted in the instant case is that the declarant is not unable to testify. There is
no showing that Zoilo is either dead, mentally incapacitated or physically incompetent
which Sec. 38 obviously contemplates. His mere absence from the jurisdiction does not make
him ipso facto unavailable under this rule.[14] For it is incumbent upon the defense to produce
each and every piece of evidence that can break the prosecution and assure the acquittal of the
accused. Other than the gratuitous statements of accused-appellant and his uncle to the effect that
Zoilo admitted having killed Malaspina, the records show that the defense did not exert any
serious effort to produce Zoilo as a witness. Lest we be misunderstood, the Court is always for
the admission of evidence that would let an innocent declaration of guilt by the real culprit. But
this can be open to abuse, as when the extrajudicial statement is not even authenticated thus
increasing the probability of its fabrication; it is made to persons who have every reason to lie
and falsify; and it is not altogether clear that the declarant himself is unable to testify. Thus, for
this case at least, exclusion is the prudent recourse as explained in Toledo -The purpose of all
evidence is to get at the truth. The reason for the hearsay rule is that the extrajudicial and
unsworn statement of another is not the best method of serving this purpose. In other words, the
great possibility of the fabrication of falsehoods, and the inability to prove their untruth, requires
that the doors be closed to such evidence.[15]

The Court of Appeals as well as the trial court correctly determined the crime to be murder
qualified by treachery. The suddenness of the attack, without any provocation from the
unsuspecting victim, made the stabbing of Malaspina treacherous.[16] However, the court a quo
erred in imposing an indeterminate prison term of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as
maximum. Murder under Art. 248 of The Revised Penal Code is punishable by reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to death. Since aside from treachery qualifying the crime to
murder there is no other modifying circumstance proved, the medium period of the penalty, i.e.
reclusion perpetua, should have been imposed on petitioner.[17]

Petitioner maintains that assuming that he committed the crime it is error to hold him answerable
for P8,300.00 as actual damages on the basis of the mere testimony of the victims sister,
Angelina Serrano, without any tangible document to support such claim. This is a valid point. In
crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant is liable for all damages which are the natural and
probable consequences of the act or omission complained of.[18] To seek recovery for actual
damages it is essential that the injured party proves the actual amount of loss with reasonable
degree of certainty premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence available.[19]
Courts cannot simply rely on speculation, conjecture or guesswork in determining the fact and
amount of damages.[20]

The award by the court a quo of P8,300.00 as actual damages is not supported by the evidence
on record. We have only the testimony of the victims elder sister stating that she incurred
expenses of P8,300.00 in connection with the death of Malaspina.[21] However, no proof of the
actual damages was ever presented in court. Of the expenses alleged to have been incurred, the
Court can only give credence to those supported by receipts and which appear to have been
genuinely expended in connection with the death of the victim. Since the actual amount was not
substantiated, the same cannot be granted.[22]
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from finding petitioner ALEJANDRO FUENTES JR.
guilty of MURDER and directing him to indemnify the heirs of Julieto Malaspina in the amount
of P50,000.00 plus costs is AFFIRMED with the modification that the penalty imposed should
be as it is corrected to reclusion perpetua, and the award of actual damages is deleted.

SO ORDERED.

ROSELLA D. CANQUE, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and SOCOR

CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari seeks a reversal of the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals
affirming the judgment[2] of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City ordering petitioner -

. . . to pay [private respondent] the principal sum of Two Hundred Ninety Nine Thousand Seven
Hundred Seventeen Pesos and Seventy Five Centavos (P299,717.75) plus interest thereon at 12%
per annum from September 22, 1986, the date of the filing of the complaint until fully paid; to
pay [private respondent] the further sum of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) for reasonable
attorneys fees; to pay the sum of Five Hundred Fifty Two Pesos and Eighty Six Centavos
(P552.86) for filing fees and to pay the costs of suit. Since [private respondent] withdrew its
prayer for an alias writ of preliminary attachment vis-a-vis the [petitioners] counterbound, the
incident on the alias writ of preliminary attachment has become moot and academic.

The facts are as follows:

Petitioner Rosella D. Canque is a contractor doing business under the name and style RDC
Construction. At the time material to this case, she had contracts with the government for (a) the
restoration of Cebu-Toledo wharf road; (b) the asphalting of Lutopan access road; and (c) the
asphalting of Babag road in Lapulapu City.[3] In connection with these projects, petitioner
entered into two contracts with private respondent Socor Construction Corporation. The first
contract (Exh. A),[4] dated April 26, 1985, provided:

The Sub-Contractor (SOCOR Corporation) and the Contractor (RDC Construction) for the
consideration hereinafter named, hereby agree as follows:

1. SCOPE OF WORK:

a. The Sub-Contractor agrees to perform and execute the Supply, Lay and Compact
Item 310 and Item 302;

b. That Contractor shall provide the labor and materials needed to complete the
project;
 c. That the Contractor agrees to pay the Sub-Contractor the price of One Thousand
Pesos only (P1,000.00) per Metric Ton of Item 310 and Eight Thousand Only
(P8,000.00) per Metric Ton of Item 302.

d. That the Contractor shall pay the Sub-Contractor the volume of the supplied Item
based on the actual weight in Metric Tons delivered, laid and compacted and accepted
by the MPWH;

e. The construction will commence upon the acceptance of the offer.

The second contract (Exh. B),[5] dated July 23, 1985, stated:

The Supplier (SOCOR Construction) and the Contractor (RDC Construction) for the
consideration hereinafter named, hereby agree as follows:

1. SCOPE OF WORK:

a. The Supplier agrees to perform and execute the delivery of Item 310 and Item 302 to the
jobsite for the Asphalting of DAS Access Road and the Front Gate of ACMDC, Toledo City;

b. That the Contractor should inform or give notice to the Supplier two (2) days before the
delivery of such items;

c. That the Contractor shall pay the Supplier the volume of the supplied items on the actual
weight in metric tons delivered and accepted by the MPWH fifteen (15) days after the
submission of the bill;

d. The delivery will commence upon the acceptance of the offer.

On May 28, 1986, private respondent sent petitioner a bill (Exh. C), containing a revised
computation,[6] for P299,717.75, plus interest at the rate of 3% a month, representing the
balance of petitioners total account of P2,098,400.25 for materials delivered and services
rendered by private respondent under the two contracts. However, petitioner refused to pay the
amount, claiming that private respondent failed to submit the delivery receipts showing the
actual weight in metric tons of the items delivered and the acceptance thereof by the
government.[7]

Hence, on September 22, 1986, private respondent brought suit in the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu to recover from petitioner the sum of P299,717.75, plus interest at the rate of 3% a month.

In her answer, petitioner admitted the existence of the contracts with private respondent as well
as receipt of the billing (Exh. C), dated May 28, 1986. However, she disputed the correctness of
the bill

. . . considering that the deliveries of [private respondent] were not signed and acknowledged by
the checkers of [petitioner], the bituminous tack coat it delivered to [petitioner] consisted of
60% water, and [petitioner] has already paid [private respondent] about P1,400,000.00 but
[private respondent] has not issued any receipt to [petitioner] for said payments and there is no
agreement that [private respondent] will charge 3% per month interest.[8]

Petitioner subsequently amended her answer denying she had entered into sub-contracts with
private respondent.[9]

During the trial, private respondent, as plaintiff, presented its vice-president, Sofia O. Sanchez,
and Dolores Aday, its bookkeeper.

Petitioners evidence consisted of her lone testimony.[10]

On June 22, 1988, the trial court rendered its decision ordering petitioner to pay private
respondent the sum of P299,717.75 plus interest at 12% per annum, and costs. It held:

. . . . [B]y analyzing the plaintiffs Book of Collectible Accounts particularly page 17 thereof
(Exh. K) this Court is convinced that the entries (both payments and billings) recorded thereat
are credible. Undeniably, the book contains a detailed account of SOCORs commercial
transactions with RDC which were entered therein in the course of business. We cannot therefore
disregard the entries recorded under Exhibit K because the fact of their having been made in the
course of business carries with it some degree of trustworthiness. Besides, no proof was ever
offered to demonstrate the irregularity of the said entries thus, there is then no cogent reason for
us to doubt their authenticity.[11]

The trial court further ruled that in spite of the fact that the contracts did not have any stipulation
on interest, interest may be awarded in the form of damages under Article 2209 of the Civil
Code.[12]

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed. It upheld the trial courts reliance on private
respondents Book of Collectible Accounts (Exh. K) on the basis of Rule 130, 37[13] of the
Rules of Court.

Hence, this appeal. Petitioner contends that

I. THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE AS

ENTRIES IN THE COURSE OF BUSINESS THE ENTRIES IN PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS BOOK OF COLLECTIBLE ACCOUNTS CONSIDERING THAT THE
PERSON WHO MADE SAID ENTRIES ACTUALLY TESTIFIED IN THIS CASE BUT
UNFORTUNATELY HAD NO PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF SAID ENTRIES.

II. THE DECISION OF THE RESPONDENT COURT SHOULD BE REVERSED AS IT

HAS ONLY INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT IT.

First. Petitioner contends that the presentation of the delivery receipts duly accepted by the then
Ministry of Public Works and Highways (MPWH) is required under the contracts (Exhs. A and
B) and is a condition precedent for her payment of the amount claimed by private respondent.
Petitioner argues that the entries in private respondents Book of Collectible Accounts (Exh.
K) cannot take the place of the delivery receipts and that such entries are mere hearsay
and, thus, inadmissible in evidence.[14]

We agree with the appellate court that the stipulation in the two contracts requiring the
submission of delivery receipts does not preclude proof of delivery of materials by private
respondent in some other way. The question is whether the entries in the Book of Collectible
Accounts (Exh. K) constitute competent evidence to show such delivery. Private respondent
cites Rule 130, 37 of the Rules of Court and argues that the entries in question constitute
entries in the course of business sufficient to prove deliveries made for the government
projects. This provision reads:

Entries in the course of business. Entries made at, or near the time of the transactions to
which they refer, by a person deceased, outside of the Philippines or unable to testify, who
was in a position to know the facts therein stated, may be received as prima facie evidence,
if such person made the entries in his professional capacity or in the performance of duty
and in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.[15]

The admission in evidence of entries in corporate books requires the satisfaction of the
following conditions:

1. The person who made the entry must be dead, outside the country or unable to
testify;

2. The entries were made at or near the time of the transactions to which they refer;

3. The entrant was in a position to know the facts stated in the entries;

4. The entries were made in his professional capacity or in the performance of a duty,
whether legal, contractual, moral or religious; and

5. The entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.[16]

As petitioner points out, the business entries in question (Exh. K) do not meet the first and
third requisites. Dolores Aday, who made the entries, was presented by private respondent to
testify on the account of RDC Construction. It was in the course of her testimony that the entries
were presented and marked in evidence. There was, therefore, neither justification nor necessity
for the presentation of the entries as the person who made them was available to testify in court.

Necessity is given as a ground for admitting entries, in that they are the best available evidence.
Said a learned judge: What a man has actually done and committed to writing when under
obligation to do the act, it being in the course of the business he has undertaken, and he
being dead, there seems to be no danger in submitting to the consideration of the court. The
person who may be called to court to testify on these entries being dead, there arises the
necessity of their admission without the one who made them being called to court be sworn
and subjected to cross-examination. And this is permissible in order to prevent a failure of
justice.[17]

Moreover, Aday admitted that she had no personal knowledge of the facts constituting the entry.
She said she made the entries based on the bills given to her. But she has no knowledge of the
truth or falsity of the facts stated in the bills. The deliveries of the materials stated in the bills
were supervised by an engineer for (such) functions.[18] The person, therefore, who has
personal knowledge of the facts stated in the entries, i.e., that such deliveries were made in the
amounts and on the dates stated, was the companys project engineer. The entries made by Aday
show only that the billings had been submitted to her by the engineer and that she faithfully
recorded the amounts stated therein in the books of account. Whether or not the bills given to
Aday correctly reflected the deliveries made in the amounts and on the dates indicated was a fact
that could be established by the project engineer alone who, however, was not presented during
trial. The rule is stated by former Chief Justice Moran, thus:

[W]hen the witness had no personal knowledge of the facts entered by him, and the person
who gave him the information is individually known and may testify as to the facts stated
in the entry which is not part of a system of entries where scores of employees have
intervened, such entry is not admissible without the testimony of the informer.[19]

Second. It is nonetheless argued by private respondent that although the entries cannot be
considered an exception to the hearsay rule, they may be admitted under Rule 132, 10[20]
of the Rules of Court which provides:

SEC. 10. When witness may refer to memorandum. A witness may be allowed to refresh his
memory respecting a fact, by anything written by himself or under his direction at the time
when the fact occurred, or immediately thereafter, or at any other time when the fact was
fresh in his memory and he knew that the same was correctly stated in the writing; but in
such case the writing must be produced and may be inspected by the adverse party, who
may, if he chooses, cross-examine the witness upon it, and may read it in evidence. So, also,
a witness may testify from such a writing, though he retain no recollection of the particular
facts, if he is able to swear that the writing correctly stated the transaction when made; but
such evidence must be received with caution.

On the other hand, petitioner contends that evidence which is inadmissible for the purpose for
which it was offered cannot be admitted for another purpose. She cites the following from Chief
Justice Morans commentaries:

The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified. Where the offer is general,
and the evidence is admissible for one purpose and inadmissible for another, the evidence should
be rejected. Likewise, where the offer is made for two or more purposes and the evidence is
incompetent for one of them, the evidence should be excluded. The reason for the rule is that it is
the duty of a party to select the competent from the incompetent in offering testimony, and he
cannot impose this duty upon the trial court. Where the evidence is inadmissible for the purpose
stated in the offer, it must be rejected, though the same may be admissible for another purpose.
The rule is stated thus: If a party x x x opens the particular view with which he offers any part of
his evidence, or states the object to be attained by it, he precludes himself from insisting on its
operation in any other direction, or for any other object; and the reason is, that the opposite party
is prevented from objecting to its competency in any view different from the one proposed.[21]

It should be noted, however, that Exh. K is not really being presented for another purpose.
Private respondents counsel offered it for the purpose of showing the amount of petitioners
indebtedness. He said:

Exhibit K, your Honor - faithful reproduction of page (17) of the book on Collectible
Accounts of the plaintiff, reflecting the principal indebtedness of defendant in the
amount of Two hundred ninety-nine thousand seven hundred seventeen pesos and
seventy-five centavos (P299,717.75) and reflecting as well the accumulated interest of
three percent (3%) monthly compounded such that as of December 11, 1987, the
amount collectible from the defendant by the plaintiff is Six hundred sixteen thousand
four hundred thirty-five pesos and seventy-two centavos (P616,435.72);[22]

This is also the purpose for which its admission is sought as a memorandum to refresh the
memory of Dolores Aday as a witness. In other words, it is the nature of the evidence that is
changed, not the purpose for which it is offered.

Be that as it may, considered as a memorandum, Exh. K does not itself constitute evidence. As
explained in Borromeo v. Court of Appeals:[23]

Under the above provision (Rule 132, 10), the memorandum used to refresh the memory of the
witness does not constitute evidence, and may not be admitted as such, for the simple reason that
the witness has just the same to testify on the basis of refreshed memory. In other words, where
the witness has testified independently of or after his testimony has been refreshed by a
memorandum of the events in dispute, such memorandum is not admissible as corroborative
evidence. It is self-evident that a witness may not be corroborated by any written statement
prepared wholly by him. He cannot be more credible just because he supports his open-court
declaration with written statements of the same facts even if he did prepare them during the
occasion in dispute, unless the proper predicate of his failing memory is priorly laid down. What
is more, even where this requirement has been satisfied, the express injunction of the rule itself is
that such evidence must be received with caution, if only because it is not very difficult to
conceive and fabricate evidence of this nature. This is doubly true when the witness stands to
gain materially or otherwise from the admission of such evidence . . . .[24]

As the entries in question (Exh. K) were not made based on personal knowledge, they could only
corroborate Dolores Adays testimony that she made the entries as she received the bills.

Third. Does this, therefore, mean there is no competent evidence of private respondents claim as
petitioner argues?[25] The answer is in the negative. Aside from Exh. K, private respondent
presented the following documents:

1) Exhibit A - Contract Agreement dated 26 April 1985 which contract covers both the
Toledo wharf project and the Babag Road project in Lapulapu City.
2) Exhibit B - Contract Agreement dated 23 July 1985 which covers the DAS Asphalting
Project.

3) Exhibit C - Revised Computation of Billings submitted on May 28, 1986.

4) Exhibit D - an affidavit executed by [petitioner] to the effect that she has no more
pending or unsettled obligations as far as Toledo Wharf Road is concerned.

5) Exhibit D-1 - Statement of Work Accomplished on the Road Restoration of Cebu-Toledo

wharf project.

6) Exhibit E - another affidavit executed by [petitioner] attesting that she has completely
paid her laborers at the project located at Babag, Lapulapu City

7) Exhibits F, G, G-1, G-2, G-3 - Premiums paid by [private respondent] together with the
receipts for filing fees.

8) Exhibits H, I, J - certifications issued by OIC, MPWH, Regional Office; Lapulapu City,

City Engineer; Toledo City Treasurers Office respectively, proving that RDC construction has no
more collectibles with all the said government offices in connection with its projects.

10) Exhibit L - Bill No. 057 under the account of RDC Construction in the amount of
P153,382.75 dated August 24, 1985.

11) Exhibit M - Bill No. 069 (RDCs account), in the amount of P1,701,795.00 dated November
20, 1985.

12) Exhibit N - Bill No. 071 (RDCs account) in the amount of P47,250.00 dated November 22,
1985.

13) Exhibit O - Bill No. 079 (RDCs account) in the amount of P7,290.00 dated December 6,
1985.

As the trial court found:

The entries recorded under Exhibit K were supported by Exhibits L, M, N, O which are all Socor
Billings under the account of RDC Construction. These billings were presented and duly
received by the authorized representatives of defendant. The circumstances obtaining in the case
at bar clearly show that for a long period of time after receipt thereof, RDC never manifested its
dissatisfaction or objection to the aforestated billings submitted by plaintiff. Neither did
defendant immediately protest to plaintiffs alleged incomplete or irregular performance. In view
of these facts, we believe Art. 1235 of the New Civil Code is applicable.

Art. 1235. When the obligee accepts the performance, knowing its incompleteness and
irregularity and without expressing any protest or objection, the obligation is deemed complied
with.
FINALLY, after a conscientious scrutiny of the records, we find Exhibit D-1 (p. 85 record) to
be a material proof of plaintiffs complete fulfillment of its obligation.

There is no question that plaintiff supplied RDC Construction with Item 302 (Bitunimous Prime
Coat), Item 303 (Bituminous Tack Coat) and Item 310 (Bitunimous Concrete Surface Course) in
all the three projects of the latter. The Lutopan Access Road project, the Toledo wharf project
and the Babag-Lapulapu Road project.

On the other hand, no proof was ever offered by defendant to show the presence of other
contractors in those projects. We can therefore conclude that it was Socor Construction Corp.
ALONE who supplied RDC with Bituminous Prime Coat, Bituminous Tack Coat and
Bituminous Concrete Surface Course for all the aforenamed three projects.[26]

Indeed, while petitioner had previously paid private respondent about P1,400,000.00 for
deliveries made in the past, she did not show that she made such payments only after the delivery
receipts had been presented by private respondent. On the other hand, it appears that petitioner
was able to collect the full amount of project costs from the government, so that petitioner would
be unjustly enriched at the expense of private respondent if she is not made to pay what is her
just obligation under the contracts.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

ADMISSIONS AND CONFESSIONS

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
GENER DE GUZMAN y SICO, accused-appellant.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:p

On 1 April 1992, complainant Gilda Ambray filed with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Bacoor, Cavite, a complaint 1 charging accused Gener de Guzman y Sico with the crime of rape
allegedly committed at 9:00 p.m. of 31 March 1992 in Meadow Wood, Executive Village,
Barangay Panapaan, Bacoor, Cavite. On even date, Gener de Guzman was arrested and detained
at the Municipal Jail of Bacoor, Cavite, but was released on 14 April 1992 upon the filing and
approval of his bail bond. 2

Gener de Guzman did not submit any counter-affidavit as required in the subpoena 3 issued by
the MTC on 14 April 1992. Finding a prima facie case against him on the basis of the evidence
for the prosecution, the MTC forwarded the record of the case to the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor for the filing of the necessary information with the appropriate court. 4
On 14 July 1992, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Cavite filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Bacoor, Cavite, Branch 19, an information 5 charging accused Gener de Guzman
with the crime of rape, allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about the 31st day of March 1992 at around 9:00 o'clock in the evening
at Meadow Wood Subd., Executive Village, Barangay Panapaan, Municipality of
Bacoor, Province of Cavite, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design, by means of force,
violence and intimidation, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, have carnal knowledge of one Gilda B. Ambray against her will and
consent, to the damage and prejudice of said Gilda B. Ambray.

Contrary to law.

The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. B-92-216.

Upon arraignment on 10 August 1992, accused Gener de Guzman entered a plea of not
guilty. 6 Trial on the merits thereafter ensued and the prosecution moved for the cancellation of
the bail bond.

On 9 December 1992, after complainant Gilda Ambray, Police Officer Efren Bautista, and Dr.
Valentin Bernales of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), completed their testimony as
witnesses for the prosecution, the trial court cancelled the bail bond of Gener de Guzman on the
ground that the evidence of his guilt was strong. 7 He was re-arrested, and on 22 January 1993,
his motion for reconsideration 8 of the order cancelling his bail bond was denied by the trial
court for lack of merit as he was charged with a capital offense punishable by reclusion perpetua
and the evidence of his guilt was strong. 9

Two other witnesses were presented by the prosecution, namely: Resurreccion Talub Quiocho, a
kumadre of the accused, and Aquilino Flores Ambray, the husband of the complainant.

The testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution established the following facts:

Homeward bound on 31 March 1992 from Anson Department Store where she worked as a sales
clerk, complainant Gilda Ambray, the 32-year old wife of Aquilino mores Ambray and a mother
of two children, was at the gate of Meadow Wood Subdivision, Panapaan, Bacoor, Cavite, at
about 8:45 p.m. waiting for a tricycle ride toward her residence. She waited for about ten
minutes. When she noticed the accused, then wearing army pants, sitting at the guardhouse, she
approached him and asked him some questions. He answered in a stammering manner. The
complainant recognized the accused very well because it was summertime and the gate of the
subdivision was well-lit. 10

After Gilda started to walk, the accused mounted his tricycle, followed her and offered her a ride,
to which she agreed. While on board the tricycle, Gilda noticed that the accused took a different
route. She got scared but managed not to show it. The accused would once in a while stop the
tricycle and tell her that it was not in good condition. 11 When they reached Phase II of the same
subdivision near an unfinished house, the accused stopped and told Gilda to push the tricycle.
She alighted from the tricycle and paid him P5.00, which he did not accept. Gilda then walked
away, but after she had taken about ten steps, the accused embraced her from behind, covered
her mouth and held her neck tightly. She tried to shout but the accused threatened her. The
accused then dragged her to a vacant lot ten meters away from the unfinished house. She
attempted to shout again, but he threatened to kill her if she made noise. She fought to free
herself from his hold, but the accused pushed and slapped her. He tried to raise her T-shirt while
holding her neck tightly. He shouted and commanded her to raise her T-shirt, which she
obligingly followed because of fear. He removed her bra and kissed her breast. She shouted
"Saklolo! Tulungan ninyo ako!," but the accused covered her mouth and again held her neck that
she could hardly breathe. He held her hand tightly and positioned himself on top of her. He
unzipped her pants and pulled it down her knees. She struggled to liberate herself, but to no
avail. The accused then tried to insert his penis into her, but failed to do so because she struggled
and fought back, then slapped him while covering her vagina with her hand. When she tried to
stand, he pushed her down and, in the process, was able to completely pull down her pants and
underwear. She pleaded to him to have mercy on her and told him that she had two children. He
warned her: "Huwag kang sisigaw, papatayin kita!" The accused again tried to insert his penis
into her, but she prevented him from doing so. The accused took her hand and let her hold his
penis to make it stiff. As Gilda became too weak to struggle against the accused's sexual
advances, the accused was able to finally consummate his dastardly desire. He then pulled out
his penis and "fingered" her private organ for a short while. The accused then warned Gilda not
to tell anybody, otherwise, he would kill her and all members of her family. 12 He told her that
she was his third victim but the two did not complain. He then dressed up. Gilda picked up her
pants and underwear and hurriedly ran toward her home, without looking back. 13

When Gilda arrived home, she told her mother and her husband, Aquilino Flores Ambray, that
she was raped by the accused. Aquilino got angry and wanted to retaliate but was prevailed upon
not to by Gilda's mother. 14

At almost midnight of 31 March 1992, Gilda and her mother reported the incident to one
Tony Antonio, the President of the Homeowners' Association and President of the
National Press Club. Antonio radioed the Bacoor Police Station to send an investigator.
PO3 Efren Bautista and Sgt. Saguisame responded to the alarm immediately. Upon their
arrival at the house of Antonio, PO3 Bautista saw Gilda with her mother. Gilda, who was
crying, related to PO3 Bautista that she was raped and described to him her assailant as a
tricycle driver, tall, strong, with curly hair and in army cut.15 Gilda also gave PO3
Bautista a vivid description of the accused's tricycle, viz., blue in color with the name
"Dimple" at the back. 16 The policemen left and went to the house of the accused. PO3
Bautista invited the accused to go with him because the Mayor wanted to talk to him. The
accused, together with PO3 Bautista, went to the residence of Antonio. When the accused
entered the house of Antonio, Gilda Ambray cried hysterically while pointing to the
accused as her rapist. The accused was then brought to the municipal jail. 17

Gilda Ambray was medically examined at the Las Piñas Hospital and issued a medical
certificate. 18 She then proceeded to the NBI for a medico-legal examination. Dr. Valentin
Bernales, a medico-legal officer of the NBI, conducted the examination on Gilda. His findings,
contained in his medico-legal report, 19 were as follows:

I. Physical Injuries:

Abrasion, brownish; lips, upper, left side, mucosal,

2.0 x 1.5 cm.; elbow, right, postero-lateral aspect,
2.0 x 1.5 cm. and postero-medial aspect, multi-
linear, with brown scab formation, 3.0 x 1.0 cm.

Contusion, reddish; back, right, scapular area, 7.0 x

5.0 cm. and left, 15.0 x 8.0 cm.

Contused abrasion, reddish black, scapular area,

left, medial aspect, 3.0 x 2.0 cm.

II. Genital Examination:

Pubic hair, fully grown, moderate. Labia majora,

gaping. Labia minora, coaptated. Fourchette, lax.
Vestibulae, pinkish, smooth. Hymen, reduced to
carunculae myrtiformis. Vaginal orifice, admits a
tube, 3.0 cm. in diameter. Vaginal wall, lax.
Rugosities, obliterated.

III. Conclusions:

1. The above physical injuries were

noted on the body of the subject at
the time of the examination.

2. Medical evidence indicative of

recent sexual intercourse with man
on or about the alleged date of
examination.

IV. Remarks:

Laboratory Report S-92-94 20 shows positive result

for the presence of human spermatozoa.

Dr. Bernales opined that the physical injuries sustained by Gilda Ambray resulted from force
applied to her," 21 while the presence of human spermatozoa in Gilda's genitals indicated recent
sexual intercourse. 22
On 3 April 1992, "Bebey" and Linda de Guzman, the parents of the accused, asked the help of
Resurreccion Talub Quiocho, the accused's kumadre, to beg for Gilda's forgiveness for the
accused's sake. The following day, Resurreccion accompanied the accused's parents, wife,
children and sister-in-law to Gilda's house. 23 Gilda met them, but to their plea for forgiveness,
she told them "that should not be tolerated." 24

Gilda further testified that she suffered moral damages, had to resign from her job due to shame,
and had spent P28,500.00 for attorney's fees. 25

Gener de Guzman interposed the defense of alibi and presented Alfredo Fenandez and Teotimo
Camagong as his witnesses.

According to Gener de Guzman, on 31 March 1992 at around 9:00 p.m., he was about to go
home and was at the corner of Meadow Wood Subdivision coming from Justineville
Subdivision. On his way home on his tricycle, he saw Gilda Ambray, who flagged him
down and hoarded his tricycle. After traveling about half a kilometer, his tricycle
malfunctioned. He told her that she better walk home because her house was already near.
He pushed his tricycle home, and on his way, one Alfredo Fenandez approached him and
inquired what was wrong with his tricycle. Alfredo helped him push the tricycle towards
his (accused's) home, and upon arrival thereat, he told Alfredo not to leave at once. At
around 9:10 p.m., they started to drink liquor until 11:00 p.m., and after their drinking
spree, he cleaned their mess and slept. Then at around 12:50 a.m. of 1 April 1992, PO3
Efren Bautista fetched and apprised him that he was accused of rape by a certain Gilda
Ambray. Thereafter, an investigation was conducted and he was brought to the Bacoor
Police Station.

Alfredo L. Fernandez, 37 years old, jobless, and a resident of Justineville Subdivision,

corroborated Gener's story about the malfunctioning tricycle and the drinking session. 26

Teotimo Camagong testified that he was present when the accused was investigated at the
residence of Tony Antonio and that the complainant did not pinpoint and identify the
accused as her alleged molester. 27

In its Decision 28 dated 30 June 1994 and promulgated on 25 July 1994, the trial court found the
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape as charged, and rendered judgment
as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered herein accused GENER SICO DE

GUZMAN is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
rape punishable by Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code. He should suffer the
prison term of reclusion perpetua and indemnify herein private complainant Gilda
Ambray the following: actual damages representing her lost monthly salary when
she resigned from her office due to shame for being a rape victim, in the sum of
P30,000.00, moral damages in the sum of P30,000.00, exemplary damages of
P10,000.00, litigation expenses of P5,000.00, and attorney's fee[s] including
appearance fees for the private prosecutor in the sum of P28,500.00.
It gave full gave weight to the testimony of Gilda Ambray because "[w]ithout doubt, the
complainant had endured the rigors of recalling her harrowing ordeal and had vividly, credibly
and candidly portrayed in detail how she was raped by the accused." 29

As to whether sexual intercourse was consummated against the will or consent of the offended
party, the trial court said:

No less than NBI Medico Legal Officer Dr. Valentin Bernales had corroborated
the stance of herein private complainant that she was raped by the accused. The
victim had sustained contusions and abrasions at her body that indicated that she
struggled against the sexual advances of the accused. As a result of the doctor's
examination on the victim, he confirmed the occurrence of a recent sexual
intercourse and presence in her private part of human spermatozoa as denoted in
his Medico Legal Report (Exh. F) and Laboratory Report (Exh. D). 30

Likewise it ruled that since the accused was drunk, he was more aggressive and sexually
capable. 31 Finally, it considered as evidence of the accused's guilt the plea of his
parents, wife and relatives for forgiveness and compromise. 32

The accused seasonably appealed from the trial court's judgment of conviction, and in urging us
to acquit him, interposes the following assignment of errors in his Appellant's Brief:

1. THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT ACCUSED HAS INDUBITABLY

EMPLOYED FORCE AND INTIMIDATION IN THE RAPE OF THE VICTIM.

2. THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT ACCUSED WAS POSITIVELY

IDENTIFIED BY THE VICTIM.

3. THE COURT ERRED IN STRESSING THAT THE ACCUSED WAS DRUNK

AT THE TIME OF THE COMMISSION OF RAPE.

In the Brief for the Appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General disagrees with the accused
and prays that we affirm in toto the appealed decision.

The first and second assigned errors may be taken up together. The upshot of the accused's
stance in these alleged errors is that he was not positively identified and that neither force
nor intimidation was proven. As to the latter he cites these facts: (a) Gilda's assailant had
three acts of sexual intercourse with her; (b) the physical examination showed that she
suffered injuries on the dorsal portion only, and none was found on her neck; (c) her
personal belongings — bra, pants, T-shirt and underwear — were completely intact; and
(d) no signs of physical violence were discernible on both the persons of the accused and
Gilda Ambray.

Rape is essentially an offense of secrecy, not generally attempted except in dark or deserted and
secluded places away from prying eyes, and the crime usually commences solely upon the word
of the offended woman herself and conviction invariably turns upon her credibility, as the
People's single witness of the actual occurrence. 33

In the review of rape cases, therefore, this Court is guided by the following principles: (1) an
accusation for rape can be made with facility: it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the
person accused, though innocent, to disprove it; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of
rape where two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be
scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on
its on merits, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the
defense.34

The resolution then of the first two assigned errors and the determination of the guilt of the
accused depend primarily on the credibility of the complainant Gilda Ambray, since only she and
the accused witnessed the incident when it happened. Her testimony alone, if credible, would
render the accused's conviction inevitable.

A meticulous assessment of Gilda's testimony demonstrates beyond doubt the truthfulness of her
story, which she narrated in a categorical, straightforward and candid manner. Further
strengthening her credibility in recounting her ordeal at the hands of the accused was her conduct
immediately after the sexual assault. She ran home without looking back, and upon her arrival
she reported the rape to her husband and her mother at once. Immediately thereafter, she reported
it to Tony Antonio, the President of the Homeowners' Association and President of the National
Press Club, who then sought police assistance. When the policemen arrived at Antonio's
residence in response to the latter's call, Gilda narrated the rape to the policemen and gave them
the description of the assailant. When the policemen brought the accused to the residence of
Antonio, Gilda forthwith pointed to the accused as the person who raped her. Gilda voluntarily
submitted herself to a medical examination at the Las Piñas Hospital and then to an examination
of her private parts by Dr. Bernales of the NBI. The following day she submitted herself to an
investigations 35 by the PNP of Bacoor, Cavite, and filed on the same day a complaint for rape
against the accused with the MTC of Bacoor, Cavite.

All the foregoing acts of Gilda were done within twenty-four hours after the commission of the
crime. The quickness and spontaneity of these deeds manifested the natural reactions of a
virtuous woman who had just undergone sexual molestation against herself, 36 and evinced
nothing more than her instant resolve to denounce the beast who criminally abused and ravished
her, and to protect her honor. Moreover, she rejected the plea for forgiveness sought by the
accused's parents, wife, and children, then suffered the travails of a public trial which
necessarily exposed her to humiliation and embarrassment by unraveling the details of the rape
and enduring a cross-examination which sought to discredit her.

What Gilda endured could only come from one whose obsession was to bring to justice the
person who had abused her and vindicate her honor, even if such vindication would never erase
from her memory that excruciatingly painful chapter in her life which left her psychologically
and emotionally scarred forever. This Court has repeatedly held that no complainant would admit
that she has been raped, make public the offense, allow the examination of her private parts,
undergo the troubles and humiliation of public trial and endure the ordeal of testifying to all its
gory details if she had not in fact been raped. 3 7

We likewise agree with the trial court that the accused used force and intimidation upon Gilda.

Another established rule in rape cases is that the force need not be irresistible; all that is
necessary is that the force used by the accused is sufficient to consummate his evil purpose, or
that it was successfully used. It need not be so great or of such character that it could not be
repelled. 38 Intimidation, on the other hand, must be viewed in light of the victim's perception
and judgment at the time of the commission of the crime and not by any hard and fast rule; it is
enough that it produces fear — fear that if the victim does not yield to the bestial demands of the
accused, something would happen to her at that moment, or even thereafter as when she is
threatened with death if she would report the incident.39

In this case, the accused embraced Gilda from behind, held her neck tightly, and covered her
mouth. As she struggled to free herself, she sustained her injuries. Dr. Bernales confirmed the
use of force, and according to him, the abrasions and contusions on Gilda's body were due to
force applied on her. Moreover, the accused also threatened Gilda with death if she would not
yield to his bestial desires. The threat certainly constituted intimidation.

The accused's contention that it was highly incredible that there was force or intimidation since
the assailant committed three acts of sexual intercourse with Gilda in three hours, deserves scant
consideration. In the first place, Gilda explained in her re-direct examination that the three hours
mentioned in her cross-examination referred to the time which elapsed from the moment she was
at the gate of Meadow Wood Subdivision and until she reported the incident to Tony Antonio. 40
The principal object of re-direct examination is to prevent injustice to the witness and the party
who has called him by affording an opportunity to the witness to explain the testimony given on
cross-examination, and to explain any apparent contradiction or inconsistency in his statements,
an opportunity which is ordinarily afforded to him during cross-examination. The re-direct
examination serves the purpose of completing the answer of a witness, or of adding a new matter
which has been omitted, or of correcting a possible misinterpretation of testimony. 41 In the
second place, on direct examination, Gilda categorically declared that the accused tried to thrice
insert his penis into her vagina. He failed in the first and second attempts because she struggled,
but succeeded on the third because she was already weak. While it may be true that on cross-
examination she testified that she was raped once, yet on re-direct examination she said
that she was raped three times, no inconsistency at all may be deduced therefrom. There
was merely confusion as to the legal qualifications of the three separate acts, i.e., Gilda's
answers were conclusions of law. A witness is not permitted to testify as to a conclusion of
law, among which, legal responsibility is one of the most conspicuous. A witness, no matter
how skillful, is not to be asked or permitted to testify as to whether or not a party is
responsible to the law. Law in the sense here used embraces whatever conclusions
belonging properly to the court. 42

What is clear to us is that there were, at least, two acts of attempted rape and one consummated
rape, committed in light of the testimony of Gilda. The information, however, charged the
accused with only one act of rape; hence, consistent with the constitutional right of the accused
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, 43 he cannot be held liable
for more than what he was charged. There can only be one conviction for rape if the information
charges only one offense, even if the evidence shows three separate acts of sexual intercourse. 44

Neither are we persuaded by the claim that Gilda was not able to positively identify the accused.
He was familiar to Gilda one or two weeks before the incident because she saw him driving a
tricycle and had, in fact, been once a passenger of his. She saw him clearly at the guardhouse
before the incident because the guardhouse was well-lit; she was his passenger that evening until
he stopped his tricycle near the unfinished house; and she had ample opportunity to see and
recognize him during the assault. Then, Gilda did not hesitate to point to and identify the accused
as her rapist when the latter was brought by the policemen to the house of Tony Antonio.

The accused's defense of alibi, which is the weakest of all defenses for it is easy to concoct and
fabricate, cannot prevail over his positive identification by Gilda.45

Moreover, any scintilla of doubt both as to the identification of the accused and as to his guilt
was dissolved by the overtures of his parents, wife, children and sister-in-law on pleading for
forgiveness from Gilda. The accused did not disown their acts, which were testified to by his
kumadre, Resurreccion Talub Quiocho, and Gilda herself. He chose not to deny their testimony.
Finally, despite the unequivocal pronouncement by the trial court that his guilt was "strongly
established by the acts of his parents, wife and relatives, who had gone to the house of the victim
to ask her forgiveness and to seek a compromise," the accused dared not assign that finding and
conclusion as an error and his Appellant's Brief is conspicuously silent thereon. Indubitably then,
the accused was a party to the decision to seek for forgiveness, or had prior knowledge of the
plan to seek for it and consented to pursue it, or confirmed and ratified the act of his parents,
wife, children and sister-in-law. A plea for forgiveness may be considered as analogous to an
attempt to compromise. In criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offense (criminal
negligence) or those allowed by law to be compromised, an offer of compromise by the accused
may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt. 46 No one would ask for
forgiveness unless he had committed some wrong, for to forgive means to absolve, to pardon, to
cease to feel resentment against on account of wrong committed; give up claim to requital from
or retribution upon
(an offender). 4 7 In People vs. Calimquim, 48 we stated:

The fact that appellant's mother sought forgiveness for her son from Corazon's
father is an indication of guilt. (See People vs. Olmedillo,
L-42660, August 30, 1982, 116 SCRA 193).

The accused may be correct in the third assigned error because no testimony of a witness
established that the accused was in a state of drunkenness when he sexually assaulted Gilda. The
trial court may have formed its conclusion that the accused was drunk from his testimony that he
and Alfredo Fernandez were drinking liquor in his house from 9:00 to 11:00 p.m. of 31 March
1992. In any event, that erroneous conclusion is innocuous.

We do not then hesitate to conclude that the accused, having had carnal knowledge of
complainant Gilda Ambray through the use of force and intimidation, committed the crime of
rape as defined and penalized in Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, the prescribed penalty
being reclusion perpetua.

The damages awarded by the trial court stand modification. No damage for loss of income due to
Gilda's resignation from her employment should have been awarded, the resignation being
unnecessary. Conformably however with the current jurisprudence, she is entitled to indemnity
of P50,000.00. For her shame, as well as mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, moral shock and social humiliation which rape necessarily brings to the offended
party,49 she is entitled to recover moral damages under Article 2219 in relation to Article 2217
of the Civil Code. However, since no aggravating circumstance had been proved, exemplary
damages may not be awarded. In Article 2230 of the Civil Code, such damages may be awarded
in criminal cases when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances.

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED and the challenged decision of 30 June 1994
of Branch 19 of the Regional Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite, in Criminal Case No. B-92-216 is
AFFIRMED, subject to the modification on the civil liabilities, and as so modified, the awards of
P30,000.00 as actual damages for loss of monthly salary and P10,000.00 as exemplary damages
are deleted, and accused-appellant Gener de Guzman y Sico is further ordered to pay the
complainant Gilda Ambray the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity. The awards for moral damages,
litigation expenses and attorney's fees stand.

Costs against the accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Melo, Francisco and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CRISPIN

YPARRAGUIRRE, accused-appellant.

DECISION
PUNO, J.:

Accused-appellant Crispin Yparraguirre was charged with the crime of rape in an Information
that reads as follows:
"That on or about July 6, 1990, in the Municipality of XXX, Province of Davao,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, armed with a hunting knife, by means of force and intimidation, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of AAA, against her
will."[1]
The prosecution established that AAA was a housemaid of appellant and his wife; that on or
about 7:00 in the evening of July 6, 1990 at the spouses' room in Panabo, Davao, AAA was cooking
porridge for the spouses' two children, one aged four years old and the other nine months
old. Accused-appellant arrived from work and found the two children asleep. He approached
AAA and gave her a small white envelope said to contain medicine for her skin disease. AAA
was afflicted with rashes on her thighs and stomach which she allegedly contracted from one of
the children. AAA opened the envelope and counted fifteen (15) tablets inside. As instructed by
appellant, AAA took all the tablets. A few minutes later, she felt weak and fell down. Suddenly,
she realized that appellant was dragging her to the spouses' bed. She tried to get up but appellant
pushed her down the bed and pointed a hunting knife at her neck. He ordered AAA not to move
or he would kill her. Then he removed her clothes and went on top of her. He kissed her face,
breasts, stomach and private parts and then entered her. AAA cried out in pain but appellant
continued entering her. After satisfying his lust, appellant pulled out and punched AAA in the
stomach. She lost consciousness.
A few minutes later, AAA woke up and saw blood in her private parts. She wiped the blood
and changed her clothes. Seeing her awake, appellant threatened to kill her should she report the
incident to her parents. Appellant then left the house.[2]
AAA did not say a word about the incident. She continued serving the Yparraguirres for one
month before leaving them to return to her mother's house in Barrio YYY. Her mother found AAA
in a state of shock. She could not eat nor talk, neither could she perform ordinary daily functions
such as dressing herself. In short, AAA became helpless. She was brought to the Municipal
Health Officer by her mother for examination. On August 22, 1990, the Municipal Health Officer,
Dr. Imelda T. Bendijo, interviewed the girl and found her unresponsive and unable to talk. She
conducted a physical examination and also found that:
"x x x Physical examination externally no abnormal findings;
Pelvic examination -- normal vagina with old laceration found at 2:00 [position]; hymen
not intact;
Internal examination -- admits one finger;
Advised for pregnancy test and for consultation by [sic] psychiatrist.
x x x."[3]
Upon the Municipal Health Officer's advice, AAA was confined at the Davao City Mental Hospital
for observation and treatment. After a week of treatment, AAA began to talk and revealed that
she was raped by appellant.[4]
Accused-appellant pled not guilty to the crime charged. He claimed that on the night of the
alleged rape he was selling fish at the public market. Allegedly, he was at the market at 4:00 in
the morning, and worked straight until 8:00 in the evening. He never left the fish stall until after
8:00 in the evening because of his many customers.[5]
The trial court found accused-appellant guilty and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua. It
also ordered him to indemnify AAA P50,000.00 as moral damages and pay P5,000.00 as attorney's
fees, thus:
"WHEREFORE, IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the court finds accused Crispin
Yparraguirre guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape punishable under
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. Correspondingly, the court hereby sentences the
said accused to suffer and undergo the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA with all the
accessory penalties provided for by law and to pay the costs.
 Accused Crispin Yparraguirre is also ordered to indemnify the victim Rosita Bacaling
the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages, plus payment of P5,000.00 as attorney's
fees.
SO ORDERED."[6]
In this appeal, accused-appellant contends that:
I
"THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF
THE CRIME OF RAPE;
II
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT WITNESS MARY ANN
YPARRAGUIRRE WENT TO THE MOTHER OF THE ACCUSED ON NOVEMBER
23, 1990 TO NEGOTIATE FOR THE DROPPING OF THE CASE."[7]
The appeal has no merit. After reviewing the records, we find that the prosecution
evidence, which rests mainly on the testimony of AAA, is credible, reliable and trustworthy.
AAA testified in a straightforward, spontaneous and candid manner and never wavered even
on cross-examination and rebuttal. The inconsistencies in her testimony are minor which
tend to buttress, rather than weaken, the conclusion that her testimony was not contrived.[8]
The question of whether AAA contracted the skin disease from the children of appellant is not
important. The undisputed fact is that she was afflicted with the disease and that appellant gave
her tablets for treatment of the disease. Appellant's allegation that AAA should have fallen asleep
for hours after ingesting the tablets is speculative. There is no evidence that the tablets were
sleeping tablets. They, however, weakened AAA and prevented her from making any resistance to
appellant's lewd acts.[9] The delay in filing the complaint does not in any way affect AAA's
credibility.[10] She was afraid of appellant's threat to her life. The complaint was filed three
months after AAA told her mother of the incident, and three months is not too long a period to file
a complaint for rape.
AAA was a seventeen-year old barrio lass and a high school dropout. She was also the
breadwinner of the family.[11] It is hard to believe that AAA would fabricate a story of defloration,
open herself to public trial and place her family, who depended on her, in a very humiliating and
compromising situation for no reason at all.[12] AAA suffered psychologically from the incident.
Before the rape, she had been working for the Yparraguirres for two months[13] and the spouses
actually found her to be a good worker.[14] When AAA returned to her family, however, she lost
her speech and could not perform ordinary daily functions that she had to seek psychiatric
treatment. Indeed, AAA's psychological condition could not have been the product of ill-motive
and fabrication.
Anent the second assigned error, there is evidence that after AAA revealed the rape to
her mother, appellant's wife, Mary Ann Yparraguirre, offered the victim's mother, BBB,
fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00) to dissuade her from filing the complaint.[15] When BBB
refused, Mary Ann increased the offer to twenty-five thousand pesos (P25,000.00). Still BBB
refused to accept it.[16] As pointed out by appellant, no criminal complaint had been filed at
the time the compromise offer was made. Nevertheless, the rape incident was already known
to appellant's wife. Mary Ann herself testified that BBB told her about it on November 3,
1990, the day when Mary Ann first offered the money.[17] An offer to compromise does not
require that a criminal complaint be first filed before the offer can be received in evidence
against the offeror.[18] What is required is that after committing the crime, the accused or his
representative makes an offer to compromise and such offer is proved.
The positive identification of accused-appellant as the rapist prevails over his defense of
alibi.[19] It was not physically impossible for appellant to have been at the scene of the crime. The
public market was merely a ten-minute walk from their rented room[20] and during work breaks,
appellant would sometimes go home to bring food to his children.[21]
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision dated May 10, 1994 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
4, Panabo, Davao is affirmed. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.

PRIVELEGED COMMUNICATION
NELLY LIM, Petitioner, v. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MANUEL D. VICTORIO,
as Presiding Judge of RTC-Rosales, Pangasinan, Branch 53, and JUAN SIM, Respondents.

Quisumbing, Torres & Evangelista for Petitioner.

Bince, Oficiana & Dancel for Private Respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; EVIDENCE; PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS;

PHYSICIAN-PATIENT PRIVILEGE; RATIONAL BEHIND THE RULE. — This rule on the
physician-patient privilege is intended to facilitate and make safe full and confidential disclosure
by the patient to the physician of all facts, circumstances and symptoms, untrammeled by
apprehension of their subsequent and enforced disclosure and publication on the witness stand, to
the end that the physician may form a correct opinion, and be enabled safely and efficaciously to
treat his patient. It rests in public policy and is for the general interest of the community.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SUBJECT TO WAIVER. — Since the object of the privilege is to
protect the patient, it may be waived if no timely objection is made to the physician’s testimony.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUISITES. — In order that the privilege may be successfully
claimed, the following requisites must concur: "1. the privilege is claimed in a civil case; 2. the
person against whom the privilege is claimed is one duly authorized to practice medicine,
surgery or obstetrics; 3. such person acquired the information while he was attending to the
patient in his professional capacity; 4. the information was necessary to enable him to act in that
capacity; and 5. the information was confidential, and, if disclosed, would blacken the reputation
(formerly character) of the patient."cralaw virtua1aw library
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CONDITIONS. — These requisites conform with the four (4) fundamental
conditions necessary for the establishment of a privilege against the disclosure of certain
communications, to wit: "1. The communications must originate in a confidence that they will
not be disclosed. 2. This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory
maintenance of the relation between the parties. 3. The relation must be one which in the opinion
of the community ought to be sedulously fostered 4. The injury that would inure to the relation
by the disclosure of the communications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the
correct disposal of litigation."cralaw virtua1aw library

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PHYSICIAN-PATIENT PRIVILEGE; SCOPE. — The physician may
be considered to be acting in his professional capacity when he attends to the patient for
curative, preventive, or palliative treatment. Thus, only disclosures which would have been
made to the physician to enable him "safely and efficaciously to treat his patient" are
covered by the privilege. It is to be emphasized that "it is the tenor only of the
communication that is privileged. The mere fact of making a communication, as well as the
date of a consultation and the number of consultations, are therefore not privileged from
disclosure, so long as the subject communicated is not stated."cralaw virtua1aw library

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; BURDEN OF PROOF AND PRESUMPTIONS; ONE WHO CLAIMS
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS MUST PROVE REQUISITES THEREOF. — One
who claims this privilege must prove the presence of these aforementioned requisites.

7. ID.; ID.; ID.; PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS; PHYSICIAN-PATIENT

PRIVILEGE; INFORMATION GATHERED IN PRESENCE OF THIRD PARTIES, NOT
PRIVILEGED. — There is authority to the effect that information elicited during
consultation with a physician in the presence of third parties removes such information
from the mantle of the privilege: "Some courts have held that the casual presence of a third
person destroys the confidential nature of the communication between doctor and patient
and thus destroys the privilege, and that under such circumstances the doctor may testify.
Other courts have reached a contrary result."cralaw virtua1aw library

8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PRIVILEGED, WAIVED IN CASE AT BAR. — while it may be true
that counsel for the petitioner opposed the oral request for the issuance of a subpoena ad
testificandum to Dr. Acampado and filed a formal motion for the quashal of the said subpoena a
day before the witness was to testify, the petitioner makes no claim in any of her pleadings that
her counsel had objected to any question asked of the witness on the ground that it elicited an
answer that would violate the privilege, despite the trial court’s advise that said counsel may
interpose his objection to the testimony "once it becomes apparent that the testimony, sought to
be elicited is covered by the privileged communication rule." The particular portions of the
stenographic notes of the testimony of Dr. Acampado quoted in the petitioner’s Petition and
Memorandum, and in the private respondent’s Memorandum, do not at all show that any
objections were interposed. Even granting ex gratia that the testimony of Dr. Acampado could be
covered by the privilege, the failure to seasonably object thereto amounted to a waiver thereof.

DECISION
 DAVIDE, JR., J.:

This petition brings into focus the rule on the confidentiality of the physician-patient
relationship. Petitioner urges this Court to strike down as being violative thereof the resolution of
public respondent Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 16991 denying due course to a petition
to annul the order of the trial court allowing a Psychiatrist of the National Mental Hospital to
testify as an expert witness and not as an attending physician of petitioner.

The parties are in agreement as to the following facts:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Petitioner and private respondent are lawfully married to each other.

On 25 November 1987, private respondent filed with Branch 53 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Pangasinan a petition for annulment of such marriage on the ground that
petitioner has been allegedly suffering from a mental illness called schizophrenia "before,
during and after the marriage and until the present." After the issues were joined and the
pre-trial was terminated, trial on the merits ensued. Private respondent presented three (3)
witnesses before taking the witness stand himself to testify on his own behalf. On 11 January
1989, private respondent’s counsel announced that he would present as his next witness the
Chief of the Female Services of the National Mental Hospital, Dr. Lydia Acampado, a Doctor of
Medicine who specializes in Psychiatry. Said counsel forthwith orally applied for the issuance of
a subpoena ad testificandum requiring Dr. Acampado to testify on 25 January 1989. Petitioner’s
counsel opposed the motion on the ground that the testimony sought to be elicited from the
witness is privileged since the latter had examined the petitioner in a professional capacity
and had diagnosed her to be suffering from schizophrenia. Over such opposition, the
subpoena was issued on 12 January 1989.chanrobles virtualawlibrary
chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph

On 24 January 1989, petitioner’s counsel filed an urgent omnibus motion to quash the
subpoena and suspend the proceedings pending resolution of the motion.

Before Dr. Acampado took the witness stand on 25 January 1989, the court heard this urgent
motion. Movant argued that having seen and examined the petitioner in a professional capacity,
Dr. Acampado is barred from testifying under the rule on the confidentiality of a physician-
patient relationship. Counsel for private respondent contended, however, that Dr. Acampado
would be presented as an expert witness and would not testify on any information acquired while
attending to the petitioner in a professional capacity. The trial court, per respondent Judge,
denied the motion and allowed the witness to testify. Dr. Acampado thus took the witness stand,
was qualified by counsel for private respondent as an expert witness and was asked hypothetical
questions related to her field of expertise. She neither revealed the illness she examined and
treated the petitioner for nor disclosed the results of her examination and the medicines she had
prescribed.

Since petitioner’s counsel insisted that the ruling of the court on the motion be reduced to
writing, respondent Judge issued the following Order on the same date:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"In his omnibus motion filed with the Court only yesterday, January 24, 1989, petitioner seeks to
prevent Dr. Lydia Acampado from testifying because she saw and examined respondent Nelly
Lim in her professional capacity perforce her testimony is covered by the privileged (sic)
communication rule.

Petitioner contends that Dr. Acampado is being presented as an expert witness and that she will
not testify on any information she acquired in (sic) attending to Nelly Lim in her professional
capacity.

Based on the foregoing manifestation of counsel for petitioner, the Court denied the respondent’s
motion and forthwith allowed Dr. Acampado to testify. However, the Court advised counsel for
respondent to interpose his objection once it becomes apparent that the testimony sought to be
elicited is covered by the privileged communication rule.

On the witness box, Dr. Acampado answered routinary (sic) questions to qualify her as an expert
in psychiatry; she was asked to render an opinion as to what kind of illness (sic) are stelazine
tablets applied to; she was asked to render an opinion on a (sic) hypothetical facts respecting
certain behaviours of a person; and finally she admitted she saw and treated Nelly Lim but she
never revealed what illness she examined and treated her (sic); nor (sic) the result of her
examination of Nelly Lim, nor (sic) the medicines she prescribed.

WHEREFORE, the omnibus motion dated January 19, 1989 is hereby DENIED." 1

On 3 March 1989, petitioner filed with the public respondent Court of Appeals a petition 2
for certiorari and prohibition, docketed therein as C.A.-G.R. SP No. 16991, to annul the
aforesaid order of respondent Judge on the ground that the same was issued with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, and to prohibit him from proceeding
with the reception of Dr. Acampado’s testimony.chanrobles.com : virtual law library

On 18 September 1989, the Court of Appeals promulgated a resolution 3 denying due course to
the petition on the ground that "the petitioner failed in establishing the confidential nature of the
testimony given by or obtained from Dr. Acampado when she testified on January 25, 1989."
Hence, the respondent Judge committed no grave abuse of discretion. In support thereof, the
respondent Court discussed the conditions which would render as inadmissible testimonial
evidence between a physician and his patient under paragraph (c), Section 24, Rule 130 of the
Revised Rules of Court and made the following findings:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The present suit is a civil case for annulment of marriage and the person whose testimony is
sought to be stopped as a privileged communication is a physician, who was summoned by the
patient in her professional capacity for curative remedy or treatment. The divergence in views is
whether the information given by the physician in her testimony in open court on January
25, 1989 was a privileged communication. We are of the opinion that they do not fall within
the realm of a privileged communication because the information were (sic) not obtained
from the patient while attending her in her professional capacity and neither were (sic) the
information necessary to enable the physician to prescribe or give treatment to the patient
Nelly Lim. And neither does the information obtained from the physician tend to blacken
the character of the patient or bring disgrace to her or invite reproach. Dr. Acampado is a
Medical Specialist II and in-charge (sic) of the Female Service of the National Center for Mental
Health a fellow of the Philippine Psychiatrist Association and a Diplomate of the Philippine
Board of Psychiatrists. She was summoned to testify as an expert witness and not as an attending
physician of petitioner.

After a careful scrutiny of the transcript of Dr. Acampado’s testimony, We find no declaration
that touched (sic) or disclosed any information which she has acquired from her patient, Nelly
Lim, during the period she attended her patient in a professional capacity. Although she testified
that she examined and interviewed the patient, she did not disclose anything she obtained in the
course of her examination, interview and treatment of her patient. Given a set of facts and asked
a hypothetical question, Dr. Acampado rendered an opinion regarding the history and behaviour
of the fictitious character in the hypothetical problem. The facts and conditions alleged in the
hypothetical problem did not refer and (sic) had no bearing to (sic) whatever information or
findings the doctor obtained from attending the (sic) patient. A physician is not disqualified to
testify as an expert concerning a patient’s ailment, when he can disregard knowledge acquired in
attending such patient and make answer solely on facts related in (sic) the hypothetical question.
(Butler v. Role, 242 Pac. 436; Supreme Court of Arizona Jan. 7, 1926). Expert testimony of a
physician based on hypothetical question (sic) as to cause of illness of a person whom he has
attended is not privileged, provided the physician does not give testimony tending to disclose
confidential information related to him in his professional capacity while attending to the patient.
(Crago v. City of Cedar Rapids, 98 NW 354, see Jones on Evidence, Vol. 3, p. 843, 3rd Ed.).

The rule on privilege (sic) communication in the relation of physician and patient proceeds
from the fundamental assumption that the communication to deserve protection must be
confidential in their origin. Confidentiality is not to be blindly implied from the mere
relation of physician and patient. It might be implied according to circumstances of each
case, taking into consideration the nature of the ailment and the occasion of the
consultation. The claimant of the privilege has the burden of establishing in each instance
all the facts necessary to create the privilege, including the confidential nature of the
information given." 4

Her motion to reconsider the resolution having been denied, petitioner took this recourse under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. In her view, the respondent Court of Appeals "seriously erred"
:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

"I.

. . . in not finding that all the essential elements of the rule on physician-patient privileged
communication under Section 21, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court (Section 24, Rule 130 of the
Revised Rules of Evidence) exist in the case at bar.

II.
. . . in believing that Dr. Acampado ‘was summoned as an expert witness and not as an attending
physician of petitioner.’

III.

. . . in concluding that Dr. Acampado made ‘no declaration that touched (sic) or disclosed any
information which she has acquired from her patient, Nelly Lim, during the period she attended
her patient in a professional capacity.’

IV.

. . . in declaring that ‘the petitioner failed in establishing the confidential nature of the testimony
given by or obtained from Dr. Acampado.’" 5

We gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective
Memoranda 6 after the private respondent filed his Comment 7 and the petitioner submitted her
reply 8 thereto. The parties subsequently filed their separate Memoranda.

The petition is devoid of any merit. Respondent Court of Appeals committed no reversible
error in its challenged resolution.

The law in point is paragraph (c), Section 24 of the Revised Rules on Evidence which
reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SECTION 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. — The following

persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library

x x x

(c) A person authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics cannot in a civil case, without
the consent of the patient, be examined as to any advice or treatment given by him or any
information which he may have acquired in attending such patient in a professional capacity,
which information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity, and which would blacken
the reputation of the patient." chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

This is a reproduction of paragraph (c), Section 21, Rule 130 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court
with two (2) modifications, namely: (a) the inclusion of the phrase "advice or treatment given by
him," and (b) substitution of the word reputation for the word character. Said Section 21 in turn
is a reproduction of paragraph (f), Section 26, Rule 123 of the 1940 Rules of Court with a
modification consisting in the change of the phrase "which would tend to blacken" in the latter to
"would blacken." 9 Verily, these changes affected the meaning of the provision. Under the 1940
Rules of Court, it was sufficient if the information would tend to blacken the character of the
patient. In the 1964 Rules of Court, a stricter requirement was imposed; it was imperative that
the information would blacken such character. With the advent of the Revised Rules on Evidence
on 1 July 1989, the rule was relaxed once more by the substitution of the word character with the
word reputation. There is a distinction between these two concepts." ‘Character’ is what a man
is, and ‘reputation’ is what he is supposed to be in what people say he is.’Character’ depends on
attributes possessed, and ‘reputation’ on attributes which others believe one to possess. The
former signifies reality and the latter merely what is accepted to be reality at present." 10

This rule on the physician-patient privilege is intended to facilitate and make safe full and
confidential disclosure by the patient to the physician of all facts, circumstances and symptoms,
untrammeled by apprehension of their subsequent and enforced disclosure and publication on the
witness stand, to the end that the physician may form a correct opinion, and be enabled safely
and efficaciously to treat his patient. 11 It rests in public policy and is for the general interest of
the community. 12

Since the object of the privilege is to protect the patient, it may be waived if no timely objection
is made to the physician’s testimony. 13

In order that the privilege may be successfully claimed, the following requisites must
concur:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"1. the privilege is claimed in a civil case;

2. the person against whom the privilege is claimed is one duly authorized to practice medicine,
surgery or obstetrics;

3. such person acquired the information while he was attending to the patient in his professional
capacity;

4. the information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity; and

5. the information was confidential, and, if disclosed, would blacken the reputation (formerly
character) of the patient." 14

These requisites conform with the four (4) fundamental conditions necessary for the
establishment of a privilege against the disclosure of certain communications, to
wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"1. The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be disclosed.

2. This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the
relation between the parties.

3. The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be sedulously
fostered

4. The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communications must be
greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation." 15

The physician may be considered to be acting in his professional capacity when he attends to the
patient for curative, preventive, or palliative treatment. Thus, only disclosures which would have
been made to the physician to enable him "safely and efficaciously to treat his patient" are
covered by the privilege. 16 It is to be emphasized that "it is the tenor only of the communication
that is privileged. The mere fact of making a communication, as well as the date of a consultation
and the number of consultations, are therefore not privileged from disclosure, so long as the
subject communicated is not stated." 17

One who claims this privilege must prove the presence of these aforementioned requisites. 18

Our careful evaluation of the submitted pleadings leads Us to no other course of action but to
agree with the respondent Court’s observation that the petitioner failed to discharge that burden.
In the first place, Dr. Acampado was presented and qualified as an expert witness. As correctly
held by the Court of Appeals, she did not disclose anything obtained in the course of her
examination, interview and treatment of the petitioner; moreover, the facts and conditions
alleged in the hypothetical problem did not refer to and had no bearing on whatever information
or findings the doctor obtained while attending to the patient. There is, as well, no showing that
Dr. Acampado’s answers to the questions propounded to her relating to the hypothetical problem
were influenced by the information obtained from the petitioner. Otherwise stated, her expert
opinion excluded whatever information or knowledge she had about the petitioner which was
acquired by reason of the physician-patient relationship existing between them. As an expert
witness, her testimony before the trial court cannot then be excluded. The rule on this point is
summarized as follows:chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

"The predominating view, with some scant authority otherwise, is that the statutory physician-
patient privilege, though duly claimed, is not violated by permitting a physician to give expert
opinion testimony in response to a strictly hypothetical question in a lawsuit involving the
physical mental condition of a patient whom he has attended professionally, where his opinion is
based strictly upon the hypothetical facts stated, excluding and disregarding any personal
professional knowledge he may have concerning such patient. But in order to avoid the bar of the
physician-patient privilege where it is asserted in such a case, the physician must base his
opinion solely upon the facts hypothesized in the question, excluding from consideration his
personal knowledge of the patient acquired through the physician and patient relationship. If he
cannot or does not exclude from consideration his personal professional knowledge of the
patient’s condition he should not be permitted to testify as to his expert opinion." 19
Secondly, it is quite clear from Dr. Acampado’s testimony that the petitioner was never
interviewed alone. Said interviews were always conducted in the presence of a third party,
thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Q I am asking you, doctor, whom did you interview?

A I interviewed the husband first, then the father and after having the history, I interviewed the
patient, Nelly.

Q How many times did Juan Sim and Nelly Lim go to your office?

A Now, the two (2) of them came three (3) times. As I have stated before, once in the month of
April of 1987 and two (2) times for the month of June 1987, and after that, since July of 1987, it
was the father of Nelly, Dr. Lim, who was bringing Nelly to me until November of 1987.

Q Now, Dr. Lim is a fellow physician?

A Yes, I understand.

Q Was there anything that he told you when he visited with you in a clinic?

A I would say that there was none. Even if I asked information about Nelly, I could not get
anything from Dr. Lim.

Q Now, when Dr. Lim and his daughter went to your clinic, was there any doctor who was also
present during that interview?

A No, sir, I don’t remember any." 20

There is authority to the effect that information elicited during consultation with a physician in
the presence of third parties removes such information from the mantle of the
privilege:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Some courts have held that the casual presence of a third person destroys the confidential nature
of the communication between doctor and patient and thus destroys the privilege, and that under
such circumstances the doctor may testify. Other courts have reached a contrary result." 21

Thirdly, except for the petitioner’s sweeping claim — that" (T)he information given by Dr.
Acampado brings disgrace and invite (sic) reproach to petitioner by falsely making it appear in
the eyes of the trial court and the public that the latter was suffering from a mental disturbance
called schizophrenia — which caused, and continues to cause, irreparable injury to the name and
reputation of petitioner and her family," 22 — which is based on a wrong premise, nothing
specific or concrete was offered to show that indeed, the information obtained from Dr.
Acampado would blacken the former’s "character" (or "reputation"). Dr. Acampado never
disclosed any information obtained from the petitioner regarding the latter’s ailment and the
treatment recommended therefor.chanrobles.com : virtual law library

Finally, while it may be true that counsel for the petitioner opposed the oral request for the
issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum to Dr. Acampado and filed a formal motion for the
quashal of the said subpoena a day before the witness was to testify, the petitioner makes no
claim in any of her pleadings that her counsel had objected to any question asked of the witness
on the ground that it elicited an answer that would violate the privilege, despite the trial court’s
advise that said counsel may interpose his objection to the testimony "once it becomes apparent
that the testimony, sought to be elicited is covered by the privileged communication rule." The
particular portions of the stenographic notes of the testimony of Dr. Acampado quoted in the
petitioner’s Petition 23 and Memorandum, 24 and in the private respondent’s Memorandum, 25
do not at all show that any objections were interposed. Even granting ex gratia that the testimony
of Dr. Acampado could be covered by the privilege, the failure to seasonably object thereto
amounted to a waiver thereof.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

TEODORO R. REGALA, EDGARDO J. ANGARA, AVELINO V. CRUZ, JOSE C.

CONCEPCION, ROGELIO A. VINLUAN, VICTOR P. LAZATIN, and EDUARDO U.
ESCUETA, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, First Division,
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, ACTING THROUGH THE PRESIDENTIAL
COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, and RAUL S. ROCO, respondents.

[G.R. No. 108113. September 20, 1996]

PARAJA G. HAYUDINI, petitioner, vs. THE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE REPUBLIC OF

THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DECISION

KAPUNAN, J.:

These cases touch the very cornerstone of every State's judicial system, upon which the workings
of the contentious and adversarial system in the Philippine legal process are based - the sanctity
of fiduciary duty in the client-lawyer relationship. The fiduciary duty of a counsel and advocate
is also what makes the law profession a unique position of trust and confidence, which
distinguishes it from any other calling. In this instance, we have no recourse but to uphold and
strengthen the mantle of protection accorded to the confidentiality that proceeds from the
performance of the lawyer's duty to his client.

The facts of the case are undisputed.

The matters raised herein are an offshoot of the institution of the Complaint on July 31,
1987 before the Sandiganbayan by the Republic of the Philippines, through the Presidential
Commission on Good Government against Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., as one of the
principal defendants, for the recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth, which includes shares of
stocks in the named corporations in PCGG Case No. 33 (Civil Case No. 0033), entitled
"Republic of the Philippines versus Eduardo Cojuangco, et al."[1]

Among the defendants named in the case are herein petitioners Teodoro Regala, Edgardo J.
Angara, Avelino V. Cruz, Jose C. Concepcion, Rogelio A. Vinluan, Victor P. Lazatin, Eduardo
U. Escueta and Paraja G. Hayudini, and herein private respondent Raul S. Roco, who all were
then partners of the law firm Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz Law Offices
(hereinafter referred to as the ACCRA Law Firm). ACCRA Law Firm performed legal services
for its clients, which included, among others, the organization and acquisition of business
associations and/or organizations, with the correlative and incidental services where its
members acted as incorporators, or simply, as stockholders. More specifically, in the
performance of these services, the members of the law firm delivered to its client documents
which substantiate the client's equity holdings, i.e., stock certificates endorsed in blank
representing the shares registered in the client's name, and a blank deed of trust or assignment
covering said shares. In the course of their dealings with their clients, the members of the law
firm acquire information relative to the assets of clients as well as their personal and business
circumstances. As members of the ACCRA Law Firm, petitioners and private respondent Raul
Roco admit that they assisted in the organization and acquisition of the companies included in
Civil Case No. 0033, and in keeping with the office practice, ACCRA lawyers acted as nominees-
stockholders of the said corporations involved in sequestration proceedings.[2]

On August 20, 1991, respondent Presidential Commission on Good Government (hereinafter

referred to as respondent PCGG) filed a "Motion to Admit Third Amended Complaint" and
"Third Amended Complaint" which excluded private respondent Raul S. Roco from the
complaint in PCGG Case No. 33 as party-defendant.[3] Respondent PCGG based its
exclusion of private respondent Roco as party-defendant on his undertaking that he will
reveal the identity of the principal/s for whom he acted as nominee/stockholder in the
companies involved in PCGG Case No. 33.[4]

Petitioners were included in the Third Amended Complaint on the strength of the following
allegations:

14. Defendants Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., Edgardo J. Angara, Jose C. Concepcion, Teodoro
Regala, Avelino V. Cruz, Rogelio A. Vinluan, Eduardo U. Escueta, Paraja G. Hayudini and Raul
Roco of the Angara Concepcion Cruz Regala and Abello law offices (ACCRA) plotted,
devised, schemed. conspired and confederated with each other in setting up, through the
use of the coconut levy funds, the financial and corporate framework and structures that
led to the establishment of UCPB, UNICOM, COCOLIFE, COCOMARK, CIC, and more
than twenty other coconut levy funded corporations, including the acquisition of San
Miguel Corporation shares and its institutionalization through presidential directives of the
coconut monopoly. Through insidious means and machinations, ACCRA, being the wholly-
owned investment arm, ACCRA Investments Corporation, became the holder of
approximately fifteen million shares representing roughly 3.3% of the total outstanding
capital stock of UCPB as of 31 March 1987. This ranks ACCRA Investments Corporation
number 44 among the top 100 biggest stockholders of UCPB which has approximately
1,400,000 shareholders. On the other hand, corporate books show the name Edgardo J.
Angara as holding approximately 3,744 shares as of February, 1984.[5]

In their answer to the Expanded Amended Complaint, petitioners ACCRA lawyers alleged that:

4.4. Defendants-ACCRA lawyers participation in the acts with which their co-defendants are
charged, was in furtherance of legitimate lawyering.

4.4.1. In the course of rendering professional and legal services to clients, defendants-ACCRA
lawyers, Jose C. Concepcion, Teodoro D. Regala, Rogelio A. Vinluan and Eduardo U. Escueta,
became holders of shares of stock in the corporations listed under their respective names in
Annex A of the expanded Amended Complaint as incorporating or acquiring stockholders only
and, as such, they do not claim any proprietary interest in the said shares of stock.

4.5. Defendant ACCRA-lawyer Avelino V. Cruz was one of the incorporators in 1976 of
Mermaid Marketing Corporation, which was organized for legitimate business purposes not
related to the allegations of the expanded Amended Complaint. However, he has long ago
transferred any material interest therein and therefore denies that the shares appearing in his
name in Annex A of the expanded Amended Complaint are his assets.[6]

Petitioner Paraja Hayudini, who had separated from ACCRA law firm, filed a separate answer
denying the allegations in the complaint implicating him in the alleged ill-gotten wealth.[7]

Petitioners ACCRA lawyers subsequently filed their "COMMENT AND/OR OPPOSITION"

dated October 8, 1991 with Counter-Motion that respondent PCGG similarly grant the same
treatment to them (exclusion as parties-defendants) as accorded private respondent Roco.[8]
The Counter-Motion for dropping petitioners from the complaint was duly set for hearing on
October 18, 1991 in accordance with the requirements of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.

In its "Comment," respondent PCGG set the following conditions precedent for the exclusion of
petitioners, namely: (a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients; (b) submission of documents
substantiating the lawyer-client relationship; and (c) the submission of the deeds of assignments
petitioners executed in favor of its clients covering their respective shareholdings.[9]

Consequently, respondent PCGG presented supposed proof to substantiate compliance by private

respondent Roco of the conditions precedent to warrant the latter's exclusion as party-defendant
in PCGG Case No. 33, to wit: (a) Letter to respondent PCGG of the counsel of respondent Roco
dated May 24, 1989 reiterating a previous request for reinvestigation by the PCGG in PCGG
Case No. 33; (b) Affidavit dated March 8, 1989 executed by private respondent Roco as
Attachment to the letter aforestated in (a); and (c) Letter of the Roco, Bunag, and Kapunan Law
Offices dated September 21, 1988 to the respondent PCGG in behalf of private respondent Roco
originally requesting the reinvestigation and/or re-examination of the evidence of the PCGG
against Roco in its Complaint in PCGG Case No. 33.[10]

It is noteworthy that during said proceedings, private respondent Roco did not refute petitioners'
contention that he did actually not reveal the identity of the client involved in PCGG Case No.
33, nor had he undertaken to reveal the identity of the client for whom he acted as nominee-
stockholder.[11]

On March 18, 1992, respondent Sandiganbayan promulgated the Resolution, herein questioned,
denying the exclusion of petitioners in PCGG Case No. 33, for their refusal to comply with the
conditions required by respondent PCGG. It held:

x x x.

ACCRA lawyers may take the heroic stance of not revealing the identity of the client for whom
they have acted, i.e. their principal, and that will be their choice. But until they do identify their
clients, considerations of whether or not the privilege claimed by the ACCRA lawyers exists
cannot even begin to be debated. The ACCRA lawyers cannot excuse themselves from the
consequences of their acts until they have begun to establish the basis for recognizing the
privilege; the existence and identity of the client.

This is what appears to be the cause for which they have been impleaded by the PCGG as
defendants herein.

5. The PCGG is satisfied that defendant Roco has demonstrated his agency and that Roco
has apparently identified his principal, which revelation could show the lack of cause
against him. This in turn has allowed the PCGG to exercise its power both under the rules
of Agency and under Section 5 of E.O. No. 14-A in relation to the Supreme Court's ruling
in Republic v. Sandiganbayan (173 SCRA 72).

The PCGG has apparently offered to the ACCRA lawyers the same conditions availed of
by Roco; full disclosure in exchange for exclusion from these proceedings (par. 7, PCGG's
COMMENT dated November 4, 1991). The ACCRA lawyers have preferred not to make
the disclosures required by the PCGG.

The ACCRA lawyers cannot, therefore, begrudge the PCGG for keeping them as party
defendants. In the same vein, they cannot compel the PCGG to be accorded the same
treatment accorded to Roco.

Neither can this Court.

WHEREFORE, the Counter Motion dated October 8, 1991 filed by the ACCRA lawyers and
joined in by Atty. Paraja G. Hayudini for the same treatment by the PCGG as accorded to Raul
S. Roco is DENIED for lack of merit.[12]

ACCRA lawyers moved for a reconsideration of the above resolution but the same was denied
by the respondent Sandiganbayan. Hence, the ACCRA lawyers filed the petition for certiorari,
docketed as G.R. No. 105938, invoking the following grounds:

The Honorable Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in subjecting petitioners

ACCRA lawyers who undisputably acted as lawyers in serving as nominee-stockholders, to
the strict application of the law of agency.

II

The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in not considering

petitioners ACCRA lawyers and Mr. Roco as similarly situated and, therefore, deserving of
equal treatment.

1. There is absolutely no evidence that Mr. Roco had revealed, or had undertaken to reveal, the
identities of the client(s) for whom he acted as nominee-stockholder.

2. Even assuming that Mr. Roco had revealed, or had undertaken to reveal, the identities of the
client(s), the disclosure does not constitute a substantial distinction as would make the
classification reasonable under the equal protection clause.

3. Respondent Sandiganbayan sanctioned favoritism and undue preference in favor of Mr. Roco
in violation of the equal protection clause.

III

The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in not holding that, under
the facts of this case, the attorney-client privilege prohibits petitioners ACCRA lawyers from
revealing the identity of their client(s) and the other information requested by the PCGG.

1. Under the peculiar facts of this case, the attorney-client privilege includes the identity of the
client(s).

2. The factual disclosures required by the PCGG are not limited to the identity of petitioners
ACCRA lawyers' alleged client(s) but extend to other privileged matters.

IV

The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in not requiring that the
dropping of party-defendants by the PCGG must be based on reasonable and just grounds and
with due consideration to the constitutional right of petitioners ACCRA lawyers to the equal
protection of the law.

Petitioner Paraja G. Hayudini, likewise, filed his own motion for reconsideration of the March
18, 1991 resolution which was denied by respondent Sandiganbayan. Thus, he filed a separate
petition for certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 108113, assailing respondent Sandiganbayan's
resolution on essentially the same grounds averred by petitioners in G.R. No. 105938.

Petitioners contend that the exclusion of respondent Roco as party-defendant in PCGG Case No.
33 grants him a favorable treatment, on the pretext of his alleged undertaking to divulge the
identity of his client, giving him an advantage over them who are in the same footing as partners
in the ACCRA law firm. Petitioners further argue that even granting that such an undertaking has
been assumed by private respondent Roco, they are prohibited from revealing the identity of
their principal under their sworn mandate and fiduciary duty as lawyers to uphold at all times the
confidentiality of information obtained during such lawyer-client relationship.

Respondent PCGG, through its counsel, refutes petitioners' contention, alleging that the
revelation of the identity of the client is not within the ambit of the lawyer-client confidentiality
privilege, nor are the documents it required (deeds of assignment) protected, because they are
evidence of nominee status.[13]

In his comment, respondent Roco asseverates that respondent PCGG acted correctly in excluding
him as party-defendant because he "(Roco) has not filed an Answer. PCGG had therefore the
right to dismiss Civil Case No. 0033 as to Roco `without an order of court by filing a notice of
dismissal,'"[14] and he has undertaken to identify his principal.[15]

Petitioners' contentions are impressed with merit.

It is quite apparent that petitioners were impleaded by the PCGG as co-defendants to force them
to disclose the identity of their clients. Clearly, respondent PCGG is not after petitioners but the
bigger fish as they say in street parlance. This ploy is quite clear from the PCGGs willingness to
cut a deal with petitioners -- the names of their clients in exchange for exclusion from the
complaint. The statement of the Sandiganbayan in its questioned resolution dated March 18,
1992 is explicit:

ACCRA lawyers may take the heroic stance of not revealing the identity of the client for whom
they have acted, i.e., their principal, and that will be their choice. But until they do identify their
clients, considerations of whether or not the privilege claimed by the ACCRA lawyers exists
cannot even begin to be debated. The ACCRA lawyers cannot excuse themselves from the
consequences of their acts until they have begun to establish the basis for recognizing the
privilege; the existence and identity of the client.

This is what appears to be the cause for which they have been impleaded by the PCGG as
defendants herein. (Underscoring ours)
In a closely related case, Civil Case No. 0110 of the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, entitled
Primavera Farms, Inc., et al. vs. Presidential Commission on Good Government respondent
PCGG, through counsel Mario Ongkiko, manifested at the hearing on December 5, 1991 that the
PCGG wanted to establish through the ACCRA that their so called client is Mr. Eduardo
Cojuangco; that it was Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco who furnished all the monies to those
subscription payments in corporations included in Annex A of the Third Amended Complaint;
that the ACCRA lawyers executed deeds of trust and deeds of assignment, some in the name of
particular persons, some in blank.

We quote Atty. Ongkiko:

ATTY. ONGKIKO:

With the permission of this Hon. Court. I propose to establish through these ACCRA lawyers
that, one, their so-called client is Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco. Second, it was Mr. Eduardo
Cojuangco who furnished all the monies to these subscription payments of these corporations
who are now the petitioners in this case. Third, that these lawyers executed deeds of trust, some
in the name of a particular person, some in blank. Now, these blank deeds are important to our
claim that some of the shares are actually being held by the nominees for the late President
Marcos. Fourth, they also executed deeds of assignment and some of these assignments have also
blank assignees. Again, this is important to our claim that some of the shares are for Mr.
Cojuangco and some are for Mr. Marcos. Fifth, that most of these corporations are really just
paper corporations. Why do we say that? One: There are no really fixed sets of officers, no fixed
sets of directors at the time of incorporation and even up to 1986, which is the crucial year. And
not only that, they have no permits from the municipal authorities in Makati. Next, actually all
their addresses now are care of Villareal Law Office. They really have no address on records.
These are some of the principal things that we would ask of these nominees stockholders, as they
called themselves.[16]

It would seem that petitioners are merely standing in for their clients as defendants in the
complaint. Petitioners are being prosecuted solely on the basis of activities and services
performed in the course of their duties as lawyers. Quite obviously, petitioners inclusion as co-
defendants in the complaint is merely being used as leverage to compel them to name their
clients and consequently to enable the PCGG to nail these clients. Such being the case,
respondent PCGG has no valid cause of action as against petitioners and should exclude them
from the Third Amended Complaint.

II

The nature of lawyer-client relationship is premised on the Roman Law concepts of locatio
conductio operarum (contract of lease of services) where one person lets his services and
another hires them without reference to the object of which the services are to be
performed, wherein lawyers' services may be compensated by honorarium or for hire,[17]
and mandato (contract of agency) wherein a friend on whom reliance could be placed
makes a contract in his name, but gives up all that he gained by the contract to the person
who requested him.[18] But the lawyer-client relationship is more than that of the
principal-agent and lessor-lessee.

In modern day perception of the lawyer-client relationship, an attorney is more than a mere agent
or servant, because he possesses special powers of trust and confidence reposed on him by his
client.[19] A lawyer is also as independent as the judge of the court, thus his powers are entirely
different from and superior to those of an ordinary agent.[20] Moreover, an attorney also
occupies what may be considered as a "quasi-judicial office" since he is in fact an officer of the
Court[21] and exercises his judgment in the choice of courses of action to be taken favorable to
his client.

Thus, in the creation of lawyer-client relationship, there are rules, ethical conduct and duties that
breathe life into it, among those, the fiduciary duty to his client which is of a very delicate,
exacting and confidential character, requiring a very high degree of fidelity and good faith,[22]
that is required by reason of necessity and public interest[23] based on the hypothesis that
abstinence from seeking legal advice in a good cause is an evil which is fatal to the
administration of justice.[24]

It is also the strict sense of fidelity of a lawyer to his client that distinguishes him from any other
professional in society. This conception is entrenched and embodies centuries of established and
stable tradition.[25] In Stockton v. Ford,[26] the U.S. Supreme Court held:

There are few of the business relations of life involving a higher trust and confidence than that of
attorney and client, or generally speaking, one more honorably and faithfully discharged; few
more anxiously guarded by the law, or governed by the sterner principles of morality and justice;
and it is the duty of the court to administer them in a corresponding spirit, and to be watchful and
industrious, to see that confidence thus reposed shall not be used to the detriment or prejudice of
the rights of the party bestowing it.[27]

In our jurisdiction, this privilege takes off from the old Code of Civil Procedure enacted by the
Philippine Commission on August 7, 1901. Section 383 of the Code specifically forbids counsel,
without authority of his client to reveal any communication made by the client to him or his
advice given thereon in the course of professional employment.[28] Passed on into various
provisions of the Rules of Court, the attorney-client privilege, as currently worded provides:

Sec. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. - The following persons cannot
testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases:

xxx

An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any communication
made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the course of, or with a view to,
professional employment, can an attorneys secretary, stenographer, or clerk be examined,
without the consent of the client and his employer, concerning any fact the knowledge of which
has been acquired in such capacity.[29]
Further, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states:

Sec. 20. It is the duty of an attorney:

(e) to maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve the secrets of
his client, and to accept no compensation in connection with his clients business except from him
or with his knowledge and approval.

This duty is explicitly mandated in Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
provides that:

Canon 17. A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust
and confidence reposed in him.

Canon 15 of the Canons of Professional Ethics also demands a lawyer's fidelity to client:

The lawyer owes "entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and
defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability," to the end that nothing
be taken or be withheld from him, save by the rules of law, legally applied. No fear of judicial
disfavor or public popularity should restrain him from the full discharge of his duty. In the
judicial forum the client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is
authorized by the law of the land, and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or
defense. But it is steadfastly to be borne in mind that the great trust of the lawyer is to be
performed within and not without the bounds of the law. The office of attorney does not permit,
much less does it demand of him for any client, violation of law or any manner of fraud or
chicanery. He must obey his own conscience and not that of his client.

Considerations favoring confidentiality in lawyer-client relationships are many and serve several
constitutional and policy concerns. In the constitutional sphere, the privilege gives flesh to one of
the most sacrosanct rights available to the accused, the right to counsel. If a client were made to
choose between legal representation without effective communication and disclosure and legal
representation with all his secrets revealed then he might be compelled, in some instances, to
either opt to stay away from the judicial system or to lose the right to counsel. If the price of
disclosure is too high, or if it amounts to self incrimination, then the flow of information would
be curtailed thereby rendering the right practically nugatory. The threat this represents against
another sacrosanct individual right, the right to be presumed innocent is at once self-evident.

Encouraging full disclosure to a lawyer by one seeking legal services opens the door to a whole
spectrum of legal options which would otherwise be circumscribed by limited information
engendered by a fear of disclosure. An effective lawyer-client relationship is largely dependent
upon the degree of confidence which exists between lawyer and client which in turn requires a
situation which encourages a dynamic and fruitful exchange and flow of information. It
necessarily follows that in order to attain effective representation, the lawyer must invoke the
privilege not as a matter of option but as a matter of duty and professional responsibility.
The question now arises whether or not this duty may be asserted in refusing to disclose the
name of petitioners' client(s) in the case at bar. Under the facts and circumstances obtaining in
the instant case, the answer must be in the affirmative.

As a matter of public policy, a clients identity should not be shrouded in mystery.[30]

Under this premise, the general rule in our jurisdiction as well as in the United States is
that a lawyer may not invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge the name or identity of his
client.[31]

The reasons advanced for the general rule are well established.

First, the court has a right to know that the client whose privileged information is sought to be
protected is flesh and blood.

Second, the privilege begins to exist only after the attorney-client relationship has been
established. The attorney-client privilege does not attach until there is a client.

Third, the privilege generally pertains to the subject matter of the relationship.

Finally, due process considerations require that the opposing party should, as a general rule,
know his adversary. A party suing or sued is entitled to know who his opponent is.[32] He
cannot be obliged to grope in the dark against unknown forces.[33]

Notwithstanding these considerations, the general rule is however qualified by some important
exceptions.

1) Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that revealing the clients name
would implicate that client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyers advice.

In Ex-Parte Enzor,[34] a state supreme court reversed a lower court order requiring a lawyer to
divulge the name of her client on the ground that the subject matter of the relationship was so
closely related to the issue of the clients identity that the privilege actually attached to both. In
Enzor, the unidentified client, an election official, informed his attorney in confidence that he
had been offered a bribe to violate election laws or that he had accepted a bribe to that end. In
her testimony, the attorney revealed that she had advised her client to count the votes correctly,
but averred that she could not remember whether her client had been, in fact, bribed. The lawyer
was cited for contempt for her refusal to reveal his clients identity before a grand jury. Reversing
the lower courts contempt orders, the state supreme court held that under the circumstances of
the case, and under the exceptions described above, even the name of the client was privileged.

U.S. v. Hodge and Zweig,[35] involved the same exception, i.e. that client identity is privileged
in those instances where a strong probability exists that the disclosure of the client's identity
would implicate the client in the very criminal activity for which the lawyers legal advice was
obtained.
The Hodge case involved federal grand jury proceedings inquiring into the activities of the
Sandino Gang, a gang involved in the illegal importation of drugs in the United States. The
respondents, law partners, represented key witnesses and suspects including the leader of the
gang, Joe Sandino.

In connection with a tax investigation in November of 1973, the IRS issued summons to Hodge
and Zweig, requiring them to produce documents and information regarding payment received
by Sandino on behalf of any other person, and vice versa. The lawyers refused to divulge the
names. The Ninth Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals, upholding non-disclosure under
the facts and circumstances of the case, held:

A clients identity and the nature of that clients fee arrangements may be privileged where the
person invoking the privilege can show that a strong probability exists that disclosure of such
information would implicate that client in the very criminal activity for which legal advice was
sought Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d at 680. While in Baird Owe enunciated this rule as a matter of
California law, the rule also reflects federal law. Appellants contend that the Baird exception
applies to this case.

The Baird exception is entirely consonant with the principal policy behind the attorney-client
privilege. In order to promote freedom of consultation of legal advisors by clients, the
apprehension of compelled disclosure from the legal advisors must be removed; hence, the law
must prohibit such disclosure except on the clients consent. 8 J. Wigmore, supra sec. 2291, at
545. In furtherance of this policy, the clients identity and the nature of his fee arrangements are,
in exceptional cases, protected as confidential communications.[36]

2) Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability, his identity is privileged. For
instance, the peculiar facts and circumstances of Neugass v. Terminal Cab Corporation,[37]
prompted the New York Supreme Court to allow a lawyers claim to the effect that he could not
reveal the name of his client because this would expose the latter to civil litigation.

In the said case, Neugass, the plaintiff, suffered injury when the taxicab she was riding, owned
by respondent corporation, collided with a second taxicab, whose owner was unknown. Plaintiff
brought action both against defendant corporation and the owner of the second cab, identified in
the information only as John Doe. It turned out that when the attorney of defendant corporation
appeared on preliminary examination, the fact was somehow revealed that the lawyer came to
know the name of the owner of the second cab when a man, a client of the insurance company,
prior to the institution of legal action, came to him and reported that he was involved in a car
accident. It was apparent under the circumstances that the man was the owner of the second cab.
The state supreme court held that the reports were clearly made to the lawyer in his professional
capacity. The court said:

That his employment came about through the fact that the insurance company had hired him to
defend its policyholders seems immaterial. The attorney in such cases is clearly the attorney for
the policyholder when the policyholder goes to him to report an occurrence contemplating that it
would be used in an action or claim against him.[38]
xxx xxx xxx.

All communications made by a client to his counsel, for the purpose of professional advice or
assistance, are privileged, whether they relate to a suit pending or contemplated, or to any other
matter proper for such advice or aid; x x x And whenever the communication made, relates to a
matter so connected with the employment as attorney or counsel as to afford presumption that it
was the ground of the address by the client, then it is privileged from disclosure. xxx.

It appears... that the name and address of the owner of the second cab came to the attorney in this
case as a confidential communication. His client is not seeking to use the courts, and his address
cannot be disclosed on that theory, nor is the present action pending against him as service of the
summons on him has not been effected. The objections on which the court reserved decision are
sustained.[39]

In the case of Matter of Shawmut Mining Company,[40] the lawyer involved was required by a
lower court to disclose whether he represented certain clients in a certain transaction. The
purpose of the courts request was to determine whether the unnamed persons as interested parties
were connected with the purchase of properties involved in the action. The lawyer refused and
brought the question to the State Supreme Court. Upholding the lawyers refusal to divulge the
names of his clients the court held:

If it can compel the witness to state, as directed by the order appealed from, that he represented
certain persons in the purchase or sale of these mines, it has made progress in establishing by
such evidence their version of the litigation. As already suggested, such testimony by the witness
would compel him to disclose not only that he was attorney for certain people, but that, as the
result of communications made to him in the course of such employment as such attorney, he
knew that they were interested in certain transactions. We feel sure that under such conditions no
case has ever gone to the length of compelling an attorney, at the instance of a hostile litigant, to
disclose not only his retainer, but the nature of the transactions to which it related, when such
information could be made the basis of a suit against his client.[41]

3) Where the governments lawyers have no case against an attorneys client unless, by revealing
the clients name, the said name would furnish the only link that would form the chain of
testimony necessary to convict an individual of a crime, the clients name is privileged.

In Baird vs Korner,[42] a lawyer was consulted by the accountants and the lawyer of certain
undisclosed taxpayers regarding steps to be taken to place the undisclosed taxpayers in a
favorable position in case criminal charges were brought against them by the U.S. Internal
Revenue Service (IRS).

It appeared that the taxpayers returns of previous years were probably incorrect and the taxes
understated. The clients themselves were unsure about whether or not they violated tax laws and
sought advice from Baird on the hypothetical possibility that they had. No investigation was then
being undertaken by the IRS of the taxpayers. Subsequently, the attorney of the taxpayers
delivered to Baird the sum of $12,706.85, which had been previously assessed as the tax due, and
another amount of money representing his fee for the advice given. Baird then sent a check for
$12,706.85 to the IRS in Baltimore, Maryland, with a note explaining the payment, but without
naming his clients. The IRS demanded that Baird identify the lawyers, accountants, and other
clients involved. Baird refused on the ground that he did not know their names, and declined to
name the attorney and accountants because this constituted privileged communication. A petition
was filed for the enforcement of the IRS summons. For Bairds repeated refusal to name his
clients he was found guilty of civil contempt. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that, a
lawyer could not be forced to reveal the names of clients who employed him to pay sums of
money to the government voluntarily in settlement of undetermined income taxes, unsued on,
and with no government audit or investigation into that clients income tax liability pending. The
court emphasized the exception that a clients name is privileged when so much has been revealed
concerning the legal services rendered that the disclosure of the clients identity exposes him to
possible investigation and sanction by government agencies. The Court held:

The facts of the instant case bring it squarely within that exception to the general rule. Here
money was received by the government, paid by persons who thereby admitted they had not paid
a sufficient amount in income taxes some one or more years in the past. The names of the clients
are useful to the government for but one purpose - to ascertain which taxpayers think they were
delinquent, so that it may check the records for that one year or several years. The voluntary
nature of the payment indicates a belief by the taxpayers that more taxes or interest or penalties
are due than the sum previously paid, if any. It indicates a feeling of guilt for nonpayment of
taxes, though whether it is criminal guilt is undisclosed. But it may well be the link that could
form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a federal crime. Certainly the
payment and the feeling of guilt are the reasons the attorney here involved was employed - to
advise his clients what, under the circumstances, should be done.[43]

Apart from these principal exceptions, there exist other situations which could qualify as
exceptions to the general rule.

For example, the content of any client communication to a lawyer lies within the privilege if it is
relevant to the subject matter of the legal problem on which the client seeks legal assistance.[44]
Moreover, where the nature of the attorney-client relationship has been previously disclosed and
it is the identity which is intended to be confidential, the identity of the client has been held to be
privileged, since such revelation would otherwise result in disclosure of the entire
transaction.[45]

Summarizing these exceptions, information relating to the identity of a client may fall within the
ambit of the privilege when the clients name itself has an independent significance, such that
disclosure would then reveal client confidences.[46]

The circumstances involving the engagement of lawyers in the case at bench, therefore, clearly
reveal that the instant case falls under at least two exceptions to the general rule. First, disclosure
of the alleged client's name would lead to establish said client's connection with the very fact in
issue of the case, which is privileged information, because the privilege, as stated earlier, protects
the subject matter or the substance (without which there would be no attorney-client
relationship).
The link between the alleged criminal offense and the legal advice or legal service sought was
duly established in the case at bar, by no less than the PCGG itself. The key lies in the three
specific conditions laid down by the PCGG which constitutes petitioners ticket to non-
prosecution should they accede thereto:

(a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients;

(b) submission of documents substantiating the lawyer-client relationship; and

(c) the submission of the deeds of assignment petitioners executed in favor of their clients
covering their respective shareholdings.

From these conditions, particularly the third, we can readily deduce that the clients indeed
consulted the petitioners, in their capacity as lawyers, regarding the financial and corporate
structure, framework and set-up of the corporations in question. In turn, petitioners gave their
professional advice in the form of, among others, the aforementioned deeds of assignment
covering their clients shareholdings.

There is no question that the preparation of the aforestated documents was part and parcel of
petitioners legal service to their clients. More important, it constituted an integral part of their
duties as lawyers. Petitioners, therefore, have a legitimate fear that identifying their clients would
implicate them in the very activity for which legal advice had been sought, i.e., the alleged
accumulation of ill-gotten wealth in the aforementioned corporations.

Furthermore, under the third main exception, revelation of the client's name would obviously
provide the necessary link for the prosecution to build its case, where none otherwise exists. It is
the link, in the words of Baird, that would inevitably form the chain of testimony necessary to
convict the (client) of a... crime."[47]

An important distinction must be made between a case where a client takes on the services of an
attorney for illicit purposes, seeking advice about how to go around the law for the purpose of
committing illegal activities and a case where a client thinks he might have previously
committed something illegal and consults his attorney about it. The first case clearly does not fall
within the privilege because the same cannot be invoked for purposes illegal. The second case
falls within the exception because whether or not the act for which the advice turns out to be
illegal, his name cannot be used or disclosed if the disclosure leads to evidence, not yet in the
hands of the prosecution, which might lead to possible action against him.

These cases may be readily distinguished, because the privilege cannot be invoked or used as a
shield for an illegal act, as in the first example; while the prosecution may not have a case
against the client in the second example and cannot use the attorney client relationship to build
up a case against the latter. The reason for the first rule is that it is not within the professional
character of a lawyer to give advice on the commission of a crime.[48] The reason for the second
has been stated in the cases above discussed and are founded on the same policy grounds for
which the attorney-client privilege, in general, exists.
In Matter of Shawmut Mining Co., supra, the appellate court therein stated that "under such
conditions no case has ever yet gone to the length of compelling an attorney, at the instance of a
hostile litigant, to disclose not only his retainer, but the nature of the transactions to which it
related, when such information could be made the basis of a suit against his client.[49]
"Communications made to an attorney in the course of any personal employment, relating to
the subject thereof, and which may be supposed to be drawn out in consequence of the relation
in which the parties stand to each other, are under the seal of confidence and entitled to
protection as privileged communications."[50] Where the communicated information, which
clearly falls within the privilege, would suggest possible criminal activity but there would be not
much in the information known to the prosecution which would sustain a charge except that
revealing the name of the client would open up other privileged information which would
substantiate the prosecutions suspicions, then the clients identity is so inextricably linked to the
subject matter itself that it falls within the protection. The Baird exception, applicable to the
instant case, is consonant with the principal policy behind the privilege, i.e., that for the purpose
of promoting freedom of consultation of legal advisors by clients, apprehension of compelled
disclosure from attorneys must be eliminated. This exception has likewise been sustained in In re
Grand Jury Proceedings[51] and Tillotson v. Boughner.[52] What these cases unanimously seek
to avoid is the exploitation of the general rule in what may amount to a fishing expedition by the
prosecution.

There are, after all, alternative sources of information available to the prosecutor which do not
depend on utilizing a defendant's counsel as a convenient and readily available source of
information in the building of a case against the latter. Compelling disclosure of the client's name
in circumstances such as the one which exists in the case at bench amounts to sanctioning fishing
expeditions by lazy prosecutors and litigants which we cannot and will not countenance. When
the nature of the transaction would be revealed by disclosure of an attorney's retainer, such
retainer is obviously protected by the privilege.[53] It follows that petitioner attorneys in the
instant case owe their client(s) a duty and an obligation not to disclose the latter's identity which
in turn requires them to invoke the privilege.

In fine, the crux of petitioners' objections ultimately hinges on their expectation that if the
prosecution has a case against their clients, the latter's case should be built upon evidence
painstakingly gathered by them from their own sources and not from compelled testimony
requiring them to reveal the name of their clients, information which unavoidably reveals much
about the nature of the transaction which may or may not be illegal. The logical nexus between
name and nature of transaction is so intimate in this case that it would be difficult to simply
dissociate one from the other. In this sense, the name is as much "communication" as
information revealed directly about the transaction in question itself, a communication which is
clearly and distinctly privileged. A lawyer cannot reveal such communication without exposing
himself to charges of violating a principle which forms the bulwark of the entire attorney-client
relationship.

The uberrimei fidei relationship between a lawyer and his client therefore imposes a strict
liability for negligence on the former. The ethical duties owing to the client, including
confidentiality, loyalty, competence, diligence as well as the responsibility to keep clients
informed and protect their rights to make decisions have been zealously sustained. In Milbank,
Tweed, Hadley and McCloy v. Boon,[54] the US Second District Court rejected the plea of the
petitioner law firm that it breached its fiduciary duty to its client by helping the latter's former
agent in closing a deal for the agent's benefit only after its client hesitated in proceeding with the
transaction, thus causing no harm to its client. The Court instead ruled that breaches of a
fiduciary relationship in any context comprise a special breed of cases that often loosen normally
stringent requirements of causation and damages, and found in favor of the client.

To the same effect is the ruling in Searcy, Denney, Scarola, Barnhart, and Shipley P.A. v.
Scheller[55] requiring strict obligation of lawyers vis-a-vis clients. In this case, a contingent fee
lawyer was fired shortly before the end of completion of his work, and sought payment quantum
meruit of work done. The court, however, found that the lawyer was fired for cause after he
sought to pressure his client into signing a new fee agreement while settlement negotiations were
at a critical stage. While the client found a new lawyer during the interregnum, events forced the
client to settle for less than what was originally offered. Reiterating the principle of fiduciary
duty of lawyers to clients in Meinhard v. Salmon[56] famously attributed to Justice Benjamin
Cardozo that "Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the
standard of behavior," the US Court found that the lawyer involved was fired for cause, thus
deserved no attorney's fees at all.

The utmost zeal given by Courts to the protection of the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege
and lawyer's loyalty to his client is evident in the duration of the protection, which exists not
only during the relationship, but extends even after the termination of the relationship.[57]

Such are the unrelenting duties required of lawyers vis-a-vis their clients because the law, which
the lawyers are sworn to uphold, in the words of Oliver Wendell Holmes,[58] "xxx is an exacting
goddess, demanding of her votaries in intellectual and moral discipline." The Court, no less, is
not prepared to accept respondents position without denigrating the noble profession that is
lawyering, so extolled by Justice Holmes in this wise:

Every calling is great when greatly pursued. But what other gives such scope to realize the
spontaneous energy of one's soul? In what other does one plunge so deep in the stream of life -
so share its passions its battles, its despair, its triumphs, both as witness and actor? x x x But that
is not all. What a subject is this in which we are united - this abstraction called the Law, wherein
as in a magic mirror, we see reflected, not only in our lives, but the lives of all men that have
been. When I think on this majestic theme my eyes dazzle. If we are to speak of the law as our
mistress, we who are here know that she is a mistress only to be won with sustained and lonely
passion - only to be won by straining all the faculties by which man is likened to God.

We have no choice but to uphold petitioners' right not to reveal the identity of their clients under
pain of the breach of fiduciary duty owing to their clients, because the facts of the instant case
clearly fall within recognized exceptions to the rule that the clients name is not privileged
information.

If we were to sustain respondent PCGG that the lawyer-client confidential privilege under the
circumstances obtaining here does not cover the identity of the client, then it would expose the
lawyers themselves to possible litigation by their clients in view of the strict fiduciary
responsibility imposed on them in the exercise of their duties.

The complaint in Civil Case No. 0033 alleged that the defendants therein, including herein
petitioners and Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. conspired with each other in setting up through the use of
coconut levy funds the financial and corporate framework and structures that led to the
establishment of UCPB, UNICOM and others and that through insidious means and
machinations, ACCRA, using its wholly-owned investment arm, ACCRA Investments
Corporation, became the holder of approximately fifteen million shares representing roughly
3.3% of the total capital stock of UCPB as of 31 March 1987. The PCGG wanted to establish
through the ACCRA lawyers that Mr. Cojuangco is their client and it was Cojuangco who
furnished all the monies to the subscription payment; hence, petitioners acted as dummies,
nominees and/or agents by allowing themselves, among others, to be used as instrument in
accumulating ill-gotten wealth through government concessions, etc., which acts constitute gross
abuse of official position and authority, flagrant breach of public trust, unjust enrichment,
violation of the Constitution and laws of the Republic of the Philippines.

By compelling petitioners, not only to reveal the identity of their clients, but worse, to submit to
the PCGG documents substantiating the client-lawyer relationship, as well as deeds of
assignment petitioners executed in favor of its clients covering their respective shareholdings, the
PCGG would exact from petitioners a link that would inevitably form the chain of testimony
necessary to convict the (client) of a crime.

III

In response to petitioners' last assignment of error, respondents allege that the private respondent
was dropped as party defendant not only because of his admission that he acted merely as a
nominee but also because of his undertaking to testify to such facts and circumstances "as the
interest of truth may require, which includes... the identity of the principal."[59]

First, as to the bare statement that private respondent merely acted as a lawyer and nominee, a
statement made in his out-of-court settlement with the PCGG, it is sufficient to state that
petitioners have likewise made the same claim not merely out-of- court but also in their Answer
to plaintiff's Expanded Amended Complaint, signed by counsel, claiming that their acts were
made in furtherance of "legitimate lawyering.[60] Being "similarly situated" in this regard,
public respondents must show that there exist other conditions and circumstances which would
warrant their treating the private respondent differently from petitioners in the case at bench in
order to evade a violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

To this end, public respondents contend that the primary consideration behind their decision to
sustain the PCGG's dropping of private respondent as a defendant was his promise to disclose the
identities of the clients in question. However, respondents failed to show - and absolutely
nothing exists in the records of the case at bar - that private respondent actually revealed the
identity of his client(s) to the PCGG. Since the undertaking happens to be the leitmotif of the
entire arrangement between Mr. Roco and the PCGG, an undertaking which is so material as to
have justified PCGG's special treatment exempting the private respondent from prosecution,
respondent Sandiganbayan should have required proof of the undertaking more substantial than
a "bare assertion" that private respondent did indeed comply with the undertaking. Instead, as
manifested by the PCGG, only three documents were submitted for the purpose, two of which
were mere requests for re-investigation and one simply disclosed certain clients which petitioners
(ACCRA lawyers) were themselves willing to reveal. These were clients to whom both
petitioners and private respondent rendered legal services while all of them were partners at
ACCRA, and were not the clients which the PCGG wanted disclosed for the alleged questioned
transactions.[61]

To justify the dropping of the private respondent from the case or the filing of the suit in the
respondent court without him, therefore, the PCGG should conclusively show that Mr. Roco was
treated as a species apart from the rest of the ACCRA lawyers on the basis of a classification
which made substantial distinctions based on real differences. No such substantial distinctions
exist from the records of the case at bench, in violation of the equal protection clause.

The equal protection clause is a guarantee which provides a wall of protection against uneven
application of statutes and regulations. In the broader sense, the guarantee operates against
uneven application of legal norms so that all persons under similar circumstances would be
accorded the same treatment.[62] Those who fall within a particular class ought to be treated
alike not only as to privileges granted but also as to the liabilities imposed.

x x x. What is required under this constitutional guarantee is the uniform operation of legal
norms so that all persons under similar circumstances would be accorded the same treatment
both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. As was noted in a recent decision:
Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and
security shall be given to every person under circumstances, which if not identical are analogous.
If law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be
treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding the
rest.[63]

We find that the condition precedent required by the respondent PCGG of the petitioners for
their exclusion as parties-defendants in PCGG Case No. 33 violates the lawyer-client
confidentiality privilege. The condition also constitutes a transgression by respondents
Sandiganbayan and PCGG of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.[64] It is grossly
unfair to exempt one similarly situated litigant from prosecution without allowing the same
exemption to the others. Moreover, the PCGGs demand not only touches upon the question of
the identity of their clients but also on documents related to the suspected transactions, not only
in violation of the attorney-client privilege but also of the constitutional right against self-
incrimination. Whichever way one looks at it, this is a fishing expedition, a free ride at the
expense of such rights.

An argument is advanced that the invocation by petitioners of the privilege of attorney-client

confidentiality at this stage of the proceedings is premature and that they should wait until they
are called to testify and examine as witnesses as to matters learned in confidence before they can
raise their objections. But petitioners are not mere witnesses. They are co-principals in the case
for recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth. They have made their position clear from the very
beginning that they are not willing to testify and they cannot be compelled to testify in view of
their constitutional right against self-incrimination and of their fundamental legal right to
maintain inviolate the privilege of attorney-client confidentiality.

It is clear then that the case against petitioners should never be allowed to take its full course in
the Sandiganbayan. Petitioners should not be made to suffer the effects of further litigation when
it is obvious that their inclusion in the complaint arose from a privileged attorney-client
relationship and as a means of coercing them to disclose the identities of their clients. To allow
the case to continue with respect to them when this Court could nip the problem in the bud at this
early opportunity would be to sanction an unjust situation which we should not here
countenance. The case hangs as a real and palpable threat, a proverbial Sword of Damocles over
petitioners' heads. It should not be allowed to continue a day longer.

While we are aware of respondent PCGGs legal mandate to recover ill-gotten wealth, we will not
sanction acts which violate the equal protection guarantee and the right against self-incrimination
and subvert the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Resolutions of respondent

Sandiganbayan (First Division) promulgated on March 18, 1992 and May 21, 1992 are hereby
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Sandiganbayan is further ordered to exclude
petitioners Teodoro D. Regala, Edgardo J. Angara, Avelino V. Cruz, Jose C. Concepcion,
*Rogelio A. Vinluan, Victor P. Lazatin, Eduardo U. Escueta and Paraja G. Hayuduni as parties-
defendants in SB Civil Case No. 0033 entitled "Republic of the Philippines v. Eduardo
Cojuangco, Jr., et al.".

SO ORDERED.

MA. PAZ FERNANDEZ KROHN, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and EDGAR KROHN, JR., respondents.

Cruz, Durian, Agabin, Atienza, Alday and Tuason for petitioner.

Oscar F. Martinez for private respondent.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

A confidential psychiatric evaluation report is being presented in evidence before the trial court
in a petition for annulment of marriage grounded on psychological incapacity. The witness
testifying on the report is the husband who initiated the annulment proceedings, not the physician
who prepared the report.

The subject of the evaluation report, Ma. Paz Fernandez Krohn, invoking the rule on privileged
communication between physician and patient, seeks to enjoin her husband from disclosing the
contents of the report. After failing to convince the trial court and the appellate court, she is now
before us on a petition for review on certiorari.

On 14 June 1964, Edgar Krohn, Jr., and Ma. Paz Fernandez were married at the Saint Vincent de
Paul Church in San Marcelino, Manila. The union produced three children, Edgar Johannes, Karl
Wilhelm and Alexandra. Their blessings notwithstanding, the relationship between the couple
developed into a stormy one. In 1971, Ma. Paz underwent psychological testing purportedly in
an effort to ease the marital strain. The effort however proved futile. In 1973, they finally
separated in fact.

In 1975, Edgar was able to secure a copy of the confidential psychiatric report on Ma. Paz
prepared and signed by Drs. Cornelio Banaag, Jr., and Baltazar Reyes. On 2 November
1978, presenting the report among others, he obtained a decree ("Conclusion") from the
Tribunal Metropolitanum Matrimoniale in Manila nullifying his church marriage with Ma.
Paz on the ground of "incapacitas assumendi onera conjugalia due to lack of due discretion
existent at the time of the wedding and thereafter." 1 On 10 July 1979, the decree was
confirmed and pronounced "Final and Definite." 2

Meanwhile, on 30 July 1982, the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of
Pasig, Br. II, issued an order granting the voluntary dissolution of the conjugal partnership.

On 23 October 1990, Edgar filed a petition for the annulment of his marriage with Ma. Paz
before the trial court. 3 In his petition, he cited the Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation Report
which Ma. Paz merely denied in her Answer as "either unfounded or irrelevant." 4

At the hearing on 8 May 1991, Edgar took the witness stand and tried to testify on the contents of
the Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation Report. This was objected to on the ground that it
violated the rule on privileged communication between physician and patient. Subsequently, Ma.
Paz filed a Manifestation expressing her "continuing objection" to any evidence, oral or
documentary, "that would thwart the physician-patient privileged communication rule," 5 and
thereafter submitted a Statement for the Record asserting among others that "there is no factual
or legal basis whatsoever for petitioner (Edgar) to claim 'psychological incapacity' to annul their
marriage, such ground being completely false, fabricated and merely an afterthought." 6 Before
leaving for Spain where she has since resided after their separation, Ma. Paz also authorized and
instructed her counsel to oppose the suit and pursue her counterclaim even during her absence.

On 29 May 1991, Edgar opposed Ma. Paz' motion to disallow the introduction of the
confidential psychiatric report as evidence, 7 and afterwards moved to strike out Ma. Paz'
Statement for the Record. 8

On 4 June 1991, the trial court issued an Order admitting the Confidential Psychiatric
Evaluation Report in evidence and ruling that —

. . . the Court resolves to overrule the objection and to sustain the Opposition
to the respondent's Motion; first, because the very issue in this case is
whether or not the respondent had been suffering from psychological
 incapacity; and secondly, when the said psychiatric report was referred to in
the complaint, the respondent did not object thereto on the ground of the
supposed privileged communication between patient and physician. What
was raised by the respondent was that the said psychiatric report was
irrelevant. So, the Court feels that in the interest of justice and for the
purpose of determining whether the respondent as alleged in the petition was
suffering from psychological incapacity, the said psychiatric report is very
material and may be testified to by petitioner (Edgar Krohn, Jr.) without
prejudice on the part of the respondent to dispute the said report or to cross-
examination first the petitioner and later the psychiatrist who prepared the
same if the latter will be presented. 9

On 27 November 1991, the trial court denied the Motion to Reconsider Order dated June 4,
1991, and directed that the Statement for the Record filed by Ma. Paz be stricken off the record.
A subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by her counsel was likewise denied.

Counsel of Ma. Paz then elevated the issue to respondent Court of Appeals. In a Decision
promulgated 30 October 1992, the appellate court dismissed the petition for certiorari. 10 On 5
February 1993, the motion to reconsider the dismissal was likewise denied. Hence, the instant
petition for review.

Petitioner now seeks to enjoin the presentation and disclosure of the contents of the psychiatric
report and prays for the admission of her Statement for the Record to form part of the records of
the case. She argues that since
Sec. 24, par. (c), Rule 130, of the Rules of Court 11 prohibits a physician from testifying on
matters which he may have acquired in attending to a patient in a professional capacity, "WITH
MORE REASON should be third person (like respondent-husband in this particular instance) be
PROHIBITED from testifying on privileged matters between a physician and patient or from
submitting any medical report, findings or evaluation prepared by a physician which the latter
has acquired as a result of his confidential and privileged relation with a patient." 12 She says
that the reason behind the prohibition is —

. . . to facilitate and make safe, full and confidential disclosure by a patient to his
physician of all facts, circumstances and symptoms, untrammeled by
apprehension of their subsequent and enforced disclosure and publication on the
witness stand, to the end that the physician may form a correct opinion, and be
enabled safely and efficaciously to treat his patient. 13

She further argues that to allow her husband to testify on the contents of the psychiatric
evaluation report "will set a very bad and dangerous precedent because it abets circumvention of
the rule's intent in preserving the sanctity, security and confidence to the relation of physician
and his patient." 14 Her thesis is that what cannot be done directly should not be allowed to be
done indirectly.

Petitioner submits that her Statement for the Record simply reiterates under oath what she
asserted in her Answer, which she failed to verify as she had already left for Spain when her
Answer was filed. She maintains that her "Statement for the Record is a plain and simple
pleading and is not as it has never been intended to take the place of her testimony;" 15 hence,
there is no factual and legal basis whatsoever to expunge it from the records.

Private respondent Edgar Krohn, Jr., however contends that "the rules are very explicit: the
prohibition applies only to a physician. Thus . . . the legal prohibition to testify is not applicable
to the case at bar where the person sought to be barred from testifying on the privileged
communication is the husband and not the physician of the petitioner." 16 In fact, according to
him, the Rules sanction his testimony considering that a husband may testify against his wife in a
civil case filed by one against the other.

Besides, private respondent submits that privileged communication may be waived by the person
entitled thereto, and this petitioner expressly did when she gave her unconditional consent to the
use of the psychiatric evaluation report when it was presented to the Tribunal Metropolitanum
Matrimoniale which took it into account among others in deciding the case and declaring their
marriage null and void. Private respondent further argues that petitioner also gave her implied
consent when she failed to specifically object to the admissibility of the report in her Answer
where she merely described the evaluation report as "either unfounded or irrelevant." At any rate,
failure to interpose a timely objection at the earliest opportunity to the evidence presented on
privileged matters may be construed as an implied waiver.

With regard to the Statement for the Record filed by petitioner, private respondent posits that this
in reality is an amendment of her Answer and thus should comply with pertinent provisions of
the Rules of Court, hence, its exclusion from the records for failure to comply with the Rules is
proper.

The treatise presented by petitioner on the privileged nature of the communication between
physician and patient, as well as the reasons therefor, is not doubted. Indeed, statutes making
communications between physician and patient privileged are intended to inspire confidence in
the patient and encourage him to make a full disclosure to his physician of his symptoms and
condition. 17 Consequently, this prevents the physician from making public information that will
result in humiliation, embarrassment, or disgrace to the patient. 18 For, the patient should rest
assured with the knowledge that the law recognizes the communication as confidential, and
guards against the possibility of his feelings being shocked or his reputation tarnished by their
subsequent disclosure. 19 The physician-patient privilege creates a zone of privacy, intended to
preclude the humiliation of the patient that may follow the disclosure of his ailments. Indeed,
certain types of information communicated in the context of the physician-patient relationship
fall within the constitutionally protected zone of privacy, 20 including a patient's interest in
keeping his mental health records confidential. 21 Thus, it has been observed that the
psychotherapist-patient privilege is founded upon the notion that certain forms of antisocial
behavior may be prevented by encouraging those in need of treatment for emotional problems to
secure the services of a psychotherapist.

Petitioner's discourse while exhaustive is however misplaced. Lim v. Court of Appeals 22 clearly
lays down the requisites in order that the privilege may be successfully invoked: (a) the privilege
is claimed in a civil case; (b) the person against whom the privilege is claimed is one duly
authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics; (c) such person acquired the information
while he was attending to the patient in his professional capacity; (d) the information was
necessary to enable him to act in that capacity; and, (e) the information was confidential and, if
disclosed, would blacken the reputation (formerly character) of the patient.

In the instant case, the person against whom the privilege is claimed is not one duly authorized to
practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics. He is simply the patient's husband who wishes to testify
on a document executed by medical practitioners. Plainly and clearly, this does not fall within
the claimed prohibition. Neither can his testimony be considered a circumvention of the
prohibition because his testimony cannot have the force and effect of the testimony of the
physician who examined the patient and executed the report.

Counsel for petitioner indulged heavily in objecting to the testimony of private respondent on the
ground that it was privileged. In his Manifestation before the trial court dated 10 May 1991, he
invoked the rule on privileged communications but never questioned the testimony as hearsay. It
was a fatal mistake. For, in failing to object to the testimony on the ground that it was hearsay,
counsel waived his right to make such objection and, consequently, the evidence offered may be
admitted.

The other issue raised by petitioner is too trivial to merit the full attention of this Court. The
allegations contained in the Statement for the Records are but refutations of private respondent's
declarations which may be denied or disproved during the trial.

The instant appeal has taken its toll on the petition for annulment. Three years have already
lapsed and private respondent herein, as petitioner before the trial court, has yet to conclude his
testimony thereat. We thus enjoin the trial judge and the parties' respective counsel to act with
deliberate speed in resolving the main action, and avoid any and all stratagems that may further
delay this case. If all lawyers are allowed to appeal every perceived indiscretion of a judge in the
course of trial and include in their appeals depthless issues, there will be no end to litigations,
and the docket of appellate courts will forever be clogged with inconsequential cases. Hence,
counsel should exercise prudence in appealing lower court rulings and raise only legitimate
issues so as not to retard the resolution of cases. Indeed, there is no point in unreasonably
delaying the resolution of the petition and prolonging the agony of the wedded couple who after
coming out from a storm still have the right to a renewed blissful life either alone or in the
company of each other. 23

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed
Decision of respondent Court of Appeals promulgated on 30 October 1992 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.