Heirs of Malabanan vs. Republic

1/29/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 587
G.R. No. 179987. April 29, 2009.*

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, petitioner,
vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent.
Land Registration Act; Public Lands Act;

Notwithstanding the passage of the Property
Registration Decree and the inclusion of Section 14(1)
therein, the Public Land Act has remained in effect.
Both laws commonly refer to persons or their
predecessors-in-interest who “have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945, or earlier.”—Notwithstanding
the passage of the Property Registration Decree and
the inclusion of Section 14(1) therein, the Public
Land Act has remained in effect. Both laws
commonly refer to persons or their predecessors-in-
interest who “have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945, or earlier.” That circumstance may have led to
the impression that one or the other is a
redundancy, or that Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act has somehow been repealed or mooted. That is
not the case.
Same; Same; Section 48 of the Public Land Act is
more descriptive of the nature of the right enjoyed by
http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/00000168975b958b9a12b199003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/127
the possessor than Section 14 of the Property

Registration Decree, which seems to presume the pre-
existence of the right, rather than establishing the
right itself for the first time.—It is clear that Section
48 of the Public Land Act is more descriptive of the
nature of the right enjoyed by the possessor than
Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree,
which seems to presume the pre-existence of the
right, rather than establishing the right itself for the
first time. It is proper to assert that it is the Public
Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073 effective 25
January 1977, that has primarily established the
right of a Filipino citizen who has been “in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition
of ownership, since
_______________
* EN BANC.
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VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009 173

Heirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic
June 12, 1945” to perfect or complete his title by

applying with the proper court for the confirmation
of his ownership claim and the issuance of the
corresponding certificate of title.
Civil Law; Prescription; Under the Civil Code that
where lands of the public domain are patrimonial in
character, they are susceptible to acquisitive
prescription.—It is clear under the Civil Code that
where lands of the public domain are patrimonial in
prescription. On the other hand, among the public

domain lands that are not susceptible to acquisitive
prescription are timber lands and mineral lands. The
Constitution itself proscribes private ownership of
timber or mineral lands.
Same; Land Registration Act; Prescription;
Alienable and disposable lands are expressly
declared by the State to be no longer intended for
public service or for the development of the national
wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can
begin to run. Such declaration shall be in the form of
a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential
Proclamation in cases where the President is duly
authorized by law.—There must be an express
declaration by the State that the public dominion
property is no longer intended for public service or
the development of the national wealth or that the
property has been converted into patrimonial.
Without such express declaration, the property, even
if classified as alienable or disposable, remains
property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article
420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by
prescription. It is only when such alienable and
disposable lands are expressly declared by the State
to be no longer intended for public service or for the
development of the national wealth that the period
of acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such
declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted
by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases
where the President is duly authorized by law.
Land Registration Act; Prescription; Public Land
Act; If a public land is declared patrimonial by law
or proclamation, can the period of possession prior to
such conversion be reckoned in counting the period of
prescription? No.—The limitation imposed by Article
1113 dissuades us from ruling that the period of
possession before the public domain land becomes
patrimonial may be counted for the purpose of

completing the prescriptive period. Possession of
public dominion property before it becomes
patrimonial cannot be the object of prescription
according to the Civil Code. As the application for
174
174 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

registration under Section 14(2) falls wholly within

the framework of prescription under the Civil Code,
there is no way that possession during the time that
the land was still classified as public dominion
property can be counted to meet the requisites of
acquisitive prescription and justify registration. Are
we being inconsistent in applying divergent rules for
Section 14(1) and Section 14(2)? There is no
inconsistency. Section 14(1) mandates
registration on the basis of possession, while
Section 14(2) entitles registration on the basis
of prescription. Registration under Section
14(1) is extended under the aegis of the
Property Registration Decree and the Public
Land Act while registration under Section
14(2) is made available both by the Property
Registration Decree and the Civil Code.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J., Concurring and Dissenting
Opinion:
Land Registration Act; Public Land Act;
Prescription; Lands belonging to the public domain
may not be acquired by prescription.—Section 14(2)
of the Property Registration Decree clearly and
explicitly refers to “private lands,” without mention
at all of public lands. There is no other way to
understand the plain language of Section 14(2) of the

Property Registration Decree except that the land
was already private when the applicant for
registration acquired ownership thereof by
prescription. The prescription therein was not the
means by which the public land was converted to
private land; rather, it was the way the applicant
acquired title to what is already private land, from
another person previously holding title to the same.
The provision in question is very clear and
unambiguous. Well-settled is the rule that when the
law speaks in clear and categorical language, there
is no reason for interpretation or construction, but
only for application.
Same; Same; Same; Sec. 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree applies only to what already are
private lands, which can be acquired by prescription.
—With the understanding that Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree applies only to what
are already private lands, then, there is no question
that the same can be acquired by prescription under
the provisions of the Civil Code, because, precisely, it
is the Civil Code which governs rights to private
lands.
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VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009 175

Supreme Court; Judgments; The acquisition of an

imperfect title to a disposable land of the public
domain was raised as an issue in the Herbieto case
and passed upon.—It must be emphasized that the
acquisition of an imperfect title to alienable and
disposable land of the public domain under Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, was

directly raised as an issue in the Petition in Herbieto
and discussed extensively by the parties in their
pleadings. That the application of Jeremias and
David Herbieto could already be dismissed on the
ground of lack of proper publication of the notice of
hearing thereof, did not necessarily preclude the
Court from resolving the other issues squarely
raised in the Petition before it. Thus, the Court
dismissed the application for registration of
Jeremias and David Herbieto on two grounds: (1) the
lack of jurisdiction of the land registration court over
the application, in light of the absence of proper
publication of the notice of hearing; and (2) the
evident lack of merit of the application given that
the applicants failed to comply with the
requirements for judicial confirmation of an
imperfect title under Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act, as amended. This is only in keeping with
the duty of the Court to expeditiously and completely
resolve the cases before it and, once and for all,
settle the dispute and issues between the parties.
Without expressly discussing and categorically
ruling on the second ground, Jeremias and David
Herbieto could have easily believed that they could
re-file their respective applications for registration,
just taking care to comply with the publication-of-
notice requirement.
Land Registration Act; Public Land Act;
Requisites for Judicial Confirmation of an Imperfect
Title.—Judicial confirmation and registration of an
imperfect title, under Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act, as amended, and Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree, respectively, should
only be granted when: (1) a Filipino citizen, by
himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural land of the

of ownership, since 12 June 1945, or earlier; and (2)
the land in question, necessarily, was already
declared alienable and disposable also by 12 June
1945 or earlier.
Same; Same; When an individual acquires an
imperfect title, he acquires a right to a grant by
operation of law.—Stringency and prudence in
interpreting and applying Section 48(b) of the Public
176

Land Act, as amended, is well justified by the

significant consequences arising from a finding that
a person has an imperfect title to agricultural land of
the public domain. Not just any lengthy occupation
of an agricultural public land could ripen into an
imperfect title. An imperfect title can only be
acquired by occupation and possession of the
land by a person and his predecessors-in-
interest for the period required and
considered by law sufficient as to have
segregated the land from the mass of public
land. When a person is said to have acquired
an imperfect title, by operation of law, he
acquires a right to a grant, a government grant
to the land, without the necessity of a
certificate of title being issued. As such, the
land ceased to be part of the public domain
and goes beyond the authority of the State to
dispose of. An application for confirmation of
title, therefore, is but a mere formality.
BRION, J., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion:

Constitutional Law; Land Registration Act; Public
Land Act; Any consideration of lands of the public
domain must begin with the Constitution and its
Regalian doctrine and the special laws thereon.—In
light of our established hierarchy of laws,
particularly the supremacy of the Philippine
Constitution, any consideration of lands of the public
domain should start with the Constitution and its
Regalian doctrine; all lands belong to the State, and
he who claims ownership carries the burden of
proving his claim. Next in the hierarchy is the PLA
for purposes of the terms of the grant, alienation and
disposition of the lands of the public domain, and the
PRD for the registration of lands. The PLA and the
PRD are special laws supreme in their respective
spheres, subject only to the Constitution. The Civil
Code, for its part, is the general law on property and
prescription and should be accorded respect as such.
In more concrete terms, where alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain are involved,
the PLA is the primary law that should govern, and
the Civil Code provisions on property and
prescription must yield in case of conflict.
Same; Same; Same; Presidential Decree No. 1073
should have provided January 24, 1947 and not
June 12, 1945 as its cut-off date.—PD 1073 should
have thus provided January 24, 1947 and not
177
VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009 177

June 12, 1945 as its cut-off date, yet the latter date
is the express legal reality. The reconciliation, as
properly defined by jurisprudence, is that where an

applicant has satisfied the requirements of Section
48 (b) of CA 141, as amended by RA 1942, prior to
the effectivity of PD 1073, the applicant is entitled to
perfect his or her title, even if possession and
occupation does not date back to June 12, 1945. For
purposes of the present case, a discussion of
the cut-off date has been fully made to
highlight that it is a date whose significance
and import cannot be minimized nor glossed
over by mere judicial interpretation or by
judicial social policy concerns; the full
legislative intent must be respected.
Same; Same; Same; Congress extended the period
for filing applications for judicial confirmation of
imperfect titles to December 31, 2020.—RA 6940
extended the period for filing applications for free
patent and judicial confirmation of imperfect title to
December 31, 2000. The law now also allows the
issuance of free patents for lands not in excess of 12
hectares to any natural-born citizen of the
Philippines who is not the owner of more than 12
hectares and who, for at least 30 years prior to the
effectivity of the amendatory Act, has continuously
occupied and cultivated, either by himself or through
his predecessors-in-interest, a tract or tracts of
agricultural public lands subject to disposition.
Congress recently extended the period for filing
applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect
and incomplete titles to alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain under RA 9176 from
December 31, 2000 under RA 6940 to December 31,
2020.
Same; Same; Same; The Court acted ultra vires in
its interpretation of Sec. 48(b), as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1073.—This Court acts
beyond the limits of the constitutionally-mandated
separation of powers in giving Section 48(b), as

amended by PD 1073, an interpretation beyond its
plain wording. Even this Court cannot read into the
law an intent that is not there even your purpose is
to avoid an absurd situation. If we feel that a law
already has absurd effects because of the passage of
time, our role under the principle of separation of
powers is not to give the law an interpretation that
is not there in order to avoid the perceived
absurdity. We thereby dip into the realm of policy—a
role delegated by the Constitution to the Legislature.
If only for this reason, we should avoid
178

expanding—through Naguit and the present

ponencia—the plain meaning of Section 48(b) of the
PLA, as amended by PD 1073.
Same; Same; Same; Prescription; A public land,
even if alienable is State property and prescription
does not run against the State.—The purpose is to
determine whether a grant or disposition of an
alienable and disposable land of the public domain
has been made, then the PLA primarily applies and
the Civil Code applies only suppletorily. The
possession and occupation that the PLA recognizes is
based on its Section 48(b) and, until the
requirements of this Section are satisfied, the
alienable and disposable land of the public domain
remains a State property that can be disposed only
under the terms of Section 11 of the PLA. In the face
of this legal reality, the question of whether—for
purposes of prescription—an alienable and
disposable land of the public domain is patrimonial

or not becomes immaterial; a public land, even if
alienable and disposable, is State property and
prescription does not run against the State. In
other words, there is no room for any hair-
splitting that would allow the inapplicable
concept of prescription under the Civil Code to
be directly applied to an alienable and
disposable land of the public domain before
this land satisfies the terms of a grant under
Section 48(b) of the PLA.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Public land may
become private by the government’s declaration in
which case prescription under the Civil Code can
run.—I agree with this statement as it describes a
clear case when the property has become private by
the government’s own declaration so that
prescription under the Civil Code can run. Note in
this regard that there is no inconsistency between
this conclusion and the hierarchy of laws on lands of
the public domain that I expounded on. To
reiterate, the PLA applies as a special and
primary law when a public land is classified as
alienable and disposable, and remains fully
and exclusively applicable until the State itself
expressly declares that the land now qualifies
as a patrimonial property. At that point, the
application of the Civil Code and its law on
prescription are triggered. The application of
Section 14(2) of the PRD follows.
179
VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009 179

Same; Same; Same; Same; Supreme Court; Stare

Decisis; The ruling in Republic vs. Court of Appeals
and Naguit (442 SCRA 445) must be abandoned.—
Naguit must be abandoned and rejected for being
based on legally-flawed premises and for being an
aberration in land registration jurisprudence. At the
very least, the present ponencia cannot be viewed as
an authority on the effective pos-session prior to
classification since this ruling, by the ponencia’s own
admission, is not necessary for the resolution of the
present case.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the

decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the
Court.
Fortun, Narvasa & Salazar for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondent.
TINGA, J.:
One main reason why the informal sector has not

become formal is that from Indonesia to Brazil, 90
percent of the informal lands are not titled and
registered. This is a generalized phenomenon in the
so-called Third World. And it has many
consequences.
xxx
The question is: How is it that so many
governments, from Suharto’s in Indonesia to
Fujimori’s in Peru, have wanted to title these people
and have not been able to do so effectively? One
reason is that none of the state systems in Asia or
Latin America can gather proof of informal titles. In
Peru, the informals have means of proving property
ownership to each other which are not the same
means developed by the Spanish legal system. The

informals have their own papers, their own forms of
agreements, and their own systems of registration,
all of which are very clearly stated in the maps
which they use for their own informal business
transactions.
If you take a walk through the countryside, from
Indonesia to Peru, and you walk by field after field—
in each field a different dog is going to bark at you.
Even dogs know what private property is all
180

about. The only one who does not know it is the

government. The issue is that there exists a
“common law” and an “informal law” which the Latin
American formal legal system does not know how to
recognize.
- Hernando De Soto1
This decision inevitably affects all untitled

lands currently in possession of persons and
entities other than the Philippine government.
The petition, while unremarkable as to the
facts, was accepted by the Court en banc in
order to provide definitive clarity to the
applicability and scope of original registration
proceedings under Sections 14(1) and 14(2) of
the Property Registration Decree. In doing so,
the Court confronts not only the relevant
provisions of the Public Land Act and the Civil
Code, but also the reality on the ground. The
countrywide phenomenon of untitled lands, as
well as the problem of informal settlement it
has spawned, has unfortunately been treated

with benign neglect. Yet our current laws are
hemmed in by their own circumscriptions in
addressing the phenomenon. Still, the duty on
our part is primarily to decide cases before us
in accord with the Constitution and the legal
principles that have developed our public land
law, though our social obligations dissuade us
from casting a blind eye on the endemic
problems.
I.
On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan
filed an application for land registration
covering a parcel of land identified as Lot 9864-
A, Cad-452-D, Silang Cadastre,2 situated in
Barangay Tibig, Silang Cavite, and consisting
of 71,324
_______________
1 “Hernando de Soto Interview” by Reason Magazine

dated 30 November 1999, at
http://www.reason.com/news/show/32213.html (Last
visited, 21 April 2009).
2 More particularly described and delineated in Plan
CSD-04-017123. Records, p. 161.
181
VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009 181

square meters. Malabanan claimed that he had

purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco,3
and that he and his predecessors-in-interest
had been in open, notorious, and continuous
adverse and peaceful possession of the land for

more than thirty (30) years.
The application was raffled to the Regional
Trial Court of (RTC) Cavite-Tagaytay City,
Branch 18. The Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) duly designated the Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor of Cavite, Jose Velazco, Jr., to
appear on behalf of the State.4 Apart from
presenting documentary evidence, Malabanan
himself and his witness, Aristedes Velazco,
testified at the hearing. Velazco testified that
the property was originally belonged to a
twenty-two hectare property owned by his
great-grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had four
sons—Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo and
Esteban—the fourth being Aristedes’s
grandfather. Upon Lino’s death, his four sons
inherited the property and divided it among
themselves. But by 1966, Esteban’s wife,
Magdalena, had become the administrator of
all the properties inherited by the Velazco sons
from their father, Lino. After the death of
Esteban and Magdalena, their son Virgilio
succeeded them in administering the
properties, including Lot 9864-A, which
originally belonged to his uncle, Eduardo
Velazco. It was this property that was sold by
Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan.5
_______________
3 But see note 5.

4 Id.
5 The trial court decision identified Eduardo Velazco as
the vendor of the property, notwithstanding the original
allegation in the application that Malabanan purchased the
same from Virgilio Velazco. See note 3. In his subsequent
pleadings, including those before this Court, Malabanan or

his heirs stated that the property was purchased from
Eduardo Velazco, and not Virgilio. On this point, the
appellate court made this observation:
“More importantly, Malabanan failed to prove his
ownership over Lot 9864-A. In his application for land
registration, Malabanan alleged that he purchased the
subject lot from Virgilio Velazco. Dur-
182
182 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

ANNOTATED
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Jose

Velazco, Jr. did not cross-examine Aristedes
Velazco. He further manifested that he “also
[knew] the property and I affirm the truth of
the testimony given by Mr. Velazco.”6 The
Republic of the Philippines likewise did not
present any evidence to controvert the
application.
Among the evidence presented by
Malabanan during trial was a Certification
dated 11 June 2001, issued by the Community
Environment & Natural Resources Office,
Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (CENRO-DENR), which stated that
the subject property was “verified to be within
the Alienable or Disposable land per Land
Classification Map No. 3013 established under
Project No. 20-A and approved as such under
FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982.”7
On 3 December 2002, the RTC rendered
judgment in favor of Malabanan, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
_______________
ing the trial of the case, however, Malabanan testified that

he purchased the subject lot from Eduardo Velazco, which
was corroborated by his witness, Aristedes Velazco, a son of
Virgilio Velazco, who stated that Eduardo was a brother of
his grandfather. As aptly observed by the Republic, no copy
of the deed of sale covering Lot 9864-A, executed either by
Virgilio or Eduardo Velazco, in favor of Malabanan was
marked and offered in evidence. In the appealed Decision,
the court a quo mentioned of a deed of sale executed in
1995 by Eduardo Velazco in favor of Malabanan which was
allegedly marked as Exhibit “I.” It appears, however, that
what was provisionally marked as Exhibit “I” was a
photocopy of the deed of sale executed by Virgilio Velazco in
favor of Leila Benitez and Benjamin Reyes. Section 34,
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides that the court shall
consider no evidence which has not been formally offered.
The offer is necessary because it is the duty of a judge to
rest his findings of facts and his judgment only and strictly
upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial. Thus,
Malabanan has not proved that Virgilio or Eduardo Velazco
was his predecessor-in-interest.” Rollo, pp. 39-40.
6 Rollo, p. 74.
7 Id., at p. 38. Emphasis supplied.
183
VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009 183

“WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this

application for registration and thus places under
the operation of Act 141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529,

otherwise known as Property Registration Law, the
lands described in Plan Csd-04-0173123-D, Lot 9864-
A and containing an area of Seventy One Thousand
Three Hundred Twenty Four (71,324) Square
Meters, as supported by its technical description now
forming part of the record of this case, in addition to
other proofs adduced in the name of MARIO
MALABANAN, who is of legal age, Filipino,
widower, and with residence at Munting Ilog, Silang,
Cavite.
Once this Decision becomes final and executory,
the corresponding decree of registration shall
forthwith issue.
SO ORDERED.”
The Republic interposed an appeal to the

Court of Appeals, arguing that Malabanan had
failed to prove that the property belonged to
the alienable and disposable land of the public
domain, and that the RTC had erred in finding
that he had been in possession of the property
in the manner and for the length of time
required by law for confirmation of imperfect
title.
On 23 February 2007, the Court of Appeals
rendered a Decision8 reversing the RTC and
dismissing the application of Malabanan. The
appellate court held that under Section 14(1) of
the Property Registration Decree any period of
possession prior to the classification of the lots
as alienable and disposable was
inconsequential and should be excluded from
the computation of the period of possession.
Thus, the appellate court noted that since the
CENRO-DENR certification had verified that
the property was declared alienable and
disposable only on 15 March 1982, the

Velazcos’ possession prior to that date could not
be factored in the computation of the period of
possession. This interpretation of the Court of
Appeals
_______________
8 Penned by Associate Justice Marina Buzon of the

Court of Appeals Fifth Division, and concurred in by
Associate Justices Edgardo Sundiam and Monina Arevalo-
Zenarosa.
184

ANNOTATED
of Section 14(1) of the Property Registration

Decree was based on the Court’s ruling in
Republic v. Herbieto.9
Malabanan died while the case was pending
with the Court of Appeals;10 hence, it was his
heirs who appealed the decision of the
appellate court. Petitioners, before this Court,
rely on our ruling in Republic v. Naguit,11
which was handed down just four months prior
to Herbieto. Petitioners suggest that the
discussion in Herbieto cited by the Court of
Appeals is actually obiter dictum since the
Metropolitan Trial Court therein which had
directed the registration of the property had no
jurisdiction in the first place since the requisite
notice of hearing was published only after the
hearing had already begun. Naguit, petitioners
argue, remains the controlling doctrine,

especially when the property in question is
agricultural land. Therefore, with respect to
agricultural lands, any possession prior to the
declaration of the alienable property as
disposable may be counted in reckoning the
period of possession to perfect title under the
Public Land Act and the Property Registration
Decree.
The petition was referred to the Court en
banc,12 and on 11 November 2008, the case was
heard on oral arguments. The Court formulated
the principal issues for the oral arguments, to
wit:
“1. In order that an alienable and disposable

land of the public domain may be registered under
Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529,
otherwise known as the Property Registration
Decree, should the land be classified as alienable
and disposable as of June 12, 1945 or is it sufficient
that such classification occur at any time prior to the
filing of the applicant for registration provided that
it is established that the applicant has been in open,
continu-
_______________
9 G.R. No. 156117, 26 May 2005, 459 SCRA 183.

10 See Rollo, p. 11.
11 G.R. No. 144507, 17 January 2005, 448 SCRA 442.
12 Through a Resolution dated 5 December 2007. See Rollo, p.
141.
185
VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009 185
ous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land

under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945 or earlier?
2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree may a parcel of land classified
as alienable and disposable be deemed private land
and therefore susceptible to acquisition by
prescription in accordance with the Civil Code?
3. May a parcel of land established as
agricultural in character either because of its use or
because its slope is below that of forest lands be
registrable under Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree in relation to the provisions of
the Civil Code on acquisitive prescription?
4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of
the subject land in their names under Section 14(1)
or Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree
or both?”13
Based on these issues, the parties

formulated their respective positions.
With respect to Section 14(1), petitioners
reiterate that the analysis of the Court in
Naguit is the correct interpretation of the
provision. The seemingly contradictory
pronouncement in Herbieto, it is submitted,
should be considered obiter dictum, since the
land registration proceedings therein was void
ab initio due to lack of publication of the notice
of initial hearing. Petitioners further point out
that in Republic v. Bibonia,14 promulgated in
June of 2007, the Court applied Naguit and
adopted the same observation that the
preferred interpretation by the OSG of Section
14(1) was patently absurd. For its part, the
OSG remains insistent that for Section 14(1) to

apply, the land should have been classified as
alienable and disposable as of 12 June 1945.
Apart from Herbieto, the OSG also cites the
subsequent rulings in Buenaventura v.
Republic,15 Fieldman Agricultural Trading v.
Republic16 and Repub-
_______________
13 Id., at pp. 186-187.

14 G.R. No. 157466, 21 June 2007, 525 SCRA 268.
15 G.R. No. 166865, 2 March 2007, 459 SCRA 271.
16 G.R. No. 147359, 28 March 2008, 550 SCRA 92.
186

ANNOTATED
lic v. Imperial Credit Corporation,17 as well as

the earlier case of Director of Lands v. Court of
Appeals.18
With respect to Section 14(2), petitioners
submit that open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession of an alienable land of the
public domain for more than 30 years ipso jure
converts the land into private property, thus
placing it under the coverage of Section 14(2).
According to them, it would not matter whether
the land sought to be registered was previously
classified as agricultural land of the public
domain so long as, at the time of the
application, the property had already been
“converted” into private property through
prescription. To bolster their argument,

petitioners cite extensively from our 2008
ruling in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties.19
The arguments submitted by the OSG with
respect to Section 14(2) are more extensive. The
OSG notes that under Article 1113 of the Civil
Code, the acquisitive prescription of properties
of the State refers to “patrimonial property,”
while Section 14(2) speaks of “private lands.” It
observes that the Court has yet to decide a case
that presented Section 14(2) as a ground for
application for registration, and that the 30-
year possession period refers to the period of
possession under Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act, and not the concept of prescription
under the Civil Code. The OSG further submits
that, assuming that the 30-year prescriptive
period can run against public lands, said period
should be reckoned from the time the public
land was declared alienable and disposable.
Both sides likewise offer special arguments
with respect to the particular factual
circumstances surrounding the subject property
and the ownership thereof.
_______________
17 G.R. No. 173088, 25 June 2008, 555 SCRA 314.

18 G.R. No. 85322, 30 April 1991, 178 SCRA 708.
19 G.R. No. 154953, 16 June 2008.
187
VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009 187

II.
First, we discuss Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree. For a full
understanding of the provision, reference has
to be made to the Public Land Act.
A.
Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as

the Public Land Act, has, since its enactment,
governed the classification and disposition of
lands of the public domain. The President is
authorized, from time to time, to classify the
lands of the public domain into alienable and
disposable, timber, or mineral lands.20
Alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain are further classified according to their
uses into (a) agricultural; (b) residential,
commercial, industrial, or for similar
productive purposes; (c) educational,
charitable, or other similar purposes; or (d)
reservations for town sites and for public and
quasi-public uses.21
May a private person validly seek the
registration in his/her name of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain? Section
11 of the Public Land Act acknowledges that
public lands suitable for agricultural purposes
may be disposed of “by confirmation of
imperfect or incomplete titles” through “judicial
legalization.”22 Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073, supplies the
details and unmistakably grants that right,
subject to the requisites stated therein:
“Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the

Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming to own any such land or an interest therein,

but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance
of the prov-
_______________
20 Section 6, Com. Act No. 141, as amended

21 Section 9, Com. Act No. 141, as amended.
22 Section 11, Com. Act No. 141, as amended.
188

ince where the land is located for confirmation of

their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title
therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors in interest have been in open,
of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier,
immediately preceding the filing of the application
for confirmation of title except when prevented by
war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions
of this chapter.”
Section 48(b) of Com. Act No. 141 received

its present wording in 1977 when the law was
amended by P.D. No. 1073. Two significant
amendments were introduced by P.D. No. 1073.

First, the term “agricultural lands” was
changed to “alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain.” The OSG submits that this
amendment restricted the scope of the lands
that may be registered.23 This is not actually
the case. Under Section 9 of the Public Land
Act, “agricultural lands” are a mere subset of
“lands of the public domain alienable or open to
disposition.” Evidently, alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain are a
larger class than only “agricultural lands.”
Second, the length of the requisite
possession was changed from possession for
“thirty (30) years immediately preceding the
filing of the application” to possession “since
June 12, 1945 or earlier.” The Court in Naguit
explained:
“When the Public Land Act was first promulgated

in 1936, the period of possession deemed necessary
to vest the right to register their title to agricultural
lands of the public domain commenced
_______________
23 OSG Memorandum, p. 13.
189
VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009 189

from July 26, 1894. However, this period was

amended by R.A. No. 1942, which provided that the
bona fide claim of ownership must have been for at
least thirty (30) years. Then in 1977, Section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act was again amended, this time

by P.D. No. 1073, which pegged the reckoning date
at June 12, 1945. xxx”
It bears further observation that Section

48(b) of Com. Act No, 141 is virtually the same
as Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree. Said Decree codified the various laws
relative to the registration of property,
including lands of the public domain. It is
Section 14(1) that operationalizes the
registration of such lands of the public domain.
The provision reads:
“SECTION 14. Who may apply.—The following

persons may file in the proper Court of First
Instance an application for registration of title to
land, whether personally or through their duly
authorized representatives:
(1) those who by themselves or through
their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945, or earlier.”
Notwithstanding the passage of the Property

Registration Decree and the inclusion of
Section 14(1) therein, the Public Land Act has
remained in effect. Both laws commonly refer
to persons or their predecessors-in-interest who
“have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945, or earlier.” That
circumstance may have led to the impression

that one or the other is a redundancy, or that
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act has
somehow been repealed or mooted. That is not
the case.
The opening clauses of Section 48 of the
Public Land Act and Section 14 of the Property
Registration Decree warrant comparison:
190

ANNOTATED
“Sec. 48 [of the Public Land Act].—The following

described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands
of the public domain or claiming to own any such
land or an interest therein, but whose titles have not
been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court
of First Instance of the province where the land is
located for confirmation of their claims and the
issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the
Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx
Sec. 14 [of the Property Registration Decree].—
Who may apply.—The following persons may file in
the proper Court of First Instance an application for
registration of title to land, whether personally or
through their duly authorized representatives:
xxx”
It is clear that Section 48 of the Public Land

Act is more descriptive of the nature of the
right enjoyed by the possessor than Section 14
of the Property Registration Decree, which
seems to presume the pre-existence of the

right, rather than establishing the right itself
for the first time. It is proper to assert that it is
the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No.
1073 effective 25 January 1977, that has
primarily established the right of a Filipino
citizen who has been “in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945”
to perfect or complete his title by applying with
the proper court for the confirmation of his
ownership claim and the issuance of the
corresponding certificate of
title.
Section 48 can be viewed in conjunction with
the afore-quoted Section 11 of the Public Land
Act, which provides that public lands suitable
for agricultural purposes may be disposed of by
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles,
and given the notion that both provisions
declare that it is indeed the Public Land Act
that primarily establishes the substantive
ownership of the possessor who has been in
possession of the property since 12 June 1945.
In turn, Section 14(a) of the
191
VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009 191

Property Registration Decree recognizes the

substantive right granted under Section 48(b)
of the Public Land Act, as well provides the
corresponding original registration procedure

for the judicial confirmation of an imperfect or
incomplete title.
There is another limitation to the right
granted under Section 48(b). Section 47 of the
Public Land Act limits the period within which
one may exercise the right to seek registration
under Section 48. The provision has been
amended several times, most recently by Rep.
Act No. 9176 in 2002. It currently reads thus:
“Section 47. The persons specified in the next

following section are hereby granted time, not to
extend beyond December 31, 2020 within which to
avail of the benefits of this Chapter: Provided, That
this period shall apply only where the area applied
for does not exceed twelve (12) hectares: Provided,
further, That the several periods of time designated
by the President in accordance with Section Forty-
Five of this Act shall apply also to the lands
comprised in the provisions of this Chapter, but this
Section shall not be construed as prohibiting any
said persons from acting under this Chapter at any
time prior to the period fixed by the President.”24
Accordingly under the current state of the

law, the substantive right granted under
Section 48(b) may be availed of only until 31
December 2020.
B.
Despite the clear text of Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act, as amended and Section 14(a)
of the Property Registration Decree, the OSG
has adopted the position that for one to acquire
the right to seek registration of an alienable
and disposable land of the public domain, it is
not enough that the applicant and his/her
predecessors-in-interest be in possession under

a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June
1945;
_______________
24 Section 47, Public Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act

No. 9176.
192

ANNOTATED
the alienable and disposable character of the

property must have been declared also as of 12
June 1945. Following the OSG’s approach, all
lands certified as alienable and disposable after
12 June 1945 cannot be registered either under
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree or Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act
as amended. The absurdity of such an
implication was discussed in Naguit.
“Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the

alienable and disposable character of the land should
have already been established since June 12, 1945 or
earlier. This is not borne out by the plain meaning of
Section 14(1). “Since June 12, 1945,” as used in the
provision, qualifies its antecedent phrase “under a
bonafide claim of ownership.” Generally speaking,
qualifying words restrict or modify only the words or
phrases to which they are immediately associated,
and not those distantly or remotely located.25 Ad
proximum antecedents fiat relation nisi impediatur

sentencia.
Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that
would result if we adopt petitioner’s position. Absent
a legislative amendment, the rule would be, adopting
the OSG’s view, that all lands of the public domain
which were not declared alienable or disposable
before June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to
original registration, no matter the length of
unchallenged possession by the occupant. Such
interpretation renders paragraph (1) of Section 14
virtually inoperative and even precludes the
government from giving it effect even as it decides to
reclassify public agricultural lands as alienable and
disposable. The unreasonableness of the situation
would even be aggravated considering that before
June 12, 1945, the Philippines was not yet even
considered an independent state.”
Accordingly, the Court in Naguit explained:
“[T]he more reasonable interpretation of Section

14(1) is that it merely requires the property sought
to be registered as already alienable and disposable
at the time the application for registration of title is
filed. If the State, at the time the application is
made, has
_______________
25 R. Agpalo, Statutory Construction (3rd ed., 1995) at p. 182.
193
VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009 193

not yet deemed it proper to release the property for

alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the
government is still reserving the right to utilize the
property; hence, the need to preserve its ownership
in the State irrespective of the length of adverse
possession even if in good faith. However, if the
property has already been classified as alienable and
disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already
an intention on the part of the State to abdicate its
exclusive prerogative over the property.”
The Court declares that the correct

interpretation of Section 14(1) is that which
was adopted in Naguit. The contrary
pronouncement in Herbieto, as pointed out in
Naguit, absurdly limits the application of the
provision to the point of virtual inutility since it
would only cover lands actually declared
alienable and disposable prior to 12 June 1945,
even if the current possessor is able to establish
possession under a bona fide claim of
ownership long before that date.
Moreover, the Naguit interpretation allows
more possessors under a bona fide claim of
ownership to avail of judicial confirmation of
their imperfect titles than what would be
feasible under Herbieto. This balancing fact is
significant, especially considering our
forthcoming discussion on the scope and reach
of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree.
Petitioners make the salient observation
that the contradictory passages from Herbieto
are obiter dicta since the land registration
proceedings therein is void ab initio in the first
place due to lack of the requisite publication of
the notice of initial hearing. There is no need to

explicitly overturn Herbieto, as it suffices that
the Court’s acknowledgment that the particular
line of argument used therein concerning
Section 14(1) is indeed obiter.
194

ANNOTATED
It may be noted that in the subsequent case

of Buenaventura,26 the Court, citing Herbieto,
again stated that “[a]ny period of possession
prior to the date when the [s]ubject [property
was] classified as alienable and disposable is
inconsequential and should be excluded from
the computation of the period of possession…”
That statement, in the context of Section 14(1),
is certainly erroneous. Nonetheless, the
passage as cited in Buenaventura should again
be considered as obiter. The application therein
was ultimately granted, citing Section 14(2).
The evidence submitted by petitioners therein
did not establish any mode of possession on
their part prior to 1948, thereby precluding the
application of Section 14(1). It is not even
apparent from the decision whether petitioners
therein had claimed entitlement to original
registration following Section 14(1), their
position being that they had been in exclusive
possession under a bona fide claim of
ownership for over fifty (50) years, but not
before 12 June 1945.
Thus, neither Herbieto nor its principal

discipular ruling Buenaventura has any
precedental value with respect to Section 14(1).
On the other hand, the ratio of Naguit is
embedded in Section 14(1), since it precisely
involved situation wherein the applicant had
been in exclusive possession under a bona fide
claim of ownership prior to 12 June 1945. The
Court’s interpretation of Section 14(1) therein
was decisive to the resolution of the case. Any
doubt as to which between Naguit or Herbieto
provides the final word of the Court on Section
14(1) is now settled in favor of Naguit.
We noted in Naguit that it should be
distinguished from Bracewell v. Court of
Appeals27 since in the latter, the application for
registration had been filed before the land was
declared alienable or disposable. The dissent
though pronounces Bracewell as the better rule
between the two. Yet two years after Bracewell,
its ponente, the esteemed Justice Consuelo
_______________
26 See note 3.
27 380 Phil. 156; 323 SCRA 193 (2000).
195
VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009 195

Ynares-Santiago, penned the ruling in Republic

v. Ceniza,28 which involved a claim of
possession that extended back to 1927 over a
public domain land that was declared alienable
and disposable only in 1980. Ceniza cited

Bracewell, quoted extensively from it, and
following the mindset of the dissent, the
attempt at registration in Ceniza should have
failed. Not so.
“To prove that the land subject of an application

for registration is alienable, an applicant must
establish the existence of a positive act of the
government such as a presidential proclamation or
an executive order; an administrative action;
investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.
In this case, private respondents presented a
certification dated November 25, 1994, issued by
Eduardo M. Inting, the Community Environment
and Natural Resources Officer in the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources Office in Cebu
City, stating that the lots involved were “found to be
within the alienable and disposable (sic) Block-I,
Land Classification Project No. 32-A, per map 2962
4-I555 dated December 9, 1980.” This is sufficient
evidence to show the real character of the land
subject of private respondents’ application. Further,
the certification enjoys a presumption of regularity
in the absence of contradictory evidence, which is
true in this case. Worth noting also was the
observation of the Court of Appeals stating that:
[n]o opposition was filed by the Bureaus of
Lands and Forestry to contest the application
of appellees on the ground that the property
still forms part of the public domain. Nor is
there any showing that the lots in question are
forestal land....”
Thus, while the Court of Appeals erred in ruling
that mere possession of public land for the period
required by law would entitle its occupant to a
confirmation of imperfect title, it did not err in

ruling in favor of private respondents as far as the
first requirement in Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act is concerned, for they were
_______________
28 Also known as Republic v. Court of Appeals, 440 Phil. 697;

392 SCRA 190 (2002).
196

able to overcome the burden of proving the

alienability of the land subject of their application.
As correctly found by the Court of Appeals,
private respondents were able to prove their open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the
subject land even before the year 1927. As a rule, we
are bound by the factual findings of the Court of
Appeals. Although there are exceptions, petitioner
did not show that this is one of them.”29
Why did the Court in Ceniza, through the

same eminent member who authored
Bracewell, sanction the registration under
Section 48(b) of public domain lands declared
alienable or disposable thirty-five (35) years
and 180 days after 12 June 1945? The telling
difference is that in Ceniza, the application for
registration was filed nearly six (6) years after
the land had been declared alienable or
disposable, while in Bracewell, the application
was filed nine (9) years before the land was
declared alienable or disposable. That
crucial difference was also stressed in Naguit to

contradistinguish it from Bracewell, a
difference which the dissent seeks to belittle.
III.
We next ascertain the correct framework of
analysis with respect to Section 14(2). The
provision reads:
“SECTION 14. Who may apply.—The following

xxx
(2) Those who have acquired ownership
over private lands by prescription under the
provisions of existing laws.”
_______________
29 Id., at pp. 710-712; pp. 201-202.
197
VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009 197

The Court in Naguit offered the following

discussion concerning Section 14(2), which we
did even then recognize, and still do, to be an
obiter dictum, but we nonetheless refer to it as
material for further discussion, thus:
“Did the enactment of the Property Registration

Decree and the amendatory P.D. No. 1073 preclude
the application for registration of alienable lands of
the public domain, possession over which

commenced only after June 12, 1945? It did not,
considering Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree, which governs and authorizes
the application of “those who have acquired
ownership of private lands by prescription under the
provisions of existing laws.”
Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring
ownership under the Civil Code.30 There is a
consistent jurisprudential rule that properties
classified as alienable public land may be converted
into private property by reason of open, continuous
and exclusive possession of at least thirty (30)
years.31 With such conversion, such property may
now fall within the contemplation of “private lands”
under Section 14(2), and thus susceptible to
registration by those who have acquired ownership
through prescription. Thus, even if possession of the
alienable public land commenced on a date later
than June 12, 1945, and such possession being been
open, continuous and exclusive, then the possessor
may have the right to register the land by virtue of
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.”
Naguit did not involve the application of

Section 14(2), unlike in this case where
petitioners have based their registration bid
primarily on that provision, and where the
evidence definitively establishes their claim of
possession only as far back as 1948. It is in this
case that we can properly appreciate the
nuances of the provision.
_______________
30 See Civil Code, Art. 1113.
31 See e.g., Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate

Court, G.R. No. 65663, 16 October 1992, 214 SCRA 604,
611; Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108998, 24
August 1994, 235 SCRA 567, 576; Group Commander,
Intelligence and Security Group v. Dr. Malvar, 438 Phil.
252, 275; 389 SCRA 493, 509 (2002).
198

ANNOTATED
A.
The obiter in Naguit cited the Civil Code
provisions on prescription as the possible basis
for application for original registration under
Section 14(2). Specifically, it is Article 1113
which provides legal foundation for the
application. It reads:
“All things which are within the commerce of men

are susceptible of prescription, unless otherwise
provided. Property of the State or any of its
subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not
be the object of prescription.”
It is clear under the Civil Code that where

lands of the public domain are patrimonial in
prescription. On the other hand, among the
public domain lands that are not susceptible to
acquisitive prescription are timber lands and
mineral lands. The Constitution itself
proscribes private ownership of timber or
mineral lands.
There are in fact several provisions in the

Civil Code concerning the acquisition of real
property through prescription. Ownership of
real property may be acquired by ordinary
prescription of ten (10) years,32 or through
extraordinary prescription of thirty (30)
years.33 Ordinary acquisitive prescription
requires possession in good faith,34 as well as
just title.35
When Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree explicitly provides that
persons “who have acquired ownership over
private lands by prescription under the
provisions of existing laws,” it unmistakably
refers to the Civil Code as a valid basis for the
registration of lands. The Civil Code is the
_______________
32 See Article 1134, Civil Code.

33 See Article 1137, Civil Code.
34 See Article 1117 in relation to Article 1128, Civil
Code. See also Articles 526, 527, 528 & 529, Civil Code on
the conditions of good faith required.
35 See Article 1117, in relation to Article 1129, Civil
Code.
199
VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009 199

only existing law that specifically allows the

acquisition by prescription of private lands,
including patrimonial property belonging to the
State. Thus, the critical question that needs
affirmation is whether Section 14(2) does

encompass original registration proceedings
over patrimonial property of the State, which a
private person has acquired through
prescription.
The Naguit obiter had adverted to a
frequently reiterated jurisprudence holding
that properties classified as alienable public
land may be converted into private property by
reason of open, continuous and exclusive
possession of at least thirty (30) years.36 Yet if
we ascertain the source of the “thirty-year”
period, additional complexities relating to
Section 14(2) and to how exactly it operates
would emerge. For there are in fact two
distinct origins of the thirty (30)-year rule.
The first source is Rep. Act No. 1942,
enacted in 1957, which amended Section 48(b)
of the Public Land Act by granting the right to
seek original registration of alienable public
lands through possession in the concept of an
owner for at least thirty years.
“The following-described citizens of the

Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming to own any such lands or an interest
therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance
of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a
certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
continuous, exclusive and notorious
_______________
36 Citing Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court,

G.R. No. 65663, 16 October 1992, 214 SCRA 604, 611; Republic v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108998, 24 August 1994, 235 SCRA
567, 576; Group Commander, Intelligence and Security Group v.
Dr. Malvar, 438 Phil. 252, 275; 389 SCRA 493, 509 (2002).
200

possession and occupation of agricultural lands of

the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title, except
when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall
be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall
be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this Chapter. (emphasis supplied)”37
This provision was repealed in 1977 with the

enactment of P.D. 1073, which made the date
12 June 1945 the reckoning point for the first
time. Nonetheless, applications for registration
filed prior to 1977 could have invoked the 30-
year rule introduced by Rep. Act No. 1942.
The second source is Section 14(2) of P.D.
1529 itself, at least by implication, as it applies
the rules on prescription under the Civil Code,
particularly Article 1113 in relation to Article
1137. Note that there are two kinds of
prescription under the Civil Code–ordinary
acquisitive prescription and extraordinary
acquisitive prescription, which, under Article

1137, is completed “through uninterrupted
adverse possession… for thirty years, without
need of title or of good faith.”
Obviously, the first source of the thirty (30)-
year period rule, Rep. Act No. 1942, became
unavailable after 1977. At present, the only
legal basis for the thirty (30)-year period is the
law on prescription under the Civil Code, as
mandated
_______________
37 Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, immediately

before its amendment by Rep. Act No. 1942, reads as
follows:
“Those who by themselves or through their predecessors
in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of
the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, except as against the Government, since July
twenty-sixth, eighteen hundred and ninety-four, except
when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this Chapter.”
201
VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009 201

under Section 14(2). However, there is a

material difference between how the thirty
(30)-year rule operated under Rep. Act No.
1942 and how it did under the Civil Code.
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as

amended by Rep. Act No. 1942, did not refer to
or call into application the Civil Code
provisions on prescription. It merely set forth a
requisite thirty-year possession period
immediately preceding the application for
confirmation of title, without any qualification
as to whether the property should be declared
alienable at the beginning of, and continue as
such, throughout the entire thirty-(30) years.
There is neither statutory nor jurisprudential
basis to assert Rep. Act No. 1942 had mandated
such a requirement,38 similar to our earlier
finding with respect to the present language of
Section 48(b), which now sets 12 June 1945 as
the point of reference.
Then, with the repeal of Rep. Act No. 1942,
the thirty-year possession period as basis for
original registration became Section 14(2) of
the Property Registration Decree, which
entitled those “who have acquired ownership
over private lands by prescription under the
provisions of existing laws” to apply for original
registration. Again, the thirty-year period is
derived from the rule on extraordinary
prescription under Article 1137 of the Civil
Code. At the same time, Section 14(2) puts into
operation the entire regime of prescription
under the Civil Code, a fact which does not hold
true with respect to Section 14(1).
B.
Unlike Section 14(1), Section 14(2) explicitly
refers to the principles on prescription under
existing laws. Accordingly, we are impelled to
apply the civil law concept of prescription,
_______________
38 Again, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as

amended by Rep. Act No. 1942, was superseded by P.D. No.
1073, which imposed the 12 June 1945 reckoning point, and
which was then incorporated in Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree.
202

ANNOTATED
as set forth in the Civil Code, in our

interpretation of Section 14(2). There is no
similar demand on our part in the case of
Section 14(1).
The critical qualification under Article 1113
of the Civil Code is thus: “[p]roperty of the
State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial
in character shall not be the object of
prescription.” The identification what consists
of patrimonial property is provided by Articles
420 and 421, which we quote in full:
“Art. 420. The following things are property of

public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads,
canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges
constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads,
and others of similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without
being for public use, and are intended for some
public service or for the development of the national
wealth.
Art. 421. All other property of the State, which

is not of the character stated in the preceding article,
is patrimonial property.
It is clear that property of public dominion,

which generally includes property belonging to
the State, cannot be the object of prescription
or, indeed, be subject of the commerce of man.39
Lands of the public domain, whether declared
alienable and disposable or not, are property of
public dominion and thus insusceptible to
acquisition by prescription.
Let us now explore the effects under the
Civil Code of a declaration by the President or
any duly authorized government officer of
alienability and disposability of lands of the
public domain. Would such lands so declared
alienable and disposable be converted, under
the Civil Code, from property of the public
dominion into patrimonial property? After all,
by connotative definition, alienable and
disposable lands may be
_______________
39 See Villarico v. Sarmiento, G.R. No. 136438, 11

November 2004, 442 SCRA 110.
203
VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009 203

the object of the commerce of man; Article 1113

provides that all things within the commerce of
man are susceptible to prescription; and the
same provision further provides that

patrimonial property of the State may be
acquired by prescription.
Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code
states that “[p]roperty of public dominion,
when no longer intended for public use or for
public service, shall form part of the
patrimonial property of the State.” It is this
provision that controls how public dominion
property may be converted into patrimonial
property susceptible to acquisition by
prescription. After all, Article 420 (2) makes
clear that those property “which belong to the
State, without being for public use, and are
intended for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth” are public
dominion property. For as long as the property
belongs to the State, although already
classified as alienable or disposable, it remains
property of the public dominion if when it is
“intended for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth.”
Accordingly, there must be an express
declaration by the State that the public
dominion property is no longer intended
for public service or the development of
the national wealth or that the property
has been converted into patrimonial.
Without such express declaration, the
property, even if classified as alienable or
disposable, remains property of the public
dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and
thus incapable of acquisition by
prescription. It is only when such
alienable and disposable lands are
expressly declared by the State to be no
longer intended for public service or for
the development of the national wealth

that the period of acquisitive prescription
can begin to run. Such declaration shall
be in the form of a law duly enacted by
Congress or a Presidential Proclamation
in cases where the President is duly
authorized by law.
204

ANNOTATED
It is comprehensible with ease that this

reading of Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree limits its scope and reach
and thus affects the registrability even of lands
already declared alienable and disposable to
the detriment of the bona fide possessors or
occupants claiming title to the lands. Yet this
interpretation is in accord with the Regalian
doctrine and its concomitant assumption that
all lands owned by the State, although declared
alienable or disposable, remain as such and
ought to be used only by the Government.
Recourse does not lie with this Court in the
matter. The duty of the Court is to apply the
Constitution and the laws in accordance with
their language and intent. The remedy is to
change the law, which is the province of the
legislative branch. Congress can very well be
entreated to amend Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree and pertinent
provisions of the Civil Code to liberalize the
requirements for judicial confirmation of

imperfect or incomplete titles.
The operation of the foregoing interpretation
can be illustrated by an actual example.
Republic Act No. 7227, entitled “An Act
Accelerating The Conversion Of Military
Reservations Into Other Productive Uses, etc.,”
is more commonly known as the BCDA law.
Section 2 of the law authorizes the sale of
certain military reservations and portions of
military camps in Metro Manila, including Fort
Bonifacio and Villamor Air Base. For purposes
of effecting the sale of the military camps, the
law mandates the President to transfer such
military lands to the Bases Conversion
Development Authority (BCDA)40 which in
turn is authorized to own, hold and/or
administer them.41 The President is authorized
to sell portions of the military camps, in whole
or in part.42 Accordingly, the BCDA law itself
declares that the military lands subject thereof
are “alienable and disposable pursuant to the
provi-
_______________
40 Rep. Act No. 7227, Sec. 7.

41 Rep. Act No. 7227, Sec. 4(a).
42 Rep. Act No. 7227, Sec. 7.
205
VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009 205

sions of existing laws and regulations

governing sales of government properties.”43
From the moment the BCDA law was
enacted the subject military lands have become
alienable and disposable. However, said lands
did not become patrimonial, as the BCDA law
itself expressly makes the reservation that
these lands are to be sold in order to raise
funds for the conversion of the former
American bases at Clark and Subic.44 Such
purpose can be tied to either “public service” or
“the development of national wealth” under
Article 420(2). Thus, at that time, the lands
remained property of the public dominion
under Article 420(2), notwithstanding their
status as alienable and disposable. It is upon
their sale as authorized under the BCDA law to
a private person or entity that such lands
become private property and cease to be
property of the public dominion.
C.
Should public domain lands become

patrimonial because they are declared as such
in a duly enacted law or duly promulgated
proclamation that they are no longer intended
for public service or for the development of the
national wealth, would the period of possession
prior to the conversion of such public dominion
into patrimonial be reckoned in counting the
prescriptive period in favor of the possessors?
We rule in the negative.
The limitation imposed by Article 1113
dissuades us from ruling that the period of
possession before the public domain land
becomes patrimonial may be counted for the
purpose of completing the prescriptive period.

Possession of public dominion property before it
becomes patrimonial cannot be the object of
prescription according to the Civil Code. As the
application for registration under Section 14(2)
falls wholly within the framework of
prescription under the Civil Code,
_______________
43 Id.
44 Section 2, Rep. Act No. 7227.
206

ANNOTATED
there is no way that possession during the time

that the land was still classified as public
dominion property can be counted to meet the
requisites of acquisitive prescription and justify
registration.
Are we being inconsistent in applying
divergent rules for Section 14(1) and Section
14(2)? There is no inconsistency. Section 14(1)
mandates registration on the basis of
possession, while Section 14(2) entitles
registration on the basis of prescription.
Registration under Section 14(1) is
extended under the aegis of the Property
Registration Decree and the Public Land
Act while registration under Section 14(2)
is made available both by the Property
Registration Decree and the Civil Code.
In the same manner, we can distinguish

between the thirty-year period under Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by
Rep. Act No. 1472, and the thirty-year period
available through Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree in relation to Article 1137
of the Civil Code. The period under the
former speaks of a thirty-year period of
possession, while the period under the
latter concerns a thirty-year period of
extraordinary prescription. Registration
under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act
as amended by Rep. Act No. 1472 is based
on thirty years of possession alone
without regard to the Civil Code, while
the registration under Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree is founded
on extraordinary prescription under the
Civil Code.
It may be asked why the principles of
prescription under the Civil Code should not
apply as well to Section 14(1). Notwithstanding
the vaunted status of the Civil Code, it
ultimately is just one of numerous statutes,
neither superior nor inferior to other statutes
such as the Property Registration Decree. The
legislative branch is not bound to adhere to the
framework set forth by the Civil Code when it
enacts subsequent legislation. Section 14(2)
manifests a clear intent to interrelate the
registration allowed under that provision with
207
VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009 207

the Civil Code, but no such intent exists with

respect to Section 14(1).
IV.
One of the keys to understanding the

framework we set forth today is seeing how our
land registration procedures correlate with our
law on prescription, which, under the Civil
Code, is one of the modes for acquiring
ownership over property.
The Civil Code makes it clear that
patrimonial property of the State may be
acquired by private persons through
prescription. This is brought about by Article
1113, which states that “[a]ll things which are
within the commerce of man are susceptible to
prescription,” and that [p]roperty of the State
or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in
character shall not be the object of
prescription.”
There are two modes of prescription through
which immovables may be acquired under the
Civil Code. The first is ordinary acquisitive
prescription, which, under Article 1117,
requires possession in good faith and with just
title; and, under Article 1134, is completed
through possession of ten (10) years. There is
nothing in the Civil Code that bars a person
from acquiring patrimonial property of the
State through ordinary acquisitive prescription,
nor is there any apparent reason to impose
such a rule. At the same time, there are
indispensable requisites—good faith and just
title. The ascertainment of good faith involves
the application of Articles 526, 527, and 528, as
well as Article 1127 of the Civil Code,45
provisions that more or less speak for

themselves.
On the other hand, the concept of just title
requires some clarification. Under Article 1129,
there is just title for the purposes of
prescription “when the adverse claimant came
into possession of the property through one of
the modes rec-
_______________
45 See Civil Code, Art. 1128.
208

ANNOTATED
ognized by law for the acquisition of ownership

or other real rights, but the grantor was not the
owner or could not transmit any right.” Dr.
Tolentino explains:
“Just title is an act which has for its purpose the

transmission of ownership, and which would have
actually transferred ownership if the grantor had
been the owner. This vice or defect is the one cured
by prescription. Examples: sale with delivery,
exchange, donation, succession, and dacion in
payment.”46
The OSG submits that the requirement of

just title necessarily precludes the applicability
of ordinary acquisitive prescription to
patrimonial property. The major premise for
the argument is that “the State, as the owner
and grantor, could not transmit ownership to

the possessor before the completion of the
required period of possession.”47 It is evident
that the OSG erred when it assumed that the
grantor referred to in Article 1129 is the State.
The grantor is the one from whom the person
invoking ordinary acquisitive prescription
derived the title, whether by sale, exchange,
donation, succession or any other mode of the
acquisition of ownership or other real rights.
Earlier, we made it clear that, whether
under ordinary prescription or extraordinary
prescription, the period of possession preceding
the classification of public dominion lands as
patrimonial cannot be counted for the purpose
of computing prescription. But after the
property has been become patrimonial, the
period of prescription begins to run in favor of
the possessor. Once the requisite period has
been completed, two legal events ensue: (1) the
patrimonial property is ipso jure converted into
private land; and (2) the person in possession
for the periods prescribed under the Civil Code
acquires ownership of the property by
operation of the Civil Code.
_______________
46 A. Tolentino, IV Civil Code of the Philippines (1991

ed.) at 26; citing 2 Castan 175.
47 Memorandum of the OSG, p. 21.
209
VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009 209

It is evident that once the possessor

automatically becomes the owner of the
converted patrimonial property, the ideal next
step is the registration of the property under
the Torrens system. It should be remembered
that registration of property is not a mode of
acquisition of ownership, but merely a mode of
confirmation of ownership.48
Looking back at the registration regime
prior to the adoption of the Property
Registration Decree in 1977, it is apparent that
the registration system then did not fully
accommodate the acquisition of ownership of
patrimonial property under the Civil Code.
What the system accommodated was the
confirmation of imperfect title brought about by
the completion of a period of possession
ordained under the Public Land Act (either 30
years following Rep. Act No. 1942, or since 12
June 1945 following P.D. No. 1073).
The Land Registration Act49 was noticeably
silent on the requisites for alienable public
lands acquired through ordinary prescription
under the Civil Code, though it arguably did
not preclude such registration.50 Still, the gap
was lamentable, considering that the Civil
Code, by itself, establishes ownership over the
patrimonial property of persons who have
completed the prescriptive periods ordained
therein. The gap was finally closed with the
adoption of the Property Registration Decree in
1977, with Section 14(2) thereof expressly
authorizing original registration in favor of
persons who have acquired ownership over
provisions of existing laws, that is, the Civil
Code as of now.
V.
We synthesize the doctrines laid down in
this case, as follows:
_______________
48 See Angeles v. Samia, 66 Phil. 44 (1938).

49 Act No. 496.
50 See Section 19, Land Registration Act, which allowed
application for registration of title by “person or persons
claiming, singly or collectively, to own the legal estate in
fee simple.”
210

ANNOTATED
(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the

Property Registration Decree, Section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act recognizes and confirms
that “those who by themselves or through their
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership, since June
12, 1945” have acquired ownership of, and
registrable title to, such lands based on the
length and quality of their possession.
(a) Since Section 48(b) merely
requires possession since 12 June 1945
and does not require that the lands
should have been alienable and disposable
during the entire period of possession, the
possessor is entitled to secure judicial

confirmation of his title thereto as soon as
it is declared alienable and disposable,
subject to the timeframe imposed by
Section 47 of the Public Land Act.51
(b) The right to register granted
under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act
is further confirmed by Section 14(1) of
the Property Registration Decree.
(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree, consider that
under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized
as a mode of acquiring ownership of
patrimonial property. However, public domain
lands become only patrimonial property not
only with a declaration that these are alienable
or disposable. There must also be an express
government manifestation that the property is
already patrimonial or no longer retained for
public service or the development of national
wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code.
And only when the property has become
patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the
acquisition of property of the public dominion
begin to run.
_______________
51 See note 24.
211
VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009 211

(a) Patrimonial property is private

property of the government. The person
acquires ownership of patrimonial
property by prescription under the Civil
Code is entitled to secure registration
thereof under Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree.
(b) There are two kinds of
prescription by which patrimonial
property may be acquired, one ordinary
and other extraordinary. Under ordinary
acquisitive prescription, a person acquires
ownership of a patrimonial property
through possession for at least ten (10)
years, in good faith and with just title.
Under extraordinary acquisitive
prescription, a person’s uninterrupted
adverse possession of patrimonial
property for at least thirty (30) years,
regardless of good faith or just title,
ripens into ownership.
B.
We now apply the above-stated doctrines to
the case at bar.
It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is
insufficient to establish that Malabanan has
acquired ownership over the subject property
under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act.
There is no substantive evidence to establish
that Malabanan or petitioners as his
predecessors-in-interest have been in
possession of the property since 12 June 1945
or earlier. The earliest that petitioners can date
back their possession, according to their own
evidence—the Tax Declarations they presented
in particular—is to the year 1948. Thus, they
cannot avail themselves of registration under

Decree.
Neither can petitioners properly invoke
Section 14(2) as basis for registration. While
the subject property was declared as alienable
or disposable in 1982, there is no competent
evidence that is no longer intended for public
use service or for the development of the
national evidence, conformably with Article 422
of the Civil Code. The classification of the
subject
212

ANNOTATED
property as alienable and disposable land of the

public domain does not change its status as
property of the public dominion under Article
420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is
insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.
VI.
A final word. The Court is comfortable with
the correctness of the legal doctrines
established in this decision. Nonetheless,
discomfiture over the implications of today’s
ruling cannot be discounted. For, every untitled
property that is occupied in the country will be
affected by this ruling. The social implications
cannot be dismissed lightly, and the Court
would be abdicating its social responsibility to
the Filipino people if we simply levied the law
without comment.
The informal settlement of public lands,

whether declared alienable or not, is a
phenomenon tied to long-standing habit and
cultural acquiescence, and is common among
the so-called “Third World” countries. This
paradigm powerfully evokes the disconnect
between a legal system and the reality on the
ground. The law so far has been unable to
bridge that gap. Alternative means of
acquisition of these public domain lands, such
as through homestead or free patent, have
proven unattractive due to limitations imposed
on the grantee in the encumbrance or
alienation of said properties.52 Judicial con-
_______________
52 See Section 118, Com. Act No. 141, as amended.

“Except in favor of the Government or any of its
branches, units, or institutions, lands acquired under free
patent or homestead provisions shall not be subject to
encumbrance or alienation from the date of the approval of
the application and for a term of five years from and after
the date of issuance of the patent or grant, nor shall they
become liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted
prior to the expiration of said period, but the improvements
or crops on the land may be mortgaged or pledged to
qualified persons, associations, or corporations.
No alienation, transfer, or conveyance of any homestead
after five years and before twenty-five years after issuance
of title shall be
213
VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009 213

firmation of imperfect title has emerged as the

most viable, if not the most attractive means to
regularize the informal settlement of alienable
or disposable lands of the public domain, yet
even that system, as revealed in this decision,
has considerable limits.
There are millions upon millions of Filipinos
who have individually or exclusively held
residential lands on which they have lived and
raised their families. Many more have tilled
and made productive idle lands of the State
with their hands. They have been regarded for
generation by their families and their
communities as common law owners. There is
much to be said about the virtues of according
them legitimate states. Yet such virtues are not
for the Court to translate into positive law, as
the law itself considered such lands as property
of the public dominion. It could only be up to
Congress to set forth a new phase of land
reform to sensibly regularize and formalize the
settlement of such lands which in legal theory
are lands of the public domain before the
problem becomes insoluble. This could be
accomplished, to cite two examples, by
liberalizing the standards for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title, or amending the
Civil Code itself to ease the requisites for the
conversion of public dominion property into
patrimonial.
One’s sense of security over land rights
infuses into every aspect of well-being not only
of that individual, but also to the person’s
family. Once that sense of security is deprived,
life and livelihood are put on stasis. It is for the
political branches to bring welcome closure to
the long pestering problem.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The

Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23
February 2007 and Resolution dated 2 October
2007 are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to
costs.
_______________
valid without the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture

and Commerce, which approval shall not be denied except
on constitutional and legal grounds.”
214

ANNOTATED
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, Austria-

Martinez, Carpio-Morales, Velasco, Jr.,
Nachura, Peralta and Bersamin, JJ., concur.
Puno (C.J.), I join J. Nazario.
Quisumbing, J., On Official Business.
Corona, J., I join the dissent of Mr. Justice
Brion.
Chico-Nazario, J., Please See Concurring
and Dissenting Opinion.
De Castro, J., I join the Concurring and
Dissenting Opinion of Justice Nazario.
Brion, J., I Dissent — See Opinion.
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
I concur in the majority opinion in

dismissing the application for registration of a
piece of land originally filed by the late Mario
Malabanan (Malabanan), petitioners’
predecessor-in-interest. The land subject of the
instant Petition, being alienable and disposable
land of the public domain, may not be acquired
by prescription under the provisions of the Civil
Code, nor registered pursuant to Section 14(2)
of the Property Registration Decree.
At the outset, it must be made clear that the
Property Registration Decree governs
registration of land under the Torrens system.
It can only identify which titles, already
existing or vested, may be registered under the
Torrens system; but it cannot be the source of
any title to land. It merely confirms, but does
not confer ownership.1
_______________
1 Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108998, 24

August 1994, 235 SCRA 567, 576.
215
VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009 215


Decree allows “those who have acquired
ownership of private lands by prescription
under the provisions of existing laws,” to apply
for registration of their title to the lands.
Petitioners do not fall under such provision,
taking into account that the land they are
seeking to register is alienable and

disposable land of the public domain, a
fact which would have several substantial
implications.
First, Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree clearly and explicitly refers
to “private lands,” without mention at all of
public lands. There is no other way to
understand the plain language of Section 14(2)
of the Property Registration Decree except that
the land was already private when the
applicant for registration acquired ownership
thereof by prescription. The prescription
therein was not the means by which the public
land was converted to private land; rather, it
was the way the applicant acquired title to
what is already private land, from another
person previously holding title to the same.2
The provision in question is very clear and
unambiguous. Well-settled is the rule that
when the law speaks in clear and categorical
language, there is no reason for interpretation
or construction, but only for application.3
With the understanding that Section 14(2) of
the Property Registration Decree applies only
to what are already private lands, then, there
is no question that the same can be acquired by
prescription under the provisions of the Civil
Code, because, precisely, it is the Civil Code
which governs rights to private lands.
_______________
2 As in the case where the land was already the subject

of a grant by the State to a private person, but the latter
failed to immediately register his title, thus, allowing
another person to acquire title to the land by prescription

under the provisions of the Civil Code.
3 Department of Agrarian Reform v. Court of Appeals,
327 Phil. 1048, 1052; 258 SCRA 404 (1996).
216

ANNOTATED
Second, Section 11 of Commonwealth Act

No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land
Act, as amended, reads:
“Section 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural

purposes can be disposed of only as follows:
(1) For homestead settlement;
(2) By sale;
(3) By lease; and
(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete
titles;
(a) By judicial legalization; or
(b) By administrative legalization (free
patent).” (Emphasis ours.)
The afore-quoted provision recognizes that

agricultural public lands may be disposed of by
the State, and at the same time, mandates that
the latter can only do so by the modes
identified in the same provision. Thus, the
intent of the legislature to make exclusive the
enumeration of the modes by which
agricultural public land may be disposed of by
the State in Section 11 of the Public Land Act,
as amended, is not only readily apparent, but
explicit. And, undeniably, the enumeration of

the modes for acquiring agricultural public
land in the said provision does not include
prescription, in the concepts described and
periods prescribed by the Civil Code.
Neither the Civil Code nor the Property
Registration Decree can overcome the express
restriction placed by the Public Land Act, as
amended, on the modes by which the State may
dispose of agricultural public land.
The Public Land Act, as amended, is a
special law specifically applying to lands of the
public domain, except timber and mineral
lands. The Public Land Act, as amended, being
a special law, necessarily prevails over the
Civil Code, a general law. Basic is the rule in
statutory construction that “where two statutes
are of equal theoretical application to a particu-
217
VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009 217

lar case, the one designed therefor specially

should prevail.” Generalia specialibus non
derogant.4
As for the Property Registration Decree, it
must be stressed that the same cannot confer
title to land and can only confirm title that
already exists or has vested. As has already
been previously discussed herein, title to
agricultural public land vests or is acquired
only by any of the modes enumerated in
Section 11 of the Public Land Act, as amended.
And, third, Section 48(b) of the Public Land

Act was amended several times, changing the
period of possession required for acquiring an
imperfect title to agricultural public land:
“Under the public land act, judicial confirmation

of imperfect title required possession en concepto de
dueño since time immemorial, or since July 26,
1894. Under C.A. No. 141, this requirement was
retained. However, on June 22, 1957, Republic Act
No. 1942 was enacted amending C.A. No. 141. This
later enactment required adverse possession for a
period of only thirty (30) years. On January 25,
1977, the President enacted P.D. No. 1073, further
amending C.A. No. 141, extending the period for
filing applications for judicial confirmation of
imperfect or incomplete titles to December 31, 1987.
Under this decree, “the provisions of Section 48 (b)
and Section 48 (c), Chapter VIII, of the Public Land
Act are hereby amended in the sense that these
provisions shall apply only to alienable and
disposable land of the public domain which have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation by the applicant himself
or thru his predecessor-in-interest under a bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12,
1945.”5 (Emphasis ours.)
Prior to Presidential Decree No. 1073,

imperfect title to agricultural land of the public
domain could be acquired by adverse
possession of 30 years. Presidential Decree No.
1073, issued on 25 January 1977, amended
Section 48(b) of the
_______________
4 See De Guzman v. Court of Appeals, 358 Phil. 397, 408;

297 SCRA 743, 751 (1998).
5 Public Estates Authority v. Court of Appeals, 398 Phil.
901, 909-910; 345 SCRA 96, 102 (2000).
218

ANNOTATED
Public Land Act by requiring possession and

occupation of alienable and disposable land of
the public domain since 12 June 1945 or earlier
for an imperfect title. Hence, by virtue of
Presidential Decree No. 1073, the requisite
period of possession for acquiring imperfect
title to alienable and disposable land of the
public domain is no longer determined
according to a fixed term (i.e., 30 years);
instead, it shall be reckoned from a fixed date
(i.e., 12 June 1945 or earlier) from which the
possession should have commenced.
If the Court allows the acquisition of
alienable and disposable land of the public
domain by prescription under the Civil Code,
and registration of title to land thus acquired
under Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree, it would be sanctioning
what is effectively a circumvention of the
amend-ment introduced by Presidential Decree
No. 1073 to Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act. Acquisition of alienable and disposable
land of the public domain by possession would
again be made to depend on a fixed term (i.e.,
10 years for ordinary prescription and 30 years
for extraordinary prescription), rather than

being reckoned from the fixed date presently
stipulated by Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act, as amended.
There being no basis for petitioners’
application for registration of the public
agricultural land in question, accordingly, the
same must be dismissed.
I, however, must express my dissent to the
discussion in the majority opinion concerning
the contradictory pronouncements of the Court
in Republic v. Naguit6 and Republic v.
Herbieto,7 on imperfect titles to alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, acquired
in accordance with Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act, as amended, and registered pursuant
to Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree.
_______________
6 G.R. No. 144057, 17 January 2005, 448 SCRA 442.

7 G.R. No. 156117, 459 SCRA 183.
219
VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009 219

According to Naguit, a person seeking

judicial confirmation of an imperfect title under
amended, need only prove that he and his
possession and occupation of the subject land
since 12 June 1945 or earlier, and that the
subject land is alienable and disposable at the

time of filing of the application for judicial
confirmation and/or registration of title. On the
other hand, it was held in Herbieto that such a
person must establish that he and his
possession and occupation of the subject land
since 12 June 1945 or earlier, and that the
subject land was likewise already declared
alienable and disposable since 12 June 1945
or earlier. The majority opinion upholds the
ruling in Naguit, and declares the
pronouncements on the matter in Herbieto as
mere obiter dictum.
As the ponente of Herbieto, I take exception
to the dismissive treatment of my elucidation
in said case on the acquisition of imperfect title
to alienable and disposable land of the public
domain, as mere obiter dictum.
An obiter dictum has been defined as an
opinion expressed by a court upon some
question of law which is not necessary to the
decision of the case before it. It is a remark
made, or opinion expressed, by a judge, in his
decision upon a cause, “by the way,” that is,
incidentally or collaterally, and not directly
upon the question before him, or upon a point
not necessarily involved in the determination of
the cause, or introduced by way of illustration,
or analogy or argument. Such are not binding
as precedent.8
To recall, the Republic of the Philippines
opposed in Herbieto the registration of certain
parcels of land of the public domain in the
names of Jeremias and David Herbieto, based
on two grounds, one substantive and the other
procedural, i.e., (1) the applicants for

registration failed to prove that they
_______________
8 Delta Motors Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 342 Phil.

173, 186; 276 SCRA 212, 223 (1997).
220

ANNOTATED
possessed the subject parcels of land for the

period required by law; and (2) the application
for registration suffers from fatal infirmity as
the subject of the application consisted of two
parcels of land individually and separately
owned by two applicants.
The Court, in Herbieto, addressed the
procedural issue first, and held that the alleged
infirmity in the application constituted a
misjoinder of causes of action which did not
warrant a dismissal of the case, only the
severance of the misjoined causes of action so
that they could be heard by the court
separately. The Court though took note of the
belated publication of the notice of hearing on
the application for registration of Jeremias and
David Herbieto, the hearing was already held
before the notice of the same was published.
Such error was not only procedural, but
jurisdictional, and was fatal to the application
for registration of Jeremias and David
Herbieto.
The Court then proceeded to a

determination of the substantive issue in
Herbieto, particularly, whether Jeremias and
David Herbieto possessed the parcels of land
they wish to register in their names for the
period required by law. The Court ruled in the
negative. Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act,
as amended, on judicial confirmation of
imperfect title, requires possession of alienable
and disposable land of the public domain since
12 June 1945 or earlier. Given that the land
sought to be registered was declared alienable
and disposable only on 25 June 1963, and the
period of possession prior to such declaration
should not be counted in favor of the applicants
for registration, then Jeremias and David
Herbieto could not be deemed to have possessed
the parcels of land in question for the requisite
period as to acquire imperfect title to the same.
The discussion in Herbieto on the acquisition
of an imperfect title to alienable and disposable
land of the public domain, which could be the
subject of judicial confirmation, was not
unnecessary to the decision of said case. It was
not a
221
VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009 221

mere remark made or opinion expressed upon a

cause, “by the way,” or only incidentally or
collaterally, and not directly upon a question
before the Court; or upon a point not
necessarily involved in the determination of the
cause; or introduced by way of illustration, or

analogy or argument, as to constitute obiter
dictum.
It must be emphasized that the acquisition
land of the public domain under Section 48(b)
of the Public Land Act, as amended, was
directly raised as an issue in the Petition in
Herbieto and discussed extensively by the
parties in their pleadings. That the application
of Jeremias and David Herbieto could already
be dismissed on the ground of lack of proper
publication of the notice of hearing thereof, did
not necessarily preclude the Court from
resolving the other issues squarely raised in
the Petition before it. Thus, the Court
dismissed the application for registration of
Jeremias and David Herbieto on two grounds:
(1) the lack of jurisdiction of the land
registration court over the application, in light
of the absence of proper publication of the
notice of hearing; and (2) the evident lack of
merit of the application given that the
applicants failed to comply with the
requirements for judicial confirmation of an
imperfect title under Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act, as amended. This is only in keeping
with the duty of the Court to expeditiously and
completely resolve the cases before it and, once
and for all, settle the dispute and issues
between the parties. Without expressly
discussing and categorically ruling on the
second ground, Jeremias and David Herbieto
could have easily believed that they could re-
file their respective applications for
registration, just taking care to comply with
the publication-of-notice requirement.
Of particular relevance herein is the

following discourse in Villanueva v. Court of
Appeals9 on what constitutes, or more
appropriately, what does not constitute obiter
dictum:
_______________
9 429 Phil. 194, 203-204; 379 SCRA 463, 469-470 (2002).
222

ANNOTATED
“It has been held that an adjudication on any

point within the issues presented by the case cannot
be considered as obiter dictum, and this rule applies
to all pertinent questions, although only incidentally
involved, which are presented and decided in the
regular course of the consideration of the case, and
led up to the final conclusion, and to any statement
as to matter on which the decision is predicated.
Accordingly, a point expressly decided does not lose
its value as a precedent because the disposition of
the case is, or might have been, made on some other
ground, or even though, by reason of other points in
the case, the result reached might have been the
same if the court had held, on the particular point,
otherwise than it did. A decision which the case
could have turned on is not regarded as obiter
dictum merely because, owing to the disposal of the
contention, it was necessary to consider another
question, nor can an additional reason in a decision,
brought forward after the case has been disposed of
on one ground, be regarded as dicta. So, also, where

a case presents two (2) or more points, any one of
which is sufficient to determine the ultimate issue,
but the court actually decides all such points, the
case as an authoritative precedent as to every point
decided, and none of such points can be regarded as
having the status of a dictum, and one point should
not be denied authority merely because another
point was more dwelt on and more fully argued and
considered, nor does a decision on one proposition
make statements of the court regarding other
propositions dicta.”
An adjudication on any point within the

issues presented by the case cannot be
considered a dictum; and this rule applies as to
all pertinent questions, although only
incidentally involved, which are presented and
decided in the regular course of the
consideration of the case, and lead up to the
final conclusion, and to any statement in the
opinion as to a matter on which the decision is
predicated. Accordingly, a point expressly
decided does not lose its value as a precedent
because the disposition of the case is or might
have been made on some other ground, or even
though, by reason of other points in the case,
the result reached might have been
223
VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009 223

the same if the court had held, on the

particular point, otherwise than it did.10
I submit that Herbieto only applied the clear

provisions of the law and established
jurisprudence on the matter, and is binding as
a precedent.
amended, explicitly requires for the acquisition
land of the public domain, possession by a
Filipino citizen of the said parcel of land since
12 June 1945 or earlier, to wit:
“Section 48. The following-described citizens of

the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such lands or an
interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of
First Instance of the province where the land is
issuance of a certificate of title thereafter, under the
xxxx
predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier,
immediately preceding the filing of the applications
for confirmation of title, except when prevented by
war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions
of this chapter.” (Emphasis ours.)

Decree, by substantially reiterating Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended,

recognizes the imperfect title thus acquired and
allows the registration of the same, viz.:
_______________
10 1 C.J.S. 314-315, as quoted in the dissenting opinion

of Tuason, J., in Primicias v. Fugoso, 80 Phil. 71, 125
(1948).
224

ANNOTATED
“Section 14. Who may apply.—The following

(1) Those who by themselves or through their
since June 12, 1945, or earlier.” (Emphasis ours.)
Meanwhile, jurisprudence has long settled

that possession of the land by the applicant for
registration prior to the reclassification of the
land as alienable and disposable cannot be
credited to the applicant’s favor.11
Given the foregoing, judicial confirmation
and registration of an imperfect title, under
amended, and Section 14(1) of the Property

Registration Decree, respectively, should only
be granted when: (1) a Filipino citizen, by
himself or through his predecessors-in-interest,
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural land of the public domain, under a
bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership,
since 12 June 1945, or earlier; and (2) the land
in question, necessarily, was already declared
alienable and disposable also by 12 June 1945
or earlier.
There can be no other interpretation of
amended, and Section 14(1) of the Prop-
_______________
11 See Almeda v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 85322, 30

April 1991, 196 SCRA 476; Vallarta v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 235 Phil. 680, 695-696; 151 SCRA 679, 690
(1987); and Republic v. Court of Appeals, 232 Phil. 444, 457;
148 SCRA 480, 492-493 (1987), cited in Republic v. Herbieto
(supra note 2). See also Republic v. Court of Appeals, 238
Phil. 475, 486-487; 154 SCRA 476, 480 (1987); Republic v.
Bacus, G.R. No. 73061, 11 August 1989, 176 SCRA 376-380;
Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 38810, 7 May 1992,
208 SCRA 428, 434; De la Cruz v. Court of Appeals, 349
Phil. 898, 904; 286 SCRA 230, 235; Republic v. De Guzman,
383 Phil. 479, 485; 326 SCRA 574, 579 (2000).
225
VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009 225

erty Registration Decree, which would not run

afoul of either the clear and unambiguous
provisions of said laws or binding judicial
precedents.
I do not agree in the observation of the
majority opinion that the interpretation of
amended, adopted in Herbieto, would result in
absurdity. Indeed, such interpretation
forecloses a person from acquiring an imperfect
title to a parcel of land declared alienable and
disposable only after 12 June 1945, which could
be judicially confirmed. Nonetheless, it must be
borne in mind that the intention of the law is to
dispose of agricultural public land to qualified
individuals and not simply to dispose of the
same. It may be deemed a strict interpretation
and application of both law and jurisprudence
on the matter, but it certainly is not an
absurdity.
Stringency and prudence in interpreting and
applying Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act,
as amended, is well justified by the significant
consequences arising from a finding that a
person has an imperfect title to agricultural
land of the public domain. Not just any lengthy
occupation of an agricultural public land could
ripen into an imperfect title. An imperfect
title can only be acquired by occupation
and possession of the land by a person
and his predecessors-in-interest for the
period required and considered by law
sufficient as to have segregated the land
from the mass of public land. When a
person is said to have acquired an
imperfect title, by operation of law, he
acquires a right to a grant, a government
grant to the land, without the necessity of

a certificate of title being issued. As such,
the land ceased to be part of the public
domain and goes beyond the authority of
the State to dispose of. An application for
confirmation of title, therefore, is but a
mere formality.12
_______________
12 See National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals,

G.R. No. 4566, 29 January 1993, 218 SCRA 41, 54.
226

ANNOTATED
In addition, as was emphasized in Herbieto,

Section 11 of the Public Land Act, as amended,
has identified several ways by which
agricultural lands of the public domain may be
disposed of. Each mode of disposing of
agricultural public land has its own specific
requirements which must be complied with. If a
person is not qualified for a judicial
confirmation of an imperfect title, because the
land in question was declared alienable and
disposable only after 12 June 1945, he is not
totally without recourse for he could still
acquire the same by any of the other modes
enumerated in the afore-quoted provision.
Regardless of my dissent to the affirmation
by the majority of the ruling in Naguit on
amended, and Section 14(1) of the Property

Registration Decree, I cast my vote with the
majority, to DENY the Petition at bar and
AFFIRM the Decision dated 23 February 2007
and Resolution dated 2 October 2000 of the
Court of Appeals dismissing, for absolute lack
of basis, petitioners’ application for registration
of alienable and disposable land of the public
domain.
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING
OPINION
BRION, J.:
I concur with the ponencia’s modified
positions on the application of prescription
under Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree (PRD), and on the denial of
the petition of the Heirs of Mario Malabanan.
I dissent in the strongest terms from the
ruling that the classification of a public land as
alienable and disposable can be made after
June 12, 1945, in accordance with this Court’s
ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals and
Naguit (Naguit)1 Effectively, what results from
this decision is a new law, crafted by this
Court, going beyond what the Constitution
_______________
1 G.R. No. 144507, January 17, 2005, 442 SCRA 445.
227
VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009 227

ordains and beyond the law that the

Legislature passed. Because the majority has
not used the standards set by the Constitution
and the Public Land Act (PLA),2 its conclusions
are based on a determination on what the law
ought to be—an exercise in policy formulation
that is beyond the Court’s authority to make.
The discussions of these grounds for dissent
follow, not necessarily in the order these
grounds are posed above.
Prefatory Statement
Critical to the position taken in this Dissent
is the reading of the hierarchy of laws that
govern public lands to fully understand and
appreciate the grounds for dissent.
In the area of public law, foremost in this
hierarchy is the Philippine Constitution, whose
Article XII (entitled National Economy and
Patrimony) establishes and fully embraces the
regalian doctrine as a first and overriding
principle.3 This doctrine postulates that all
lands belong to the State,4 and that no public
land can be acquired by private persons
without any grant, express or implied, from the
State.5
In the statutory realm, the PLA governs the
classification, grant, and disposition of
domain and, other than the Constitution, is the
country’s primary law on the matter. Section 7
of the PLA delegates to the President the
authority to administer and dispose of
alienable public lands. Section 8 sets out the
public lands open to disposition or concession,
and the requirement that they should be
officially delimited and classified and, when
_______________
2 Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended (CA 141).

3 See Collado v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107764,
October 4, 2002, 390 SCRA 343.
4 Constitution, Article XII, Section 2.
5 See Republic v. Herbieto, G.R. No. 156117, May 26,
2005, 459 SCRA 182.
228

ANNOTATED
practicable, surveyed. Section 11, a very

significant section, states that—
“Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes

can be disposed of only as follows and not
otherwise:
(1) For homestead settlement;
(2) By sale;
(3) By lease;
(4) By confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete title;
(5) By judicial legalization;
(6) By administrative legalization (free
patent).
Section 48 covers confirmation of imperfect

title, and embodies a grant of title to the
qualified occupant or possessor of an alienable
public land. This section provides:
“SECTION 48. The following described citizens

of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such lands or an

interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of
First Instance of the province where the land is
issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the
(a) Those who prior to the transfer of
sovereignty from Spain to the United States have
applied for the purchase, composition or other form
of grant of lands of the public domain under the laws
and royal decrees then in force and have instituted
and prosecuted the proceedings in connection
therewith, but have, with or without default upon
their part, or for any other cause, not received title
therefor, if such applicants or grantees and their
heirs have occupied and cultivated said lands
continuously since the filing of their applications.
predecessors in interest have been in the open,
occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or
ownership, except as against the Government, since
July twenty-sixth, eighteen hundred and ninety-
four, except when prevented by war or force majeure.
These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the
229
VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009 229

conditions essential to a Government grant and shall

be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter.”
Significantly, subsection (a) has now been

deleted, while subsection (b) has been amended
by PD 1073 as follows:
“SECTION 4. The provisions of Section 48(b)

and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII of the Public Land
disposable lands of the public domain which have
possession and occupation by the applicant himself or
thru his predecessor-in-interest, under a bona fide
1945.
Complementing the PLA is the PRD.6 It was

enacted to codify the various laws relating to
property registration. It governs the
registration of lands under the Torrens System,
as well as unregistered lands, including chattel
mortgages. Section 14 of the PRD provides:
“SECTION 14. Who May Apply.—The following

(1) Those who by themselves or through
their predecessors-in-interest have been in
possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of
provisions of existing laws.

private lands or abandoned river beds by right of
accession or accretion under the existing laws.
_______________
6 Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529, amending Act No. 496

that originally brought the Torrens system into the Philippines in
1903.
230

(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land

in any other manner provided for by law.”
Subsection (1) of Section 14 is a copy of, and

appears to have been lifted from, Section 48(b)
of the PLA. The two provisions, however, differ
in intent and legal effect based on the purpose
of the law that contains them. The PLA is a
substantive law that classifies and
provides for the disposition of alienable
lands of the public domain. The PRD, on
the other hand, specifically refers to the
manner of bringing registerable lands,
among them alienable public lands,
within the coverage of the Torrens
system. Thus, the first is a substantive law,
while the other is essentially procedural, so
that in terms of substantive content, the PLA
should prevail.7
Significantly bearing on the matter of lands
in general is the Civil Code and its provisions
on Property 8 and Prescription.9 The law on

property assumes importance because land,
whether public or private, is property.
Prescription, on the other hand, is a mode of
acquiring ownership of land, al-
_______________
7 Substantive law is that which creates, defines and

regulates rights, or which regulates the rights and duties
which give rise to a cause of action, that part of the law
which courts are established to administer, as opposed to
adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the method of
enforcing rights or obtain redress for their invasion
(Primicias v. Ocampo, 93 Phil. 446.) It is the nature and
the purpose of the law which determines whether it is
substantive or procedural, and not its place in the statute,
or its inclusion in a code (Regalado, Remedial Law
Compendium, Volume I [Ninth Revised Edition], p. 19).
Note that Section 55 of the PLA refers to the Land
Registration Act (the predecessor law of the PRD) on how
the Torrens Title may be obtained.
8 Civil Code, Book II (Property, Ownership and its
Modifications), Articles 415-711.
9 Civil Code, Book III (Different Modes of Acquiring
Ownership), Articles 1106-1155.
231
VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009 231

though it is not one of the modes of disposition

mentioned in the PLA.
Chapter 3, Title I of Book II of the Civil Code
is entitled “Property in Relation to the Person to
Whom it Belongs.” On this basis, Article 419

classifies property to be property of public
dominion or of private ownership. Article 420
proceeds to further classify property of public
dominion into those intended for public use, for
public service, and for the development of the
national wealth. Article 421 states that all
other properties of the State not falling under
Article 420 are patrimonial property of the
State, and Article 422 adds that property of
public dominion, no longer intended for public
use or for public service, shall form part of the
patrimonial property of the State. Under
Article 425, property of private ownership,
besides patrimonial property of the State,
provinces, cities and municipalities, consists of
all property belonging to private persons, either
individually or collectively.
Prescription is essentially a civil law term
and is not mentioned as one of the modes of
acquiring alienable public land under the PLA,
(Significantly, the PLA—under its Section 48
—provides for its system of how possession can
ripen into ownership; the PLA does not refer to
this as acquisitive prescription but as basis for
confirmation of title.) Section 14(2) of the PRD,
however, specifies that “[t]hose who have
acquired ownership of private lands by
prescription under the provisions of existing
laws” as among those who may apply for land
registration. Thus, prescription was
introduced into the land registration
scheme (the PRD), but not into the special
law governing lands of the public domain
(the PLA).
A starting point in considering prescription
in relation with public lands is Article 1108 of
the Civil Code, which states that prescription

does not run against the State and its
subdivisions. At the same time, Article 1113
provides that “all things which are within the
commerce of men are susceptible of
prescription, unless otherwise provided;
property of the
232

ANNOTATED
State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial

in character shall not be the object of
prescription.” The provisions of Articles 1128 to
1131 may also come into play in the application
of prescription to real properties.
In light of our established hierarchy of
laws, particularly the supremacy of the
Philippine Constitution, any
consideration of lands of the public
domain should start with the Constitution
and its Regalian doctrine; all lands belong
to the State, and he who claims ownership
carries the burden of proving his claim.10
Next in the hierarchy is the PLA for
purposes of the terms of the grant,
alienation and disposition of the lands of
the public domain, and the PRD for the
registration of lands. The PLA and the
PRD are special laws supreme in their
respective spheres, subject only to the
Constitution. The Civil Code, for its part,
is the general law on property and
prescription and should be accorded

respect as such. In more concrete terms,
where alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain are involved, the PLA
is the primary law that should govern,
and the Civil Code provisions on property
and prescription must yield in case of
conflict.11
The Public Land Act
At the risk of repetition, I start the
discussion of the PLA with a reiteration of
the first principle that under the regalian
doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong
to the State, and the State is the source of any
asserted right to ownership in land and
charged with the conservation of such
_______________
10 See the consolidated cases of The Secretary of the

Department of Environment and Natural Resources v. Yap,
G.R. No. 167707 and Sacay v. The Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, G.R.
No. 173775, jointly decided on October 8, 2008 (the Boracay
cases).
11 Civil Code, Article 18.
233
VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009 233

patrimony. Otherwise expressed, all lands not

otherwise appearing to be clearly within
private ownership are presumed to belong to
the State.12 Thus, all lands that have not
been acquired from the government,

either by purchase or by grant, belong to
the State as part of the inalienable public
domain.13 We should never lose sight of the
impact of this first principle where a private
ownership claim is being asserted against the
State.
The PLA has undergone many revisions and
changes over time, starting from the first PLA,
Act No. 926; the second public land law that
followed, Act No. 2874; and the present CA 141
and its amendments. Act No. 926 was described
in the following terms:
“The law governed the disposition of lands of the

public domain. It prescribed rules and regulations
for the homesteading, selling and leasing of portions
of the public domain of the Philippine Islands, and
prescribed the terms and conditions to enable
persons to perfect their titles to public lands in the
Islands. It also provided for the “issuance of patents
to certain native settlers upon public lands,” for the
establishment of town sites and sale of lots therein,
for the completion of imperfect titles, and for the
cancellation or confirmation of Spanish concessions
and grants in the Islands.” In short, the Public
Land Act operated on the assumption that title
to public lands in the Philippine Islands
remained in the government; and that the
government’s title to public land sprung from
the Treaty of Paris and other subsequent
treaties between Spain and the United States.
The term “public land” referred to all lands of the
public domain whose title still remained in the
government and are thrown open to private
appropriation and settlement, and excluded the
patrimonial property of the government and the friar

lands.”14
_______________
12 Director of Lands and Director of Forest Development

v. Intermediate Appellate Court and J. Antonio Araneta,
G.R. No. 73246, March 2, 1993, 219 SCRA 339.
13 See the Boracay cases, supra note 8.
14 See the opinion of Justice Reynato S. Puno (now Chief
Justice) in Cruz v. Secretary of the Department of
Environment and
234

ANNOTATED
This basic essence of the law has not

changed and has been carried over to the
present PLA and its amendments. Another
basic feature, the requirement for open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of the alienable and disposable
public land under a bona fide claim of
ownership also never changed. Still another
consistent public land feature is the concept
that once a person has complied with the
requisite possession and occupation in the
manner provided by law, he is automatically
given a State grant that may be asserted
against State ownership; the land, in other
words, ipso jure becomes private land.15 The
application for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title shall then follow, based on the
procedure for land registration.16 It is in this

manner that the PLA ties up with the PRD.
A feature that has changed over time has
been the period for reckoning the required
occupation or possession. In the first PLA, the
required occupation/possession to qualify for
judicial confirmation of imperfect title was 10
years preceding the effectivity of Act No. 926—
July 26, 1904 (or since July 26, 1894 or earlier).
This was retained up to CA 141, until this law
was amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 1942
(enacted on June 22, 1957),17 which provided
for a simple 30-year prescriptive period for
judicial confirmation of imperfect title. This
period did not last; on January 25, 1977,
Presidential
_______________
Natural Resources (G.R. No. 135385, December 6, 2000, 347

SCRA 128) quoted in Collado (supra note 2).
15 Enunciated in the old case of Susi v. Razon and

Director of Lands, 48 Phil. 424 (1925); See Abejaron v.
Nabasa, cited on p. 10 of this Dissent.
16 PLA, Sections 49-56; the reference to the Land
Registration Act (Act No. 496) should now be understood to
mean the PRD which repealed Act 496.
17 An Act to Amend Subsection (b) of Section Forty
Eight of Commonwealth Act Numbered One Hundred Forty
One, otherwise known as the The Public Land Act.
235
VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009 235

Decree No. 1073 (PD 1073)18 changed the

required 30-year possession and occupation
period provision, to possession and occupation
of the land applied for since June 12, 1945, or
earlier. PD 1073 likewise changed the lands
subject of imperfect title, from agricultural
lands of the public domain to alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain. PD 1073
also extended the period for applications for
free patents and judicial confirmation of
imperfect titles to December 31, 1987.
The significance of the date “June 12, 1945”
appears to have been lost to history. A major
concern raised against this date is that the
country was at this time under Japanese
occupation, and for some years after, was
suffering from the uncertainties and
instabilities that World War II brought.
Questions were raised on how one could
possibly comply with the June 12, 1945 or
earlier occupation/possession requirement of
PD 1073 when the then prevailing situation did
not legally or physically permit it.
Without the benefit of congressional records,
as the enactment of the law (a Presidential
Decree) was solely through the President’s
lawmaking powers under a regime that
permitted it, the most logical reason or
explanation for the date is the possible impact
of the interplay between the old law and the
amendatory law. When PD 1073 was enacted,
the utmost concern, in all probability, was how
the law would affect the application of the old
law which provided for a thirty-year possession
period. Counting 30 years backwards from the
enactment of PD 1073 on January 25, 1977, PD
1073 should have provided for a January 24,
1947 cut-off date, but it did not. Instead, it

provided, for unknown reasons, the date June
12, 1945.
_______________
18 Extending the Period of Filing Applications for

Administrative Legislation (Free Patent) and Judicial
Confirmation of Imperfect and Incomplete Titles to
Alienable and Disposable Lands in the Public Domain
Under Chapter VII and Chapter VIII of Commonwealth Act
No. 141, As Amended, For Eleven (11) Years Commencing
January 1, 1977.
236

ANNOTATED
The June 12, 1945 cut-off date raised legal

concerns; vested rights acquired under the old
law (CA 141, as amended by RA 1942)
providing for a 30-year possession period could
not be impaired by the PD 1073 amendment.
We recognized this legal dilemna in Abejaron v.
Nabasa,19 when we said:
“However, as petitioner Abejaron’s 30-year

period of possession and occupation required
by the Public Land Act, as amended by R.A.
1942 ran from 1945 to 1975, prior to the
effectivity of P.D. No. 1073 in 1977, the
requirement of said P.D. that occupation and
possession should have started on June 12,
1945 or earlier, does not apply to him. As the
Susi doctrine holds that the grant of title by virtue of

Sec. 48(b) takes place by operation of law, then upon
Abejaron’s satisfaction of the requirements of this
law, he would have already gained title over the
disputed land in 1975. This follows the doctrine
laid down in Director of Lands v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, et al., that the law cannot
impair vested rights such as a land grant. More
clearly stated, “Filipino citizens who by
themselves or their predecessors-in-interest
have been, prior to the effectivity of P.D. 1073
on January 25, 1977, in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition
of ownership, for at least 30 years, or at least
since January 24, 1947” may apply for judicial
confirmation of their imperfect or incomplete
title under Sec. 48(b) of the Public Land Act.”
From this perspective, PD 1073 should have

thus provided January 24, 1947 and not June
12, 1945 as its cut-off date, yet the latter date
is the express legal reality. The reconciliation,
as properly defined by jurisprudence, is that
where an applicant has satisfied the
requirements of Section 48 (b) of CA 141, as
amended by RA 1942, prior to the effectivity of
PD 1073, the applicant is entitled to perfect his
or her title, even if possession and occupation
does not date back to June 12, 1945. For
purposes of the present case, a discussion
of
_______________
19 G.R. No. 84831, June 20, 2001, 359 SCRA 47.
237
VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009 237

the cut-off date has been fully made to

highlight that it is a date whose
significance and import cannot be
minimized nor glossed over by mere
judicial interpretation or by judicial
social policy concerns; the full legislative
intent must be respected.
In considering the PLA, it should be noted
that its amendments were not confined to RA
1942 and PD 1073. These decrees were
complemented by Presidential Decree No.
892 (PD 892)20—issued on February 16, 1976—
which limited to six months the use of Spanish
titles as evidence in land registration
proceedings.21 Thereafter, the recording of all
unregistered lands shall be governed by Section
194 of the Revised Administrative Code, as
amended by Act No. 3344. Section 3 of PD 1073
totally disallowed the judicial confirmation of
incomplete titles to public land based on
unperfected Spanish grants.
_______________
20 Discontinuance of the Spanish Mortgage System of

Registration and of the Use of Spanish Titles as Evidence in
Land Registration Proceedings.
21 Section 1 of PD 892 states:
SECTION 1. The system of registration under
the Spanish Mortgage Law is discontinued, and all
lands recorded under said system which are not yet
covered by Torrens title shall be considered as

unregistered lands.
All holders of Spanish titles or grants should
apply for registration of their lands under Act No.
496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act,
within six (6) months from the effectivity of this
decree. Thereafter, Spanish titles cannot be used as
evidence of land ownership in any registration
proceedings under the Torrens system.
Hereafter, all instruments affecting lands
originally registered under the Spanish Mortgage
Law may be recorded under Section 194 of the
Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Act.
3344.
238

ANNOTATED
Subsequently, RA 694022 extended the

period for filing applications for free patent and
judicial confirmation of imperfect title to
December 31, 2000. The law now also allows
the issuance of free patents for lands not in
excess of 12 hectares to any natural-born
citizen of the Philippines who is not the owner
of more than 12 hectares and who, for at least
30 years prior to the effectivity of the
amendatory Act, has continuously occupied and
cultivated, either by himself or through his
predecessors-in-interest, a tract or tracts of
agricultural public lands subject to disposition.
Congress recently extended the period for
filing applications for judicial confirmation of
imperfect and incomplete titles to alienable and

disposable lands of the public domain under RA
9176 from December 31, 2000 under RA 6940
to December 31, 2020.23
Read together with Section 11 of the
PLA (which defines the administrative
grant of title to alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain through
homestead settlement and sale, among
others), RA 6940 and RA 9176 signify that
despite the cut-off date of June 12, 1945
that the Legislature has provided, ample
opportunities exist under the law for the
grant of alienable lands of the public
domain to deserving beneficiaries.
Presidential Decree No. 1529 or the
Property Registration Decree
As heretofore mentioned, PD 1529 amended
Act No. 496 on June 11, 1978 to codify the
various laws relative to registra-
_______________
22 An Act Granting a Period ending on December 31,

2000 for Filing Applications for Free Patent and Judicial
Confirmation of Imperfect Title to Alienable and
Disposable Lands of the Public Domain under Chapters VII
and VIII of the Public Land Act (CA 141, as amended).
23 R.A. No. 9176, Section 2.
239
VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009 239

tion of property. Its Section 14 describes the

applicants who may avail of registration under
the Decree, among them—
(1) Those who by themselves or through their

since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
private lands by prescription under the provision of
existing laws.
These subsections and their impact on the

present case are separately discussed below.
Section 14(1)
Section 14(1) merely repeated PD 1073
which sets a cut-off date of June 12, 1945 and
which, under the conditions discussed above,
may be read to be January 24, 1947.
The ponencia discussed Section 48(b) of the
PLA in relation with Section 14(1) of the PRD
and, noted among others, that “under the
current state of the law, the substantive right
granted under Section 48(b) may be availed of
only until December 31, 2020.” This is in light
of RA 9176, passed in 2002,24 limiting the filing
of an application for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title to December 31, 2020. The
amendatory law apparently refers only to the
use of Section 14(1) of the PRD as a mode of
registration. Where ownership right or title has
already vested in the possessor-occupant of the
land that Section 48(b) of the PLA grants by
operation of law, Section 14(2) of the PRD
continuous to be open for purposes of
registration of a “private land” since

compliance with Section 48(b) of the PLA vests
title to the occupant/possessor and renders the
land private in character.
_______________
24 See pp. 14-15 of the ponencia.
240

ANNOTATED
The ponencia likewise rules against the

position of the Office of the Solicitor General
that the public land to be registered must have
been classified as alienable and disposable as of
the cut-off date for possession stated in Section
48(b)—June 12, 1945. In doing this, it cites and
reiterates its continuing support for the ruling
in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Naguit that
held:25
“Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the

alienable and disposable character of the land should
have already been established since June 12, 1945 or
earlier. This is not borne out by the plain meaning of
Section 14(1). “Since June 12, 1945,” as used in the
provision, qualifies its antecedent phrase “under a
bonafide claim of ownership.” Generally speaking,
qualifying words restrict or modify only the words or
phrases to which they are immediately associated,
and not those distantly or remotely located. Ad
proximum antecedents fiat relation nisi impediatur

sentencia.
Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that
would result if we adopt petitioner’s position. Absent
a legislative amendment, the rule would be, adopting
the OSG’s view, that all lands of the public domain
which were not declared alienable or disposable
before June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to
original registration, no matter the length of
unchallenged possession by the occupant. Such
interpretation renders paragraph (1) of Section 14
virtually inoperative and even precludes the
government from giving it effect even as it decides to
reclassify public agricultural lands as alienable and
disposable. The unreasonableness of the situation
would even be aggravated considering that before
June 12, 1945, the Philippines was not yet even
considered an independent state.
Instead, the more reasonable interpretation
of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires the
property sought to be registered as already
alienable and disposable at the time the
application for registration of title is filed. If
the State, at the time the application is made, has
not yet deemed it proper to release the property for
alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the
government is still reserving the right to utilize the
property; hence, the need to preserve its ownership
in the State irrespective of
_______________
25 Supra note 1.
241
VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009 241

the length of adverse possession even if in good faith.

However, if the property has already been classified
as alienable and disposable, as it is in this case, then
there is already an intention on the part of the State
to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the
property.
xxx
This case is distinguishable from Bracewell
v. Court of Appeals, wherein the Court noted
that while the claimant had been in possession
since 1908, it was only in 1972 that the lands in
question were classified as alienable and
disposable. Thus, the bid at registration
therein did not succeed. In Bracewell, the
claimant had filed his application in 1963, or
nine (9) years before the property was
declared alienable and disposable. Thus, in
this case, where the application was made
years after the property had been certified as
alienable and disposable, the Bracewell ruling
does not apply.”
As it did in Naguit, the present ponencia as

well discredits Bracewell. It does the same with
Republic v. Herbieto26 that came after Naguit
and should have therefore overtaken the
Naguit ruling. In the process, the ponencia
cites with approval the ruling in Republic v.
Ceniza,27 penned by the same ponente who
wrote Bracewell.
While the ponencia takes pains to compare
these cases, it however completely misses the
point from the perspective of whether
possession of public lands classified as
alienable and disposable after June 12, 1945
should be credited for purposes of a grant

under Section 48(b) of the PLA, and of
registration under Section 14(1) of the PRD.
These cases, as analyzed by the ponencia,
merely granted or denied registration on the
basis of whether the public land has been
classified as alienable and disposable at the
time the petition for registration was filed.
Thus, except for Naguit, these cases can be
cited only as instances when registration was
denied or granted
_______________
26 G.R. No. 156117, May 26, 2005, 459 SCRA 183, 201-
202.
27 40 Phil. 697 (2002); penned by Mme. Justice Consuelo
Ynares-Santiago.
242

ANNOTATED
despite the classification of the land as

alienable after June 12, 1945.
The ruling in Naguit is excepted because, as
shown in the quotation above, this is one case
that explained why possession prior to the
classification of public land as alienable should
be credited in favor of the possessor who filed
his or her application for registration after the
classification of the land as alienable and
disposable, but where such classification
occurred after June 12, 1945.
Closely analyzed, the rulings in Naguit that

the ponencia relied upon are its statutory
construction interpretation of Section 48(b) of
the PLA and the observed ABSURDITY of
using June 12, 1945 as the cut-off point for the
classification.
Five very basic reasons compel me to
strongly disagree with Naguit and its reasons.
First. The constitutional and statutory
reasons. The Constitution classifies public
lands into agricultural, mineral, and timber. Of
these, only agricultural lands can be
alienated.28 Without the requisite
classification, there can be no basis to
determine which lands of the public domain are
alienable and which are not; hence,
classification is a constitutionally-
required step whose importance should be
given full legal recognition and effect.
Otherwise stated, without classification into
disposable agricultural land, the land forms
part of the mass of the public domain that, not
being agricultural, must be mineral or timber
land that are completely inalienable and as
such cannot be possessed with legal effects. To
allow effective possession is to do violence to
the regalian doctrine; the ownership and
control that the doctrine denotes will be less
than full if the possession that should be with
the State as owner, but is elsewhere without
any authority, can anyway be recognized.
_______________
28 Constitution, Article XII, Section 2.
243
VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009 243

From the perspective of the PLA under

which grant can be claimed under its
Section 48(b), it is very important to note
that this law does not apply until a
classification into alienable and
disposable land of the public domain is
made. If the PLA does not apply prior to a
public land’s classification as alienable and
disposable, how can possession under its
Section 48(b) be claimed prior such
classification? There can simply be no imperfect
title to be confirmed over lands not yet
classified as disposable or alienable because, in
the absence of such classification, the land
remains unclassified public land that fully
belongs to the State. This is fully supported by
Sections 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 of CA 141.29 If the
land is either mineral or timber and can never
_______________
29 SECTION 6. The President, upon the

recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce, shall from time to time classify the lands of the
public domain into—
(a) Alienable or disposable,
(b) Timber, and
(c) Mineral lands,
and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such
lands from one class to another, for the purposes of their
administration and disposition.
SECTION 7. For the purposes of the
administration and disposition of alienable or
disposable public lands, the President, upon

recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce, shall from time to time declare what
lands are open to disposition or concession under
this Act.
SECTION 8. Only those lands shall be declared open
to disposition or concession which have been officially
delimited and classified and, when practicable, surveyed,
and which have not been reserved for public or quasi-public
uses, nor appropriated by the Government, nor in any
manner become private property, nor those on which a
private right authorized and recognized by this Act or any
other valid law may be claimed, or which, having been
reserved or appropriated, have ceased to be so. However,
the President may, for reasons of public interest, declare
lands of the public domain
244

ANNOTATED
be the subject of administration and

disposition, it defies legal logic to allow the
possession of these unclassified lands to
produce legal effect. Thus, the classification of
public land as alienable and disposable is
inextricably linked to effective possession that
can ripen into a claim under Section 48(b) of
the PLA.
Second. The Civil Code reason.
Possession is essentially a civil law term that
can best be understood in terms of the Civil
Code in the absence of any specific definition in
the PLA other than in terms of time of
possession.30 Article 530 of the Civil Code

provides that “[O]nly things and rights which
are susceptible of being appropriated may be the
object of pos-
_______________
open to disposition before the same have had their

boundaries established or been surveyed, or may, for the
same reason, suspend their concession or disposition until
they are again declared open to concession or disposition by
proclamation duly published or by Act of the National
Assembly.
SECTION 9. For the purpose of their administration

and disposition, the lands of the public domain alienable or
open to disposition shall be classified, according to the use
or purposes to which such lands are destined, as follows:
(a) Agricultural;
(b) Residential, commercial, industrial, or for
similar productive purposes;
(c) Educational, charitable, or other similar
purposes;
(d) Reservations for town sites and for public
and quasi-public uses.
The President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce, shall from time to time make
the classifications provided for in this section, and may, at
any time and in a similar manner, transfer lands from one
class to another.
SECTION 10. The words “alienation,” “disposition,” or
“concession” as used in this Act, shall mean any of the
methods authorized by this Act for the acquisition, lease,
use, or benefit of the lands of the public domain other than
timber or mineral lands.
30 See: Article 18, Civil Code.
245
VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009 245

session.” Prior to the declaration of alienability,

a land of the public domain cannot be
appropriated; hence, any claimed possession
cannot have legal effects. This perspective fully
complements what has been said above under
the constitutional and PLA reasons. It
confirms, too, that the critical difference the
ponencia saw in the Bracewell and Naguit
situations does not really exist. Whether an
application for registration is filed before or
after the declaration of alienability becomes
immaterial if, in one as in the other, no
effective possession can be recognized prior to
the declaration of alienability.
Third. Statutory construction and the
cut-off date – June 12, 1945. The ponencia
assumes, based on its statutory construction
reasoning and its reading of Section 48(b) of the
PLA, that all that the law requires is
possession from June 12, 1945 and that it
suffices if the land has been classified as
alienable at the time of application for
registration. As heretofore discussed, this cut-
off date was painstakingly set by law and
should be given full significance. Its full import
appears from PD 1073 that amended Section
48(b), whose exact wordings state:
“SECTION 4. The provisions of Section 48(b)

and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII of the Public Land

disposable lands of the public domain which have
possession and occupation by the applicant himself or
thru his predecessor-in-interest, under a bona fide
1945.”
Under this formulation, it appears clear that

PD 1073 did not expressly state what Section
48(b) should provide under the amendment PD
1073 introduced in terms of the exact wording of
the amended Section 48(b). But under the PD
1073 formulation, the intent to count the
alienability to June 12, 1945 appears very
clear. The provision applies only to alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain that
is described in terms of the character of the
possession required
246

ANNOTATED
since June 12, 1945. This intent—seen in the

direct, continuous and seamless linking of the
domain to June 12, 1945 under the wording of
the Decree—is clear and should be respected.
Fourth. Other Modes of Acquisition of
lands under the PLA. Naguit’s absurdity
argument that the ponencia effectively adopted
is more apparent than real, since the use of
June 12, 1945 as cut-off date for the declaration
of alienability will not render the grant of

alienable public lands out of reach. The
acquisition of ownership and title may still be
obtained by other modes under the PLA.
Among other laws, RA 6940, mentioned above,
now allows the use of free patents.31 It was
approved on March 28, 1990; hence, counting
30 years backwards, possession since April
1960 or thereabouts may qualify a possessor to
apply for a free patent. The administrative
modes provided under Section 11 of the PLA
are also open, particularly, homestead
settlement and sales.
Fifth. Addressing the wisdom—the
absurdity—of the law. This Court acts
beyond the limits of the constitutionally-
mandated separation of powers in giving
Section 48(b), as amended by PD 1073, an
interpretation beyond its plain wording. Even
this Court cannot read into the law an intent
that is not there even your purpose is to avoid
an absurd situation. If we feel that a law
already has absurd effects because of the
passage of time, our role under the principle of
separation of powers is not to give the law an
interpretation that is not there in order to
avoid the perceived absurdity. We thereby dip
into the realm of policy—a role delegated by the
Constitution to the Legislature. If only for this
reason, we should avoid expanding—through
Naguit and the present ponencia—the plain
meaning of Section 48(b) of the PLA, as
amended by PD 1073.
In standing by Naguit, the ponencia
pointedly discredits the ruling in Herbieto; it is,
allegedly, either an incorrect
_______________
31 See: pp. 10-11 of this Dissent.
247
VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009 247

ruling or an obiter dictum. As to legal

correctness, Herbieto is in full accord with what
we have stated above; hence, it cannot be
dismissed off-hand as an incorrect ruling.
Likewise, its ruling on the lack of effective legal
possession prior to the classification of a public
land as alienable and disposable cannot strictly
be obiter because it responded to an issue
directly raised by the parties. Admittedly, its
ruling on jurisdictional grounds could have
fully resolved the case, but it cannot be faulted
if it went beyond this threshold issue into the
merits of the claim of effective possession prior
to the classification of the land as alienable and
disposable.
To be sure, Herbieto has more to it than the
Naguit ruling that the ponencia passes off as
the established and definitive rule on
possession under Section 14(1) of the PRD.
There, too, is the undeniable reason that
no definitive ruling touching on Section
14(1) can be deemed to have been
established in the present case since the
applicant Heirs could only prove
possession up to 1948. For this reason, the
ponencia falls back on and examines
Section 14(2) of the PRD. In short, if there
is a perfect example of a ruling that is not

necessary for the resolution of a case, that
unnecessary ruling is the ponencia’s
ruling that Naguit is now the established
rule.
Section 14(2)
Section 14(2), by its express terms,
applies only to private lands. Thus, on
plain reading, it does not apply to
alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain that Section 14(1) covers.
This is the difference between Sections
14(1) and 14(2).
The ponencia, as originally formulated, saw
a way of expanding the coverage of Section
14(2) via the Civil Code by directly applying
civil law provisions on prescription on alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain. To
quote the obiter dictum in Naguit that the
ponencia wishes to enshrine
248

ANNOTATED
as the definitive rule and leading case on

Sections 14(1) and 14(2):32
“Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring

ownership under the Civil Code. There is a
consistent jurisprudential rule that properties
classified as alienable public land may be converted
into private property by reason of open, continuous
and exclusive possession of at least thirty (30) years.
With such conversion, such property may now fall

within the contemplation of “private lands” under
Section 14(2), and thus susceptible to registration by
those who have acquired ownership through
prescription. Thus, even if possession of the
alienable public land commenced on a date later
than June 12, 1945, and such possession being open,
continuous and exclusive, then the possessor may
have the right to register the land by virtue of
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.”
The ponencia then posits that Article 1113 of

the Civil Code should be considered in the
interpretation of Section 14(2). Article 1113 of
the Civil Code provides:
“All things which are within the commerce of men

are susceptible of prescription, unless otherwise
provided. Property of the State or any of its
subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not
be the object of prescription.”
The application of Article 1113 assumes, of

course, that (1) the Civil Code fully applies to
domain; (2) assuming that the Civil Code fully
applies, these properties are patrimonial and
are therefore “private property”; and (3)
assuming that the Civil Code fully applies, that
these properties are within the commerce of
men and can be acquired through prescription.
I find the Naguit obiter to be questionable
because of the above assumptions and its direct
application of prescription under Section 14(2)
to alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain. This Section becomes relevant
only once the ownership of an alienable

and disposable land of
_______________
32 See p. 20 of the ponencia.
249
VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009 249

the public domain vests in the occupant

or possessor pursuant to the terms of
Section 48(b) of the PLA, with or without
judicial confirmation of title, so that the
land has become a private land. At that
point, Section 14(2) becomes fully
operational on what had once been an
alienable and disposable land of the
public domain.
Hierarchy of Law in Reading PRD’s
Section 14(2)
The hierarchy of laws governing the lands of
the public domain is clear from Article XII,
Section 3 of the Constitution. There are
matters that the Constitution itself provides
for, and some that are left for Congress to deal
with. Thus, under Section 3, the Constitution
took it upon itself to classify lands of the public
domain, and to state that only agricultural
lands may be alienable lands of the public
domain. It also laid down the terms under
which lands of the public domain may be leased
by corporations and individuals. At the same
time, it delegated to Congress the authority to
classify agricultural lands of the public domain

according to the uses to which they may be
devoted. Congress likewise determines, by law,
the size of the lands of the public domain that
may be acquired, developed, held or leased, and
the conditions therefor.
In acting on the delegation, Congress is
given the choice on how it will act, specifically,
whether it will pass a general or a special law.
On alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain, Congress has, from the very beginning,
acted through the medium of a special law,
specifically, through the Public Land Act that
by its terms “shall apply to the lands of the
public domain; but timber and mineral lands
shall be governed by special laws.” Notably, the
Act goes on to provide that nothing in it “shall
be understood or construed to change or modify
the administration and disposition of the lands
commonly called ‘friar lands’ and those which,
being privately owned, have reverted to or
become property of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines, which administration and
disposition shall be governed by laws at present
in force or which
250

ANNOTATED
may hereafter be enacted.”33 Under these

terms, the PLA can be seen to be a very specific
act whose coverage extends only to lands of the
public domain; in this sense, it is a special law

on that subject.
In contrast, the Civil Code is a general law
that covers general rules on the effect and
application of laws and human relations;
persons and family relations; property and
property relations; the different modes of
acquiring ownership; and obligations and
contracts.34 Its general nature is best
appreciated when in its Article 18, it provides
that: “In matters which are governed by the
Code of Commerce and special laws, their
deficiency shall be supplied by the provisions of
this Code.”
The Civil Code has the same relationship
with the PRD with respect to the latter’s
special focus—land registration—and fully
applies civil law provisions in so far only as
they are allowed by the PRD. One such case
where the Civil Code is expressly allowed to
apply is in the case of Section 14(2) of the PRD
which calls for the application of prescription
under existing laws.
As already explained above, the PLA and the
PRD have their own specific purposes and are
supreme within their own spheres, subject only
to what the higher Constitution provides. Thus,
the PRD must defer to what the PLA provides
when the matter to be registered is an
domain.
Application of the Civil Code
In its Book II, the Civil Code has very clear
rules on property, including State property. It
classifies property as either of public dominion
or of private ownership,35 and property for
_______________
33 CA 141, Section 2.
34 These are the Introductory Chapters and Books I to
IV of the Civil Code.
251
VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009 251

public use, public service and those for the

development of the national wealth as property
of the public dominion.36 All property not so
characterized are patrimonial property of the
State37 which are susceptible to private
ownership,38 against which prescription will
run.39
In reading all these provisions, it should not
be overlooked that they refer to the properties
of the State in general, i.e., to both movable and
immovable properties.40Thus, the Civil Code
provisions on property do not refer to
land alone, much less do they refer solely
to alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain. For this specie of land, the
PLA is the special governing law and,
under the Civil Code itself, the Civil Code
provisions shall apply only in case of
deficiency.41
This conclusion gives rise to the question –
can alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain at the same time be patrimonial
property of the State because they are not for
public use, public purpose, and for the

development of national wealth?
The answer to this question can be found,
among others, in the interaction discussed
above between the PLA and PRD, on the one
hand, and the Civil Code, on the other, and will
depend on the purpose for which an answer is
necessary.
If, as in the present case, the purpose is to
determine whether a grant or disposition of an
domain has been made, then the PLA primarily
applies and the Civil Code applies only
suppletorily. The possession and occupation
that the PLA recognizes is
_______________
36 Id., Article 420.

40 Article 415 of the Civil Code defines immovable
property, while Article 416 defines movable property.
252

ANNOTATED
based on its Section 48(b) and, until the

requirements of this Section are satisfied, the
domain remains a State property that can be
disposed only under the terms of Section 11 of

the PLA. In the face of this legal reality, the
question of whether—for purposes of
prescription—an alienable and disposable land
of the public domain is patrimonial or not
becomes immaterial; a public land, even if
alienable and disposable, is State property and
prescription does not run against the State.42
In other words, there is no room for any
hairsplitting that would allow the
inapplicable concept of prescription
under the Civil Code to be directly
applied to an alienable and disposable
land of the public domain before this land
satisfies the terms of a grant under
Section 48(b) of the PLA.
Given this conclusion, any further discussion
of the patrimonial character of alienable and
disposable public lands under the norms of the
Civil Code is rendered moot and academic.
From the prism of the overriding regalian
doctrine that all lands of the public domain are
owned by the State, an applicant for land
registration invoking Section 14(2) of the PRD
to support his claim must first clearly show
that the land has been withdrawn from the
public domain through an express and positive
act of the government.43
A clear express governmental grant or act
withdrawing a particular land from the mass of
the public domain is provided both in the old
and the prevailing Public Land Acts. These
laws invariably provide that compliance with
the required possession of agricultural public
land (under the first and second PLAs) or
domain (under the prevailing PLA) in the

manner and
_______________

43 Supra note 10, Director of Lands v. Intermediate
Appellate Court.
253
VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009 253

duration provided by law is equivalent to a

government grant. Thus, the land ipso jure
becomes private land. It is only at that point
that the “private land” requirement of Section
14(2) materializes.44
Prescription
In my original Dissent (in response to the
original ponencia), I discussed ordinary
acquisitive prescription as an academic exercise
to leave no stone unturned in rejecting the
ponencia’s original conclusion that prescription
directly applies to alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain under Section 14(2)
of the PRD. I am happy to note that the present
ponencia has adopted, albeit without any
attribution, part of my original academic
discussion on the application of the Civil Code,
particularly on the subjects of patrimonial
property of the State and prescription.
Specifically, I posited—assuming arguendo
that the Civil Code applies—that the
classification of a public land as alienable and
disposable does not per se signify that the land

is patrimonial under the Civil Code since
property, to be patrimonial, must not be for
public use, for public purpose or for the
development of national wealth. Something
more must be done or shown beyond the fact of
classification. The ponencia now concedes that
“[T]here must also be an express government
manifestation that the property is already
patrimonial or no longer retained for public use
or the development of the national wealth,
under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only
when the property has become patrimonial can
the prescriptive
_______________
44 At this point, prescription can be invoked, not by the

occupant/possessor who now owns the land in his private
capacity, but against the new owner by whomsoever shall
then occupy the land and comply with the ordinary or
extraordinary prescription that the Civil Code ordains.
This assumes that the new owner has not placed the land
under the Torrens system; otherwise, indefeasibility and
imprescriptibility would set in.
254

ANNOTATED
period for the acquisition of property of the

public domain begin to run.”
I agree with this statement as it describes a
clear case when the property has become
private by the government’s own declaration so

that prescription under the Civil Code can run.
Note in this regard that there is no
inconsistency between this conclusion and the
hierarchy of laws on lands of the public domain
that I expounded on. To reiterate, the PLA
applies as a special and primary law when
a public land is classified as alienable and
disposable, and remains fully and
exclusively applicable until the State
itself expressly declares that the land now
qualifies as a patrimonial property. At
that point, the application of the Civil
Code and its law on prescription are
triggered. The application of Section 14(2)
of the PRD follows.
To summarize, I submit in this Concurring
and Dissenting Opinion that:
1. The hierarchy of laws on public domain
must be given full application in considering
lands of the public domain. Top consideration
should be accorded to the Philippine
Constitution, particularly its Article XII,
followed by the consideration of applicable
special laws—the PLA and the PRD, insofar as
this Decree applies to lands of the public
domain. The Civil Code and other general laws
apply to the extent expressly called for by the
primary laws or to supply any of the latter’s
deficiencies.
2. The ruling in this ponencia and in
Naguit that the classification of public lands as
alienable and disposable does not need to date
back to June 12, 1945 at the latest, is wrong
because:
a. Under the Constitution’s regalian
doctrine, classification is a required step
whose full import should be given full

effect and recognition; giving legal effect
to
255
VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009 255

possession prior to classification runs

counter to the regalian doctrine.
b. The Public Land Act applies only
from the time a public land is classified as
alienable and disposable; thus, Section
48(b) of this law and the possession it
requires cannot be recognized prior to any
classification.
c. Under the Civil Code, “[O]nly
things and rights which are susceptible of
being appropriated may be the object of
possession.” Prior to the classification of a
public land as alienable and disposable, a
land of the public domain cannot be
appropriated; hence, any claimed
possession cannot have legal effects.
d. There are other modes of acquiring
alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain under the Public Land Act;
this legal reality renders the ponencia’s
absurdity argument misplaced.
e. The alleged absurdity of the law
addresses the wisdom of the law and is a
matter for the Legislature, not for this
Court, to address.
Consequently, Naguit must be abandoned
and rejected for being based on legally-flawed
premises and for being an aberration in land

registration jurisprudence. At the very least,
the present ponencia cannot be viewed as an
authority on the effective possession prior to
classification since this ruling, by the
ponencia’s own admission, is not necessary for
the resolution of the present case.
Petition denied, judgment and resolution

affirmed.
Note.—Factual considerations relating to

lands of the public domain properly rest within
the administrative competence of the Director
of Lands and the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources. (Estrella vs. Robles,
Jr., 538 SCRA 60 [2007]).
——o0o——
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Heirs of Malabanan vs. Republic

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1/29/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 587

G.R. No. 179987. April 29, 2009.*

Land Registration Act; Public Lands Act;

the possessor than Section 14 of the Property

VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009 173

June 12, 1945” to perfect or complete his title by

prescription. On the other hand, among the public

patrimonial may be counted for the purpose of

174 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

registration under Section 14(2) falls wholly within

understand the plain language of Section 14(2) of the

VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009 175

Supreme Court; Judgments; The acquisition of an

48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, was

possession and occupation of agricultural land of the

176 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Land Act, as amended, is well justified by the

BRION, J., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion:

VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009 177

properly defined by jurisprudence, is that where an

separation of powers in giving Section 48(b), as

178 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

expanding—through Naguit and the present

disposable land of the public domain is patrimonial

VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009 179

Same; Same; Same; Same; Supreme Court; Stare

PETITION for review on certiorari of the

One main reason why the informal sector has not

means developed by the Spanish legal system. The

180 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

about. The only one who does not know it is the

This decision inevitably affects all untitled

has spawned, has unfortunately been treated

1 “Hernando de Soto Interview” by Reason Magazine

VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009 181

square meters. Malabanan claimed that he had

adverse and peaceful possession of the land for

3 But see note 5.

pleadings, including those before this Court, Malabanan or

182 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Jose

dispositive portion of which reads:

ing the trial of the case, however, Malabanan testified that

VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009 183

“WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this

the operation of Act 141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529,

The Republic interposed an appeal to the

disposable only on 15 March 1982, the

8 Penned by Associate Justice Marina Buzon of the

184 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

of Section 14(1) of the Property Registration

argue, remains the controlling doctrine,

“1. In order that an alienable and disposable

9 G.R. No. 156117, 26 May 2005, 459 SCRA 183.

VOL. 587, APRIL 29, 2009 185

Heirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic

ous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land

Based on these issues, the parties

OSG remains insistent that for Section 14(1) to

13 Id., at pp. 186-187.

186 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

lic v. Imperial Credit Corporation,17 as well as

prescription. To bolster their argument,

17 G.R. No. 173088, 25 June 2008, 555 SCRA 314.