1.
Barredo vs Garcia and Almario (his driver’s negligence) but rather for his own
July 17, 2011
At about 1:30am on May 3, 1936, Fontanilla’s taxi
collided with a “kalesa” thereby killing the 16 year
old Faustino Garcia. Faustino’s parents filed a
criminal suit against Fontanilla and reserved their
right to file a separate civil suit. Fontanilla was
eventually convicted. After the criminal suit,
Garcia filed a civil suit against Barredo – the
owner of the taxi (employer of Fontanilla). The
suit was based on Article 1903 of the civil code
(negligence of employers in the selection of their
employees). Barredo assailed the suit arguing that
his liability is only subsidiary and that the
separate civil suit should have been filed against
Fontanilla primarily and not him.
ISSUE: Whether or not Barredo is just subsidiarily
liable.
HELD: No. He is primarily liable under Article
1903 which is a separate civil action against
negligent employers. Garcia is well within his
rights in suing Barredo. He reserved his right to
file a separate civil action and this is more
expeditious because by the time of the SC
judgment Fontanilla is already serving his
sentence and has no property. It was also proven
that Barredo is negligent in hiring his employees
because it was shown that Fontanilla had had
multiple traffic infractions already before he hired
him – something he failed to overcome during
hearing. Had Garcia not reserved his right to file a
separate civil action, Barredo would have only
been subsidiarily liable. Further, Barredo is not
being sued for damages arising from a criminal act
1 | TORTS CASES 12/13/18 JESSIE MARIE DELA PEÑA
automobile passed in such close proximity to the
negligence in selecting his employee (Article
1903).
2. PICART vs. SMITH, JR.
FACTS: On the Carlatan Bridge in La Union. Picart
was riding on his pony over said bridge. Before he
had gotten half way across, Smith approached
from the opposite direction in an automobile. As
the defendant neared the bridge he saw a
horseman on it and blew his horn to give warning
of his approach. He continued his course and after
he had taken the bridge he gave two more
successive blasts, as it appeared to him that the
man on horseback before him was not observing
the rule of the road.
Picart saw the automobile coming and heard the
warning signals. However, being perturbed by the
novelty of the apparition or the rapidity of the
approach, he pulled the pony closely up against
the railing on the right side of the bridge instead
of going to the left. He says that the reason he did
this was that he thought he did not have sufficient
time to get over to the other side. As the
automobile approached, Smith guided it toward
his left, that being the proper side of the road for
the machine. In so doing the defendant assumed
that the horseman would move to the other side.
Seeing that the pony was apparently quiet, the
defendant, instead of veering to the right while yet
some distance away or slowing down, continued
to approach directly toward the horse without
diminution of speed. When he had gotten quite
near, there being then no possibility of the horse
getting across to the other side, the defendant
quickly turned his car sufficiently to the right to
escape hitting the horse; but in so doing the
animal that it became frightened and turned its
body across the bridge, got hit by the car and the
limb was broken. The horse fell and its rider was
thrown off with some violenceAs a result of its
injuries the horse died. The plaintiff received
contusions which caused temporary
unconsciousness and required medical attention
for several days.
From a judgment of the CFI of La Union absolving
Smith from liability Picart has appealed.
ISSUE: WON Smith was guilty of negligence such
as gives rise to a civil obligation to repair the
damage done
HELD: the judgment of the lower court must be
reversed, and judgment is here rendered that the
Picart recover of Smith damages
YES
The test by which to determine the existence of
negligence in a particular case may be stated as
follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged
negligent act use that person would have used in
the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of
negligence. The existence of negligence in a given
case is not determined by reference to the
personal judgment of the actor in the situation
before him. The law considers what would be
reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of
ordinary intelligence and prudence and
determines liability by that. The question as to
what would constitute the conduct of a prudent
man in a given situation must of course be always
determined in the light of human experience and
in view of the facts involved in the particular case.
Could a prudent man, in the case under
consideration, foresee harm as a result of the
course actually pursued? If so, it was the duty of
the actor to take precautions to guard against that
harm. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by
ignoring of the suggestion born of this prevision, is
always necessary before negligence can be held to
exist. Stated in these terms, the proper criterion
for determining the existence of negligence in a
given case is this: Conduct is said to be negligent
when a prudent man in the position of the
tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect
harmful to another was sufficiently probable to
warrant his foregoing conduct or guarding against
its consequences.
Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant
in the present case we think that negligence is
clearly established. A prudent man, placed in the
position of the defendant, would in our opinion,
have recognized that the course which he was
pursuing was fraught with risk, and would
therefore have foreseen harm to the horse and the
rider as reasonable consequence of that course.
Under these circumstances the law imposed on
the Smith the duty to guard against the threatened
harm.
It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself
was not free from fault, for he was guilty of
2 | TORTS CASES 12/13/18 JESSIE MARIE DELA PEÑA
antecedent negligence in planting himself on the
wrong side of the road. But as we have already
stated, Smith was also negligent; and in such case
the problem always is to discover which agent is
immediately and directly responsible. It will be
noted that the negligent acts of the two parties
were not contemporaneous, since the negligence
of the defendant succeeded the negligence of the
plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Under these
circumstances the law is that the person who has
the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm
and fails to do so is chargeable with the
consequences, without reference to the prior
negligence of the other party.
3. Cusi v. PNR| Guerrero J.G.R. No. L-
29889 May 31, 1979
FACTS
• Spouses Cusi attended a birthday party in
Paranaque, Rizal. After the party which broke up
at about 11 o'clock that evening, the spouses
proceeded home in their Vauxhall car with
Victorino Cusi at the wheel. Upon reaching the
railroad tracks, finding that the level crossing bar
was raised and seeing that there was no flashing
red light, and hearing no whistle from any coming
train, Cusi proceeded to cross the tracks. At the
same time, a train bound for Lucena traversed the
crossing, resulting in a collision between the two.
• This accident caused the spouses to suffer
deformities and to lose the earnings they used to
enjoy as successful career people.
• The defense is centered on the proposition that
the gross negligence of Victorino Cusi was the
proximate cause of the collision; that had he made
a full stop before traversing the crossing as
required by section 56(a) of Act 3992 (Motor
Vehicle Law), he could have seen and heard the
approach of the train, and thus, there would have
been no collision.
ISSUES: W/N Victorino Cusi was negligent and
such was the proximate cause of the collision
Ruling:
No.
• Negligence has been defined by Judge Cooley in
his work on Torts as "the failure to observe for the
protection of the interests of another person that
degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand, whereby such other
person suffers injury."
• All that the law requires is that it is always
incumbent upon a person to use that care and
diligence expected of reasonable men under
similar circumstances.
• In this case, the warning devices installed at the
railroad crossing were manually operated; there
were only 2 shifts of guards provided for the
operation thereof — one, the 7:00 A.M. to 3:00 P.
M. shift, and the other, the3:00 P.M. to 11:00 P.M.
shift. On the night of the accident, the train for
Lucena was on an unscheduled trip after 11:00
P.M. During that precise hour, the warning devices
were not operating for no one attended to them.
Also, as observed by the lower court, the
locomotive driver did not blow his whistle, thus:
"... he simply sped on without taking an extra
precaution of blowing his whistle.
That the train was running at full speed is attested
to by the fact that notwithstanding the application
of the emergency brakes, the train did not stop
until it reached a distance of around 100 meters."
• Victorino Cusi had exercised all the necessary
precautions required of him as to avoid injury to -
himself and to others. We find no need for him to
have made a full stop; relying on his faculties of
sight and hearing, Victorino Cusi had no reason to
anticipate the impending danger
• The record shows that the spouses Cusi
previously knew of the existence of the railroad
crossing, having stopped at the guardhouse to ask
for directions before proceeding to the party. At
the crossing, they found the level bar raised, no
warning lights flashing nor warning bells ringing,
nor whistle from an oncoming train. They safely
traversed the crossing.
On their return home, the situation at the crossing
did not in the least change, except for the absence
of the guard or flagman. Hence, on the same
impression that the crossing was safe for passage
as before, Victorino Cusi merely slackened his
speed and proceeded to cross the tracks, driving
at the proper rate of speed for going over railroad
crossings
4. JARCO MARKETING v. COURT OF
APPEALS
CRIME:
TOPIC: Art. 12 – Exempting Circumstances
(Accident)
3 | TORTS CASES 12/13/18 JESSIE MARIE DELA PEÑA
PETITIONER: Leonardo Kong, Jose Tiope & Elsa
Panelo, being the branch manager, operations
manager & supervisor, respectively, under Jarco
Marketing
RESPONDENT: Criselda & Conrado Aguilar
(Parents of Zhienith)
NATURE OF PETITION: Complaint for Damages
PREVIOUS DECISIONS: Petitioners was ordered by
the respondents, the reimbursement of the
hospitalization, medical bills, and wake and
funeral expenses used for the deceased, Zheinith
Aguilar.
FACTS: Zheinith, a 6 year old child, died due to
multiple injuries she sustained during the collapse
of the counter at the business establishment
owned by the petitioners. That in the afternoon of
May 9, 1983, Criselda and Zheinith was at the 2 nd
floor of the Syvel’s Department Store in Makati
City, Criselda was signing her credit card slip at
the payment and verification counter when she
felt a loud thud. And when she looked behind her,
beheld her daughter on the floor, pinned by bulk
of the store’s gift-wrapping counter/structure.
CONTENTION OF THE PETITIONER: They should
not be held liable for the death of Zheinith, as the
counter that befell her was caused by the
negligence of both Criselda and Zheinith. Being the
mother, she must assure the safety of her child.
Criselda attributed negligence when she let go of
Zheinith which allowed her to come near the
counter.
CONTENTION OF THE RESPONDENT: The fall of
the counter being the proximate cause of death of
Zheinith was because of negligence of the owner
of the establishment as it was not nailed and
shaky, which was then also corroborated by the
witnesses who used to work at the establishment.
That negligence being imputed to the mother was
not reasonable for she was at that moment was
signing the credit card slip.
SUPREME COURT DECISION: Petition for
DISMISSAL was DENIED. And the previous
judgment was AFFIRMED, imposing penalty, viz:
 P50, 000.00 compensatory damage
for the death of Zhienith, with legal
interest of 6% per annum from April
27, 1984
 P99,420.86 as reimbursement for
hospitalization expenses incurred,
with legal interest of 6% per annum
from April 27, 1984
 P100, 000.00 as moral and exemplary
damages
 P20, 000.00 in the concept of
attorney’s fees
REASONS: Petitioner Panelo and other store
supervisor were personally informed by the
witnesses while they were still working at the said
establishment that the counter was unstable for
the reason that it was not nailed on the floor. Yet,
neither initiated any concrete action to remedy
the situation.
Even if the court attributes contributory
negligence to ZHIENETH and assume that she
climbed over the counter, no injury should have
occurred if the counter was stable and sturdy.

OTHER LEGAL CONCEPTS DISCUSSED: A child
under nine (9) years of age must be conclusively
incapable of contributory negligence, provided
under Article 12, par. 2-3 of the Revised Penal
Code.
5. CHILD LEARNING CENTER, INC. and
SPOUSES EDGARDO L. LIMON and SYLVIA S.
LIMON, vs.
TIMOTHY TAGARIO, assisted by his parents
BASILIO TAGORIO and HERMINIA TAGORIO
GR No. 150920, November 25, 2005
FACTS:
Timothy Tagoria was a grade IV student at
Marymount School, an academic institution
operated and maintained by Child Learning
Center, Inc. (CLC). One afternoon, he found himself
locked inside the boy’s comfort room in
Marymount. He started to panic so he banged and
kicked the door and yelled for help. No help
arrived. He then decided to open the window to
call for help. As he opened the window, Timothy
went right through and fell down three stories.
Timothy was hospitalized and given medical
treatment for serious multiple physical injuries.
He, assisted by his parents, filed a civil action
against the CLC, the members of its Board of
Directors which includes the Spouses Limon. They
claim that the school was negligent for not
installing iron grills at the window of the boy’s
comfort room. CLC, in its defense, maintained that
there was nothing defective about the locking
mechanism of the door and that the fall of
Timothy was not due to its fault or negligence. CLC
further maintained that it had exercised the due
care and diligence of a good father of a family to
ensure the safety, well-being and convenience of
its students. The trial court ruled in favor of the
4 | TORTS CASES 12/13/18 JESSIE MARIE DELA PEÑA
respondents. The respondents proceeded their
appeal to the Court of Appeals who affirmed the
trial court’s ruling in toto.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the school was negligent for the
boy’s accidental fall.
RULING:
YES. In every tort case filed under Article 2176 of
the Civil Code, plaintiff has to prove by a
preponderance of evidence: (1) the damages
suffered by the plaintiff; (2) the fault or negligence
of the defendant or some other person for whose
act he must respond; and (3) the connection of
cause and effect between the fault or negligence
and the damages incurred.
In this tort case, respondents contend that CLC
failed to provide precautionary measures to avoid
harm and injury to its students in two instances:
(1) failure to fix a defective door knob despite
having been notified of the problem; and (2)
failure to install safety grills on the window where
Timothy fell from. During trial, it was found that
the lock was defective. The architect witness
testified that he did not verify if the doorknob at
the comfort room was actually put in place.
Further, the fact that Timothy fell out through the
window shows that the door could not be opened
from the inside. That sufficiently points to the fact
that something was wrong with the door, if not
the door knob, under the principle of res ipsa
loquitor. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitor applies
where (1) the accident was of such character as to
warrant an inference that it would not have
happened except for the defendant’s negligence;
(2) the accident must have been caused by an
agency or instrumentality within the exclusive
management or control of the person charged
with the negligence complained of; and (3) the
accident must not have been due to any voluntary
action or contribution on the part of the person
injured. Petitioners are clearly answerable for
failure to see to it that the doors of their school
toilets are at all times in working condition. The
fact that a student had to go through the window,
instead of the door, shows that something was
wrong with the door. As to the absence of grills on
the window, petitioners contend that there was no
such requirement under the Building Code.
Nevertheless, the fact is that such window, as
petitioners themselves point out, was
approximately 1.5 meters from the floor, so that it
was within reach of a student who finds the
regular exit, the door, not functioning.
Petitioners, with the due diligence of a good father
of the family, should have anticipated that a
student, locked in the toilet by a non-working
door, would attempt to use the window to call for
help or even to get out. Considering all the
circumstances, therefore, there is sufficient basis
to sustain a finding of liability on petitioners’ part.
Petitioners’ argument that CLC exercised the due
diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of its employees is not
decisive. Due diligence in the selection and
supervision of employees is applicable where the
employer is being held responsible for the acts or
omissions of others under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code. In this case, CLC’s liability is under Article
2176 of the Civil Code, premised on the fact of its
own negligence in not ensuring that all its doors
are properly maintained. The Court’s
pronouncement that Timothy climbed out of the
window because he could not get out using the
door, negates petitioners’ other contention that
the proximate cause of the accident was Timothy’s
own negligence. The injuries he sustained from
the fall were the product of a natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any
intervening cause, that originated from CLC’s own
negligence.
 6. CONCEPCION ILAO-ORETA v. SPOUSES
EVA MARIE and BENEDICTO NOEL
RONQUILLO, et al.
Respondent spouses Eva Marie Ronquillo
and Noel Benedicto Ronquillo had not been
blessed with a child despite several years of
marriage. They thus consulted petitioner
Dr. Concepcion Ilao-Oreta, an obstetrician-
gynecologist-consultant and chief of the
Reproductive Endocrinology and Infertility
Section at the St. Luke‘s Medical Center. Dr. Ilao-
Oreta advised Eva Marie to undergo a
laparoscopic procedure whereby a laparascope
would be inserted through the
patient‘s abdominal wall to get a direct viewof her
internal reproductive organ in order to determine
the real cause of her infertility.
The procedure was scheduled on April 5,
1999 at 2:00 p.m. to be performed by Dr. Ilao-
Oreta. Eva Marie, accompanied by Noel, checked in
at the St. Luke‘s Medical Center and underwent
pre-operative procedures including the
administration of intravenous fluid and enema.
However, Dr. Ilao-Oreta did not arrive at the
scheduled time for the procedure and no prior
notice of its cancellation was received. It turned
out that the doctor was on a return flight from
Hawaii to, and arrived at 10:00 p.m. of April 5,
1999 in, Manila.
The Ronquillo spouses filed a complaint
against Dr. Ilao-Oreta and the St. Luke‘s Medical
Center for breach of professional and service
contract and for damages before the Regional
Trial Court of Batangas City. They prayed for the
award of actual damages including alleged loss of
income of Noel while accompanying his wife to the
hospital, moral damages, exemplary damages,
costs of litigation, attorney‘s fees, and other
available reliefs and remedies. The RTC decided in
favor of Ronquillo spouses and awarded Eva
5 | TORTS CASES 12/13/18 JESSIE MARIE DELA PEÑA
Marie actual damages but ruled that the failure of
the doctor to arrive on time was not intentional. It
found no adequate proof that Noel had been
deprived of any job contract while attending to his
wife in the hospital. The spouses appealed to
the Court of Appeals and found that Dr. Ilao-Oreta
grossly negligent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Dr. Ilao-Oreta is guilty of gross
negligence for her failure to arrive at the
scheduled time for the procedure
HELD:
It bears noting that when she was scheduling the
date of her performance of the procedure, Dr. Ilao-
Oreta had just gotten married and was preparing
for her honeymoon, and it is of common human
knowledge that excitement attends its
preparations. Her negligence could then be partly
attributed to human frailty which rules out
its characterization as gross.
Dr. Ilao-Oreta‘s negligence not being gross,
Ronquillo spouses are not entitled to recover
moral damages. Neither are the spouses entitled
to recover exemplary damages in the absence of a
showing that Dr. Ilao-Oreta acted in a wanton,
fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent
manner, nor to award of attorney‘s fees as,
contrary to the finding of the CA that the spouses
“were compelled to litigate and incur expenses to
protect their interest,” the records show that they
did not exert enough efforts to settle the matter
before going to court.
7. Amado vs Rio, 95 Phil 33
8. ROBERTO C. SICAM and AGENCIA de
R.C. SICAM, INC. vs. SPOUSES JORGE
G.R. No. 159617, August 8, 2007
FACTS: On different dates, Lulu Jorge pawned
several pieces of jewelry with Agencia de R. C.
Sicam located in Parañaque to secure a loan.
On October 19, 1987, two armed men entered the
pawnshop and took away whatever cash and
jewelry were found inside the pawnshop vault.
On the same date, Sicam sent Lulu a letter
informing her of the loss of her jewelry due to the
robbery incident in the pawnshop. Respondent
Lulu then wroteback expressing disbelief, then
requested Sicam to prepare the pawned jewelry
for withdrawal on November 6, but Sicam failed to
return the jewelry.
Lulu, joined by her husband Cesar, filed a
complaint against Sicam with the RTC of Makati
seeking indemnification for the loss of pawned
jewelry and payment of AD, MD and ED as well as
AF.
The RTC rendered its Decision dismissing
respondents’ complaint as well as petitioners’
counterclaim. Respondents appealed the RTC
Decision to the CA which reversed the RTC,
ordering the appellees to pay appellants the actual
value of the lost jewelry and AF. Petitioners MR
denied, hence the instant petition for review on
Certiorari.
ISSUE: are the petitioners liable for the loss of the
pawned articles in their possession? (Petitioners
insist that they are not liable since robbery is a
fortuitous event and they are not negligent at all.)
HELD: The Decision of the CA is AFFIRMED.
YES
Article 1174 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by
the law, or when it is otherwise declared by
stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation
requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be
responsible for those events which could not be
foreseen or which, though foreseen, were
inevitable.
Fortuitous events by definition are extraordinary
events not foreseeable or avoidable. It is therefore,
not enough that the event should not have been
foreseen or anticipated, as is commonly believed
but it must be one impossible to foresee or to
avoid. The mere difficulty to foresee the
happening is not impossibility to foresee the same.
To constitute a fortuitous event, the following
elements must concur:
(a) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected
occurrence or of the failure of the debtor to
comply with obligations must be independent of
human will;
(b) it must be impossible to foresee the event that
constitutes the caso fortuito or, if it can be
foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid;
(c) the occurrence must be such as to render it
impossible for the debtor to fulfill obligations in a
normal manner; and,
(d) the obligor must be free from any participation
in the aggravation of the injury or loss.
The burden of proving that the loss was due to a
fortuitous event rests on him who invokes it. And,
in order for a fortuitous event to exempt one from
liability, it is necessary that one has committed no
negligence or misconduct that may have
occasioned the loss.
6 | TORTS CASES 12/13/18 JESSIE MARIE DELA PEÑA
Sicam had testified that there was a security guard
in their pawnshop at the time of the robbery. He
likewise testified that when he started the
pawnshop business in 1983, he thought of
opening a vault with the nearby bank for the
purpose of safekeeping the valuables but was
discouraged by the Central Bank since pawned
articles should only be stored in a vault inside the
pawnshop. The very measures which petitioners
had allegedly adopted show that to them the
possibility of robbery was not only foreseeable,
but actually foreseen and anticipated. Sicam’s
testimony, in effect, contradicts petitioners’
defense of fortuitous event.
Moreover, petitioners failed to show that they
were free from any negligence by which the loss of
the pawned jewelry may have been occasioned.
Robbery per se, just like carnapping, is not a
fortuitous event. It does not foreclose the
possibility of negligence on the part of herein
petitioners.
Petitioners merely presented the police report of
the Parañaque Police Station on the robbery
committed based on the report of petitioners’
employees which is not sufficient to establish
robbery. Such report also does not prove that
petitioners were not at fault. On the contrary, by
the very evidence of petitioners, the CA did not err
in finding that petitioners are guilty of concurrent
or contributory negligence as provided in Article
1170 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 1170. Those who in the performance of their
obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or
delay, and those who in any manner contravene
the tenor thereof, are liable for damages.
**
Article 2123 of the Civil Code provides that with
regard to pawnshops and other establishments
which are engaged in making loans secured by
pledges, the special laws and regulations
concerning them shall be observed, and
subsidiarily, the provisions on pledge, mortgage
and antichresis.
The provision on pledge, particularly Article 2099
of the Civil Code, provides that the creditor shall
take care of the thing pledged with the diligence of
a good father of a family. This means that
petitioners must take care of the pawns the way a
prudent person would as to his own property.
In this connection, Article 1173 of the Civil Code
further provides:
Art. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor
consists in the omission of that diligence which is
required by the nature of the obligation and
corresponds with the circumstances of the
persons, of time and of the place. When negligence
shows bad faith, the provisions of Articles 1171
and 2201, paragraph 2 shall apply.
If the law or contract does not state the diligence
which is to be observed in the performance, that
which is expected of a good father of a family shall
be required.

We expounded in Cruz v. Gangan that negligence
is the omission to do something which a
reasonable man, guided by those considerations
which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human
affairs, would do; or the doing of something which
a prudent and reasonable man would not do. It is
want of care required by the circumstances.
A review of the records clearly shows that
petitioners failed to exercise reasonable care and
caution that an ordinarily prudent person would
have used in the same situation. Petitioners were
guilty of negligence in the operation of their
pawnshop business. Sicam’s testimony revealed
that there were no security measures adopted by
petitioners in the operation of the pawnshop.
Evidently, no sufficient precaution and vigilance
were adopted by petitioners to protect the
pawnshop from unlawful intrusion. There was no
clear showing that there was any security guard at
all. Or if there was one, that he had sufficient
training in securing a pawnshop. Further, there is
no showing that the alleged security guard
exercised all that was necessary to prevent any
untoward incident or to ensure that no suspicious
individuals were allowed to enter the premises. In
fact, it is even doubtful that there was a security
guard, since it is quite impossible that he would
not have noticed that the robbers were armed
with caliber .45 pistols each, which were allegedly
poked at the employees. Significantly, the alleged
security guard was not presented at all to
corroborate petitioner Sicam’s claim; not one of
petitioners’ employees who were present during
the robbery incident testified in court.
7 | TORTS CASES 12/13/18 JESSIE MARIE DELA PEÑA
Furthermore, petitioner Sicam’s admission that
the vault was open at the time of robbery is clearly
a proof of petitioners’ failure to observe the care,
precaution and vigilance that the circumstances
justly demanded.
The robbery in this case happened in petitioners’
pawnshop and they were negligent in not
exercising the precautions justly demanded of a
pawnshop.
NOTES:
We, however, do not agree with the CA when it
found petitioners negligent for not taking steps to
insure themselves against loss of the pawned
jewelries.
Under Section 17 of Central Bank Circular No. 374,
Rules and Regulations for Pawnshops, which took
effect on July 13, 1973, and which was issued
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 114,
Pawnshop Regulation Act, it is provided that
pawns pledged must be insured, to wit:
Sec. 17. Insurance of Office Building and Pawns-
The place of business of a pawnshop and the
pawns pledged to it must be insured against fire
and against burglary as well as for the latter(sic),
by an insurance company accredited by the
Insurance Commissioner.
However, this Section was subsequently amended
by CB Circular No. 764 which took effect on
October 1, 1980, to wit:
Sec. 17 Insurance of Office Building and Pawns –
The office building/premises and pawns of a
pawnshop must be insured against fire. (emphasis
supplied).
where the requirement that insurance against
burglary was deleted. Obviously, the Central Bank
considered it not feasible to require insurance of
pawned articles against burglary.
The robbery in the pawnshop happened in 1987,
and considering the above-quoted amendment,
there is no statutory duty imposed on petitioners
to insure the pawned jewelry in which case it was
error for the CA to consider it as a factor in
concluding that petitioners were negligent.
Nevertheless, the preponderance of evidence
shows that petitioners failed to exercise the
diligence required of them under the Civil Code.
9. Corinthian Gardens vs Sps.
Tanjuangco, GR 160795, June 27, 2008
FACTS:
Reynaldo and Maria Luisa Tanjangco own
Lots 68 and 69 located at Corinthian Gardens
Subdivision, Quezon City, which is managed
by petitioner Corinthian Gardens Association,
Inc. ). On the other hand, Frank and Teresita
Cuaso own Lot 65 which is adjacent to the
Tanjangcos' lots.
Before the Cuasos constructed their
house on Lot 65, a relocation survey was
necessary. As Geodetic Engineer Democrito
De Dios conducted all the previous surveys for
the subdivision's developer, Corinthian
referred Engr. De Dios to the Cuasos. Before,
during and after the construction of the said
house, Corinthian conducted periodic ocular
inspections in order to determine compliance
with the approved plans pursuant to the
Manual of Rules and Regulations of
Corinthian. Unfortunately, after the Cuasos
constructed their house employing the
services of C.B. Paraz Construction Co., Inc.
 build their perimeter fence encroached on the
Tanjangcos' Lot 69 by 87 square meters.
No amicable settlement was reached
between the parties. Thus, the Tanjangcos
demanded that the Cuasos demolish the
perimeter fence but the latter failed and
refused, prompting the Tanjangcos to file with
the RTC a suit against the Cuasos for Recovery
of Possession with Damages.
** The Cuasos ascribed negligence to C.B.
Paraz for its failure to ascertain the proper
specifications of their house, and to Engr. De
Dios for his failure to undertake an accurate
relocation survey, thereby, exposing them to
litigation. The Cuasos also faulted Corinthian
for approving their relocation survey and
building plans without verifying their
accuracy and in making representations as to
Engr. De Dios' integrity and competence. The
Cuasos alleged that had Corinthian exercised
diligence in performing its duty, they would
not have been involved in a boundary dispute
with the Tanjangcos. Thus, the Cuasos opined
that Corinthian should also be held
answerable for any damages that they might
incur as a result of such construction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Corinthian Garden’s
Association is liable for negligence, in
approving the building plan and whether or
not it acted in good faith in doing so.
HELD:
YES, Corinthian cannot and should not be
allowed to justify or excuse its negligence by
claiming that its approval of the Cuasos'
building plans was only limited to a so-called
"table inspection and not actual site
measurement. Corinthian's failure to prevent
the encroachment of the Cuasos' perimeter
wall into Tanjangcos' property - despite the
inspection conducted - constitutes negligence
8 | TORTS CASES 12/13/18 JESSIE MARIE DELA PEÑA
and, at the very least, contributed to the injury
suffered by the Tanjangcos.
10. Hrs. of Completo vs Albayada, GR
172200, July 6, 2010
Facts
Albayda is a Master Sergeant of the PH Air Force,
and Completo was the taxi driver of a Toyota
Corolla which was owned by Abiad. Albayda was
riding a bike on his way to the office, when
Completo’s taxi bumped and sideswept him,
causing serious physical injuries. He [Albayda]
was brought to the PH Air Force General Hospital,
but he was transferred to the AFP Medical Center
because he sustained a fracture and there was no
orthopedic doctor available in the first hospital.
He was confined from 27 Aug 1997 to 11 Feb
1998, and again in 23 Feb to 22 Mar 1998 [approx.
7 months].
Conciliation before the barangay failed, so
Albayda filed a complaint for physical injuries
through reckless imprudence against Completo
before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasay.
Completo filed a counter-charge of damage to
property through reckless imprudence against
Albayda. The Office of the City Prosecutor
recommended the filing of an information for
Albayda’s complaint, and Completo’s complaint
[against Albayda] was dismissed. Albayda
manifested his reservation to file a separate civil
action for damages against Completo and Abiad.
Albayda alleged that Completo’s negligence is
the proximate cause of the incident. He demanded
the following damages and their respective
amounts: Actual damages – 276,550; Moral
damages – 600,000; Exemplary damages –
200,000; Attorney’s fees – 25,000 + 1,000
per court appearance.
On the other hand, Completo alleged that he
was carefully driving the taxicab when he heard a
strange sound from the taxicab’s rear right side.
He found Albayda lying on the road, holding his
left leg, so he brought Albayda to PH Air Force
General Hospital. Completo asserted that he was
an experienced driver, and that he already
reduced his speed to 20km even before reaching
the intersection. In contrast, Albayda rode his
bicycle at high speed, causing him to lose control
of the bicycle. Completo said that Albayda had no
cause of action.
Several people testified for each side, but here
are some notes on the testimony of the owner of
the taxi driver, Abiad. Abiad said that aside from
being a soldier, he also held franchises of taxicabs
and passenger jeepneys, and being a taxicab
operator, he would wake up early to personally
check the taxicabs. When Completo applied as a
taxicab driver, Abiad required him to show his
bio-data, NBI clearance, and driver’s license.
Completo never figured in a vehicular accident
since he was employed, and according to Abiad, he
[Completo] was a good driver and good man.
RTC rendered judgment in favor of Albayda,
and the defendants are ordered to pay actual
[46k] and moral [400k] damages, and attorney’s
fees [25k]. Upon appeal at the CA, the court
affirmed RTC’s decision with modifications [no
more actual damages; awarded temperate
damages [40k]; moral damages only 200k;
Completo and Abiad are solidarily liable to pay
Albayda; added legal interest].
Issues and Holding
1. WON CA erred in finding that Completo was
the one who caused the collision. NO
2. WON Abiad failed to prove that he observed
the diligence of a good father of the family.
YES
3. WON the award of moral and temperate
damages and attorney’s fees for Albayda had
no basis. NO / NO / YES
Ratio
On Negligence
It is a rule in negligence suits that the plaintiff has
the burden of proving by a preponderance of
evidence the motorist’s breach in his duty of care
 owed to the plaintiff, that the motorist was
negligent in failing to exercise the diligence
required to avoid injury to the plaintiff, and that
such negligence was the proximate cause of the
injury suffered. NCC 2176 quoted, and said that
the question of the motorist’s negligence is a
question of fact. Usually, more will be required of
a motorist [25mi/hr = 37ft/sec] than a bicyclist
[10mi/hr = 15ft/sec] in discharging the duty of
care because of the physical advantages the
former has over the latter.
It was proven by a preponderance of evidence that
Completo failed to exercise reasonable diligence.
 He was overspeeding at the time he hit
Albayda’s bicycle; he did not slow down even
when he approached the intersection
 Such negligence was the sole and proximate
cause of the injuries sustained by Albayda
 It was proven that Albayda had the right of way
since he reached the intersection ahead of
Completo
NCC 2180 cited – obligation imposed by NCC 2176
is demandable also for those persons for whom
one is responsible. Employers are liable for
damage caused by employees, but the
responsibility ceases upon proof that employers
observed the diligence of the good father of the
family in the selection and supervision of
employees. The burden of proof is on the
employer. The responsibility of two or more
persons who are liable for QD is solidary. The
employer’s civil liability for his employee’s
negligent acts is also primary and direct, owing to
his own negligence in selecting and supervising
them, and this liability attaches even if the
employer is not in the vehicle at the time of
collision.
In the selection of employees, employers are
required to examine them as to their
qualifications, experience, and service
records. With respect to supervision, employers
should formulate SOPs and monitor their
implementation, and impose disciplinary
9 | TORTS CASES 12/13/18 JESSIE MARIE DELA PEÑA
measures for breaches. To establish these factors
in a trial involving the issue of vicarious
[secondary] liability, employers must submit
concrete proof, including documentary evidence.
ABIAD’S EVIDENCE CONSISTED ENTIRELY OF
TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE, AND THIS IS
INSUFFICIENT TO OVERCOME THE LEGAL
PRESUMPTION THAT HE WAS NEGLIGENT IN
THE SELECTION AND SUPERVISION OF
COMPLETO.
On Damages
CA rightfully deleted the award of actual damages
because Albayda failed to present documentary
evidence to establish the amount incurred.
Temperate damages may be recovered when the
court finds that some pecuniary loss has been
suffered but its amount cannot be proved with
certainty. Moral damages are awarded in QDs
causing physical injuries, so the award is proper.
The award of attorney’s fees is deleted for failure
to prove that petitioners acted in bad faith in
refusing to satisfy respondent’s just and valid
claim.
11. Pacis vs Morales, GR 169467, Feb. 25,
2010
FACTS: petitioners filed with the trial
court a civil case for damages against
respondent Morales.
Petitioners are the parents of Alfred Pacis,
a 17-year old student who died in a
shooting incident inside the Top Gun
Firearms and Ammunitions Store in
Baguio City. Morales is the owner of the
gun store.
On the fateful day, Alfred was in the gun
store, with Matibag and Herbolario as
sales agents and caretakers of the store
while owner Morales was in Manila. The
gun which killed Alfred is a gun owned by
a store customer which was left with
Morales for repairs, which he placed
inside a drawer. Since Morales would be
going to Manila, he left the keys to the
store with the caretakers. It appears that
the caretakers took the gun from the
drawer and placed it on top of a table.
Attracted by the sight of the gun, the
young Alfred got hold of the same.
Matibag asked Alfred to return the gun.
The latter followed and handed the gun to
Matibag. It went off, the bullet hitting the
young Alfred in the head.
A criminal case for homicide was filed
against Matibag. Matibag, however, was
acquitted of the charge against him
because of the exempting circumstance of
“accident” under Art. 12, par. 4 of the RPC.
By agreement of the parties, the evidence
adduced in the criminal case for homicide
against Matibag was reproduced and
adopted by them as part of their evidence
in the instant case.
The trial court rendered its decision in
favor of petitioners, ordering the
defendant to pay plaintiffs indemnity for
the death of Alfred, actual damages for
the hospitalization and burial, expenses
incurred by the plaintiffs, compensatory
damages, MD and AF.
Respondent appealed to the CA, which
reversed the trial court’s Decision and
absolved respondent from civil liability
under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. MR
denied, hence this petition.
ISSUE: Was Morales negligent?
HELD: Petition granted. The CA decision
is set aside and the trial court’s Decision
reinstated.

YES
This case for damages arose out of the
accidental shooting of petitioners’ son.
Under Article 1161 of the Civil Code,
petitioners may enforce their claim for
damages based on the civil liability
arising from the crime under Article 100
of the RPC or they may opt to file an
independent civil action for damages
under the Civil Code. In this case, instead
of enforcing their claim for damages in
the homicide case filed against Matibag,
petitioners opted to file an independent
civil action for damages against
respondent whom they alleged was
Matibag’s employer. Petitioners based
their claim for damages under Articles
2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code.
**
Unlike the subsidiary liability of the
employer under Article 103 of the RPC,
the liability of the employer, or any
person for that matter, under Article 2176
of the Civil Code is primary and direct,
based on a person’s own negligence.
Article 2176 states:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission
causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for
the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties,
is called quasi-delict and is governed by
the provisions of this Chapter.
This case involves the accidental
discharge of a firearm inside a gun store.
Under PNP Circular No. 9, entitled the
“Policy on Firearms and Ammunition
10 | TORTS CASES 12/13/18 JESSIE MARIE DELA PEÑA
Dealership/Repair,” a person who is in
the business of purchasing and selling of
firearms and ammunition must maintain
basic security and safety requirements of
a gun dealer, otherwise his License to
Operate Dealership will be suspended or
canceled.
Indeed, a higher degree of care is
required of someone who has in his
possession or under his control an
instrumentality extremely dangerous in
character, such as dangerous weapons or
substances. Such person in possession or
control of dangerous instrumentalities
has the duty to take exceptional
precautions to prevent any injury being
done thereby. Unlike the ordinary affairs
of life or business which involve little or
no risk, a business dealing with
dangerous weapons requires the exercise
of a higher degree of care.
As a gun store owner, respondent is
presumed to be knowledgeable about
firearms safety and should have known
never to keep a loaded weapon in his
store to avoid unreasonable risk of harm
or injury to others. Respondent has the
duty to ensure that all the guns in his
store are not loaded. Firearms should be
stored unloaded and separate from
ammunition when the firearms are not
needed for ready-access defensive use.
With more reason, guns accepted by the
store for repair should not be loaded
precisely because they are defective and
may cause an accidental discharge such as
what happened in this case. Respondent
was clearly negligent when he accepted
the gun for repair and placed it inside the
drawer without ensuring first that it was
not loaded. In the first place, the defective
gun should have been stored in a vault.
Before accepting the defective gun for
repair, respondent should have made
sure that it was not loaded to prevent any
untoward accident. Indeed, respondent
should never accept a firearm from
another person, until the cylinder or
action is open and he has personally
checked that the weapon is completely
unloaded. For failing to insure that the
gun was not loaded, respondent himself
was negligent. Furthermore, it was not
shown in this case whether respondent
had a License to Repair which authorizes
him to repair defective firearms to restore
its original composition or enhance or
upgrade firearms.
Clearly, respondent did not exercise the
degree of care and diligence required of a
good father of a family, much less the
degree of care required of someone
dealing with dangerous weapons, as
would exempt him from liability in this
case.
12. Taylor vs Manila Railroad, 16 Phil 8
David Taylor was a 15 year old boy who
spent time as a cabin boy at sea; he was
also able to learn some principles of
mechanical engineering and mechanical
drawing from his dad’s office (his dad was
a mechanical engineer); he was also
employed as a mechanical draftsman
earning P2.50 a day – all said, Taylor was
mature well beyond his age.
One day in 1905, he and another boy
entered into the premises of Manila
Electric power plant where they found
20-30 blasting caps which they took
home. In an effort to explode the said
caps, Taylor experimented until he
succeeded in opening the caps and then
 he lighted it using a match which resulted
to the explosion of the caps causing
severe injuries to his companion and to
Taylor losing one eye.
Taylor sued Manila Electric alleging that
because the company left the caps
exposed to children, they are liable for
damages due to the company’s
negligence.
ISSUE: Whether or not Manila Electric is
liable for damages.
HELD: No. The SC reiterated the elements
of quasi delict as follows:
(1) Damages to the plaintiff.
(2) Negligence by act or omission of
which defendant personally, or some
person for whose acts it must respond,
was guilty.
(3) The connection of cause and effect
between the negligence and the damage.
In the case at bar, it is true that Manila
Electric has been negligent in disposing
off the caps which they used for the
power plant, and that said caps caused
damages to Taylor. However, the causal
connection between the company’s
negligence and the injuries sustained by
Taylor is absent. It is in fact the direct acts
of Taylor which led to the explosion of the
caps as he even, in various experiments
and in multiple attempts, tried to explode
the caps. It is from said acts that led to the
explosion and hence the injuries.
Taylor at the time of the accident was
well-grown youth of 15, more mature
11 | TORTS CASES 12/13/18 JESSIE MARIE DELA PEÑA
both mentally and physically than the
average boy of his age; he had been to sea
as a cabin boy; was able to earn P2.50 a
day as a mechanical draftsman thirty days
after the injury was incurred; and the
record discloses throughout that he was
exceptionally well qualified to take care.
The evidence of record leaves no room for
doubt that he well knew the explosive
character of the cap with which he was
amusing himself. The series of
experiments made by him in his attempt
to produce an explosion admit of no other
explanation. His attempt to discharge the
cap by the use of electricity, followed by
his efforts to explode it with a stone or a
hammer, and the final success of his
endeavors brought about by the
applications of a match to the contents of
the cap, show clearly that he knew what
he was about. Nor can there be any
reasonable doubt that he had reason to
anticipate that the explosion might be
dangerous.
“The just thing is that a man should suffer
the damage which comes to him through
his own fault, and that he cannot demand
reparation therefor from another.”
13. Jarco Mktg. vs CA, 321 SCRA 377
14. Culion vs Philippines, 55 Phil 129
Facts:
Culion Ice and Fish was the registered owner of
the motor schooner, Gwendoline, which it uses for
its fishing trade. In order to save costs in running
the boat, Culion Ice decided to have the engine
changed from gasoline consumer to a crude oil
burner. Quest, general manager of Philippine
Motors, a domestic corporation engaged in
machinery engines and motors, agreed to do the
job. Upon inspection, Quest came to conclusion
that a carburetor needed to be installed. In the
course of the work, it was observed that the
carburetor was flooding and that the gasoline and
other fuel was trickling freely to the floor but this
concern was dismissed by Quest. During the boat’s
trial run, the engine stopped and upon being
started, a back fire occurred which then instantly
spread and finally engulfed Gwendoline. The crew
members safely escaped but Gwendoline was
destroyed. Culion Ice moved for the recovery of
the damages against Philippine Motors. The trial
court ruled for Culion Ice. Philippine Motor asserts
that the accident was not due to the fault of Quest.
Issue:
Whether or not Quest was negligent.
Ruling: YES.
When a person holds himself out as being
competent to do things requiring professional
skill, he will be held liable for negligence if he fails
to exhibit the care and skill of one ordinarily
skilled in the particular work which he attempts to
do. The proof shows that Quest had had ample
experience in fixing the engines of automobiles
and tractors, but it does not appear that he was
experienced in the doing of similar work on boats.
For this reason, possibly the dripping of the
mixture form the tank on deck and the flooding of
the carburetor did not convey to his mind an
adequate impression of the danger of fire. But a
person skilled in that particular sort of work
would, we think have been sufficiently warned
from those circumstances (risks) to cause him to
take greater and adequate precautions against the
danger. In other words Quest did not use the skill
that would have been exhibited by one ordinarily
expert in repairing gasoline engines on boats.
There was here, in our opinion, on the part of
Quest, a blameworthy antecedent inadvertence to
possible harm, and this constitutes negligence.
The burning of the Gwendoline may be said to
have resulted from accident, but this accident was
in no sense an unavoidable accident. It would not
have occurred but for Quest’s carelessness or lack
of skill. The test of liability is not whether the
injury was accidental in a sense, but whether
Quest was free from blame.

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