Cir vs Liquigaz es.

The
- CTA En Banc highlighted that the amounts in th
what is appealable to the CTA is the “decision” e FAN and the FDDA were different.
ofthe CIR on disputed assessment and not the as
sessment itself. Oceanic vs CIR
- -
An assessment becomes a disputed assessment aft main issue is whether or not a demand letter for
er a tax deficiency assessments issued and signed by
taxpayer has filed its protest to the assessment in a
the administrative level. subordinate officer who was acting in behalf of t
Thereafter, the CIR either issues a he
decision on the disputed assessment or fails to a Commissioner of Internal Revenue, is deemed fin
ct on it and al and
is, therefore, considered denied. The taxpayer ma executory and subject to an appeal to the Court
y then of Tax Appeals
appeal the decision on the disputed assessment or -
the It is clear from the above provision that the act
inaction of the CIR. As such, the FDDA is not t of issuance
he only of the demand letter by the Chief of the Accoun
means that the final tax liability of a taxpayer is ts
fixed, Receivable and Billing Division does not fall und
which may then be appealed by the taxpayer. Un er any of the exceptions that have been mentioned
der the as non-delegable.
law, inaction on the part of the CIR may likewis -
e result in A demand letter for payment of delinquent taxes
the finality of a taxpayer’s tax liability as it is d may be
eemed a considered a decision on a disputed or protested
denial of the protest filed by the latter, which m assessment. The determination on whether or not
ay also be appealed before the CTA. a
- demand letter is final is conditioned upon the lan
It is undisputed that the FDDA merely showed L guage used or the tenor of the letter being sent to the
iquigaz’ taxpayer
tax liabilities without any details on the specific -
transactions which gave rise to its supposed tax In this case, the letter of demand dated January
deficiencies. While it provided for the legal bases 24, 1991,
of the assessment, it fell short of informing unquestionably constitutes the final action taken b
Liquigaz of the factual y the
bases thereof. Thus, the FDDA as regards the E Bureau of Internal Revenue on petitioner’s reques
WT and FBT tax deficiency did not t for
comply with the requirement in Section 3.1.6 of reconsideration when it reiterated the tax deficien
RR No. 12- cy
99, as amended, for failure to inform Liquigaz o assessments due from petitioner, and requested its
f the factual basis thereof. The CIR erred in claiming payment. Failure to do so would result in the “is
that Liquigaz was informed of suance of a
the factual bases of the assessment because the F warrant of distraint and levy to enforce its collec
DDA tion
made reference to the PAN and FAN/FLD, whic without further notice.”11 In addition, the letter c
h were ontained a notation indicating that petitioner’s
accompanied by details of the alleged discrepanci request for
reconsideration had been denied for lack of supp only on Ap 7, 1965, when theprivate respondent was
orting documents. definitely informed of the impliedrejection of the said
- protest and the warrant was finallyserved on it.
The demand letter received by petitioner verily si Hence, when the appeal was filed on April 23, 1965,
gnified a only 20 days of the reglementary period had
character of finality. Therefore, it was tantamount beenconsumed.
to a
rejection of the request for reconsideration. As co Yabes vs Flojo
rrectly - Doroteo Yabes in a letter dated September
held by the Court of Tax Appeals, “while the de 18, 1962, that the latter’s request for reinvestiga
nial of the tion was denied on the ground that he has “not
protest was in the form of a demand letter, the submitted any evidence to offset the findings of
notation in this
the said letter making reference to the protest fil Office as to warrant a reinvestigation thereof”;12
ed by but
petitioner clearly shows the intention of the respo eight days later or on September 26, 1962, the
ndent to make it as [his] final decision.” Commissioner wrote a letter advising Doroteo
Yabes that “the administrative appeal x x x will
Advertising vs CA be held in abeyance pending the resolution of the
The taxpayer received on June 18, 1973 and March issues in a similar case
5,1974 the deficiency assessments herein. The -
warrants ofdistraint were served upon it on April 18 As to the issue of whether or not the assessment
and May 25, 1973or within five years after the made
assessment of the tax.Obviously, the warrants were by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue against
issued to interrupt the five-year prescriptive period. the deceased taxpayer Doroteo Yabes, as contained
Its enforcement was notimplemented because of the in the letter
pending protests of thetaxpayer and its requests for dated March 27, 1962, has become final, executo
withdrawal of the warrantswhich were eventually ry and
resolved in Commissioner Plana’sletter of May 23, incontestable, after Doroteo Yabes had received t
1979.It should be noted that the Commissioner did he
notinstitute any judicial proceeding to collect the tax. Commissioner’s letter dated August 3, 1962, den
Herelied on the warrants of distraint to interrupt the ying the
runningof the statute of limitations. He gave the latter’s protest against the said assessment on Se
taxpayer ampleopportunity to contest the assessments ptember
but at the sametime safeguarded the Government’s 18, 1962 and his failure to appeal therefrom with
interest by means ofthe warrants of distraint. in the 30day period contemplated under Section
11, of Republic Act
CIR VS ALGUE 1125, We are constrained to agree with the Cour
- a warrant of distraint andlevy was presented to the t of Tax
private respondent, through itscounsel, Atty. Alberto Appeals, when it denied the Commissioner’s moti
Guevara, Jr., who refused to receiveit on the ground on to dismiss CTA Case No. 2216
of the pending protest -
- As the Court of Tax Appeals correctly noted,11 the There is no reason for Us to disagree from or re
protestfiled by private respondent was not pro forma verse the
and wasbased on strong legal considerations. It thus Court of Tax Appeals’ conclusion that under the
had the effectof suspending on January 18, 1965, circumstances of this case, what may be consider
when it was filed, thereglementary period which ed as final
started on the date theassessment was received, viz., decision or assessment of the Commissioner is th
Jaauary 14, 1965. Theperiod started running again e filing of the complaint for collection in the
respondent Court of First immediatepayment of a tax deficiency assessment
Instance of Cagayan, the summons of which was previously made, istantamount to a denial of the
served on taxpayer’s request forreconsideration. Such letter
petitioners on January 20, 1971, and that therefor amounts to a final decision ona disputed assessment
e the and is thus appealable to the Courtof Tax Appeals (C
appeal with the Court of Tax Appeals in CTA C
ase No. 2216 was filed on time LASCONA LAND CO., INC., petitioner, vs.
COMMIS- SIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
CIR VS UNION SHIPPING respondent.
- - Whetherthe subject assessment has become final,
The main thrust of this petition is that the issuan executory anddemandable due to the failure of
ce of a petitioner to file an appealbefore the CTA within
warrant of distraint and levy is proof of the final thirty (30) days from the lapse of theOne Hundred
ity of an Eighty (180)-day period pursuant to Section228 of
assessment because it is the most drastic action the NIRC.
of all - Therefore, as in Section 228, when the law provided
media of enforcing the collection of tax, and is t forthe remedy to appeal the inaction of the CIR, it did
antamount notintend to limit it to a single remedy of filing of an
to an outright denial of a motion for reconsiderat appealafter the lapse of the 180-day prescribed
ion of an period. Precisely,when a taxpayer protested an
assessment. Among others, petitioner contends tha assessment, he naturallyexpects the CIR to decide
t the either positively or negatively. Ataxpayer cannot be
warrant of distraint and levy was issued after res prejudiced if he chooses to wait for thefinal decision
pondent of the CIR on the protested assessment. Moreso,
corporation filed a request for reconsideration of because the law and jurisprudence have
subject alwayscontemplated a scenario where the CIR will
assessment, thus constituting petitioner’s final dec decide on theprotested assessment.It must be
ision in the disputed assessments emphasized, however, that in case of theinaction of
- Under the circumstances, the Commissioner of the CIR on the protested assessment, while
InternalRevenue, not having clearly signified his final wereiterate—the taxpayer has two options, either: (1)
action on thedisputed assessment, legally the period file apetition for review with the CTA within 30 days
to appeal has notcommenced to run. Thus, it was only after theexpiration of the 180-day period; or (2) await
when privaterespondent received the summons on the the finaldecision of the Commissioner on the
civil suit forcollection of deficiency income on disputed assessmentand appeal such final decision to
December 28, 1978 thatthe period to appeal the CTA within 30 daysafter the receipt of a copy of
commenced to run.The request for reinvestigation such decision, these optionsare mutually exclusive
and reconsideration wasin effect considered denied and resort to one bars theapplication of the other
by petitioner when the latterfiled a civil suit for
collection of deficiency income. So thaton January In RCBC v. CIR,12 the Court has held that in case
10, 1979 when private respondent filed theappeal theCommissioner failed to act on the disputed
with the Court of Tax Appeals, it consumed a totalof assessmentwithin the 180-day period from date of
only thirteen (13) days well within the thirty day submission ofdocuments, a taxpayer can either: (1)
periodto appeal pursuant to Section 11 of R.A. 1125. file a petition forreview with the Court of Tax
Appeals within 30 days afterthe expiration of the
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, 180-day period; or (2) await the finaldecision of the
petitioner,vs. ISABELA CULTURAL Commissioner on the disputed assessments and
CORPORATION, respondent. appealsuch final decision to the Court of Tax Appeals
- A final demand letter from the Bureau of within 30days after receipt of a copy of such
InternalRevenue, reiterating to the taxpayer the decision.
PAGCOR VS BIR dated August 2, 2005 issued by respondent and
- which
Following the verba legis doctrine, the law must petitioner received on August 4, 2005. Under the
be
applied exactly as worded since it is clear, plain, abovequoted Section 228 of the 1997 Tax Code,
and petitioner had 30 days to appeal respondent’s denial
unequivocal.15 A textual reading of Section 3.1.5 of its protest to the CTA.
gives a protesting taxpayer like PAGCOR only Since petitioner received the denial of its adminis
three options: 1. trative
If the protest is wholly or partially denied by th protest on August 4, 2005, it had until Septembe
e CIR r 3, 2005
or his authorized representative, then the taxpayer to file a petition for review before the CTA Divi
may sion. It filed
appeal to the CTA within 30 days from receipt one, however, on October 20, 2005, hence, it wa
of the whole or partial denial of the protest. 2. s filed out of
If the protest is wholly or partially denied by th time. For a motion for reconsideration of the
e CIR’s authorized representative, then the taxpayer denial of the
may appeal to administrative protest does not toll the 30-
the CIR within 30 days from receipt of the whol day period to appeal to the CTA.
e or partial denial of the protest. 3.
If the CIR or his authorized representative failed Alliedd vs CIR
to act -
upon the protest within 180 days from submissio In this case, records show that petitioner disputed
n of the the
required supporting documents, then the taxpayer PAN but not the Formal Letter of Demand with
may appeal to the CTA within 30 days from the lapse Assessment Notices. Nevertheless, we cannot bla
of the 180day period. me
- petitioner for not filing a protest against the For
To further clarify the three options: A whole or mal Letter
partial of Demand with Assessment Notices since the la
denial by the CIR’s authorized representative ma nguage
y be used and the tenor of the demand letter indicate
appealed to the CIR or the CTA. A whole or pa that it is
rtial denial the final decision of the respondent on the matte
by the CIR may be appealed to the CTA. The C r. We have time and again reminded the CIR to
IR or the indicate, in a clear and
CIR’s authorized representative’s failure to act m unequivocal language, whether his action on a di
ay be sputed
appealed to the CTA. There is no mention of an assessment constitutes his final determination ther
appeal to eon in
the CIR from the failure to act by the CIR’s aut order for the taxpayer concerned to determine wh
horized representative. en his or
her right to appeal to the tax court accrues.26 Vi
Fishwealth vs CIR ewed in the
- light of the foregoing, respondent is now estoppe
In the case at bar, petitioner’s administrative prot d from
est claiming that he did not intend the Formal Letter
was denied by Final Decision on Disputed Asses of Demand with Assessment Notices to be a final
sment decision.