Chapter 1 immovable property

Art. 415. All things which may be the object of appropriation are considered either:

1. Immovable or real property

2. Movable or personal property

Chapter 1

415 immovable the Ff are immovable

1. Land, buildings, roads and constructions of all kind adhered to the soil (LBR-CAK-AS)
2. Trees plants and growing fruits, while they are attached to the land or from an integral part of
an immovable. (TPGF-WAL or FIPI)
3. Everything attached to an immovable in a fixed manner, in such a way that it cannot be
separated therefrom without breaking the material or deterioration of the object.
(EAI-FM-CBS-w/o BMDO)
4. Statutes, reliefs paintings or other objects for use or ornamentation, placed in buildings or on
lands by the owner of the immovable in such a manner that it reveals the intention to attach
them permanently to the tenements. (SRP OOUO PBL OI RIAPT)
5. Machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement for
an industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land, and which tend
directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works; (MRII IOT IW w/c CB PL TDMNSIW)

6. Animal houses, pigeon houses, beehives fishponds or breeding places of similar nature, in case
their owner has place them or preserves them with the intention to have them permanently
attached to the land, and forming a permanent part of It; the animals in these places are
included;

7. Fertilizers actually used on a piece of land;

8. Mines, quarries and slag dumps, while the matter thereof forms part of the bed, and waters
either running or stagnant.

9. Docks and structures which, though floating, are intended by their nature and object to
remained at a fixed place on a river, lake or coast;

10. Contracts for public works and servitudes and other real rights over immovable property.

By nature essence and nature are ands and roads in paragraph 1

immovable or cannot be
moved from one place to
another,
By incorporation treated as immovable by
reason of their attachment or
incorporation to an immovable
of Article 415 and mines,
quarries and slug dumps in
paragraph 8 of Article 415
such as buildings and
constructions of all kinds
adhered to the soil
 in such manner as to be an
integral part thereof, while they are still attached to
the land or form an integral
part of an immovable; and
those that are attached to an
immovable in the manner
provided for in paragraph 3 of
Article 415;
by destination those which are essentially 4,5,6,7,9.
movable, but by the purpose
for which they have been
placed in an immovable,
partake of the nature of the
latter because of the added
utility derived therefrom,

by analogy or by law 10.

Art. 416. The following things are deemed to be personal property:

(1) Those movables susceptible of appropriation which are not included in the preceding article;

(2) Real property which by any special provision of law is considered as personalty;

(3) Forces of nature which are brought under control by science; and

(4) In general, all things which can be transported from place to place without impairment of the real
property to which they are fixed. (335a)

Art. 417. The following are also considered as personal property:

(1) Obligations and actions which have for their object movables or demandable sums; and

(2) Shares of stock of agricultural, commercial and industrial entities, although they may have real
estate. (336a)

§ 15. Movable Property

“personal” property depends upon the meaning and application which our law gives to the term “real”
property. Thus, under our law, all properties which are not real are personal. Hence, while certain
property may, by its nature, be moved from one place to another, it will not be considered as movable
property if it is classifi ed as immovable property under the provisions of Article 415 because of the
purpose for which it has been placed in an immovable, in which case, it shall partake of the nature of the
latter and shall be classifi ed as an immovable property by destination.

[15.2] What May Be Considered “Movable” Property, In General

all things susceptible of appropriation which can be transported from place to place without impairment
of the real property to which they are fixed and not included in the enumeration in Article 415 are
classified as “personal” or “movable” property

By way of example: if certain machineries for use in an industry or works are placed on the tenement
not by the owner of the tenement and they are not attached to the tenement in a fixed manner but
can, in fact, be separated therefrom without causing substantial injury, they are considered as movable
property.

 ungathered fruits referred to in the second paragraph of Article 415 shall be treated as personal
property
 A “chose in action” means, literally, a thing in action,112 and is the right of bringing an
action,113 or a right to recover a

Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:

(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed
by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;

(2) Those which belongs to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public
service or for the development of the national wealth. (339a)

§ 18. Property of State: Public Dominion

[18.1] Kinds of Property of Public Dominion Pertaining to the State In relation to the State, there are
three kinds of property of public dominion:

(1) those that are intended for public use;

(2) those that are intended for some public service; and

(3) those that are intended for the development of national wealth.

[18.2] “Public Dominion,” as Referring To “Public Ownership”

In a sense, the term “public dominion” means ownership by the public in generalor “public ownership
“special collective ownership for the general use and enjoyment, an application to the satisfaction of
collective needs, and resides in the social group.”

Viewed in this light, the State holds these properties not in the concept of an ownerbut only in
consequence of its territorial integrity.

Hence, the relation of the State to these properties arises from the fact that the State is the juridical
representative of the social group, and as such it takes care of them, preserves them and regulates their
use for the general welfare.

intended for public use or for some public service mentioned in paragraph numbers (1) and (2) of Article

the latter may not make them the object of commerce unless they are properly converted into
patrimonial properties pursuant to the provisions of Article 422 of the New Civil Code.
[18.3] “Public Dominion,” as Referring To “State Ownership” In another sense, the term “public
dominion” may also mean properties or things held by the State by regalian right.128 Under Section 2 of
Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, which reaffi rms the regalian doctrine or jura regalia
earlier enshrined in the 1935 Philippine Constitution, all lands of the public domain as well as all natural
resources are owned by the State.129

Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, for example, the Supreme Court held that submerged lands are part
of the State’s inalienable natural resources and classified as property of public dominion.

The Public Estates Authority (PEA) is the central implementing agency tasked to undertake
reclamation projects nationwide. It took over the leasing and selling functions of the DENR
(Department of Environmental and Natural Resources) insofar as reclaimed or about to be reclaimed
foreshore lands are concerned.
PEA sought the transfer to the Amari Coastal Bay and Development Corporation, a private corporation,
of the ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands. PEA also sought to have 290.156 hectares
of submerged areas of Manila Bay to Amari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the transfer is valid.
HELD: No. To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to Amari as
private lands will sanction a gross violation of the constitutional ban on private corporations from
acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
The Supreme Court affirmed that the 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom
Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public
domain. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources
of the public domain. The transfer (as embodied in a joint venture agreement) to AMARI, a private
corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands, is void for being contrary to Section
3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind
of alienable land of the public domain. Furthermore, since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to
Amari ownership of 290.156 hectares of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for
being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of
natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain.
[18.4] “Public Ownership” Distinguished From “State Ownership” Property of public dominion falling
under the concept of State ownership by virtue of regalian right must be distinguished from property
of public dominion in the concept of public ownership. In the latter, not even the State may make them
the object of commerce. Hence, they cannot be leased, donated, sold or be the object of any
contract.131 With respect to natural resources, they are not, however, totally outside the commerce of
man as the Constitution allows the State to enter into co-production, joint venture or production-sharing
agreements with private individuals or corporations for their exploration, development and
utilization.132 With respect to fi shponds, for example, which are likewise owned by the State,133
they may be leased although they may not be alienated. Under Section 45 of R.A. No. 8550, otherwise
known as “The Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998,” public lands such as tidal swamps, mangroves,
marshes, foreshore lands and ponds suitable for fishery operations shall not be disposed or alienated
but they may be the subject matter of a fi shpond lease agreement.

Manila Lodge No. 761 v. Court of Appeals 73 SCRA 162 (1976) In 1905, the Philippine Commission
enacted Act No. 1360 authorizing the City of Manila to reclaim a portion of the Manila Bay and the
reclaimed area was to form part of the Luneta extension. The Act likewise provided that the reclaimed
area “shall be the property of the City of Manila.” The City of Manila was likewise authorized to lease
the northern side of the reclaimed area for a hotel site. Subsequently, the Philippine Commission passed
Act No. 1657, amending Act No. 1360, to authorized the City of Manila to lease or sell the portion set
aside as a hotel site. After the reclamation, the City of Manila sold a portion of the reclaimed land
(located on the southern end) to Manila Lodge which, in turn, sold the same to Tarlac Development
Corp. After such purchase, the City of Manila fi led a petition in court for the re-annotation of its right
to repurchase the property sold to Manila Lodge, which petition was granted by the court. Thereafter,
the TDC fi led an action to be declared the purchaser of the property in good faith. After trial, the trial
court found the subject land to be part of the “public park or plaza” and, therefore, part of the public
dominion. Consequently, the court declared the sale of the subject land by the City of Manila to Manila
Lodge void. Both Manila Lodge and TDC appealed from the said decision. One of the issues raised by
the appellants was that in order that the character of property for public use may be so attached to a
plaza, the latter must be actually constructed or at least laid out as such. They contended that the subject
property was not yet constructed as a plaza or at least laid out as a plaza when it was sold by the City
of Manila. On this particular issue, the Supreme Court held that in order to be property of public
dominion an intention to devote it to public use is suffi cient. The Court explained: “It is not necessary,
therefore, that a plaza be already constructed or laid out as a plaza in order that it be considered property
for public use. It is suffi cient that it be intended to be such. In the case at bar, it has been shown that
the intention of the lawmaking body in giving to the City of Manila the extension to the Luneta was
not a grant to it of patrimonial property but a grant for public use as a plaza.”

[18.5] Intent to Devote, Sufficient

For a property of the State to fall under public dominion, it is not necessary that the same be actually
used for some public use or for some public service. In the case of Manila Lodge No. 761 v. Court
of Appeals,134 the Supreme Court clarified that in order to be property of public dominion an intention
to devote it to public use is sufficient and it is not necessary that it must actually be used as such.
Hence, it matters not that the property is not actually devoted for public use or for some public service.
If the property has been intended for such use or service, and it has not been devoted to other uses and
no measures have been adopted which amount to a withdrawal thereof from public use or service, the
same remains property of public dominion, the fact that it is not actually devoted for public use or
service notwithstanding.

[18.6] Public Use and Public Service,

Distinguished In Villarico v. Sarmiento,137 the Supreme Court defined the term “public use” as that
“use which is not confined to privileged individuals, but is open to the indefinite public.” Hence,
properties for public use may be distinguished from properties intended for public service in that the
former may be used indiscriminately by the public while the latter, although used for the benefit of
the public, cannot be used indiscriminately by anyone but only by those that are authorized by
proper authority.

(A) Roads [19.2] Roads The “roads” referred to under Article 420(1) of the New Civil Code are
the national highways and roads constructed and maintained by the national government
through the Department of Public Works and Highways.
Provincial, city and municipal roads and streets, on the other hand, are properties of public
dominion of the local government unit concerned and are governed by Article 424 of the Civil
Code and the provisions of the Local Government Code.
(B) (B) Canals [19.3] Canals A “canal” is usually an artificial waterway, drainage, irrigation
or navigation.
In the case of Santos v. Moreno, the Supreme Court, quoting Article 339(1) of the Spanish Civil
Code of 1889,141 held that “canals constructed by the State and devoted to public use are of public
ownership” (or of public dominion). Conversely, said the Court, “canals constructed by private
persons within their private lands and devoted exclusively for private use must be of private
ownership.” In the Santos case, the canals involved were declared to be of private ownership
since they were constructed by the owners of hacienda San Esteban for their exclusive use
and prohibited the public from using them.
In the case, however, of Mercado v. Municipal President of Macabebe, while the canal involved
(Batasan-Limasan) was originally dug by the estate’s owner, the Supreme Court held that he had
lost any right over it by prescription since he allowed said canal to be used by the public for
navigation and fi shing purposes for a period of twenty-two (22) years. In this case, the canal could
have been of private ownership had not its builder lost it by prescription.
In Bautista v. Alarcon, the plaintiff therein sought the injunction against the defendants who
allegedly constructed a dam across a public canal which conveyed water from the Obando River
to fishponds belonging to several persons. The canal was situated within a public land. In sustaining
the injunction granted by the lower court, the Supreme Court said: “No private person has a right
to usurp possession of a watercourse, branch of a river, or lake of the public domain and use,
unless it shall have been proved that he constructed the same within property of his exclusive
ownership, and such usurpation constitutes a violation of the legal provisions which explicitly
exclude such waterways from the exclusive use or possession of a private party.” (Italics supplied)
In view of the foregoing cases, the rule appears to be that if a canal is constructed by private person
within his private land and devoted it exclusively for private use, the same is of private ownership.
However, if the canal is situated within a public property or the same is constructed by the
State and devoted to public use, such canal is property of public dominion.

Rivers [19.4]

(C) “River” is a Composite Term Although Article 420 of the New Civil Code speaks only of
rivers and banks, “rivers” is a composite term which includes:
 (1) the running waters,

(2) the bed, and

(3) the banks.

All these constitute the river. Since a river is but one compound concept, it should have only
one nature, i.e., it should either be totally public or completely private. And since rivers are
of public ownership, it is implicit that all the three component elements be of the same nature
also. However, to dispel all possible doubts, Article 420, paragraph 1 of the New Civil Code
and Article 5, paragraph (a) of the Water Code of the Philippines, expressly make all three
elements properties of public dominion.

Natural Bed of a River The bed of the river is also classified as property of the public
dominion.

In the case of Binalay v. Manalo, it was held that the buyer did not acquire private ownership
of the bed of the eastern branch of the Cagayan River even if it was included in the deeds of
absolute sale executed by the sellers since the sellers “could not have validly sold land
that constituted property of public dominion.”

[19.6] Extent of River Bed

What is the extent of the river bed? Article 70 of the Law of Waters of August 3, 1866 defines
the “natural bed” or “channel” of a creek or river as “the ground covered by its waters during
the highest floods.”150 The Supreme Court had the occasion to apply this provision in the case
of Binalay.151 In

(D) Ports [19.9] Ports sea ports and air ports

MIAA v. CA the fact that the air ports are collecting terminal fees does not do away with its
character as public domain The operation by the government of a tollway does not change the
character of the road as one for public use. Someone must pay for the maintenance of the road,
either the public indirectly through the taxes they pay the government, or only those among
the public who actually use the road through the toll fees they pay upon using the road. The
tollway system is even a more effi cient and equitable manner of taxing the public for the
maintenance of public roads.

The charging of fees to the public does not determine the character of the property whether
it is of public dominion or not. Article 420 of the Civil Code defines property of public
dominion as one ‘intended for public use.’ Even if the government collects toll fees, the road
is still ‘intended for public use’ if anyone can use the road under the same terms and conditions
as the rest of the public. The charging of fees, the limitation on the kind of vehicles that can
use the road, the speed restrictions and other conditions for the use of the road do not affect
the public character of the road.”

[19.11] Shore, Property of Public Dominion Shores are properties of public dominion. Thus,
when the sea advances and private properties are permanently invaded by the waves, the
 properties so invaded become part of the shore or beach and they then pass to the public
domain. The owner thus dispossessed does not retain any right to the natural products
resulting from their new nature; it is a de facto case of eminent domain, and not subject to
indemnity. This process whereby private property is converted into property for public use
through the natural action of the sea and the abandonment by the owner has been called
“natural expropriation.”

 Shore, Defined “Shore” is understood to be that space which is alternately covered and
uncovered by water with the movements of the tides.162 Its interior or terrestrial limit
is the line reached by the highest equinoctial tides.163 Where the tides are not
appreciable, the shore begins on the land-side at the line reached by the sea during
ordinary storms or tempests.

Thus, in Cagampang v. Morano,165 the Supreme Court held that the subject property is part
of the shore and public property as the same is covered by the highest tides from May to July
and there is no showing that these tides are due to abnormal conditions

Shore, Property of Public Dominion Shores are properties of public dominion.166 Thus,
when the sea advances and private properties are permanently invaded by the waves, the
properties so invaded become part of the shore or beach and they then pass to the public
domain. The owner thus dispossessed does not retain any right to the natural products resulting
from their new nature; it is a de facto case of eminent domain, and not subject to indemnity.
This process whereby private property is converted into property for public use through the
natural action of the sea and the abandonment by the owner has been called “natural
expropriation.”

which, quoting Corpus Juris, is “that part of the land adjacent to the sea which is alternately covered
and left dry by the ordinary fl ow of the tides.” Thus, in the Ponce cases, the Supreme Court upheld the
Cebu City ordinance but only with respect to the reclamation of the foreshore areas, and nullifi ed the
same with respect to the submerged areas
In Republic v. Court of Appeals,179 the Supreme Court declared as invalid the ordinances passed by
the Pasay City and the reclamation agreements it entered into with Republic Real Estate Corporation
on the ground that the subject matter thereof were submerged lands and not foreshore lands. The Court
held that the term foreshore lands cannot be unduly stretched to include the submerged areas. The
Court reiterated what was said in the Ponce cases that the term “foreshore” refers to “that part of the
land adjacent to the sea which is alternately covered and left dry by the ordinary fl ow of the tides.”
In Chavez v. Public Estates Authority,180 the Court declared as invalid the joint venture agreement
between Public Estates Authority (PEA) and Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation (Amari).
In said case, PEA entered into a joint venture agreement with Amari obligating itself to convey title
and possession over 750 hectares of land, 592.15 hectares or 78% of the total area are still submerged
and permanently under the waters of Manila Bay. Under the said agreement, the PEA conveyed to
Amari the submerged lands even before their actual reclamation, although the documentation of the
deed of transfer and issuance of the certifi cates of title would be made only after actual reclamation.
A question arose with respect to the validity of this transaction. In declaring the contract to be invalid
the Supreme Court held: “Submerged lands, like the waters (sea or bay) above them, are part of the
State’s inalienable natural resources. Submerged lands are property of public dominion, absolutely
inalienable and outside the commerce of man. This is also true with respect to foreshore lands. Any
sale of submerged or foreshore lands is void being contrary to the Constitution.”
(G) Lakes [19.14]
Ownership of Lakes
Natural lakes and lagoons and their beds belong to the State and are part of public dominion. Lakes
and lagoons naturally occurring on private lands also belong to the State.
Hence, lakes and lagoons developed by a private person on private lands are of private ownership.
The Water Code of the Philippines, however, prohibits any person from developing a lake, stream or
spring for recreational purposes without first obtaining a permit from the National Water Resources
Council.
The Laguna de Bay has long been recognized as a lake. As such, the accretion occurring therein, by
mandate of Article 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, belongs to the owner of the land
contiguous thereto.
[19.15] Natural Bed of Lakes, Defined
What is the natural bed or basin of lakes?
In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court defined the extent of a lake bed, as
follows: “The natural bed or basin of lakes, ponds, or pools, is the ground covered by their waters when
at their highest ordinary depth.”
In Republic v. Court of Appeals, the Republic, thru the Director of Lands, opposed the registration of
a parcel of land with an area of 17,311 square meters and situated near the shore of Laguna de
Bay,about twenty (20) meters therefrom, on the ground that such is part of the public domain and
therefore not registrable.
The Director of Lands contends that since the land sought to be registered is covered with water
four to five months a year, the same is part of the lake bed of Laguna de Bay, or is at least, a
foreshore land.
The rise in the water level of the Laguna de Bay, as observed four to five months a year during the
rainy season, is caused by the rains.
It is the rains which bring about the inundation of a portion of the land in question. Applying the
provisions of Article 74 of the Law of Waters of 1866, the Supreme Court held that since the rise in
the water level which causes the submersion of the land occurs during a shorter period (four to five
months a year) than the level of the water at which the land is completely dry, the latter should be
considered as the “highest ordinary depth” of Laguna de Bay. Therefore, the Court concludes, the land
sought to be registered is not part of the bed or basin of Laguna de Bay, and therefore capable of
registration as private property.
A creek is defined as a recess or arm extending from a river and participating in the ebb and fl
ow of the sea. It is a property belonging to the public domain which is not susceptible to private
appropriation and acquisityive prescription and, as public water, it cannot be registered under the
Torrens System in the name of any individual.194 It is included in the phrase “others of similar
character” in paragraph 1 of Article 420 of the New Civil Code.
§ 20. Property of Public Dominion: For Public Service All properties of the State that are devoted or
intended for some public service are likewise part of the public dominion.196 As earlier explained,
these properties cannot be used indiscriminately by anyone but only by those that are authorized by
proper authority. A good example of a property falling under this category is the Roppongi property.
The Roppongi property is one of the four (4) properties in Japan acquired by the Philippine government
under the Reparations Agreement entered into with Japan in 1956. Under the said agreement, the
Roppongi property was specifi cally designated to house the Philippine Embassy. As such, the nature
of the Roppongi lot as property for public service is expressly spelled out. It is dictated by the terms of
the Reparations Agreement and the corresponding contract of procurement which bind the Philippine
government and the Japanese government. As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is
outside the commerce of men and cannot be alienated.
§ 21. Property of Public Dominion:
For the Development of National Wealth Property of public dominion pertaining and/or belonging to
the State refers not only to property devoted to public use or to some public service, but also to property
devoted to the development of the national wealth. This class of property constituted property of
public dominion although employed for some economic or commercial activity to increase the
national wealth.
The Laws of the Indies were followed by the Ley Hipotecaria or the Mortgage Law of 1893. The
Spanish Mortgage Law provided for the systematic registration of titles and deeds as well as
possessory claims.
The Royal Decree of 1894 or the “Maura Law” partly amended the Mortgage Law as well as the
Law of the Indies. The Maura Law was the last Spanish land law promulgated in the Philippines. It
required the “adjustment” or registration of all agricultural lands, otherwise the lands would revert to
the State.

(A) Natural Resources

[21.2] Fishponds

 Fishponds are owned by the State. The 1987 Constitution specifically declares that all
lands of the public domain, waters, fisheries, and other natural resources belong to the
State. Included here are the fishponds, which may not be alienated but only leased.
 Possession thereof, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership
 Under Section 45 of R.A. No. 8550, otherwise known as “The Philippine Fisheries
Code of 1998,” public lands such as tidal swamps, mangroves, marshes, foreshore
lands and ponds suitable for fishery operations shall not be disposed or alienated. They
may, however, be the subject matter of a fishpond lease agreement.

[21.3] Watershed Reservation

A watershed reservation is also a natural resource and cannot therefore be alienated. A positive act
(e.g., an official proclamation) of the Executive Department is needed to declassify land which had
been earlier classifi ed as a watershed reservation and to convert it into alienable or disposable
land for agricultural or other purposes. Unless and until the land classified as such is released in an
official proclamation so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain,
the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.

[21.4] Submerged Lands

 Submerged lands, like the waters (sea or bay) above them, are part of the State’s inalienable natural
resources.

This is also true with respect to foreshore lands. Any sale of submerged or foreshore lands is void
being contrary to the Constitution.

(B) Lands of the Public Domain

[21.5] Classification Under Section 3 of Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, lands of the
public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands and national parks. Only
agricultural lands are allowed, however, to be alienated.

On the other hand, mineral and timber or forest lands are not subject to private ownership unless they
are first reclassified as agricultural lands and so released for alienation.

Hence, it is already a settled rule that forest lands or forest reserves are not capable of private
appropriation, and possession thereof, however long, cannot convert them into private property,
unless such lands are reclassified and considered disposable and alienable by the Director of
Forestry.

[21.6] Classification of Public Lands, Prerogative of the Executive

Agricultural public lands may be defined as those alienable portions of the lands of the public domain
which are not forest or timber, mineral, or national parks.

Their disposition is provided for under Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Sections 6-7), which states that
it is only the President, upon the recommendation of the proper department head, who has the authority
to classify the lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable, timber and mineral lands.

 The classification of public lands, therefore, is an exclusive prerogative of the Executive

Department of the Government and not of the courts.
 In the absence of such classification, the land remains as unclassifi ed land until it is released
therefrom and rendered open to disposition.
 This is in consonance with the Regalian doctrine that all lands of the public domain belong to
the State, and that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land and charged
with the conservation of such patrimony.

[21.7] When Public Lands Classified As Patrimonial Property

It is only after the Government has declared the land to be alienable and disposable agricultural lands
that the year of entry, cultivation and exclusive and adverse possession can be counted for purposes of
an imperfect title.

From the foregoing, it appears that agricultural public lands are classified as patrimonial property of
the State as soon as they are made available for alienation or disposition.

Prior to the reclassification of public lands into agricultural lands and prior to their being made
available for alienation and disposition, they form part of the property of public dominion, under
Article 420, paragraph 2, “for the development of the national wealth” and under Section 2 of Article
XII of the 1987 Constitution.232

§ 22. Characteristics of Properties of Public Dominion

The following are the characteristics of properties of public dominion:

[22.1]

1. Properties of public dominion are outside the commerce of man.2 Being outside the commerce of
man, it cannot be alienated or leased or otherwise be the subject matter of contracts.

Hence, the right of the public to use public property may not be bargained away through contract.

In Dacanay v. Asistio, for example, when certain public streets in Caloocan City were converted into
flea markets and leased to several vendors, the Supreme Court held that such leases were null and void
since a public street is property for public use hence outside the commerce of man. Being outside the
commerce of man, it may not be the subject of lease or other contract. In this case, the Court directed
the City Mayor to demolish the market stalls occupying said city streets

. In Maneclang v. Intermediate Appellant Court, the Supreme Court declared as null and void the
compromise agreement between the parties since the stipulations contained therein partake of the
nature of an adjudication of ownership in favor of one of the parties of the fishpond in dispute which
was found to be originally a creek forming a tributary of the Agno River. Being outside the commerce
of man, these properties may not be alienated.

In Laurel v. Garcia, for example, the Supreme Court held that since the Roppongi Property is a property
of public dominion it cannot be alienated. In Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, the Court voided the
joint venture agreement between PEA and Amari since the former conveyed to the latter submerged
lands, which are declared to be part of the State’s inalienable natural resources, hence, absolutely
inalienable.

In Binalay v. Manalo,240 it was held that the buyer did not acquire private ownership of the bed of
the eastern branch of the Cagayan River even if it was included in the deeds of absolute sale
executed by the sellers since the sellers “could not have validly sold land that constituted property
of public dominion.”

With respect to natural resources, however, the Constitution allows the State to enter into co-
production, joint venture or production sharing agreements with private individuals or corporations for
their exploration, development and utilization. With respect to fishponds which are likewise owned by
the State,they may be leased although they may not be alienated. Under Section 45 of R.A. No. 8550,
otherwise known as “The Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998,” public lands such as tidal swamps,
mangroves, marshes, foreshore lands and ponds suitable for fishery operations shall not be disposed or
alienated but they may be the subject matter of a fishpond lease agreement.
[22.2] They Are Not Susceptible To Private Appropriation and Acquisitive Prescription Properties of
public dominion are not susceptible to private appropriation and acquisitive prescription.

Thus, in Celestial v. Cachopero, the Court held that the petitioner’s claim of ownership over a parcel
of land which is a dried-up bed of the Salunayan Creek based on her alleged long term adverse
possession must necessarily fail since the same is a property of public dominion.

In Palomo v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that the adverse possession which may be the basis
of a grant of title in confirmation of imperfect title cases applies only to alienable lands of the public
domain. In this case, since the subject property is part of the reservation for provincial park purposes
and, thus, part of the forest zone, it is not registrable and its possession, no matter how lengthy, cannot
convert it into private property.

Since properties of public dominion are not subject to private appropriation, they cannot be registered
under the Land Registration Law and be the subject of a Torrens Title.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that the lower court cannot validly order the
registration of two lots in the names of private respondents since these lots “were portions of the bed
of the Meycauayan river and are therefore classified as property of the public domain under Article
420, paragraph 1 and Article 502, paragraph 1 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.”\ In Republic v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, the Court likewise held that the subject parcel of land, being part
of a forest reserve, cannot be registered.

Art. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character stated in the preceding article, is
patrimonial property. (340a)

§ 23. Patrimonial Property of the State

All other property of the State, which is not of the character stated in Article 420 of the New Civil Code,
is patrimonial property.

It is considered as a property of the State in what may be called the private sense.

It is said that over this kind of property the State has the same rights and has the same power of
disposition as private individuals subject, of course, to existing rules and regulations.

Thus, in Chavez v. Public Estates Authority,the Court held that “government owned lands, as long they
are patrimonial property, can be sold to private parties, whether Filipino citizens or qualified private
corporations.”

[23.1] Examples of Patrimonial Property

[23.1.1] Friar Lands; act 1120

From the beginnings of Spanish colonization up to the establishment of American sovereignty, religious
corporations had acquired large tracts of land in the Philippines, breeding feelings of unrest and
agitation among Filipino tenants occupying those lands. In order to avert any outbreak of violence, the
Philippine Bill of 1902 authorized the Insular Government to exercise the power of eminent domain over
lands which, on August 13, 1898, were owned or held by religious orders in such tracts or parcels or in
such manner as in the opinion of the Philippine Commission injuriously affected the peace and
welfare of the people. Hence, the Friar Lands Act (Act No. 1120) was passed to appease the restless
Filipinos and to curtail and diminish the influence of the Catholic Church. Thus, lands acquired by the
government from religious corporations or orders (during the Taft administration in 1903) are referred
to as “friar lands.” Friar lands over which the Government holds title are not public lands but private or
patrimonial property of the State.261 However, they can be alienated only upon proper compliance with
the requirements of Act No. 1120 or the Friar Lands Act.

[23.1.2] Alienable and Disposable Lands of the Public Domain

Alienable lands of the public domain, or those available for alienation or disposition, are part of the
patrimonial properties of the State.

They are State properties available for private ownership except that their appropriation is qualified by
Sections 2 and 3 of Article XII of the Constitution and the public land laws.

Before lands of the public domain are declared available for private acquisition, or while they remain
intended for public use or for public service or for the development of national wealth, they would
partake of properties of public dominion just like mines before their concessions are granted, in which
case, they cannot be alienated or leased or otherwise be the object of contract.2In contrast,
patrimonial properties may be bought or sold or in any manner utilized with the same effects as
properties owned by private persons.

[23.1.3] Lands Covered by Republic Act No. 7227 Well-settled is the doctrine that public land granted to
an end user government agency for a specific public use may subsequently be withdrawn by Congress
from public use and declared patrimonial property to be sold to private parties.

R.A. No. 7227 creating the BCDA is a law that declares specific military reservations no longer needed
for defense or military purposes and reclassifies such lands as patrimonial property for sale to private
parties.2

[23.2] Disposition of Patrimonial Property

It was held in Laurel v. Garcia, that any conveyance of a real property falling under the patrimonial
property of the State must be authorized and approved by a law enacted by the Congress. The Court
cited Section 48, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292), which reads:
“SEC. 48. Official Authorized to Convey Real Property. — Whenever real property of the Government is
authorized by law to be conveyed, the deed of conveyance shall be executed in behalf of the
government by the following:

(1) For property belonging to and titled in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, by the President,
unless the authority therefore is expressly vested by law in another officer.

(2) For property belonging to the Republic of the Philippines but titled in the name of any political
subdivision or of any corporate agency or instrumentality by the executive head of the agency or
instrumentality.”
Hence, in the case of Laurel, the Court held that even if the Roppongi property is patrimonial property
of the State, then President Corazon Aquino could not sell it since there was no law authorizing her to
do so.

[23.3] Not Susceptible To Acquisitive Prescription

There is a view to the effect that patrimonial properties of the State are subject to acquisitive
prescription on the basis of Article 1113 of the New Civil Code, which reads:

“Art. 1113. All things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of prescription, unless
otherwise provided. Property of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not
be the object of prescription.”

It has been argued that the afore-quoted provision impliedly authorizes the acquisition of patrimonial
properties of the State by way of acquisitive prescription. However, it is an ironclad dictum that
prescription can never lie against the Government

Possession of patrimonial property of the Government, whether spanning decades or centuries, can not
ipso facto ripen into ownership. Commonwealth Act No. 141 which authorizes confi rmation of
imperfect title. The adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of title in confi rmation of
imperfect title cases, however, applies only to alienable lands of the public domain273 — which fall
under the patrimonial properties of the State.

Art. 422. Property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service,
shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State. (341a)

§ 24. Conversion: From Public Dominion to Patrimonial Property

When land of the public domain ceases to be one, or when the change takes place, is a question our
courts have debated early.

In Municipality of Oas v. Roa, it was held that property of the public dominion, a public plaza in this
instance, becomes patrimonial property upon use thereof for purposes other than a plaza.

In Municipality of Hinunangan v. Director of Lands, it was held that when a fortress ceases to be used
for the purpose for which it was constructed, it becomes a patrimonial property of the state.

In these two cases, the character of the property, and any change occurring therein, depends on the
actual use to which it is dedicated.

In Ignacio v. Director of Lands case, however, the Supreme Court ruled that a property continues to be
part of the public domain, not available for private appropriation or ownership until there is a formal
declaration on the part of the government, either through the Executive department or the Legislative,
to the effect that the property is no longer needed for public service, for public use or for special
industries.

Thus, under Ignacio, either the Executive Department or the Legislative Department may convert
property of the State of public dominion into patrimonial property of the State.

In Cebu Oxygen Acetylene v. Bercilles, the City Council of Cebu by resolution declared a certain portion
of an existing street as an abandoned road, “the same not being included in the city development plan.”
Subsequently, by another resolution, the City Council of Cebu authorized the acting City Mayor to sell
the land through public bidding. Although there was no formal and explicit declaration of conversion
of property for public use into patrimonial property, the Supreme Court declared the withdrawal of
the property in question from public use and its subsequent sale as valid.

Then came the case of Laurel v. Garcia. In this case, the property involved (“Roponggi property”) was
acquired from the Japanese government as indemnification to the Filipino people for their losses and
suffering during World War II.

As intended, it became the site of the Philippine Embassy in Japan for sometime until the embassy was
transferred to another site.

Since then, the Philippine Government has failed to develop the Roponggi property.

In 1985, the Executive Department passed an administrative order creating a committee to study the
disposition or utilization of some properties, including the Roponggi property.

In 1987, the President issued Executive Order No. 296 providing that some properties, including the
Roponggi property, be made available for sale or lease to non-Filipinos.

Answering the question as to whether the Roponggi property has been converted into patrimonial
property, the Supreme Court held that abandonment of the intention to use the Roponggi property for
public service and to make it a patrimonial property “cannot be inferred from the non-use alone
specially if the non-use was attributable not to the government’s own deliberate and indubitable will
but to a lack of financial support to repair and improve the property.” The Court likewise ruled that
E.O. No. 296 does not declare that the property has lost its public character since the executive order
merely intends to make the properties available to foreigners and not to Filipinos. It was based on the
wrong premise or assumption that the Roponggi was earlier converted into alienable real property.

In fine, it is now clear that there must be an affirmative act, either on the part of executive or the
legislative, to reclassify property of the public dominion into patrimonial.

Hence, the conversion can no longer be inferred from the non-use alone of the property for the
purpose to which it is intended.

Art. 423. The property of provinces, cities, and municipalities is divided into property for public use and
patrimonial property. (343)

Classification of Properties of Political Subdivisions

The property of provinces, cities and municipalities is di vided into property for public use and
patrimonial property.

The first consists of the provincial roads, city streets, municipal streets, squares, fountains, public
waters, promenades, and public works for public service paid for by said provinces, cities or
municipalities.

All other property possessed by said provinces, cities or municipalities is patrimonial.285 The nature of
properties owned by cities (municipalities and provinces) in this country is determined by the character
of the use or service for which they are intended or devoted.286 Properties which are intended for
public use or for some public service are properties for public use.287 All others are patrimonial
properties.

It matters not that the property is not actually devoted for public use or for some public service. If it has
been intended for such use or service, and the city (municipality or province) has not devoted it to other
uses, or adopted any measure which amounted to a withdrawal of the property from public use and
service, the same remains property for public use, the fact that it is not actually devoted for public use
or service notwithstanding.

Art. 424. Property for public use, in the provinces, cities, and municipalities, consists of the provincial
roads, city streets, municipal streets, the squares, fountains, public waters, promenades, and public
works for public service paid for by said provinces, cities, or municipalities. All other property possessed
by any of them is patrimonial and shall be governed by this Code, without prejudice to the provisions of
special laws. (344a)

Art. 427. Ownership may be exercised over things or rights. (n)

Concept of Ownership

the word “property” is derived from the Roman word proprius, meaning one’s own which, in essence, is
the concept of ownership.
property, on the other hand, accentuates the relation between the thing and the owner to whom it
belongs (which concept, therefore, has a predominantly objective meaning).

Dominus master of the house and dominium

The concept of “property” under the Civil Code refers to those things which are susceptible of
appropriation while the concept of “ownership” refers to the mass or bundle of rights that may be
exercised over a property. In other words, ownership refers to the bundle of rights that may be
exercised over a property while the latter is the object of the exercise of such rights.

The Civil Code does not define ownership.

nstead, the Code simply enumerates the rights which are included therein, as follows:

(1) the right to enjoy the property (Art. 428, par. 1, NCC);

(2) the right to dispose the property (Art. 428, par. 1, NCC);

(3) the right to recover the property from any holder or possessor (Art. 428, par. 2, NCC);

(4) the right to exclude any person from enjoyment and disposal of the property (Art. 429, NCC);

(5) the right to enclose or fence the land or tenement (Art. 430, NCC);

(6) the right to demand indemnity for damages suffered due to lawful interference by a third person to
avert an imminent danger (Art. 432, NCC);

(7) the right to just compensation in case of eminent domain (Art. 435, NCC);

(8) the right to construct any works or make any plantations and excavations on the surface or
subsurface of the land (Art. 437, NCC);

(9) the right to hidden treasure found in the owner’s property (Art. 438, NCC); and

(10) the right to accessions. (Art. 440, NCC)

EDREE

DJCTA
 JBL REYE: He defines ownership as “an independent right of exclusive enjoyment and control of the
thing for the purpose of deriving therefrom all advantages required by the reasonable needs of the
owner (holder of the right) and the promotion of the general welfare but subject to the restrictions
imposed by law and the right of others.”

Ownership Is A Real Right; obli;DPS

Personal right or jus in personam is one which imposes an obligation on a definite person.7 Stated
otherwise, personal right or more properly called the right of obligation is the power belonging to one
person to demand from another, as a definite passive subject, the fulfillment of a prestation to give, to
do or not to do.

A real right or jus in re, on the other hand, has been defined as the power belonging to a person over a
specific thing without a definite passive subject against whom such right may be personally enforced.9 A
right in rem, therefore, is one which imposes an obligation on persons generally, i.e., either on all the
world or on all the world except certain determinate persons.

A real right or jus in re, on the other hand, has been defined as the power belonging to a person over a
specific thing without a definite passive subject against whom such right may be personally enforced.9 A
right in rem, therefore, is one which imposes an obligation on persons generally, i.e., either on all the
world or on all the world except certain determinate persons.

Elements of ownership

it is a direct relation between the specific thing and its holder in such a way that it

permits the holder to exclude others from the enjoyment of the thing. Correspondingly, it creates an
obligation on the part of third persons not to interfere in such enjoyment. save for the exception
mentioned in Article 432 of the Civil Code which will be discussed in subsequent sections of this Book.

, the Civil Code recognizes the existence of other real rights that may be exercised in relation to
property,

i.e., possession, usufruct, easement, pledge and mortgage, etc. Of all these rights, however, ownership
is considered as the most complete because it provides the owner the most ample power of dominion
over the property.

In contrast, however, the other real rights are necessarily limited since they merely serve as restrictions
on one’s exercise of ownership.

Restricts ownership

(1) real rights over one’s own property (jus in re propria); and (2) real rights over the property of
another (jus in re aliena).—lesser rights s of jus in re aliena are usufruct, easement, possession
and mortgage. In these examples, the owner of the property has for the time being parted with
some of his rights, thereby restricting and abridging the right of ownership
 PORPERTY IS THE OBJ OF THE OWNESHIP.

Subj matter can be thing or right

Hence, it would have been better if Article 427 simply stated that “ownership is exercised over
property.” After all, the concept of property under the Civil Code embraces both material objects and
rights.

Art. 428. The owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those
established by law. The owner has also a right of action against the holder and possessor of the thing in
order to recover it. (348a)

In Roman Law, the attributes of ownership are the following:

(1) jus u-ten-di or the right to use property without destroying its substance;

(2) jus fru-en-di or the right to the fruits;

(3) jus dis-po-nen-di or the right to dispose or alienate;

(4) jus a-bu-ten-di or the right to abuse or to consume the thing by its use;

(5) jus po-ssi-den-di or the right to possess; and

(6) jus vin-di-can-di or the right to recover.

UfDAPV

It is noticeable, however, that the present article mentions only three rights — the rights to enjoy,
dispose and recover. EDR

This is because the right to enjoy already includes in it the right to use (jus utendi), the right to the
fruits (jus fruendi), the right to possess (jus possidendi) and the right to abuse or consume (jus
abutendi). Another right to accession (the enjoyment of anything attached or incorporated to it,
either naturally or artificially (the right of accession).

Essence of ownership is the right of the owner to freely enjoy either the property itself or the benefits
derived therefrom

As explained by the late Senator Tolentino, citing Sanchez Roman and Valverde, the jus abutendi
should not be understood as the right of the owner to exercise absolute and unlimited power over the
thing to the point of destroying it by any means, however inconvenient and prejudicial to the public
interest or to the right of others. According to him, jus abutendi properly meant the use that
extinguishes, that consumes, by acts of the owner, things which are consumable.

Jus abutendi should not be understood as the right of the owner to exercise absolute and unlimited
power over the thing to the point of destroying it by any means, however inconvenient and
prejudicial to the public interest or to the right of others According to him, jus abutendi properly
meant the use that extinguishes, that consumes, by acts of the owner, things which are consumable.

right to use his property, it has been held that the purchaser of a house which is leased is entitled to
terminate the lease, there being no stipulation to the contrary and the lease not being recorded.

This is so because the right to the use of the said house is one of the rights transferred to him by virtue
of his ownership.

Also, the owner may not be prevented from enjoying his property on the mere pretext that the present
occupant badly needs the same in view of an acute housing shortage brought about by the destruction
of the City of Manila during the Second World War.

Right to Dispose

Jus disponendi or the power of the owner to dispose of his property includes the power to alienate, to
encumber, to limit, to transform, to destroy and to merge. The right to alienate is the right of the owner
to transmit either by onerous or gratuitous title his right to another by any act inter vivos or mortis
causa.

uch right is exclusively vested upon the owner based upon the principle that “no one can give what he
does not have.” Examples of alienation are sale and donation.

The right to limit or encumber is the power of the owner to deprive himself of several of the rights
included in ownership and transfer them to another.

Thus, the owner may deprive himself of the use and possession of his property by entering into
contracts of lease and commodatum, for example.

He may also deprive himself of the right to enjoy his property, including the right to receive the fruits,
by constituting a usufruct in favor of a third person. The right to limit or encumber is the power of the
owner to deprive himself of several of the rights included in ownership and transfer them to another.
Thus, the owner may deprive himself of the use and possession of his property by entering into
contracts of lease and commodatum, for example. He may also deprive himself of the right to enjoy his
property, including the right to receive the fruits, by constituting a usufruct in favor of a third person.

Right to Recover
Instead, he is required to resort to the proper legal processes for the purpose of obtaining recovery of
possession Instead, he is required to resort to the proper legal processes for the purpose of obtaining
recovery of possession

Under existing laws and jurisprudence, there are three kinds of actions available to recover possession
of real property:

(a) accion interdictal;

(b) accion publiciana; and

(c) accion reivindicatoria.

For the recovery of possession of a personal property, on the other hand, the available remedy is called
replevin.

(detentacion) and unlawful detainer (desahuico

An action for unlawful detainer, on the other hand, may be filed when possession by “a lessor, vendor,
vendee, or other person against whom

An action for unlawful detainer, on the other hand, may be fi led when possession by “a lessor, vendor,
vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld
after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or
implied.” Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts juris. 1 year from the date of actual entry in case of
forcible entry, and from the date of the last demand, in case of unlawful detainer.

The use of summary procedure in ejectment cases is intended to provide an expeditious means of
protecting actual possession or right to possession of the property.

They are not processes to determine the actual title to an estate

Forcible entry and unlawful detainer, which deal with physical or de facto possession, may be
distinguished as follows:

(1): in forcible entry, the possession by the defendant is unlawful ab initio because he acquires
possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth;

(2) In an action for forcible entry, the plaintiff must allege and prove that he was in prior physical
possession of the premises until deprived thereof,

while in unlawful detainer, while in illegal detainer, the plaintiff need not have been in prior physical
possession.

FE
the possession by the defendant
is unlawful ab initio because he
acquires possession by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy, or
stealth;
Their main difference lies in
the time when possession
became unlawful
UD
possession is originally lawful but
becomes illegal by reason of the
termination of his right of
possession under his contract
with the plaintiff.
 the plaintiff has prior possession
of the property and he is deprived
thereof by the defendant through
force, intimidation, threat,
strategy or stealth
The one year period within which
to bring an action for forcible
entry is generally counted from
the date of actual entry on the
land, except that when entry was
made through stealth, the one
year period is counted from the
time the plaintiff learned thereof
Must prove the defendant unlawfully
withholds possession of the
property after the expiration or
termination of his right thereto
under any contract, express or
implied; hence, prior physical
possession is not required. This is
especially so where a vendee
seeks to obtain possession of the
thing sold.
Period the one year prescriptive period is
counted from the date of the last
demand.Hence, in the latter type
of action, the plaintiff must first
make such demand, which is
jurisdictional in nature.

Forcible entry is a summary action to recover material or physical possession of real property when the
person who originally held it was deprived of possession by “force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or
stealth.”

In other words, if at the time of the filing of the complaint more than one year had elapsed since
defendant had turned plaintiff out of possession or defendant’s possession had become illegal, the
action will be, not one of the forcible entry or illegal detainer, but an accion publiciana

Sps. Custodio and Sps. Santos v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 116100, Feb. 9, 1996

The private respondents own a parcel of land with a two-door apartment erected thereon situated at
Interior P. Burgos St., Palingon, Tipas, Taguig, Metro Manila. They were able to acquire said property
through a contract of sale with spouses Mamerto Rayos and Teodora Quintero as vendors. Said property
may be described to be surrounded by other immovables pertaining to petitioners. Taking P. Burgos
Street as the point of reference, on the left side, going to private respondents’, the row of houses will be
as follows: That of petitioners Spouses Custodio, then that of petitioner Spouses Santos and then that of
the private respondents. As an access to P. Burgos Street from private respondents’ property, there are
two possible passageways. The fi rst passageway is approximately one meter wide and is about 20
meters distant from the private respondents’ residence to P. Burgos Street. Such path is passing in
between the previously mentioned row of houses. The second passageway is about 3 meters in width
and length from the private respondents’ residence to P. Burgos Street; it is about 26 meters.
Thereafter, the petitioners constructed an adobe fence in their respective properties such that the
entire fi rst passageway was enclosed. Subsequently, the private respondents fi led a complaint against
the petitioners for the grant of an easement of right of way with prayer for damages. After trial, the trial
court ordered the petitioners to grant the private respondents access to the passageway upon payment
of just compensation. Not satisfi ed with the judgment, the private respondents faulted the trial court
for not awarding them damages. On the sole issue of whether the trial court erred in not awarding
damages in their favor, the matter reached the High Court. In ruling that the private respondents were
not entitled to damages, the Court explained — The act of petitioners in constructing a fence within
their lot is a valid exercise of their right as owners, hence not contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy.

To repeat, whatever injury or damage may have been sustained by private respondents by reason of the
rightful use of the said land by petitioners is damnum absque injuria.

Any injury or damage occasioned thereby is damnum absque injuria. The courts can give no redress for
hardship to an individual resulting from action reasonably calculated to achieve a lawful end by lawful
means.”

Custodio and Sps. Santos v. Court of Appeals,101 both involving the exercise of the owner’s right to
enclose or fence his property. In Villafuerte, the lot owners were held liable to pay damages because the
exercise of the right was attended with bad faith — it was resorted to for the purpose of evicting the
occupants whose lease contract had already expired

State of nece

not be considered as unlawful physical invasion upon another’s property.

In order for the interference to be justified under the state of necessity, the following requisites must be
present: (1) there must be a situation of grave peril, an actual or imminent danger, either upon the
person of the actor or a third person or their property;

(2) the interference is necessary to avert such danger; (3) the threatened damaged, compared to the
damage arising to the owner from the interference, is much greater; and

(4) the state of necessity must not be brought about by the intentional provocation of the party invoking
the same.106

“Art. 11. Justifying circumstances. — The following do not incur any criminal liability: xxx xxx xxx 4. Any
person who, in order to avoid an evil or injury, does an act which causes damage to another provided
that the following requisites are present:

First. That the evil sought to be avoided actually exists; Second. That the injury feared be greater than
that done to avoid it;

Third. That there be no other practical and less harmful means of preventing it.”

Civil liability is borne by the person/persons benefi ted by the act of the accused.107 This is the only
case among the justifying circumstances where there is civil liability, but the civil liability is borne by the
persons for whose benefit the harm has been prevented in proportion to the benefi t which they may
have received.
 1. If the danger comes from another’s property, the case is one of defense against danger,110 in
which case, there is no obligation to indemnify the owner for the damage caused if the latter
himself was responsible for such damage
2. But if another’s property is used to avert danger not arising from it, the act is essentially one in a
state of necessity which will entitle the owner to the indemnity provided in Article 432 of the
Civil Code.

The owner of the property may impose restrictions or limitations on ownership in two situations: (1) at
the time that he transmits the property to another person; or (2) at the time that he continues to be the
owner of the property.

if they are in the nature of real rights, are referred to in Roman Law as jus in re aliena.

which may be exercised by another person against the property of the owner, if they are in the nature
of real rights, are referred to in Roman Law as jus in re aliena. A donor or testator, for example, may
prohibit partition of the subject property but such prohibition cannot exceed twenty years.114