DANGEROUS GOOD TRANSPORTATION BY ROAD:

FROM RISK ANALYSIS TO EMERGENCY PLANNING

B. Fabiano*, F. Currò, A.P. Reverberi, R. Pastorino

DICheP – Chemical and Process Engineering Department “G.B. Bonino”,

University of Genoa, Via Opera Pia, 15 – 16145 Genoa, Italy

Abstract

Despite the relative recent move towards inherent safe materials, the relentless drive of

consumerism requires increased quantities of dangerous goods to be manufactured,

transported, stored and used year on year. The safety and effectiveness of road transport

systems is to be considered a strategic goal in particular in those countries, like Italy, in

which 80% of goods are transported by this means. In this paper, we face the risk from

dangerous good transport by presenting a site-oriented framework for risk assessment

and developing a theoretical approach for emergency planning and optimization. In the

first step, we collected field data on a pilot highway and developed a database useful to

allow a realistic evaluation of the accident frequency on a given route, by means of

multivariate statistical analysis. To this end, we considered both inherent factors (such

as tunnels, bend radii, height gradient, slope etc), meteorological factors, and traffic

factors (traffic frequency of tank truck, dangerous good truck etc.) suitable to modify

the standard national accident frequency. By applying the results to a pilot area, making

reference to flammable and explosive scenarios, we performed a risk assessment

* Corresponding author E-mail: brown@unige.it (B.Fabiano)

sensitive to route features and population exposed. The results show that the risk

associated to the transport of hazardous materials, in some highway stretches, can be at

the boundary of the acceptability level of risk set down by the well known F/N curves

established in the Netherlands. On this basis, in the subsequent step, we developed a

theoretical approach, based on the graph theory, to plan optimal emergency actions. The

effectiveness of an emergency planning can normally be evaluated in term of system

quickness and reliability. As a case study, we applied the developed approach to identify

optimal consistency and localisation in the pilot area of “prompt action vehicles”,

properly equipped, quick to move and ready for every eventuality. Applying this method

results in an unambiguous and consistent selection criterion that allows reduction of

intervention time, in connection with technical and economic optimisation of

emergency equipment.

Keywords Accident frequency; Hazardous Materials; Emergency; Transportation

1. Introduction

Despite the relative recent move towards “inherent safe” materials, the relentless drive

of consumerism has required increased quantities of dangerous goods to be

manufactured, transported, stored and used year on year (Thomson, 1998). Of the

different way of transportation, rail has higher damage potential, as larger quantities are

transported by this means. However, considering the damage it may cause to life and

properties, transport by road is more hazardous, as roads often pass through populated

areas, especially in developing countries. The recent EEC Directive 96/82/EC implies

the evaluation of risk in highly industrialized areas by means of Quantitative Area Risk
Analysis techniques. It must be evidenced that certain dangerous substances are

transported along particular Italian road routes in quantities that would exceed the

threshold for safety notification or declaration, set down in Italy by Seveso II Directive,

if stored in a fixed installation. On the other side, it must be remembered that EEC

Directive 94/55/EC implies the harmonisation of the different national legislation on

transport of hazardous materials by road. The safety and efficiency of road transport is

to be considered a strategic goal in particular in those countries, like Italy, in which

about 80% of goods is transported by this means, with a 30% increase with reference to

the 2010 forecast. In particular, Italian highways are very crowded with trucks,

considering that 17% of the whole good traffic by road of EU (15 Countries) is

transported on these highways. Moreover, the number of cars is still steadily increasing,

making a place on the road more and more a scarce commodity. Empirical evidence

shows that though improvement in transport safety, in Italy a consistent number of

serious accidents on motorways and highways keeps occurring, evidencing that the risk

connected to dangerous goods transport is comparable with the fixed plants one.

Analysis of the risks presented by the transportation of hazardous materials presents a

very different risk than a fixed facility: detailed information on shipments is not

available on a national, regional, or local level in contrast with fixed facility inventories

(Pine & Marx, 1997). As reported by different researchers, a specifically tailored QRA

methodology can represent an effective tool to assess the risk to people associated with

the transport of dangerous substance. The selection of the best route for transport has

been widely investigated (List, Mirchandani, Turnquist & Zografos, 1991) and was

recently formulated as a “minimum cost flow problem”, which consists of determining,

for a specific hazardous substance, the cheapest flow distribution, honouring the arc
capacities, from the origin to the destination vertices (Leonelli, Bonvicini & Spadoni,

2000). Poor appreciation of factors related to road conditions such as road class,

designated speed limits, traffic density, as well as of the population characteristics, is

likely to result in a risk assessment insensitive to route specifics and over- or under-

estimating the overall level of risk (Davies, 1999).

In this paper, a site-oriented risk analysis procedure is tested in a pilot area, starting

from an in-depth inventory of hazardous materials transported and from a statistical

analysis of traffic and accidents observed in the area. In fact, it must be observed that to

ensure that a local emergency plan is complete, it must take into account the nature and

extent hazardous materials are transported by road in the area. The results are then

discussed and a mathematical model for optimising emergency planning is presented. A

main focus in the management of emergencies has been on resources and logistics; in

other words, having what and who you need it to meet the crisis within an urgent time

frame (Kowalski, 1995). The importance of the ability of the emergency response

services to minimize the damage was recently highlighted by a pilot project carried out

in the Netherlands, where the evaluation method of external safety risk included three

new criteria, additional to individual risk and societal risk (Wiersma & Molag, 2004):

 “self-rescue” i.e. the ability of the people in the vicinity of the accident to safe

themselves;

 “controllability” i.e. emergency response services;

 “consequences” i.e. analysis of representative scenarios in terms of number of

fatalities, injuries and material damage.

The criterion of controllability is focused on the ability of the emergency response

services to minimize the magnitudo and to prevent escalation of the accident. In case of
accident in hazmat transportation and subsequent release into the environment, it is very

important to have at one's disposal information on each chemical hazardous product

involved, trained and skilful personnel and suitable “prompt action vehicles”, properly

equipped to be employed if the above mentioned hazardous release would happen. To

this end, in the last phase of this paper, the optimization algorithm is developed for

solving the problem of optimal location of emergency vehicles in the pilot area.

2. Theoretical structure

2.1 Transportation risk analysis

Generally speaking, the concept of risk is the relation between frequency and the

number of people suffering from a specified level of harm in a given population from

the realization of specified hazards (Vrijling, Van Hengel & Houben, 1995).

The model required for our purposes is focused on a proper evaluation of the expected

frequency of accidents If the route is divided into road stretches, each characterized by

different characteristics, the expected number of fatalities as consequence of an accident

occurred on the road stretch r and evolving according to a scenario S, can be expressed

as:

Dr   f r N r , S PS (1)
S

where:

fr = frequency of accident in the r-th road stretch [accident·year-1]

Nr,S = number of fatalities caused by the accident evolving according to a

scenario S in the r-th road stretch [fatalities accident-1]

PS = probability of evolving scenarios of type S, following the accident

initialiser (i.e. collision; roll-over; failure etc.) [-]

Transportation network can be considered as a number of vertices linked one another by

a number of arcs. As shown in the following paragraph, the vertices represent origin-

destination points, tool-gates, storage areas on the transportation network and the arcs

are the roads connecting vertices. An arc between two vertices is characterized by a

different number of road stretches and the expected number of fatalities for the arc is:

D   f r N r , S PS (1)
r S

where Nr,S is the total number of fatalities according to eq. (2):

N r , S  ( ASin ·k ·v  ASoff ·d P )·PF , S (2)

being the in-road and the off-road number of fatalities calculated respectively as:

N in r , S  ASin ·k ·v·PF , S (3)

N off r ,S  ASoff ·d P ·PF ,S (4)

where:

ASin = consequence in-road area associated with scenario S

[m2]

ASoff = consequence off-road area associated with scenario S [km2]

PF , S = probability of fatality for accident scenario S [-]

k = average vehicle occupation factor [-]

v = vehicle density on the road area [vehicle·m-2]

dP = population density [inhabitants·km-2]

The frequency of an accident involving a scenario S, on the r-th road stretch, can be

expressed as:

f r , S  f r ·PS (5)

f r   r Lr nr (6)
 6
 r   0 ,r  h j (7)
j 1

where:

r = expected frequency on r-th road stretch [accident·km-1·vehicle-1·year-1]

Lr = road length [km]

nr = number of vehicles [vehicle]

0,r = national accident frequency [accident·km-1·vehicle-1·year-1]

hj = local enhancing/mitigating parameters [-]

As is well known, various factors influence the accidents: mechanical, environmental,

behavioural, physical, road intrinsic descriptors. A statistical multivariate analysis was

performed, by comparing historical accident data related to the whole regional highways

and data directly collected on the field on each stretch, in order to highlight relevant

intrinsic road factors and meteorological, traffic conditions etc. (Fabiano, Currò, Palazzi

& Pastorino, 2001).

Table 1 shows the parameters suitable to influence accident rates and grouped into three

categories: intrinsic characteristics, meteorological conditions and traffic conditions.

The values of the parameters are in the range 0.8-2.5.

2.2 Emergency planning

The effectiveness of an action aimed at facing an emergency situation can normally be

evaluated in terms of systems quickness and reliability. To approach the optimisation

problem we adopted the graph-theory, recently introduced by Beroggi &Wallace (1994)

in computing optimal course of action for emergency response. Generally speaking, a

linear graph may be defined as a set N of objects named vertices V i (i = 1,…,n) and a
set A of arcs linking couples of vertices (Vi, Vj). In details, a graph is a couple G(N,A)

where N=[V1,…,n] is a set of vertices and A=[a i,j=(Vi,Vj)| Vi, Vj  N] is a class of

elements called arcs. Between two vertices, several oriented arcs may exist: the

maximum number of the same oriented arcs between two vertices is called P and the

graph is a P-graph. The set of vertices N can be run according to different ways: as tail,

leading to the research in breadth (breadth-first), or as a pile, leading to research in

depth (depth-first) or backtracking (Tarjan, 1972). In order to solve the minimum

intervention time problem, a label d(i) is assigned to every vertex V i, defining the path

between vertices and a pointer pred(i), which shows the predecessor of Vi in the

considered path. The sequence starts from a temporary value for d(i) which has to be

modified, by iteration, as to reach the right value. After a comparative survey on various

shortest path algorithms (Dreyfus, 1969) we considered the Dijkstra algorithm (Dijkstra,

1959) of label setting, as follows:

1. d(s)=0; d(i) =  ; pred(i)=s;

2. d(h)=min[d(i) / d(i) not exact]; d(h) becomes exact;

3. if Vi  A(h) and di not exact, d(i) = min[d(i), d(h) + ]; eventually pred(i)=h;

4. if every value d(i) is exact, then stop, if not go to 2.

We developed the optimisation algorithm as schematised in Figure 1. Every vertex

corresponds to a toll gate, a fire brigade station or to a storage area and the algorithm

allots the exact value for d(i) at the last iteration for every vertex.
3. Case-study

The methodology previously presented was applied to a pilot area, referring to the

routes starting from the Genoa port area (the most important in the Mediterranean basin)

towards four direction: the industrialized North Italian and Central Europe districts,

France and South of Italy. All of these highways are characterized by high truck traffic

(mainly ADR) and inherent factors (ascribed to road out-of-date: the year of

construction of A7 is 1935) determining to a major accident risk, with reference to both

individual and social risk, defined according to the Dutch limits.

3.1 Data collection and analysis

The value of traffic and accidents for the four highways in the area are shown in Table

2. In particular, it can be noticed that A7 highway is characterized by values higher at

least an order of magnitude than the accident frequency (6.0·10-8) calculated by other

researchers for certain type of load threatening accidents (James, 1986), thus

approaching the calculated values for urban road.

By considering the daily ADR traffic on the different highway sections, it results that

the higher values of dangerous goods fluxes correspond to the intersection between the

highways A10 (West riviera) and A12 (East riviera), in the stretch between the towns of

Bolzaneto and Busalla and in the starting stretch, from the central port of Genoa

(Genova Ovest toll-gate) to the connection between the highways A10 and A7.

The substances transported are shown in Figure 3: it is important to notice the high

striking transport percentages of chlorine and ethylene oxide.

The immediate causes of accident are summed up in Figure 4.

The proportion of severe accidents on these highways during the years 1995-1999 is in

the range 60-70% of the total accidents, defining a severe incident as one involving

death, serious injuries, a fire or explosion, or more than EUR 25000 worth of damage.

3.2 Modelling

In order to obtain a correct evaluation of the density of the population which might be

exposed to Hazmat hazards from transport it is necessary to include data on the

population density along the route and on the so-called motorist density, taking into

account, as well, the proportion which may be considered particularly vulnerable or

protected. Otherwise, all individuals within a threshold distance from road stretches run

the same risks regardless of their location.

The population density along a route segment can vary with time, such as from day to

night, and from month to month: the average density on the route can be calculated

starting from the collected statistical data relevant to average daily traffic, average speed

and geometrical data of carriageway and lanes, in each highway stretch considered.

Also on-road population can vary during the day: in order to evaluate correctly the

number of on-road population involved in the accident, the response and the variations

in the motorist density as a consequence of an accident, were considered.

Two classes of motorist density are to be considered: the former refers to the

carriageway, where the accident occurs, the latter considers the opposite carriageway,

were the “ghoul effect” causes the slowing down of the traffic.

In order to evaluate the probability of death in the area involved, the consequence model

was applied making reference to event trees for every type of accident consequence:

pool fire, flash fire, jet fire, BLEVE, fire ball, UVCE, release of toxic substances.
Average individual risk, defined as “the frequency at which an individual may be

expected to sustain a given level of harm from the realization of a specific hazard”

(Dantzig & Kriens, 1960), has been determined averaging the estimating individual risk

levels for all the individuals in the selected area, as above-described. For individual risk,

we considered the upper acceptability criterion set down in the Netherlands in new

situations or new developments, corresponding to 10-6 year-1.

The same technique was secondly adopted for the evaluation of societal risk. Societal

risk analysis can lead, via the generation of expectation values (average number of lives

lost) to the consideration of the need for, and cost benefit, of risk reduction measures,

even if it involves many generalising assumptions and averaging (Purdy, 1993). In all

concepts, the most stringent of the personally and the socially acceptable level of risk

determines the acceptable level of risk. So both criteria have to be satisfied (Vrijling et

al., 1995). The same acceptability criterion for individual and societal risk was

considered by Alp and Eelensky (1996), in developing a rigorous mathematical platform

on which risk assessment can be built. It must be evidenced that the societal acceptable

risk criterion is not standardized in the different EU Countries. So, in the absence of a

national statistical reference, we adopted again the F/N limit curves established in the

Netherlands, dividing as well the so-called Alarp region into two bands: the

acceptability criterion of the risk so modified is explained in Table 3, where P is the

cumulative frequency per year and N the number of fatalities (Høj & Kröger, 2002).

The results of the risk evaluation for the pilot area are summarized in Figure 5.

To reduce “intervention time”, the localization of “prompt action vehicles” must found

on scientific statement, as previously explained, taking into consideration the concept of

“minimum pathway”. The main constraint the theoretical approach is based upon is that
the emergency vehicle can not be placed in any site of the concerned provincial

territory, but only in the Fire Brigades Central Department or in one of the six

detachment. Central Department and the six detachments are to be considered as

vertices in the “final graph”, which will solve the problem.

In the same way, it is possible to indicate the “hazardous areas”, where production,

transformation and hazardous substances storage take place, as vertices of the “final

graph”. To complete the construction of the “final graph”, it was necessary to take into

consideration highly hazardous areas along the highway. We considered as vertices of

the graph inlet and outlet toll-gates, fire brigade districts and central department, as well

as production, transformation and storage sites of dangerous substances. The obtained

final graph is depicted in Figure 6.

The arcs, which link vertices together, represents normal way and highway “units”,

between all areas taken into consideration.

In order to evaluate the considered graph, we allotted to each arc a corresponding scalar,

defined “cost of the arc”. This scalar value corresponds to a time: the Average Run Time

(in minutes) needed to reach from a vertex the subsequent one. Time was calculated

considering distances between vertices and assuming two average speeds: 80 km h-1 as

highway speed and 30 km h-1 as urban speed.

4. Results and discussion

The results of transport risk analysis in the area show that the risk associated with the

transport of hazardous materials on the highways considered, in a number of stretches

(Figure 5), is at the limit of the acceptable level of risk set down according to the

criterion schematized in Table 3 and previously discussed. The results are similar to

those reported by Milazzo, Lisi, Maschio, Antonioni, Bonvicini & Spadoni (2002) who

presented risk analysis in an urban area, where flammable substances were prevalent in

road transportation. They concluded that overall societal risk was not acceptable on the

basis of the Dutch risk criteria and that the risk associated with the road transportation is

higher for N<20, while the risk associated with railway transportation become dominant

for N>20.

On these bases, strategies for the reduction of risks and emergency management in the

area must be developed. As a first approach, the opportunity of limiting hazardous

materials travelling during particular time bands must be considered. As an example,

about 53% of ADR traffic is focused in the time interval 8 a.m. - 1 p.m.

A second strategic opportunity consists in imposing a different highway route for

hazardous materials transport. For example, an alternative route from Genoa to Milan is

represented by A26 highway, from Genoa Voltri towards Alessandria: this highway,

being more recent and characterized by lower intrinsic risk factors, it could gather also

the traffic from East and Genoa central port. However, the practical utilization of this

option is made difficult by the need of crossing a long urban stretch, characterized by

high risk level (as depicted in Figure 5). A solution for risk reduction is therefore the

construction of a slip road connecting Genoa central port and highway A26, even if the

feasibility of this option is obviously constrained by economical and environmental

impact issues. Therefore a risk reduction could pass through a redefinition of the

transportation network and in defining proper emergency plans.

Table 4 depicts a selection of the complete flow sheet reporting the vertices and the

costs of the arcs. In the first row are indicated all 36 vertices of the graph. In the

following rows, are reported the distances of each vertex from the other ones and

respective forerunner, corresponding to the “cost of the arc”. From Table 4, we can

notice that the route stretching from vertex 1 to vertex 4 and including vertices 2 and 3

has a total cost of 31 minutes. In the same way, vertex 36 is distant from vertex 1 130

minutes, according to the considered route. By applying the method to the whole

transportation network, it is possible to know all distances (in minutes) of each vertex 1,

2, 3, ..., 36 from all the other 36 vertices.

In column B it is indicated maximum time needed to reach, from a vertex, all the other

ones. For example, vertex 1 is distant from all the other vertices 130 minutes as a

maximum. It means that, starting from vertex 1, it is possible to reach vertex 36 (the

further one from vertex 1) in a maximum time of 130 minutes. All other vertices can be

reached in a shorter time.

Moreover, starting from vertex 28, it is possible to reach all the other vertices in a

maximum time of 67 minutes. From the final graph, we can observe that vertex 28

corresponds to Nervi Highway toll-gate. It is obvious that if the “prompt action vehicle”

is located near vertex 28, it will be able to reach all the other vertices corresponding to

hazardous areas, in a maximum time of 67 minutes, representing, under this constraint,

the minimum intervention time. Of course, the “prompt action vehicle” has to be placed

inside the Fire Brigades Central Station or in one of the six Provincial District.
Let’s now take into consideration the option of two “prompt action vehicles”: also in

this case they are to be placed inside the Fire Brigades Central Station or in one of the

six Provincial District. From the elaboration (Table 5 being a selection of this example),

it results that the “prompt action vehicles” can be placed in vertices:

• 10 - 13 • 10 – 15 • 10 – 21 • 10 - 26 • 10 - 31 • 10 – 32

• 13 - 15 • 13 - 21 • 13 - 26 • 13 - 31 • 13 - 32 • 15 – 21

• 15 – 26 • 15 – 31 • 15 – 32 • 21 - 26 • 21 - 31 • 21 – 32

• 26 – 32 • 6 – 31 • 31 - 32

If we place the two vehicles in vertices 15 and 31, vertex 1 can be reached, starting from

vertex 15, in 61 minutes and starting from vertex 31, in 88 minutes. In order to reduce

action time to reach vertex 1, it is convenient to start from vertex 15. The same logic

must be followed for every vertex of the final graph. In the end, placing the two prompt

action vehicles in vertices 15 and 31 it will be possible to reach all the vertices in a

maximum time of 61 minutes. From data of Table 5, if we place the two vehicles in

vertices 26 and 31 or 26 and 32, it derives that all vertices can be reached in a maximum

time of 58 minutes (column A).

In conclusion, if we place the two “prompt action vehicles” in vertices 26 and 31

(Genova - Est and Rapallo highway toll-gates) or in vertices 26 and 32 (Genova - Est

and Chiavari highway toll-gates), it will be possible to intervene in a maximum time of

58 minutes, which represents the minimum intervention time, under these conditions.

This same logic can be followed whether three or more “prompt action vehicles” are

available. It is noteworthy noting that, if we have at our disposal three “prompt action

vehicles” placed in vertices 10 - 21 - 32, it is possible to reach all vertices in a

maximum time of 41 minutes (from Table 5). The same result is obtained in case we
have at our disposal seven “prompt action vehicles” placed in the seven Fire Brigades

provincial stations. It must be remarked that the resources necessary to control an

accident and mitigate its consequences include an emergency management plan, trained

manpower, appropriate equipment, available communication, plus knowledgeable and

decisive leaders (Kowalski, 1995).

5. Conclusions

The risk from transporting dangerous goods by road and the strategies proposed to

select road load/routes are faced in this paper, by developing a site-oriented framework

sensitive to route specifics and population exposed. The results of the risk evaluation

evidenced some critical situations of the road transportation network in those highway

stretches crossing urban areas and starting from Genoa port. Strategies for the reduction

of risks may include distribution and limitation of ADR road traffic, improvement of

highway section, alternative routes and appropriate emergency management.

Considering this last issue, an optimisation algorithm, based on the graph theory was

developed to select optimal consistency and localisation in the area of “prompt action

vehicles”, properly equipped, quick to move and ready for every eventuality. Applying

this method results in an unambiguous and consistent selection criterion that allows

reduction of intervention time (41 minute maximum), in connection with technical and

economic optimisation of emergency equipment (three vehicles).

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 Figure Captions

Figure 1. Modified Dijkstra algorithm.

Figure 2. Pilot area.

Figure 3. Inventory of hazardous material traffic.

Figure 4. Immediate causes of accident.

Figure 5. Risk characterization in the different highways stretches.

Figure 6. Final graph.

Table 1.

Local enhancing and mitigating parameters.

Parameter
Straight road
INTRINSIC CHARACTERISTICS h1 Road bend (radius > 200m)
Road bend (radius < 200m)
Plane road
Slope road (gradient < 5%)
h2 Steep slope road (gradient > 5%)
Downhill road (gradient < 5%)
Steep downhill road (gradient > 5%)
Two lanes for each carriageway
Two lanes and emergency lane for
h3 each carriageway
Three lanes and emergency lane for
each carriageway
Well lighted straight tunnel
h4 Other tunnels
Bridge
TRAFFIC CHARACT. METEOR. COND.

Fine weather
Rain
Heavy rain
h5 Fog
Snow/ice

Low intensity < 500 vehicle/h

Medium intensity <1250 vehicle/h
with heavy traffic <125 truck/day
High intensity > 1250 vehicle/h
h6
High intensity > 1250 vehicle/h with
heavy traffic > 250 truck/day
Table 2

Daily traffic and accident frequency

Accident per km
Daily traffic [n]
per 10 millions of vehicles
Highway
Length Heavy Light Heavy Light
Total Total
[km] vehicle vehicle vehicle vehicle
A26 83.7 34946 7172 27774 6.29 6.63 4.97
A12 48.7 52105 8139 43966 5.16 5.22 4.84
A10 45.5 55025 9190 45835 6.06 7.20 6.95
A7 50.0 33721 6353 27368 9.83 9.92 9.81
A7 – Stretch 1 1.9 30075 6123 23952 8.63 11.77 7.83
A7 – Stretch 2 3 31620 6235 25385 4.04 7.32 3.24
A7 – Stretch 3 2.9 27758 5134 22624 6.47 11.04 5.43
A7 – Stretch 4 14.3 15476 3250 12226 6.56 7.66 6.27
A7 – Stretch 5 5 12289 2768 9521 13.4 17.82 12.09
A7 – Stretch 6 5.8 12042 2746 9296 7.45 6.88 7.62
A7 – Stretch 7 6.6 11823 2512 9311 4.56 6.61 4.01
Table 3

Acceptability criterion of the risk

Evaluation of the risk Criterion Explanation

10 5 No need for detailed studies. Check that
Acceptable risk P
N2 risk maintains at this level.
10 5 10 4 Tolerable risk if cost of reduction would
Tolerability region A P 2
N2 N exceed the improvements gained
Tolerable only if risk reduction is
10 4 10 3
Tolerability region B  P  impracticable or if its cost is grossly in
N2 N2 disproportion to the improvement gained
10 3 Risk intolerable: risk cannot be justified
Unacceptable risk P
N2 even in extraordinary circumstances
Table 4

Summary of the results (one “prompt action vehicle”)

Vertex 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 [...] 33 34 35 36 A B
distance from 1 0 13 22 31 40 44 44 105 114 115 130 130 130
forerunner 0 1 2 3 4 5 5 32 33 34 34 34
[...]
distance from 28 66 53 44 35 44 48 48 39 48 49 64 67 67
forerunner 2 3 4 8 4 5 5 32 33 34 34 34
[...]
 V er tex 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 A
Table 5

d ist. fr o m 1 0 41 28 19 10 19 23 23 7 9 0 2 5 12 14 20 23 22 22 25 29 40 41 47 54 70 16 17 25 40 41 47 60 64 73 74 89
foreru n n er 2 3 4 8 4 5 5 1 0 8 0 10 10 12 13 12 15 15 15 18 15 20 21 21 23 24 12 26 26 28 29 29 31 32 33 34 34
d ist. fr o m 1 3 53 40 31 22 31 35 35 1 9 21 12 14 7 0 2 10 13 12 12 15 19 30 31 37 44 60 10 11 19 34 35 41 54 58 67 68 83
foreru n n er 2 3 4 8 4 5 5 1 0 8 12 10 13 0 13 13 15 15 15 18 15 20 21 21 23 24 13 26 26 28 29 29 31 32 33 34 34
d ist. fr o m 1 5 61 48 39 30 39 43 43 2 7 29 20 22 15 10 12 0 3 2 2 5 9 20 21 27 34 50 8 9 17 32 33 39 52 56 65 66 81
foreru n n er 2 3 4 8 4 5 5 1 0 8 12 10 15 15 13 0 15 15 15 18 15 20 21 21 23 24 15 26 26 28 29 29 31 32 33 34 34
d ist. fr o m 2 1 81 68 59 50 59 63 63 4 7 49 40 42 35 30 32 20 23 22 22 25 11 0 1 7 14 30 28 29 37 52 53 59 72 76 85 86 101
foreru n n er 2 3 4 8 4 5 5 1 0 8 12 10 15 15 13 20 15 15 15 18 21 0 21 21 23 24 15 26 26 28 29 29 31 32 33 34 34
d ist. fr o m 2 6 57 44 35 26 35 39 39 2 3 25 16 18 11 10 12 8 11 10 10 13 17 28 29 35 42 58 0 1 9 24 25 31 44 48 57 58 73
foreru n n er 2 3 4 8 4 5 5 1 0 8 12 10 26 26 13 26 15 15 15 18 15 20 21 21 23 24 0 26 26 28 29 29 31 32 33 34 34
d ist. fr o m 3 1 88 75 66 57 66 70 70 5 4 56 47 49 42 41 43 39 42 41 41 44 48 59 60 66 73 89 31 32 22 7 8 0 13 17 26 27 42
foreru n n er 2 3 4 8 4 5 5 1 0 8 12 10 26 26 13 26 15 15 15 18 15 20 21 21 23 24 28 26 29 31 29 0 31 32 33 34 34
d ist. fr o m 3 2 101 88 79 70 79 83 83 6 7 69 60 62 55 54 56 52 55 54 54 57 61 72 73 79 86 102 44 45 35 20 21 13 0 4 13 14 29
foreru n n er 2 3 4 8 4 5 5 1 0 8 12 10 26 26 13 26 15 15 15 18 15 20 21 21 23 24 28 26 29 31 29 32 0 32 33 34 34

m in 1 0 -1 3 41 2 8 19 10 1 9 2 3 2 3 7 9 0 2 5 0 2 10 13 12 12 15 19 30 31 37 44 6 0 10 11 19 3 4 3 5 4 1 5 4 5 8 6 7 6 8 8 3 83
m in 1 0 -1 5 41 2 8 19 10 1 9 2 3 2 3 7 9 0 2 5 10 12 0 3 2 2 5 9 20 21 27 34 5 0 8 9 17 3 2 3 3 3 9 5 2 5 6 6 5 6 6 8 1 81
m in 1 0 -2 1 41 2 8 19 10 1 9 2 3 2 3 7 9 0 2 5 12 14 20 23 22 22 25 11 0 1 7 14 3 0 16 17 25 4 0 4 1 4 7 6 0 6 4 7 3 7 4 8 9 89
m in 1 0 -2 6 41 2 8 19 10 1 9 2 3 2 3 7 9 0 2 5 10 12 8 11 10 10 13 17 28 29 35 42 5 8 0 1 9 2 4 2 5 3 1 4 4 4 8 5 7 5 8 7 3 73
m in 1 0 -3 1 41 2 8 19 10 1 9 2 3 2 3 7 9 0 2 5 12 14 20 23 22 22 25 29 40 41 47 54 7 0 16 17 22 7 8 0 1 3 1 7 2 6 2 7 4 2 70
m in 1 0 -3 2 41 2 8 19 10 1 9 2 3 2 3 7 9 0 2 5 12 14 20 23 22 22 25 29 40 41 47 54 7 0 16 17 25 2 0 2 1 1 3 0 4 1 3 1 4 2 9 70
m in 1 3 -1 5 53 4 0 31 22 3 1 3 5 3 5 1 9 2 1 1 2 1 4 7 0 2 0 3 2 2 5 9 20 21 27 34 5 0 8 9 17 3 2 3 3 3 9 5 2 5 6 6 5 6 6 8 1 81
m in 1 3 -2 1 53 4 0 31 22 3 1 3 5 3 5 1 9 2 1 1 2 1 4 7 0 2 10 13 12 12 15 11 0 1 7 14 3 0 10 11 19 3 4 3 5 4 1 5 4 5 8 6 7 6 8 8 3 83
m in 1 3 -2 6 53 4 0 31 22 3 1 3 5 3 5 1 9 2 1 1 2 1 4 7 0 2 8 11 10 10 13 17 28 29 35 42 5 8 0 1 9 2 4 2 5 3 1 4 4 4 8 5 7 5 8 7 3 73
m in 1 3 -3 1 53 4 0 31 22 3 1 3 5 3 5 1 9 2 1 1 2 1 4 7 0 2 10 13 12 12 15 19 30 31 37 44 6 0 10 11 19 7 8 0 1 3 1 7 2 6 2 7 4 2 60
m in 1 3 -3 2 53 4 0 31 22 3 1 3 5 3 5 1 9 2 1 1 2 1 4 7 0 2 10 13 12 12 15 19 30 31 37 44 6 0 10 11 19 20 21 13 0 4 1 3 1 4 2 9 60
Summary of the results (several “prompt action vehicle”).

m in 1 5 -2 1 61 4 8 39 30 3 9 4 3 4 3 2 7 2 9 2 0 2 2 15 10 12 0 3 2 2 5 9 0 1 7 14 3 0 8 9 17 32 33 39 52 56 6 5 6 6 8 1 81
m in 1 5 -2 6 57 4 4 35 26 3 5 3 9 3 9 2 3 2 5 1 6 1 8 11 10 12 0 3 2 2 5 9 20 21 27 34 5 0 0 1 9 24 25 31 44 48 5 7 5 8 7 3 73
m in 1 5 -3 1 61 4 8 39 30 3 9 4 3 4 3 2 7 2 9 2 0 2 2 15 10 12 0 3 2 2 5 9 20 21 27 34 5 0 8 9 17 7 8 0 13 17 2 6 2 7 4 2 61
m in 1 5 -3 2 61 4 8 39 30 3 9 4 3 4 3 2 7 2 9 2 0 2 2 15 10 12 0 3 2 2 5 9 20 21 27 34 5 0 8 9 17 20 21 13 0 4 1 3 1 4 2 9 61
m in 2 1 -2 6 57 4 4 35 26 3 5 3 9 3 9 2 3 2 5 1 6 1 8 11 10 12 8 11 10 10 13 11 0 1 7 14 3 0 0 1 9 24 25 31 44 48 5 7 5 8 7 3 73
m in 2 1 -3 1 81 6 8 59 50 5 9 6 3 6 3 4 7 4 9 4 0 4 2 35 30 32 20 23 22 22 25 11 0 1 7 14 3 0 28 29 22 7 8 0 13 17 2 6 2 7 4 2 81
m in 2 1 -3 2 81 6 8 59 50 5 9 6 3 6 3 4 7 4 9 4 0 4 2 35 30 32 20 23 22 22 25 11 0 1 7 14 3 0 28 29 35 20 21 13 0 4 1 3 1 4 2 9 81
m in 2 6 -3 1 57 4 4 35 26 3 5 3 9 3 9 2 3 2 5 1 6 1 8 11 10 12 8 11 10 10 13 17 28 29 35 42 5 8 0 1 9 7 8 0 13 17 2 6 2 7 4 2 58
m in 2 6 -3 2 57 4 4 35 26 3 5 3 9 3 9 2 3 2 5 1 6 1 8 11 10 12 8 11 10 10 13 17 28 29 35 42 5 8 0 1 9 20 21 13 0 4 1 3 1 4 2 9 58
m in 3 1 -3 2 88 7 5 66 57 6 6 7 0 7 0 5 4 5 6 4 7 4 9 42 41 43 39 42 41 41 44 48 59 60 66 73 8 9 31 32 22 7 8 0 0 4 1 3 1 4 2 9 89
m in 1 0 -2 1 - 3 2 41 2 8 19 10 1 9 2 3 2 3 7 9 0 2 5 12 14 20 23 22 22 25 11 0 1 7 14 3 0 16 17 25 20 21 13 0 4 1 3 1 4 2 9 41
m in 1 0 -1 3 - 1 5 -2 1 -
41 28 19 10 19 23 23 7 9 0 2 5 0 2 0 3 2 2 5 9 0 1 7 14 30 0 1 9 7 8 0 0 4 13 14 29 41
2 6 -3 1 - 3 2