SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION

January 31, 2018

A.C. No. 10783

ATTY. BENIGNO T. BARTOLOME,, Complainant

vs.
ATTY. CHRISTOPHER A. BASILIO, Respondent

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

For resolution are the Motion to Lift Suspension1 dated July 19, 2017 filed by respondent Atty.
Christopher A. Basilio (Basilio), as well as the Report and Recommendation2 dated September 13,
2017 of the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC), recommending that: (a) Basilio be meted with an
additional penalty of fine in the amount of ₱10,000.00 for his failure to immediately comply with the
Court's order of suspension from the practice of law, as mandated in the Decision3 dated October 14,
2015 of the Court; and (b) the lifting of the order of suspension be held in abeyance pending the
payment of the fine.

The Facts

In the October 14, 2015 Decision4 (the Decision), the Court suspended Basilio from the practice of
law for one (1) year, revoked his incumbent commission as a notary public, and prohibited him from
being commissioned as a notary public for two (2) years, effective immediately, after finding him
guilty of violating the 2004 Rules of Notarial Practice and Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He is further warned that a repetition of the same offense or similar acts
in the future shall be dealt with more severely.5

The Decision was circulated to all courts for the information and implementation of the order of
suspension.6 Basilio, thru his counsel, Atty. Edward L. Robea (Robea), claimed to have received a
copy of the Decision on December 2, 2015,7 hence, his suspension from the practice of law, as well
as the revocation of his notarial commission and prohibition from being commissioned as a notary
public should have all effectively commenced on the same date. In a Resolution8 dated April 20,
2016, the Court denied with finality Basilio's motion for reconsideration9 of the Decision.

However, in a letter10 dated June 9, 2016, Atty. Sotero T. Rambayon (Rambayon) inquired from the
Court about the status of Basilio's suspension, alleging that the latter still appeared before Judge
Venancio M. Ovejera of the Municipal Trial Court of Paniqui, Tarlac on April 26, 2016. The letter was
subsequently referred to the OBC for appropriate action.11 In a letter-reply12 dated July 25, 2016, the
OBC informed Rambayon that the Decision had already been circulated to all courts for
implementation, and that Basilio's motion for reconsideration had been denied with finality by the
Court.

Consequently, in a Report and Recommendation13 dated July 27, 2016, the OBC recommended that
Basilio be required to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court for not
immediately complying with the Court's order of suspension upon receipt of the Decision. He was
further required to file a sworn statement, with certifications from the Office of the Executive Judge of
the court where he practices his legal profession and from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines' (IBP)
Local Chapter where he is affiliated with, affirming that he has ceased and desisted from the practice
of law, has not appeared in court as counsel, and has not practiced his notarial commission during
the mandated period.

In another letter14 dated August 22, 2016, Rambayon informed the Court that in the schedule of
cases before Judge Bemar D. Fajardo of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Paniqui, Tarlac, Branch
67, there were five (5) cases15 where the litigants were supposedly represented by Basilio.

In a Resolution16 dated October 5, 2016, the Court, among others, noted Rambayon's letter dated
August 22, 2016 and further required Basilio to: (a) show cause within ten (10) days from notice why
he should not be held in contempt of court for not immediately complying with the order of
suspension upon receipt of the Decision; and (b)file a sworn statement with certifications affirming
that he has fully served his penalty of suspension.

Complying17 with the show cause order, Basilio explained that he did not immediately comply with the
suspension order because he believed that his suspension was held in abeyance pending resolution
of his motion for reconsideration of the Decision, following the guidelines in Maniago v. De
Dios18(Maniago), wherein it was stated that "[u]nless the Court explicitly states that the decision is
immediately executory upon receipt thereof, respondent has [fifteen (15)] days within which to file a
motion for reconsideration thereof. The denial of said motion shall render the decision final and
executory."19 On this score, he maintained that what was immediately executory was only the
revocation of his notarial commission and the two (2)-year prohibition of being commissioned as a
notary public.20

In a Resolution21 dated March 15, 2017, the Court noted Basilio's compliance, and referred the case
to the OBC for evaluation, report, and recommendation. In a Report and Recommendation22 dated
June 22, 2017, the OBC recommended that the directives in the Court's October 5, 2016 Resolution
be reiterated, i.e., the filing of a sworn statement with certifications attesting to his compliance with
the full service of suspension, and require Basilio to comply with the same within ten (10) days from
notice.

Before the Court could act on the OBC's June 22, 2017 Report and Recommendation, Basilio filed a
Motion to Lift Suspension (Motion)23 on July 25, 2017, attaching an Affidavit of Cessation/Desistance
from Practice of Law or Appearance in Court.24 In his motion, Basilio stated that he "has commenced
to serve his penalty on July 9, 2016 and continue to serve his penalty until the present upon his
receipt of the Order of the [Court] denying his Motion for Reconsideration."25 He further mentioned
that he "immediately ceased and desisted from the practice of his notarial commission on December
2, 2015 until the present."26 Basilio likewise attached to his Motion the following: (a)
Certification27 dated July 12, 2017 from the IBP-Tarlac Chapter, affirming that Basilio "has not
appeared in court beginning July 9, 2016 to July 9, 2017" and "has not practiced his notarial
commission as notary public from December 2, 2016 [up to] the present"; (b) Certification28 dated
July 14, 2017 from the RTC of Paniqui, Tarlac, Branch 67, attesting that Basilio has ceased and
desisted from the practice of law and has not practiced his notarial commission from December 2,
2016 up to the present; and (c) Certifications29 dated July 17, 2017, from the RTC of Camiling,
Tarlac, Branch 68 and July 20, 2017, from the RTC of Tarlac City, Branch 64, both affirming that
Basilio did not appear as counsel in said courts from July 9, 2016 up to the present.

The Action and Recommendation of the OBC

In a Report and Recommendation30 dated September 13, 2017, the OBC recommended that Basilio
be meted with an additional penalty of a fine in the amount of ₱10,000.00 for his failure to
immediately comply with the Court's order of suspension from the practice of law, as mandated in
the Decision. Likewise, it recommended that the lifting of the order of suspension from the practice of
law be held in abeyance pending his payment of the fine.

The OBC maintained that Basilio, through his counsel, Robea, received the Decision on November
3, 2015. Hence, the one (1)-year suspension order from the practice of law imposed upon him
commenced from the said date should end on November 3, 2016. On the other hand, the two (2)-
year order of revocation of notarial commission and prohibition from being commissioned as a notary
public should end on November 3, 2017. However, the OBC observed that Basilio served his
suspension order from the practice of law beginning only on July 9, 2016 and desisted from his
notarial practice on December 2, 2015, as shown by the attached Certifications; hence, the
recommended fine.

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issues for the Court's resolution are: (a) whether or not Basilio's suspension should
now be lifted, and (b) whether or not he should be fined for his failure to immediately comply with the
order of the Court.

The Court's Ruling

The dispositive portion of the Decision explicitly states that the penalties imposed on Basilio for
violation of the 2004 Rules of Notarial Practice and Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility - namely: (a)suspension from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year;
(b) revocation of his incumbent commission as a notary public; and (c) prohibition from being
commissioned as a notary public for two (2) years, were all "effective immediately", viz.:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Atty. Christopher A. Basilio GUILTY of violating the 2004 Rules of
Notarial Practice and Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly,
the Court hereby SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for one (1) year; REVOKES his
incumbent commission as a notary public, if any; and PROHIBITS him from being commissioned as
a notary public for two (2) years, effective immediately. He is WARNED that a repetition of the same
offense or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.31 [Emphasis, italics, and
underscoring supplied]

Accordingly, Basilio's compliance with the order of suspension, as well as all the other penalties,
should have commenced on the day he received the Decision. 1âwphi 1

According to the OBC, Basilio received the Decision on November 3, 2015. However, records show
that Basilio, through Robea, actually received the Decision on December 2, 2015, as per the
Registry Return Receipt, and that the same was merely mailed on November 13 (not 3), 2015.32 The
OBC - albeit still inaccurately - must have thought that this latter date was to be considered as the
date of receipt. In fact, Basilio, in his motion for reconsideration and compliance to the Court's
October 5, 2016 Resolution,33 has repeatedly maintained that he received the Decision on December
2, 2015. This averment appears to be consistent with the documents on record and hence, ought to
prevail.

This notwithstanding, Basilio himself admitted that he served his suspension only on July 9, 2016,
proffering that he believed that what was immediately executory was only the revocation of his
notarial commission and the two (2)-year prohibition against being commissioned as a notary public.
Unfortunately, the Court cannot accept such flimsy excuse in light of the Decision's unequivocal
wording.

Irrefragably, the clause "effective immediately" was placed at the end of the enumerated series of
penalties to indicate that the same pertained to and therefore, qualified all three (3) penalties, which
clearly include his suspension from the practice of law. The immediate effectivity of the order of
suspension - not just of the revocation and prohibition against his notarial practice - logically
proceeds from the fact that all three (3) penalties were imposed on Basilio as a result of the Court's
finding that he failed to comply with his duties as a notary public, in violation of the provisions of the
2004 Rules of Notarial Practice, and his sworn duties as a lawyer, in violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Thus, with the Decision's explicit wording that the same
was "effective immediately", there is no gainsaying that Basilio's compliance therewith should have
commenced immediately from his receipt of the Decision on December 2, 2015. On this score,
Basilio cannot rely on the Maniago ruling as above-claimed since it was, in fact, held therein that a
decision is immediately executory upon receipt thereof if the decision so indicates, as in this case.

All told, for his failure to immediately serve the penalties in the Decision against him upon receipt,
Basilio acted contumaciously,34 and thus should be meted with a fine in the amount of
₱10,000.00,35 as recommended by the OBC. Pending his payment of the fine and presentation of
proof thereof, the lifting of the order of suspension from the practice of law is perforce held in
abeyance.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby FINDS respondent Atty. Christopher A. Basilio GUILTY of indirect
contempt. He is hereby FINED in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (₱10,000.00) and STERNLY
1âwphi1

WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar infractions will be dealt with more severely. The
lifting of the order of suspension from the practice of law is HELD IN ABEYANCE pending his
payment of the fine and presentation of proof thereof.

SO ORDERED.

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Chairperson

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

NOEL GIMENEZ TIJAM

Associate Justice
 EN BANC

January 10, 2018

A.C. No. 8208

RET. JUDGE VIRGILIO ALPAJORA, Complainant

vs.
ATTY. RONALDO ANTONIO V. CALAYAN, Respondent

DECISION

GESMUNDO, J.:

Before the Court is a Counter-Complaint1 filed by complainant (Ret.) Judge Virgilio

Alpajora (Complainant) against respondent Atty. Ronaldo Antonio V. Calayan (Respondent), which
originated from an administrative complaint filed by the latter against the former before the Office of
the Court Administrator (OCA) for ignorance of the law and/or issuance of undue order. The
administrative complaint against Judge Alpajora was dismissed by the Court in a Resolution,2 dated
March 2, 2009, on the ground that the matters raised therein were judicial in nature.

In his Comment/Opposition with Counter-Complaint to Discipline Complainant,3 complainant charged

respondent with (a) filing a malicious and harassment administrative case, (b) propensity for
dishonesty in the allegations in his pleadings, (c) misquoting provisions of law, and (d)
misrepresentation of facts. Complainant prayed for respondent's disbarment and cancellation of his
license as a lawyer.

The Antecedents

Prior to this case, an intra-corporate case docketed as Civil Case No. 2007-10 and entitled "Calayan
Educational Foundation Inc. (CEFI), Dr. Arminda Calayan, Dr. Bernardita Calayan-Brion and Dr.
Manuel Calayan vs. Atty. Ronalda A.V. Calayan, Susan S. Calayan and Deanna
Rachelle S. Calayan, " was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lucena City designated as
commercial court and presided by Judge Adolfo Encomienda. Respondent was President and
Chairman of the Board of Trustees of CEFI. He signed and filed pleadings as "Special Counsel pro
se" for himself. Court proceedings ensued despite several inhibitions by judges to whom the case
was re-raffled until it was finally re-raffled to complainant. Thereafter, complainant issued an
Omnibus Order,4dated July 11, 2008 for the creation of a management committee and the
appointment of its members. That Order prompted the filing of the administrative case against the
Judge Alpajora.

The administrative case against complainant was dismissed. The Court, however, referred the
comment/opposition with counter-complaint filed by complainant in the administrative case against
him to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for appropriate action.

The OBC deemed it proper to re-docket the counter-complaint as a regular administrative case
against respondent. Thus, in a Resolution,5 dated June 3, 2009, upon recommendation of the OBC,
the Court resolved to require respondent to submit his comment on the counter-complaint.
In its Resolution,6 dated September 9, 2009, the Court noted respondent's comment and referred the
administrative case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.

After a mandatory conference before the IBP, both parties were directed to submit their respective
verified position papers.

Position of complainant

Complainant alleged that he partially tried and heard Civil Case No. 2007-10, an intra-corporate
case filed against respondent, when he later voluntarily inhibited himself from it on account of the
latter's filing of the administrative case against him.

The intra-corporate case was previously tried by Presiding Judge Adolfo Encomienda (Presiding
Judge Encomienda) until he voluntarily inhibited after respondent filed an Urgent Motion to Recuse
and a Supplement to Defendant's Urgent Motion to Recuse on the grounds of undue delay in
disposing pending incidents, gross ignorance of the law and gross inefficiency.7 The motions came
after Presiding Judge Encomienda issued an order appointing one Atty. Antonio Acyatan (Atty.
Acyatan) as receiver, who was directed to immediately take over the subject corporation.

After Presiding Judge Encomienda inhibited himself, the case was re-raffled to the sala of Executive
Judge Norma Chionglo-Sia, who also inhibited herself because she was about to retire. The case
was referred to Executive Judge Eloida R. de Leon-Diaz for proper disposition and re-raffle.8 The
case was finally raffled to complainant.9

Complainant averred that the administrative case against him by respondent was brought about by
his issuance of the omnibus order, dated July 11, 2008, where he ordered the creation of a
management committee and appointment of its members. Meanwhile, the RTC resolved that Atty.
Acyatan continue to discharge his duties and responsibilities with such powers and authority as the
court-appointed receiver. The trial court also authorized the foundation to pay Atty. Acyatan
reimbursement expenses and professional charges. Complainant claimed that his order was not
acceptable to respondent because he knew the import and effect of the said order - that he, together
with his wife and daughter, would lose their positions as Chairman, Treasurer and Secretary,
respectively, and as members of the Board of Trustees of the CEFI.10

Complainant further claimed that before the records of Civil Case 2007-10 was transmitted to his
sala and after he had inhibited from said case, respondent filed thirteen (13) civil and special actions
before the RTC of Lucena City.11Atty. Calayan also filed two (2) related intra-corporate controversy
cases - violating the rule on splitting causes of actions - involving the management and operation of
the foundation. According to complainant, these showed the propensity and penchant of respondent
in filing cases, whether or not they are baseless, frivolous or unfounded, with no other intention but
to harass, malign and molest his opposing parties, including the lawyers and the handling judges.
Complainant also revealed that respondent filed two (2) other administrative cases against a judge
and an assisting judge in the RTC of Lucena City, which were dismissed because the issues raised
were judicial in nature.12

Complainant also disclosed that before his sala, respondent filed eighteen (18) repetitious and
prohibited pleadings.13 Respondent continuously filed pleadings after pleadings as if to impress upon
the court to finish the main intra-corporate case with such speed. To complainant's mind, the
ultimate and ulterior objective of respondent in filing the numerous pleadings, motions, manifestation
and explanations was to prevent the takeover of the management of CEFI and to finally dismiss the
case at the pre-trial stage.
Complainant further revealed that due to the series of motions for recusation or inhibition of judges,
there is no presiding judge in Lucena City available to try and hear the Calayan cases. Moreover,
respondent filed nine (9) criminal charges against opposing lawyers and their respective clients
before the City Prosecutor of Lucena City. In addition, there were four (4) administrative cases filed
against opposing counsels pending before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline.14

Based on the foregoing, complainant asserted that respondent committed the following: (1) serious
and gross misconduct in his duties as counsel for himself; (2) violated his oath as lawyer for [a] his
failure to observe and maintain respect to the courts (Section 20(b), Rule 138, Rules of Court); [b] by
his abuse of judicial process thru maintaining actions or proceedings inconsistent with truth and
honor and his acts to mislead the judge by false statements (Section 20(d), Rule 138); (3) repeatedly
violated the rules of procedures governing intra-corporate cases and maliciously misused the same
to defeat the ends of justice; and (4) knowingly violated the rule against the filing of multiple actions
arising from the same cause of action.

Position of respondent

In his Position Paper,15 respondent countered that the subject case is barred by the doctrine of res
judicata.

According to him, the counter-complaint was integrated with the Comment/Opposition of

complainant in the administrative case docketed as A.M. OCA LP.I. No. 08-2968-RTJ filed by
respondent against the latter. He stressed that because no disciplinary measures were levelled on
him by the OCA as an outcome of his complaint, charges for malpractice, malice or bad faith were
entirely ruled out; moreso, his disbarment was decidedly eliminated.16Respondent argued that the
doctrine of res judicata was embedded in the OCA's finding that his complaint was judicial in
nature.17 He likewise averred that the conversion of the administrative complaint against a judge into
a disbarment complaint against him, the complaining witness, was hideously adopted to deflect the
charges away from complainant. Respondent insisted that the counter-complaint was not sanctioned
by the Rules of Court on disbarment and the Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Bar
Discipline.18

Respondent also claimed that the counter-complaint was unverified and thus, without complainant's
own personal knowledge; instead, it is incontrovertible proof of his lack of courtesy and obedience
toward proper authorities and fairness to a fellow lawyer.19

Further, respondent maintained that complainant committed the following: (1) grossly unethical and
immoral conduct by his impleading a non-party;20 (2) betrayal of his lawyer's oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR);21 (3) malicious and intentional delay in not terminating the pre-
trial,22 in violation of the Interim Rules because he ignored the special summary nature of the
case;23 and (4) misquoted provisions of law and misrepresented the facts.24

Lastly, it was respondent's submission that the counter-complaint failed to adduce the requisite
quantum of evidence to disbar him, even less, to cite him in contempt of court assuming ex
gratia the regularity of the referral of the case.25

Report and Recommendation of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline

In its Report and Recommendation,26 the Investigating Commissioner noted that, instead of refuting
the allegations and evidence against him, respondent merely reiterated his charges against
complainant. Instead of asserting his defense against complainant's charges, the position paper for
the respondent appeared more to be a motion for reconsideration of the Resolution dated March 2,
2009 rendered by the Supreme Court, dismissing the administrative case against complainant.27

In any case, based on the parties' position papers, the Investigating Commissioner concluded that
respondent violated Section 20, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,28 Rules 8.01, 10.01 to 10.03, 11.03,
11.04, 12.02 and 12.04 of the CPR29 and, thus, recommended his suspension from the practice of
law for two (2) years,30 for the following reasons:

First, respondent did not deny having filed four (4) cases against the counsel involved in the intra-
corporate case from which the subject administrative cases stemmed, and nine (9) criminal cases
against the opposing parties, their lawyers, and the receiver before the Office of the Prosecutor of
Lucena City - all of which were subject of judicial notice. The Investigating Commissioner opined that
such act manifested respondent's malice in paralyzing these lawyers from exerting their utmost effort
in protecting their client's interest.31

Second, respondent committed misrepresentation when he cited a quote from former Chief Justice
Hilario Davide, Jr. as a thesis when, in fact, it was a dissenting opinion. The Investigating
Commissioner further opined that describing the supposed discussions by the judge with
respondent's adverse counsels as contemplated crimes and frauds is not only grave but also
unfounded and irrelevant to the present case.32

Third, respondent grossly abused his right of recourse to the courts by the filing of multiple actions
concerning the same subject matter or seeking substantially identical relief.33 He admitted filing
pleadings indiscriminately, but argued that it was within his right to do so and it was merely for the
purpose of saving CEFI from imminent downfall.34 The Investigating Commissioner opined that the
filing of multiple actions not only was contemptuous, but also a blatant violation of the lawyer's oath.35

Fourth, respondent violated Canon 11 of the CPR by attributing to complainant ill-motives that were
not supported by the record or had no materiality to the case.36 He charged complainant with
coaching adverse counsel on account of their alleged close ties, inefficiency in dealing with his
pleadings, acting with dispatch on the adverse party's motions, partiality to the plaintiffs because he
was a townmate of Presiding Judge Encomienda, and arriving at an order without predicating the
same on legal bases under the principle of stare decisis.37 According to the Investigating
Commissioner, these charges are manifestly without any basis and also established respondent's
disrespect for the complainant.38

Based on the findings, the Investigating Commissioner ultimately concluded:

As a party directly involved in the subject intra-corporate controversy, it is duly noted that
Respondent was emotionally affected by the ongoing case. His direct interest in the proceedings
apparently clouded his judgment, on account of which he failed to act with circumspect in his choice
of words and legal remedies. Such facts and circumstances mitigate Respondent's liability. Hence, it
is hereby recommended that Respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years.39

Consequently, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution40 adopting and approving the report
and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. It recommended the suspension of
respondent from the practice of law for two (2) years.

Aggrieved, respondent moved for reconsideration.

In a Resolution,41 dated May 4, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors denied respondent's motion for
reconsideration as there was no cogent reason to reverse the findings of the Commission and the
motion was a mere reiteration of the matters which had already been threshed out.

Hence, pursuant to Section 12(b), Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court,42 the Resolution of the IBP
Board of Governors, together with the whole record of the case, was transmitted to the Court for final
action.

Ruling of the Court

The Court adopts the findings of the Investigating Commissioner and the recommendation of the IBP
Board of Governors.

It bears stressing that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. It is bestowed
upon individuals who are not only learned in law, but also known to possess good moral character.
Lawyers should act and comport themselves with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond
reproach, in order to promote the public's faith in the legal profession.43

When lawyers, in the performance of their duties, act in a manner that prejudices not only the rights
of their client, but also of their colleagues and offends due administration of justice, appropriate
disciplinary measures and proceedings are available such as reprimand, suspension or even
disbarment to rectify their wrongful acts.

The Court, however, emphasizes that a case for disbarment or suspension is not meant to grant
relief to a complainant as in a civil case, but is intended to cleanse the ranks of the legal profession
of its undesirable members in order to protect the public and the courts.44 Proceedings to discipline
erring members of the bar are not instituted to protect and promote the public good only, but also to
maintain the dignity of the profession by the weeding out of those who have proven themselves
unworthy thereof.45

In this case, perusal of the records reveals that Atty. Calayan has displayed conduct unbecoming of
a worthy lawyer.

Harassing tactics against opposing counsel

As noted by the IBP Investigating Commissioner, respondent did not deny filing several cases, both
civil and criminal, against opposing parties and their counsels. In his motion for reconsideration of
the IBP Board of Governors' Resolution, he again admitted such acts but expressed that it was not
ill-willed. He explained that the placing of CEFI under receivership and directing the creation of a
management committee and the continuation of the receiver's duties and responsibilities by virtue of
the Omnibus Order spurred his filing of various pleadings and/or motions.46 It was in his desperation
and earnest desire to save CEFI from further damage that he implored the aid of the courts.47

The Court is mindful of the lawyer's duty to defend his client's cause with utmost zeal. However,
professional rules impose limits on a lawyer's zeal and hedge it with necessary restrictions and
qualifications.48 The filing of cases by respondent against the adverse parties and their counsels, as
correctly observed by the Investigating Commissioner, manifests his malice in paralyzing the lawyers
from exerting their utmost effort in protecting their client's interest.49 Even assuming arguendo that
such acts were done without malice, it showed respondent's gross indiscretion as a colleague in the
legal profession.
Unsupported ill-motives attributed to a judge

As officers of the court, lawyers are duty-bound to observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts and judicial officers. They are to abstain from offensive or menacing language or behavior
before the court and must refrain from attributing to a judge motives that are not supported by the
record or have no materiality to the case.50

Here, respondent has consistently attributed unsupported imputations against the complainant in his
pleadings. He insisted that complainant antedated the order, dated August 15, 2008, because the
envelopes where the order came from were rubber stamped as having been mailed only on August
26, 2008.51 He also accused the complainant judge of being in cahoots and of having deplorable
close ties with the adverse counsels;52 and that complainant irrefutably coached said adverse
counsels.53 However, these bare allegations are absolutely unsupported by any piece of evidence.
Respondent did not present any proof to establish complainant's alleged partiality or the antedating.
The date of mailing indicated on the envelope is not the date of issue of the said order.

Canon 11 and Rule 11.04 of the CPR state that:

Canon 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the Courts and to judicial officers
and should insist on similar conduct by others.

xxx

Rule 11.04 A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record or have no
materiality to the case.

In light of the foregoing, the Court finds respondent guilty of attributing unsupported ill-motives to
complainant. It must be remembered that all lawyers are bound to uphold the dignity and authority of
the courts, and to promote confidence in the fair administration of justice. It is the respect for the
courts that guarantees the stability of the judicial institution; elsewise, the institution would be resting
on a very shaky foundation.54

Hence, no matter how passionate a lawyer is towards defending his client's cause, he must not
forget to display the appropriate decorum expected of him, being a member of the legal profession,
and to continue to afford proper and utmost respect due to the courts.

Failure to observe candor, fairness and good faith before the court; failure to assist in the speedy
and efficient administration of justice

It cannot be gainsaid that candidness, especially towards the courts, is essential for the expeditious
administration of justice. Courts are entitled to expect only complete candor and honesty from the
lawyers appearing and pleading before them. A lawyer, on the other hand, has the fundamental duty
to satisfy that expectation. Otherwise, the administration of justice would gravely suffer if indeed it
could proceed at all.55

In his Motion for Reconsideration56 of the Resolution dated February 10, 2014 of the IBP Board of
Governors, respondent wrote:

Anent, the Respondent's alleged commission of falsehood in his pleadings, suffice it to state that if
certain pleadings prepared by the Respondent contained some allegations that turned out to be
inaccurate, the same were nevertheless unintentional and only arose out of the Respondent's honest
misappreciation of certain facts;57

The records, however, showed that respondent's allegations were not brought about by mere
inaccuracy. For one of his arguments against the complainant, respondent relied on Rule 9 of the
Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate Controversies which provides:

SECTION 1. Creation of a Management Committee. - As an incident to any of the cases filed under
these Rules or the Interim Rules on Corporate Rehabilitation, A PARTY MAY APPLY for the
appointment of a management committee for the corporation, partnership or association, when there
is imminent danger of: xxx [Emphasis supplied]

He stressed that the courts cannot motu proprio legally direct the appointment of a management
committee when the Interim Rules predicate such appointment exclusively upon the application of a
party in the complaint a quo.58

By employing the term "exclusively" to describe the class of persons who can apply for the
appointment of a management committee,59 respondent tried to mislead the Court. Lawyers are well
aware of the tenor of a provision of law when "may" is used. "May" is construed as permissive and
operating to confer discretion.60 Thus, when the Interim Rules stated that "a party may apply x x x, " it
did not connote exclusivity to a certain class. It simply meant that should a party opt for the
appointment of such, it may do so. It does not, however, exclude the courts from ordering the
appointment of a management committee should the surrounding circumstances of the case warrant
such.

Further, as regards his alleged misquotation, respondent argues that he should have been cited in
contempt. He found justification in Cortes vs. Bangalan,61 to wit:
1âwphi1

xxx. The alleged offensive and contemptuous language contained in the letter-complaint was not
directed to the respondent court. As observed by the Court Administrator, "what respondent should
have done in this particular case is that he should have given the Court (Supreme Court) the
opportunity to rule on the complaint and not simply acted precipitately in citing complainant in
contempt of court in a manner which obviously smacks of retaliation rather than the upholding of a
court's honor."

A judge may not hold a party in contempt of court for expressing concern on his impartiality even if
the judge may have been insulted therein. While the power to punish in contempt is inherent in all
courts so as to preserve order in judicial proceedings and to uphold the due administration of justice,
judges, however, should exercise their contempt powers judiciously and sparingly, with utmost
restraint, and with the end in view of utilizing their contempt powers for correction and preservation
not for retaliation or vindication.62

As correctly pointed out by the Investigating Commissioner, the jurisprudence quoted precisely
cautions a judge against citing a party in contempt, which is totally contradictory to the position of
respondent. He misrepresented the text of a decision, in violation of the CPR.

Moreover, in defense of the multiple pleadings he filed, respondent avers that there is no law or rule
that limits the number of motions, pleadings and even cases as long as they are sufficient in form
and substance and not violative of the prohibition against forum shopping.63 He maintains that his
pleadings were filed in utmost good faith and for noble causes, and that he was merely exercising
his constitutionally protected rights to due process and speedy disposition of cases.64
Ironically, Atty. Calayan's indiscriminate filing of pleadings, motions, civil and criminal cases, and
even administrative cases against different trial court judges relating to controversies involving CEFI,
in fact, runs counter to the speedy disposition of cases. It frustrates the administration of justice. It
degrades the dignity and integrity of the courts.

A lawyer does not have an unbridled right to file pleadings, motions and cases as he pleases.
Limitations can be inferred from the following rules:

1. Rules of Court

a. Rule 71, Section 3. Indirect Contempt to be Punished After Charge and Hearing. - After charge in
writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such
period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of
the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:

xxx

(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of a court not
constituting direct contempt under Section 1 of this Rule;

(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice;

xxx

2. Code of Professional Responsibility

a. Canon 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and for legal processes.

b. Canon 10, Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not
misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.

c. Canon 12 - A lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the
speedy and efficient administration of justice.

d. Canon 12, Rule 12.04 -A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the
execution of a Judgment or misuse Court processes.

Respondent justifies his filing of administrative cases against certain judges, including complainant,
by relying on In Re: Almacen (Almacen).65 He claims that the mandate of the ruling laid down
in Almacen was to encourage lawyers' criticism of erring magistrates.66

In Almacen, however, it did not mandate but merely recognized the right of a lawyer, both as an
officer of the court and as a citizen, to criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate
channels the acts of courts and judges.67 In addition, the Court therein emphasized that these
criticisms are subject to a condition, to wit:

But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over
the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and
abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is
a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to
disciplinary action.68 [Emphasis supplied.]

Indubitably, the acts of respondent were in violation of his duty to observe and maintain the respect
due to the courts of justice and judicial officers and his duty to never seek to mislead the judge or
any judicial officer.69

In his last ditch attempt to escape liability, respondent apologized for not being more circumspect
with his remedies and choice of words. He admitted losing objectivity and becoming emotional while
pursuing the cases involving him and the CEFI. The Court, however, reiterates that a lawyer's duty,
is not to his client but primarily to the administration of justice. To that end, his client's success is
wholly subordinate. His conduct ought to, and must always, be scrupulously observant of the law
and ethics. Any means, not honorable, fair and honest which is resorted to by the lawyer, even in the
pursuit of his devotion to his client's cause, is condemnable and unethical.70

For having violated the CPR and the Lawyer's Oath, respondent's conduct should be meted with a
commensurate penalty.

WHEREFORE, the Court ADOPTS and APPROVES the Resolution of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines - Board of Governors dated September 28, 2013. Accordingly, Atty. Ronaldo Antonio V.
Calayan is found GUILTY of violating The Lawyer's Oath and The Code of Professional
Responsibility and he is hereby ordered SUSPENDEDfrom the practice of law for two (2) years, with
a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or a similar offense will warrant the imposition of a
more severe penalty.

Let copies of this decision be furnished the: (a) Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to
all courts throughout the country for their information and guidance; (b) the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines; and (c) the Office of the Bar Confidant. Let a copy of this decision be attached to the
personal records of the respondent.

SO ORDERED.

ALEXANDER G. GESMUNDO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice Associate Justice
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN
Associate Justice Associate Justice

FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA ALFREDO BENJAMIN S. CAGUIOA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

SAMUEL R. MARTIRES NOEL G. TIJAM

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANDRES B. REYES, JR.

Associate Justice
 SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION

January 10, 2018

A.C. No. 9000

TOMAS P. TAN, JR., Complainant

vs.
ATTY. HAIDE V. GUMBA, Respondent

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

This case is an offshoot of the administrative Complaint1 filed by Tomas P. Tan, Jr. (complainant)
against Atty. Haide V. Gumba (respondent), and for which respondent was suspended from the
practice of law for six months. The issues now ripe for resolution arc: a) whether respondent
disobeyed a lawful order of the Court: by not abiding by the order of her suspension; and b) whether
respondent deserves a stiffer penalty for such violation.

Factual Antecedents

According to complainant, in August 1999, respondent obtained from him a ₱350,000.00 loan with
12% interest per annum. Incidental thereto, respondent executed in favor of complainant an undated
Deed of Absolute Sale2 over a 105- square meter lot located in Naga City, and covered by Transfor
Certificate of Title No. 20553 under the name of respondent's father, Nicasio Vista. Attached to said
Deed was a Special Power of Attorney4 (SPA) executed by respondent's parents authorizing her to
apply for a loan with a bank to be secured by the subject property. Complainant and respondent
purportedly agreed that if the latter failed to pay the loan in or before August 2000, complainant may
register the Deed of Absolute Sale with the Register of Deeds (RD).5

Respondent failed to pay her loan when it fell due. And despite repeated demands, she failed to
settle her obligation. Complainant attempted to register the Deed of Absolute Sale with the RD of
Naga City but to no avail because the aforesaid SPA only covered the authority of respondent to
mortgage the property to a bank, and not to sell it.6

Complainant argued that if not for respondent's misrepresentation, he would not have approved her
loan. He added that respondent committed dishonesty, and used her skill as a lawyer and her moral
ascendancy over him in securing the loan. Thus, he prayed that respondent be sanctioned for her
infraction.7

In his Commissioner's Report8 dated February 9, 2009; Commissioner Jose I. de la Rama, Jr.
(Commissioner de la Rama) faulted respondent for failing to file an answer, and participate in the
mandatory conference, He further declared that the SPA specifically authorized respondent to
mortgage the property with a bank. He stressed that for selling t.lie property, and not just mortgaging
it to complainant, who was not even a bank, respondent acted beyond her authority. Having done
so, she committed gross violation of the Lawyer's Oath as well as Canon 1,9 Rule 1.01,10and Canon
711 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. As such, he recommended that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for one year.
In the Resolution No. XIX-2010-44612 dated August 28, 2010, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines -
Board of Governors (IBP-BOG) resolved to adopt and approve the Report and Recommendation of
Commissioner de la Rama.

Action of the Supreme Court

Thereafter, the Court issued a Resolution13 dated October 5, 2011, which sustained the findings and
conclusion of the IBP. The Court nonetheless found the reduction of the penalty proper, pursuant to
its sound judicial discretion and on the facts of the case. Accordingly, it suspended respondent from
the practice of law for six months, effective immediately, with a warning that a repetition of same or
similar act will be dealt with more severely.

On March 14, 2012, the Court resolved to serve anew the October 5, 2011 Resolution upon
respondent because its previous copy sent to her was returned unserved.14 In its August 13, 2012
Resolution,15 the Court considered .the October 5, 2011 Resolution to have been served upon
respondent after the March 14, 2012 Resolution was also returned unserved. In the same resolution,
the Court also denied with finality respondent's motion for reconsideration on the October 5, 2011
Resolution.

Subsequently, Judge Margaret N. Armea (Judge Armea) of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of
Naga City, Branch 2 wrote1 a letter16 inquiring from the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
whether respondent could continue representing her clients and appear in courts. She also asked
the OCA if the decision relating to respondent's suspension, which was downloaded from the
inten1et, constitutes sufficient notice to disqualify her to appear in courts for the period of her
suspension.

According to Judge Armea, her inquiry arose because respondent represented a party in a case
pending in her court; and, the counsel of the opposing party called Judge Arrr1ea's attention
regarding the legal standing of respondent to appear as counsel. Judge Armea added that
respondent denied that she was suspended to practice law since she (respondent) had not yet
received a copy of the Court's resolution on the matter.

In her Answer/Comment17 to the query of Judge Armea, respondent countered that by reason of such
downloaded decision, Judge Armea and Executive Judge Pablo Cabillan Formaran III (Judge
Formaran III) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naga City disallowed her appearance in their
courts. She insisted that service of any pleading or judgment cannot be made through the inte1net.
She further claimed that she had not received an authentic copy of the Court's. October 5, 2011
Resolution.

On January 22, 2013, the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) referred the October 5, 2011 Resolution
to the OCA for circulation to all courts.18 In response, on January 30, 2013, the OCA issued OCA
Circular No. 14-201319 addressed to the courts.20 the Office of the Chief State Prosecutor (CSP),
Public Attorney’s Office (PAO), and the IBP informing them of the October 5, 2011 and August 13,
2012 Resolutions of the Court.

IBP’s Report and Recommendation

Meanwhile, in its Notice of Resolution No XX-2013-35921 dated March 21, 2013, the IBP-BOG
resolved to adopt and approve the Report and Recommendation22 of Commissioner Oliver A.
Cachapero (Comrnissioner Cachapero) to dismiss the complaint against respondent. According to
Commissioner Cachapero. there is no rule allowing the service of judgements through the internet;
and. Judge Armea and Judge Formaran III acted ahead of time when they implemented the
suspension of respondent even before the actual service upon her of the resolution concerning her
suspension.

Statement and Report of the OBC

In its November 22, 2013 .Statement.23 the OBC stressed that respondent received the August 13,
2012 Resolution (denying her motion, for reconsideration on the October 5, 2011 Resolution) on
November 12, 2012 per Registry Return Receipt No. 53365. Thus, the effectivity of respondent's
suspension was from November 12, 2012 until May 12, 2013. The OBC also pointed out that
suspension is not automatically lifted by mere lapse of the period of suspension. It is necessary that
an order be issued by the Court lifting the suspension to enable the concerned lawyer to resume
practice of law.

The OBC further maintained in its November 27, 2013 Report24 that respondent has no authority to
practice law and appear in court as counsel during her suspension, and until such time that the
Court has lifted the order of her suspension. Thus, the OBC made these recommendations:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises, it is respectfully recommended that:

1. Respondent be REQUIRED to file a sworn statement with motion to lift order of her suspension,
attaching therewith certifications from the Office of the Executive Judge of the court where she
practices [h]er profession and IBP Local Chapter of which she is affiliated, that she has ceased and
desisted from the practice of law from 12 November 2012 to 12 May 2013, immediately: and 2. The
IBP be REQUIRED to EXPLAIN within 72 hours why they should not be sanctioned for disciplinary
action for issuing said Notice of Resolution No. XX-2013-359, dated 21 March 2013, purportedly
dismissing this case for lack of merit.25

On February 19, 2014, the Court noted26 the OBC Report, and directed respondent to comply with
the guidelines relating to the lifting of the order of her suspension as enunciated in Maniago v.Atty.
De Dios.27

Upon the request of respondent, on December 2, 2014, the OBC issued a Certification,28 which
stated that respondent had been ordered suspended from the practice of law for six months, and as
of the issuance of said certification, the order of her suspension had not yet been lifted.

Complaint against the OCA, the OBC and Atty. Paraiso

On February 6, 2015, respondent filed with the RTC a verified Complaint29 for nullity of clearance,
damages, and preliminary injunction with urgent prayer for a temporary restraining order against the
OCA, the OBC, and Atty. Nelson P. Paraiso (Atty. Paraiso). The case was docketed as Civil Case
No. 2015-0007.

Essentially, respondent accused the OCA and the OBC of suspending her from the practice of law
even if the administrative case against her was still pending with the IBP. She likewise faulted the
OBC for requiring her to submit a clearance from its office before she resumes her practice of law
after the suspension. In turn, she argued that Atty. Paraiso benefited from this supposed "bogus
suspension" by publicly announcing the disqualification of respondent to practice law.

In its Answer,30 the OCA argued that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the action, which seeks
reversal, modification or enjoinment of a directive of the Court. The OCA also stressed that
respondent should raise such matter by filing a motion for reconsideration in the administrative case,
instead of filing a complaint with the RIC. It also stated that the instance of OCA Circular No. 14-
2013 was in compliance with the Court's directive to inform all courts, the CSP, the PAO, and the
IBP of the suspension of respondent.

For its pmt, the OBC declared in a Report31 dated March 24, 2015 that during and after the period of
her suspension, without the same having been lifted, respondent filed pleadings and appeared in
courts in the following cases:

x x x (l) Civil Case No. 2013-0106 (Romy Fay Gumba v. The City Assessor of Naga City, et. al.), (2)
Civil Case No. RTC 2006-0063 (Sps. Jaime M. Kalaw et. al. v. Fausto David, et al.), (3) Other Spec.
Proc. No. RTC 2012-0019 (Petition for Reconstitution of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 21128 of the
Registry of Deeds of Naga City v. Danilo O. Laborado).32

The OBC likewise confirmed that as of the time it issued the March 24, 2015 Report, the Court had
not yet lifted the order of suspension against respondent. The OBC opined that for failing to comply
with the order of her suspension, respondent deliberately refi1sed to obey a lawful order of the
Court. Thus, it recommended that a stiffer penalty be imposed against respondent.

On June 4, 2015, the OBC reported that the RTC dismissed Civil Case No. 2015-0007 for lack of
jurisdiction, and pending resolution was respondent's motion for reconsideration.33

Issue

Is respondent administratively liable for engaging in the practice of law during the period of her
suspension and prior to an order of the Court lifting such suspension?

Our Ruling

Time and again, the Court reminds the bench and bar "that the practice of law is not a right but a
mere privilege [subject] to the inherent regulatory power of the [Court],"34 It is a "privilege burdened
with conditions."35 As such, lawyers must comply with its 1igid standards, which include mental
fitness, maintenance of highest level of morality, and full compliance with the rules of the legal
profession.36

With regard to suspension to practice law, in Maniago v. Atty. De Dios,37 The Court laid down the
guidelines for the lifting of an order of suspension, to wit:

l) After a finding that respondent lawyer must be suspended from the practice of law, the Court shall
render a decision imposing the penalty;

2) Unless the Court explicitly states that the decision is immediately executory upon receipt thereof,
respondent has 15 days within which to file a motion for reconsideration thereof. The denial of said
motion shall render the decision final and executory;

3) Upon the expiration of the period of suspension, respondent shall file a Sworn Statement with the
Court, through the Office of the Bar Confidant, stating therein that he or she has desisted from the
practice of law and has not appeared in any court during the period of his or her suspension;

4) Copies of the Sworn Statement shall be furnished to the Local Chapter of the IBP and to the
Executive Judge of the courts where respondent has pending cases handled by him or her, and/or
where he or she has appeared as counsel;
5) The Sworn Statement shall be considered as proof of respondent's compliance with the order of
suspension;

6) Any finding or report contrary to the statements made by the lawyer tmder oath shall be a ground
for the imposition of a more severe punishment, or disbarment, as may be warranted.38

Pursuant to these guidelines, in this case, the Court issued a Resolution dated October 5, 2011
suspending respondent from the practice of law for six months effective immediately. Respondent
filed her motion for reconsideration. And, on November 12, 2012, she received the notice of the
denial of such motion per Registry Return Receipt No. 53365.

While, indeed, service of a judgment or resolution must be done only personally or by registered
mail,39 and that mere showing of a downloaded copy of the October 5, 2011 Resolution to
respondent is not a valid service, the fact, however, that respondent was duly informed of her
suspension remains unrebutted. Again, as stated above, she filed a motion for reconsideration on
the October 5, 2011 Resolution, and the Court duly notified her of the denial of said motion. It thus
follows that respondent's six months suspension commenced from the notice of the denial of her
motion for reconsideration on November 12, 2012 until May 12, 2013.

In lbana-Andrade v. Atty. Paita-Moya,40 despite having received the Resolution anent her
suspension, Atty. Paita-Moya continued to practice law. She filed pleadings and she appeared as
counsel in courts. For which reason, the Court suspended her from the practice of law for six months
in addition to her initial one month suspension, or a total of seven months.

Too, in Feliciano v. Atty. Bautista-Lozada,41 respondent therein, Atty. Lozada, appeared and signed
as counsel, for and in behalf of her husband, during the period of her suspension from the practice of
law. For having done so, the Court ruled that she engaged in unauthorized practice of law. The
Court did not give weight to Atty. Lozada's defense of good faith as she was very well aware that
when she represented her husband, she was still serving her suspension order. The Court also
noted that Atty. Lozada did not seek any clearance or clarification from the Court if she can
represent her husband in court. In this regard, the Court suspended Atty. Lozada for six months for
her willful disobedience to a lawful order of the Court.

Similarly, in this case, the Court notified respondent of her suspension. However, she continued to
engage in the practice law by filing pleadings and appearing as counsel in courts during the period of
her suspension.

It is common sense that when the Court orders the suspension of a lawyer from the practice of law,
the lawyer must desist from performing all functions which require the application of legal knowledge
witl1in the period of his or her suspension.42 To stress, by practice of law, we refer to "any activity, in
or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training, and
experience. It includes performing acts which are characteristic of the legal profession, or rendering
any kind of service which requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill.''43 In fine, it will
amount to unauthorized practice, and a violation of a lawful order of the Court if a suspended lawyer
engages in the practice of law during the pendency of his or her suspension.44

As also stressed by the OBC in its March 24, 2015 Report, during and even after the period of her
suspension and without filing a sworn statement for the lifting of her suspension, respondent signed
pleadings and appeared in courts as counsel. Clearly, such acts of respondent are in violation of the
order of her suspension to practice law.
Moreover, the lifting of a suspension order is not automatic. It is necessary that there is an order
from the Court lifting the suspension of a lawyer to practice law. To note, in Maniago, the Court
1âw phi 1

explicitly stated that a suspended lawyer shall, upon the expiration of one’s suspension, file a sworn
statement with the Court, and that such statement shall be considered proof of the lawyer's
compliance 1Nith the order of suspension.

In this case, on February 19, 2014, the Court directed respondent to comply with the guidelines for
the lifting of the suspension order against her by filing a sworn statement on the matter. However,
respondent did not comply. Instead, she filed a complaint (Civil Case No. 2015-0007) against the
OCA, the OBC and a certain Atty. Paraiso with the RTC. For having done so, respondent violated a
lawful order of the Court, that is, to comply with the guidelines for the lifting of the order of
suspension against her.

To recapitulate, respondent's violation of the lawful order of the Court is two-fold: 1) she filed
pleadings and appeared in court as counsel during the period of her suspension, and prior to t1e
lifting of such order of her suspension: and 2) she did not comply with the Court's directive for her to
file a sworn statement in compliance with the guidelines for the lifting of the suspension order.

Under Section 27,45 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from practice of law for willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court,
among other grounds. Here, respondent willfully disobeyed the Court's lawful orders by failing to
comply with the order of her suspension, and to the Court's directive to observe the guidelines for
the lifting thereof. Pursuant to prevailing Jurisprudence, the suspension for six (6) months from the
practice of law against respondent is in order.46

WIIEREFORE, Atty. Haide V. Gumba is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for an
additional period of six (6) months (from her original six (6) months suspension) and WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.

Atty. Haide V. Gumba is DIRECTED to infom1 the Court of the date of her receipt of this Decision, to
determine the reckoning point when her suspension shall take effect.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines for their information and guidance. 'The Office of the Bar Confidant is
DIRECTED to append a copy of this Decision to the record of respondent as member of the Bar.

SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate JusticeWE CONCUR:TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

SAMUEL R. MARTIRES
Associate Justice
 SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No. 10684, January 24, 2018

ILUMINADA D. YUZON, Complainant, v. ATTY. ARNULFO M. AGLERON, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This administrative case arose from a Complaint1 filed by Iluminada Yuzon Vda. de
Rodriguez (Iluminada)before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-
CBD) seeking to disbar Atty. Arnulfo M. Agleron (Atty. Agleron), for misappropriating the amount of
P582,000.00 which the respondent lawyer received in trust from the complainant.

Complainant's Position

Iluminada alleged that sometime on December 23, 2008, she gave Atty. Agleron the amount of
Php400,000.00, and on January 12, 2009, the amount of P600,000.00 in Managers Check, or the total
amount of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) meant for the purchase of a house and a lot of one Alexander
Tenebroso (Alexander), situated at Mati, Davao Oriental. However, since the intended purchase did not
materialize, Iluminada demanded the return of the aforesaid amounts that she entrusted to Atty. Agleron,
which the latter failed to return. On February 24, 2009, Iluminada, through her lawyer Atty. Vivencio V.
Jumamil (Atty. Vivencio), through a letter, demanded the return of the amount of P750,000.00. On March 2,
2009, Atty. Agleron replied through a letter and explained that he already returned the amount of
P418,000.00, and that the remaining balance is only P582,000.00 which shall be paid upon payment of his
client who borrowed the said amount for his emergency operation after an accident which took place on
January 13, 2009.

Iluminada also alleged that she filed an Estafa case under Article 315, paragraph 1(B) of the Revised Penal
Code against Atty. Agleron.

Respondent's Position

Atty. Agleron, among others, claims that the amount of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) was delivered to
him at the Office of the Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co., Davao City upon the maturity of two (2) postdated
checks issued by Reverend Pastor Apollo Quiboloy (Rev. Quiboloy); that the amount of P600,000.00 was
delivered on December 15, 2008, and the other check which matured on January 15, 2009, in the amount of
P400,000.00, were all deposited with the Philippine National Bank, Mati Branch for safekeeping, while
awaiting for the finalization of the transaction with Alexander regarding the acquisition of the house subject
of Civil Case No. 2287-7-2007, then pending in the Municipal Trial Court of Mati, Davao Oriental; and that
the total amount of P438,000.00 was delivered to herein Iluminada on different occasions, as per her
request, and that the balance of P582,000.00 was never misappropriated and/or converted to the personal
use and benefit of Atty. Agleron as the said amount was borrowed for the emergency operation of a client
who, at that time has nobody to turn to for help. Thus, Atty. Agleron's infraction should not warrant the
imposition of the supreme penalty of disbarment. Atty. Agleron prayed that, if he be found guilty, the lesser
penalty of fine should be imposed considering he rendered almost fifty (50) years of service in the
government, and he is also an Officer and Member of the IBP, Davao Oriental Chapter.

Report and Recommendation

After the mandatory conference on January 17, 2012 and upon a thorough evaluation of the evidence
presented by the parties in their respective position papers, the IBP-CBD submitted its Report and
Recommendation, dated March 30, 2012, finding Atty. Agleron to have violated Section 27,2 Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court. Thus, the IBP Investigating Commissioner found Atty. Agleron administratively liable and
recommended that he be meted the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year. This
ruling is based on Atty. Agleron's admission that he is still in possession of the amount of P582,000.00.

Thus, the Investigating Commissioner is convinced that Atty. Agleron is guilty of Gross Misconduct under
Section 27, Rule 138 for violating his duty to his client by converting and using his client's money.
Accordingly, the penalty of suspension of one (1) year from the practice of law in any court was imposed on
Atty. Agleron. The various mitigating factors: that Atty. Agleron has been a Member and Officer of the IBP
Davao Oriental Chapter; that he has been in the practice of law, as Assistant and later on as Provincial
Fiscal; and, that he was able to retire from the government service for a span of almost fifty (50)
years sans any disciplinary records were taken into consideration. The Commissioner also recommended the
return to Iluminada of the amount of P582,000.00 with legal interest of twelve percent (12%) from May 5,
2010, with warning that a repetition of similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

In a Resolution3 dated August 31, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the aforesaid
Report and Recommendation. Atty. Agleron moved for reconsideration,4 whereas Iluminada moved for a
partial reconsideration5 explaining that the penalty meted on Atty. Agleron dilutes the very essence of the
offense charged. However, both were denied by the IBP Board of Governors through a Notice of Resolution
No. XXI-2014-3296 dated May 4, 2014.

Atty. Agleron filed with this Court an Urgent Motion for the Immediate Lifting of the Order of Suspension
dated August 31, 2013,7 and affirmed by Resolution No. XXI-2014-3298 dated May 4, 2014, of the IBP Board
of Governors. Thus, this Court issued a Resolution9 dated January 18, 2016 referring to the Office of the Bar
Confidant (OBC) Atty. Agleron's Urgent Motion for the Immediate Lifting of the Order of Suspension.

The Obc's Report and Recommendation

The OBC recommended that the merit of this case be finally resolved by this Court for the proper
determination of the order of suspension imposed on Atty. Agleron. The OBC further recommended that
Atty. Agleron's Urgent Motion for the Immediate Lifting of the Order of Suspension issued by the IBP on
August 31, 2013, be denied.

The Issue before the Court

The basic issue, in this case, is the effectivity of the order of suspension imposed on Atty. Agleron.

The Court's Ruling

The Court resolves to adopt the findings of fact of the IBP.

Here, there is no question as to whether or not the respondent lawyer misappropriated the amount of
money the complainant entrusted to him, since Atty. Agleron already admitted the same, in clear violation
of his fiduciary duty to his client. Jurisprudence is instructive that a lawyer's failure to return upon demand
the monies he/she holds for his/her client gives rise to the presumption that he/she has appropriated the
said monies for his/her own use, to the prejudice and in violation of the trust reposed in him/her by his/her
client.10

Proceeding from the premise that indeed Atty. Agleron merely wanted to help another client who is going
through financial woes, he, nevertheless, acted in disregard of his duty as a lawyer with respect to
Iluminada. Such act is a gross violation of general morality, as well as of professional ethics.11

It is of no moment as well that Atty. Agleron's property has been subjected to a levy;12 thus, his claim in his
Urgent Motion for the Immediate Lifting of the Order of Suspension13 that with such levy he has even
overpaid Iluminada, considering that the total value of his property is P2,912,000.00 is bereft of merit. Levy
is defined as the act or acts by which an officer of the law and court sets apart or appropriates a part or the
whole of the loser's (judgment debtor's) property for the purpose of eventually conducting an execution sale
to the end that the writ of execution may be satisfied, and the judgment debt, paid.14Thus, there must be an
execution sale first before he can claim that he already complied with his legal obligation.
Further, respondent also violated Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR) when he failed to return upon demand the amount Iluminada entrusted to him, viz.:

CANON 16 — A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONIES AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY
COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.

Rule 16.01 — A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.

xxxx

Rule 16.03 — A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand. x x x15

Verily, the relationship between a lawyer and his client is highly fiduciary and prescribes on a lawyer a great
fidelity and good faith. The highly fiduciary nature of this relationship imposes upon the lawyer the duty to
account for the money or property collected or received for or from his client.16 Thus, a lawyer's failure to
return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of his client, as in this case, gives rise to the
presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use in violation of the trust reposed in him by
his client.17

As to the issue on when is the effectivity of the order of suspension, the OBC aptly explained in its Report
and Recommendation dated February 16, 2016, that the Court merely noted the IBP's Notice of Resolution
which suspended Atty. Agleron from the practice of law and that such act does not imply the approval of the
same. Here, this Court is yet to finally resolve first the merit of this administrative case. Thus, the effectivity
of the order of suspension has not actually commenced and it is erroneous on Atty. Agleron's part to claim in
his Motion18 dated August 6, 2015, that he has already served the one (1) year suspension from the date of
the issuance of the IBP Notice of Resolution on August 31, 2013, to August 31, 2014, is bereft of merit.

Jurisprudence is instructive that as guardian of the legal profession, this Court has the ultimate disciplinary
power over members of the Bar to ensure that the highest standards of competence, honesty and fair
dealing are maintained.19 Verily, this Court has the final say on imposition of sanctions to be imposed on
errant members of both bench and bar, this Court has the prerogative of making its own findings and
rendering judgment on the basis thereof rather than that of the IBP, OSG, or any lower court to whom an
administrative complaint has been referred to for investigation and report.20

Section 12 of Rule 139-B reads:

Section 12. Review and Decision by the Board of Governors.—

xxxx

(b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines that the respondent should
be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall issue a resolution setting forth its findings and
recommendations which, together with the whole record of the case, shall forthwith be transmitted to the
Supreme Court for final action.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Arnulfo M. Agleron is hereby held GUILTY of Gross Misconduct in violation
of Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, as well as Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of
one (1) year, with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with
more severely. Respondent is also ORDERED to PAY complainant the amount of Five Hundred Eighty-Two
Thousand Pesos (P582,000.00), with twelve percent (12%) interest from the date of demand until June 30,
2013 and six percent (6%) per annum from July 1, 2013 until full payment.21

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to the personal
record of respondent; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and the Office of the Court Administrator, for
circulation to all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
This Decision shall be immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio (Chairperson), Perlas-Bernabe, Caguioa, and Reyes, Jr., JJ., concur.

 THIRD DIVISION

A.C. No. 9129, January 31, 2018

MARIA EVA DE MESA, Complainant, v. ATTY. OLIVER O. OLAYBAL, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

We stress, yet again, the fidelity that the attorney owes towards the client. A violation of such fidelity
warrants the sanction of the attorney with suspension from the practice of law.

Antecedents

The complainant charges respondent Atty. Oliver O. Olaybal with betrayal of trust and confidence,
malpractice and gross misconduct as a lawyer.

The complainant avers that the respondent was her counsel in her criminal cases for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22, specifically: Criminal Case No. 88229, filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court in Pasig City
(Pasig Case), Br. 72, and Criminal Case Nos. 26685 to 26688, filed in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
(MCTC), Branch 2, in Legaspi City (Legaspi Case); that as regards the Pasig Case, he advised her to settle
amicably for the amount of P78,640.00; that following his advice, she procured, through the help of Rowena
Basco, her sister, Prudential Bank Manager's Checks No. 5574 and No. 5575 dated November 18, 2005
respectively for the amounts of P74,400.00 and P4,240.00; that both checks were crossed and payable to
Asialink Finance Corporation (Asialink); that she handed the checks to the respondent for delivery to
Asialink; that he did not deliver the checks to Asialink, but instead deposited them to his account through
his son; that on February 28, 2006, he executed a compromise agreement with Asialink on her behalf as
settlement of the Pasig Case; that under the compromise agreement, he undertook to pay Asialink the total
sum of P83,328.00 through monthly installment payments of P6,110.75 from March 28, 2006 to February
28, 2007; that he also executed a deed of undertaking in Asialink's favor, whereby he guaranteed her
monthly payment by issuing 12 post-dated checks in favor of Asialink; and that with respect to the Legaspi
Cases, he failed to file her counter-affidavit on time, thereby jeopardizing her chances of testifying therein.1

In his answer and position paper, the respondent counters that the two manager's checks worth P78,640.00
were not in full settlement of the complainant's obligations because he still had to negotiate with Asialink on
the final amount; that before he could negotiate with Asialink's representative, his son erroneously
deposited the manager's checks to his account for safekeeping, without his knowledge and consent; that he
nonetheless succeeded in settling her account with Asialink to her advantage by reducing her obligation from
P115,770.00 to P83,328.00 through the elimination of surcharges and attorney's fees; that he was
authorized to agree to the terms of the compromise agreement by her sister, Rowena Basco, and that she
also agreed, through Atty. Romulo Ricafort, a friend of her mother-in-law, to implement the terms of the
compromise agreement; that he prepared ahead of time the counter-affidavit to be submitted in the Legaspi
Cases, but he was unable to file the same due to her fault and negligence and those of her witnesses; and
that the matter already became moot and academic in any case inasmuch as the Legaspi Cases were
dismissed on October 26, 2006.2

Findings and Recommendation of the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
In his Report and Recommendation dated February 22, 2008,3 IBP Investigating Commissioner Randall C.
Tabayoyong declared that the respondent had misappropriated the amounts of the manager's checks for his
personal gain and benefit in violation of Canon 16, Rule 16.014 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility;5 that his depositing the checks to his account and commingling the proceeds thereof with his
personal funds violated Rule 16.026 of the of the Code of Professional Responsibility;7 and that his entering
into the compromise settlement without authority placed the complainant at risk of undergoing criminal
prosecution and conviction, thereby failing to safeguard her interest in violation of his ethical duty under
Canon 188 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Anent the penalty to be imposed upon the respondent, IBP Investigating Commissioner Tabayoyong, taking
into consideration the respondent's age and his efforts to rectify his wrongdoing, such as: (a) executing a
deed of undertaking in favor of Asialink to guarantee the complainant's monthly installment payment under
the compromise agreement; (b) issuing checks from his own checking account as the complainant's
payment under the compromise agreement; and (c) bearing the P4,098.00 difference between the
settlement amount and the amount given to him by the complainant,9 recommended as follows:

WHEREFORE, it is therefore respectfully recommended that respondent be suspended for six (6) months
for having violated Canons 16 and 18 and Rules 16.01 and 16.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.10

In its Resolution No. XVIII-2008-159 dated April 15, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the report of IBP Investigating Commissioner Tabayoyong, but modified the recommended penalty
by also requiring the return of the amount of P78,640.00 to the complainant within 30 days from
notice, viz.:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and
the applicable laws and rules, and considering respondent's violations of Canons 16 and 17 and Rule 16.01
and 16.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Oliver O. Olaybal is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for six (6) months and Ordered to Return the P78,640.00 to complainant within Thirty (30)
days from receipt of notice.11

The respondent sought reconsideration,12 but the IBP Board of Governors denied his motion via Resolution
No. XIX-2011-390 dated June 26, 2011.13

Issues

Were the findings and recommendations of the IBP Board of Governors proper?

Ruling of the Court

We sustain the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors.

The records show that the respondent received from the complainant crossed manager's checks payable to
Asialink worth P78,640.00 representing the settlement amount for her criminal cases; that instead of
immediately transmitting the checks to Asialink, he managed to deposit the same to his personal account for
collection; and that he asserted as explanation for the deposit of the checks in his personal account that the
deposit was due to the honest mistake of his son in order to prevent the checks from becoming stale.

We agree with the findings of the IBP Investigating Commissioner and IBP Board of Governors that the
explanation of the respondent was improbable for being contrary to human experience. We reiterate the IBP
Investigating Commissioner's observations on the matter:

x x x It bears stressing that the subject checks were not only payable to Asialink, but were duly crossed.
Hence, under existing banking rules and regulations and common commercial practice, these checks can
only be deposited to the account of Asialink and to no other. It is quite perplexing to believe that
respondent's son would even think that these checks belonged to his father and would, without even asking
him, "mistakenly" deposit these checks to his account, for the faces of both checks unmistakably show that
these should be given to Asialink. This Office is similarly unconvinced of the claim that the checks were
deposited so that these would not become stale. As shown by the faces of these checks, these were issued
in November 18, 2005 and would become stale, six (6) months thereafter. Yet, after the lapse of about two
(2) weeks, or on December 1, 2005, the said checks were already deposited to respondent's account. Thus,
at the time of their deposit, the subject checks were clearly far from being stale. Accordingly, respondent's
explanation is devoid of any probative value not only because it is uncorroborated, but also because it is
contrary to human experience.14

The respondent's failure to deliver the checks to Asialink and instead depositing the checks in his account
and thereafter misappropriating the funds thereof for his personal benefit constituted a serious breach by
him of Canon 16, Rule 16.01; and Rule 16.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which state as
follows:

Canon 16 — A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY
COME TO HIS POSSESSION.

Rule 16.01 — A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.

Rule 16.02 — A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and those of
others kept by him.

The respondent flagrantly violated these canons of ethical conduct and professionalism, and should be held
responsible. We can never understate that the relationship between a lawyer and his client is highly
fiduciary, and imposes on the former a great degree of fidelity and good faith.15 Thus, any money or
property received by him from his client for delivery to another in the context of the relationship is merely
held by him in trust and should not be appropriated for his own benefit. For him to do otherwise is a
violation of his oath as an attorney and officer of the Court.

Also, the respondent's act of binding the complainant to the terms of the compromise agreement even if he
had not been expressly and properly authorized to do so reflected his disregard of the duty of fidelity that he
owed at all times towards her as the client. He thereby violated Canon 17 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, viz.:

CANON 17 - A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE
TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.

The IBP Board of Governors recommended that the respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six
months after taking due consideration of the various circumstances attendant to his case. The
recommendation is well taken. Any breach of the fidelity towards the client that an attorney commits
justifies the penalty of his suspension from the practice of law for a period of time.

WHEREFORE, the Court SUSPENDS respondent ATTY. OLIVER O. OLAYBAL from the practice of law for
a period of six months effective upon receipt hereof; ORDERS him to return to the complainant the amount
of P78,640.00 within 30 days from receipt hereof; and WARNS him that a stiffer penalty will be imposed on
him should he commit a similar offense hereafter.

Let copies of this decision be attached to the personal records of ATTY. OLIVER O. OLAYBAL as a member
of the Philippine Bar, and be furnished to the Office of the Court Administrator for proper dissemination to all
courts throughout the country. Copies shall further be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant and the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Leonen, and Gesmundo, JJ., concur.

Martires, J., on official business.
 THIRD DIVISION

A.C. No. 9067, January 31, 2018

MARJORIE A. APOLINAR-PETILO, Complainant, v. ATTY. ARISTEDES A. MARAMOT, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

A lawyer is a disciple of truth because he swore upon his admission to the Bar that he would do no falsehood
nor consent to the doing of any in court, and that he would conduct himself as a lawyer according to the
best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his clients. His violation
of the Lawyer's Oath through the commission of falsehood can be condignly sanctioned.

Antecedents

In her complaint-affidavit,1 complainant Marjorie A. Apolinar-Petilo (Marjorie) alleges that the respondent
consented to, abetted and participated in the illegal act of falsifying a public document in violation of Article
171(4) in relation to Article 172(2) of the Revised Penal Code; and that he thereby violated the Lawyer's
Oath, Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of Canon 1 and Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The public document in question was the deed of donation2 executed in favor of Princess Anne Apolinar-
Petilo (Princess Anne) and Ma. Mommayda V. Apolinar (Mommayda) who were only 12 years old and 16 1/2
years old, respectively, at the time of its execution.3 Asserting that the respondent had known of the
minority of the donees, Marjorie insists that he was thereby guilty of falsification first in his capacity as a
lawyer by preparing the deed of donation and indicating therein that both donees were then "of legal age";
and as a notary public by notarizing the document. She claims that he, being Mommayda's counsel in the
latter's adoption case, was aware of the untruthful statements he made in the deed of donation because he
thereafter submitted the deed of donation as evidence therein.4

In his answer, the respondent states that Margarita Apolinar (Margarita) and her sister-in-law Justina
Villanueva-Apolinar (Justina) went to his law office sometime in 2000; that Margarita was a grandaunt who
owned a parcel of land in Calapan, Oriental Mindoro that she wanted to donate to Princess Anne, Marjorie's
own daughter, and Mommayda, the adopted daughter of Justina; that upon learning of Princess Anne's
minority, he advised that she had to be represented by either parent;5 that not one to be easily turned
down, Margarita persisted, and prevailed over him; that he thereupon prepared the deed of donation but left
the date, the document number and page number blank; that he reserved the notarization for later after the
parties had signed the document; that he allowed Margarita to bring the deed of donation to Manila where
she was supposedly proceeding in order to procure the signature of Princess Anne thereon and as a way of
avoiding additional travel expenses; and that Justina had mentioned to him at the time that Margarita was
then suffering from colon cancer and had only a little time to live.

The respondent recalled that a month afterwards Margarita and Justina returned to him with the signed
deed of donation; that he then noticed that the document did not bear the signatures of Princess Anne's
parents; that Margarita again offered to procure the signatures on the document; and that Margarita and
Justina did not anymore return with the document until the time when he had to enter the instrument in his
notarial book for his monthly report.

Margarita eventually died on April 13, 2003. Later on, with issues about her properties left unresolved, the
relationship among her relatives quickly turned sour, and the deed of donation again came to the fore. In
2004, Justina and her husband Tomas went to see the respondent and confided to him that they were
entangled in a court battle with Marjorie, their niece, over Margarita's properties, including the apartment in
Manila where they had been occupying since 1980. They then learned from the respondent that because
Mommayda's birth certificate had been simulated, they needed to legally adopt her in order to enable her to
inherit from them. Hence, they filed a petition for the adoption of Mommayda, which did not sit well with
Marjorie.
Claiming that her successional rights as a niece or heir to Tomas vis-a-vis would be adversely affected by
the adoption of Mommayda, Marjorie vigorously opposed the petition for adoption, and argued for its
dismissal on the basis that Tomas and Justina were not morally capable of adoption as shown by their
simulation of the birth of Mommayda. Marjorie also brought several criminal cases in the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor on the ground of the simulation of the birth and falsification of the birth certificate of
Mommayda in violation of Articles 347, 359, 183 and 184 of the Revised Penal Code.

Marjorie's opposition to the petition for adoption and her criminal charges were dismissed. Also dismissed
were her opposition to the petition of Tomas and Justina for the correction of entry in Mommayda's birth
certificate, as well as Marjorie's motion to recall the social worker for cross examination in the adoption
case. The respondent claims that Marjorie -exasperated and dissatisfied with the outcome - then turned
against him and instituted the complaint for his disbarment or suspension from the practice of law.6

The respondent submits that there was nothing illegal in the deed of donation; that as the sole owner of the
donated land, Margarita had an absolute right to dispose of her property by donation; that no law prohibited
donations to minors; and that the filing of the petition for judicial partition was an express if not implied
ratification of the defect in the donation; and that in regard to the submission of the simulated birth
certificate in evidence, the purpose of filing the petition for adoption was to rectify the simulation and to
convert the relationship between Mommayda and her adopting parents into a legal one.7

During the mandatory conference set by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar
Discipline, Marjorie admitted that a petition for judicial partition involving the donated land was meanwhile
filed; that a compromise agreement8 was reached; and that Princess Anne sold her share to Mommayda.9

In his position paper,10 the respondent asserts that the complaint was pure harassment calculated only to
besmirch and malign his reputation; and that the complaint was also a premeditated tactic to prolong or
pre-empt the adoption case considering that a favorable ruling thereat would adversely affect Marjorie's
rights as an heir of Mommayda's parents.

In his resolution dated May 22, 2008,11 the IBP Commissioner recommended that:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the undersigned Commissioner finds respondent Atty.
Aristedes A. Maramot to have violated the Notarial Law, his act having undermined the confidence of the
public on notarial documents; and, respectfully recommends his suspension from notarial practice for a
period of one (1) year while the other complaints against him are recommended dismissed for lack of
merit.12

In his motion for reconsideration,13 the respondent submitted that he did not employ any falsity because it
was only Margarita - the donor - who had in fact attested to the execution of the deed of donation in the
notarial acknowledgement of the deed of donation; that it was inconsequential even if Princess Anne had
signed the deed of donation not in his presence; that in conveyances, only the person encumbering or
conveying needed to personally appear, sign and acknowledge the deed before the notary public; and that
Princess Anne and Mommayda's names were placed in the document merely for them to accept the
donation.

The respondent pleads for the mitigation of his liability considering that he has exhibited candor in admitting
his offense. He represents that his act was not gross enough as to justify suspension; that the complainant
had thereby suffered no damage, but had actually benefitted from the act; that he had notarized in good
faith; and that with this offense being his first in his 12 years as a law practitioner and as notary public,
humanitarian considerations should be considered in his favor because he had children to support and had
been his family's sole bread winner.

In her comment on the respondent's motion for reconsideration,14 Majorie avers that Princess Anne could
not have signed the instrument in Manila because her daughter was then studying in Victoria, Oriental
Mindoro.

In Resolution No. XVII-2008-337 dated July 17, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved
the report and recommendations of the Commission on Bar Discipline, but modified the penalty by
recommending the immediate revocation of the respondent's notarial commission and his disqualification
from reappointment as a notary for two years, thus:15

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, with
modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and for Respondent's violation of the Notarial Law,
Atty. Aristedes Maramot is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year, immediate
Revocation of his Notarial Commission if presently Commissioned and Disqualified from reappointment as
Notary Public for Two (2) years.16

The IBP Board of Governors denied the respondent's motion for reconsideration through Resolution No. XIX-
2011-424 dated June 26, 2011,17 thus:

RESOLVED to unanimously DENY Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration, there being no cogent reason to
reverse the findings of the Board and it being a mere reiteration of the matters which had already been
threshed out and taken into consideration. Thus, for lack of substantial ground or reason to disturb it, the
Board of Governors' Resolution No. XVIII-2008-337 dated July 17, 2008 is hereby AFFIRMED.18

On September 6, 2011, the respondent filed in this Court his Comment on the IBP Board of Governor's
Resolution No. XVII-2008-337 and No. XIX-2011-424 dated August 16, 2011.19

In its Report dated June 27, 2012,20 the Office of the Bar Confidant recommended to treat the comment as a
petition for review.

On February 15, 2012, the respondent filed an amended comment dated December 5, 2011.21

On July 23, 2012, the Court resolved: (1) to direct the respondent to furnish the IBP a copy of his amended
comment and submit proof of its service within ten (10) days; and (2) to require the complainant to file her
comment thereon within 15 days from receipt.22

Accordingly, the complaint submitted her comment on November 9, 2012, opposing the respondent's prayer
for reconsideration and asking the Court to uphold the Resolutions of the IBP Board of Governors.

Ruling of the Court

We affirm the Resolutions of the IBP Board of Governors.

A.
As a Lawyer

Every lawyer before entering his duties and responsibilities as a member of the Bar and an officer of the
Court, professes as a natural course the promises contained in the Lawyer's Oath, to wit:

I do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, I will support the
Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will
do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or
sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, or give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for
money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion
with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients, and I impose upon myself these voluntary
obligations without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God. (Emphasis supplied)

The letter and spirit of the Lawyer's Oath are oftentimes forgotten or taken for granted in the course of the
lawyer's practice of law. To give teeth thereto, the Court has adopted and instituted the Code of Professional
Responsibility to govern every lawyer's relationship with his profession, the courts, the society, and his
clients.
Pertinent in this case are Rule 1.01 and Rule 1.02 of Canon 1; and Rule 10.1 of Canon 10, which provide:

CANON 1 - x x x

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system.

CANON 10 - x x x

Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he
mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.

The respondent prepared the deed of donation. At the time of his preparation of the document, he actually
knew that Princess Anne was a minor; hence, his claim of having then advised that her parents should
represent her in the execution of the document. Mommayda was likewise a minor. His awareness of the
latter's minority at the time was not disputed because he was also representing Mommayda in the latter's
adoption proceedings aside from being Mommayda's neighbor. Nonetheless, he still indicated in the deed of
donation that the donees were of legal age. His doing so, being undeniably dishonest, was contrary to his
oath as a lawyer not to utter a falsehood. He thereby consciously engaged in an unlawful and dishonest
conduct, defying the law and contributing to the erosion of confidence in the Law Profession.

The respondent's explanation that it was only Margarita who actually acknowledged that the deed of
donation was her own free act and deed does not extricate him from responsibility. The deed of donation,
whether or not acknowledged by the donees, should not bear any false statement upon a material fact. The
ages of the donees were material because they bore on their capacities to render the donation efficacious.
That neither Princess Anne nor Mommayda acknowledged the deed of donation did not cure the defect.

The respondent justifies himself by stating that the persistence of the donor Margarita prevailed upon him to
prepare the deed of donation as he had done; and adverts to the donor's assurance that she would herself
procure the signatures of the parents of Princess Anne on the document. He also submits that the execution
of the deed had redounded to the advantage of the minors; and that there was no law that prohibited the
donation in favor of minors.

The respondent cannot be relieved by his justifications and submissions. As a lawyer, he should not invoke
good faith and good intentions as sufficient to excuse him from discharging his obligation to be truthful and
honest in his professional actions. His duty and responsibility in that regard were clear and unambiguous.
In Young v. Batuegas,23 this Court reminded that truthfulness and honesty had the highest value for
attorneys, thus:

A lawyer must be a disciple of truth. He swore upon his admission to the Bar that he will do no falsehood nor
consent to the doing of any in court and he shall conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his
knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his clients. He should bear in mind
that as an officer of the court his high vocation is to correctly inform the court upon the law and the facts of
the case and to aid it in doing justice and arriving at correct conclusion. The courts, on the other hand, are
entitled to expect only complete honesty from lawyers appearing and pleading before them. While a lawyer
has the solemn duty to defend his client's rights and is expected to display the utmost zeal in defense of his
client's cause, his conduct must never be at the expense of truth.24

The respondent posits that a donation could be made in favor of a minor. Such position was not a factor,
however, because whether or not a minor could benefit from the donation did not determine the merits of
the complaint for his disbarment or suspension from the practice of law. Neither was his claim that the filing
of the petition for judicial partition amounted to the ratification of the deed of donation a factor to be
considered in his favor. The decisive consideration is whether or not he committed a falsehood in his
preparation of the deed of donation. Sadly for him, the answer is in the affirmative.
Relative to the respondent's submission of the false birth certificate of Mommayda in the proceedings for her
adoption, we adopt with approval the following findings and recommendation made by the IBP
Commissioner absolving the respondent, viz.:

The Certificate of Live Birth of Ma. Mommayda Villanueva Apolinar is certainly a simulated one where it was
made to appear that she was the biological child of Spouses Tomas V. Apolinar and Justina P. Villanueva
when she was not. It was not shown, however, that respondent has a hand when its contents were given to
the employee of the Local Civil Registrar of Victoria, Mindoro Oriental. From the face of the document, it
appears that Tomas Apolinar himself gave the details and he signed the Certificate of Live concerned.

When the respondent used the document in the adoption case of Ma. Mommayda Villanueva Apolinar by the
Spouses Tomas and Justina Apolinar (docketed as Spec. Proc. No. R-04-5396, RTC, Branch 40, Calapan
City, Mindoro Oriental), the respondent did not misrepresent that Ma. Mommayda V. Apolinar is the
biological daughter of the petitioners. In fact, there was nothing that was misrepresented in the allegations
in the petition. This led to the filing of another case for the correction of entry in the birth certificate of the
same Ma. Mommayda V. Apolinar docketed as Spec. proc. CV-05-5445. It was alleged therein that Leini
Villanueva Guerrero and Johnny Ortega are the biological parents of Ma. Mommayda Apolinar.25

B.
As a Notary Public

The respondent is also being hereby charged with having executed the notarial acknowledgment for the
deed of donation despite Princess Anne not having actually appeared before him.

The respondent explains that he did not employ any falsity or dishonesty, and that he did not make
untruthful statements in executing the notarial acknowledgment.

In this respect, the IBP Commissioner observed that:

It cannot be denied that the respondent violated the Notarial Law when he, by his own admission, notarized
the Deed of Donation which was signed by at least one of the parties, namely: the donee, Princess Anne
Petilo, who signed not in the presence of the Notary Public but somewhere in Metro Manila. This fact the
respondent has admitted in his Answer (records, P. 22 Statement of Facts, par. 3). For this reason, notaries
public are once again reminded to observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of
their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of this form of conveyance would be
undermined. Hence a notary public should not notarized a document unless the persons who signed the
same are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents
and truth of what are stated therein (Serzo vs. Flores, A.C. No. 6040 [formerly CBD 02-972, July 30, 2004]
citing Fulgencio v. Martin, 403, 403 SCRA 216, 2200221).26

The IBP Commissioner obviously rendered his foregoing observations on the assumption that Princess Anne
had herself acknowledged the instrument not in the presence of the respondent as the Notary Public. But, as
borne out by the acknowledgment, only Margarita's name was indicated as the person appearing before the
respondent during the notarization of the instrument, to wit:

BEFORE ME, on the date and at the place afore-cited personally appeared Margarita V. Apolinar with her CTC
indicated below her name and signature, issued at Victoria, Oriental Mindoro, all known to me the same
person who executed the foregoing instrument and she acknowledged to me that the same is her own free
act and deed (Emphasis supplied)27

Nonetheless, the respondent's denial of having employed any falsity or dishonesty, or of making untruthful
statements in executing the notarial acknowledgment does not necessarily save the day for him. There is no
question that a donation can be accepted in a separate instrument. However, the deed of donation in
question was also the same instrument that apparently contained the acceptance.28 The names of Princess
Anne and Mommayda as the donees, even if still minors, should have been included in the notarial
acknowledgment of the deed itself; and, in view of their minority, the names of their respective parents (or
legal guardians) assisting them should have also been indicated thereon. This requirement was not complied
with. Moreover, Princess Anne and Mommayda should have also signed the deed of donation themselves
along with their assisting parents or legal guardians.
The omission indicated that the deed of donation was not complete. Hence, the notarial acknowledgment of
the deed of donation was improper. Rule II Section 1 of the Rules on Notarial Practice provides that:

SECTION 1. Acknowledgment. - "Acknowledgment" refers to an act in which an individual on a single

occasion:

(a) appears in person before the notary public and presents an integrally complete instrument or document;
xxxx

We cannot approve of the recommended penalty of suspension for one year. The circumstances peculiar to
the complaint call for lenity in favor of the respondent, but who must nonetheless be sternly warned against
a repetition of the offense at the risk of suffering a more stringent penalty. We hold that the penalties
commensurate to the offense is suspension from the practice of law for six months.

WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and DECLARES respondent ATTY. ARISTEDES MARAMOT guilty of
violating the Lawyer's Oath, Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of Canon 1 and Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and the Rules on Notarial Practice; SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for
six months effective from notice of this decision, with revocation of his notarial commission and
disqualification from being re-appointed as Notary Public for two years effective upon receipt; and warns him
of a more stringent penalty upon repetition of the offense.

SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Leonen, and Gesmundo, JJ., concur.

Martires, J., on official business.
 EN BANC

A.M. No. RTJ-16-2470 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 12-3987-RTJ), January 10, 2018

PROSECUTOR LEO T. CAHANAP, Complainant, v. JUDGE LEONOR S. QUIÑONES, REGIONAL TRIAL

COURT, BRANCH 6, ILIGAN CITY, LANAO DEL NORTE, Respondent.

DECISION

CAGUIOA, J.:

Complainant Prosecutor Leo T. Cahanap (Complainant) filed the instant administrative complaint on October
30, 2012, charging respondent Judge Leonor S. Quinones (respondent Judge) with Gross Ignorance of the
Law, Gross Misconduct and violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct for the following alleged acts of
respondent Judge:

First, Complainant alleged that in his last two (2) years as a prosecutor in Branch 6, he suffered unbearable
and intolerable oppression in the hands of respondent Judge.1

In the case of People v. Inot, docketed as Criminal Case No. 6-15566, respondent Judge got angry and
objected to the leading questions asked during complainant's re-direct examination, notwithstanding the fact
that no objections were raised by the defense counsel.2

In the case of People v. Badelles, docketed as Criminal Case No. 06- 15405, respondent Judge issued an
order blaming complainant for the failure of the forensic chemist to bring the chemistry reports for the other
accused in the case because complainant did not sufficiently specify the chemistry reports due to the
court.3 In the same case, respondent Judge gave complainant a lecture on the proper demeanor and
conduct in court while he was making a formal offer of a testimony, causing extreme embarrassment to
complainant.4

Complainant asserted that the prosecutors, who previously appeared before respondent Judge, opted to be
assigned to other courts as they too experienced humiliation and harsh treatment from her. Further,
respondent Judge's staff themselves were subjected to respondent Judge's insolent behavior.5

Second, Complainant further accused respondent Judge of habitual tardiness which delayed the start of
court sessions, usually at 9:30 or 10:00 in the morning, earning for her sala the monicker "Branch 10."6

Third, in the proceedings for the case of People v. Heck (Heck Case), docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 15144,
15149, 15151 and 15153 for Estafa, pending before respondent Judge's sala, respondent Judge, in open
court and heard by the public, asked private complainant, Hanna Mamad, to go to her house because she
was interested in buying jewelry items from her.7

Respondent Judge ordered her staff to provide Mamad with directions to her house.8 Complainant averred
that when he called Mamad on September 13, 2012, Mamad confirmed that respondent Judge bought
jewelry from her. Court personnel have also testified that respondent Judge showed off the jewelry she
bought from Mamad.9

Fourth, in proceedings in the case of People v. Macapato (Macapato Case), docketed as Criminal Case No.
16089 for Attempted Murder, respondent Judge issued an Order dated June 18, 2012, directing the release
of accused Dimaampao's vehicle despite the prosecution's written opposition on the ground that the vehicle
has yet to be presented as evidence in court and has yet to be formally offered before the court could
acquire jurisdiction.10

Respondent Judge immediately set accused's subject motion for the release of accused Dimaampao's vehicle
for hearing a day after it was filed, in violation of the three-day notice rule.11 The Transcript of Stenographic
Notes (TSN) of the hearing revealed that respondent Judge showed her bias and practically acted as defense
counsel, prompting the prosecution to move for the inhibition of respondent Judge.12
Fifth, in the case of People v. Tingcang (Tingcang Case), docketed as Criminal Case No. 6-6115 for Murder,
respondent Judge dismissed the case provisionally without prejudice to its refiling upon the availability of the
prosecution's witnesses on the ground of speedy trial.13 The prosecution lamented that the delay in the
proceedings was due to the absence of the accused who has been in hiding since 1996.14

Sixth, in the case of People v. Casido (Casido Case), docketed as Criminal Case No. 6-16034, respondent
Judge dismissed a complaint for Attempted Murder due to the absence of a fatal wound on the victim, which
the prosecution believed to be misplaced in an information for Attempted Murder.15

Seventh and lastly, complainant averred that respondent Judge also mistreated her court staff. On July 29,
2011, respondent Judge allegedly shouted at a court stenographer, and called her "bogo" which meant
dumb.16

Respondent Judge berated another stenographer and shouted at the latter ''punyeta ka"17 and "buwisit
ka"18.

Comment dated January 12, 2013 of respondent Judge

Respondent Judge, in her Comment dated January 12, 2013, denied that she maltreated the prosecutors
assigned to her sala. In support thereof, she submitted the following documents:

1) Certification19 dated January 3, 2013 issued by OIC-Provincial Prosecutor

Diosdado D. Cabrera, stating that Prosecutor Macacuna B. Macadatu
requested for transfer for security reasons, not due to respondent
Judge's maltreatment;

2) Letter20 dated March 22, 2011 to former Secretary Leila M. De Lima by

Prosecutor Macacuna B. Macadato, requesting for transfer of assignment
from Iligan City to the Prosecutor's Office in Marawi City, due to a threat
to his life;

3) Affidavit21 dated December 18, 2012 executed by Prosecutor

Mangontawar M. Gubat, proving that he declined to be the trial
prosecutor in respondent Judge's sala for health reasons, not due to the
insolent behavior of respondent Judge; and

4) Joint Affidavit22 dated January 3, 2013 by Public Attorneys Nur Jaypha R.

Bacaraman and Rashid A. Macarimbang, attesting that their re-
assignment or subsequent transfer to other branches of the RTC in Iligan
City is a matter of policy in their office, with due consideration to the
caseloads of individual lawyers in the district or the balancing of work
assignment, not due to the reported misbehavior of respondent Judge.
Relative to the Heck Case, respondent Judge denied having asked jewelry from Mamad, the private
complainant in the subject case.23

Respondent Judge reasoned that she immediately acted on the motion of the defense in the Macapato Case
because an urgent motion is exempted from the three-day notice rule. She maintained that the motion was
granted and was issued in good faith in the performance of judicial functions.24

Respondent Judge also insisted that her order of dismissal in the Tingcang Case was issued in good faith in
the performance of her judicial functions.25

Respondent Judge admitted her mistake in the Casido Case, averring that the finding of lack of probable
cause on the basis of absence of a 'fatal injury' was an error but an error of judgment made in good faith.26

In response to the allegation that she unduly interfered in the court proceedings, respondent Judge
explained that she merely reminded lawyers of the purpose of enforcing the rules and to elicit evidence with
sufficient probative value to help in the search for truth. She maintained that she was just helping the
prosecution and/or lawyers to propound questions to the witnesses whenever she found it necessary to
clarify matters.27

On her alleged offensive and disrespectful attitude towards her staff, respondent Judge denied being
oppressive to her staff. She claimed that she merely rebuked or admonished them in the exercise of her
supervisory authority.28

Respondent Judge also admitted arriving late to court but denied that her tardiness was often or habitual.
Assuming arguendo that she was habitually late, she countered that her sixty percent (60%) disposal rate of
cases assigned to her from June 2010 to November 2012 would refute the issue of punctuality hurled
against her.29

OCA Resolution dated October 9, 2014

The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommended that the charges against respondent Judge
relative to the issuance of the (1) Order dated June 18, 2012 in the Macapato Case, (2) Order dated June
18, 2012 in the Tingcang Case for the dismissal of the case on the ground of violation of the accused's right
to speedy trial, and (3) Order relative to the Casido Case, dismissing the same for lack of probable cause, be
dismissed for involving issues judicial in nature which are beyond the purview of an administrative
proceeding.30

The OCA reasoned that a party's remedy, if prejudiced by the orders of a judge given in the course of a trial,
lies with the proper reviewing court, not with OCA by means of an administrative complaint.31 It must be
understood that the statutory mandate of the OCA extends only to the administrative supervision over court
officials and personnel and does not include the authority to interfere with the judicial prerogatives of a
judge to try and resolve a case and its pending incidents. For the OCA to review the merits underlying each
decision and order issued by respondent Judge would result in a re-evaluation of his exercise of his judicial
discretion which is definitely beyond the OCA's authority. These are clearly matters for judicial
adjudication.32 It has been stressed that questions judicial in nature ought to be threshed out in a judicial
proceeding and definitely not in an administrative one.33

With respect however to the other charges, pertaining largely to the demeanor of respondent Judge, the
OCA found that the same appear to be serious.34 However, because of the conflicting versions presented by
the parties, there exist factual issues that cannot be resolved merely on the basis of the records at hand,
and can be ventilated only in a formal investigation where the parties can adduce their respective
evidence.35

The OCA thus recommended that the remaining charges filed against respondent Judge be referred to the
Executive Justice of the Court of Appeals, Cagayan de Oro City, for raffle among the Justices thereat for
investigation, report and recommendation within sixty (60) days from receipt of the records.36
In a Resolution37 dated February 11, 2015, the Third Division of the Court adopted the recommendations of
the OCA.

Complainant filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the OCA's Report dated October 9, 2014, which was
denied by the Court in a Resolution38 dated July 1, 2015.

Report dated July 13, 2015 of Investigating Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh

Investigating Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh (Investigating Justice) recommended that respondent Judge
be held administratively liable for Oppression with a fine of P40,000.00 and Habitual Tardiness with a fine of
P20,000.00.39

The Investigating Justice also recommended that respondent Judge be transferred to a different court
considering the irremediably strained relations between respondent Judge and the court staff;40 and that the
names of certain witnesses be blocked from the decision that the Court will render in this case.41

The testimonies of the court staff witnesses and the Branch Clerk of Court uniformly pointed to the habitual
tardiness of respondent Judge in coming to work and holding court hearings, which they consistently
testified to as generally starting between 9:00 and 9:30 in the morning.42 In the judicial affidavit of
complainant, he attested that during his time as the public prosecutor in respondent Judge's sala,
respondent Judge started court hearings at 9:30 a.m., instead of 8:30 a.m.43 The successor of complainant,
Assistant City Prosecutor Diaz, also confirmed that respondent Judge commenced court sessions between
9:30 a.m. and 10:00 a.m.44

The testimonies of court staff witnesses also revealed that respondent Judge does not want to indicate in the
Minutes of the Proceedings the actual time court sessions start. A court staff testified that one of the court's
casual employee was once reprimanded by respondent Judge when she wrote in the Minutes of the
Proceedings that the actual time of arrival of respondent Judge was 9:30 a.m..45 The Branch Clerk of Court
even admitted under oath that the Minutes of the Hearings and Notices indicate that court hearings start at
8:30a.m. instead of the actual time the hearings commenced.46

Although the Minutes of the Proceedings in her court reflect that respondent Judge start court sessions
regularly at 8:30 a.m., the uniform testimonies of the witnesses regarding respondent Judge's habitual
tardiness, despite the risk of being held administratively and criminally liable, constitute substantial evidence
to hold respondent Judge liable.47

On the charge of Oppression, the Investigating Justice found that respondent Judge failed to show
compassion, patience, courtesy and civility to lawyers who appear before her in contravention of the
mandates of the New Code of Judicial Conduct which sets the high standards of demeanor before all judges
must observe.

Respondent Judge displayed antagonistic behavior towards Atty. Basher Macapado, who appeared as
defense counsel in Criminal Case Nos. 15539, 15540 and 15541, during the hearing on May 14, 2012:

COURT:

Atty. Macapado, during the last hearing, it was Atty. Plando who appeared. These were already testified by
this witness. Next time, if you intend to do your cross-examination you better appear so you will not be
wasting the court's time and these were already testified to by the witness. Where is Atty. Plando?

ATTY. MACAPADO:

He is out of town Your Honor. As far as this is concerned Your Honor, this was not testified to by this
witness. COURT: It is your question (Presiding Judge banging the gavel). What is your question before this?

ATTY. MACAPADO:
I am asking about the confirmatory test.

COURT:

That was testified already. Listen! (banging the gavel again and raising her voice).

ATTY. MACAPADO:

That was testified (interrupted)

COURT:

You listen! (banging the gavel again)

ATTY. MACAPADO:

Yes Your Honor, I am listening.

COURT:

I will contempt you. That was already taken during the last hearing when Atty. Plando appeared and this
time you were asking the same question.

ATTY. MACAPADO:

Yes Your Honor because what this witness have testified is about confirmation and this object was not
presented to the court Your Honor.

COURT:

You are out of order Atty. Macapado. Next time before you appear you ask Atty. Plando a copy of the
previous transcript so that there will be no redundancy. Have you read or are you aware?

ATTY. MACAPADO:

Yes Your Honor because the two of us appeared.

COURT:

Are you sure of that?

ATTY. MACAPADO:

Yes Your Honor.

COURT:

But that was already taken during the last hearing.

ATTY. MACAPADO:

I am only asking the witness about this object Your Honor and this was not presented during the last
hearing.
COURT:

But you were asking, what IS confirmatory test and that was already taken.

ATTY. MACAPADO:

Yes Your Honor because she mention it now.

COURT:

Proceed now.48

Through the filing of a Manifestation, Atty. Macapado apologized to the court for the incident which
happened during the hearing on May 14, 2012 but prayed for respondent Judge to extend a little respect to
all lawyers who appear before her court in the presence of their respective clients and other litigants.49

As evidenced by the TSN taken on January 25, 2011, respondent Judge also engaged in an argument in
open court with a certain Atty. Gerardo Padilla who appeared as defendants' counsel in Civil Case No. 06-
7010.50 Atty. Padilla found the behavior of respondent Judge antagonistic51 which led to the exchange of
words between respondent Judge and Atty. Padilla who was prompted to utter the words "xxx you can do
your worst and I will do my best"52 to respondent Judge, maintaining civility towards the court despite the
exchange.

Complainant and Assistant City Prosecutor Diaz also experienced the same antagonistic and hostile behavior
from respondent Judge which caused them embarrassment in open court as shown in the TSNs submitted by
complainant. Complainant was scolded by respondent Judge in open court on September 10, 2012 for his
failure to properly address the court.53 On November 4, 2014, ACP Diaz felt humiliated when respondent
Judge admonished her also in open court because respondent Judge felt displeased with ACP Diaz's reaction
and alleged disrespectful behavior which led ACP Diaz to cry and made her unable to continue with the
presentation of her witness.54

The Investigating Justice reasoned that if respondent Judge felt that complainant or any other lawyer must
be admonished for his/her behavior or unpreparedness in court, respondent Judge could have called them
privately to approach the bench or even in chambers to scold him/her, but certainly not to embarrass them
in front of their clients and other litigants as the same may also cause shame to the court, if an argument
ensues, and will directly affect the professional and personal lives of all involved. These incidents highlighted
respondent Judge's lack of temperance and self-restraint which taints her impartiality in making decisions in
the eyes of the public.55

To make matters worse, respondent Judge also exhibited conduct unbecoming of a judge when she shouted
at a court staff in her chambers while correcting the court staffs draft orders which she dictated in open
court and called the court staff, "bogo ba nimo" (you are dumb or stupid).56 Although respondent Judge and
the court staff were alone in the chambers, the court staff felt humiliated as she was berated for fifteen (15)
minutes and she cried when she went to the staff room.57

Another court staff also experienced being berated and humiliated by respondent Judge. In correcting the
court staffs eleven (11) draft orders, respondent Judge humiliated her by repeatedly pointing at her
mistakes in an elevated voice in the presence of a friend of respondent Judge, who happened to be a party
in a civil case pending before their court.58 Nearly in tears, the court staff went out of the chambers and told
her co-workers that she would no longer help in drafting orders in bail bond applications so she could
concentrate on her drafts.59 Respondent Judge found court staffs reaction to be improper, so respondent
Judge followed her to the staff room and continued to scold her in front of the other staff members, and
even called for an emergency staff meeting60 where respondent Judge even called the court staff "punyeta
ka, buwisit ka" in front of the other staff.61

The Investigating Justice emphasized in her Report that judges are expected to observe courtesy and civility
at all times in addressing lawyers, litigants and witnesses appearing in his/her sala62 considering that judges
must act beyond reproach to maintain the court's integrity and public confidence in the judicial system.63
The Investigating Justice also said that respondent judge's belligerent, oppressive and tyrannical behavior
towards her court staff and lack of courtesy, civility and self-restraint towards lawyers and litigants during
court hearings cannot be treated with leniency. The Investigating Justice added that public confidence in the
judiciary must be maintained and the tenets on the first duty of judges to conduct themselves beyond
reproach must be safeguarded.64

OCA Report dated October 26, 2015

The OCA, in their Report dated October 26, 2015, agreed and adopted the findings of the Investigating
Justice.

Apart from Complainant, three (3) court staff testified to the habitual tardiness of respondent Judge who
began the court hearings between 9:00 a.m. and 9:30 a.m.65 A former assistant City Prosecutor also
confirmed that she commenced court sessions at the said time.66 The testimonies of her staff also revealed
that she did not want to indicate in the Minutes of the Proceedings the actual time when court sessions
started.67 It was also revealed that a casual employee was once reprimanded by respondent Judge when the
employee wrote in the Minutes that the actual time of arrival of respondent Judge was 9:30a.m., as
corroborated by the testimony of another court staff.68

Respondent Judge unquestionably failed to observe the prescribed official hours as repeatedly enjoined by
the Court.69 She admitted being late "sometimes" in arriving to the court and beginning the court hearings
as rebuffed by contrary evidence.70 Facing the risk of being administratively and criminally held liable,
respondent Judge's own branch clerk of court even bravely testified that court sessions commenced between
9:00a.m. and 10:00 a.m. although the Minutes of the Proceedings reflected the time at 8:30 a.m..71

The OCA also found that respondent Judge failed to show compassion, patience, courtesy and civility to
lawyers who appear before her in contravention of the mandates of the Code of Judicial Ethics, which sets
the high standards of demeanor all judges must observe.72

The OCA pointed out that one significant aspect that became apparent during the investigation is respondent
Judge's competence in the performance of her duties.73 True, she was exonerated in the instant complaint
because the issues raised were judicial in nature and in another case for grave abuse of discretion,
dishonesty and partiality for lack of merit.74 But, as testified to by witnesses, respondent Judge did not
personally prepare the court's orders, resolutions and decisions; she did not know the details of some cases
before her; and she does not possess proficiency in English.75 Yet, respondent Judge remained intractable
and would not own up to her mistakes and shortcomings.76

The OCA held that respondent Judge violated the Code of Judicial Conduct for her repeated acts of
oppression against lawyers and court staff (gross misconduct) which constitute serious charge pursuant to
Rule 140, Section 8 of the Revised Rules of Court punishable by dismissal, suspension from office for more
than three (3) to six (6) months or a fine of more than P20,000.00 to P40,000.00.77

The OCA also held that respondent Judge is also guilty of habitual tardiness which is a less serious charge
sanctioned by either suspension from office for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months or a
fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.78

The OCA noted that the penalties that may be imposed on respondent Judge may be mitigated by her being
a first offender as she has never been previously sanctioned.79 She has also offered her apology.80One staff
member said that she would sometimes show motherly care and compassion towards her staff.81 Further,
her "temper explosions" are no longer as frequent as before.82

Anent Justice Singh's recommendation that respondent Judge be transferred to a different court considering
the strained relations between respondent Judge and the court staff, the OCA recommended that respondent
Judge be given a fair chance to change her unpleasant attitude and behavior.83 The OCA averred that, with
this present administrative case, her court staff have now become emboldened and are no longer afraid to
speak up.84 They can easily initiate another complaint against respondent Judge if circumstances
warrant.85 As a deterrent against future abuses, the OCA proposed that a periodic report be submitted to the
OCA to apprise the OCA of any untoward incident involving respondent Judge in her dealings with her court
staff and the public.86
 The Court's Ruling

The Court agrees with the findings of the OCA.

The Court has time and again reminded the members of the bench to faithfully observe the prescribed
official hours to inspire public respect for the justice system. It has issued Supervisory Circular No. 14 dated
October 22, 1985, Circular No. 13 dated July 1, 1987, and Administrative Circular No. 3-99 dated January
15, 1999 to reiterate the trial judges' mandate to exercise punctuality in the performance of their duties.

Section 5 of Supervisory Circular No. 14 issued by the Court on October 22, 1985 states:

5. Session Hours. - Regional Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts shall hold daily sessions from Monday to Friday, from 8:30 to 12:00 noon and
from 2:00 to 4:30 p.m. assisted by a skeletal force, also on rotation, primarily to act on petitions for bail
and other urgent matters. (Emphasis supplied)

Circular No. 13 dated July 1, 1987 entitled, "Guidelines m the Administration of Justice" provides that:

Guidelines for Trial Courts

xxxx

1. Punctuality and strict observance of office hours. - Punctuality in the holding of scheduled
hearings is an imperative. Trial judges should strictly observe the requirement of at least
eight hours of service a day, five hours of which should be devoted to trial, specifically from
8:30 a.m. to 12:00 noon and from 2:00 to 4:30 as required by par. 5 of the Interim
Rules issued by Supreme Court on January 11, 1983, pursuant to Sec. 16 of BP 129.
(Underscoring in the original)

Administrative Circular No. 3-99 dated January 15, 1999 entitled, "Strict Observance of Session Hours of
Trial Courts and Effective Management of Cases To Ensure Their Speedy Disposition," reiterates the mandate
for trial judges to exercise punctuality in the performance of their duties, thus:

To insure speedy disposition of cases, the following guidelines must be faithfully observed:

I. The session hours of all Regional Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts shall be from 8:30A.M. to noon and from 2:00 P.M.
to 4:30 P.M., from Monday to Friday. The hours in the morning shall be
devoted to the conduct of trial, while the hours in the afternoon shall be
utilized for (1) the conduct of pre-trial conferences; (2) writing of
decisions, resolutions or orders, or (3) the continuation of trial on the
merits, whenever rendered necessary, as may be required by the Rules
of Court, statutes, or circular in specified cases.

xxxx
II. Judges must be punctual at all times.

xxxx

IV. There should be strict adherence to the policy on avoiding

postponements and needless delay.

xxxx

VI. All trial judges must strictly comply with Circular No. 38-98, entitled
"Implementing the Provisions of Republic Act No. 8493" ("An Act to
Ensure a Speedy Trial of All Cases Before the Sandiganbayan, Regional
Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Appropriating
Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes") issued by the Honorable Chief
Justice Andres R. Narvasa on 11 August 1998 and which took effect on
15 September 1998.87 (Italics supplied)

The aforesaid circulars are restatements of the Canons of Judicial Ethics which enjoin judges to be punctual
in the performance of their judicial duties, recognizing that the time of litigants, witnesses, and attorneys is
of value, and that if the judge is not punctual in his habits, he sets a bad example to the bar and tends to
create dissatisfaction in the administration of justice.88

The OCA aptly found that the testimonies of the prosecutors and the court staff unquestionably proved that
respondent Judge failed to observe the prescribed official hours as repeatedly enjoined by the Court.
Respondent Judge's own branch clerk of court even testified that court sessions commenced between 9:00
a.m. and 10:00 a.m. although the Minutes of the Proceedings reflected the time at 8:30 a.m.89

The OCA also correctly observed that respondent Judge failed to show compassion, patience, courtesy and
civility to lawyers who appear before her in contravention of the mandates of the Code of Judicial Ethics,
which sets the high standards of demeanor all judges must observe.90

Section 3, Canon 5 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct clearly provides:

Section 3. Judges shall carry out judicial duties with appropriate consideration for all persons, such as the
parties, witnesses, lawyers, court staff and judicial colleagues, without differentiation on any irrelevant
ground, immaterial to the proper performance of such duties.

In relation to Rule 3.04, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, provides that judges must always be
courteous and patient with lawyers, litigants and witnesses appearing in his/her court, thus:
Rule 3.04- A judge should be patient, attentive, and courteous to lawyers, especially the inexperienced, to
litigants, witnesses and others appearing before the court. A judge should avoid unconsciously falling into
the attitude of mind that the litigants are made for the courts, instead of the courts to the litigants.

Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct likewise states:

Section 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the court and be patient,
dignified and courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the judge deals in
an official capacity. Judges shall require similar conduct of legal representatives, court staff and others
subject to their influence, direction or control.

The Court is convinced that respondent Judge is guilty of Oppression as shown in several incidents of
misbehavior by respondent Judge, some of which are stated below:

1) Respondent Judge displayed antagonistic behavior towards Atty.

Macapado who appeared as defense counsel in three (3) criminal cases
and who might have increased the tone of his voice in their verbal
tussle. He filed with the court apologizing for the incident but prayed for
respondent Judge to extend a little respect to all lawyers who appear
before her court in the presence of their clients and other litigants.91

2) Respondent Judge engaged in an argument in open court with a certain

Atty. Gerardo Padilla who appeared as defendants' counsel in Civil Case
No. 06-7010.92Atty. Padilla found the behavior of respondent Judge
antagonistic which led to the exchange of words between respondent
Judge and Atty. Padilla who was prompted to utter the words "xxx you
can do you worst and I will do my best"93 to respondent Judge,
maintaining civility towards the court despite the exchange.

3) Assistant City Prosecutor Diaz was humiliated by respondent Judge who

admonished her also in open court because respondent Judge felt
displeased with ACP Diaz's reaction and alleged disrespectful behavior
which led ACP Diaz to cry and made her unable to continue with the
presentation of her witness.94

4) Respondent Judge exhibited conduct unbecoming of a judge when she

shouted at a court staff in her chambers while correcting the court staffs
draft orders which she dictated in open court and called the court staff,
"bogo ba nimo" (you are dumb or stupid).95 Although respondent Judge
and the court staff were alone in the chambers, the court staff felt
humiliated as she was berated for fifteen (15) minutes and she cried
when she went to the staff room.96
5) Another court staff also experienced being berated and humiliated by
respondent Judge. In correcting the court staffs eleven (11) draft orders,
respondent Judge humiliated her by repeatedly pointing at her mistakes
in an elevated voice in the presence of a friend of respondent Judge,
who happened to be a party in a civil case pending before their
court.97 Nearly in tears, the court staff went out of the chambers and
told her co-workers that she would no longer help in drafting orders in
bail bond applications so she could concentrate on her
drafts.98 Respondent Judge found court staff's reaction to be improper,
so respondent Judge followed her to the staff room and continued to
scold her in front of the other staff members, and even called for an
emergency staff meeting99 where respondent Judge even called the
court staff "punyeta ka, buwisit ka" in front of the other staff.100

The Court has previously ruled that "[a] display of petulance and impatience in the conduct of trial is a norm
of behavior incompatible with the needful attitude and sobriety of a good judge.''101

Thus, the Court finds the imposition of fines amounting to Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00) and Twenty
Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), appropriate given the prevailing facts of the present case vis-a-vis
respondent Judge's record for habitual malfeasance in office.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby finds respondent Presiding Judge Leonor
S. Quiñones, Branch 6, Regional Trial Court, Iligan City GUILTY of (1) Oppression (gross misconduct
constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct) and FINED in the amount of Forty Thousand Pesos
(P40,000.00); and (2) Habitual Tardiness and FINED in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00), with WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more
severely.

The Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 6, Regional Trial Court, Iligan City) is hereby DIRECTED to SUBMITa
status report on the working relationship in the court within fifteen (15) days from the end of each semester
for two (2) years.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Perlas-Bernabe,
Leonen, Jardeleza, Martires, Tijam, Reyes, Jr., and Gesmundo, JJ., concur.
 FIRST DIVISION

A.C. No. 9512, February 05, 2018

ROBERTO P. MABINI, Complainant, v. ATTY. VITTO A. KINTANAR, Respondent.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Before the Court is an administrative Complaint1 filed by Roberto P. Mabini (complainant) against Atty. Vitto
A. Kintanar (respondent) for misconduct on the sole ground that he notarized a document executed by his
wife, Evangeline C. Kintanar (Evangeline).

Factual Antecedents

In his Position Paper,2 complainant stated that sometime in November 2003, Regina Alamares (Regina)
approached him and his wife, Mercedes M. Mabini (Mercedes), to sell her 3,317 square meter realty located
in Daraga, Albay. Said property was identified as Lot No. 1959, and covered by Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. 251 (1904). Regina made known to complainant and Mercedes that said title was lost but its,
duplicate certificate may be secured from the Register of Deeds. (RD) Complainant and Mercedes
nonetheless bought the property. Later, complainant filed a petition for issuance of second owners duplicate
copy of OCT 251 (1904), which the .Regional Trial Court (RTC) granted. On March 2, 2005, the RD of Albay
issued Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-133716 covering the property in the names of complainant and
Mercedes over the property.

Complainant further averred that, in March 2012, however, respondent's wife, Evangeline, filed a complaint
against him (complainant), among other persons, for reconveyance, annulment of title, damages with
prayer for preliminary injunction or restraining order before the RTC of Legaspi City. Attached to said
complaint was an Affidavit of Lost Owner's Duplicate Copy of Title3 executed by Evangeline and notarized by
respondent on April 25, 2002, and registered in his notarial book under Doc. No. 172, Page No. 35; Book
No. 33, Series of 2002.

According to complainant, respondent knew that he (respondent) was not authorized to notarize a document
of his wife, or any of his relative within the fourth civil degree, whether by affinity or consanguinity; thus,
for having done so, respondent committed misconduct as a lawyer/Notary Public.

For his part, respondent countered that the subject Affidavit purportedly executed by his wife appeared to
have been notarized on April 25, 2002; as such, it was governed by Revised Administrative Code of 1917,
which did not prohibit a Notary Public from notarizing a document executed by one's spouse. He likewise
stated that, granting for argument's sake that he indeed notarized said Affidavit, he did not violate the law
as the document involved was a mere affidavit, not a bilateral document or contract.4

Because of his demise on July 24, 2013, complainant's spouse, Mercedes, substituted him as complainant in
the case.5 On October 26, 2013, Mercedes died. Her and complainant's children6substituted her in the case.7

Report and Recommendation of the IBP Investigating Commissioner

On August 25, 2015, Commissioner Almira A. Abella-Orfanel (Investigating Commissioner) found respondent
guilty of misconduct and recommended his suspension. from the practice of law for six months.8 She opined
that relatives by affinity are relatives by virtue of marriage. She stressed that "[i]f the law prohibits
notarization of acts done by relative by affinity, it is but logical that the law also prohibit[s] the notarization
of the root cause of such relationship, the spouse, Without the spouse, said prohibition will not exist."9 She
added that since the law treats spouses as one upon their marriage, it follows that the notarization of the
spouse's act is disallowed considering that a person cannot notarize his or her own act.

Notice of Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors (IBP-BOG)

In its Resolution No. XXII-2015-98, the IBP-BOG resolved to modify the recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner in that respondent was imposed a stiffer penalty of six months' suspension from
the practice of law; immediate revocation of his commission as Notary Public; and, a two-year
disqualification as Notary Public.

Issue

Whether respondent committed misconduct by notarizing his wife's affidavit of loss in 2002.

Our Ruling

It is a truism that the duties performed by a Notary Public are not just plain ministerial acts. They are so
impressed with public interest and dictated by public policy. Such is the case since notarization makes a
private document into a public one and as a public document, it enjoys full credit on its face.10 However, a
lawyer cannot be held liable for a violation of his duties as Notary Public when the law in effect at the time of
his complained act does not provide any prohibition to the same, as in the case at bench.

In Heirs of Pedro Alilano v. Atty. Examen,11 the Court explicitly decreed that the Spanish Notarial Law of
1889 was repealed by the 1917 Revised Administrative Code. It added that it was only in 2004 that the
Court passed the Revised Rules on Notarial Practice, to wit:
Prior to 1917, governing law for notaries public in the Philippines was the Spanish Notarial Law of 1889.
However, the law governing Notarial Practice is changed with the passage of the January 3, 1916 Revised
Administrative Code, which took effect in 1917. In 2004, the Revised Rules on Notarial Practice was passed
by the Supreme Court.

In Kapunan, et al. v. Casilan and Court of Appeals, the Court had the opportunity to state that enactment of
the Revised Administrative Code repealed the Spanish Notarial Law of 1889. x x x12
In said case, respondent Atty. Examen was charged with violating the Notarial Law when he notarized in
1984 the absolute deed of sale executed by his brother and the latter's wife. The Court held that Atty.
Examen was competent to no said document because the Revised Administrative Code did not prohibit a
Notary Public from notarizing any document of a relative.13

Moreover, in Aznar Brothers Realty Co. v. Court of Appeals,14 the Court reiterated that indeed the Spanish
Notarial Law of 1889 was repealed by the Revised Administrative Code and its Chapter 11 governed notarial
practice at the time the subject deed therein was notarized in 1964.15

Too, in Ylaya v. Atty. Gacott,16 the Court made an express pronouncement that the subject documents
therein notarized in 2000 and 2001 were not covered by the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, viz.:
We note that the respondent has not squarely addressed the issue of his relationship with Reynold, whom
the complainant alleges to be the respondent's uncle because Reynold is married to the respondent's
maternal aunt. However, this is of no moment as the respondent cannot be held liable for violating Section 3
(c), Rule IV of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC because the Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 4, 2001 and the MOA
dated April 19, 2000 were notarized by the respondent prior to effectivity of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC on July 6,
2004. The notarial law in force in the years 2000-2001 was Chapter 11 of Act No. 2711 (the Revised
Administrative Code of 1917) which did not contain the present prohibition against notarizing documents
where the parties are related to the notary public within the 4th civil degree, by affinity or consanguinity.
Thus, we must likewise dismiss the charge for violation of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC.17
Considering the foregoing, there is indeed no basis to hold respondent liable for misconduct for notarizing
his wife's Affidavit in 2002.

To recall, complainant alleged that respondent was guilty of misconduct because he notarized the affidavit of
his wife on April 25, 2002. Nevertheless, at the time of such notarization, it was the 1917 Revised
Administrative Code that covered notarial practice. As elucidated in Alilano and Ylaya, during the effectivity
of said Code, a Notary Public was not disallowed from notarizing a document executed by a relative. Neither
was there a prohibition for a Notary Public to notarize a document executed by his or her spouse.

As discussed, the 1917 Revised Administrative Code repealed the Spanish Notarial Law. In turn, the
provisions anent notarial practice embodied in the Revised Administrative Code were superseded by the
passage of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. This only means that any prohibition enumerated in the
2004 Rules on Notarial Practice does not cover the acts made by a Notary Public earlier, including those
executed in 2002.

All told, the Court holds that respondent did not violate any of his duties as Notary Public when he notarized
the affidavit of his wife on April 25, 2002.
WHEREFORE, the Complaint against Atty. Vitto A. Kintanar is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C.J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Jardeleza, and Tijam, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:
 SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No. 10441, February 14, 2018

SUSAN T. DE LEON, Complainant, v. ATTY. ANTONIO A. GERONIMO, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This case is pursuant to a disbarment complaint which Susan T. De Leon filed against Atty. Antonio A.
Geronimo, for purportedly committing acts in violation of the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR).

The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:

Complainant Susan T. De Leon engaged the services of Atty. Antonio A. Geronimo on March 28, 2003 to
represent her in a labor case, where De Leon's employees filed complaints for illegal dismissal and violations
of labor standards against her. On November 26, 2003, the Labor Arbiter (LA) rendered a
Decision1 dismissing said complaints for illegal dismissal against De Leon, but ordering her to pay each of
the employees P5,000.00 as financial assistance. Without being informed by Atty. Geronimo, the employees
filed an appeal before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). On November 30, 2004, the NLRC
reversed the LA decision, ordering De Leon and her co-respondents to reinstate the employees and pay
them more than P7 Million.2 When De Leon received a copy of the Motion for Reconsideration which Atty.
Geronimo prepared, she was disappointed since the motion was composed of only three (3) pages and the
arguments did not address all the issues in the assailed decision. Thus, De Leon later filed a Supplemental
Motion for Reconsideration before the NLRC.3 On January 28, 2005, Atty. Geronimo provided her with copies
of some of the records of her case, particularly the LA and NLRC decisions, after which, De Leon never heard
from him again.

After several months of not hearing from her lawyer, De Leon finally decided to call Atty. Geronimo on
March 1, 2006 to follow up on the status of both the Motion for Reconsideration and the Supplemental
Motion for Reconsideration. Much to her surprise, Atty. Geronimo informed her that said motions had
already been denied by the NLRC in a Resolution4 dated August 26, 2005, which he had received sometime
in September 2005. When De Leon asked him if he elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (CA), Atty.
Geronimo said that he did not. When she asked why, Atty. Geronimo replied that it did not matter anyway
since she did not have any money, further telling her, " 'Di ba wala ka naman properties?" De Leon likewise
asked him why he did not inform her that he had already received a copy of the Resolution denying the
motions, to which he replied, "Wala ka naman pera!" At that point, De Leon told him that she's terminating
his services as her counsel. Thereafter, Atty. Geronimo filed a withdrawal of appearance as counsel.

On the other hand, Atty. Geronimo claims that De Leon filed the complaint against him for his perceived
negligence even when he exerted his best defending her before the LA by filing the mandatory pleadings
and supporting documents. After explaining that the LA ruling was already favorable to her, De Leon decided
not to appeal the LA's award of financial assistance and merely wait for the employees to file an appeal.
Atty. Geronimo also explained to her remedies if the NLRC reversed the LA ruling; that she might be forced
to bring the case to the CA and the Supreme Court. De Leon said that she had no more money to defray the
expenses of the suit. On November 30, 2004, the NLRC promulgated its decision. On January 28, 2005, or
six (6) days before February 3, 2005, the deadline for the filing of the Motion for Reconsideration of the
NLRC Decision, De Leon called Atty. Geronimo and told him to give her the decisions of the LA and NLRC,
and to surrender to her the entire case records because she would ask another lawyer to prepare her motion
for reconsideration. Although Atty. Geronimo believed that, with the surrender of the case records and De
Leon's statement that she would get another lawyer, he had already been relieved of his duties, he still
prepared a motion for reconsideration on February 2, 2005. When he asked De Leon if she was ready to file
the Motion for Reconsideration, the latter said no. So she signed the one he had prepared, verified it under
oath, and filed it with the NLRC. For this, Atty. Geronimo did not collect any pleading fee. On February 16,
2005, however, De Leon filed a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration which had been prepared by a
lawyer who did not enter an appearance in the case. On September 6, 2005, Atty. Geronimo received a copy
of the NLRC Resolution denying De Leon's motions. When he informed her of said Resolution and the
requirements needed in filing a petition before the CA, De Leon said that she had no more money since her
garment factory was already closed and she was unemployed. Atty. Geronimo told her that without money
in the bank (De Leon construed this as "Wala ka naman pera"), the sheriff could not get anything from her.
He also asked about her house and lot. De Leon said that they were living in the house owned by her
husband's parents and they did not own any real property (De Leon construed this as " 'Di ba wala ka
naman properties?") He reiterated that without any money or property, the sheriff could not get anything
from her. De Leon then remarked that she would no longer file a petition before the CA or if she would,
another lawyer would have to prepare it for her. Thus, and since he was no longer in possession of the
records of De Leon's case, Atty. Geronimo could not prepare the petition for certiorari before the CA.

On January 31, 2011, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
recommended Atty. Geronimo's suspension from the practice of law, to wit:5

In view of the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that the respondent be meted the penalty of
suspension from [the] practice of law for a period of six (6) months.

Respectfully submitted, Pasig City, 31 January 2011.

On December 29, 2012, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XX-2012-650,6 which adopted
the abovementioned recommendation, with modification, thus:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, with
modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled
case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and finding the recommendation fully supported by
the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering that Respondent was remiss in his
duty as counsel for complainant, Atty. Antonio A. Geronimo is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for three (3) months.

The Court's Ruling

The Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the findings and recommendation of the IBP that Atty.
Geronimo must be sanctioned for his acts.

The relationship between a lawyer and a client is imbued with utmost trust and confidence. Lawyers are
expected to exercise the necessary diligence and competence in managing cases entrusted to them. They
commit not only to review cases or give legal advice, but also to represent their clients to the best of their
ability without the need to be reminded by either the client or the court.7

Canon 17 and Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the CPR provide:

CANON 17 - A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE
TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.

CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.

Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a
reasonable time to client's request for information.

Here, when De Leon received a copy of the Motion for Reconsideration which Atty. Geronimo prepared, she
was disappointed since the motion was composed of only three (3) pages and the arguments did not
address all the issues in the assailed decision. After Atty. Geronimo had provided her with copies of the LA
and NLRC decisions, De Leon never heard from him again. When she called him on March 1, 2006 to follow
up on the status of the motions, she was so furious to learn that, not only had the motions been denied by
the NLRC, but worse, Atty. Geronimo no longer appealed the case to the CA. Atty. Geronimo's failure to
inform his client about the adverse ruling of the NLRC, thereby precluding her from further pursuing an
appeal, is a clear breach of Canons 17 and 18 of the CPR.

Clients are led to expect that lawyers would be ever-mindful of their cause and accordingly exercise the
required degree of diligence in handling their affairs. Verily, a lawyer is expected to maintain at all times a
high standard of legal proficiency, and to devote his full attention, skill, and competence to the case,
regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. A lawyer's duty of competence
and diligence includes not merely reviewing the cases entrusted to the counsel's care or giving sound legal
advice, but also consists of properly representing the client before any court or tribunal, attending scheduled
hearings or conferences, preparing and filing the required pleadings, prosecuting the handled cases with
reasonable dispatch, and urging their termination without waiting for the client or the court to prod him or
her to do so. Therefore, a lawyer's negligence in fulfilling his duties subjects him to disciplinary action.8

Atty. Geronimo was unjustifiably remiss in his bounden duties as De Leon's counsel. The lack of proper
communication and coordination between De Leon and Atty. Geronimo is palpable but cannot possibly be
attributed to the client's lack of diligence. It is rather incredible that while De Leon was supposedly no longer
interested in filing an opposition to the appeal filed by the employees before the NLRC, she even took the
entire records of the case from Atty. Geronimo in January 2005. Atty. Geronimo also argued that an
opposition or a comment to said appeal is not a mandatory pleading but only a directory one. But prudence
dictates that filing an opposition or comment to an appeal is always preferable rather than merely waiting
and hoping that the NLRC would affirm the favorable LA ruling. Atty. Geronimo likewise explained that De
Leon remarked that she would no longer file a petition before the CA. It is inconceivable that De Leon would
simply refuse to oppose the NLRC's ruling considering that it ordered her and her co-respondents to
reinstate the employees and pay them more than P7 Million. The fact is that she had been consistently kept
in the dark as to the true status of her case, preventing her from pursuing an appeal. She would not have
learned about it had she not called her lawyer herself to finally follow up.

Also, Atty. Geronimo believed that, with the surrender of the case records and De Leon's statement that she
would get another lawyer, he had already been relieved of his duties as her counsel. This is, however,
contrary to his subsequent actions. If this were true, he would have formally withdrawn from De Leon's case
as her registered counsel long before March 2006. But he even prepared a motion for reconsideration on
February 2, 2005, which De Leon signed, verified under oath, and filed with the NLRC. Atty. Geronimo
simply argues that he did not collect any pleading fee for the same.

Atty. Geronimo's negligence cost De Leon her entire case and left her with no appellate remedies. Her legal
cause was orphaned, not because a court of law ruled on the merits of her case, but because a person
privileged to act as her counsel failed to discharge his duties with the requisite diligence. Atty. Geronimo
failed to exhaust all possible means to protect his client's interest, which is contrary to what he had sworn to
do as a member of the legal profession.9

A problem arises whenever agents, entrusted to manage the interests of another, use their authority or
power for their benefit or fail to discharge their duties. In many agencies, there is information asymmetry
between the principal and the entrusted agent. That is, there are facts and events that the agent must
attend to that may not be known by the principal. This information asymmetry is even more pronounced in
an attorney-client relationship. Lawyers are expected, not only to be familiar with the minute facts of their
cases, but also to see their relevance in relation to their causes of action or their defenses. It is the lawyer
that receives the notices and must decide the mode of appeal to protect the interest of his or her client.10

Thus, the relationship between a lawyer and her client is regarded as highly fiduciary. Between the lawyer
and the client, it is the lawyer that has the better knowledge of facts, events, and remedies. While it is true
that the client chooses which lawyer to engage, he or she usually does so mostly on the basis of reputation.
It is only upon actual engagement that the client discovers the level of diligence, competence, and
accountability of the counsel that he or she chooses. In some cases, such as this one, the discovery comes
too late. Between the lawyer and the client, therefore, it is the lawyer that should bear the full cost of
indifference or negligence.11

As regards the appropriate penalty, several cases show that lawyers who have been held liable for gross
negligence for infractions similar to those of Atty. Geronimo's were suspended for a period of six (6)
months. In Spouses Aranda v. Atty. Elayda,12 the lawyer who failed to appear at the scheduled hearing
despite due notice which resulted in the submission of the case for decision was found guilty of gross
negligence and hence, suspended for six (6) months. In the case of The Heirs of Tiburcio F. Ballesteros, Sr.
v. Atty. Apiag,13 the lawyer who did not file a pre-trial brief and was absent during the pre-trial conference
was likewise suspended for six (6) months. In Abiero v. Atty. Juanino,14 the lawyer who neglected a legal
matter entrusted to him by his client, in violation of Canons 17 and 18 of the CPR, was also suspended for
six (6) months. Thus, consistent with existing jurisprudence, the Court finds it proper to impose the same
penalty against respondent and accordingly suspends him for a period of six (6) months.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court SUSPENDS Atty. Antonio A. Geronimo from the
practice of law for a period of six (6) months and WARNS him that a repetition of the same or similar
offense shall be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Decision be included in the personal records of Atty. Antonio A. Geronimo and entered in
his file in the Office of the Bar Confidant.

Let copies of this Decision be disseminated to all lower courts by the Office of the Court Administrator, as
well as to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, J., (Chairperson), Perlas-Bernabe, and Reyes, Jr., JJ., concur.

Caguioa, J., on official business.

Endnotes:
 SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No. 11829, February 26, 2018

MARIA ROMERO, Complainant, v. ATTY. GERONIMO R. EVANGELISTA, JR., Respondent.

RESOLUTION

REYES, JR., J.:

For the Court's resolution is a Complaint1 for disbarment filed by Maria Romero (Maria) with the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) against Atty. Geronimo R. Evangelista, Jr. (Atty. Evangelista), for his alleged
violation of several provisions2 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) and Canon 63of the Canons
of Professional Ethics.

The Facts

In her Complaint, Maria alleged that in several cases, Atty. Evangelista represented her and her aunt Adela
A. Romero (Adela), in their individual capacities and as Heirs of the Late Adela Aguinaldo Vda. De Romero.
However, Atty. Evangelista subsequently represented the Spouses Joseph and Rosalina Valles in suits
against Adela, enumerated as follows:

1. Civil Case No. 319 (Forcible Entry with Damages) - Adela Romero vs. Spouses Joseph and Rosalina Valles,
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, First Judicial Region, Tuba-Sablan, Benguet4

2. Civil Case No. 13-CV-2940 (Recovery of Possession and Ownership with Damages) - Adela Romero vs.
Spouses Joseph and Rosalina Valles, Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region, Branch 10, Benguet
Province5

3. Civil Case No. 12-CV-2880 - Adela Romero vs. Spouses Joseph and Rosalina Valles, First Judicial Region,
Branch 10, La Trinidad, Benguet6

In his Answer,7 Atty. Evangelista admitted that he had handled cases involving the properties of the Romero
clan, but not a single case for Maria.8 He explained that: a) there was never a lawyer-client relationship
between him and Maria; b) his professional services were never retained by Maria nor did he receive any
privileged information regarding Maria's cases; and c) Maria never paid him any legal fee.9

Atty. Evangelista also contended that Adela is not a complainant in the disbarment case against him nor is
there any proof that she authorized Maria to file a complaint on her (Adela's) behalf.10

Report and Recommendation of the IBP

In the Report and Recommendation11 dated February 27, 2015, the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD)
found Atty. Evangelista to have represented conflicting interests and recommended that he be meted the
penalty of suspension from the practice of law for one year.

The IBP-CBD noted that Atty. Evangelista, who once lawyered for Adela, had accepted and handled legal
actions against her. In his defense, Atty. Evangelista argued that Adela herself did not file a complaint
against him. But, according to the IBP-CBD, Adela's participation in the filing of the action is not necessary
since Atty. Evangelista's culpability had been established by documentary evidence on record.12

In its Resolution13 dated June 6, 2015, the IBP-Board of Governors adopted and approved in toto the Report
and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD. Atty. Evangelista filed a motion for reconsideration,14praying for the
mitigation of his penalty. The motion was denied in IBP Resolution No. XXII-2017-79415dated January 27,
2017.
 Issue

Whether Atty. Evangelista is guilty of representing conflicting interests

The Court's Ruling

After a judicious review of the records, the Court concurs with the IBP's findings, except for the
recommended penalty.

"The relationship between a lawyer and his client should ideally be imbued with the highest level of trust and
confidence. Necessity and public interest require that this be so. Part of the lawyer's duty to his client is to
avoid representing conflicting interests."16 In Hornilla vs. Salunat,17 the Court explained the concept of
conflict of interest, viz:

There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more opposing parties.
The test is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer's duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it
is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument will be
opposed by him when he argues for the other client." This rule covers not only cases in which confidential
communications have been confided, but also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be
used. Also, there is conflict of interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to
perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him and also
whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use against his first client any knowledge acquired
through their connection. Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new
relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his
client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof.18

The rule against conflict of interest also "prohibits a lawyer from representing new clients whose interests
oppose those of a former client in any manner, whether or not they are parties in the same action or on
totally unrelated cases,"19 since the representation of opposing clients, even in unrelated cases, "is
tantamount to representing conflicting interests or, at the very least, invites suspicion of double-dealing
which the Court cannot allow."20 The only exception is provided under Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the CPR - if
there is a written consent from all the parties after full disclosure.21 "Such prohibition is founded on
principles of public policy and good taste as the nature of the lawyer-client relations is one of trust and
confidence of the highest degree."22

With Atty. Evangelista's admission that he retained clients who have cases against Adela without all the
parties' written consent, it is clear that he has violated Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the CPR. Adela's non-
participation in the filing of the instant complaint is immaterial, since it is stated under Section 1, Rule 139-B
of the Rules of Court, as amended by Bar Matter No. 1645 that, "[proceedings for the disbarment,
suspension or discipline of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or upon the filing of
a verified complaint of any person before the Supreme Court or the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)."

Considering that this is Atty. Evangelista's first offense in his more than 30 years of practice,23 the Court
finds a six-month suspension from the practice of law to be an adequate and appropriate sanction against
him. In Atty. Nuique vs. Atty. Sedillo,24 the Court ordered the suspension of Atty. Eduardo Sedillo from the
practice of law for six (6) months, upon a finding that he represented opposing clients in unrelated cases.
In Tulio vs. Atty. Buhangin,25 the Court similarly imposed the penalty of suspension for a period of six (6)
months against Atty. Gregory Buhangin, who, aside from failing to comply with the orders of the IBP, also
filed a complaint against his former client in representation of such client's siblings, involving legal matters
which the former entrusted to him.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds Atty. Geronimo R, Evangelista, Jr. GUILTY of
representing conflicting interests in violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, effective upon
receipt of this Resolution, with a STERN WARNING that a commission of the same or similar offense in the
future will result in the imposition of a more severe penalty.
Let copies of this Resolution be entered in the personal record of Atty. Geronimo R. Evangelista, Jr. as a
member of the Philippine Bar and furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, J., (Chairperson), Peralta, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.

Caguioa, J., on wellness leave.

Endnotes:
 SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No. 10756 (Formerly CBD Case No. 11-3218), February 21, 2018

JUNIELITO R. ESPANTO, Complainant, v. ATTY. ERWIN V. BELLEZA, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before us is the verified Complaint1 of Junielito R. Espanto (Junielito) against Atty. Erwin V. Belleza (Atty.
Belleza) for grave misconduct, malpractice, deliberate falsehood, violation of oath of office and violation of
the Code of Professional Responsibility in connection with the demolition of complainant's 2-storey
residential house situated at Barangay Maya, MacArthur, Leyte, without his knowledge and against his will.

Complainant alleged that he is the owner of a 2-storey concrete residential house situated on a lot covered
by Original Certificate of Title No. P-43641,2 which was sold by his father to him on January 12,
2001.3 Junielito alleged that sometime in 2006 while working abroad, he was informed that Nelia
Alibangbang-Miller (Nelia), their neighbor, was claiming that his house was encroaching on a portion of the
adjoining lot she bought. Thereafter, Nelia filed a case for Recovery of Possession with Damages before the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of MacArthur-Mayorga, MacArthur, Leyte, docketed as Civil Case No. 75
against the Espantos.4 However, Junielito asserted that he was not included as party to said complaint
despite Nelia's allegation that his house was encroaching on the latter's lot.

In January 2009, after Junielito went back to the Philippines, he averred that Nelia would always harass him
to pay the portion of the land allegedly being encroached upon by his house. He complained that Nelia
threatened him and his family that she would demolish their houses as she already won in the case she filed
against his brother, sister and mother.

On November 22, 2010, through a letter,5 Atty. Belleza notified Junielito that he is given seven (7) days to
vacate the subject property of his client, Nelia. After seven days, Nelia posted a notice on the door of his
house stating "To: Lito, your 7 days is up! Nelia Miller" and padlocked the gate of Junielito's house.6

On December 1, 2010, Junielito alleged that Atty. Belleza went to his house and threatened him that they
will file a writ of execution to demolish his house if he will not agree to sell and vacate his house. Junielito
lamented that while he initially refused, he eventually gave in as he was already tired of his situation.

On the same day, because Junielito was initially reluctant, Nelia and Atty. Belleza assured him that he will
be informed of the final details of the sale should there be a buyer of the property. Junielito alleged that
Atty. Belleza drafted an acknowledgment receipt7 where it was indicated therein that he received the
amount of P50,000.00 as a partial payment, and that he will receive the final percentage of the sale price
when the property of Nelia is sold. Thereafter, Atty. Belleza and the Spouses Miller told him to vacate the
house to facilitate its sale and to be able to make the necessary repairs to which he complied as he believed
their sincerity and honesty.

Thus, in the morning of February 14, 2011, Junielito was surprised to receive a text message from his niece,
Elenita Pille, informing him that his house was being demolished with the participation of Nelia and a certain
Irene Tano (Irene), allegedly the buyer of the property.

Junielito lamented that when he got hold of the Deed of Absolute Sale8 executed by Nelia and Irene, which
was prepared and notarized by Atty. Belleza, he then realized that the latter defrauded him as shown by the
fact that he facilitated the sale without his knowledge. Junielito felt aggrieved as they agreed that Atty.
Belleza and Nelia will inform him should there be a buyer of the property so he can participate in the sale
transaction, considering that his house sits on a portion of Nelia's property. However, not only did Atty.
Belleza fail to inform him of the sale of the property, but they also had his house demolished without his
knowledge and consent, and without permit from the municipal government.
Likewise, Junielito pointed out that in his Counter-Affidavit9 dated April 30, 2011 Atty. Belleza lied when he
stated therein that Civil Case No. 75 has been decided with finality, when in truth and in fact, said case has
yet to be decided with finality as shown by the Certification10 dated May 19, 2011 issued by Melba
Lagunzad, Clerk of Court II, 13th MCTC, MacArthur-Mayorga, MacArthur, Leyte.

Junielito also alleged that in the Counter-Affidavit11 dated April 30, 2011 of the Spouses Miller, they lied
when they made it appear that the P50,000.00 was given to him out of pity when in fact it was a partial
payment and guarantee that he will be informed of the sale should there be anyone interested to buy his
property.

Junielito expressed his frustration as he believed that Atty. Belleza, a lawyer, was supposed to be an
instrument in the administration of justice. However, given his above-mentioned actuations and behavior,
Atty. Belleza not only failed to observe his duty and obligations as a lawyer but he likewise showed his
unfitness to be retained as member of the bar. He, thus, pray that Atty. Belleza be suspended or disbarred
from the practice of law.

On October 7, 2011, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), ordered
Atty. Belleza to submit his Answer on the complaint against him.12

In his Answer13 dated November 10, 2011, Atty. Belleza countered that there was already a Compromise
Agreement between the parties in Civil Case No. 75, which was approved by the court on December 27,
2006.14 He, likewise, claimed that he merely typed and printed the acknowledgment receipt and served as
witness to the issuance of the same. He further denied that he had any participation in the demolition of
complainant's house.

In its Report and Recommendation15 dated July 19, 2012, the IBP-CBD recommended that Atty. Belleza be
suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months for his deliberate disregard of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

However, the IBP-Board of Governors, in Notice of Resolution No. XX-2013-761,16 dated June 21, 2013,
resolved to adopt and approve with modification the Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD, and
instead suspended Atty. Belleza from the practice of law for three (3) months.

We concur with the findings and recommendation of the IBP-CBD.

Well established is the rule that administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. These
cases are distinct from and proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.17 Public interest is its primary
objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be
allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon
a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of
preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging
the profession of members who by their misconduct have proven themselves no longer worthy to be
entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney.18 Corollarily, We will
limit the issue on whether Atty. Belleza committed transgressions that would question his fitness to practice
law, and thus, refrain from discussing issues that are judicial in nature.

Canon 1 clearly mandates the obedience of every lawyer to laws and legal processes. To the best of his
ability, a lawyer is expected to respect and abide by the law and, thus, avoid any act or omission that is
contrary thereto. A lawyer's personal deference to the law not only speaks of his character but it also
inspires respect and obedience to the law, on the part of the public.19

Given the facts of the case, we find that Atty. Belleza failed to exercise the good faith required of a lawyer in
handling the legal affairs of his client. Even without touching the issue of the subject properties' ownership,
Atty. Belleza cannot deny that the subject property sold by Nelia to Irene was still pending litigation due to
the alleged encroachment of Junielito's house on the property of Nelia. It was precisely the reason why they
filed a complaint for recovery of possession against Junielito's relatives. Moreover, when Atty. Belleza sent a
notice to vacate Nelia's property to Junielito on November 22, 2010, the civil case was still pending
litigation.
As noted by the IBP-CBD, the acknowledgment receipt of P50,000.00 issued by Nelia as witnessed and
signed by Atty. Belleza is an evidence by itself that he had knowledge of Junielito's interest on the property
even if he disputes the latter's ownership of the subject property. We quote the acknowledgment receipt for
clarification, to wit:

I, LITO ESPANTO acknowledge receipt of the sum of Fifty Thousand (50,000.00) pesos, Philippine Currency
from Nelia Miller as partial payment towards sale of "house". I acknowledged I will receive a final
percentage of sale price when house and lot by Nelia Miller is ultimately sold. Final sales details
will be disclosed immediately to me when all property is sold and final payment will be made at
that time. I acknowledge sale price cannot be "predetermined" due to economic conditions.

x x x20

Upon review of the foregoing acknowledgment receipt, it can be inferred that Junielito acknowledged that he
received P50,000.00 as partial payment and that he will receive the final percentage of sale price when
house and lot by Nelia is sold. It likewise stated therein that Junielito has the right to be informed of the
final sale price and other details related to the sale. Considering that Junielito was in fact paid albeit partial
and was given the right to be informed of the final sale details, it clearly shows that Nelia and Atty. Belleza
recognized Junielito's interest as an owner although it pertains only to a portion of Nelia's property where his
house sits. Why else would they agree on informing Junielito of such material information if they knew that
he has no right whatsoever with the property being sold.

It should also be pointed out that Atty. Belleza neither denied the existence of the acknowledgment receipt
nor the fact that he signed the same.21 Thus, given the foregoing circumstances, it can be presumed that
Atty. Belleza knew that the sale of the property will necessarily affect Junielito. Consequently, when they
sold the property of Nelia without informing Junielito despite their agreement to such effect, Atty. Belleza
not only breached their agreement and betrayed Junielito's trust; he also instigated a malicious and unlawful
transaction to the prejudice of Junielito.

Furthermore, even assuming there was already a compromise agreement, it was malicious to sell Nelia's
property without complying with the conditions and agreements set forth therein. Atty. Belleza knew that
one of the issues sought to be resolved in said case was the issue on whether Junielito's house was
encroaching on Nelia's property. However, said issue could not be resolved without settling the boundaries
of the lots, which explains why the compromise agreement contained provisions for a relocation survey. For
clarification, We quote the pertinent portion of the compromise agreement as thus:

1. Parties agreed to relocate the subject properties designated as Cadastral Lot Nos. 127, and 159;

2. Parties agreed that a commissioner be appointed by the Court to conduct the relocation survey
which be (sic) composed of a qualified and licensed geodetic engineer from the office of the Land
and Surveys Division of the Department Environment and Natural Resources, Sto. Niño,
Extension, Tacloban City;

xxxx

4. Parties likewise agreed that if ever it will be found out by the result of the survey that indeed defendants
encroached a portion of the land of the plaintiff designated as Cadastral Lot No. 159, parties have the
following options:

a. Defendants will buy from the plaintiff the whole area encroached at a reasonable price; or
b. If defendants cannot afford, defendants shall buy only the area encroached which the house of the
defendant is located with reasonable yard at reasonable price and defendant shall vacate the remaining area
and transfer to the unoccupied portion of lot 127 vacated by the heirs of Onofre Lagarto provided further
that plaintiff will be responsible to the heirs of Onofre Lagarto for them to remove their house; or
c. Plaintiff shall buy the value of the house at a reasonable price;
5. That if ever if (sic) it's found out by the relocation survey that the defendants have not encroached the
land of the plaintiff designated as Cadastral Lot No. 159, then, plaintiff will not disturb the peaceful
possession of the defendants and would voluntarily dismiss the above-entitled complaint;22

However, when Junielito's house was demolished on February 14, 2011, it appears that no relocation survey
was conducted on the subject properties. In fact, in Order23 dated April 4, 2011, the court ordered the
appearance of the parties in Civil Case No. 75 since while there was already a compromise agreement
entered into by them, the court wanted to verify if a relocation survey has been conducted on the lots
subject of the case as the records were bereft of any showing that a commissioner's report has been
submitted to the court.

Atty. Belleza should know that a compromise agreement once approved by final order of the court has the
force of res judicata between the parties and should not be disturbed except for vices of consent or
forgery.24 Hence, when a decision on a compromise agreement is final and executory; it has the force of law
and is conclusive between the parties. Compromise agreements are contracts,25 and contractual obligations
between parties have the force of law between them and absent any allegation that the same are contrary
to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy, they must be complied with in good
faith.26 Thus, when Atty. Belleza ignored the provisions of the compromise agreement and proceeded with
the sale of the property even without the relocation survey, there is no question that he wantonly violated
Canon 1 of the CPR.

Moreover, as found during the mandatory conference before the IBP, Atty. Belleza knew that complainant
was not a party in Civil Case No. 75, albeit, his 2-storey concrete residential house appeared to be
encroaching on Nelia's property. Thus, even assuming that there was a valid compromise agreement in Civil
Case No. 75, said judgment based on compromise agreement will not bind complainant. Consequently, even
if there was already a writ of execution, the same will not likewise bind complainant. Moreso, while Atty.
Belleza claims that there was a valid compromise agreement, he, however, failed to show that there was a
demolition order issued by the court. There was likewise no demolition permit issued by the local
government.27

It is basic that there could be no demolition of building or structures without a writ of execution and
demolition issued by the court. This Court in a number of decisions held that even if there is already a writ
of execution, there must still be a need for a special order for the purpose of demolition issued by the court
before the officer in charge can destroy, demolish or remove improvements over the contested
property.28 The pertinent provisions are the following:

Before the removal of an improvement must take place, there must be a special order, hearing and
reasonable notice to remove. Section 10(d), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides:

(d) Removal of improvements on property subject of execution. When the property subject of execution
contains improvements constructed or planted by the judgment obligor or his agent, the officer shall not
destroy, demolish or remove said improvements except upon special order of the court, issued upon motion
of the judgment obligee after due hearing and after the former has failed to remove the same within a
reasonable time fixed by the court.

The above-stated rule is clear and needs no interpretation. If demolition is necessary, there must be a
hearing on the motion filed and with due notices to the parties for the issuance of a special order of
demolition.29

The requirement of a special order of demolition is based on the rudiments of justice and fair play. It frowns
upon arbitrariness and oppressive conduct in the execution of an otherwise legitimate act. It is an
amplification of the provision of the Civil Code that every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in
the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith.30 Furthermore, it appeared that when the demolition was made on February 14, 2011, the case has
not yet attained finality as evidenced by a certification issued by Clerk of Court Melba E. Lagunzad of the
13th MCTC of MacArthur-Mayorga, MacArthur, Leyte on May 19, 2011.31

In his last ditch effort to exonerate himself, Atty. Belleza denied that he or his client consented or had
knowledge or participated on the demolition and pointed instead on the buyer, Irene, as the sole perpetrator
of the illegal demolition. We are, however, unconvinced since the demolition would not have happened if
Atty. Belleza and his client did not sell the subject property to Irene in violation of the compromise
agreement and while Civil Case No. 75 is still pending litigation. Thus, Atty. Belleza cannot wash his hands
from liability as to the illegal demolition of complainant's house since in the first place, he facilitated the sale
of the subject property.

Clearly, Atty. Belleza's actuations which resulted in the demolition of Junielito's house violates Canon 1 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility which mandates that a lawyer must uphold the Constitution and
promote respect for the legal processes. Infact, contrary to this edict, Atty. Belleza's acts of demanding
Junielito to vacate his house, and the selling of the property while Civil Case no. 75 was still pending, he
violated the basic constitutional right of Junielito not to be deprived of a right or property without due
process of law.

Despite his assertions of good faith, the Court cannot turn a blind eye on Atty. Belleza's acts of: (1) issuing
the notice to vacate to Junielito while the case was still pending litigation; (2) failing to inform Junielito of
the sale of Nelia's property in contravention to the stipulation in the acknowledgment receipt; and (3)
facilitating, drafting and notarizing of the deed of sale between Nelia and Irene in violation of the
compromise agreement due to the absence of relocation survey. If the Court allows these irregular practice
for the reason that lawyers are constrained to suit their client's interests, the Court would, in effect, sanction
impropriety and wrongdoing.

We note that while lawyers owe entire devotion to the interest of their clients and zeal in the defense of
their client's right, they should not forget that they are officers of the court, bound to exert every effort to
assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. Canon 19 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility mandates lawyers to represent their clients with zeal but within the bounds of the law. They
should not, therefore, misuse the rules of procedure to defeat the ends of justice or unduly delay a case,
impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court processes.32

Time and again, the Court has reminded lawyers that their support for the cause of their clients should
never be attained at the expense of truth and justice. While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of
his client, full devotion to his genuine interest, and warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights,
as well as the exertion of his utmost learning and ability, he must do so only within the bounds of the law. It
needs to be emphasized that the lawyer's fidelity to his client must not be pursued at the expense of truth
and justice, and must be held within the bounds of reason and common sense. His responsibility to protect
and advance the interests of his client does not warrant a course of action propelled by ill motives and
malicious intentions.33

PENALTY

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be disbarred or
suspended on any of the following grounds: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice or other gross misconduct in office;
(3) grossly immoral conduct; (4) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (5) violation of the
lawyer's oath; (6) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (7) willful appearance as
an attorney for a party without authority. A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether
in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity
and good demeanor, or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.

Here, the acts of Atty. Belleza in: (1) issuing the notice to vacate to Junielito while the case was still pending
litigation; (2) failing to inform Junielito of the sale of Nelia's property in contravention to the stipulation in
the acknowledgment receipt; and (3) facilitating, drafting and notarizing the deed of sale between Nelia and
Irene in violation of the compromise agreement due to the absence of relocation survey, clearly constitute
malpractice and gross misconduct in his office as attorney, for which a suspension from the practice of law
for six (6) months is warranted.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Atty. Erwin V. Belleza GUILTY of violations of Canons 1 and 19 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility for which he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6)
months, effective immediately upon receipt of this Decision, with a STERN WARNING that a commission of
the same or similar offense in the future will result in the imposition of a more severe penalty.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to Atty. Erwin V.
Belleza's personal record as a member of the Bar. Likewise, let copies of the same be served on the IBP, and
the OCA, which is directed to circulate them to all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

Atty. Erwin V. Belleza is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date of his receipt of this Decision so that the
Court can determine the reckoning point when his suspension shall take effect.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, J. (Chairperson), Perlas-Bernabe, and Reyes, Jr., JJ., concur.

Caguioa, J., on wellness leave.

Endnotes:
 SECOND DIVISION

A.M. No. MTJ-17-1893 (Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 15-2773-MTJ), February 19, 2018

TEODORA ALTOBANO-RUIZ, Complainant, v. HON. RAMSEY DOMINGO G. PICHAY, PRESIDING

JUDGE, BRANCH 78, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, PARAÑAQUE CITY, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before us is the Complaint1 dated June 22, 2015 of complainant Teodora Altobano-Ruiz (Ruiz) against
respondent Judge Ramsey Domingo G. Pichay (Judge Pichay), Presiding Judge, Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC), Branch 78, Parañaque City for gross ignorance of the law and gross misconduct in connection with
the latter's act of granting bail in favor of Francis Eric Paran (Paran).

The factual antecedents of the case are as follows.

Complainant Ruiz and Paran are the accused in an adultery case, docketed as Criminal Case No.
2562,2which is pending before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Trece Martires City, Cavite,
presided by Judge Gonzalo Q. Mapili, Jr. On March 19, 2014, accused Paran was apprehended at his
residence in Quezon City by police authorities from Parañaque City by virtue of the Warrant of Arrest3 dated
March 12, 2014 issued by Judge Mapili. He was detained for several days at the Parañaque City Police
Station.

On March 22, 2014, accused Paran filed an application for bail before Branch 78, MeTC, Parañaque City,
which was promptly approved by respondent Judge Pichay after the accused posted a cash bond of
P12,000.00, to wit:

WHEREFORE, the Police Authorities of Parañaque City Police Station, Warrant and Subpoena Unit, Parañaque
City is hereby DIRECTED to RELEASE IMMEDIATELY WITHOUT ANY FURTHER DELAY the accused FRANCIS
ERIC PARAN unless there are causes or cases warranting his further detention.

The Branch Clerk of Court is hereby DIRECTED to transmit the bond to the Court of origin.

SO ORDERED.4

On the other hand, Ruiz voluntarily surrendered before Judge Mapili and was temporarily released on bail
upon posting a cash bond of P12,000.00.

Ruiz alleged that Judge Pichay had no authority to approve Paran's application for bail since the latter
already had a pending criminal case for adultery in another court, and he was actually arrested in Quezon
City which was outside Judge Pichay's territorial jurisdiction.

On August 10, 2015, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) directed Judge Pichay to submit his
comment on the complaint against him.5

In his Comment6 dated November 27, 2015, Judge Pichay countered that his assailed Order dated March 22,
2014 was rendered in good faith and in strict adherence to and faithful compliance with his duties mandated
under the Constitution and the Rules of Court. He insisted on his court's jurisdiction over accused Paran's
application for bail because the latter was detained at the Parañaque City Police Station, as shown in the
Certificate of Detention issued by SPO4 Dondie Oliva Aquino. He further averred that he acted on the bail
application on the same date that it was filed, which was a Saturday, in order to give effect to the accused's
constitutional right to bail. Finally, Judge Pichay asserted that his action was neither tainted with malice nor
did he receive financial gain in resolving the application with dispatch.
On January 18, 2017, the OCA recommended that the instant administrative complaint be re-docketed as a
regular administrative matter. It further found Judge Pichay guilty of gross ignorance of the law and
recommended that he be meted the penalty of a fine in the amount of P5,000.00 with stern warning.7

We adopt the findings of the OCA, except as to the recommended penalty.

Section 17 (a) of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended by Administrative Circular No. 12-94 which
governs the approval of bail bonds for criminal cases pending outside the judge's territorial jurisdiction is
instructive, to wit:

Section 17. Bail, where filed. — (a) Bail in the amount fixed may be filed with the court where the case is
pending, or in the absence or unavailability of the judge thereof, with any regional trial judge, metropolitan
trial judge, municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit trial judge in the province, city, or municipality. If the
accused is arrested in a province, city, or municipality other than where the case is pending, bail may also
be filed with any Regional Trial Court of said place, or if no judge thereof is available, with any metropolitan
trial judge, municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit trial judge therein.

xxx

The foregoing provision anticipates two (2) situations. First, the accused is arrested in the same province,
city or municipality where his case is pending. Second, the accused is arrested in the province, city or
municipality other than where his case is pending. In the first situation, the accused may file bail in the
court where his case is pending or, in the absence or unavailability of the judge thereof, with another branch
of the same court within the province or city. In the second situation, the accused has two (2) options. First,
he may file bail in the court where his case is pending or, second, he may file bail with any regional trial
court in the province, city or municipality where he was arrested. When no regional trial court judge is
available, he may file bail with any metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge or municipal circuit trial
judge therein.8

However, in the instant case, the case where Judge Pichay approved Paran's bail bond and issued release
order was not pending before his sala. As correctly pointed out by the OCA, although accused Paran was
detained at the Station Detention Cell, Parañaque City Police Station, he was nevertheless arrested at his
residence in Quezon City. Considering that Paran was arrested in Quezon City, he could also file his bail
application before any branch at the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, and in the absence of any judge
thereat, then before any branch of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City. Paran could have also filed
his bail application before the MTCC, Trece Martires City, where his case was pending.

Indeed, the only circumstance where Judge Pichay can exercise authority to rule on Paran's bail application
is if the latter, who was detained in Parañaque City, was not yet charged with a criminal offense in another
court, pursuant to Section 17(c),9 Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. However, in the instant case,
there was already a pending criminal case against Paran before the MTCC, Trece Martires, Cavite as shown
in the Certificate of Detention10 attached in Paran's application of bail. In fact, Paran's arrest was by virtue of
a warrant of arrest issued by Judge Mapili of the MTCC, Trece Martires City. More importantly, Judge Pichay
likewise failed to prove that there was no available judge to act on Paran's application of bail in the said
respective courts. Clearly, Judge Pichay's approval of Paran's bail constituted an irregularity arising from his
lack of the authority to do so.

In Judge Español v. Judge Mupas,11 the Court held that judges who approve applications for bail of accused
whose cases are pending in other courts are guilty of gross ignorance of the law. In Lim v. Judge
Dumlao,12 the Court held that:

x x x The requirements of Section 17(a), Rule 114 x x x must be complied with before a judge
may grant bail. The Court recognizes that not every judicial error bespeaks ignorance of the law and that,
if committed in good faith, does not warrant administrative sanction, but only in cases within the parameters
of tolerable misjudgment. Where, however, the law is straightforward and the facts so evident, not
to know it or to act as if one does not know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.

Respondent judge undeniably erred in approving the bail and issuing the order of release. He is
expected to know that certain requirements ought to be complied with before he can approve
[the accuseds] bail and issue an order for his release. The law involved is rudimentary that it leaves
little room for error. x x x13

It must be emphasized that rules of procedure have been formulated and promulgated by this Court to
ensure the speedy and efficient administration of justice. Failure to abide by these rules undermines the
wisdom behind them and diminishes respect for the law. Judges should ensure strict compliance therewith at
all times in their respective jurisdictions.14 Judge Pichay cannot excuse himself from the consequences of his
action by invoking good faith. As a judge, he must have the basic rules at the palm of his hands as he is
expected to maintain professional competence at all times. Since Judge Pichay presides over MeTC-Br. 78 in
Parañaque City, his territorial jurisdiction is confined therein. Therefore, to approve bail applications and
issue corresponding release orders in a case pending in courts outside his territorial jurisdiction, constitute
ignorance of the law so gross as to amount to incompetence.15

Time and again, the Court has adverted to the solemn obligation of judges to be very zealous in the
discharge of their bounden duties. Nonetheless, the earnest efforts of judges to promote a speedy
administration of justice must at all times be exercised with due recognition of the boundaries and limits of
their jurisdiction or authority.16 Judge Pichay might have the noble objective to expedite the case and render
prompt justice but he cannot do in violation of the rules of procedure.

PENALTY

Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC17 characterizes gross
ignorance of the law and procedure as a grave offense. The penalties prescribed for such offense are: (1)
Dismissal from service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and
disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or
controlled corporations, provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued
leave credits; (2) Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) months
but not exceeding six (6) months; or (3) a fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.

While We agree with the findings of the OCA, We, however, do not agree with its recommendation in so far
as the penalty to be imposed since this is not Judge Pichay's first administrative infraction. In Spouses
Marcelo v. Judge Pichay,18 Judge Pichay was found guilty of violating Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court for undue delay in resolving the pending incidents relative to Civil Case No. 2004-286 and was fined in
the amount of P12,000.00. In A.M. No. MTJ-10-1763 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 09-2209-MTJ),19 Judge Pichay
was also held administratively liable for the same offense. Thus, considering also Judge Pichay's previous
administrative infractions, We find it apt to impose the maximum amount of fine upon him.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Judge Ramsey Domingo G. Pichay, Presiding Judge, Branch
78, Metropolitan Trial Court, Parañaque City is found GUILTY of GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW, and
a FINE equivalent to the amount of P40,000.00 is hereby imposed upon him. He is, likewise, sternly warned
that the commission of the same offense or a similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, J., (Chairperson), Perlas-Bernabe, and Reyes, Jr., JJ., concur.

Caguioa, J., on official leave.

Endnotes:
 SECOND DIVISION

March 7, 2018

OCA IPI No. 17-4663-RTJ

ATTY. BERTENI C. CAUSING and PERCIVAL CARAG MABASA, Complaints

vs.
PRESIDING JUDGE JOSE LORENZO R. DELA ROSA, Regional Trial Court, Branch 4, Manila,
Respondent

DECISION

CAGUIOA, J.:

Before the Court is the Complaint1 dated January 6, 2017 filed before the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) by Atty. Berteni C. Causing (Atty. Causing) and Percival Carag Mabasa a.k.a.
Percy Lapid (Mabasa) against respondent Judge Jose Lorenzo R. Dela Rosa (respondent Judge
Dela Rosa), Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch (Br.) 4, Manila.

Antecedents

Atty. Causing and his client, Mabasa (Complainants), charged respondent Judge Dela Rosa with
gross ignorance of the law, gross misconduct and gross incompetence for reversing2 the dismissal of
Criminal Case Nos. 09-268685-86 entitled People v. Eleazar, et al. (Libel Cases), wherein Mabasa
was one of the accused.

Complainants alleged that the Libel Cases were dismissed by former Acting Presiding Judge Gamor
B. Disalo (Judge Disalo) in an Order3 dated April 13, 2015 on the ground that the right of the accused
to speedy trial had been violated. The prosecution filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the April 13,
2015 Order before the RTC Br. 4 Manila, now presided by respondent Judge Dela Rosa.

Respondent Judge Dela Rosa granted the prosecution's Motion for Reconsideration in the assailed
Resolution4dated November 23, 2015 (November 23, 2015 Resolution), the pertinent portions of
which read:

xxxx

In opposition thereto, counsel for the accused cites double jeopardy. However, several settings of
this Court showed that the resetting was on motion of counsel for the accused and hence with the
consent of the accused. Further, the questioned Order dated April 13, 2015 has not yet attained
finality, so double jeopardy is not yet attached.

Further, the records of this case would show that the accused is not entirely without blame as to why
this case has been pending. Aside from that, the accused filed a Motion to Quash as well as
accused’s Motion for Reconsideration thereto resulting in the conduct of the arraignment only in the
last year of September.

The prosecution should be given its day in court. To deny the Motion For Reconsideration is a (sic)
deny to prosecute on the part of the prosecution.5
Complainants questioned respondent Judge Dela Rosa's November 23, 2015 Resolution granting
the prosecution's Motion for Reconsideration because, according to them, it was elementary for
respondent Judge Dela Rosa to know that the prior dismissal of a criminal case due to a violation of
the accused’s right to speedy trial is equivalent to a dismissal on the merits of the case and, as such,
granting the prosecution's Motion for Reconsideration was tantamount to a violation of the
constitutional right against double jeopardy.6 Complainants averred further that it was unacceptable,
given respondent Judge Dela Rosa's position and the presumption of his knowledge of the law, for
him to have disregarded a rule as elementary as the constitutional right of an accused against
double jeopardy.7

Complainants also criticized respondent Judge Dela Rosa's act of referring to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) Atty. Causing's two (2) separate posts on his Facebook and blogspot accounts
about the subject criminal cases. They reasoned that respondent Judge Dela Rosa should have first
required Atty. Causing to show cause why he should not be cited in contempt for publicizing and
taking his posts to social media. Atty. Causing emphasized that the posts were presented using
decent words and thus, it was incorrect for respondent Judge Dela Rosa to refer his actions to a
disciplinary body such as the IBP. Atty. Causing further asserted that he did not violate the sub
judice8 rule because this rule cannot be used to preserve the unfairness and errors of respondent
Judge Dela Rosa.9

In a 1st Indorsement10 dated January 16, 201 7, the OCA directed respondent Judge Dela Rosa to file
his Comment within ten (10) days from receipt thereof.11

In his Comment12 dated March 13, 2017 (Comment), respondent Judge Dela Rosa averred that he
had already reversed the November 23, 2015 Resolution as early as June 20, 2016 - or way before
the filing of the Complaint on January 6, 2017 - when he issued a Resolution13 of even date, which
states:

x x x While the records of the cases will show delay also attributable to the defense and that this
court was acting in the spirit of fairness, the April 13, 2015 Order of Hon. Disalo should be upheld to
the prejudice of fairness. Being caught between a rock and a hard place, liberality is afforded to the
accused. x x x

xxxx

As the records would show that the Hon. Judge Disalo dismissed these cases on the right of speedy
trial, double jeopardy attaches. Hence, this Court's Resolution dated November 23, 2015 is recalled
and set aside. The dismissal dated April 13, 2015 as dictated in the Order of Hon. Judge Disalo is
reinstated.

While the right of due process of the State may have been circumvented, the interest of the private
complainants with regard to the civil aspect of the cases is protected as the dismissal of the subject
criminal cases is without prejudice to the pursuit of civil indemnity.14

Respondent Judge Dela Rosa explained in his Comment that he had issued the November 23, 2015
Resolution because, after studying the records, he discovered that Complainants caused much of
the delay in the proceedings.15

Respondent Judge Dela Rosa then enumerated in his Comment the instances wherein
Complainants caused the delay in the proceedings in the Libel Cases:
 1. While the warrant of arrest for Mabasa was issued on May 28, 2009, it was only one (1)
year and four (4) months after or on September 28, 2010 that Mabasa was detained;16

2. Mabasa filed a Motion to Dismiss on November 30, 2010;17

3. The aiTaignment and pre-trial of the cases were reset after then Presiding Judge
Marcelino L. Sayo, Jr. (Judge Sayo) issued an Order dated April 6, 2011, which indicated
that Mabasa, through counsel, moved that the scheduled arraignment and pre-trial be reset
in order "for the parties to settle the civil aspect of these cases"·18

4. The counsel of Mabasa filed an Urgent Motion for Deferment dated June 9, 2011
requesting again for the re-scheduling of the arraignment and pre-trial;19

5. The pre-trial of the case was again rescheduled in an Order dated August 24, 2011 by the
lower court due to the absence of Mabasa’s co-accused, Johnson L. Eleazar;20

6. Mabasa filed a Motion to Quash dated October 11, 2011, citing the court's lack of
jurisdiction;21

7. The lower court, in an Order dated June 27, 2012, rescheduled again the arraignment and
pre-trial, citing the absence of the private prosecutor, Mabasa and his counsel;22

8. Judge Sayo thereafter issued an Order dated November 28, 2012, directing the issuance
of warrants of arrest against Mabasa and co- accused Gloria Galuno due to their continued
non-appearance in court;23

9. In an Order dated December 12, 2012, Judge Sayo lifted the warrants of arrest against
Mabasa and his other co-accused in the Libel Cases after their counsel admitted that their
non-appearance in the previous hearing was due to the fault of their counsel's law office;24

10. The hearing of the case on June 30, 2014 was rescheduled after Mabasa moved for the
resetting of the case due to the absence of his counsel;25

11. In an Order by Judge Disalo dated August 11, 2014, counsel for Mabasa was absent
again. Mabasa was finally arraigned after the court appointed one of the lawyers from the
Public Attorney’s Office as counsel de oficio for Mabasa;26

12. The Commissioner's Report dated September 23, 2014 stated that the preliminary
conference failed to push through due to the absence of Mabasa and his counsel;27 and

13. The initial date of the presentation of the prosecution evidence was set on April 13, 2015
by the branch clerk of court. Notably, the cases against Mabasa would be dismissed on the
same day.28

Respondent Judge Dela Rosa emphasized that the day the Libel Cases were dismissed, i.e., on
April 13, 2015, was actually the date set for the first actual trial of the cases. He stressed that the
delay of almost five (5) years in the subject cases was attributable more to Mabasa than anyone
else.29

Respondent Judge Dela Rosa claimed that the November 23, 2015 Resolution was issued in good
faith and after evaluation of the evidence submitted by each party. He denied that the same was
motivated by bad faith, ill will, fraud, dishonesty, corruption or caprice. In fact, Respondent Judge
issued this as a matter of fairness - that is, to give the private complainants in the Libel Cases an
opportunity to pursue against Mabasa and his co-accused the civil aspect of the Libel Cases.30

Finally, respondent Judge Dela Rosa stressed how the filing of this administrative complaint against
him - on January 6, 2017, or after he had already reversed the November 23, 2015 Resolution
through his June 20, 2016 Resolution -is pure harassment.31

OCA Report and Recommendation

In a Report and Recommendation32 dated June 28, 2017, the OCA recommended that the
administrative complaint against Judge Dela Rosa be dismissed for lack of merit.

After considering the allegations in the Complaint and respondent Judge Dela Rosa’s Comment, the
OCA found that in the absence of any proof that respondent Judge Dela Rosa was ill-motivated in
issuing the November 23, 2015 Order and that he had, in fact, issued his June 20, 2016 Resolution
reversing himself, the charge of gross ignorance of the law should be dismissed.

The OCA ratiocinated as follows:

The main issue in this administrative complaint is rooted in respondent Judge's issuance of the
Order dated 23 November 201 [5], reversing the previous one dismissing the criminal cases on the
ground of violation of the right of the accused to speedy trial. Respondent Judge has already
admitted that he made a mistake in issuing the said order as this would have constituted a
violation of the right of the accused against double jeopardy. To rectify his error, he granted
the motion for reconsideration filed by the accused.

Although not without exceptions, it is settled that the function of a motion for reconsideration is to
point out to the court the error that it may have committed and to give it a chance to correct itself.
In "Republic of the Philippines v. Abdulwahab A. Bayao, et al. "33 , the Court explains the general rule
that the purpose of a motion for reconsideration is to grant an opportunity for the court to rectify any
actual or perceived error attributed to it by re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances of
the case. The wisdom of this rule is to expedite the resolution of the issues of the case at the level of
the trial court so it can take a harder look at the records to come up with a more informed decision
on the case.34 (Emphasis supplied)

The OCA found that the records of the case show that respondent Judge Dela Rosa admitted that
he had erred in issuing the November 23, 2015 Order, but that he had rectified such mistake.35 The
OCA held that this is precisely why our judicial system has remedies for both the party-litigants and
the court to avail of if need be.36 The OCA asserted that it would be absurd to still hold respondent
Judge Dela Rosa liable despite his rectification through his June 20, 2016 Resolution.37

As to the referral by respondent Judge Dela Rosa to the IBP of Atty. Causing' s act of posting
matters pertaining to the pending criminal case on the internet, the OCA disagreed with Atty.
Causing's argument that respondent Judge Dela Rosa should have first required him to show cause
for having done so.38 The OCA explained that respondent Judge Dela Rosa cannot just exercise his
contempt powers on a whim, if not haphazardly, if he believes that he has other remedies to resort
to, just like in this case.39

The Court’s Ruling

In view of the foregoing, the Court hereby adopts and approves the findings of facts and conclusions
of law in the above-mentioned OCA Report and Recommendation.

Gross ignorance of the law is the disregard of basic rules and settled jurisprudence.40 A judge may
also be administratively liable if shown to have been motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or
corruption in ignoring, contradicting or failing to apply settled law and jurisprudence.41

The Court however has also ruled that "not every error or mistake of a judge in the performance of
his official duties renders him liable."42

For liability to attach for ignorance of the law, the assailed order, decision or actuation of the judge in
the performance of official duties must not only be found erroneous but, most importantly, it must
also be established that he was moved by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred, or some other like motive.
As a matter of policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his
judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action even though such acts are erroneous.43

The Court agrees with the OCA that it would be absurd to hold respondent Judge Dela Rosa liable
for his November 23, 2015 Order when he had himself rectified this in his subsequent June 20, 2016
Order. To rule otherwise would be to render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try
the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his
judgment.44 To hold otherwise "would be nothing short of harassing judges to take the fantastic and
impossible oath of rendering infallible judgments."45

Furthermore, nothing in the records of the case suggests that respondent Judge Dela Rosa was
motivated by bad faith, fraud, corruption, dishonesty or egregious error in rendering his decision.
Other than their bare assertions, Complainants failed to substantiate their allegations with competent
proof. Bad faith cannot be presumed46 and this Court cannot conclude bad faith intervened when
none was actually proven.47

The Court likewise finds no merit in Complainants' allegation that respondent Judge Dela Rosa
should have first required Atty. Causing to show cause for his act of posting matters pertaining to the
pending criminal case on the internet. The Court agrees with the OCA that respondent Judge Dela
1âw phi 1

Rosa's act of referring the matter to the IBP, an independent tribunal who exercises disciplinary
powers over lawyers, was a prudent and proper action to take for a trial court judge. The Court has
explained, in the case of Lorenzo Shipping Corporation v. Distribution Management Association of
the Philippines,48 that judges' power to punish contempt must be exercised judiciously and sparingly,
not for retaliation or vindictiveness, viz.:

x x x [T]he power to punish for contempt of court is exercised on the preservative and not on the
vindictive principle, and only occasionally should a court invoke its inherent power in order to retain
that respect without which the administration of justice must falter or fail. As judges[,] we ought to
exercise our power to punish contempt judiciously and sparingly, with utmost restraint, and with the
end in view of utilizing the power for the correction and preservation of the dignity of the Court, not
for retaliation or vindictiveness.49

In fine, the administrative charge against respondent Judge Dela Rosa should be, as it is hereby,
dismissed.

WHEREFORE, the instant administrative complaint against respondent Presiding Judge Jose
Lorenzo R. Dela Rosa, Regional Trial Court, Branch 4, Manila is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.

ALFREDO BENJAMIN S. CAGUIOA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Acting Chief Justice
Chairperson

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANDRES B. REYES, JR.

Associate Justice
 SECOND DIVISION

March 5, 2018

A.C. No. 9257

[Formerly CBD Case No. 12-3490]

EDGAR M. RICO, Complainant

vs.
ATTY. REYNALDO G. SALUTAN, Respondent

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

The present case was initiated through a letter complaint to Judge Antonio P. Laolao, Sr., Presiding
Judge of Municipal Trial Court, Branch 6, Davao City, against respondent Atty. Reynaldo G. Salutan
for purportedly misleading the court and for contempt of court.

The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:

Complainant Edgar M. Rico explained that his · relatives were plaintiffs in a civil case for Forcible
Entry before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 4, Davao City. The court had
ordered the defendants to restore plaintiffs' possession of the subject properties, remove all
structures that had been introduced on the same, and to pay reasonable sum for their occupation of
the properties.

Milagros Villa Abrille, one of the defendants in the aforementioned case, filed a separate case for
Unlawful Detainer against Rico covering the same property. On November 6, 2001, the MTCC
ordered Rico to vacate the premises. Subsequently, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) affirmed the
MTCC ruling and issued a Writ of Execution.

On July 9, 2004, the court's sheriff executed a Return Service stating that the writ could not be
served on Rico since the property subject of the case was different from the lot which Rico was
occupying. Thereafter, Villa Abrille, through her counsel, respondent Atty. Salutan, filed a motion for
the issuance of an Alias Writ of Execution. On May 15, 2007, the sheriff executed a Return of
Service again since the alias writ could not be enforced for the same reason as the first time. On
April 4, 2008, Villa Abrille once again filed a motion for the issuance of another Alias Writ of
Execution, which, this time, the MTCC denied. Hence, Villa Abrille went to the Court for the issuance
of a Writ of Mandamus to compel the MTCC to issue another Writ of Execution and for the sheriff to
implement the same. The Court, however, dismissed the case.

For the fourth (4th) time, Villa Abrille filed another motion for the issuance of a Writ of Execution.
This time, the MTCC granted it. Consequently, the court sheriff issued a Final Notice to Vacate to
Rico on June 10, 2010. On June 15, 2010, the same sheriff led the demolition of the house and
other improvements on the property. Thus, Rico filed the administrative complaint against Atty.
Salutan.

For his part, Atty. Salutan denied the charges and argued that he merely advocated for his client's
cause and did the same within the bounds of the law and of the rules. He merely did what a zealous
lawyer would naturally do in representation of his client.
On January 2, 2013, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) recommended the dismissal of the administrative complaint against Atty. Salutan,
to wit:

Foregoing premises considered, the undersigned believes and so holds that the complaint is without
merit. Accordingly, he recommends DISMISSAL of the same.1

On March 21, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XX-2013-357,2 which
adopted the abovementioned recommendation, thus:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein
made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, the case is hereby DISMISSED.

Thereafter, Rico moved for reconsideration of said Resolution. On March 23, 2014, the IBP Board of
Governors passed another resolution, Resolution No. XXI-2014-183,3 denying said motion for
reconsideration and approving its 2013 Resolution, to wit:

RESOLVED to DENY Complainant's Motion for Reconsideration, there being no cogent reason to
reverse the findings of the Commission and it being a mere reiteration of the matters which had
already been. threshed out and taken into consideration. Thus, Resolution No. XX-2013-357 dated
March 21, 2013 is hereby AFFIRMED.

The Court’s Ruling

The Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the findings and recommendation of the IBP that
the instant administrative complaint against Atty. Salutan must be dismissed.

In administrative proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant. For the court to
exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be established by convincing
and satisfactory proof.4

Here, despite the charges hurled against Atty. Salutan, Rico failed to show any badge of deception
on the lawyer's part. There was no court decision declaring that Villa Abrille’s title was fake or that it
had encroached on Rico's property. All that Atty. Salutan did was to zealously advocate for the
cause of his client. He was not shown to have misled or unduly influenced the court through
misinformation. He merely persistently pursued said cause and he did so within the bounds of the
law and the existing rules. He succeeded at finally having the writ of execution, albeit at the fourth
(4th ) time, implemented.

The Court has consistently held that an attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of
the charges against him until the contrary is proved, and that as an officer of the court, he is
presumed to have performed his duties in accordance with his oath. Burden of proof, on the other
hand, is defined in Section 1 of Rule 131 as the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in
issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law.5

Weight and sufficiency of evidence, under Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, ·is not determined
mathematically by the numerical superiority of the witnesses testifying to a given fact. It depends on
its practical effect in inducing belief for the party on the judge trying the case.6
In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt is substantial
evidence, which is that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion. Further, the complainant has the burden of proving by substantial
evidence the allegations in his complaint. The basic rule is that mere allegation is not evidence and
is not equivalent to proof. Likewise, charges based on mere suspicion and speculation cannot be
given credence. Besides, the evidentiary threshold of substantial evidence - as opposed to
preponderance of evidence - is more in keeping with the primordial purpose of and essential
considerations attending this type of cases. As case law elucidates, disciplinary proceedings against
lawyers are sui generis.Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action
or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being
intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, it also involves
neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor. It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its
primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit
person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the
Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court
with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest
administration of justice by purging the. profession of members who by their misconduct have
proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to
the office of an attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant
or a prosecutor.7

In the case at bar, Rico seriously failed to discharge said burden of proof. He failed to establish his
claims through relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion - that is that Atty. Salutan indeed misled the court, directly or indirectly, in the course of
championing his client’s cause.

In a court battle, there must necessarily be a victor and a vanquished. A vain effort from the
vanquished litigant should not, however, cause him to immediately accuse the victor of resorting to
deceptive ploy or tactics, especially when he had been given sufficient opportunity to counter every
move of the victor in court. One should be magnanimous enough to acknowledge the triumph of one
who had waged a fair legal battle against another in a court of law.

Members of the Bar must be reminded that enthusiasm, or even excess of it, is no less a virtue, if
channelled in the right direction. However, it must be circumscribed within the bounds of propriety
1âwphi 1

and with due regard for the proper place of courts in our system of government. While zeal or
enthusiasm in championing a client's cause is desirable, unprofessional conduct stemming from
such zeal or enthusiasm is always disfavored.8 Such undesirable conduct, however, is not shown to
be extant in this case.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court DISMISSES the instant Complaint against
Atty. Reynaldo G. Salutan for utter lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Acting Chief Justice
Chairperson
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE ALFREDO BENJAMIN S. CAGUIOA
Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANDRES B. REYES, JR.

Associate Justice
 EN BANC

A.M. No. RTJ-15-2435 (Formerly A.M. No. 15-08-246-RTC), March 06, 2018

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant, v. JUDGE WINLOVE M. DUMAYAS, BRANCH

59, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, MAKATI CITY, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

This case stemmed from the charges against respondent Judge Winlove M. Dumayas of Branch 59, Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Makati City, for allegedly rendering a decision without citing the required factual and legal
bases and by ignoring the applicable jurisprudence, which constitutes gross misconduct and gross ignorance
of the law. The antecedents of the case at bar are as follows: In the July 7, 2015 issue of the Philippine Daily
Inquirer, Ramon Tulfo wrote an article entitled "What's Happening to Makati Judges?," where he raised
certain issues against three (3) Makati City judges, one of whom is respondent Judge Dumayas for
supposedly imposing a light sentence against the accused in one criminal case, when he should have found
them guilty of committing murder instead. Said case is Criminal Case No. 12-2065, entitled People v. Juan
Alfonso Abastillas, et al.

Upon investigation and review of the July 2, 2014 Decision penned by Judge Dumayas in the aforecited
case, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found two (2) issues with said ponencia, particularly in the
imposition of the penalties:

First, he appreciated the presence of the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense by
concluding that there was unlawful aggression on the part of American national George Anikow and that
there was no sufficient provocation on the part of accused Crispin C. Dela Paz and Galiciano S. Datu III. In
doing so, he totally ignored the positive testimony of security guard Jose Romel Saavedra and the physical
evidence consisting of closed circuit television (CCTV) video footages of the incident clearly showing that
Anikow had already fled, but was still pursued and viciously attacked and hit by the accused when they
finally caught up with him. It is a well-settled rule that the moment the first aggressor runs away, unlawful
aggression on the part of the first aggressor ceases to exist, and when the unlawful aggression ceases, the
defender no longer has any right to kill or wound the former aggressor; otherwise, retaliation and not self-
defense is committed. Retaliation is not the same as self-defense. In retaliation, the aggression that the
injured party started had already ceased when the accused attacked him, while in self-defense, aggression
was still existing when the aggressor was injured by the accused.

Second, without mentioning any factual or legal basis therefor, Judge Dumayas appreciated in favor of Dela
Paz and Datu III the ordinary mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, contrary to Saavedra's
positive testimony that the four (4) accused, including Dela Paz and Datu III, warned him not to report the
incident or note their plate number as they were leaving the scene of the incident. Besides, two (2) other
Rockwell security guards testified that they apprehended the four (4) accused in the vehicle as they were
leaving the Rockwell Center before they were turned over to the custody of the police. In appreciating said
ordinary mitigating circumstance, Judge Dumayas never cited any factual or legal reason to justify the
same, as there was nothing in the record that supports his conclusion. In fact, the evidence presented show
otherwise. By deliberately not explaining in his Decision how he arrived at his conclusion that Dela Paz and
Datu III voluntarily surrendered, Judge Dumayas violated Section 14, Article VIII1 of the Constitution.

In a Resolution dated August 25, 2015, the Court En Banc directed Judge Dumayas to show cause why no
disciplinary action should be taken against him for ignoring existing jurisprudence on unlawful aggression
and for inappropriately appreciating the ordinary mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender without
citing any basis, when he rendered his Decision dated July 2, 2014 in Criminal Case No. 12-2065.

In his Compliance dated October 18, 2015, Judge Dumayas argued that judges cannot be held civilly,
criminally, and administratively liable for any of their official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as they
act in good faith. He vehemently denied having conveniently ignored the existing jurisprudence on unlawful
aggression. He explained that his ruling was based on the fact that the mortal wound on Anikow's neck was
inflicted when there was still unlawful aggression on his part against the accused, which placed the latter in
legitimate self-defense. It was only after the first fist fight that Anikow ran away.

He likewise apologized for failing to quote in his Decision the portions of the testimony of the prosecution
witnesses attesting to the voluntary surrender of the accused. He quoted the testimony of Dominador H.
Royo, one of the security guards who apprehended the accused when they were trying to leave Rockwell
Center:

xxxx

Q: What did you tell to the driver again?

A: I told him that there was a problem at the upper part of Rockwell Drive so I asked him to surrender his
license to me, sir.

Q: Was there any resistance on his part to surrender his license or he just gave it to you voluntarily?
A: Voluntarily sir.

xxxx

Q: Now if the driver intended to leave he could just left you there and then he could just spread out correct?
A: Yes sir.

Q: But he did not?

A: Yes sir.

Q: So there was really no intention to escape, correct?

A: Yes sir. 2

Judge Dumayas stressed that the aforementioned testimony clearly shows that the accused indeed
voluntarily surrendered to the security guards who stopped them, and later to the police officers, when they
were turned over to the latter's custody.

On April 18, 2017, the OCA recommended the imposition of the extreme penalty of dismissal, thus:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, we respectfully recommend for the consideration of the Court that Judge
Winlove M. Dumayas, Branch 59, Regional Trial Court, Makati City, be ADJUDGED GUILTY of gross
ignorance of the law or procedure and gross misconduct, and be METED the penalty of DISMISSAL from
the service, with forfeiture of his retirement benefits, except his accrued leave credits, and with prejudice to
reinstatement in any branch of the government, including government owned and controlled corporations.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.3

The Court's Ruling

The Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the findings and recommendations of the OCA.

It is clear that Judge Dumayas failed to hear and decide the subject case with the cold neutrality of an
impartial judge. As aptly found by the OCA after its exhaustive investigation, first, Judge Dumayas
downgraded the offense charged from murder to homicide. Second, he inappropriately appreciated the
privileged mitigating circumstance of self-defense and the ordinary mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender despite the overwhelming testimonial and physical evidence to the contrary. Third, he sentenced
Dela Paz and Datu III to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of four (4) years, two (2) months,
and one (1) day, as minimum, to six (6) years of prision correccional, as maximum, which made them
eligible for probation. Finally, he granted the separate applications for probation of Dela Paz and Datu III,
effectively sparing them from suffering the penalties they rightfully deserve. The pattern of said acts
appears to be deliberate, calculated, and meant to unduly favor the accused, and at the same time, can be
characterized as flagrant and indifferent to the consequences caused to the other parties, including the
State.

On November 27, 2012, an Information was filed charging Juan Alfonso Abastillas, Crispin Dela Paz, Osric
Cabrera, and Galiciano Datu III with the crime of murder under Article 248 of The Revised Penal Code, thus:

On the 24th day of November 2012, in the City of Makati, Philippines, accused, conspiring and confederating
with one another and all of them mutually helping and aiding, one another, with intent to kill and with the
qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault, employ personal violence and stab one George Anikow with a knife, thereby inflicting upon
the latter injuries and wounds on the different parts of his body, the fatal one of which is the stab wound on
his neck, which directly caused his death.4

In his Decision, Judge Dumayas discussed his findings on the existence of self-defense, thus:

The prosecution's evidence, however, likewise proves that (1) there was unlawful aggression on the part of
Anikow; and (2) there was no provocation on the part of any of the accused.

To quote again from the February 21, 2013 Resolution of the Court, "No Less than the sworn statement of
the eyewitness Saavedra was explicit on this account."

"x x x x at nagulat na lang ako ng may kumalabog at nakita ko na hinampas nitong foreigner gamit ang
kanyang kamay ang gawing kaliwa ng sasakyan, at napatigil ang sasakyan at bumaba ang apat na lalaking
sakay nito, at ito naman foreigner ay sumugod papalapit sa apat, at ako naman ay umawat at namagitan at
don nakakasalitaan na at galit na din itong apat na lalaki, at don biglang sinugod at sinuntok ni foreigner
ang isa sa apat at nagkagulo na, at ako naman at sige pa rin sa ka-aawat at ini-iwas ko rin ang aking hawak
na shot gun dahil baka ito ay ma-agaw sa akin at don tumakbo na itong foreigner papalayo sa direksyon ng
Burgos, mga 30 meters siguro ang estimate ko na nilayo niya at sumugod pa ang dalawa sa suspect,
samantalang yung dalawa pang suspect ay naiwan sa tabi ng Volvo nila nang abutan nila ang foreigner ay
nagakasuntokan pa uli hanggang sa bumagsak ang foreigner there be actual and positive attack." [Exhibit
"C,"emphasis supplied]

In fine, the prosecution's own evidence clearly and convincingly proves: (1) unlawful aggression on the part
of Anikow, the primordial element of self-defense; and (2) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
accused. Generally, aggression is considered unlawful when it is unprovoked or unjustified. (People vs.
Valencia, 133 SCRA 82) The unlawful aggression of Anikow resulted in injuries to the accused. This Court
takes judicial notice of the Medical Certificates issued by Dr. Nulud attesting to the said injuries attached to
the records of this case.

In so far, however, as the second element of self-defense is concerned, this Court is convinced that the
means employed by accused Dela Paz and Datu were unreasonable - there was no rational equivalence
between the means of attack and the means of defense. Reasonableness of the means employed depends
on the imminent danger of the injury to the person attacked; he acts under the impulse of self-preservation.
He is not going to stop and pause to find out whether the means he has in his hands is reasonable. (Eslabon
vs. People, 127 SCRA 785) True, Anikow committed unlawful aggression against the accused with his fists.
However, the means used by the accused were unreasonable.5

Curiously, Judge Dumayas himself stated in his Decision that the accused never invoked self-defense, and
yet, he was quick to declare that there was unlawful aggression based on clear and convincing evidence, to
wit:

xxxx

Accused Abastillas did not invoke self-defense but attempted to cast doubt on the prosecution's
evidence that he inflicted the fatal wound on the neck of Anikow and a wound on his back.

xxxx
The Court attaches great significance and importance to the CCTV video footage and the image frames
extracted from it. Bereft of the aforesaid objectionable evidence of the prosecution, the CCTV footages and
images would show that it was not accused Abastillas who inflicted the fatal blow neither was he who
inflicted the wound on the back of Anikow. xxx

xxxx

In this jurisdiction, in self-defense, the burden of proof rests upon the accused and must be established by
clear and convincing evidence. (People vs. Corecor, 159 SCRA 84) In this case, however, the prosecution's
own evidence clearly and convincingly establishes unlawful aggression and lack of provocation
on the part of any of the accused, which relieves them from the duty of proving the same.6

It is settled that self-defense is an affirmative allegation and offers exculpation from liability for crimes only
if timely invoked and satisfactorily proved. When the accused admits the act charged but interposes a lawful
defense, the order of trial may be modified7 and the burden shifts to the accused to prove that he indeed
acted in self-defense by establishing the following with clear and convincing evidence: (1) unlawful
aggression on the part of the victims; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel
the aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on his part. Self-defense cannot be justifiably
appreciated when it is extremely doubtful by itself. Indeed, in invoking self-defense, the burden of evidence
is shifted and the accused claiming self-defense must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on
the weakness of the prosecution.8 Without a doubt, respondent judge seems to have forgotten this
established legal principle.

In his Compliance, Judge Dumayas never denied the existence of evidence showing that Anikow fled from
the accused after the first fist and after that the accused went after him. But he claims that the fatal wound
was inflicted on Anikow during the first scuffle when the aggression on his part was still existing, which
placed the accused in legitimate self-defense. In his Decision, however, it is clear that he appreciated the
existence of the mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense even without the accused invoking and
proving the same, simply because the prosecution itself clearly and convincingly proved the existence of
unlawful aggression and lack of sufficient provocation from any of the accused. His complete disregard of
the settled rules and jurisprudence on self-defense and of the events that transpired after the first fight,
despite the existence of testimonial and physical evidence to the contrary, in the appreciation of the
privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense casts serious doubt on his impartiality and
good faith. Such doubt cannot simply be brushed aside despite his belated justification and explanation.

Under Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, impartiality applies not only to the decision itself, but
also to the process by which the decision is made. When Judge Dumayas chose to simply ignore all the
evidence showing that the accused still pursued Anikow after the latter had already run away, not even
bothering to explain the irrelevance or lack of weight of the same, such act necessarily put the integrity of
his entire Decision in question.

Likewise, his failure to cite in the Decision his factual and legal bases for finding the presence of the ordinary
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender is not a mere matter of judicial ethics. No less than the
Constitution provides that no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.9 The Court cannot simply accept the lame excuse that
Judge Dumayas failed to cite said bases due to a mere oversight on his part that was made in good faith.

Moreover, even if Judge Dumayas' explanation to such omission was acceptable, he still failed to sufficiently
justify why he appreciated the ordinary mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender on the part of the
accused. For voluntary surrender to be appreciated, the following requisites must be present: 1) the
offender has not been actually arrested; 2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or the
latter's agent; and 3) the surrender was voluntary. The essence of voluntary surrender is spontaneity and
the intent of the accused to give himself up and submit himself to the authorities either because he
acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to save the authorities the trouble and expense that may be incurred for
his search and capture.10 In the case at bar, it was not shown from the evidence presented that the accused
intended to surrender and admit the commission of the crime; they did not even invoke self-defense during
trial. On the contrary and far from being spontaneous, security guard Saavedra even testified that accused
warned him not to report the incident or note their plate number as they were fleeing the scene of the
incident.
Indeed, it is settled that, unless the acts were committed with fraud, dishonesty, corruption, malice or ill-
will, bad faith, or deliberate intent to do an injustice, the respondent judge may not be administratively
liable for gross misconduct, ignorance of the law, or incompetence of official acts in the exercise of judicial
functions and duties, particularly in the adjudication of cases.11 However, when the inefficiency springs from
a failure to recognize such a basic and fundamental rule, law, or principle, the judge is either too
incompetent and undeserving of the position and title vested upon him, or he is too vicious that he
deliberately committed the oversight or omission in bad faith and in grave abuse of authority.12Here, the
attendant circumstances would reveal that the acts of Judge Dumayas contradict any claim of good faith.
And since the violated constitutional provision is so elementary, failure to abide by it constitutes gross
ignorance of the law, without even a need for the complainant to prove any malice or bad faith on the part
of the judge.

Corollarily, the Court finds Judge Dumayas guilty of gross ignorance of the law and gross misconduct.

Gross ignorance of the law is the disregard of basic rules and settled jurisprudence. A judge may also be
administratively liable if shown to have been motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption in
ignoring, contradicting or failing to apply settled law and jurisprudence. Though not every judicial error
bespeaks ignorance of the law and that, if committed in good faith, does not warrant administrative
sanction, the same applies only in cases within the parameters of tolerable misjudgment. Such, however, is
not the case with Judge Dumayas. Where the law is straightforward and the facts so evident, failure to know
it or to act as if one does not know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. A judge is presumed to have
acted with regularity and good faith in the performance of judicial functions. But a blatant disregard of a
clear and unmistakable provision of the Constitution upends this presumption and subjects the magistrate to
corresponding administrative sanctions.13

For liability to attach for ignorance of the law, the assailed order, decision or actuation of the judge in the
performance of official duties must not only be found erroneous but, most importantly, it must also be
established that he was moved by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred, or some other similar motive. Judges are
expected to exhibit more than just cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural laws. They must know
the laws and apply them properly in all good faith. Judicial competence requires no less. Thus, unfamiliarity
with the rules is a sign of incompetence. Basic rules must be at the palm of his hand. When a judge displays
utter lack of familiarity with the rules, he betrays the confidence of the public in the courts. Ignorance of the
law is the mainspring of injustice. Judges owe it to the public to be knowledgeable, hence, they are expected
to have more than just a modicum of acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules; they must know
them by heart.14

Although a judge may not always be subjected to disciplinary actions for every erroneous order or decision
he issues, that relative immunity is not a license to be negligent or abusive and arbitrary in performing his
adjudicatory prerogatives. If judges wantonly misuse the powers granted to them by the law, there will be,
not only confusion in the administration of justice, but also oppressive disregard of the basic requirements of
due process. For showing partiality towards the accused, Judge Dumayas can be said to have misused said
powers.

Indubitably, Judge Dumayas violated the Code of Judicial Conduct ordering judges to ensure that his or her
conduct, both in and out of court, maintains and enhances the confidence of the public, the legal profession
and litigants in the impartiality of the judge and of the judiciary.15 He simply used oversight, inadvertence,
and honest mistake as convenient excuses. He acted with conscious indifference to the possible undesirable
consequences to the parties involved.

Indeed, Judge Dumayas is also guilty of gross misconduct. Misconduct is a transgression of some
established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public
officer. To warrant dismissal from service, the misconduct must be grave, serious, important, weighty,
momentous, and not trifling. The misconduct must imply wrongful intention and not a mere error of
judgment and must also have a direct relation to and be connected with the performance of the public
officer's official duties amounting either to maladministration or willful, intentional neglect, or failure to
discharge the duties of the office. In order to differentiate gross misconduct from simple misconduct, the
elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be
manifest in the former.16
To hold a judge administratively liable for gross misconduct, ignorance of the law or incompetence of official
acts in the exercise of judicial functions and duties, it must be shown that his acts were committed with
fraud, dishonesty, corruption, malice or ill-will, bad faith, or deliberate intent to do an injustice.17 The Court
has repeatedly and consistently held that the judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be
impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. The litigants arc entitled to no
less than that. They should be sure that when their rights are violated they can go to a judge who shall give
them justice. They must trust the judge, otherwise they will not go to him at all. They must believe in his
sense of fairness, otherwise they will not seek his judgment. Without such confidence, there would be no
point in invoking his action for the justice they expect.18

Interestingly, Judge Dumayas has the following administrative cases filed against him:

Docket Date
Complainant Nature Status
Number Filed

Case
Aug.
Asuncion, 64-03- Rendering Unjust Dismissed
1. 29,
Gliceria CA-J Decision (Oct. 7,
2003
2003)

Case
Jan.
Fortun, Gross Ignorance of Dismissed
2. 08-2784 18,
Raymond A. the Law (March 17,
2008
2008)

Case
08- Sept.
Knowingly Rendering Dismissed
3. Co, Felix S. 3002- 25,
Unjust Judgment (June 17,
RTJ 2008
2011)

Case
10- Nov.
Gross Ignorance of Dismissed
4. Reyes, Gemma 3555- 17,
the Law (March 14,
RTJ 2010
2012)

Case
11- Feb. Knowingly Rendering
Estevez, Dismissed
5. 3603- 8, Unjust Order and
Lourdita (Sept. 12,
RTJ 2011 Ignorance of the Law
2011)

RCBC CAP
Feb.
Corp. rep. by RTJ-15- Gross Ignorance of
6. 6, Pending
Ramon 2411 the Law
2012
Posadas

13- July Grave Abuse of Case

Montenegro,
7. 4095- 5, Discretion, Dismissed
Gregorio A.
RTJ 2013 Incompetence, Gross (Sept. 9,
 Ignorance of the Law, 2015)
Viol. of R.A. 3019,
Conduct Prejudicial to
the Best Interest of
the Service

Case
13- Sept.
Fabularum, Grave Abuse of Dismissed
8. 4140- 24,
Alberto DC Discretion and Bias (June 25,
RTJ 2013
2014)

PDIC rep. by 13- Nov.

Gross Ignorance of
9. Atty. R. 4162- 21, Pending
the Law
Mendoza, Jr. RTJ 2013

Gross Ignorance of
PCSO rep. by Nov.
RTJ-16- the Law, Grave Abuse
10. Atty. J.F. Rojas 27, Pending
2477 of Authority, Gross
II 2013
Neglect of Duty

14- Nov.
Tanjutco, Knowingly Rendering
11. 4332- 10, Pending
Carolina Unjust Judgment
RTJ 2014

Gross Ignorance of
15- March
Yuseco, the Law, Grave Abuse
12. 4381- 26, Pending
Francis, Jr. R. of Authority and
RTJ 2015
Gross Incompetence

Gross Ignorance of
16- Feb. the Law, Bias,
Sarrosa,
13. 4534- 22, Partiality, and Viol. of Pending
Michael, et al.
RTJ 2016 Code of Judicial
Conduct

That a significant number of litigants saw it fit to file administrative charges against Judge Dumayas, with
most of these cases having the same grounds, i.e., gross ignorance of the law or procedure and knowingly
rendering unjust judgment, only shows how poorly he has been performing as a member of the bench. The
Court takes the aforementioned incidents as evidence of respondent's stubborn propensity to not follow the
rule of law and procedure in rendering judgments and orders. This definitely has besmirched the integrity
and seriously compromised the reputation, not only of his court, but more importantly, of the entire judicial
system which he . represents.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Winlove M. Dumayas of Branch 59, Regional Trial Court, Makati
City, GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law or procedure and gross misconduct and hereby DISMISSEShim
from the service with FORFEITURE of retirement benefits, except leave credits, and with prejudice to re-
employment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned and
controlled corporations.19
SO ORDERED.

Carpio,* Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen, Jardeleza, Caguioa,
Martires, Tijam, Reyes, Jr., and Gesmundo, JJ., concur.
Sereno, C.J., on leave.
Velasco, Jr., J., inhibit due to relation to a party.
 EN BANC

A.C. No. 7186, March 13, 2018

ROMEO A. ZARCILLA AND MARITA BUMANGLAG, Complainants, v. ATTY. JOSE C. QUESADA,

JR., Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Before us is a Petition for Disbarment1 dated February 9, 2006 filed by complainants Romeo A. Zarcilla
(Zarcilla) and Marita Bumanglag (Bumanglag) against respondent Atty. Jose C. Quesada, Jr. (Atty. Quesada)
for gross misconduct.

The facts are as follows:

On August 5, 2002, complainant Zarcilla executed an Affidavit-Complaint2 against respondent Atty. Quesada
and complainant Marita Bumanglag, among others, for falsification of public documents docketed as I.S. No.
02-128-SF. Zarcilla alleged that Bumanglag conspired with certain spouses Maximo Quezada and Gloria
Quezada (Spouses Quezada) and Atty. Quesada to falsify a Deed of Sale3 dated April 12, 2002 by making it
appear that his parents, Perfecto G. Zarcilla and Tarcela A. Zarcilla, sold a parcel of land under TCT No. T-
18490 in favor of the Spouses Quezada despite knowledge that his parents were already deceased since
March 4, 2001 and January 9, 1988, respectively, as per Death Certificates4issued by the Office of the
Municipal Civil Registrar of Santo Tomas, La Union. Said signing of deed of sale was allegedly witnessed by a
certain Norma Zafe and Bumanglag, and notarized by Atty. Quesada.

Other than the alleged falsified deed of sale, Zarcilla also claimed that on March 20, 2002, the Spouses
Quezada filed a petition for the administrative reconstitution of the original copy of TCT No. 18490 where
they presented the Joint Affidavit of his then already deceased parents, the spouses Perfecto Zarcilla and
Tarcela A. Zarcilla as the petitioners.5 Said Joint-Affidavit of the Spouses Quezada was again notarized by
Atty. Quesada.

However, on October 9, 2002, Bumanglag executed a Counter-affidavit6 in the same case where she claimed
to be the real owner of the property after Perfecto Zarcilla sold the same to her mother. Bumanglag also
stated therein that she facilitated the sale transaction to the Spouses Quezada which, in effect, exonerated
her co-respondents, including Atty. Quesada, the pertinent portion of which reads:

xxxx

6. That after the death of my mother I needed money to pay for the expenses she incurred when she was
sick and need medication and all the (sic) to pay for the expenses of her burial. I offered to sell the property
to Spouses MAX QUEZADA and GLORIA QUEZADA. I showed them the Deed of Sale between PERFECTO
ZARCILLA and my mother. I also showed them the paper that my mother signed giving me the land;

7. That the Spouses Quezada told me that they will buy the land provided I will be the one to transfer the
said land to their name. They gave me an advance payment so that I could transfer the land to them. I
made it appear that PERFECTO ZARCILLA sold the property to the said spouses because the title
of the land was still in the name of Perfecto Zarcilla. I did not have [any] criminal intent when I
did it because the land no longer belong to Perfecto Zarcilla. I did all the subsequent acts like Petition
for Reconstitution in the name of Perfecto Zarcilla because then, the title was still in his name. However,
there was no damage to the heirs of PERFECTO ZARCILLA because the land had long been sold to my
mother and the sons and daughters no longer had no legal claim to the said land;

8. That SPOUSES MAXIMO QUEZADA & GLORIA QUEZADA did not falsify any document because I
was the one who facilitated the transaction knowing that the land I was selling really belonged
to me. Not one of my brothers and (sic) sisters never (sic) complained when I sold the land. I
just delivered the document to the Spouses MAXIMO QUEZADA & GLORIA QUEZADA including the
title in their name. I was paid the balance after the Certificate of Title in their name was finally delivered.7

All other respondents in the said falsification case, except for Atty. Quesada, also filed their respective
counter-affidavits where they reiterated Bumanglag's admission.8

In a Resolution9 dated April 14, 2003, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of La Union held Bumanglag
only to undergo trial. All other respondents, including Atty. Quesada who did not even file his counter-
affidavit, were exonerated for insufficiency of evidence.

Both Zarcilla and Bumanglag filed their respective motions for reconsideration, but both were denied.
Consequently, Bumanglag was indicted for four counts of falsification of public documents before the
Municipal Trial Court of Sto. Tomas, La Union, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 3594, 3595, 3597, and
3598.

However, Zarcilla later on withdrew said cases when he learned that Bumanglag was not aware of the
contents of her counter-affidavit when she signed the same. He also found out that Bumanglag was
deceived by her co accused, including Atty. Quesada. Thus, upon the motion of Zarcilla, in an Order10dated
July 27, 2005, the court dismissed all falsification cases against Bumanglag.

In a Resolution11 dated June 26, 2006, the Court resolved to require Atty. Quesada to file a comment on the
complaint against him.

On August 28, 2006, Atty. Quesada file a Motion for Extension of Time to File Comment12 due to voluminous
workload. On September 18, 2006, Atty. Quesada filed a second motion for extension to file comment. In a
Resolution13 dated November 20, 2006, the Court granted Atty. Quesada's motions for extension with a
warning that the second motion for extension shall be the last and that no further extension will be given.

On September 26, 2007, due to Atty. Quesada's failure to file a comment on the complaint against him
within the extended period which expired on October 17, 2006, the Court resolved to require Atty. Quesada
to (a) show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt from such failure, and
(b) comply with the Resolution dated June 26, 2006 by submitting the required comment.14

Due to Atty. Quesada's failure to comply with the Show Cause Resolution dated September 26, 2007, the
Court resolved to (a) impose upon Atty. Quesada, a fine of P1,000.00, and (b) require Atty. Quesada to
comply with the Resolution dated June 26, 2006 by filing the comment required therein.15

No payment of fine was made as of January 13, 2009 as evidenced by a Certification16 which was issued by
Araceli Bayuga, Supreme Court Chief Judicial Staff Officer.

Again, failing to comply with the directives of the Court to pay the fine imposed against him and to submit
his comment, the Court, in a Resolution17 dated February 16, 2009, resolved to (a) impose upon Atty.
Quesada an additional fine of P1,000.00, or a penalty of imprisonment of five (5) days if said fines are not
paid within 10 days from notice, and (b) order Atty. Quesada to comply with the Resolution dated June 26,
2006 to submit his comment on the complaint against him. Atty. Quesada was also warned that should he
fail to comply, he shall be ordered arrested and detained by the National Bureau of Investigation until he
shall have made the compliance or until such time as the Court may order.

Despite repeated notices and warnings from the Court, no payment of fine was ever made as of September
3, 2010 as evidenced by a Certification18 which was issued by Araceli Bayuga, Supreme Court Chief Judicial
Staff Officer. On December 28, 2010, another Certification19 was issued anew showing no record of payment
of fine by Atty. Quesada.

Thus, in a Resolution20 dated March 9, 2011, the Court resolved to (1) increase the fine imposed on Atty.
Quesada to P3,000.00, or imprisonment often (10) days if such fine is not paid within the prescribed period;
and (2) require Atty. Quesada to comply with the Resolution dated June 26, 2006 by submitting the required
comment on the complaint.
No payment of fine was made as of July 12, 2011, as evidenced by a Certification21 which was issued by
Araceli Bayuga, Supreme Court Chief Judicial Staff Officer.

It appearing that Atty. Quesada failed to comply with the numerous Resolutions of the Court to pay the fine
imposed upon him and submit comment on the complaint against him, in a Resolution22 dated August 24,
2011, the Court ordered the arrest of Atty. Quesada, and directed the NBI to arrest and detain him until he
shall have compli[ed] with the Court's Resolution dated March 9, 2011. Subsequently, the Court issued a
Warrant of Arrest.23

Apparently forced by his looming detention, after five (5) years, Atty. Quesada filed his Comment24dated
October 10, 2011, in compliance with Resolution dated June 26, 2006. He claimed that he is a victim of
political harassment, vengeance and retribution, and that the instant case against him was filed solely for
the purpose of maligning his person. Attached to his compliance was postal money order in the amount of
P3,000.00 as payment for the fine imposed upon him.

In a Letter25 dated October 10, 2011, Atty. Ricardo S. Pangan, Jr., Regional Director of the NBI, informed
the Court that Atty. Quesada voluntarily surrendered before the agents of the NBI on October 11, 2011, and
claimed that he had already complied with the Resolution of the Court. Atty. Quesada submitted a copy of
his comment and payment of fine, thus, on the same day, Atty. Quesada was immediately released from
custody.

On February 1, 2012, the Court referred the instant case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.26

During the mandatory conference before the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), only Bumanglag
and her counsel appeared. Atty. Quesada failed to appear thereto, thus, the mandatory conference was
reset to July 11, 2012. However, on July 11, 2012, Atty. Quesada failed again to appear, thus, the
mandatory conference was reset anew to July 25, 2012. Meanwhile, Bumanglag informed the IBP-CBD that
co-complainant Romeo Zarcilla passed away in 2005.

On July 23, 2012, Atty. Quesada requested that the mandatory conference be reset due to health reasons.
He submitted his Medical Certificate dated May 2, 2012 showing that he underwent a head operation and
that he is still on recovery period.

On July 25, 2012, Atty. Quesada failed again to appear, thus, the parties were directed to appear on August
23, 2012 and submit their respective verified position papers. However, on August 23, 2012, only
Bumanglag and her counsel appeared, and Atty. Quesada failed to appear anew. Thus, considering that the
parties were duly notified of the hearing, the case was deemed submitted for resolution.

On May 30, 2014, the IBP-CBD, in its Report and Recommendation, recommended that respondent Atty.
Quesada be disbarred from the practice of law.

In a Resolution No. XXI-2015-097 dated January 31, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt
and approve the report and recommendation of the IBP-CBD.

RULING

We adopt the findings and recommendation of the IBP.

A disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal, but is rather an investigation
by the court into the conduct of its officers.27 The issue to be determined is whether respondent is still fit to
continue to be an officer of the court in the dispensation of justice. Hence, an administrative proceeding for
disbarment continues despite the desistance of a complainant, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the
same, or in this case, the failure of respondent to answer the charges against him despite numerous notices.

However, in administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving, by substantial evidence,
the allegations in the complaint. Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. For the Court to exercise its disciplinary
powers, the case against the respondent must be established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof. As
in this case, considering the serious consequence of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar,
this Court has consistently held that clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the
administrative penalty.28

Thus, in the instant case, the allegations of falsification or forgery against Atty. Quesada must be
competently proved because falsification or forgery cannot be presumed. As such, the allegations should
first be established and determined in appropriate proceedings, like in criminal or civil cases, for it is only by
such proceedings that the last word on the falsity or forgery can be uttered by a court of law with the legal
competence to do so. A disbarment proceeding is not the occasion to determine the issue of falsification or
forgery simply because the sole issue to be addressed and determined therein is whether or not the
respondent attorney is still fit to continue to be an officer of the court in the dispensation of justice.
Accordingly, We decline to rule herein whether or not the respondent had committed the supposed
falsification of the subject affidavit in the absence of the prior determination thereof in the appropriate
proceeding.29

We, however, noted that Atty. Quesada Violated the notarial law for his act of notarizing the: (1) Deed of
Sale30 dated April 12, 2002 purportedly executed by and between the spouses Maximo F. Quezada and
Gloria D. Quezada, the buyers, and complainant Zarcilla's parents, the spouses Tarcela Zarcilla and Perfecto
Zarcilla; and the (2) Joint Affidavit31 dated March 20, 2002 purportedly executed by the spouses Tarcela
Zarcilla and Perfecto Zarcilla for the reconstitution of TCT No. T-18490, when in both occasions the spouses
Tarcela Zarcilla and Perfecto Zarcilla could no longer execute said documents and appear before Atty.
Quesada since they have long been deceased as evidenced by their death certificates. Tarcela Zarcilla died
on January 9, 1988, while Perfecto Zarcilla died on March 4, 2001.32

Section 2 (b) of Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice stresses the necessity of the affiant's personal
appearance before the notary public:

xxx

(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the instrument or
document -

(1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the notarization; and
(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary public through
competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules.

Thus, a notary public should not notarize a document unless the person who signed the same is the very
same person who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and the truth of
what are stated therein. Without the appearance of the person who actually executed the document in
question, the notary public would be unable to verify the genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging
party and to ascertain that the document is the party's free act or deed. Here, Atty. Quesada's act of
notarizing the deed of sale appeared to have been done to perpetuate a fraud. This is more evident when he
certified in the acknowledgment thereof that he knew the vendors and knew them to be the same persons
who executed the document. When he then solemnly declared that such appeared before him and
acknowledged to him that the document was the vendor's free act and deed despite the fact that the
vendors cannot do so as they were already deceased, Atty. Quesada deliberately made false
representations, and was not merely negligent.

Thus, by his actuations, Atty. Quesada violated not only the notarial law but also his oath as a lawyer when
he notarized the deed of sale without all the affiant's personal appearance. His failure to perform his duty as
a notary public resulted not only damage to those directly affected by the notarized document but also in
undermining the integrity of a notary public and in degrading the function of notarization. The responsibility
to faithfully observe and respect the legal solemnity of the oath in an acknowledgment or jurat is more
pronounced when the notary public is a lawyer because of his solemn oath under the Code of Professional
Responsibility to obey the laws and to do no falsehood or consent to the doing of any. Lawyers
commissioned as notaries public are mandated to discharge with fidelity the duties of their offices, such
duties being dictated by public policy and impressed with public interest.33
Time and again, We have held that notarization of a document is not an empty act or routine. It is invested
with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries
public. Notarization converts a private document into a public document, thus, making that document
admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full
faith and credit upon its face. Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to rely
upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended to a private instrument.34

For this reason, notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of
their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of this form of conveyance would be
undermined. Hence, a notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the
same are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents
and truth of what are stated therein. The purpose of this requirement is to enable the notary public to verify
the genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the
party's free act and deed.35

Aside from Atty. Quesada's violation of his duty as a notary public, what this Court find more deplorable was
his defiant stance against the Court as demonstrated by his repetitive disregard of the Court's directives to
file his comment on the complaint. Despite several Court resolutions, notices, directives and imposition of
fines for Atty. Quesada's compliance and payment, he ignored the same for more than five years.
Consequently, this case has dragged on for an unnecessary length of time. More than five (5) years have
already elapsed from the time the Court issued the first Resolution dated June 26, 2006 which required Atty.
Quesada to file his comment until his eventual submission of comment on October 10, 2011. It took a
warrant of arrest to finally move Atty. Quesada to file his Comment and pay the fines imposed upon him.
While the Court has been tolerant of his obstinate refusal to comply with its directives, he shamelessly
ignored the same and wasted the Court's time and resources.

And even with the submission of his comment, he did not offer any apology and/or any justification for his
long delay in complying with the directives/orders of this Court. We surmised that when Atty. Quesada
finally complied with the Court's directives, his compliance was neither prompted by good faith or willingness
to obey the Court nor was he remorseful of his infractions but was actually only forced to do so considering
his impending arrest. There is, thus, no question that his failure or obstinate refusal without justification or
valid reason to comply with the Court's directives constitutes disobedience or defiance of the lawful orders of
Court, amounting to gross misconduct and insubordination or disrespect.36

Atty. Quesada's acts constitute willful disobedience of the lawful orders of this Court, which under Section
27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is in itself alone is a sufficient cause for suspension or disbarment. His
cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring the orders of the Supreme Court constitutes utter disrespect to the
judicial institution. His conduct indicates a high degree of irresponsibility. We have repeatedly held that a
Court's Resolution is "not to be construed as a mere request, nor should it be complied with partially,
inadequately, or selectively." Atty. Quesada's obstinate refusal to comply with the Court's orders "not only
betrays a recalcitrant flaw in his character; it also underscores his disrespect of the Court's lawful orders
which this Court will not tolerate."37

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. - A member of the bar
may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for
corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The practice
of soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice.

As an officer of the court, it is a lawyer's duty to uphold the dignity and authority of the court. The highest
form of respect for judicial authority is shown by a lawyer's obedience to court orders and
processes.38 Considering Atty. Quesada's predisposition to disregard not only the laws of the land but also
the lawful orders of the Court, it only shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and
good demeanor. Worse, with his repeated disobedience to this Court's orders, Atty. Quesada displayed no
remorse as to his misconduct which, thus, proved himself unworthy of membership in the Philippine Bar.
Clearly, Atty. Quesada is unfit to discharge the duties of an officer of the court and deserves the ultimate
penalty of disbarment.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, We find respondent ATTY. JOSE C. QUESADA JR. GUILTY of gross
misconduct and willful disobedience of lawful orders rendering him unworthy of continuing membership in
the legal profession. He is, thus, ordered DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name stricken-off of
the Roll of Attorneys, effective immediately. We, likewise, REVOKE his incumbent notarial commission, if
any, and PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIES him from being commissioned as a notary public.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, which shall forthwith record it in the
personal file of respondent. All the Courts of the Philippines; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, which
shall disseminate copies thereof to all its Chapters; and all administrative and quasi-judicial agencies of the
Republic of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio,*Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen, Jardeleza,
Caguioa, Martires, Tijam, Reyes, Jr., and Gesmundo, JJ., concur.
Sereno, C.J., on leave.

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT

Sirs/Mesdames:

Please take notice that on March 13, 2018 a Decision/Resolution, copy attached herewith, was rendered by
the Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the original of which was received by this Office on April 26,
2018 at 2:00 p.m.

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) EDGAR O. ARICHETA

Clerk of Court

Endnotes:
A.M. No. 17-11-06-CA

RE: ANONYMOUS LETTERCOMPLAINT (with Attached Pictures) AGAINST ASSOCIATE

JUSTICE NORMANDIE B. PIZARRO, COURT OF APPEALS,

DECISION

MARTIRES, J.:

This administrative matter arose from an anonymous letter-complaint1 charging Associate Justice
Normandie B. Pizarro (Justice Pizarro) of the Court of Appeals (CA) of habitually gambling in
casinos, "selling" decisions, and immorally engaging in an illicit relationship. The subject letter-
complaint was initially filed with the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) on 20 September 2017.
The matter was referred by the Ombudsman to this Court on 24 October 2017.2

The anonymous letter-complaint accused Justice Pizarro of being a gambling addict who would
allegedly lose millions of pesos in the casinos daily, and insinuated that Justice Pizarro resorted to
"selling" his cases in order to support his gambling addiction.

The anonymous complainant further accused Justice Pizarro of having an illicit relationship, claiming
that Justice Pizarro bought his mistress a house and lot in Antipolo City, a condominium unit in
Manila, and brand new vehicles such as Toyota Vios and Ford Everest worth millions of pesos.
Lastly, the anonymous complainant alleged that Justice Pizarro, together with his mistress and her
whole family, made several travels abroad to shop and to gamble in casinos.

Attached to the anonymous letter-complaint are four (4) sheets of photographs3 showing Justice
Pizarro sitting at the casino tables allegedly at the Midori Hotel and Casino in Clark, Pampanga.

On 21November2017, the Court issued a Resolution4 noting the 27 September 2017 Letter of the
Ombudsman referring the anonymous letter-complaint; and requiring Justice Pizarro to file his
comment on the anonymous letter-complaint.

On 8 December 2017, Justice Pizarro filed his comment5 wherein he admitted to his indiscretion. He
stated that he was indeed the person appearing on the subject photographs sitting at a casino table.
He explained that the photographs were taken when he was accompanying a balikbayan friend; and
that they only played a little in a parlor game fashion without big stakes and without their identities
introduced or made known. Justice Pizarro averred that the photographs may have been taken by
people with ulterior motives considering his plan for early retirement.

He further confessed that sometime in 2009 he also played at the casino in what he termed, again, a
parlor game concept. He maintained, however, that such was an indiscretion committed by a dying
man because, prior to this, he had learned that he had terminal cancer.

He also found as cruel, baseless, and highly unfair the accusation that he is the "most corrupt justice
in the Philippines" noting that no administrative case had been filed against him for the past seven
(7) years; that his first administrative case, which this Court resolved in his favor, actually involved
his former driver in Ilocos Sur who forged his signature to make it appear that the driver was
employed in the judiciary; and that all of the few administrative cases filed against him did not
involve corruption; and that he was absolved in all.
Justice Pizarro likewise categorically denied having a mistress. He characterized such accusations
as cowardly acts of his detractors, who even furnished· copies of the anonymous complaint to the
presiding justice of the appellate court and the leader of a major religious group, with the intent of
destroying his character.

ISSUE

The sole issue before the Court is whether Justice Pizarro is guilty of the accusations against him for
which he may be held administratively liable.

THE COURT’S RULING

Under the Rules of Court, administrative complaints against judges of regular courts and special
courts as we11 as justices of the CA and the Sandigan,bayan may be instituted: (1) by the Supreme
Court motu proprio; (2) upon a verified complaint, supported by affidavits of persons who have
personal knowledge of the facts alleged therein or by documents which may substantiate said
allegations; or (3) upon an anonymous complaint, supported by public records of indubitable
integrity.6

The rationale for the requirement that complaints against judges and justices of the judiciary must be
accompanied by supporting evidence is to protect magistrates from the filing of t1imsy and virtually
unsubstantiated charges against them.7 This is consistent with the rule that in administrative
proceedings, the complainants bear the burden of proving the allegations in their complaints by
substantial evidence. If they fail to show in a satisfactory manner the facts upon which their claims
are based, the respondents are not obliged to prove their exception or defense.8

In this case, the anonymous complaint accused Justice Pizarro of selling favorable decisions, having
a mistress, and habitually playing in casinos; and essentially charging him of dishonesty and
violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Law, immorality, and unbecoming conduct. These
accusations, however, with the only exception of gambling in casinos, are not supported by any
evidence or by any public record of indubitable integrity. Thus, the bare allegations of corruption and
immorality do not deserve any consideration. For this reason, the charges of corruption and
immorality against Justice Pizarro must be dismissed for lack of merit.

Inasmuch as the Court would want to cleanse the Judiciary of its erring and undesirable members
and personnel, such policy could only be implemented with the strict observance of due process,
such that substantial evidence is required to prove the charges against a member of the
Judiciary.9 The Court is duty bound to protect its ranks or any member or personnel of the Judiciary
from baseless or unreasonable charges.10

Indeed, while the law and justice abhor all forms of abuse committed by public officers and
employees whose sworn duty is to discharge their duties with utmost responsibility, integrity,
competence, accountability, and loyalty, the Court must protect them against unsubstantiated
charges that tend to adversely affect, rather than encourage, the effective performance of their
duties and functions.11

As regards the accusation of habitually playing in casinos, it is clear that the anonymous complaint
was not supported by public records of indubitable integrity as required by the rules. Nevertheless, it
is equally undisputed, as in fact it was admitted, that Justice Pizarro was the same person playing in
a casino in Clark, Pampanga, as shown by the photographs attached to the anonymous complaint.
He also admitted that he played in a casino sometime in 2009. The Court cannot simply ignore this
evident and admitted fact. The issue now is whether Justice Pizarro may be held administratively
liable for gambling in casinos.

Recently, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) reminded judges and court personnel to strictly
comply with the prohibition against gambling or being seen in gambling places such as the
casino.12 The OCA cited Circular No. 413 issued by the Court on 27 August 1980 which reads:

The attention of the Court has been invited to the presence of some judges in gambling casinos
operating under Presidential Decree No. 1067- B. This is clearly violative of Section 5(3-b) of said
Decree. It reads as follows:

(3-b) Persons not allowed to play -

(a) Government officials connected directly with the operation of the government or any of its
agencies."

In accordance with law and pursuant to the Resolution of the Court en bane in Administrative Matter
No. 1544-0, dated August 21, 1980, judges of inferior courts and the court personnel are
enjoined from playing in or being present in gambling casinos.

Moreover, judges are likewise enjoined to keep in mind the Canons of Judicial Ethics, paragraph 3 of
which provides:

3. Avoidance of appearance of impropriety. - A judge’s official conduct should be free from the
appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the
performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond reproach." (emphases
supplied and italics in the original)

With respect to Circular No. 4 and Administrative Matter No. 1544-0, it is with regret that the Court
finds them inapplicable to the present case. It is clear from the words of these issuances that the
prohibition from entering and gambling in casinos is applicable only to judges of inferior courts and
court personnel. Stated differently, the aforesaid issuances do not cover justices of collegial courts
for the simple reason that they are neither judges of the inferior courts nor can they be described as
personnel of the court. Although the term "judge" has been held to comprehend all kinds of judges,
the same is true only if the said term is not modified by any word or phrase.14 In the case of Circular
No. 4 and Administrative Matter No. 1544- 0, the term "judge" has been qualified by the phrase
"inferior courts." Thus, absurd as it may seem, Justice Pizarro cannot be held administratively liable
under Circular No. 4 and Administrative Matter No. ] 544-0.

Nevertheless, the inapplicability of the aforestated Court issuances to justices of collegial courts
does not necessarily mean that Justice Pizarro is absolutely cleared of his evident and admitted act
of playing in casinos.

Section 5 (3-b)(a) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1067-B and Section 14(4)(a) of P.D. No. 1869,
which consolidated P.D. No. 1067-B with other presidential decrees issued relative to the franchise
and powers of the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, did not define the meaning of the
term "government officials connected directly with the operation of the government or any of its
agencies" as well as the words used therein. The same is true with respect to the presidential
issuances relative to such prohibition.15 Considering, however, that the obvious purpose of the
subject prohibition is the regulation of conduct of government officials, reference may be made to
pertinent administrative laws and jurisprudence pertaining thereto to comprehend the meaning of the
term under scrutiny.
In this regard, Section 2(1) of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987
defines "Government of the Republic of the Philippines" as "the corporate governmental entity
through which the functions of government are exercised throughout the Philippines, including, save
as the contrary appears from the context, the various arms through which political authority is made
effective in the Philippines, whether pertaining to the autonomous regions, the provincial, city,
municipal or barangay subdivisions or other forms of local government."16The term "Government of
the Republic of the Philippines" or "Philippine Government" is broad enough to include the local
governments and the central or national government which, in turn, consist of the legislative,
executive, and judicial branches, as well as constitutional bodies and other bodies created in
accordance with the constitution.17

Section 2(4) of E.O. No. 292 further states that "Agency of the Government" refers to any of the
various units of the Government, including a department, bureau, office, instrumentality, or
government-owned or -controlled corporations, or a local government or a distinct unit therein.

Section 2(14) of E.0. No. 292 also defines an "officer" as distinguished from a "clerk" or "employee"
as "a person whose duties, not being of a clerical or manual nature, involves the exercise of
discretion in the performance of the functions of the government." On the other hand, when used
with reference to a person having authority to do a particular act or perform a particular function in
the exercise of governmental power, "officer" includes any government employee, agent or body
having authority to do the act or exercise that function.

As regards the qualifying phrase "connected directly with the operation," its definition could not be
found in the Administrative Code and other similarly applicable statutes and rules. It is settled,
however, that in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, words and phrases used in a
statute should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning.18

The words should be read and considered in their natural, ordinary, commonly accepted and most
obvious signification, according to good and approved usage and without resorting to forced or
subtle construction.19 Indeed, the lawmaker is presumed to have employed the words in the statute in
their ordinary and common use and acceptation.20

Thus, the words "connected," "directly," and "operation" must be given their ordinary meaning in
relation to their ordinary use in organizations or institutions such as the government. Hence, the term
"connected" may mean "involved" "associated" or "related;" "directly" may mean "immediately"
"without any intervening agency or instrumentality or determining influence" or "without any
intermediate step;" and "operation" may mean "doing or performing action" or "administration."
Additionally, "to operate" is synonymous to the terms "to exercise" and "to act."

From the foregoing, it is opined that the term "government official connected directly to the operation
of the government or any of its agencies" refers to any person employed by the government whose
tasks is the performance and exercise of any of the functions and powers of such government or any
agency thereof, as conferred on them by law, without any intervening agency. Simply put, a
"government official connected directly to the operation of the government or any of its agencies" is a
government officer who performs the functions of the government on his own judgment or discretion
- essentially, a government officer under Section 2(14) of E.O. No. 292.

Applying the above definition to the present case, it is clear that Justice Pizarro is covered by the
term "government official connected directly with the operation of the government." Indeed, one of
the functions of the government, through the Judiciary, is the administration of justice within its
territorial jurisdiction. Justice Pizarro, as a magistrate of the CA, is clearly a government official
directly involved in the administration of justice; and in the performance of such function, he
exercises discretion. Thus, by gambling in a casino, Justice Pizarro violated the prohibition from
gambling in casinos as provided under Section 14(4)(a) of P.D. No. 1869.

Although P.D. No. 1869 did not provide for a penalty for any act done in contravention of its
provisions particularly the prohibition on gambling, in City Government of Tagbilaran v. Hontanosas,
Jr., 21 it was held that such transgression constitutes violations of Paragraphs 3 and 22 of the Canons
of Judicial Ethics, which respectively provide:

3. Avoidance of appearance of impropriety -

A judge’s official conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety, and his personal
behavior, not only upon the bench and in the performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday
life, should be beyond reproach.

xxxx

22. Infractions of law -

The judge should be studiously careful himself to avoid even the slightest infraction of the law, lest it
be a demoralizing example to others.22

Further, Justice Pizarro also violated Canons 2 and 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary which pe1tinently provides:

CANON 2
INTEGRITY

Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office but also to the personal
demeanor of judges.

SEC. 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to
be so in the view of a reasonable observer.

SEC. 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people’s faith in the integrity of the
judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to be done.
1âwphi1

xxxx

CANON 4
PROPRIETY

Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of a
judge.

SEC. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.

SEC. 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that might
be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In particular,
judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.
The Court has repeatedly reminded judges to conduct themselves irreproachably, not only while in
the discharge of official duties but also in their personal behavior every day.23 No position demands
greater moral righteousness and uprightness from its occupant than does the judicial office. Judges
in particular must be individuals of competence, honesty and probity, charged as they are with
safeguarding the integrity of the court and its proceedings. Judges should behave at all times so as
to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, and avoid impropriety
and the appearance of impropriety in all their activities. A judge's personal behaviour outside the
court, and not only while in the performance of his official duties, must be beyond reproach, for he is
perceived to be the personification of law and justice. Thus, any demeaning act of a judge degrades
the institution he represents.24

Accordingly, the Court finds respondent Justice Pizarro guilty of conduct unbecoming of a member
of the judiciary. Considering, however, that this is the respondent justice's first transgression, and
further bearing in mind his immediate admission of his indiscretion as well as the number of years he
has been in government service, the Court finds the imposition of a fine in the amount of
₱100,000.00 sufficient in this case.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Associate Justice Normandie B. Pizarro GUILTY of
conduct unbecoming of a member of the judiciary, and is hereby ORDERED to pay a fine in the
amount of ₱100,000,00.

SO ORDERED.

SAMUEL R. MARTIRES
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

(On Leave)
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO*
Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO** PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

No Part due to close

relation to J. Pizarro MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice
Associate Justice

I dissent. See separate opinion

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA ALFREDO BENJAMIN S. CAGUIOA

Associate Justice Associate Justice
NOEL GIMENEZ TIJAM ANDRES B. REYES, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice

ALEXANDER G. GESMUNDO
Associate Justice
 FIRST DIVISION

March 12, 2018

A.C. No. 9119

EUGENIO E. CORTEZ, Complaint

vs.
ATTY. HERNANDO P. CORTES, Respondent

DECISION

TIJAM, J.:

The instant controversy arose from a Complaint-Affidavit1 filed by complainant Eugenio E.

Cortez2 against respondent Atty. Hernando P. Cortes (Atty. Cortes) for grave misconduct, and
violation of the Lawyer's Oath and the Code for Professional Responsibility.

Complainant alleged that he engaged the services of Atty. Cortes as his counsel in an illegal
dismissal case against Philippine Explosives Corporation (PEC). He further alleged that he and Atty.
Cortes had a handshake agreement on a 12% contingency fee as and by way of attorney's fees.3

Atty. Cortes prosecuted his claims for illegal dismissal which was decided in favor of complainant.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the National Labor Relations Commissions ordering
PEC to pay complaint the total amount of One million One Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱1, 100,000)
m three staggered payments. PEC then issued City Bank Check No. 1000003986 dated March 31,
2005 in the amount of Five Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱550,000), Check No. 1000003988 in
the amount of Two Hundred Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (₱275,000) dated April 15, 2005, and
Check No. 1000003989 also in the amount of Two Hundred Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos
(₱275,000) dated April 30, 2005, all payable in the name of complainant.4

Complainant narrated that after the maturity of the first check, he went to China Bank, Southmall Las
Pinas with Atty. Cortes and his wife to open an account to deposit the said check. Atty. Cortes asked
complainant to wait outside the bank while he personally, for and in his behalf, facilitated the opening
of the account. After thirty minutes, he was asked to go inside and sign a joint savings account with
Atty. Cortes.5

On April 7, 2005, complainant alleged that when he was about to withdraw the amount of the initial
check deposited, Atty. Cortes arrived with his wife and ordered the bank teller to hold off the
transaction. When complainant asked why he did that, Atty. Cortes answered that 50% of the total
awarded claims belongs to him as attorney's fees. When complainant questioned him, Atty. Cortes
became hysterical and imposingly maintained that 50% of the total awarded claims belongs to him.6

Complainant then tried to pacify Atty. Cortes and his wife and offered to pay ₱200,000, and when
Atty. Cortes rejected it, he offered the third check amounting to ₱275,000, but Atty. Cortes still
insisted on the 50% of the total award. Complainant was then forced to endorse the second and third
checks to Atty. Cortes, after which he was able to withdraw the proceeds of the first check. With the
help of the lawyers in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), complainant was able to have the
drawer of the checks cancel one of the checks endorsed to Atty. Cortes before he was able to
encash the same.
Atty. Cortes, in his Answer, admitted that his services were engaged by complainant to pursue the
labor claims. He, however, denied that they agreed on a 12% contingency fee by way of attorney's
fees.7

Atty. Cortes claimed that complainant is a relative of his, but considering that the case was to be
filed in Pampanga and he resided in Las Piñas, he would only accept the case on a fifty-fifty sharing
arrangement.8

Atty. Cortes alleged that the checks were issued pursuant to the preexecution agreement reached
by the parties at the office of Labor Arbiter Herminio V. Suelo. He and complainant agreed that the
amount of the first check be divided fifty-fifty, the whole of the second check would be the
complainant's, and the third check would be his.9

Atty. Cortes further alleged that he had to assist complainant in the opening of an account to deposit
the checks. Atty. Cortes had to convince the bank manager to accept the checks issued in the name
of Eugene E. Cortez despite the fact that complainant's ID's are all in the name of Eugenio E.
Cortez.10 He claimed that anyone in his place would have demanded for the holding off of the
transaction because of the base ingratitude, patent deception and treachery of complainant.11

Atty. Cortes posited that the check forms part and parcel of the judgment award to which he had a
lien corresponding to his attorney's fees and complainant should have at least invited him to witness
the "harvest of the fruits."12

Atty. Cortes insisted that the alleged 12% agreement is false, being merely a concoction of
Gomplainant’s fertile and unstable mind. He also pointed out that the fifty-fifty sharing arrangement
is not unconscionably high because the complainant was given the option to hire other lawyers, but
still he engaged his services.13

After hearing and submission of position papers, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, in a Report
and Recommendation dated April 11, 2007, recommended the six-month suspension of Atty. Cortes.
It ruled that a contingent fee arrangement should generally be in writing, and that contingent fees
depend upon an express contract without which the lawyer can only recover on the basis of quantum
meruit. It also pointed out that the Labor Code establishes a limit as to the amount of attorney's fees
that a lawyer may collect or charge his client in labor cases.

The report and recommendation was adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors in an
August 17, 2007 Resolution:

R E S O L U T I O N NO. XVIII-2007-74

CBD Case No. 05-1482

Eugenio E. Cortez vs.

Atty. Hernando P. Cortes

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of
this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules, and for violation of A1iicle 11 (b) of the Labor Code, Atty.
Hernando P. Cortes is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months and Ordered
to Return to complainant whatever amount he received in excess of the 10% allowable attorney's
fees in labor case (sic).

TOMAS N. PRADO
National Secretary14

A motion for reconsideration15 was filed by Atty. Cortes, which was denied by the IBP Board of
Governors.16

The issue, plainly, is whether or not the acts complained of constitute misconduct on the part of Atty.
Cortes, which would subject him to disciplinary action.

We rule in the affirmative.

We have held that a contingent fee arrangement is valid in this jurisdiction. It is generally recognized
as valid and binding, but must be laid down in, an express contract.17 The case of Rayos v. Atty.
Hernandez18 discussed the same succinctly, thus:

A contingent fee arrangement is valid in this jurisdiction and is generally recognized as valid
and binding but must be laid down in an express contract. The amount of contingent fee agreed
upon by the parties is subject to the stipulation that counsel will be paid for his legal services only
if the suit or litigation prospers. A much higher compensation is allowed as contingent fee in
consideration of the risk that the lawyer may get nothing if the suit fails. Contracts of this nature are
permitted because they redound to the benefit of the poor client and the lawyer especially in cases
where the client has meritorious cause of action, but no means with which to pay for legal services
unless he can, with the sanction of law, make a contract for a contingent fee to be paid out of the
proceeds of the litigation. Oftentimes, the contingent fee arrangement is the only means by which
the poor and helpless can seek redress for injuries sustained and have their rights
vindicated.19 (Emphasis Ours)

In this case, We note that the parties did not have an express contract as regards the payment of
fees. Complainant alleges that the contingency fee was fixed at 12% via a handshake agreement,
while Atty. Cortes counters that the agreement was 50%.

The IBP Commission on Discipline pointed out that since what respondent handled was merely a
labor case, his attorney's foes should not exceed 10%, the rate allowed under Article 11120 of the
Labor Code.

Although we agree that the 50% contingency fee was excessive, We do not agree that the 10%
limitation as provided in Article 111 is automatically applicable.

The case of Masmud v. NLRC (First Division), et al., 21 discussed the matter of application of Article
111 of the Labor Code on attorney's fees:

There are two concepts of attorney's fees. In the ordinary sense, attorney's fees represent the
reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for the legal services rendered to the
latter. On the other hand, in its extraordinary concept, attorney's fees may be awarded by the
court as indemnity for damages to be paid by the losing party to the prevailing party, such
that, in any of the cases provided by law where such award can be made, e.g., those authorized in
Article 2208 of the Civil Code, the amount is payable not to the lawyer but to the client, unless they
have agreed that the award shall pertain to the lawyer as additional compensation or as part thereof.
 xxxx

Contrary to Evangelina’s proposition, Article 111 of the Labor Code deals with the extraordinary
concept of attorneys fees. It regulates the amount recoverable as attorney's fees in the
1âwphi1

nature of damages sustained by and awarded to the prevailing party. It may not be used as
the standard in fixing the amount payable to the lawyer by his client for the legal services he
rendered.22 (Emphasis Ours)

It would then appear that the contingency fees that Atty. Cortes required is in the ordinary sense as it
represents reasonable compensation for legal services he rendered for complainant. Necessarily,
the 10% limitation of the Labor Code would not be applicable. Beyond the limit fixed by Article 111,
such as between the lawyer and the client, the attorney's fees may exceed 10% on the basis
of quantum meriut.23 We, however, are hard-pressed to accept the justification of the 50%
contingency fee that Atty. Cortes is insisting on for being exorbitant.

Generally, the amount of attorney's fees due is that stipulated in the retainer Agreement which is
conclusive as to the amount of the lawyers compensation. In the absence thereof, the amount of
1âwphi1

attorney's fees is fixed on the basis of quantum meruit, i.e., the reasonable worth of the attorneys
services.24 Courts may ascertain also if the attorney's fees are found to be excessive, what is
reasonable under the circumstances. In no case, however, must a lawyer be allowed to recover
more than what is reasonable, pursuant to Section 24, Rule 13825 of the Rules of Court.26

Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that "A lawyer shall charge only fair and
reasonable fees." Rule 20.01 of the same canon enumerates the following factors which should
guide a lawyer in determining his fees:

(a) The time spent and the extent of the services rendered or required;

(b) The novelty and difficulty of the questions involved;

(c) The importance of the subject matter;

(d) The skill demanded;

(e) The probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the proffered case;

(f) The customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP Chapter to which
he belongs;

(g) The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client from the service;

(h) The contingency or' certainty of compensation;

(i) The character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and

(j)The professional standing of the lawyer.

Here, as set out by Atty. Cortes himself, the complainant's case was merely grounded on
complainant's alleged absence without leave for the second time and challenging the plant manager,
the complainant's immediate superior, to a fist fight. He also claimed that the travel from his home in
Las Piñas City to San Fernando, Pampanga was costly and was an ordeal. We likewise note that
Atty. Cortes admitted that complainant was a close kin of his, and that complainant appealed to his
services because, since his separation from work, he had no visible means of income and had so
many mouths to feed. These circumstances cited by Atty. Cortes to justify the fees; to Our mind,
does not exculpate Atty. Cortes, but in fact, makes Us question all the more, the reasonableness of
it.

We believe and so hold that the contingent fee here claimed by Atty. Cortes was, under the facts
obtaining in this case, grossly excessive and unconscionable. The issues involved could hardly be
said to be novel and Atty. Cortes in fact already knew that complainant was already hard up. We
have held that lawyering is not a moneymaking venture and lawyers are not merchants.27 Law
advocacy, it has been stressed, is not capital that yields profits.28 The returns it births are simple
rewards for a job done or service rendered. It is a calling that, unlike mercantile pursuits which enjoy
a greater deal of freedom from governmental interference, is impressed with a public interest, for
which it is subject to State regulation.29

Here, considering that complainant was amenable to a 12% contingency fee, and which we likewise
deem to be the reasonable worth of the attorney's services rendered by Atty. Cortes under the
circumstances, Atty. Cortes is hereby adjudged to return to complainant the amount he received in
excess of 12% of the total award. If the Law has to remain an honorable profession and has to attain
its basic ideal, those enrolled in its ranks should not only master its tenets and principles but should
also, by their lives, accord continuing fidelity to such tenets and principles.30

We, however, find that the recommended suspension of six months is too harsh and considering that
Atty. Cortes is nearing ninety years old and that there was no question that Atty. Cortes was able to
get a favorable outcome, a reduction of the suspension is proper. We then reduce and sanction Atty.
Cortes to a three-month suspension from the practice of law.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Atty. Hernando P. Cortes is found GUILTY of

violation of Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for three (3) months, and is ordered to return to complainant Eugenio E. Cortez
the amount he received in excess of the 12% allowable attorney's fees.

SO ORDERED.

NOEL GIMENEZ TIJAM

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

(On Leave)
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO*
Chief Justice
Chairperson

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO** MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA
Associate Justice