G.R. No.

154599 January 21, 2004

THE LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY NATIONAL, petitioner,

vs.
THE CITY MAYOR OF MANILA, HON. JOSE ATIENZA, JR., and THE CITY COUNCIL OF MANILA, respondents.

DECISION

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeks the nullification of Manila City Ordinance No. 8039,
Series of 2002,1 and respondent City Mayor’s Executive Order No. 011, Series of 2002,2 dated 15 August 2002 , for being
patently contrary to law.

The antecedents are as follows:

Petitioner Liga ng mga Barangay National (Liga for brevity) is the national organization of all the barangays in the
Philippines, which pursuant to Section 492 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as The Local Government Code of
1991, constitutes the duly elected presidents of highly-urbanized cities, provincial chapters, the metropolitan Manila
Chapter, and metropolitan political subdivision chapters.

Section 493 of that law provides that "[t]he liga at the municipal, city, provincial, metropolitan political subdivision, and
national levels directly elect a president, a vice-president, and five (5) members of the board of directors." All other
matters not provided for in the law affecting the internal organization of the leagues of local government units shall be
governed by their respective constitution and by-laws, which must always conform to the provisions of the Constitution
and existing laws.3

On 16 March 2000, the Liga adopted and ratified its own Constitution and By-laws to govern its internal
organization.4 Section 1, third paragraph, Article XI of said Constitution and By-Laws states:

All other election matters not covered in this Article shall be governed by the "Liga Election Code" or such other rules as
may be promulgated by the National Liga Executive Board in conformity with the provisions of existing laws.

By virtue of the above-cited provision, the Liga adopted and ratified its own Election Code.5 Section 1.2, Article I of the
Liga Election Code states:

1.2 Liga ng mga Barangay Provincial, Metropolitan, HUC/ICC Chapters. There shall be nationwide synchronized elections
for the provincial, metropolitan, and HUC/ICC chapters to be held on the third Monday of the month immediately after the
month when the synchronized elections in paragraph 1.1 above was held. The incumbent Liga chapter president
concerned duly assisted by the proper government agency, office or department, e.g. Provincial/City/NCR/Regional
Director, shall convene all the duly elected Component City/Municipal Chapter Presidents and all the current elected
Punong Barangays (for HUC/ICC) of the respective chapters in any public place within its area of jurisdiction for the
purpose of reorganizing and electing the officers and directors of the provincial, metropolitan or HUC/ICC Liga chapters.
Said president duly assisted by the government officer aforementioned, shall notify, in writing, all the above concerned at
least fifteen (15) days before the scheduled election meeting on the exact date, time, place and requirements of the said
meeting.

The Liga thereafter came out with its Calendar of Activities and Guidelines in the Implementation of the Liga Election
Code of 2002,6 setting on 21 October 2002 the synchronized elections for highly urbanized city chapters, such as the Liga
Chapter of Manila, together with independent component city, provincial, and metropolitan chapters. lawphi1.net
On 28 June 2002, respondent City Council of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8039, Series of 2002, providing, among
other things, for the election of representatives of the District Chapters in the City Chapter of Manila and setting the
elections for both chapters thirty days after the barangay elections. Section 3 (A) and (B) of the assailed ordinance read:

SEC. 3. Representation Chapters. — Every Barangay shall be represented in the said Liga Chapters … by the Punong
Barangay…or, in his absence or incapacity, by the kagawad duly elected for the purpose among its members….

A. District Chapter

All elected Barangay Chairman in each District shall elect from among themselves the President, Vice-President and five
(5) members of the Board….

B. City Chapter

The District Chapter representatives shall automatically become members of the Board and they shall elect from among
themselves a President, Vice-President, Secretary, Treasurer, Auditor and create other positions as it may deem
necessary for the management of the chapter.

The assailed ordinance was later transmitted to respondent City Mayor Jose L. Atienza, Jr., for his signature and
approval.

On 16 July 2002, upon being informed that the ordinance had been forwarded to the Office of the City Mayor, still
unnumbered and yet to be officially released, the Liga sent respondent Mayor of Manila a letter requesting him that said
ordinance be vetoed considering that it encroached upon, or even assumed, the functions of the Liga through legislation,
a function which was clearly beyond the ambit of the powers of the City Council.7

Respondent Mayor, however, signed and approved the assailed city ordinance and issued on 15 August 2002 Executive
Order No. 011, Series of 2002, to implement the ordinance.

Hence, on 27 August 2002, the Liga filed the instant petition raising the following issues:

WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT CITY COUNCIL OF MANILA COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, WHEN IT ENACTED CITY ORDINANCE NO. 8039 S.
2002 PURPOSELY TO GOVERN THE ELECTIONS OF THE MANILA CHAPTER OF THE LIGA NG MGA BARANGAYS
AND WHICH PROVIDES A DIFFERENT MANNER OF ELECTING ITS OFFICERS, DESPITE THE FACT THAT SAID
CHAPTER’S ELECTIONS, AND THE ELECTIONS OF ALL OTHER CHAPTERS OF THE LIGA NG MGA BARANGAYS
FOR THAT MATTER, ARE BY LAW MANDATED TO BE GOVERNED BY THE LIGA CONSTITUTION AND BY-LAWS
AND THE LIGA ELECTION CODE.

II

WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT CITY MAYOR OF MANILA COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN HE ISSUED EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 011 TO
IMPLEMENT THE QUESTIONED CITY ORDINANCE NO. 8039 S. 2002.

In support of its petition, the Liga argues that City Ordinance No. 8039, Series of 2002, and Executive Order No. 011,
Series of 2002, contradict the Liga Election Code and are therefore invalid. There exists neither rhyme nor reason, not to
mention the absence of legal basis, for the Manila City Council to encroach upon, or even assume, the functions of the
Liga by prescribing, through legislation, the manner of conducting the Liga elections other than what has been provided
for by the Liga Constitution and By-laws and the Liga Election Code. Accordingly, the subject ordinance is an ultra
vires act of the respondents and, as such, should be declared null and void.

As for its prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, the petitioner cites as reason therefor the fact that
under Section 5 of the assailed city ordinance, the Manila District Chapter elections would be held thirty days after the
regular barangay elections. Hence, it argued that the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary
injunction would be imperative to prevent the implementation of the ordinance and executive order.

On 12 September 2002, Barangay Chairman Arnel Peña, in his capacity as a member of the Liga ng mga Barangay in the
City Chapter of Manila, filed a Complaint in Intervention with Urgent Motion for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining
Order and/or Preliminary Injunction.8 He supports the position of the Liga and prays for the declaration of the questioned
ordinance and executive order, as well as the elections of the Liga ng mga Barangay pursuant thereto, to be null and void.
The assailed ordinance prescribing for an "indirect manner of election" amended, in effect, the provisions of the Local
Government Code of 1991, which provides for the election of the Liga officers at large. It also violated and curtailed the
rights of the petitioner and intervenor, as well as the other 896 Barangay Chairmen in the City of Manila, to vote and be
voted upon in a direct election.

On 25 October 2002, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Manifestation in lieu of Comment.9 It supports the
petition of the Liga, arguing that the assailed city ordinance and executive order are clearly inconsistent with the express
public policy enunciated in R.A. No. 7160. Local political subdivisions are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid
delegation of legislative power from the national legislature. They are mere agents vested with what is called the power of
subordinate legislation. Thus, the enactments in question, which are local in origin, cannot prevail against the decree,
which has the force and effect of law.

On the issue of non-observance by the petitioners of the hierarchy-of-courts rule, the OSG posits that technical rules of
procedure should be relaxed in the instant petition. While Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, grants original
jurisdiction over cases of this nature to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), the exigency of the present petition, however, calls
for the relaxation of this rule. Section 496 (should be Section 491) of the Local Government Code of 1991 primarily
intended that the Liga ng mga Barangay determine the representation of the Liga in the sanggunians for the immediate
ventilation, articulation, and crystallization of issues affecting barangay government administration. Thus, the immediate
resolution of this petition is a must.

On the other hand, the respondents defend the validity of the assailed ordinance and executive order and pray for the
dismissal of the present petition on the following grounds: (1) certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is unavailing;
(2) the petition should not be entertained by this Court in view of the pendency before the Regional Trial Court of Manila of
two actions or petitions questioning the subject ordinance and executive order; (3) the petitioner is guilty of forum
shopping; and (4) the act sought to be enjoined is fait accompli.

The respondents maintain that certiorari is an extraordinary remedy available to one aggrieved by the decision of a
tribunal, officer, or board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. The City Council and City Mayor of Manila are not
the "board" and "officer" contemplated in Rule 65 of the Rules of Court because both do not exercise judicial functions.
The enactment of the subject ordinance and issuance of the questioned executive order are legislative and executive
functions, respectively, and thus, do not fall within the ambit of "judicial functions." They are both within the prerogatives,
powers, and authority of the City Council and City Mayor of Manila, respectively. Furthermore, the petition failed to show
with certainty that the respondents acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.

The respondents also asseverate that the petitioner cannot claim that it has no other recourse in addressing its grievance
other than this petition for certiorari. As a matter of fact, there are two cases pending before Branches 33 and 51 of the
RTC of Manila (one is for mandamus; the other, for declaratory relief) and three in the Court of Appeals (one is for
prohibition; the two other cases, for quo warranto), which are all akin to the present petition in the sense that the relief
being sought therein is the declaration of the invalidity of the subject ordinance. Clearly, the petitioner may ask the RTC or
the Court of Appeals the relief being prayed for before this Court. Moreover, the petitioner failed to prove discernible
compelling reasons attending the present petition that would warrant cognizance of the present petition by this Court.

Besides, according to the respondents, the petitioner has transgressed the proscription against forum-shopping in filing
the instant suit. Although the parties in the other pending cases and in this petition are different individuals or entities, they
represent the same interest.

With regard to petitioner's prayer for temporary restraining order and/ or preliminary injunction in its petition, the
respondents maintain that the same had become moot and academic in view of the elections of officers of the City Liga ng
mga Barangay on 15 September 2002 and their subsequent assumption to their respective offices.10 Since the acts to be
enjoined are now fait accompli, this petition for certiorari with an application for provisional remedies must necessarily fail.
Thus, where the records show that during the pendency of the case certain events or circumstances had taken place that
render the case moot and academic, the petition for certiorari must be dismissed.

After due deliberation on the pleadings filed, we resolve to dismiss this petition for certiorari.

First, the respondents neither acted in any judicial or quasi-judicial capacity nor arrogated unto themselves any judicial or
quasi-judicial prerogatives. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is a special civil
action that may be invoked only against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.

Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. — When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has
acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment
be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs
as law and justice may require.

Elsewise stated, for a writ of certiorari to issue, the following requisites must concur: (1) it must be directed against a
tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) the tribunal, board, or officer must have acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there
is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

A respondent is said to be exercising judicial function where he has the power to determine what the law is and what the
legal rights of the parties are, and then undertakes to determine these questions and adjudicate upon the rights of the
parties.11

Quasi-judicial function, on the other hand, is "a term which applies to the actions, discretion, etc., of public administrative
officers or bodies … required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions
from them as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature."12

Before a tribunal, board, or officer may exercise judicial or quasi-judicial acts, it is necessary that there be a law that gives
rise to some specific rights of persons or property under which adverse claims to such rights are made, and the
controversy ensuing therefrom is brought before a tribunal, board, or officer clothed with power and authority to determine
the law and adjudicate the respective rights of the contending parties.13

The respondents do not fall within the ambit of tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. As
correctly pointed out by the respondents, the enactment by the City Council of Manila of the assailed ordinance and the
issuance by respondent Mayor of the questioned executive order were done in the exercise of legislative and executive
functions, respectively, and not of judicial or quasi-judicial functions. On this score alone, certiorari will not lie.
Second, although the instant petition is styled as a petition for certiorari, in essence, it seeks the declaration by this Court
of the unconstitutionality or illegality of the questioned ordinance and executive order. It, thus, partakes of the nature of a
petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has only appellate, not original, jurisdiction.14 Section 5, Article VIII of
the Constitution provides:

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions
for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.

(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final
judgments and orders of lower courts in:

(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential
decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question. (Italics supplied).

As such, this petition must necessary fail, as this Court does not have original jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory
relief even if only questions of law are involved.15

Third, even granting arguendo that the present petition is ripe for the extraordinary writ of certiorari, there is here a clear
disregard of the hierarchy of courts. No special and important reason or exceptional and compelling circumstance has
been adduced by the petitioner or the intervenor why direct recourse to this Court should be allowed.

We have held that this Court’s original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari (as well as of prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is not exclusive, but is concurrent with the Regional Trial Courts and the Court of
Appeals in certain cases. As aptly stated in People v. Cuaresma:16

This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute,
unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor0 will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of
courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and also serves as a general determinant of the
appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard of that judicial hierarchy most certainly
indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior") courts should be filed with the
Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court’s
original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor,
clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is [an] established policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent inordinate
demands upon the Court’s time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction,
and to prevent further over-crowding of the Court’s docket.

As we have said in Santiago v. Vasquez,17 the propensity of litigants and lawyers to disregard the hierarchy of courts in
our judicial system by seeking relief directly from this Court must be put to a halt for two reasons: (1) it would be an
imposition upon the precious time of this Court; and (2) it would cause an inevitable and resultant delay, intended or
otherwise, in the adjudication of cases, which in some instances had to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the
proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues because this Court is not a trier of
facts.

Thus, we shall reaffirm the judicial policy that this Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired
cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, and exceptional and compelling circumstances justify the availment of the
extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari, calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction.18

Petitioner’s reliance on Pimentel v. Aguirre19 is misplaced because the non-observance of the hierarchy-of-courts rule was
not an issue therein. Besides, what was sought to be nullified in the petition for certiorari and prohibition therein was an
act of the President of the Philippines, which would have greatly affected all local government units. We reiterated therein
that when an act of the legislative department is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, settling the
controversy becomes the duty of this Court. The same is true when what is seriously alleged to be unconstitutional is an
act of the President, who in our constitutional scheme is coequal with Congress.

We hesitate to rule that the petitioner and the intervenor are guilty of forum-shopping. Forum-shopping exists where the
elements of litis pendentia are present or when a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other.
For litis pendentia to exist, the following requisites must be present: (1) identity of parties, or at least such parties as are
representing the same interests in both actions; (2) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being
founded on the same facts; and (3) identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases, such that any
judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res
judicata in the other case.20

In the instant petition, and as admitted by the respondents, the parties in this case and in the alleged other pending cases
are different individuals or entities; thus, forum-shopping cannot be said to exist. Moreover, even assuming that those five
petitions are indeed pending before the RTC of Manila and the Court of Appeals, we can only guess the causes of action
and issues raised before those courts, considering that the respondents failed to furnish this Court with copies of the said
petitions.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 139791 December 12, 2003

MANILA BANKERS LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
EDDY NG KOK WEI, respondent.

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision1 dated March 26, 1999 and Resolution2 dated August
5, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 40504, entitled "Eddy Ng Kok Wei vs. Manila Bankers Life Insurance
Corporation".

The factual antecedents as borne by the records are:

Eddy Ng Kok Wei, respondent, is a Singaporean businessman who ventured into investing in the Philippines. On
November 29, 1988, respondent, in a Letter of Intent addressed to Manila Bankers Life Insurance Corporation, petitioner,
expressed his intention to purchase a condominium unit at Valle Verde Terraces.

Subsequently or on December 5, 1988, respondent paid petitioner a reservation fee of ₱50,000.00 for the purchase of a
46-square meter condominium unit (Unit 703) valued at ₱860,922.00. On January 16, 1989, respondent paid 90% of the
purchase price in the sum of ₱729,830.00.

Consequently, petitioner, through its President, Mr. Antonio G. Puyat, executed a Contract to Sell in favor of the
respondent. The contract expressly states that the subject condominium unit "shall substantially be completed and
delivered" to the respondent "within fifteen (15) months" from February 8, 1989 or on May 8, 1990, and that "(S)hould
there be no substantial completion and fail(ure) to deliver the unit on the date specified, a penalty of 1% of the total
amount paid (by respondent) shall be charged against (petitioner)".

Considering that the stipulated 15-month period was at hand, respondent returned to the Philippines sometime in April,
1990.

In a letter dated April 5, 1990, petitioner, through its Senior Assistant Vice-President, Mr. Mario G. Zavalla, informed
respondent of the substantial completion of his condominium unit, however, due to various uncontrollable forces (such
as coup d‘ etat attempts, typhoon and steel and cement shortage), the final turnover is reset to May 31, 1990. 1âw phi 1

Meanwhile, on July 5, 1990, upon receipt of petitioner’s notice of delivery dated May 31, 1990, respondent again flew
back to Manila. He found the unit still uninhabitable for lack of water and electric facilities.

Once more, petitioner issued another notice to move-in addressed to its building administrator advising the latter that
respondent is scheduled to move in on August 22, 1990.

On October 5, 1990, respondent returned to the Philippines only to find that his condominium unit was still unlivable.
Exasperated, he was constrained to send petitioner a letter dated November 21, 1990 demanding payment for the
damages he sustained. But petitioner ignored such demand, prompting respondent to file with the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 150, Makati City, a complaint against the former for specific performance and damages, docketed as Civil Case
No. 90-3440.

Meanwhile, during the pendency of the case, respondent finally accepted the condominium unit and on April 12, 1991,
occupied the same. Thus, respondent’s cause of action has been limited to his claim for damages.

On December 18, 1992, the trial court rendered a Decision3 finding the petitioner liable for payment of damages due to the
delay in the performance of its obligation to the respondent. The dispositive portion reads:

"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff and against defendant, ordering Manila Bankers Life
Insurance Corporation to pay plaintiff Eddy Ng Kok Wei the following:

1. One percent (1%) of the total amount plaintiff paid defendant;

2. ₱100,000.00 as moral damages;

3. ₱50,000.00 as exemplary damages;

4. ₱25,000.00 by way of attorney’s fees; and

Cost of suit.

"SO ORDERED."

On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in a Decision dated March 26, 1999, affirmed in toto the trial court’s award of damages
in favor of the respondent.

Unsatisfied, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the Appellate Court in a Resolution dated
August 5, 1999.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Petitioner contends that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the instant case;
and that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court’s finding that petitioner incurred unreasonable delay in the
delivery of the condominium unit to respondent.

On petitioner’s contention that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the instant case, Section 1 (c) of Presidential Decree
No. 1344, as amended, provides:

"SECTION 1. – In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real estate trade and business and in addition to its powers
provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority [now Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board (HLURB)]4 shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature:

xxx

"C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots or
condominium units against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman.

x x x."

Pursuant to the above provisions, it is the HLURB which has jurisdiction over the instant case. We have consistently held
that complaints for specific performance with damages by a lot or condominium unit buyer against the owner or developer
falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB.5

While it may be true that the trial court is without jurisdiction over the case, petitioner’s active participation in the
proceedings estopped it from assailing such lack of it. We have held that it is an undesirable practice of a party
participating in the proceedings and submitting its case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable,
and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse.6

Here, petitioner failed to raise the question of jurisdiction before the trial court and the Appellate Court. In effect, petitioner
confirmed and ratified the trial court’s jurisdiction over this case. Certainly, it is now in estoppel and can no longer question
the trial court’s jurisdiction.

On petitioner’s claim that it did not incur delay, suffice it to say that this is a factual issue. Time and again, we have ruled
that "the factual findings of the trial court are given weight when supported by substantial evidence and carries more
weight when affirmed by the Court of Appeals."7 Whether or not petitioner incurred delay and thus, liable to pay
damages as a result thereof, are indeed factual questions.

The jurisdiction of this Court in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, is limited to reviewing only errors of law, not of fact, unless the factual findings being assailed are not supported
by evidence on record or the impugned judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts.8 These exceptions are not
present here.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated March 26, 1999 and Resolution dated August 5,
1999 of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO.

Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Vitug, (Chairman), Corona, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.

A.M. No. MTJ-01-1370 April 25, 2003
(Formerly A.M. No. 00-11-238-MTC)

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, complainant,

vs.
JUDGE AGUSTIN T. SARDIDO, Municipal Trial Court of Koronadal, South Cotabato, respondent.

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is an administrative case against respondent Judge Agustin T. Sardido ("Judge Sardido") formerly presiding judge of
the Municipal Trial Court of Koronadal, South Cotabato, for gross ignorance of the law. Judge Sardido issued an Order
dated 20 October 1998 excluding Judge Braulio Hurtado, Jr. ("Judge Hurtado") of the Regional Trial Court of Kabacan,
North Cotabato as one of the accused in an Amended Information.1 Judge Sardido ruled that Supreme Court Circular No.
3-89 requires that Judge Hurtado be dropped from the Amended Information and his case be forwarded to the Court.

The Facts

Private complainant Teresita Aguirre Magbanua accused Oscar Pagunsan and Danilo Ong of the crime of "Falsification by
Private Individual and Use of Falsified Document."2 The Amended Information included Judge Hurtado. The case,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 14071, was raffled to Judge Sardido, then presiding judge of the Municipal Trial Court of
Koronadal, South Cotabato ("MTC-Koronadal").

In a Deed of Absolute Sale dated 8 August 1993, private complainant Magbanua and six other vendors allegedly sold two
parcels of land, covered by TCT Nos. 47873 and 33633 and located at the commercial district of Koronadal, to Davao
Realty Development Corporation, represented by accused Ong, with co-accused Pagunsan, as broker. Judge Hurtado,
who at that time was the Clerk of Court of RTC-Koronadal and ex-officio notary public, notarized the Deed of Absolute
Sale.

However, private complainant Magbanua denies signing the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 8 August 1993 which states that
the consideration for the sale was only P600,000.00. Private complainant asserts that what she and the other vendors
signed was a Deed of Absolute Sale dated 6 August 1996 for a consideration of P16,000,000.00. Under the terms of the
sale, the vendee agreed to pay for the capital gains tax. The consideration in the 8 August 1993 Deed of Absolute Sale
was apparently undervalued. Subsequently, the Bureau of Internal Revenue assessed the vendors a deficiency capital
gains tax of P1,023,375.00.

Judge Hurtado filed a motion praying that the criminal complaint against him be forwarded to the Supreme Court. Judge
Hurtado claimed that Circular No. 3-89 dated 6 February 1989 requires "all cases involving justices and judges of the
lower courts, whether or not such complaints deal with acts apparently unrelated to the discharge of their official functions,
such as acts of immorality, estafa, crimes against persons and property, etc." to be forwarded to the Supreme Court.
Judge Hurtado asserted that since the case against him is one involving a judge of a lower court, the same should be
forwarded to the Supreme Court pursuant to Circular No. 3-89.

The Provincial Prosecutor opposed Judge Hurtado’s motion, arguing that the case against Judge Hurtado is not within the
scope of Circular No. 3-89 since it is not an IBP-initiated case. Moreover, the offense charged was committed in 1993
when Judge Hurtado was still a clerk of court and ex-officio notary public.

On 20 October 1998, Judge Sardido issued an Order, the pertinent portions of which read:
The issue to be resolved in the instant case is, whether the case of Judge Hurtado, who is charged for acts committed
prior to his appointment as an RTC Judge, falls within the purview of the afore-said Circular No. 3-89.

It is the humble submission of the Court that the case of Judge Hurtado, an RTC Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Kabacan, North Cotabato, falls within the meaning and intent of the said circular.

For reasons being, firstly, the said circular provides that all cases involving justices and judges of lower courts shall be
forwarded to the Supreme Court for appropriate action, whether or not such complaints deal with acts apparently
unrelated to the discharge of their official functions, and regardless of the nature of the crime, without any qualification
whether the crime was committed before or during his tenure of office. Under the law on Legal Hermeneutics, if the law
does not qualify we must not qualify. Secondly, it would sound, to the mind of the Court, awkward for a first level court to
be trying an incumbent judge of a second level court.

For reasons afore-stated, this Court can not and shall not try this case as against Judge Hurtado, unless the Honorable
Supreme Court would order otherwise.

Wherefore, the foregoing premises duly considered, the name of Judge Braulio L. Hurtado, Jr. is ordered excluded from
the amended information and the case against him is ordered forwarded to the Honorable Supreme Court, pursuant to the
afore-said Circular No. 3-89 of the Supreme Court, dated February 9, 1989.

Accordingly, Maxima S. Borja ("Borja"), Stenographer I and Acting Clerk of Court II of the MTC-Koronadal, South
Cotabato, wrote a letter dated 21 July 1999 forwarding the criminal case against Judge Hurtado to the Court Administrator
for appropriate action.

Then Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo issued a Memorandum dated 25 October 2000 pointing out that Circular
No. 3-89 refers only to administrative complaints filed with the IBP against justices and judges of lower courts. The
Circular does not apply to criminal cases filed before trial courts against such justices and judges.

Thus, in the Resolution of 6 December 2000, the Court directed that the letter of Acting Clerk of Court Borja be returned to
the MTC-Koronadal together with the records of the criminal case. The Court directed Judge Sardido to explain in writing
why he should not be held liable for gross ignorance of the law for excluding Judge Hurtado from the Amended
Information and for transmitting the records of Judge Hurtado’s case to the Court.

In his Explanation dated 26 January 2001, Judge Sardido reasoned out that he excluded Judge Hurtado because Circular
No. 3-89 directs the IBP to "forward to the Supreme Court for appropriate action all cases involving justices and judges of
lower courts x x x." Judge Sardido claims that the Circular likewise "applies to courts in cases involving justices or judges
of the lower courts," especially so in this case where "Judge Hurtado was charged with falsification of public document as
a notary public while he was still the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of the 11th Judicial Region in Koronadal,
South Cotabato."

In the Resolution of 28 March 2001, the Court referred this case to the Office of the Court Administrator ("OCA") for
evaluation, report and recommendation. On 10 July 2001, the OCA submitted a Memorandum recommending that this
case be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter.

Judge Sardido filed his Manifestation dated 20 September 2001 stating that he is submitting the case for decision based
on the pleadings and records already filed. Judge Sardido insisted that he did "what he had done in all honesty and good
faith."

OCA’s Findings and Conclusions

The OCA found that Judge Sardido erred in excluding Judge Hurtado as one of the accused in the Amended Information
in Criminal Case No. 14071. The OCA held that Circular No. 3-89, which is Judge Sardido’s basis in issuing the Order of
20 October 1998, refers to administrative complaints filed with the IBP against justices and judges of lower courts. The
Circular does not apply to criminal cases filed against justices and judges of lower courts. The OCA recommended that a
fine of P5,000.00 be imposed on Judge Sardido for gross ignorance of the law.

The Court’s Ruling

The Court issued Circular No. 3-89 in response to a letter dated 19 December 1988 by then IBP President Leon M.
Garcia, seeking clarification of the Court’s En Banc Resolution of 29 November 1998 in RE: Letter of then Acting
Presiding Justice Rodolfo A. Nocon3 and Associate Justices Reynato Puno4 and Alfredo Marigomen5 of the Court of
Appeals.

A certain Atty. Eduardo R. Balaoing had filed a complaint against Court of Appeals Justices Nocon, Puno and Marigomen
relating to a petition filed before their division. In its En Banc Resolution of 29 November 1988, the Court required the IBP
to refer to the Supreme Court for appropriate action the complaint6 filed by Atty. Balaoing with the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline. The Court stated that the power to discipline justices and judges of the lower courts is within the Court’s
exclusive power and authority as provided in Section 11, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.7 The Court Administrator
publicized the En Banc Resolution of 29 November 1988 by issuing Circular No. 17 dated 20 December 1988.

The Court issued Circular No. 3-89 on 6 February 1989 clarifying the En Banc Resolution of 29 November 1988. Circular
No. 3-89 provides in part as follows:

(1) The IBP (Board of Governors and Commission on Bar Discipline) shall forward to the Supreme Court for appropriate
action all cases involving justices and judges of lower courts, whether or not such complaints deal with acts apparently
unrelated to the discharge of their official functions, such as acts of immorality, estafa, crimes against persons and
property, etc. x x x. (Emphasis supplied)

Circular No. 3-89 clarified the second paragraph, Section 1 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court which states that:

The IBP Board of Governors may, motu proprio or upon referral by the Supreme Court or by a Chapter Board of Officers,
or at the instance of any person, initiate and prosecute proper charges against erring attorneys including those in the
government service. (Emphasis supplied).

As clarified, the phrase "attorneys x x x in the government service" in Section 1 of Rule 139-B does not include justices of
appellate courts and judges of lower courts who are not subject to the disciplining authority of the IBP. All administrative
cases against justices of appellate courts and judges of lower courts fall exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court.

However, Rule 139-B refers to Disbarment and Discipline of Attorneys which is administrative and not criminal in nature.
The cases referred to in Circular No. 3-89 are administrative cases for disbarment, suspension or discipline of attorneys,
including justices of appellate courts and judges of the lower courts. The Court has vested the IBP with the power to
initiate and prosecute administrative cases against erring lawyers.8 However, under Circular No. 3-89, the Court has
directed the IBP to refer to the Supreme Court for appropriate action all administrative cases filed with IBP against justices
of appellate courts and judges of the lower courts. As mandated by the Constitution, the Court exercises the exclusive
power to discipline administratively justices of appellate courts and judges of lower courts.

Circular No. 3-89 does not refer to criminal cases against erring justices of appellate courts or judges of lower courts. Trial
courts retain jurisdiction over the criminal aspect of offenses committed by justices of appellate courts9and judges of lower
courts. This is clear from the Circular directing the IBP, and not the trial courts, to refer all administrative cases filed
against justices of appellate courts and judges of lower courts to the Supreme Court. The case filed against Judge
Hurtado is not an administrative case filed with the IBP. It is a criminal case filed with the trial court under its jurisdiction as
prescribed by law.

The acts or omissions of a judge may well constitute at the same time both a criminal act and an administrative offense.
Whether the criminal case against Judge Hurtado relates to an act committed before or after he became a judge is of no
moment. Neither is it material that an MTC judge will be trying an RTC judge in the criminal case. A criminal case against
an attorney or judge is distinct and separate from an administrative case against him. The dismissal of the criminal case
does not warrant the dismissal of an administrative case arising from the same set of facts. The quantum of evidence that
is required in the latter is only preponderance of evidence, and not proof beyond reasonable doubt which is required in
criminal cases.10 As held in Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc. v. Naldoza:11

Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and they may proceed
independently of civil and criminal cases.

The burden of proof for these types of cases differ. In a criminal case, proof beyond reasonable doubt is necessary; in an
administrative case for disbarment or suspension, ‘clearly preponderant evidence’ is all that is required. Thus, a criminal
prosecution will not constitute a prejudicial question even if the same facts and circumstances are attendant in the
administrative proceedings.

It should be emphasized that a finding of guilt in the criminal case will not necessarily result in a finding of liability in the
administrative case. Conversely, respondent’s acquittal does not necessarily exculpate him administratively. In the same
vein, the trial court’s finding of civil liability against the respondent will not inexorably lead to a similar finding in the
administrative action before this Court. Neither will a favorable disposition in the civil action absolve the administrative
liability of the lawyer. The basic premise is that criminal and civil cases are altogether different from administrative
matters, such that the disposition in the first two will not inevitably govern the third and vice versa. For this reason, it would
be well to remember the Court’s ruling in In re Almacen, which we quote:

"x x x Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve
a trial of an action or a suit, but are rather investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being
intended to inflict punishment, [they are] in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a
prosecutor therein. [They] may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is [their] primary objective, and the
real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such.
Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his
actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper
and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have prove[n]
themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. x x
x"

A judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules. He must be
conversant with basic legal principles and well-settled doctrines. He should strive for excellence and seek the truth with
passion.12 Judge Sardido failed in this regard. He erred in excluding Judge Hurtado as one of the accused in the Amended
Information and in forwarding the criminal case against Judge Hurtado to the Court.

One last point. This administrative case against Judge Sardido started before the amendment13 of Rule 140 classifying
gross ignorance of the law a serious offense punishable by a fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.
The amendment cannot apply retroactively to Judge Sardido’s case. However, the fine of P5,000.00 recommended by the
OCA is too light a penalty considering that this is not the first offense of Judge Sardido.

In RE: Hold Departure Order Issued by Judge Agustin T. Sardido,14 the Court reprimanded Judge Sardido for issuing a
hold-departure order contrary to Circular No. 39-97. In Cabilao v. Judge Sardido,15 the Court fined Judge Sardido
P5,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of discretion and gross misconduct. The Court gave a stern
warning to Judge Sardido that a commission of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely. In Almeron v.
Judge Sardido,16 the Court imposed on Judge Sardido a stiffer fine of P10,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law. He was
again sternly warned that the commission of the same or similar act in the future would be dealt with more severely
including, if warranted, his dismissal from the service.

In a more recent administrative case, Torcende v. Judge Sardido,17 the Court found Judge Sardido again guilty of gross
ignorance of the law and of gross misconduct. This time the Court dismissed Judge Sardido from the service with
forfeiture of his retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits. The dismissal was with prejudice to reemployment in
any branch of the government or any of its agencies or instrumentalities, including government-owned and controlled
corporations.

The records of the OCA further disclose that Judge Sardido has other similar administrative complaints18 still pending
against him. Such an unflattering service record erodes the people’s faith and confidence in the judiciary. It is the duty of
every member of the bench to avoid any impression of impropriety to protect the image and integrity of the judiciary.19 The
Court may still impose a fine on Judge Sardido in the instant case despite his dismissal from the service.

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Agustin T. Sardido is FINED Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) for gross ignorance of
the law. The fine may be deducted from his accrued leave credits.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, Ynares-Santiago, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

.R. No. 151149 September 7, 2004

GEORGE KATON, petitioner,

vs.
MANUEL PALANCA JR., LORENZO AGUSTIN, JESUS GAPILANGO and JUAN FRESNILLO, respondents.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Where prescription, lack of jurisdiction or failure to state a cause of action clearly appear from the complaint filed with the
trial court, the action may be dismissed motu proprio by the Court of Appeals, even if the case has been elevated for
review on different grounds. Verily, the dismissal of such cases appropriately ends useless litigations.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the December 8, 2000 Decision2and the
November 20, 2001 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP No. 57496. The assailed Decision disposed as
follows:

"Assuming that petitioner is correct in saying that he has the exclusive right in applying for the patent over the land in
question, it appears that his action is already barred by laches because he slept on his alleged right for almost 23 years
from the time the original certificate of title has been issued to respondent Manuel Palanca, Jr., or after 35 years from the
time the land was certified as agricultural land. In addition, the proper party in the annulment of patents or titles acquired
through fraud is the State; thus, the petitioner’s action is deemed misplaced as he really does not have any right to assert
or protect. What he had during the time he requested for the re-classification of the land was the privilege of applying for
the patent over the same upon the land’s conversion from forest to agricultural.
"WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to cost."4

The assailed Resolution, on the other hand, denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner. It affirmed the
RTC’s dismissal of his Complaint in Civil Case No. 3231, not on the grounds relied upon by the trial court, but because of
prescription and lack of jurisdiction.

The Antecedent Facts

The CA narrates the antecedent facts as follows:

"On August 2, 1963, herein [P]etitioner [George Katon] filed a request with the District Office of the Bureau of Forestry in
Puerto Princesa, Palawan, for the re-classification of a piece of real property known as Sombrero Island, located in
Tagpait, Aborlan, Palawan, which consists of approximately 18 hectares. Said property is within Timberland Block of LC
Project No. 10-C of Aborlan, Palawan, per BF Map LC No. 1582.

"Thereafter, the Bureau of Forestry District Office, Puerto Princesa, Palawan, ordered the inspection, investigation and
survey of the land subject of the petitioner’s request for eventual conversion or re-classification from forest to agricultural
land, and thereafter for George Katon to apply for a homestead patent.

"Gabriel Mandocdoc (now retired Land Classification Investigator) undertook the investigation, inspection and survey of
the area in the presence of the petitioner, his brother Rodolfo Katon (deceased) and his cousin, [R]espondent Manuel
Palanca, Jr. During said survey, there were no actual occupants on the island but there were some coconut trees claimed
to have been planted by petitioner and [R]espondent Manuel Palanca, Jr. (alleged overseer of petitioner) who went to the
island from time to time to undertake development work, like planting of additional coconut trees.

"The application for conversion of the whole Sombrero Island was favorably endorsed by the Forestry District Office of
Puerto Princesa to its main office in Manila for appropriate action. The names of Felicisimo Corpuz, Clemente Magdayao
and Jesus Gapilango and Juan Fresnillo were included in the endorsement as co-applicants of the petitioner.

"In a letter dated September 23, 1965, then Asst. Director of Forestry R.J.L. Utleg informed the Director of Lands, Manila,
that since the subject land was no longer needed for forest purposes, the same is therefore certified and released as
agricultural land for disposition under the Public Land Act.

"Petitioner contends that the whole area known as Sombrero Island had been classified from forest land to agricultural
land and certified available for disposition upon his request and at his instance. However, Mr. Lucio Valera, then [l]and
investigator of the District Land Office, Puerto Princesa, Palawan, favorably endorsed the request of [R]espondents
Manuel Palanca Jr. and Lorenzo Agustin, for authority to survey on November 15, 1965. On November 22, a second
endorsement was issued by Palawan District Officer Diomedes De Guzman with specific instruction to survey vacant
portions of Sombrero Island for the respondents consisting of five (5) hectares each. On December 10, 1965, Survey
Authority No. R III-342-65 was issued authorizing Deputy Public Land Surveyor Eduardo Salvador to survey ten (10)
hectares of Sombrero Island for the respondents. On December 23, 1990, [R]espondent Lorenzo Agustin filed a
homestead patent application for a portion of the subject island consisting of an area of 4.3 hectares.

"Records show that on November 8, 1996, [R]espondent Juan Fresnillo filed a homestead patent application for a portion
of the island comprising 8.5 hectares. Records also reveal that [R]espondent Jesus Gapilango filed a homestead
application on June 8, 1972. Respondent Manuel Palanca, Jr. was issued Homestead Patent No. 145927 and OCT No.
G-7089 on March 3, 19775 with an area of 6.84 hectares of Sombrero Island.

"Petitioner assails the validity of the homestead patents and original certificates of title covering certain portions of
Sombrero Island issued in favor of respondents on the ground that the same were obtained through fraud. Petitioner
prays for the reconveyance of the whole island in his favor.
"On the other hand, [R]espondent Manuel Palanca, Jr. claims that he himself requested for the reclassification of the
island in dispute and that on or about the time of such request, [R]espondents Fresnillo, Palanca and Gapilango already
occupied their respective areas and introduced numerous improvements. In addition, Palanca said that petitioner never
filed any homestead application for the island. Respondents deny that Gabriel Mandocdoc undertook the inspection and
survey of the island.

"According to Mandocdoc, the island was uninhabited but the respondents insist that they already had their respective
occupancy and improvements on the island. Palanca denies that he is a mere overseer of the petitioner because he said
he was acting for himself in developing his own area and not as anybody’s caretaker.

"Respondents aver that they are all bona fide and lawful possessors of their respective portions and have declared said
portions for taxation purposes and that they have been faithfully paying taxes thereon for twenty years.

"Respondents contend that the petitioner has no legal capacity to sue insofar as the island is concerned because an
action for reconveyance can only be brought by the owner and not a mere homestead applicant and that petitioner is
guilty of estoppel by laches for his failure to assert his right over the land for an unreasonable and unexplained period of
time.

"In the instant case, petitioner seeks to nullify the homestead patents and original certificates of title issued in favor of the
respondents covering certain portions of the Sombrero Island as well as the reconveyance of the whole island in his favor.
The petitioner claims that he has the exclusive right to file an application for homestead patent over the whole island since
it was he who requested for its conversion from forest land to agricultural land."6

Respondents filed their Answer with Special and/or Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim in due time. On June 30,
1999, they also filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of the alleged defiance by petitioner of the trial court’s Order to
amend his Complaint so he could thus effect a substitution by the legal heirs of the deceased, Respondent Gapilango.
The Motion to Dismiss was granted by the RTC in its Order dated July 29, 1999.

Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration of the July 29, 1999 Order was denied by the trial court in its Resolution dated
December 17, 1999, for being a third and prohibited motion. In his Petition for Certiorari before the CA, petitioner charged
the trial court with grave abuse of discretion on the ground that the denied Motion was his first and only Motion for
Reconsideration of the aforesaid Order.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Instead of limiting itself to the allegation of grave abuse of discretion, the CA ruled on the merits. It held that while
petitioner had caused the reclassification of Sombrero Island from forest to agricultural land, he never applied for a
homestead patent under the Public Land Act. Hence, he never acquired title to that land.

The CA added that the annulment and cancellation of a homestead patent and the reversion of the property to the State
were matters between the latter and the homestead grantee. Unless and until the government takes steps to annul the
grant, the homesteader’s right thereto stands.

Finally, granting arguendo that petitioner had the exclusive right to apply for a patent to the land in question, he was
already barred by laches for having slept on his right for almost 23 years from the time Respondent Palanca’s title had
been issued.

In the Assailed Resolution, the CA acknowledged that it had erred when it ruled on the merits of the case. It agreed with
petitioner that the trial court had acted without jurisdiction in perfunctorily dismissing his September 10, 1999 Motion for
Reconsideration, on the erroneous ground that it was a third and prohibited motion when it was actually only his first
motion.
Nonetheless, the Complaint was dismissed motu proprio by the challenged Resolution of the CA Special Division of five
members – with two justices dissenting – pursuant to its "residual prerogative" under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of
Court.

From the allegations of the Complaint, the appellate court opined that petitioner clearly had no standing to seek
reconveyance of the disputed land, because he neither held title to it nor even applied for a homestead patent. It
reiterated that only the State could sue for cancellation of the title issued upon a homestead patent, and for reversion of
the land to the public domain.

Finally, it ruled that prescription had already barred the action for reconveyance. First, petitioner’s action was brought 24
years after the issuance of Palanca’s homestead patent. Under the Public Land Act, such action should have been taken
within ten years from the issuance of the homestead certificate of title. Second, it appears from the submission (Annex "F"
of the Complaint) of petitioner himself that Respondents Fresnillo and Palanca had been occupying six hectares of the
island since 1965, or 33 years before he took legal steps to assert his right to the property. His action was filed beyond the
30-year prescriptive period under Articles 1141 and 1137 of the Civil Code.

Hence, this Petition.7

Issues

In his Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues:

"1. Is the Court of Appeals correct in resolving the Petition for Certiorari based on an issue not raised (the merits of the
case) in the Petition?

"2. Is the Court of Appeals correct in invoking its alleged ‘residual prerogative’ under Section 1, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure in resolving the Petition on an issue not raised in the Petition?"8

The Court’s Ruling

The Petition has no merit.

First Issue:

Propriety of Ruling on the Merits

This is not the first time that petitioner has taken issue with the propriety of the CA’s ruling on the merits. He raised it with
the appellate court when he moved for reconsideration of its December 8, 2000 Decision. The CA even corrected itself in
its November 20, 2001 Resolution, as follows:

"Upon another review of the case, the Court concedes that it may indeed have lost its way and been waylaid by the
variety, complexity and seeming importance of the interests and issues involved in the case below, the apparent
reluctance of the judges, five in all, to hear the case, and the volume of the conflicting, often confusing, submissions
bearing on incidental matters. We stand corrected."9

That explanation should have been enough to settle the issue. The CA’s Resolution on this point has rendered petitioner’s
issue moot. Hence, there is no need to discuss it further. Suffice it to say that the appellate court indeed acted ultra
jurisdictio in ruling on the merits of the case when the only issue that could have been, and was in fact, raised was the
alleged grave abuse of discretion committed by the trial court in denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. Settled is
the doctrine that the sole office of a writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction. Such writ does not include a
review of the evidence,10 more so when no determination of the merits has yet been made by the trial court, as in this
case.

Second Issue:

Dismissal for Prescription and Lack of Jurisdiction

Petitioner next submits that the CA erroneously invoked its "residual prerogatives" under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules
of Court when it motu proprio dismissed the Petition for lack of jurisdiction and prescription. According to him, residual
prerogative refers to the power that the trial court, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, may still validly exercise even
after perfection of an appeal. It follows that such powers are not possessed by an appellate court.

Petitioner has confused what the CA adverted to as its "residual prerogatives" under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of
Court with the "residual jurisdiction" of trial courts over cases appealed to the CA.

Under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in
the answer are deemed waived, except when (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) litis pendentia, (3) res
judicata and (4) prescription are evident from the pleadings or the evidence on record. In the four excepted instances, the
court shall motu proprio dismiss the claim or action. In Gumabon v. Larin11 we explained thus:

"x x x [T]he motu proprio dismissal of a case was traditionally limited to instances when the court clearly had no
jurisdiction over the subject matter and when the plaintiff did not appear during trial, failed to prosecute his action for an
unreasonable length of time or neglected to comply with the rules or with any order of the court. Outside of these
instances, any motu proprio dismissal would amount to a violation of the right of the plaintiff to be heard. Except for
qualifying and expanding Section 2, Rule 9, and Section 3, Rule 17, of the Revised Rules of Court, the amendatory 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure brought about no radical change. Under the new rules, a court may motu proprio dismiss a claim
when it appears from the pleadings or evidence on record that it has no jurisdiction over the subject matter; when there is
another cause of action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or where the action is barred by a prior
judgment or by statute of limitations. x x x."12 (Italics supplied)

On the other hand, "residual jurisdiction" is embodied in Section 9 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, as follows:

"SEC. 9. Perfection of appeal; effect thereof. – A party’s appeal by notice of appeal is deemed perfected as to him upon
the filing of the notice of appeal in due time.

"A party’s appeal by record on appeal is deemed perfected as to him with respect to the subject matter thereof upon the
approval of the record on appeal filed in due time.

"In appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the appeals filed in due
time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties.

"In appeals by record on appeal, the court loses jurisdiction only over the subject matter thereof upon the approval of the
records on appeal filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties.

"In either case, prior to the transmittal of the original record or the record on appeal, the court may issue orders for the
protection and preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal, approve
compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal in accordance with Section 2 of Rule
39, and allow withdrawal of the appeal." (Italics supplied)

The "residual jurisdiction" of trial courts is available at a stage in which the court is normally deemed to have lost
jurisdiction over the case or the subject matter involved in the appeal. This stage is reached upon the perfection of the
appeals by the parties or upon the approval of the records on appeal, but prior to the transmittal of the original records or
the records on appeal.13 In either instance, the trial court still retains its so-called residual jurisdiction to issue protective
orders, approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal, and allow the
withdrawal of the appeal.

The CA’s motu proprio dismissal of petitioner’s Complaint could not have been based, therefore, on residual jurisdiction
under Rule 41. Undeniably, such order of dismissal was not one for the protection and preservation of the rights of the
parties, pending the disposition of the case on appeal. What the CA referred to as residual prerogatives were the general
residual powers of the courts to dismiss an action motu proprio upon the grounds mentioned in Section 1 of Rule 9 of the
Rules of Court and under authority of Section 2 of Rule 114 of the same rules.

To be sure, the CA had the excepted instances in mind when it dismissed the Complaint motu proprio "on more
fundamental grounds directly bearing on the lower court’s lack of jurisdiction"15 and for prescription of the action. Indeed,
when a court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the only power it has is to dismiss the action.16

Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations in the complaint and the
character of the relief sought.17 In his Complaint for "Nullification of Applications for Homestead and Original Certificate of
Title No. G-7089 and for Reconveyance of Title,"18 petitioner averred:

"2. That on November 10, 1965, without the knowledge of [petitioner, Respondent] Manuel Palanca Jr., [petitioner’s]
cousin, in connivance with his co-[respondent], Lorenzo Agustin, x x x fraudulently and in bad faith:

2.1. x x x made the request for authority to survey as a pre-requisite to the filing of an application for homestead patent in
his name and that of his Co-[Respondent] Agustin, [despite being] fully aware that [Petitioner] KATON had previously
applied or requested for re-classification and certification of the same land from forest land to agricultural land which
request was favorably acted upon and approved as mentioned earlier; a clear case of intrinsic fraud and
misrepresentation;

xxx xxx xxx

2.3. In stating in his application for homestead patent that he was applying for the VACANT PORTION of Sombrero Island
where there was none, the same constituted another clear case of fraud and misrepresentation;

"3. That the issuance of Homestead Patent No. 145927 and OCT No. G-7089 in the name of [Respondent] Manuel
Palanca Jr. and the filing of Homestead Patent Applications in the names of [respondents], Lorenzo Agustin, Jesus
Gapilango and Juan Fresnillo[,] having been done fraudulently and in bad faith, are ipso facto null and void and of no
effect whatsoever."19

xxx xxx xxx

"x x x. By a wrongful act or a willful omission and intending the effects with natural necessity arise knowing from such act
or omission, [Respondent Palanca] on account of his blood relation, first degree cousins, trust, interdependence and
intimacy is guilty of intrinsic fraud [sic]. x x x."20

Thereupon, petitioner prayed, among others, for a judgment (1) nullifying the homestead patent applications of
Respondents Agustin, Fresnillo and Gapilango as well as Homestead Patent No. 145927 and OCT No. G-7089 in the
name of Respondent Palanca; and (2) ordering the director of the Land Management Bureau to reconvey the Sombrero
Island to petitioner.21

The question is, did the Complaint sufficiently allege an action for declaration of nullity of the free patent and certificate of
title or, alternatively, for reconveyance? Or did it plead merely for reversion?
The Complaint did not sufficiently make a case for any of such actions, over which the trial court could have exercised
jurisdiction.

In an action for nullification of title or declaration of its nullity, the complaint must contain the following allegations: 1) that
the contested land was privately owned by the plaintiff prior to the issuance of the assailed certificate of title to the
defendant; and 2) that the defendant perpetuated a fraud or committed a mistake in obtaining a document of title over the
parcel of land claimed by the plaintiff.22 In these cases, the nullity arises not from fraud or deceit, but from the fact that the
director of the Land Management Bureau had no jurisdiction to bestow title; hence, the issued patent or certificate of title
was void ab initio.23

In an alternative action for reconveyance, the certificate of title is also respected as incontrovertible, but the transfer of the
property or title thereto is sought to be nullified on the ground that it was wrongfully or erroneously registered in the
defendant’s name.24 As with an annulment of title, a complaint must allege two facts that, if admitted, would entitle the
plaintiff to recover title to the disputed land: (1) that the plaintiff was the owner of the land, and (2) that the defendant
illegally dispossessed the plaintiff of the property.25 Therefore, the defendant who acquired the property through mistake
or fraud is bound to hold and reconvey to the plaintiff the property or the title thereto.26

In the present case, nowhere in the Complaint did petitioner allege that he had previously held title to the land in question.
On the contrary, he acknowledged that the disputed island was public land,27 that it had never been privately titled in his
name, and that he had not applied for a homestead under the provisions of the Public Land Act.28 This Court has held that
a complaint by a private party who alleges that a homestead patent was obtained by fraudulent means, and who
consequently prays for its annulment, does not state a cause of action; hence, such complaint must be dismissed.29

Neither can petitioner’s case be one for reversion. Section 101 of the Public Land Act categorically declares that only the
solicitor general or the officer in his stead may institute such an action.30 A private person may not bring an action for
reversion or any other action that would have the effect of canceling a free patent and its derivative title, with the result
that the land thereby covered would again form part of the public domain.31

Thus, when the plaintiff admits in the complaint that the disputed land will revert to the public domain even if the title is
canceled or amended, the action is for reversion; and the proper party who may bring action is the government, to which
the property will revert.32 A mere homestead applicant, not being the real party in interest, has no cause of action in a suit
for reconveyance.33 As it is, vested rights over the land applied for under a homestead may be validly claimed only by the
applicant, after approval by the director of the Land Management Bureau of the former’s final proof of homestead patent.34

Consequently, the dismissal of the Complaint is proper not only because of lack of jurisdiction, but also because of the
utter absence of a cause of action,35 a defense raised by respondents in their Answer.36 Section 2 of Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court37 ordains that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest, who stands to
be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit. Indeed, one who has no right or interest to protect has no cause of
action by which to invoke, as a party-plaintiff, the jurisdiction of the court.38

Finally, assuming that petitioner is the proper party to bring the action for annulment of title or its reconveyance, the case
should still be dismissed for being time-barred.39 It is not disputed that a homestead patent and an Original Certificate of
Title was issued to Palanca on February 21, 1977,40 while the Complaint was filed only on October 6, 1998. Clearly, the
suit was brought way past ten years from the date of the issuance of the Certificate, the prescriptive period for
reconveyance of fraudulently registered real property.41

It must likewise be stressed that Palanca’s title -- which attained the status of indefeasibility one year from the issuance of
the patent and the Certificate of Title in February 1977 -- is no longer open to review on the ground of actual fraud.
Ybanez v. Intermediate Appellate Court42 ruled that a certificate of title, issued under an administrative proceeding
pursuant to a homestead patent, is as indefeasible as one issued under a judicial registration proceeding one year from its
issuance; provided, however, that the land covered by it is disposable public land, as in this case.
In Aldovino v. Alunan,43 the Court has held that when the plaintiff’s own complaint shows clearly that the action has
prescribed, such action may be dismissed even if the defense of prescription has not been invoked by the defendant. In
Gicano v. Gegato,44 we also explained thus:

"x x x [T]rial courts have authority and discretion to dismiss an action on the ground of prescription when the parties'
pleadings or other facts on record show it to be indeed time-barred; (Francisco v. Robles, Feb. 15, 1954; Sison v.
McQuaid, 50 O.G. 97; Bambao v. Lednicky, Jan. 28, 1961; Cordova v. Cordova, Jan. 14, 1958; Convets, Inc. v. NDC,
Feb. 28, 1958; 32 SCRA 529; Sinaon v. Sorongan, 136 SCRA 408); and it may do so on the basis of a motion to dismiss
(Sec. 1,f, Rule 16, Rules of Court), or an answer which sets up such ground as an affirmative defense (Sec. 5, Rule 16),
or even if the ground is alleged after judgment on the merits, as in a motion for reconsideration (Ferrer v. Ericta, 84 SCRA
705); or even if the defense has not been asserted at all, as where no statement thereof is found in the pleadings (Garcia
v. Mathis, 100 SCRA 250; PNB v. Pacific Commission House, 27 SCRA 766; Chua Lamco v. Dioso, et al., 97 Phil. 821);
or where a defendant has been declared in default (PNB v. Perez, 16 SCRA 270). What is essential only, to repeat, is that
the facts demonstrating the lapse of the prescriptive period be otherwise sufficiently and satisfactorily apparent on the
record; either in the averments of the plaintiff's complaint, or otherwise established by the evidence."45 (Italics supplied)

Clearly then, the CA did not err in dismissing the present case. After all, if and when they are able to do so, courts must
endeavor to settle entire controversies before them to prevent future litigations.46

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED, and the assailed Resolution AFFIRMED. The dismissal of the Complaint
in Civil Case No. 3231 is SUSTAINED on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction, failure to state a cause of action and
prescription. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Carpio Morales*, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 147406 July 14, 2008

VENANCIO FIGUEROA y CERVANTES,1 Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

When is a litigant estopped by laches from assailing the jurisdiction of a tribunal? This is the paramount issue raised in
this petition for review of the February 28, 2001 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 22697.

Pertinent are the following antecedent facts and proceedings:

On July 8, 1994, an information3 for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide was filed against the petitioner before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan, Branch 18.4 The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 2235-M-94.5 Trial on
the merits ensued and on August 19, 1998, the trial court convicted the petitioner as charged.6 In his appeal before the
CA, the petitioner questioned, among others, for the first time, the trial court’s jurisdiction.7

The appellate court, however, in the challenged decision, considered the petitioner to have actively participated in the trial
and to have belatedly attacked the jurisdiction of the RTC; thus, he was already estopped by laches from asserting the
trial court’s lack of jurisdiction. Finding no other ground to reverse the trial court’s decision, the CA affirmed the petitioner’s
conviction but modified the penalty imposed and the damages awarded.8
Dissatisfied, the petitioner filed the instant petition for review on certiorari raising the following issues for our resolution:

a. Does the fact that the petitioner failed to raise the issue of jurisdiction during the trial of this case, which was initiated
and filed by the public prosecutor before the wrong court, constitute laches in relation to the doctrine laid down in Tijam v.
Sibonghanoy, notwithstanding the fact that said issue was immediately raised in petitioner’s appeal to the Honorable
Court of Appeals? Conversely, does the active participation of the petitioner in the trial of his case, which is initiated and
filed not by him but by the public prosecutor, amount to estoppel?

b. Does the admission of the petitioner that it is difficult to immediately stop a bus while it is running at 40 kilometers per
hour for the purpose of avoiding a person who unexpectedly crossed the road, constitute enough incriminating evidence
to warrant his conviction for the crime charged?

c. Is the Honorable Court of Appeals justified in considering the place of accident as falling within Item 4 of Section 35 (b)
of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, and subsequently ruling that the speed limit thereto is only 20 kilometers per
hour, when no evidence whatsoever to that effect was ever presented by the prosecution during the trial of this case?

d. Is the Honorable Court of Appeals justified in convicting the petitioner for homicide through reckless imprudence (the
legally correct designation is "reckless imprudence resulting to homicide") with violation of the Land Transportation and
Traffic Code when the prosecution did not prove this during the trial and, more importantly, the information filed against
the petitioner does not contain an allegation to that effect?

e. Does the uncontroverted testimony of the defense witness Leonardo Hernal that the victim unexpectedly crossed the
road resulting in him getting hit by the bus driven by the petitioner not enough evidence to acquit him of the crime
charged?9

Applied uniformly is the familiar rule that the jurisdiction of the court to hear and decide a case is conferred by the law in
force at the time of the institution of the action, unless such statute provides for a retroactive application thereof.10 In this
case, at the time the criminal information for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide with violation of the Automobile
Law (now Land Transportation and Traffic Code) was filed, Section 32(2) of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 12911 had
already been amended by Republic Act No. 7691.12 The said provision thus reads:

Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal
Cases.—Except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and the Sandiganbayan,
the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

xxxx

(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of
the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from
such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof: Provided, however, That in
offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof.

As the imposable penalty for the crime charged herein is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods or
imprisonment for 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years,13 jurisdiction to hear and try the same is conferred on the
Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs). Clearly, therefore, the RTC of Bulacan does not have jurisdiction over Criminal Case No.
2235-M-94.

While both the appellate court and the Solicitor General acknowledge this fact, they nevertheless are of the position that
the principle of estoppel by laches has already precluded the petitioner from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC—the
trial went on for 4 years with the petitioner actively participating therein and without him ever raising the jurisdictional
infirmity. The petitioner, for his part, counters that the lack of jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter may be raised
at any time even for the first time on appeal. As undue delay is further absent herein, the principle of laches will not be
applicable.

To settle once and for all this problem of jurisdiction vis-à-vis estoppel by laches, which continuously confounds the bench
and the bar, we shall analyze the various Court decisions on the matter.

As early as 1901, this Court has declared that unless jurisdiction has been conferred by some legislative act, no court or
tribunal can act on a matter submitted to it.14 We went on to state in U.S. v. De La Santa15 that:

It has been frequently held that a lack of jurisdiction over the subject-matter is fatal, and subject to objection at any stage
of the proceedings, either in the court below or on appeal (Ency. of Pl. & Pr., vol. 12, p. 189, and large array of cases
there cited), and indeed, where the subject-matter is not within the jurisdiction, the court may dismiss the proceeding ex
mero motu. (4 Ill., 133; 190 Ind., 79; Chipman vs. Waterbury, 59 Conn., 496.)

Jurisdiction over the subject-matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the
court; it is given only by law and in the manner prescribed by law and an objection based on the lack of such jurisdiction
can not be waived by the parties. x x x16

Later, in People v. Casiano,17 the Court explained:

4. The operation of the principle of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction seemingly depends upon whether the lower
court actually had jurisdiction or not. If it had no jurisdiction, but the case was tried and decided upon the theory that it had
jurisdiction, the parties are not barred, on appeal, from assailing such jurisdiction, for the same "must exist as a matter of
law, and may not be conferred by consent of the parties or by estoppel" (5 C.J.S., 861-863). However, if the lower court
had jurisdiction, and the case was heard and decided upon a given theory, such, for instance, as that the court had no
jurisdiction, the party who induced it to adopt such theory will not be permitted, on appeal, to assume an inconsistent
position—that the lower court had jurisdiction. Here, the principle of estoppel applies. The rule that jurisdiction is conferred
by law, and does not depend upon the will of the parties, has no bearing thereon. Thus, Corpus Juris Secundum says:

Where accused has secured a decision that the indictment is void, or has been granted an instruction based on its
defective character directing the jury to acquit, he is estopped, when subsequently indicted, to assert that the former
indictment was valid. In such case, there may be a new prosecution whether the indictment in the former prosecution was
good or bad. Similarly, where, after the jury was impaneled and sworn, the court on accused's motion quashed the
information on the erroneous assumption that the court had no jurisdiction, accused cannot successfully plead former
jeopardy to a new information. x x x (22 C.J.S., sec. 252, pp. 388-389; italics ours.)

Where accused procured a prior conviction to be set aside on the ground that the court was without jurisdiction, he is
estopped subsequently to assert, in support of a defense of previous jeopardy, that such court had jurisdiction." (22 C.J.S.
p. 378.)18

But in Pindañgan Agricultural Co., Inc. v. Dans,19 the Court, in not sustaining the plea of lack of jurisdiction by the plaintiff-
appellee therein, made the following observations:

It is surprising why it is only now, after the decision has been rendered, that the plaintiff-appellee presents the question of
this Court’s jurisdiction over the case. Republic Act No. 2613 was enacted on August 1, 1959. This case was argued on
January 29, 1960. Notwithstanding this fact, the jurisdiction of this Court was never impugned until the adverse decision of
this Court was handed down. The conduct of counsel leads us to believe that they must have always been of the belief
that notwithstanding said enactment of Republic Act 2613 this Court has jurisdiction of the case, such conduct being born
out of a conviction that the actual real value of the properties in question actually exceeds the jurisdictional amount of this
Court (over ₱200,000). Our minute resolution in G.R. No. L-10096, Hyson Tan, et al. vs. Filipinas Compaña de Seguros,
et al., of March 23, 1956, a parallel case, is applicable to the conduct of plaintiff-appellee in this case, thus:
x x x that an appellant who files his brief and submits his case to the Court of Appeals for decision, without questioning the
latter’s jurisdiction until decision is rendered therein, should be considered as having voluntarily waived so much of his
claim as would exceed the jurisdiction of said Appellate Court; for the reason that a contrary rule would encourage the
undesirable practice of appellants submitting their cases for decision to the Court of Appeals in expectation of favorable
judgment, but with intent of attacking its jurisdiction should the decision be unfavorable: x x x20

Then came our ruling in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy21 that a party may be barred by laches from invoking lack of jurisdiction at a
late hour for the purpose of annulling everything done in the case with the active participation of said party invoking the
plea. We expounded, thus:

A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different reasons. Thus, we speak of
estoppel in pais, of estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches.

Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by
exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert
it.

The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of public policy which requires, for the peace of
society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of limitations, is not a mere question of time but is
principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted.

It has been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and,
after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86
A.L.R. 79). In the case just cited, by way of explaining the rule, it was further said that the question whether the court had
jurisdiction either of the subject matter of the action or of the parties was not important in such cases because the party is
barred from such conduct not because the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but
for the reason that such a practice cannot be tolerated—obviously for reasons of public policy.

Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the
merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court (Pease vs. Rathbun-Jones etc., 243 U.S.
273, 61 L. Ed. 715, 37 S.Ct. 283; St. Louis etc. vs. McBride, 141 U.S. 127, 35 L. Ed. 659). And in Littleton vs. Burgess, 16
Wyo. 58, the Court said that it is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular
matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty.

Upon this same principle is what We said in the three cases mentioned in the resolution of the Court of Appeals of May
20, 1963 (supra)—to the effect that we frown upon the "undesirable practice" of a party submitting his case for decision
and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse—as well as in
Pindañgan etc. vs. Dans et al., G.R. L-14591, September 26, 1962; Montelibano et al. vs. Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co.,
Inc., G.R. L-15092; Young Men Labor Union etc. vs. The Court of Industrial Relations et al., G.R. L-20307, Feb. 26, 1965,
and Mejia vs. Lucas, 100 Phil. p. 277.

The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became a quasi-party on July 31, 1948, it could have raised the
question of the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Cebu to take cognizance of the present action by
reason of the sum of money involved which, according to the law then in force, was within the original exclusive
jurisdiction of inferior courts. It failed to do so. Instead, at several stages of the proceedings in the court a quo, as well as
in the Court of Appeals, it invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final
adjudication on the merits. It was only after an adverse decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke
up to raise the question of jurisdiction. Were we to sanction such conduct on its part, We would in effect be declaring as
useless all the proceedings had in the present case since it was commenced on July 19, 1948 and compel the judgment
creditors to go up their Calvary once more. The inequity and unfairness of this is not only patent but revolting.22
For quite a time since we made this pronouncement in Sibonghanoy, courts and tribunals, in resolving issues that involve
the belated invocation of lack of jurisdiction, have applied the principle of estoppel by laches. Thus, in Calimlim v.
Ramirez,23 we pointed out that Sibonghanoy was developing into a general rule rather than the exception:

A rule that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and upheld in decisions so numerous to cite is that the
jurisdiction of a court over the subject-matter of the action is a matter of law and may not be conferred by consent or
agreement of the parties. The lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on
appeal. This doctrine has been qualified by recent pronouncements which stemmed principally from the ruling in the cited
case of Sibonghanoy. It is to be regretted, however, that the holding in said case had been applied to situations which
were obviously not contemplated therein. The exceptional circumstance involved in Sibonghanoy which justified the
departure from the accepted concept of non-waivability of objection to jurisdiction has been ignored and, instead a blanket
doctrine had been repeatedly upheld that rendered the supposed ruling in Sibonghanoy not as the exception, but rather
the general rule, virtually overthrowing altogether the time-honored principle that the issue of jurisdiction is not lost by
waiver or by estoppel.

In Sibonghanoy, the defense of lack of jurisdiction of the court that rendered the questioned ruling was held to be barred
by estoppel by laches. It was ruled that the lack of jurisdiction having been raised for the first time in a motion to dismiss
filed almost fifteen (15) years after the questioned ruling had been rendered, such a plea may no longer be raised for
being barred by laches. As defined in said case, laches is "failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length
of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission
to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert has abandoned it or
declined to assert it.24

In Calimlim, despite the fact that the one who benefited from the plea of lack of jurisdiction was the one who invoked the
court’s jurisdiction, and who later obtained an adverse judgment therein, we refused to apply the ruling in Sibonghanoy.
The Court accorded supremacy to the time-honored principle that the issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by
estoppel.

Yet, in subsequent cases decided after Calimlim, which by sheer volume are too plentiful to mention, the Sibonghanoy
doctrine, as foretold in Calimlim, became the rule rather than the exception. As such, in Soliven v. Fastforms Philippines,
Inc.,25 the Court ruled:

While it is true that jurisdiction may be raised at any time, "this rule presupposes that estoppel has not supervened." In the
instant case, respondent actively participated in all stages of the proceedings before the trial court and invoked its
authority by asking for an affirmative relief. Clearly, respondent is estopped from challenging the trial court’s jurisdiction,
especially when an adverse judgment has been rendered. In PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation vs. Court of
Appeals, we held:

Moreover, we note that petitioner did not question at all the jurisdiction of the lower court x x x in its answers to both the
amended complaint and the second amended complaint. It did so only in its motion for reconsideration of the decision of
the lower court after it had received an adverse decision. As this Court held in Pantranco North Express, Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals (G.R. No. 105180, July 5, 1993, 224 SCRA 477, 491), participation in all stages of the case before the trial court,
that included invoking its authority in asking for affirmative relief, effectively barred petitioner by estoppel from challenging
the court’s jurisdiction. Notably, from the time it filed its answer to the second amended complaint on April 16, 1985,
petitioner did not question the lower court’s jurisdiction. It was only on December 29, 1989 when it filed its motion for
reconsideration of the lower court’s decision that petitioner raised the question of the lower court’s lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioner thus foreclosed its right to raise the issue of jurisdiction by its own inaction. (italics ours)

Similarly, in the subsequent case of Sta. Lucia Realty and Development, Inc. vs. Cabrigas, we ruled:

In the case at bar, it was found by the trial court in its 30 September 1996 decision in LCR Case No. Q-60161(93) that
private respondents (who filed the petition for reconstitution of titles) failed to comply with both sections 12 and 13 of RA
26 and therefore, it had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. However, private respondents never
questioned the trial court’s jurisdiction over its petition for reconstitution throughout the duration of LCR Case No. Q-
60161(93). On the contrary, private respondents actively participated in the reconstitution proceedings by filing pleadings
and presenting its evidence. They invoked the trial court’s jurisdiction in order to obtain affirmative relief – the
reconstitution of their titles. Private respondents have thus foreclosed their right to raise the issue of jurisdiction by their
own actions.

The Court has constantly upheld the doctrine that while jurisdiction may be assailed at any stage, a litigant’s participation
in all stages of the case before the trial court, including the invocation of its authority in asking for affirmative relief, bars
such party from challenging the court’s jurisdiction (PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 297
SCRA 402 [1998]). A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and
after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction (Asset Privatization Trust vs.
Court of Appeals, 300 SCRA 579 [1998]; Province of Bulacan vs. Court of Appeals, 299 SCRA 442 [1998]). The Court
frowns upon the undesirable practice of a party participating in the proceedings and submitting his case for decision and
then accepting judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse (Producers Bank of the
Philippines vs. NLRC, 298 SCRA 517 [1998], citing Ilocos Sur Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. NLRC, 241 SCRA 36 [1995]).
(italics ours)26

Noteworthy, however, is that, in the 2005 case of Metromedia Times Corporation v. Pastorin,27 where the issue of lack of
jurisdiction was raised only in the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) on appeal, we stated, after examining the
doctrines of jurisdiction vis-à-vis estoppel, that the ruling in Sibonghanoy stands as an exception, rather than the general
rule. Metromedia, thus, was not estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter before the NLRC on appeal.28 1avvphi1

Later, in Francel Realty Corporation v. Sycip,29 the Court clarified that:

Petitioner argues that the CA’s affirmation of the trial court’s dismissal of its case was erroneous, considering that a full-
blown trial had already been conducted. In effect, it contends that lack of jurisdiction could no longer be used as a ground
for dismissal after trial had ensued and ended.

The above argument is anchored on estoppel by laches, which has been used quite successfully in a number of cases to
thwart dismissals based on lack of jurisdiction. Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, in which this doctrine was espoused, held that a
party may be barred from questioning a court’s jurisdiction after being invoked to secure affirmative relief against its
opponent. In fine, laches prevents the issue of lack of jurisdiction from being raised for the first time on appeal by a litigant
whose purpose is to annul everything done in a trial in which it has actively participated.

Laches is defined as the "failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by
exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert
it."

The ruling in Sibonghanoy on the matter of jurisdiction is, however, the exception rather than the rule. Estoppel by laches
1avv phi1

may be invoked to bar the issue of lack of jurisdiction only in cases in which the factual milieu is analogous to that in the
cited case. In such controversies, laches should be clearly present; that is, lack of jurisdiction must have been raised so
belatedly as to warrant the presumption that the party entitled to assert it had abandoned or declined to assert it. That
Sibonghanoy applies only to exceptional circumstances is clarified in Calimlim v. Ramirez, which we quote:

A rule that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and upheld in decisions so numerous to cite is that the
jurisdiction of a court over the subject-matter of the action is a matter of law and may not be conferred by consent or
agreement of the parties. The lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on
appeal. This doctrine has been qualified by recent pronouncements which stemmed principally from the ruling in the cited
case of Sibonghanoy. It is to be regretted, however, that the holding in said case had been applied to situations which
were obviously not contemplated therein. The exceptional circumstance involved in Sibonghanoy which justified the
departure from the accepted concept of non-waivability of objection to jurisdiction has been ignored and, instead a blanket
doctrine had been repeatedly upheld that rendered the supposed ruling in Sibonghanoy not as the exception, but rather
the general rule, virtually overthrowing altogether the time-honored principle that the issue of jurisdiction is not lost by
waiver or by estoppel.

Indeed, the general rule remains: a court’s lack of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on
appeal. The reason is that jurisdiction is conferred by law, and lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take
cognizance of and to render judgment on the action. Moreover, jurisdiction is determined by the averments of the
complaint, not by the defenses contained in the answer.30

Also, in Mangaliag v. Catubig-Pastoral,31 even if the pleader of lack of jurisdiction actively took part in the trial proceedings
by presenting a witness to seek exoneration, the Court, reiterating the doctrine in Calimlim, said:

Private respondent argues that the defense of lack of jurisdiction may be waived by estoppel through active participation
in the trial. Such, however, is not the general rule but an exception, best characterized by the peculiar circumstances
in Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy. In Sibonghanoy, the party invoking lack of jurisdiction did so only after fifteen years and at a
stage when the proceedings had already been elevated to the CA. Sibonghanoy is an exceptional case because of the
presence of laches, which was defined therein as failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to
do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is the negligence or omission to
assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert has abandoned it or
declined to assert it.32

And in the more recent Regalado v. Go,33 the Court again emphasized that laches should be clearly present for the
Sibonghanoy doctrine to be applicable, thus:

Laches is defined as the "failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by
exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable length of time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined
to assert it."

The ruling in People v. Regalario that was based on the landmark doctrine enunciated in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy on the
matter of jurisdiction by estoppel is the exception rather than the rule. Estoppel by laches may be invoked to bar the issue
of lack of jurisdiction only in cases in which the factual milieu is analogous to that in the cited case. In such
controversies, laches should have been clearly present; that is, lack of jurisdiction must have been raised so belatedly as
to warrant the presumption that the party entitled to assert it had abandoned or declined to assert it.

In Sibonghanoy, the defense of lack of jurisdiction was raised for the first time in a motion to dismiss filed by the Surety
almost 15 years after the questioned ruling had been rendered. At several stages of the proceedings, in the court a quo as
well as in the Court of Appeals, the Surety invoked the jurisdiction of the said courts to obtain affirmative relief and
submitted its case for final adjudication on the merits. It was only when the adverse decision was rendered by the Court of
Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the question of jurisdiction.

Clearly, the factual settings attendant in Sibonghanoy are not present in the case at bar. Petitioner Atty. Regalado, after
the receipt of the Court of Appeals resolution finding her guilty of contempt, promptly filed a Motion for Reconsideration
assailing the said court’s jurisdiction based on procedural infirmity in initiating the action. Her compliance with the
appellate court’s directive to show cause why she should not be cited for contempt and filing a single piece of pleading to
that effect could not be considered as an active participation in the judicial proceedings so as to take the case within the
milieu of Sibonghanoy. Rather, it is the natural fear to disobey the mandate of the court that could lead to dire
consequences that impelled her to comply.34

The Court, thus, wavered on when to apply the exceptional circumstance in Sibonghanoy and on when to apply the
general rule enunciated as early as in De La Santa and expounded at length in Calimlim. The general rule should,
however, be, as it has always been, that the issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on
appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel. Estoppel by laches, to bar a litigant from asserting the court’s absence or
lack of jurisdiction, only supervenes in exceptional cases similar to the factual milieu of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy. Indeed, the
fact that a person attempts to invoke unauthorized jurisdiction of a court does not estop him from thereafter challenging its
jurisdiction over the subject matter, since such jurisdiction must arise by law and not by mere consent of the parties. This
is especially true where the person seeking to invoke unauthorized jurisdiction of the court does not thereby secure any
advantage or the adverse party does not suffer any harm.35

Applying the said doctrine to the instant case, the petitioner is in no way estopped by laches in assailing the jurisdiction of
the RTC, considering that he raised the lack thereof in his appeal before the appellate court. At that time, no considerable
period had yet elapsed for laches to attach. True, delay alone, though unreasonable, will not sustain the defense of
"estoppel by laches" unless it further appears that the party, knowing his rights, has not sought to enforce them until the
condition of the party pleading laches has in good faith become so changed that he cannot be restored to his former state,
if the rights be then enforced, due to loss of evidence, change of title, intervention of equities, and other causes.36 In
applying the principle of estoppel by laches in the exceptional case of Sibonghanoy, the Court therein considered the
patent and revolting inequity and unfairness of having the judgment creditors go up their Calvary once more after more or
less 15 years.37 The same, however, does not obtain in the instant case.

We note at this point that estoppel, being in the nature of a forfeiture, is not favored by law. It is to be applied rarely—only
from necessity, and only in extraordinary circumstances. The doctrine must be applied with great care and the equity must
be strong in its favor.38 When misapplied, the doctrine of estoppel may be a most effective weapon for the
accomplishment of injustice.39 Moreover, a judgment rendered without jurisdiction over the subject matter is void.40 Hence,
the Revised Rules of Court provides for remedies in attacking judgments rendered by courts or tribunals that have no
jurisdiction over the concerned cases. No laches will even attach when the judgment is null and void for want of
jurisdiction.41 As we have stated in Heirs of Julian Dela Cruz and Leonora Talaro v. Heirs of Alberto Cruz,42

It is axiomatic that the jurisdiction of a tribunal, including a quasi-judicial officer or government agency, over the nature
and subject matter of a petition or complaint is determined by the material allegations therein and the character of the
relief prayed for, irrespective of whether the petitioner or complainant is entitled to any or all such reliefs. Jurisdiction over
the nature and subject matter of an action is conferred by the Constitution and the law, and not by the consent or waiver
of the parties where the court otherwise would have no jurisdiction over the nature or subject matter of the action. Nor can
it be acquired through, or waived by, any act or omission of the parties. Moreover, estoppel does not apply to confer
jurisdiction to a tribunal that has none over the cause of action. x x x

Indeed, the jurisdiction of the court or tribunal is not affected by the defenses or theories set up by the defendant or
respondent in his answer or motion to dismiss. Jurisdiction should be determined by considering not only the status or the
relationship of the parties but also the nature of the issues or questions that is the subject of the controversy. x x x x The
proceedings before a court or tribunal without jurisdiction, including its decision, are null and void, hence, susceptible to
direct and collateral attacks.43

With the above considerations, we find it unnecessary to resolve the other issues raised in the petition.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. Criminal Case No. 2235-M-94 is
hereby DISMISSED without prejudice.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 198755 June 5, 2013

ALBERTO PAT-OG, SR., Petitioner,
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which seeks to set aside the
April 6, 2011 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 101700, affirming the April 11, 2007 Decision2 of
the Civil Service Commission (CSC), which ordered the dismissal of petitioner Alberto Pat-og, Sr. (Pat-og) from the
service for grave misconduct.

The Facts

On September 13, 2003, Robert Bang-on (Bang-on), then a 14-year old second year high school student of the Antadao
National High School in Sagada, Mountain Province, tiled an affidavit-complaint against Pat-og, a third year high school
teacher of the same school, before the Civil Service Commission-Cordillera Administrative Region (CSC-CAR).

Bang-on alleged that on the morning of August 26, 2003, he attended his class at the basketball court of the school,
where Pat-og and his third year students were also holding a separate class; that he and some of his classmates joined
Pat-og’s third year students who were practicing basketball shots; that Pat-og later instructed them to form two lines; that
thinking that three lines were to be formed, he stayed in between the two lines; that Pat-og then held his right arm and
punched his stomach without warning for failing to follow instructions; and that as a result, he suffered stomach pain for
several days and was confined in a hospital from September 10-12, 2003, as evidenced by a medico-legal certificate,
which stated that he sustained a contusion hematoma in the hypogastric area.

Regarding the same incident, Bang-on filed a criminal case against Pat-og for the crime of Less Serious Physical Injury
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bontoc, Mountain Province.

Taking cognizance of the administrative case, the CSC-CAR directed Pat-og to file his counter-affidavit. He denied the
charges hurled against him and claimed that when he was conducting his Music, Arts, Physical Education and Health
(MAPEH) class, composed of third year students, he instructed the girls to play volleyball and the boys to play basketball;
that he later directed the boys to form two lines; that after the boys failed to follow his repeated instructions, he scolded
them in a loud voice and wrested the ball from them; that while approaching them, he noticed that there were male
students who were not members of his class who had joined the shooting practice; that one of those male students was
Bang-on, who was supposed to be having his own MAPEH class under another teacher; that he then glared at them,
continued scolding them and dismissed the class for their failure to follow instructions; and that he offered the sworn
statement of other students to prove that he did not box Bang-on.

On June 1, 2004, the CSC-CAR found the existence of a prima faciecase for misconduct and formally charged Pat-og.

While the proceedings of the administrative case were ongoing, the RTC rendered its judgment in the criminal case and
found Pat-og guilty of the offense of slight physical injury. He was meted the penalty of imprisonment from eleven (11) to
twenty (20) days. Following his application for probation, the decision became final and executory and judgment was
entered.

Meanwhile, in the administrative case, a pre-hearing conference was conducted after repeated postponement by Pat-og.
With the approval of the CSC-CAR, the prosecution submitted its position paper in lieu of a formal presentation of
evidence and formally offered its evidence, which included the decision in the criminal case. It offered the affidavits of
Raymund Atuban, a classmate of Bang-on; and James Domanog, a third year high school student, who both witnessed
Pat-og hit Bang-on in the stomach.

For his defense, Pat-og offered the testimonies of his witnesses - Emiliano Dontongan (Dontongan), a teacher in another
school, who alleged that he was a member of the Municipal Council for the Protection of Children, and that, in such
capacity, he investigated the incident and came to the conclusion that it did not happen at all; and Ernest Kimmot, who
testified that he was in the basketball court at the time but did not see such incident. Pat-og also presented the affidavits
of thirteen other witnesses to prove that he did not punch Bang-on.

Ruling of the CSC-CAR

In its Decision,3 dated September 19, 2006, the CSC-CAR found Pat-og guilty and disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, all premises told, respondent Alberto Pat-og, Sr., Teacher Antadao National High School, is hereby found
guilty of Simple Misconduct.

Under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, the imposable penalty on the first offense of Simple
Misconduct is suspension of one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months.

Due to seriousness of the resulting injury to the fragile body of the minor victim, the CSC-CAR hereby imposed upon
respondent the maximum penalty attached to the offense which is six months suspension without pay.

The CSC-CAR gave greater weight to the version posited by the prosecution, finding that a blow was indeed inflicted by
Pat-og on Bang-on. It found that Pat-og had a motive for doing so - his students’ failure to follow his repeated instructions
which angered him. Nevertheless, the CSCCAR ruled that a motive was not necessary to establish guilt if the perpetrator
of the offense was positively identified. The positive identification of Pat-og was duly proven by the corroborative
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, who were found to be credible and disinterested. The testimony of defense
witness, Dontongan, was not given credence considering that the students he interviewed for his investigation claimed
that Pat-og was not even angry at the time of the incident, contrary to the latter’s own admission.

The CSC-CAR held that the actions of Pat-og clearly transgressed the proper norms of conduct required of a public
official, and the gravity of the offense was further magnified by the seriousness of the injury of Bang-on which required a
healing period of more than ten (10) days. It pointed out that, being his teacher, Pat-og’s substitute parental authority did
not give him license to physically chastise a misbehaving student. The CSC-CAR added that the fact that Pat-og applied
for probation in the criminal case, instead of filing an appeal, further convinced it of his guilt.

The CSC-CAR believed that the act committed by Pat-og was sufficient to find him guilty of Grave Misconduct. It,
however, found the corresponding penalty of dismissal from the service too harsh under the circumstances. Thus, it
adjudged petitioner guilty of Simple Misconduct and imposed the maximum penalty of suspension for six (6) months.

On December 11, 2006, the motion for reconsideration filed by Pat-og was denied for lack of merit.4

The Ruling of the CSC

In its Resolution,5 dated April 11, 2007, the CSC dismissed Pat-og’s appeal and affirmed with modification the decision of
the CSC-CAR as follows:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED. The decision of the CSC-CAR
is affirmed with the modification that Alberto Pat-og, Sr., is adjudged guilty of grave misconduct, for which he is meted out
the penalty of dismissal from the service with all its accessory penalties of cancellation of eligibilities, perpetual
disqualification from reemployment in the government service, and forfeiture of retirement benefits.6
After evaluating the records, the CSC sustained the CSC-CAR’s conclusion that there existed substantial evidence to
sustain the finding that Pat-og did punch Bang-on in the stomach. It gave greater weight to the positive statements of
Bang-on and his witnesses over the bare denial of Patog. It also highlighted the fact that Pat-og failed to adduce evidence
of any ill motive on the part of Bang-on in filing the administrative case against him. It likewise gave credence to the
medico-legal certificate showing that Bang-on suffered a hematoma contusion in his hypogastric area.

The CSC ruled that the affidavits of Bang-on’s witnesses were not bereft of evidentiary value even if Pat-og was not
afforded a chance to cross-examine the witnesses of Bang-on. It is of no moment because the cross- examination of
witnesses is not an indispensable requirement of administrative due process.

The CSC noted that Pat-og did not question but, instead, fully acquiesced in his conviction in the criminal case for slight
physical injury, which was based on the same set of facts and circumstances, and involved the same parties and issues.
It, thus, considered his prior criminal conviction as evidence against him in the administrative case.

Finding that his act of punching his student displayed a flagrant and wanton disregard of the dignity of a person,
reminiscent of corporal punishment that had since been outlawed for being harsh, unjust, and cruel, the CSC upgraded
Pat-og’s offense from Simple Misconduct to Grave Misconduct and ordered his dismissal from the service.

Pat-og filed a motion for reconsideration, questioning for the first time the jurisdiction of CSC over the case. He contended
that administrative charges against a public school teacher should have been initially heard by a committee to be
constituted pursuant to the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers.

On November 5, 2007, the CSC denied his motion for reconsideration.7 It ruled that Pat-og was estopped from
challenging its jurisdiction considering that he actively participated in the administrative proceedings against him, raising
the issue of jurisdiction only after his appeal was dismissed by the CSC.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In its assailed April 6, 2011 Decision,8 the CA affirmed the resolutions of the CSC. It agreed that Pat-og was estopped
from questioning the jurisdiction of the CSC as the records clearly showed that he actively participated in the proceedings.
It was of the view that Pat-og was not denied due process when he failed to cross-examine Bang-on and his witnesses
because he was given the opportunity to be heard and present his evidence before the CSC-CAR and the CSC.

The CA also held that the CSC committed no error in taking into account the conviction of Pat-og in the criminal case. It
stated that his conviction was not the sole basis of the CSC for his dismissal from the service because there was
substantial evidence proving that Pat-og had indeed hit Bang-on.

In its assailed Resolution,9 dated September 13, 2011, the CA denied the motion for reconsideration filed by Pat-og.

Hence, the present petition with the following

Assignment of Errors

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT
AFFIRMED THE SUPREME PENALTY OF DISMISSAL FROM SERVICE WITH FORFEITURE OF RETIREMENT
BENEFITS AGAINST THE PETITIONER WITHOUT CONSIDERING PETITIONER’S LONG YEARS OF GOVERNMENT
SERVICE?

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT
RULED THAT PETITIONER IS ESTOPPED FROM QUESTIONING THE JURISDICTION OF THE CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION TO HEAR AND DECIDE THE ADMINISTRATIVE CASE AGAINST HIM?
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED AND COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION IN DISMISSING THE APPEAL DESPITE LACK OF SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE?

On Jurisdiction

Pat-og contends that Section 9 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4670, otherwise known as the Magna Carta for Public School
Teachers, provides that administrative charges against a public school teacher shall be heard initially by a committee
constituted under said section. As no committee was ever formed, the petitioner posits that he was denied due process
and that the CSC did not have the jurisdiction to hear and decide his administrative case. He further argues that
notwithstanding the fact that the issue of jurisdiction was raised for the first time on appeal, the rule remains that estoppel
does not confer jurisdiction on a tribunal that has no jurisdiction over the cause of action or subject matter of the case.

The Court cannot sustain his position.

The petitioner’s argument that the administrative case against him can only proceed under R.A. No. 4670 is misplaced.

In Puse v. Santos-Puse,10 it was held that the CSC, the Department of Education (DepEd) and the Board of Professional
Teachers-Professional Regulatory Commission (PRC) have concurrent jurisdiction over administrative cases against
public school teachers.

Under Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, the CSC is the body charged with the establishment and administration of a
career civil service which embraces all branches and agencies of the government.11 Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292 (the
Administrative Code of 1987)12 and Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 807 (the Civil Service Decree of the
Philippines)13 expressly provide that the CSC has the power to hear and decide administrative disciplinary cases instituted
with it or brought to it on appeal. Thus, the CSC, as the central personnel agency of the government, has the inherent
power to supervise and discipline all members of the civil service, including public school teachers.

Indeed, under Section 9 of R.A. No. 4670, the jurisdiction over administrative cases of public school teachers is lodged
with the investigating committee constituted therein.14 Also, under Section 23 of R.A. No. 7836 (the Philippine Teachers
Professionalization Act of 1994), the Board of Professional Teachers is given the power, after due notice and hearing, to
suspend or revoke the certificate of registration of a professional teacher for causes enumerated therein.15

Concurrent jurisdiction is that which is possessed over the same parties or subject matter at the same time by two or more
separate tribunals. When the law bestows upon a government body the jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving
specific matters, it is to be presumed that such jurisdiction is exclusive unless it be proved that another body is likewise
vested with the same jurisdiction, in which case, both bodies have concurrent jurisdiction over the matter.16

Where concurrent jurisdiction exists in several tribunals, the body that first takes cognizance of the complaint shall
exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others. In this case, it was CSC which first acquired jurisdiction over the case
because the complaint was filed before it. Thus, it had the authority to proceed and decide the case to the exclusion of the
DepEd and the Board of Professional Teachers.17

In CSC v. Alfonso,18 it was held that special laws, such as R.A. No. 4670, do not divest the CSC of its inherent power to
supervise and discipline all members of the civil service, including public school teachers. Pat-og, as a public school
teacher, is first and foremost, a civil servant accountable to the people and answerable to the CSC for complaints lodged
against him as a public servant. To hold that R.A. No. 4670 divests the CSC of its power to discipline public school
teachers would negate the very purpose for which the CSC was established and would impliedly amend the Constitution
itself.

To further drive home the point, it was ruled in CSC v. Macud19 that R.A. No. 4670, in imposing a separate set of
procedural requirements in connection with administrative proceedings against public school teachers, should be
construed to refer only to the specific procedure to be followed in administrative investigations conducted by the DepEd.
By no means, then, did R.A. No. 4670 confer an exclusive disciplinary authority over public school teachers on the
DepEd.

At any rate, granting that the CSC was without jurisdiction, the petitioner is indeed estopped from raising the issue.
Although the rule states that a jurisdictional question may be raised at any time, such rule admits of the exception where,
as in this case, estoppel has supervened.20 Here, instead of opposing the CSC’s exercise of jurisdiction, the petitioner
invoked the same by actively participating in the proceedings before the CSC-CAR and by even filing his appeal before
the CSC itself; only raising the issue of jurisdiction later in his motion for reconsideration after the CSC denied his appeal.
This Court has time and again frowned upon the undesirable practice of a party submitting his case for decision and then
accepting the judgment only if favorable, but attacking it for lack of jurisdiction when adverse.21

On Administrative Due Process

On due process, Pat-og asserts that the affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are of questionable veracity
having been subscribed in Bontoc, which is nearly 30 kilometers from the residences of the parties. Furthermore, he
claimed that considering that the said affiants never testified, he was never afforded the opportunity to cross-examine
them. Therefore, their affidavits were mere hearsay and insufficient to prove his guilt.

The petitioner does not persuade.

The essence of due process is simply to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, a fair and reasonable
opportunity to explain one’s side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained
of.22 Administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense. In administrative
proceedings, a formal or trial-type hearing is not always necessary23 and technical rules of procedure are not strictly
applied. Hence, the right to cross-examine is not an indispensable aspect of administrative due process.24 The petitioner
cannot, therefore, argue that the affidavit of Bang-on and his witnesses are hearsay and insufficient to prove his guilt.

At any rate, having actively participated in the proceedings before the CSC-CAR, the CSC, and the CA, the petitioner was
apparently afforded every opportunity to explain his side and seek reconsideration of the ruling against him. 1âwphi1

As to the issue of the veracity of the affidavits, such is a question of fact which cannot now be raised before the Court
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The CSC-CAR, the CSC and the CA did not, therefore, err in giving credence to the
affidavits of the complainants and his witnesses, and in consequently ruling that there was substantial evidence to support
the finding of misconduct on the part of the petitioner.

On the Penalty

Assuming that he did box Bang-on, Pat-og argues that there is no substantial evidence to prove that he did so with a clear
intent to violate the law or in flagrant disregard of the established rule, as required for a finding of grave misconduct. He
insists that he was not motivated by bad faith or ill will because he acted in the belief that, as a teacher, he was exercising
authority over Bang-on in loco parentis, and was, accordingly, within his rights to discipline his student. Citing his 33 years
in the government service without any adverse record against him and the fact that he is at the edge of retirement, being
already 62 years old, the petitioner prays that, in the name of substantial and compassionate justice, the CSC-CAR’s
finding of simple misconduct and the concomitant penalty of suspension should be upheld, instead of dismissal.

The Court agrees in part.

Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior. To constitute an
administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be connected with the performance of the official functions and
duties of a public officer. In grave misconduct, as distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear
intent to violate the law or t1agrant disregard of an established rule must be manifest.25

Teachers are duly licensed professionals who must not only be competent in the practice of their noble profession, but
must also possess dignity and a reputation with high moral values. They must strictly adhere to, observe, and practice the
set of ethical and moral principles, standards, and values laid down in the Code of Ethics of Professional Teachers, which
apply to all teachers in schools in the Philippines, whether public or private, as provided in the preamble of the said
Code.26 Section 8 of Article VIII of the same Code expressly provides that "a teacher shall not inflict corporal punishment
on offending learners."

Clearly then, petitioner cannot argue that in punching Bang-on, he was exercising his right as a teacher in loco parentis to
discipline his student. It is beyond cavil that the petitioner, as a public school teacher, deliberately violated his Code of
Ethics. Such violation is a flagrant disregard for the established rule contained in the said Code tantamount to grave
misconduct.

Under Section 52(A)(2) of Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, the penalty for grave
misconduct is dismissal from the service, which carries with it the cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits
and perpetual disqualification from reemployment in the government service.27 This penalty must, however, be tempered
with compassion as there was sut1icient provocation on the part of Bang-on. Considering further the mitigating
circumstances that the petitioner has been in the government service for 33 years, that this is his first offense and that he
is at the cusp of retirement, the Court finds the penalty of suspension for six months as appropriate under the
circumstances.

WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the petition and MODIFIES the April 6, 2011 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101700. Accordingly, Alberto Pat-og, Sr. is found GUlLTY of Grave Misconduct, but the
penalty is reduced from dismissal from the service to SUSPENSION for SIX MONTHS.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 168539 March 25, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
HENRY T. GO, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Resolution1 of the Third Division2 of the Sandiganbayan
(SB) dated June 2, 2005 which quashed the Information filed against herein respondent for alleged violation of Section 3
(g) of Republic Act No. 3019 (R.A. 3019), otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

The Information filed against respondent is an offshoot of this Court's Decision3 in Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air
Terminals Co., Inc. which nullified the various contracts awarded by the Government, through the Department of
Transportation and Communications (DOTC), to Philippine Air Terminals, Co., Inc. (PIATCO) for the construction,
operation and maintenance of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III).
Subsequent to the above Decision, a certain Ma. Cecilia L. Pesayco filed a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman
against several individuals for alleged violation of R.A. 3019. Among those charged was herein respondent, who was then
the Chairman and President of PIATCO, for having supposedly conspired with then DOTC Secretary Arturo Enrile
(Secretary Enrile) in entering into a contract which is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government.

On September 16, 2004, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause to indict, among others,
herein respondent for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. While there was likewise a finding of probable cause against
Secretary Enrile, he was no longer indicted because he died prior to the issuance of the resolution finding probable cause.

Thus, in an Information dated January 13, 2005, respondent was charged before the SB as follows:

On or about July 12, 1997, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the late ARTURO ENRILE, then Secretary of the Department of Transportation
and Communications (DOTC), committing the offense in relation to his office and taking advantage of the same, in
conspiracy with accused, HENRY T. GO, Chairman and President of the Philippine International Air Terminals, Co., Inc.
(PIATCO), did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally enter into a Concession Agreement, after the project for
the construction of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III) was awarded
to Paircargo Consortium/PIATCO, which Concession Agreement substantially amended the draft Concession Agreement
covering the construction of the NAIA IPT III under Republic Act 6957, as amended by Republic Act 7718 (BOT law),
specifically the provision on Public Utility Revenues, as well as the assumption by the government of the liabilities of
PIATCO in the event of the latter's default under Article IV, Section 4.04 (b) and (c) in relation to Article 1.06 of the
Concession Agreement, which terms are more beneficial to PIATCO while manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the
government of the Republic of the Philippines.4

The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 28090.

On March 10, 2005, the SB issued an Order, to wit:

The prosecution is given a period of ten (10) days from today within which to show cause why this case should not be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused considering that the accused is a private person and the
public official Arturo Enrile, his alleged co-conspirator, is already deceased, and not an accused in this case.5

The prosecution complied with the above Order contending that the SB has already acquired jurisdiction over the person
of respondent by reason of his voluntary appearance, when he filed a motion for consolidation and when he posted bail.
The prosecution also argued that the SB has exclusive jurisdiction over respondent's case, even if he is a private person,
because he was alleged to have conspired with a public officer.6

On April 28, 2005, respondent filed a Motion to Quash7 the Information filed against him on the ground that the operative
facts adduced therein do not constitute an offense under Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. Respondent, citing the show cause
order of the SB, also contended that, independently of the deceased Secretary Enrile, the public officer with whom he was
alleged to have conspired, respondent, who is not a public officer nor was capacitated by any official authority as a
government agent, may not be prosecuted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019.

The prosecution filed its Opposition.8

On June 2, 2005, the SB issued its assailed Resolution, pertinent portions of which read thus:

Acting on the Motion to Quash filed by accused Henry T. Go dated April 22, 2005, and it appearing that Henry T. Go, the
lone accused in this case is a private person and his alleged co-conspirator-public official was already deceased long
before this case was filed in court, for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused, the Court grants the Motion to
Quash and the Information filed in this case is hereby ordered quashed and dismissed.9

Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues, to wit:

 I

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED AND DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A
MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE IN GRANTING THE DEMURRER TO
EVIDENCE AND IN DISMISSING CRIMINAL CASE NO. 28090 ON THE GROUND THAT IT HAS NO JURISDICTION
OVER THE PERSON OF RESPONDENT GO.

II

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED AND DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A
MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE, IN RULING THAT IT HAS NO
JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF RESPONDENT GO DESPITE THE IRREFUTABLE FACT THAT HE HAS
ALREADY POSTED BAIL FOR HIS PROVISIONAL LIBERTY

III

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED WHEN, IN COMPLETE DISREGARD OF THE EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION, IT QUASHED THE INFORMATION AND DISMISSED CRIMINAL
CASE NO. 2809010

The Court finds the petition meritorious.

Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 provides:

Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. – In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by
existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

xxxx

(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the
same, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby.

The elements of the above provision are:

(1) that the accused is a public officer;

(2) that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and

(3) that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government.11

At the outset, it bears to reiterate the settled rule that private persons, when acting in conspiracy with public officers, may
be indicted and, if found guilty, held liable for the pertinent offenses under Section 3 of R.A. 3019, in consonance with the
avowed policy of the anti-graft law to repress certain acts of public officers and private persons alike constituting graft or
corrupt practices act or which may lead thereto.12 This is the controlling doctrine as enunciated by this Court in previous
cases, among which is a case involving herein private respondent.13

The only question that needs to be settled in the present petition is whether herein respondent, a private person, may be
indicted for conspiracy in violating Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019 even if the public officer, with whom he was alleged to have
conspired, has died prior to the filing of the Information.
Respondent contends that by reason of the death of Secretary Enrile, there is no public officer who was charged in the
Information and, as such, prosecution against respondent may not prosper.

The Court is not persuaded.

It is true that by reason of Secretary Enrile's death, there is no longer any public officer with whom respondent can be
charged for violation of R.A. 3019. It does not mean, however, that the allegation of conspiracy between them can no
longer be proved or that their alleged conspiracy is already expunged. The only thing extinguished by the death of
Secretary Enrile is his criminal liability. His death did not extinguish the crime nor did it remove the basis of the charge of
conspiracy between him and private respondent. Stated differently, the death of Secretary Enrile does not mean that there
was no public officer who allegedly violated Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019. In fact, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
Luzon found probable cause to indict Secretary Enrile for infringement of Sections 3 (e) and (g) of R.A. 3019.14 Were it not
for his death, he should have been charged.

The requirement before a private person may be indicted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, among others, is that
such private person must be alleged to have acted in conspiracy with a public officer. The law, however, does not require
that such person must, in all instances, be indicted together with the public officer. If circumstances exist where the public
officer may no longer be charged in court, as in the present case where the public officer has already died, the private
person may be indicted alone.

Indeed, it is not necessary to join all alleged co-conspirators in an indictment for conspiracy.15 If two or more persons enter
into a conspiracy, any act done by any of them pursuant to the agreement is, in contemplation of law, the act of each of
them and they are jointly responsible therefor.16 This means that everything said, written or done by any of the
conspirators in execution or furtherance of the common purpose is deemed to have been said, done, or written by each of
them and it makes no difference whether the actual actor is alive or dead, sane or insane at the time of trial.17 The death of
one of two or more conspirators does not prevent the conviction of the survivor or survivors.18 Thus, this Court held that:

x x x [a] conspiracy is in its nature a joint offense. One person cannot conspire alone. The crime depends upon the joint
act or intent of two or more persons. Yet, it does not follow that one person cannot be convicted of conspiracy. So long as
the acquittal or death of a co-conspirator does not remove the bases of a charge for conspiracy, one defendant may be
found guilty of the offense.19

The Court agrees with petitioner's contention that, as alleged in the Information filed against respondent, which is deemed
hypothetically admitted in the latter's Motion to Quash, he (respondent) conspired with Secretary Enrile in violating Section
3 (g) of R.A. 3019 and that in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. Hence, the criminal liability incurred by a co-
conspirator is also incurred by the other co-conspirators.

Moreover, the Court agrees with petitioner that the avowed policy of the State and the legislative intent to repress "acts of
public officers and private persons alike, which constitute graft or corrupt practices,"20 would be frustrated if the death of a
public officer would bar the prosecution of a private person who conspired with such public officer in violating the Anti-
Graft Law.

In this regard, this Court's disquisition in the early case of People v. Peralta21 as to the nature of and the principles
governing conspiracy, as construed under Philippine jurisdiction, is instructive, to wit:

x x x A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and
decide to commit it. Generally, conspiracy is not a crime except when the law specifically provides a penalty therefor as in
treason, rebellion and sedition. The crime of conspiracy known to the common law is not an indictable offense in the
Philippines. An agreement to commit a crime is a reprehensible act from the view-point of morality, but as long as the
conspirators do not perform overt acts in furtherance of their malevolent design, the sovereignty of the State is not
outraged and the tranquility of the public remains undisturbed.
However, when in resolute execution of a common scheme, a felony is committed by two or more malefactors, the
existence of a conspiracy assumes pivotal importance in the determination of the liability of the perpetrators. In stressing
the significance of conspiracy in criminal law, this Court in U.S. vs. Infante and Barreto opined that

While it is true that the penalties cannot be imposed for the mere act of conspiring to commit a crime unless the statute
specifically prescribes a penalty therefor, nevertheless the existence of a conspiracy to commit a crime is in many cases a
fact of vital importance, when considered together with the other evidence of record, in establishing the existence, of the
consummated crime and its commission by the conspirators.

Once an express or implied conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the extent
and character of their respective active participation in the commission of the crime or crimes perpetrated in furtherance of
the conspiracy because in contemplation of law the act of one is the act of all. The foregoing rule is anchored on the
sound principle that "when two or more persons unite to accomplish a criminal object, whether through the physical
volition of one, or all, proceeding severally or collectively, each individual whose evil will actively contributes to the wrong-
doing is in law responsible for the whole, the same as though performed by himself alone." Although it is axiomatic that no
one is liable for acts other than his own, "when two or more persons agree or conspire to commit a crime, each is
responsible for all the acts of the others, done in furtherance of the agreement or conspiracy." The imposition of collective
liability upon the conspirators is clearly explained in one case where this Court held that x x x it is impossible to graduate
the separate liability of each (conspirator) without taking into consideration the close and inseparable relation of each of
them with the criminal act, for the commission of which they all acted by common agreement x x x. The crime must
therefore in view of the solidarity of the act and intent which existed between the x x x accused, be regarded as the act of
the band or party created by them, and they are all equally responsible x x x

Verily, the moment it is established that the malefactors conspired and confederated in the commission of the felony
proved, collective liability of the accused conspirators attaches by reason of the conspiracy, and the court shall not
speculate nor even investigate as to the actual degree of participation of each of the perpetrators present at the scene of
the crime. Of course, as to any conspirator who was remote from the situs of aggression, he could be drawn within the
enveloping ambit of the conspiracy if it be proved that through his moral ascendancy over the rest of the conspirators the
latter were moved or impelled to carry out the conspiracy.

In fine, the convergence of the wills of the conspirators in the scheming and execution of the crime amply justifies the
imputation to all of them the act of any one of them. It is in this light that conspiracy is generally viewed not as a separate
indictable offense, but a rule for collectivizing criminal liability.

xxxx

x x x A time-honored rule in the corpus of our jurisprudence is that once conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators who
acted in furtherance of the common design are liable as co-principals. This rule of collective criminal liability emanates
from the ensnaring nature of conspiracy. The concerted action of the conspirators in consummating their common
purpose is a patent display of their evil partnership, and for the consequences of such criminal enterprise they must be
held solidarily liable.22

This is not to say, however, that private respondent should be found guilty of conspiring with Secretary Enrile. It is settled
that the absence or presence of conspiracy is factual in nature and involves evidentiary matters.23 Hence, the allegation of
conspiracy against respondent is better left ventilated before the trial court during trial, where respondent can adduce
evidence to prove or disprove its presence.

Respondent claims in his Manifestation and Motion24 as well as in his Urgent Motion to Resolve25 that in a different case,
he was likewise indicted before the SB for conspiracy with the late Secretary Enrile in violating the same Section 3 (g) of
R.A. 3019 by allegedly entering into another agreement (Side Agreement) which is separate from the Concession
Agreement subject of the present case. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 28091. Here, the SB, through a
Resolution, granted respondent's motion to quash the Information on the ground that the SB has no jurisdiction over the
person of respondent. The prosecution questioned the said SB Resolution before this Court via a petition for review on
certiorari. The petition was docketed as G.R. No. 168919. In a minute resolution dated August 31, 2005, this Court denied
the petition finding no reversible error on the part of the SB. This Resolution became final and executory on January 11,
2006. Respondent now argues that this Court's resolution in G.R. No. 168919 should be applied in the instant case.

The Court does not agree. Respondent should be reminded that prior to this Court's ruling in G.R. No. 168919, he already
posted bail for his provisional liberty. In fact, he even filed a Motion for Consolidation26 in Criminal Case No. 28091. The
Court agrees with petitioner's contention that private respondent's act of posting bail and filing his Motion for Consolidation
vests the SB with jurisdiction over his person. The rule is well settled that the act of an accused in posting bail or in filing
motions seeking affirmative relief is tantamount to submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the court.27

Thus, it has been held that:

When a defendant in a criminal case is brought before a competent court by virtue of a warrant of arrest or otherwise, in
order to avoid the submission of his body to the jurisdiction of the court he must raise the question of the court’s
jurisdiction over his person at the very earliest opportunity. If he gives bail, demurs to the complaint or files any dilatory
plea or pleads to the merits, he thereby gives the court jurisdiction over his person. (State ex rel. John Brown vs.
Fitzgerald, 51 Minn., 534)

xxxx

As ruled in La Naval Drug vs. CA [236 SCRA 78, 86]:

"[L]ack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be waived either expressly or impliedly. When a defendant
voluntarily appears, he is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. If he so wishes not to waive
this defense, he must do so seasonably by motion for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court; otherwise,
he shall be deemed to have submitted himself to that jurisdiction."

Moreover, "[w]here the appearance is by motion for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the
person, it must be for the sole and separate purpose of objecting to said jurisdiction. If the appearance is for any other
purpose, the defendant is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. Such an appearance gives the
court jurisdiction over the person."

Verily, petitioner’s participation in the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan was not confined to his opposition to the
issuance of a warrant of arrest but also covered other matters which called for respondent court’s exercise of its
jurisdiction. Petitioner may not be heard now to deny said court’s jurisdiction over him. x x x.28

In the instant case, respondent did not make any special appearance to question the jurisdiction of the SB over his person
prior to his posting of bail and filing his Motion for Consolidation. In fact, his Motion to Quash the Information in Criminal
Case No. 28090 only came after the SB issued an Order requiring the prosecution to show cause why the case should not
be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over his person.

As a recapitulation, it would not be amiss to point out that the instant case involves a contract entered into by public
officers representing the government. More importantly, the SB is a special criminal court which has exclusive original
jurisdiction in all cases involving violations of R.A. 3019 committed by certain public officers, as enumerated in P.D. 1606
as amended by R.A. 8249. This includes private individuals who are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories
with the said public officers. In the instant case, respondent is being charged for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, in
conspiracy with then Secretary Enrile. Ideally, under the law, both respondent and Secretary Enrile should have been
charged before and tried jointly by the Sandiganbayan. However, by reason of the death of the latter, this can no longer
be done. Nonetheless, for reasons already discussed, it does not follow that the SB is already divested of its jurisdiction
over the person of and the case involving herein respondent. To rule otherwise would mean that the power of a court to
decide a case would no longer be based on the law defining its jurisdiction but on other factors, such as the death of one
of the alleged offenders.

Lastly, the issues raised in the present petition involve matters which are mere incidents in the main case and the main
case has already been pending for over nine (9) years. Thus, a referral of the case to the Regional Trial Court would
further delay the resolution of the main case and it would, by no means, promote respondent's right to a speedy trial and a
speedy disposition of his case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated June 2, 2005, granting
respondent's Motion to Quash, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Sandiganbayan is forthwith DIRECTED to
proceed with deliberate dispatch in the disposition of Criminal Case No. 28090.

SO ORDERED.