Professional Documents
Culture Documents
September 7, 2006
During the course of the twentieth century Mexico, Argentina, and Peru
three countries exhibited liberal nationalism as a dominant state ideology. These national
economy as the proper institutional structure to secure national progress. During well-
defined periods in each of these countries, subordinate movements and excluded elites
organization.
Yet the extent to which popular nationalism replaced liberal nationalism varied
among the three countries. Mexico under the government of Cárdenas (1934-1940) was
elites and subordinate sectors led to the appropriation of popular national narratives by
official ideology. This discursive change unfolded simultaneously with the expansion of
of nationalism, in which state authorities did not manage to turn popular national
1
discourses into hegemonic cultural scripts in the context of an already established cultural
machinery. Finally, for most of the twentieth century Peru epitomized a blocked
narratives from dominant state ideology. Only under Velasco (1968-1975), with the
emergence of new ruling coalitions, did popular nationalism become an official national
discourse.
transformation of nationalism in twentieth century Mexico, Argentina, and Peru: why did
popular nationalism emerge as an official state ideology; why did the timing of this
discursive change vary; and why did these countries differ in the extent to which popular
unfold more generally and what the key causal processes and configurations involved in
state-focused approach.1 Such an approach builds on key insights from the literature,
that nationalism constitutes a powerful discursive tool for both the legitimization and
the contestation of state power (e.g., Brubaker 1996; Calhoun 1997; Chatterjee 1993;
Hobsbawn 1990), and that patterns of state institutional development are critical for
the dissemination of nationalism (e.g., Anderson 1991; Gellner 1983; Mann 1993). I
between state elites and subordinate movements, and by the timing of state making.
1
See Yashar (2005) for a similar approach to explain indigenous mobilization in contemporary Latin
America.
2
The label “state-focused” seeks to avoid confusion with the state-centered literature
(e.g., Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol 1985), and its emphasis on states as
institutional actors and its lack of attention to the agency of social movements.
theoretical issues. Many classical works (e.g., Anderson 1991; Breuilly 1982; Gellner
1983; Hobsbawn 1990; Smith 1986; Tilly 1994) have developed a sophisticated set
of arguments about the origins of nationalism. Yet they remain silent when it comes
member and who can claim rights—evolve over time. The study of popular
nationalism in Mexico, Argentina, and Peru sets the stage for theorizing
The focus on these three Latin American cases also addresses another
the region. Most theories of nationalism are grounded in European countries and probe
their theoretical claims in light of empirics from these cases (Gellner 1983; Hobsbawn
1990; Smith 1986; Tilly 1994).2 A comparative approach to nationalism in Latin America
nationalism in the region. Yet, this growing literature (e.g., de la Cadena 2000; Gutierrez
2
One of the few notable exceptions is Benedict Anderson’s highly acclaimed Imagined Communities
(1991), which argues that early nineteenth century “Creole pioneers” invented nations in the struggle
for Independence from Spain, thereby establishing a “blueprint” for nationalism around the globe.
Yet, Anderson’s argument about the Latin American origins of nationalism did not work out: Ideas
about popular sovereignty and citizenship employed by insurgent creoles originated in Western
Europe (Greenfeld 1992; Guibernau 1996), and Anderson’s elite-centered argument ignored the
agency of subaltern actors in the construction of national imagined communities (Lomnitz 2001,
Guardino 1996; Mallon 1995; Thurner 1997).
3
1999; Quijada 1994; 2000; Shumway 1991; Thurner 1997) remains—with a few
perspective, however, these studies often lack the necessary tools to identify the causal
facilitates the synthesis of this important literature into a comparative framework for
Official national discourses were highly consequential for policy decisions in the
three countries. Ideas about national identity and history informed citizenship
regimes and redistributive policies (e.g., Collier and Collier 1991; Yashar 2005).
Boundaries of national belonging shaped the political, civil, and social rights granted
practical exercise of these rights. For instance, in the three countries, social welfare
provisions were more limited for those segments of the population that did not fit
into corporatist categories established and legitimized by popular nationalism and its
class-based understanding of the nation (e.g., Hamilton 1982; Plotkin 2002; Stepan
1978).
Peru indigenous movements gained prominence throughout the last decades, while
Argentina witnessed the increasing mobilization of its indigenous people and recent
3
Comparative approaches to nationalism include Brading (1991), Quijada (1994; 2000), and Bouchard
(1998). Yet these works are largely descriptive and not grounded in a theoretically motivated explanatory
framework.
4
immigrants from the Andean countries. These movements advanced alternative
popular nationalism (e.g., de la Cadena 2000; García 2005; Gutierrez 1999; Stephen
2002; Yashar 2005). Their struggle illustrates once more a central contention of this
Like with most other concepts in the social sciences scholars engage in heated
(e.g., Armstrong 1982; Breuilly 1982; Gellner 1999; Gorski 2000; Smith 1999),
subjective or objective (e.g., Bauman 1992; Calhoun 1997; Tamir 1993), alive and well
or destined to disappear in the dustbin of history (e.g., Hobsbawn 1977; Kedouri 1960;
Nairn 1977). Despite the overall conceptual dispersion the literature can be roughly
divided into three distinct approaches that emphasize different aspects of nationalism.
One group of scholars stresses collective action and views nationalism as a set of political
behaviors. In this perspective nationalism refers to social movements or state policies that
advance the interests of collectivities framed as nations (e.g., Beissinger 2002; Breuilly
1982; Hechter 2000; Tilly 1990). A second group highlights emotions and depicts
form of social solidarity infusing with passion ties to the national community and
5
establishing a sense of belonging (e.g., Guibernau 1996; James 1996; Marx 2003). A
(e.g., Anderson 1991; Brubaker 1996; Gellner 1983; Smith 1986). In this perspective
For conceptualizing nationalism this study draws on the latter two approaches. I
about collectivities in terms of nations and national identities (Calhoun 1997; Özkirimli
2005). Its basic underpinning is the idea that a political unit is congruent with an
principles, cognitive schemata, symbols, myths, and rituals with emotions and collective
meaning and fuses them into specific reference points for the construction of national
inclusion. These boundary markers are historical fabrications, but they may be
Finlayson 1998).
The emphasis on cognitions, evaluations, and emotions situates the concept at the
interface between politics and culture and avoids the overemphasis of the political
movements and state policies ignores a key feature of nationalism, its peculiar power to
bring the political and the cultural together. Moreover, this definition avoids conflating
explanans and explanandum, because it includes neither the actions producing particular
4
This definition provides a basis for distinguishing between nationalism and other forms of discourse
involved in the legitimation or challenge of state power. For instance, agrarianism is distinct from
nationalism because it evokes an imagined community of peasants rather than nationals.
6
understandings of national identity nor the political behaviors these national discourses
might inspire.
equal and inherently limited nations, and a state as their political embodiment,
nationalism also forms a grid for the challenge of state power. The idea of a sovereign
nationalism. The main distinction is based on the major social actors that advance and/or
and consciously articulated state ideology. States draw upon national discourses to
legitimate authority and achieve social control (Gellner 1983; Hobsbawn 1990; Smith
political support and challenge state authority. Stark empirical examples are the vignettes
about the nation by leaders of the Zapatista movement in Mexico. Third and finally,
nationalism is a cultural script with almost self-evident plausibility that provides a lens
through which social reality is framed in daily habits and routines (Anderson 1991; Billig
1995; Brubaker 1996). This form of nationalism is reflected in the cheering for one’s
7
national soccer team during the World Cup, or taking the national framing of news for
granted.
propose the following conceptual model for tracing transformations of nationalism. State
ideologies aim to become gradually translated into hegemonic cultural scripts.5 These
implicit frames of reference help to propel the pervasiveness of states in the life-world of
their resident populations (Eley and Suny 1996; Verdery 1993). At the same time,
cultural scripts enjoy relative autonomy from state control and therefore provide
order to challenge state ideologies (Chatterjee 1993; Mallon 1995). On the basis of this
official ideas about the nation. A transformation of nationalism is associated with (1) the
movements; (2) the selective incorporation of alternative narratives into state ideologies,
---------------------------------
Figure 1 about here
---------------------------------
5
National discourses are hegemonic if they have achieved the status of broadly diffused reference points.
In this definition, hegemony is not equated with citizens’ acceptance of official national ideologies, but
refers to the use of these discourses in daily life (see Gramsci 1971).
6
This model is inspired by Robert Wuthnow’s (1989) “social-structural” approach to ideological change. In
his empirical work he discusses the production, selection, and institutionalization of the Reformation, the
Enlightment, and socialism as ideological forms.
8
Movements usually do not “invent” alternative national narratives from scratch,
but draw on cultural scripts to construct contending visions of national history and
identity that achieve broader resonance across public spheres. Movement organizations
and their networks with cultural producers—the agents involved in the creation and
alternative narratives by state elites tends to involve the cooptation of contentious cultural
as regular products of state organizations, with the aim to translate these discourses into
hegemonic cultural scripts. Key in this process are the institutional domains of education,
nationalism. Building on the idea that nationalism is involved in both the legitimation and
state action and the contestation and alliance structures between state elites and social
framework is that during the early and mid-20th century in Mexico, Argentina, and Peru
9
the central state consolidated and expanded its reach, and that these three countries were
increasingly incorporated into the global capitalist economy, entailing the spread of
market relations into rural areas and incipient forms of industrialization. Political
centralization and economic expansion set the stage for the emergence of new social
actors: Movements of subordinate classes, middle sectors, and excluded local elites
gained momentum and mobilized for their political and symbolic inclusion.
periods of intensified mobilization are marked by the formation of new collective actors,
obtain broader support and advance their demands, reaching from coalitions and
bargaining over mass demonstrations, strikes and public ceremonies, to rebellions and the
strategic use of violence. A critical dimension of all these mobilization processes is the
effort to legitimate their claims, produce a sense of collective identity among claimants,
and transform existing meaning structures in accordance with their political projects.
work” of social movements. National symbols or myths provide movement leaders and
affiliated cultural producers with a device to orient participants and dignify political
demands within a broader frame of reference (see Snow et al. 1986; Snow and Benford
1988). Movements also create alternative national narratives in order to represent their
10
political demands as the “national interest,” and to portray the claims of contending social
for movements of subordinate actors, the identity of “national” provides a power resource
in the struggle for the extension of social and political rights (Kastoryano 2002). Thus,
appealing alternative narratives and make this vision heard in the public sphere. Both the
ideological tactics and the organizational forms of movements are crucial for explaining
when and under what conditions the alternative narrative production of movements
reaches beyond the boundaries of contentious networks themselves and achieves broader
resonance.
National narratives are more likely to achieve public attention if they refurbish
already broadly diffused myths and symbols and manage to infuse them with a different
recognized figures by emphasizing different character traits and political legacies and
may reinterpret the main historical events and periods from official history to embed their
ideologies and use the common language of cultural scripts to construct coherent
11
An effective framing strategy alone, however, does not guarantee success (see
(McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001)—are critical for advancing alternative narratives.
These organizational forms constitute the institutional backdrop for the production and
organizations and informal networks generate resources necessary for the financial
support and collective coordination of ideological projects (McCarthy and Zald 1977).
For instance, movement organizations may recruit and finance the work of cultural
producers engaged in the formulation of national narratives and protect them from direct
state repression. Moreover, these collective vehicles facilitate access to larger audiences
and provide the means for the public circulation of ideological products. Movements
tend to be more successful in alternative narrative production when they feature formal
organization and membership networks beyond the local or regional level, when they are
organized around relatively stable interests and collective identities, and when they
discourses may change dramatically and incorporate alternative narratives (or key
elements thereof) into official national discourse. For instance, presidential speeches may
depict certain episodes of national history in a way previously found only in coffeehouse
12
taken into account for explaining transformations of nationalism: the state. States are
socioeconomic, and also ideological and cultural projects (Gorski 2003; Loveman 2005).
At the same time, states are embedded in a series of relationships with other social actors,
and these ties are marked by varying degrees of cooperation and conflict (Evans 1995;
This study builds on insights from the political development literature, which
argues that state action is fundamentally shaped by the type of alliance structures upon
which states base their power (e.g., Collier and Collier 1991; Huber and Stephens 2001;
Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Luebbert 1991; Waldner 1999). Translated into the domain of
ideology and discourse, such an analytical perspective suggests that changing political
in the balance of power between state elites and social actors may create an incentive to
This study emphasizes two likely paths through which changing political
alliances between state authorities and entrenched economic elites sets off the
refashioning of official national discourses. Such a context, usually marked by high levels
of social mobilization, intra-elite conflict, and the emergence of new political leaders,
induces executive authorities to adopt new strategies for attaining and consolidating state
13
themselves as distinct from the old regime and to differentiate their political and
movements representing subordinate classes such as labor and the peasantry motivate the
incorporation popular narratives into official ideology. With these alliances, subordinate
movements acquire new political weight, enabling them to pressure more effectively for
the redefinition of state-sponsored national discourses. In turn, state elites are bound to
consider alternative narratives for maintaining these new ruling coalitions and
consolidating state power. Thus, in both paths, changing alliance configurations between
state authorities and collective actors constitute a likely context for the incorporation of
various social and material goods (e.g., prestige, access to audiences) valuable to
facilities. For instance, state authorities may offer alternative intellectuals a career in
a more effective forum for their visions of the nation, and at the same time loosening
products (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001: 44). For instance, states may embrace
14
organizations involved in the reinterpretation of national history by selectively funding
their activities or providing them with a logistical framework for diffusion. This process
may even entail the eventual absorption of social movement organizations into state
agencies of cultural production and consumption (Gorski 2003: 166-168). Thus, the
changing ties between cultural producers, movement organizations, and state agencies.
It bears emphasis, however, that states usually do not act as monolithic entities.
Of particular importance for the study of nationalism is the relationship between cultural
and ideological organizations on the one hand, and the executive branch of the state on
the other. These different state agencies potentially marshal distinct interests and
identities, and their relationship might be marked by conflict and contradicting activities,
rather than by cooperation and coordinated information flows. For instance, the ministry
of education might oppose the coalition-building efforts of the government. Thus, the
scope of state alliances may vary, depending on whether new alliance structures become
“sticky” and extend beyond executive authorities to include state organizations engaged
States cannot simply adopt alternative narratives as state ideologies and turn them
take place, new forms of national ideology need to become a regular product of state
15
organizations, and need to be embedded in professional roles and collective rituals (see
power,” which refers to the institutional capacity of states to permeate society and
implement their projects throughout the territories that they claim to govern (Mann 1984;
1993). This form of state power enables central state organizations to shape and regulate,
both normatively and by force, the social relations within their territorial boundaries.
Infrastructurally more powerful states exhibit the logistical techniques necessary to name,
register, tax, police, conscript, and educate their subjects, and they do so both in the
capital and the farthest points of their territories. Thus, key sources of state infrastructural
force, and tax collection (see Evans, Rueschemeyer and Skocpol 1985; Goodwin 2001;
Yet, roads, police officers, and tax offices alone do not win over citizens’ hearts
and minds. Cultural and educational state organizations therefore require analytical
attention in their own right (Gorski 2003; Loveman 2005). This study centers on the
and rituals dedicated to regulating the production and diffusion of ideological products,
and controlling cultural producers and their organizations (Berezin 1991; Wuthnow
1989). Thus, the concept seeks to trace the “third dimension” of state power (see Lukes
16
1974), the capacity of state organizations to pursue their projects on the basis of
schools), and principal actors in such a domain (e.g., educational authorities and
teachers). While public schooling is certainly of critical importance, other relevant arenas
for examining the ideological work of states include mass communication, art and
entertainment, public ceremonies and rituals, and social policy. State ideological
infrastructure varies with respect to the reach of state organizations in these institutional
domains. For instance, an extensive network of public primary schools facilitates the
For example, monetary patronage and subsidies for national history institutes facilitate
control over these organizations and their intellectual production. And finally, the cultural
ideological products. For instance, state authorities issue detailed guidelines defining the
works or literature.
ideological infrastructure. The relationship between executive authorities and these actors
resources and regulations in place, strained relations may foster the opposition of cultural
17
producers and thereby inhibit the production and diffusion of ideological forms from
“within the state.” For instance, public school teachers may resist the ideological
and employ a variety of strategies to subvert its content in the classroom. Thus, state
regulatory capacities of state organizations, it is also based on the training and outlook of
cultural producers and their alignments and contestations with executive elites.
Ideas about timing and historical sequence are useful for assessing the impact of
state ideological infrastructure (Ertman 1997; Rueschemeyer 1973; see also Pierson
2004). I argue that an already established cultural machinery makes it more difficult for
state elites to convert a new national ideology into a regular product of state
geographical reach, and maintains cultural producers who were trained under the
invested in the professional identity of these cultural producers, which in turn enhances
The question remains how social mobilization, state alliances, and state
18
subsequent section brings the conceptualization of nationalism and the explanatory
forward by the state, and (3) a cultural script with almost self-evident plausibility.
marked by the exclusion of new alternative narratives from state ideologies, with the
result that these narratives remain confined to social forces without access to state
power.
processes: (1) the formation of movements that successfully advance alternative ideas
about the nation, (2) the change of alliance structures between state authorities, oligarchic
elites, and subordinate movements, which provide an incentive for the incorporation of
these alternative narratives into state ideologies, and (3) the congruence between
discursive changes and the expansion of state ideological infrastructure, facilitating the
19
institutionalization of these new official ideologies. When all three processes are present,
grounding of state power in accomodationist alliances with oligarchic elites prevents the
cases requires a clear understanding of what kind of national discourses were present in
each case at a given point in time. In other words, we first need a device for tracing cross-
vantage point. This section develops an inductive typology for identifying differences and
between civic and ethnic forms of nationalism– tracks whether inclusion into the national
Hobsbawn 1990). Civic nationalism portrays the nation as a political community that is
20
At a first glance, this typology provides certain comparative insights for Mexico,
Argentina, and Peru. During the late nineteenth century national discourses in all three
understanding of the nation, official state ideologies emphasized the public institutions of
state and civil society, most importantly the Constitution, as major identity markers.
Attachment to the nation was based on the commitment to a shared set of political
practices and values and had to be reinforced by carefully calibrated civic rituals.
Analogously, national discourses in Mexico, Argentina, and Peru also showed important
traits of ethnic nationalism. During the twentieth century alternative national narratives
advanced by contentious actors and, later on, official national ideologies propagated by
common language, religion, and tradition. Cultural sameness, and not shared rights,
Yet the analytical leverage provided by the distinction between civic and ethnic
three countries. This dissertation illustrates that late nineteenth century national
ideologies not only evoked Enlightment ideas of popular sovereignty and individual
citizenship, they were also deeply infused with Comtean political positivism and adopted
late nineteenth century racial thinking with its emphasis on biology, eugenics, and social
darwinianism. Achieving “order and progress” appeared as the most promising recipe to
secure the nation’s wellbeing. Official national discourses depicted enlightened and
benevolent elites as the natural leaders of these states and portrayed them as the
protagonists of national history. Their actions were critical to propel the respective
21
national community from “barbarism” to “civilization”—a category associated with
economic modernization, urban and cosmopolitan European culture, and ideas about
constituted the ideal underpinning for a society favoring natural selection and the
domination of “the fittest.” Excluded were those who did not match the image of a
“civilized nation.” As a matter of fact, official national ideologies in these three countries
recreated the ethnoracial hierarchies from the colonial period and conceived of only small
segments of the population, wealthy, white, and literate, as fully included nationals. Thus,
late nineteenth century nationalism in Mexico, Argentina, and Peru fused civic ideals
Also the concept of ethnic nationalism does not capture important dimensions of
twentieth century alternative national narratives and state ideologies. This study shows
that these forms of nationalism highlighted the cultural bases of national identity in
Mexico, Argentina, and Peru, yet they did not employ imageries of shared ethnic decent
or common blood ties. Even when imagined as cultural communities, assimilation into
these nations remained a possibility. In other words, these national discourses recognized
the diverse racial or ethnic origins of the nation, but intended to blend those differences
national unity was complemented by an emphasis on “the people” as the “true” carriers of
Mexican, Argentinean, and Peruvian identity and protagonists of national history. The
main cleavage was between the “masses” and the “oligarchy,” the latter marked as not
intertwined with foreign interests, these national discourses often took a strong anti-
22
imperialist stance and envisioned a strong state and an inward-oriented economy as the
ideal institutional order of the nation. A strong state was also deemed necessary to
categories, rather than in terms of equal individual citizenship. Thus, in all three cases
Based on these patterns I argue that a different typology is more suitable for
tracing the similarities and differences among national discourses in Mexico, Argentina,
and Peru: the distinction between liberal and popular nationalism. As summarized in
Table 1, this typology traces these forms of nationalism along four dimensions:
membership criteria—tracking what the defining features of the national community are;
symbolic universe—pinpointing the key actors and main cleavages within the imagined
community; and political vision—detecting imageries about the ideal institutional order
for the nation. Based on this distinction it is possible to identify two main variations
grounded in its political and economic institutions, and its territorial boundaries. This
political conception is complemented by the idea that national unity can only be
accomplished through the move from “barbarism” to “civilization” and the creation of a
peculiar national culture. Liberal nationalism advances an elitist image of the nation
23
organized around the agency of enlightened leaders, while popular nationalism
emphasizes that subordinate sectors embody the authentic national community and
therefore are legitimate historical agents. Finally, the two forms of national diverge in
---------------------------------
Table 1 about here
---------------------------------
historiography, the term is widely used to describe the dominant political and ideological
project in the region during the mid- to late nineteenth century (e.g., Brading 1973;
Gootenberg 1993; Hale 1968; Halperín Donghi 1987a). Distinct from the contemporary
use of the word in the United States, and also distinct from the classical liberalism
associated with theorists such as Adam Smith, John Locke, and John Stuart Mill, the
form of liberalism present in nineteenth century Latin America was strongly influenced
by the philosophical positivism of Auguste Comte (e.g., Mahoney 2001; Eastwood 2004).
As such, this ideology was marked by the tension between individual rights and
freedoms, and the inherent value assigned to natural social hierarchies. Latin American
liberalism supported the idea that all people are equally capable of reason and progress,
while also embracing Darwin’s theory of natural selection and depicting lower classes as
24
biologically incapable of governing themselves. The term “popular” is also grounded in
occurred in the context of broader economic and sociopolitical change during the early
and mid twentieth century, precisely when previously marginalized sectors mobilized for
their political and symbolic inclusion, and when both fascism and communism gained
increasing prominence as global ideological models. Scholars often describe this epoch as
“populism” or “populist period” (e.g., Cotler 2005; Stein 1980), defined by political and
ideological projects evoking the idea of a national people in opposition to an elite (e.g.,
The distinction between liberal and popular nationalism leaves room for an
intermediary, yet qualitatively different type: romantic nationalism. This form of national
same time, romantic nationalism resembles liberal national ideology in its elitist image of
the national community, and its hierarchical projections about the proper institutional
order of the nation. The label “romantic” points to its grounding in nineteenth century
German Romanticism, an intellectual and artistic movement that arose in reaction to the
Enlightment. Its most prominent advocate, Johann Gottfried von Herder, countered the
voluntary aspects of civic nationalism with the idea of the nation as an a-historical entity
class. In early twentieth century Mexico, Argentina, and Peru romantic nationalism
could be first identified in alternative national narratives articulated by middle sectors and
excluded elites. Later on, it found its way into official state ideologies in the context of
25
Why Mexico, Argentina, and Peru?
assessed against evidence from Mexico, Argentina, and Peru. This case selection is
these countries, which facilitates the matching and contrasting of cases integral to any
comparative analysis. I combine two strategies of comparison, a most similar and a most
different systems design (Collier and Collier 1991; Przeworski and Teune 1970) for
sharply with the persistence of liberal nationalism in Peru. At the same time, countries as
distinct as Argentina and Peru experienced similar transformative episodes. Finally, each
of these cases constitutes a stark empirical example of one of the ideal typical
continuum, with other countries in Latin America likely to follow these trajectories or
combinations of them.
Mexico and Peru exhibit important similarities with respect to colonial history,
economic history, and demographic composition. The Audiencia of Mexico and the
Audiencia of Lima, roughly corresponding to the areas of modern Mexico and Peru, were
complex precolonial societies and their large indigenous populations (Newson 1985;
26
administrative and coercive state organizations in these territories, which remained the
bureaucratic cores of the empire throughout the colonial period (Guardino and Walker
1992; Mahoney and vom Hau 2005). In both Mexico and Peru economic activities were
predominantly oriented towards the extraction of precious metals and the exploitation of
indigenous labor (Andrien 2001; Brading 1971; Cole 1985; Stern 1993). The creation of
mercantile actors and ethnoracial stratification systems during the colonial period had
large implications for subsequent national development and continues to shape the
institutional set-up and lived experience in these two countries today (Mahoney 2003a).
nationalism played themselves out in a completely different context, a settler society with
massive European migration and a booming export economy. The region corresponding
to modern Argentina lacked a dense indigenous population, and during much of the
colonial period played only a marginal role for economic production and political
administration in the Spanish colonial system (Halperín Donghi 1993). In fact, state
formation in Argentina only gained momentum in the late colonial period (Rock 1987;
2002). As a former colonial backwater, Argentina was spared from the most delirious
found in postcolonial Mexico and Peru (Klarén 2000; Knight 1992; Mahoney 2003a;
Mahoney and vom Hau 2005). Instead, extensive economic expansion was accompanied
by the massive inflow of European immigrants (Devoto 2003; Halperín Donghi 1987b).
Thus, the choice of comparing Mexico and Peru to Argentina follows a most
different systems design. During the twentieth century these countries exhibited a key
similarity: all three witnessed a transition from liberal to popular nationalism in a context
27
characterized by state expansion, incorporation into the global capitalist economy,
urbanization, and agrarian development. The exact dates when this discursive change
unfolded differed for each country, though they roughly fall in between 1910 and 1950—
with the exception of Peru, where a comparable discursive change only occurred much
later, during the 1960s and 1970s. The profound historical differences between Mexico
and Peru on the one hand, and Argentina on the other, provide a stronger basis for
inferring that transformations of nationalism were driven by conflicts between states and
Selecting Mexico, Argentina, and Peru also sets the stage for explaining contrasts
and similarities through pairs of comparison. The comparison between Mexico and Peru
follows a most similar systems design. Exhibiting important historical similarities, these
a comprehensive transformation. After the revolution, new state elites ascended, and
of nationalism. During the 1930s and 1940s subordinate forces repeatedly advanced
excluded from state ideology. The comparison between Argentina under Perón and Peru
under Velasco follows a most different systems logic. Both resemble a contained
during the military government in the 1970s popular nationalism gained prominence as
official national discourse in Peru. Yet, in both cases state elites did not manage to
28
translate this popular national ideology into more implicit cultural scripts. Thus, the
Methodology
understood here, is a mode of social scientific inquiry that moves back and forth between
history and theory in effort to develop and refine concepts, and identity and assess causal
comparisons are used to contrast theoretically important aspects of the different cases
strategies of causal assessment (Mahoney 1999). For instance, I argue that the presence
of alliances with subordinate actors is a necessary condition for the emergence of popular
nationalism as an official national ideology, while its absence propels the continued
highly aggregated level of cross-case comparisons. This method helps to assess causal
within specific cases. Of particular importance for this mode of analysis are “process
tracing” and analytical narrative. The former explores whether there is a causal
29
association between explanatory factors and the outcome of interest by detecting whether
the within-case dynamics follow the hypothesized causal path (George and Bennett
2005). In other words, this methodological tool involves the identification of causal
mechanisms—or the continuous processes and events that unfold from effect to outcome
evidence. This dissertation also uses analytical narrative (Mahoney 2003b; Stryker 1996).
This informal technique is focused disaggregating explanatory factors and outcomes into
smaller event processes with the aim to do justice to causal complexity. It is especially
useful for tracing configurations of causal factors and their interplay and making causal
inferences through the comparison of particular event sequences. Organized around the
arguments.
For the analysis of nationalism this dissertation is centrally concerned with the
reconstruction of historical discourses about national identity and history. Its main focus
groupings, and temporal periods. In doing so, this study employs a variety of historical
sources, combining primary evidence with secondary sources on the three countries. For
material, most importantly school textbooks on national history, literature, and civic
education. I use textbooks because public schools are arguably the major nationalizing
institution of the state during the 20th century. State authorities put major efforts into
establishing an official curriculum and regulating the content of these texts, for instance
30
through special approval commissions. The relatively wide circulation of textbooks
grants them a significant advantage over other plausible sources. For instance, writings
of political elites or intellectuals were much more limited in their diffusion, and therefore
calculations, such as winning the next election. Finally, a comparative study of textbooks
from the three countries affords the opportunity to develop an analytical framework that
nationalism in Mexico, Argentina, and Peru (e.g., Cucuzza and Somoza 2001; Heise and
Degregori 1973; Plotkin 2002; Portocarrero and Oliart 1989; Vaughan 1982; Vázquez
1970).
schooling during the late 19th century, a period that witnessed the prevalence of liberal
over substantial periods of time, from 1884 to 1955 in Argentina, from 1888 to 1960 in
Mexico, and from 1905 to 1978 in Peru. In each country I reviewed between 50 and 70
textbooks for these periods, collecting at least five publications per decade. For the
selection of textbooks I employed three main criteria. First, I focused on primary school
textbooks because only a small segment of the population attended secondary schools
during the time of interest. Second, I selected those textbooks that were published or
31
approved by national educational authorities. Third and finally, among the approved
textbooks I preferred those that were reprinted in several editions, indicating their actual
use. For contextualizing this textbook analysis I also collected information on the
regulation of textbook production and circulation. I tracked guidelines for editorials and
touches upon one of the most difficult tasks in historical research: the reception of
ideological forms among common people. Especially in past societies with low literacy
different sources and modes of inquiry are highly contested (e.g., Knight 1994; Mallon
1995; Thurner 1997). In this study I draw on interviews with teachers and periodicals
ideological forms. For exploring teachers’ role in this process I zoomed in on the
activities and outlooks of primary school teachers during the main transformative
periods: the transitions towards popular nationalism under Cárdenas in Mexico (1934-
1940), Perón in Argentina (1946-1955), and the military government of Velasco in Peru
(1968-1975). For Mexico I relied primarily on detailed interviews with teachers already
active during the 1930s found the Archivo de la Palabra, an oral history archive that
32
consists of several hundred biographical interviews with individuals involved in Mexican
Revolution. I also consulted El Maestro Rural, a journal that mostly published articles
periodical written by teachers for teachers. I screened this journal for outlooks on national
identity and history by sampling those issues that were published around the major
and private school teachers already active during the Velasco regime.
In contrast to other plausible sources, for instance legal records, this focus on
teachers affords the opportunity to continue to focus on the domain of education and to
complement the textbook analysis with sources from the same organizational context. As
producers and consumers of national ideology teachers play a double role in the
products advanced by state authorities and constitute the initial transmission belt in the
identity and marshal a certain degree of autonomy to interpret, package, and rework state
ideologies in the classroom. Thus, a focus on teachers provides a window for exploring
both the contestations of nationalism among different state organizations and the
negotiation of official national discourses within larger society. The exclusive focus on
teachers over another highly plausible source within the domain of education, students’
reactions to textbooks, has largely pragmatic and empirical reasons. With the exception
Gvirtz’ (1999) study of student notebooks from the Peronist period indicates, these
33
lecture notes were highly dependent on the topics and textbook sections emphasized by
teachers.
Only for the analysis of alternative national narratives this study departs from an
combined secondary literature with the analysis of periodicals that showed a close
affinity to the movements of interest. For instance, I consulted daily newspapers and
APRA’s La Tribuna in Peru during the 1930s, or that were known as an important
during the 1940s. The review of periodicals built on my findings from the textbook
analysis and predominantly concentrated on the ten year period before a major
ideological transformation took place or was theoretically expected to unfold. The main
rationale behind this collection strategy was to identify the alternative national narratives
that were immediately available to (new) state elites in a context of changing political
configurations. The selection of actual articles was selective. As a rule of thumb I focused
again on sampling texts from issues published around major national holidays, such as
reviewed the relevant periodicals more extensively during certain years with special
events, such as the 400th anniversary of the foundation of Lima in 1935. My final sample
included those journal and newspaper articles that explicitly dealt with themes related to
These distinct historical sources provided the textual corpus for reconstructing
nationalism as alternative national narratives, cultural scripts, and state ideologies in each
34
case. For tracing their continuities and variations over time I screened the selected texts
according to several major themes. With respect to national history I explored founding
historical epochs, and the main forces “driving” national history. When focusing on
well as representations of external others and major enemies. I was also interested in
ideas about hierarchies found within the national imagined community and therefore
searched for depictions of the most important national heroes, symbols such as flags and
maps, and national holidays and the reasons given to celebrate them. In the case of
textbooks I supplemented the textual analysis with a focus on their iconography. Across
all historical sources, this analytical grid provided the backdrop to identify distinct
point.
Historical Argument
This section elaborates on the previous discussion and introduces the cases
examined throughout this study in more detail. While acknowledging the peculiarities of
Argentina, and Peru through the optic of a state-focused approach and seeks to the broad
Liberal Nationalism
35
During the late nineteenth century, often described as period of “oligarchic
domination” (O’Donnell 1977: 66), Mexico, Argentina, and Peru left the vicious circle of
political turmoil and economic stagnation behind that characterized the immediate
postcolonial era. Central states consolidated, expanding their power vis-à-vis local
caudillo rule. Political centralization was closely intertwined with economic expansion,
largely driven by foreign investment, the production of agrarian exports, and incipient
industries.7 The rural economy was dominated by large estates, the main beneficiaries of
their political power in an alliance with a narrow elite of large landowners and
industrialists, the main beneficiaries of the export boom. The majority of political offices
went to members of these elites who ruled through a combination of clientilism, electoral
Mexican, Argentinean, and Peruvian state elites advanced liberal nationalism with
the aim to legitimate the reigning oligarchic order. The respective national Constitution
appeared as the centerpiece of a “civic religion” built around carefully calibrated rituals
and ceremonies, and only enlightened leaders were capable of achieving greater degrees
cultural scripts, however, faced substantial limitations. In all three countries the reach of
state ideological infrastructure was limited. In Mexico and Peru, the development of
public schooling and the regulation of mass communication and cultural politics
7
In Argentina this economic bonanza was accompanied by the equally dramatic demographic
reorganization of society based on massive European immigration.
36
consolidated cultural and pedagogical organizations, the reach of the state’s cultural
Liberal nationalism was contested. The three countries witnessed the growth and
politicization of middle sectors and working classes that mobilized for their political and
symbolic inclusion; regional elites felt threatened by the rising power of the central state;
and the expanding “ideological work” of state organizations upset the established balance
of church and state. Representatives of these social forces often employed contending
national narratives. These movements, even though they varied in their framing
about national history and identity found in the reigning liberal nationalism and infused
artistic and political movements, worried about the consequence of European mass
migration, emphasized the Hispanic roots of the nation and imagined the gaucho as the
movement largely composed of regional elites from the Andes, portrayed the Inca Empire
as the origin of a peculiar national culture. By contrast, anarchists, the main political
force among organized labor during this period, depicted nationalism as a bourgeois
37
State-initiated Transitions towards Romantic Nationalism
political configurations. Both Mexico and Argentina witnessed transitions from liberal to
mobilization and intra-elite conflict. During the armed phase of the Mexican Revolution
(1910-1920) intra-elite conflicts and popular rebellions toppled the old oligarchic regime
and led to the temporary collapse of the central state. Both the peasantry and urban labor
revolutionary leaders.
The revolutionary struggles ended with the military defeat of these popular forces
and the ascendance of a new postrevolutionary state elite, composed of provincial elites
and middle sectors. Confronted with a highly mobilized society and recurrent conflicts
among the “revolutionary family” itself, state power became grounded in alliances with
urban labor and, to a lesser degree, with peasants. During the 1920s these alliances took
the form of paternalistic ties between political caudillos and subordinate leaders, and
were therefore highly volatile and subject to change. Eager to distinguish themselves
from the Porfirian era the new state elites adopted romantic projections about national
identity and history. Official national ideology envisioned a transcendental “cosmic race”
of mestizos as the basis of a genuine national identity and celebrated the Aztec past as the
nationalism remained limited. Throughout the 1920s the state cultural machinery
38
continued to lack the reach necessary for the translation of the official national discourses
without revolutionary transformation. Yet again, this discursive change developed on the
the almost complete demographic reorganization of the country. Between 1890 and 1910
powerful labor movement emerged among a rapidly expanding urban proletariat, and the
among middle sectors and dissidents within the oligarchic elite. State authorities
against labor, a more rigorous project of “nationalizing” the immigrant population, and an
attempt at a controlled political opening from above. It was in this context that romantic
races,” the local version of the melting pot) and celebrated the gaucho as the most
process. The idea of the nation as an organic and self-regulating cultural community
strategy of controlled political opening backfired, and the Radical Party won the election
in 1916 and established itself as the dominant political force for the subsequent decade,
39
national ideology. In contrast to postrevolutionary Mexico, Argentina witnessed the
expanded the reach of “mass socializing” institutions such as public schooling and
patriotic rituals and invested heavily in cultural politics. The temporal congruence
When compared to Mexico and Argentina, Peru did not experience a similar
transition toward romantic nationalism during the early twentieth century. The 1910s and
1920s witnessed heightened labor protest, and indigenous movements in the Andes
Leguía, an outsider candidate for the presidency, won the 1919 elections and staged a
coup when defeated candidates contested the election results. In the face of substantial
opposition from the oligarchic establishment Leguía tried to base his political rule on the
toward popular sectors. His speeches resonated with romantic nationalism, celebrating
the Inca Empire as the cradle of the Peruvian nation government. Leguía, however, soon
coastal and highland elites, romantic nationalism did not find its way into the state’s
Thus, during this initial transformative phase the three countries embarked on
40
reigning liberal nationalism managed to persist. Based on a state-focused approach this
study shows that changing political configurations were key in shaping these divergent
by very different structural contexts, state elites initiated a discursive change in response
Peru under Leguía subordinate mobilization and intra-elite conflict did not entail a similar
order of state-making reveals that in Argentina the simultaneous expansion of the cultural
scripts, while in Mexico state ideological infrastructure remained limited. These different
In Mexico, Argentina, and Peru transitions toward popular nationalism were again
vis-à-vis state elites. Changes in official national ideology were not only motivated by the
decay of accomodationist alliances, they also included the active formation of new
coalition structures between popular sectors and state authorities. In this mobilization-
based path, the incorporation of popular nationalism as official ideology was grounded in
populist alliances and the increased political weight of subordinate forces. State
authorities tended to include subordinate forces and popular national narratives in their
41
In Mexico, the revolutionary struggles had left behind highly mobilized
decades. Urban workers, even though numerically smaller than the various peasant
understanding of the nation and depicted peasants and workers as the protagonists of
history of militancy expanded its political influence during the 1930s. Socialists and
ideological reach. Their alternative national narratives reworked official story lines,
portraying Spanish colonialism as the onset of imperial exploitation and depicting the
gaucho as a wage laborer and symbol of subaltern revolutionary spirit. In Peru the
Socialist Party under the leadership of José Carlos Mariátegui and Alianza Popular
“the people” as the “true” national subjects in opposition to the “oligarchy” with the
revalorization of indigenous culture and the Inca Empire as key markers of Peruvian
identity.
The three countries also witnessed the emergence of political Catholics. These
Church, and sought to limit socialist and communist influence among popular sectors. In
Mexico, catholic mobilization probably took the most radical form. Once
postrevolutionary state elites started to enforce the anticlerical articles of the 1917
42
constitution, already prevalent tensions escalated into a three year-long civil war, the so-
called Cristero Rebellion. In Argentina and Peru the boundaries between state and church
were somewhat more blurred than in Mexico, and political Catholics resorted to less
confrontational tactics. The Acción Católica emerged as the most important platform for
in the timing of this ideological change were to an important extent driven by political
nationalism as official national ideology in Mexico. This ideological change took off
when the coalition between organized labor, peasants, and postrevolutionary state elites
consolidated. Even though popular sectors were subjected to increased state control, they
obtained more political weight and substantial material concessions, and executive
authorities made subordinate interests an integral part of their political calculations and
nation-building strategies. This shift in the domestic balance of power was accompanied
8
A peculiarity of political Catholics in Argentina was their close affiliation with factions of the nationalist
movement. This oppositional force fused the celebrations of Argentina’s Hispanic origins with a strong
anti-imperialist stance and drew on fascism as a model for the corporatist organization of society. Catholic
militants were often nationalists and vice versa, and both often resorted to the same organizational
infrastructure in their mobilization efforts.
43
selectively adopted themes and discursive patterns previously found in alternative
class. Popular nationalism also reinterpreted the mestizo nation as composed of peasants,
culminated in the Revolution, setting the stage for a more egalitarian, industrialized, and
1955). During this period Juán Domingo Perón built a highly personalistic political
Cárdenas, this alliance entailed both the domestication of subordinate mobilization and
alliances also included political Catholics, at least during the initial phase of Peronism.
Official versions of national history assigned subordinate classes a critical role in shaping
national destiny, contrasting the actions of the dispossessed “masses” with the ones of the
“oligarchy.” Perón and his wife Evita appeared as the embodiment of the nation, equating
the political constituencies of the Peronist movement with the national community. While
version of the “melting pot”), it emphasized the Hispanic and Catholic roots of the nation.
Peru during the 1930s 1940s stands in sharp contrast to Mexico and Argentina:
Popular nationalism remained confined to the domain of alternative narratives and did not
44
gain prominence as official national ideology. From 1945 to 1948, under the presidency
of José Luis Bustamante y Rivero, the country experienced a brief democratic opening.
Accomodationist alliances with oligarchic elites crumbled, and state authorities sought to
build a multi-class coalition that included APRA and communists, and that enjoyed tacit
support from political Catholics. Yet, these new alliance structures, suffering from
massive internal conflicts, proved to be highly volatile and ultimately too short-lived for
A military coup ended this democratic experiment and state power continued to be based
It was only during the 1970s, under the military government Juán Alvarado
discourse. Similar to Mexico and Argentina, this ideological transformation was driven
by changing alliance structures. More than any previous government in modern Peruvian
history the Velasco government marshaled full autonomy from traditional oligarchic
forces. Yet, these new political alliances with popular sectors remained volatile and
contested, and did not achieve the same degree of institutionalization as in the other two
cases. Nonetheless, state elites adopted a focus on class and precolonial indigenous roots
in Peru under Velasco portrayed peasants and workers as protagonists of national history
45
and celebrated Túpac Amaru, the leader of an indigenous uprising during the 1780s, as
liberal nationalism as official national ideology in all three countries. Yet the extent of
dramatic expansion of cultural and pedagogical state organizations only began with
intervened in the control of radio broadcasting, and enhanced the regulation of cultural
politics. This temporal congruence between state making and ideological change
Argentina under Perón and Peru under Velasco, state making was disjointed from
During the subsequent decades, when the postrevolutionary regime was increasingly
46
characterized by political authoritarianism towards subordinate sectors, popular
nationalism retained its hegemonic status as national ideology. By contrast, the contained
transformations of nationalism in Argentina under Perón and Peru under Velasco did not
remained fiercely contested and existed in a stalemate with the previously dominant
liberal and romantic nationalism. In Argentina after 1955, both Peronists and the anti-
over policy and office into contestations over national belonging and identity. In Peru,
the removal of popular nationalism from state ideology after Velasco’s ousting fueled its
transformations of nationalism in early 20th century Argentina, Mexico, and Peru. The
factors and might even locate the transformation of nationalism in a different historical
time period. It is found that these approaches point to certain complementary factors, yet
that they ultimately fall short of the explanatory power of a state-focused framework.
Modernization
question of this theoretical tradition is how the transformation from traditional to modern
47
society plays itself out in different countries (see Eisenstadt 1970; Inkeles and Smith
1974; Parsons 1951). Modernization theory provides some of the major theories of
nationalism with a macrostructural grounding. Scholars have long argued that the
progress, industrialization, the expansion of state structures, and the diffusion of new
cultural institutions (e.g., Anderson 1991; Deutsch 1966; Gellner 1983). Thus,
inclusiveness, for instance reflected in the standardization of languages and the diffusion
societies.
nationalism establishes the basis for the following proposition: The formation of
relatively integrated economies and the rise of high-capacity states motivated transitions
towards popular nationalism in Mexico, Argentina, and Peru. The assimilationist and
grounding for the legitimation of state-led socialization projects. Thus, when compared
to the explanatory framework outlined above, modernization theory emphasizes the same
starting point, major socioeconomic and political change during the 1880-1950 period,
for explaining distinct trajectories of nationalism in the three countries. And indeed, as
this dissertation will illustrate, state consolidation and economic development provided
an important backdrop for the effective articulation of both official national ideologies
48
Yet, this competing approach ultimately has far less explanatory power than the
shows that transformations of nationalism cannot be read off modernizing trends. For
instance, dramatic economic growth and state expansion in Argentina during the 1880s
and then again during the 1910s did not automatically translate into the adoption of
Argentina requires a focus on politics; the transition towards popular nationalism is better
explained by contestations and alliances between states and social movements. Thus,
World-Cultural Models
explanation based on ideas about the massive diffusion of world-wide cultural and
prescriptions for action with a worldwide reach (Boli 1987; Meyer 1980). In this
perspective nationalism refers to world-cultural models that provide a standard form for
the construction of nations. These models define and legitimate the national discourses
advanced by states and movements. Local actors draw on world-approved norms about
the sovereignty of the people and adopt highly stylized forms for the depiction of national
culture and history. The diffusion and availability of these global models of nationalism
49
accelerated dramatically during the early twentieth century and has become especially
changes in global cultural and institutional forces. The diffusion of distinct templates for
sponsored national ideologies in Mexico, Argentina, and Peru. As such, this perspective
countries. Especially during the 1930s and 1940s popular nationalism thrived as a global
model. A variety of political projects, ranging from Roosevelt’s New Deal, the
national wellbeing. Thus, these schemata constituted important reference points for both
downplaying domestic factors such an approach cannot account for the contrasting
trajectories of nationalism found in the three countries during the 1930s and 1940s. As
this dissertation will show, a focus on global models cannot explain why popular
and remained excluded from state-sponsored discourses in Peru, even though it was
50
emphasis on political alliance structures can account for these distinct trajectories of
nationalism.
War Making
wars (e.g., Centeno 2002; Comaroff and Stern 1994; Mann 1993; Smith 1981). Military
conflict fosters the use and dissemination of national ideology. State authorities employ
and armies and military experience contribute to the propagation of nationalist symbols
and the creation of a sense of nationhood. Military conflict also contributes to the
articulation of alternative national projects. States in war often trade material and
potential loss of life among the resident population. Thus, wars can facilitate ideological
change and the diffusion of alternative ideas about national identity and history.
In the “war making” perspective international struggles play a critical role for
the national territory. This approach therefore suggests that episodes of international war
such, this approach also points to a possible alternative episode of change, located
roughly between 1850 and 1890. This is because major international wars that involved
the mobilization of substantial parts of the population were the US-Mexican War (1846-
51
1848) and the French Invasion (1861-1866) for Mexico, the War of the Pacific (1879-
1884) between Peru and Chile, and the War of the Triple Alliance (1865-1870) between
Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay on the one hand, and Paraguay on the other.
remarkable analysis precisely emphasizes the 1850-1890 period for explaining the
distinct trajectories of nationalism in these countries. She argues that in Peru the War of
the Pacific enhanced the articulation of popular narratives, yet state authorities continued
advancing popular nationalism and state authorities more responsive to these alternative
discourses. As a result, the Mexican state incorporated parts of these popular national
While Mallon’s study certainly gives important clues about the historical
and Peru, it does not provide an exhausting explanation of the distinct trajectories of
nationalism followed by these countries. As this study will illustrate, during the late
nineteenth century and thus after the critical juncture highlighted by Mallon, nationalism
exhibited striking similarities across the two cases: both Mexico and Peru marshaled
limitation of the “war making” perspective for the puzzle explored in this dissertation.
This approach ultimately cannot account for the dramatic changes of nationalism that
52
In sum, modernization processes, global models of nationalism, and international
wars have certainly affected trajectories of nationalism in Mexico, Argentina, and Peru.
institutionalization of official national discourses and set the stage for subordinate
provided both state authorities and movement actors with a discursive backdrop for
projections about national identity. Likewise, international wars opened spaces for
does precisely that. In this study I suggest that domestic alliance configurations between
state authorities and movements and the institutional development of states were crucial
in mediating modernization trends and shaping how international models translated into
Argentina, and Peru through the theoretical framework outlined in this chapter. Chapter
Two argues that from a comparative vantage point the three countries exhibited liberal
nationalism as a dominant state ideology during the first decades of the 20th century. The
53
chapter also examines the three countries along critical dimensions of the explanatory
framework. Mexico, Argentina, and Peru were marked by the relative absence of
alliances with dominant economic elites, and the reach of state ideological infrastructure
was limited. Chapter Three compares Postrevolutionary Mexico during the 1920s to
where state elites adopted romantic national narratives in contexts of substantial social
mobilization, changing political alliance structures and the decline of oligarchic power.
By contrast, intra-elite conflict in Peru under Leguia did not entail the decay of
ideology.
the forging of alliances between Peronist state elites and organized labor, official national
discourse became infused with popular nationalism. Yet, state authorities confronted
54
cultural machinery, and did not manage to turn popular national narratives into
The next two substantive chapters focus on Peru. Chapter Six suggests that during
the 1930s and 1940s Peru epitomized a blocked transformation of nationalism. Popular
populist party, and did not succeed in replacing liberal nationalism as dominant state
ideology. Chapter Seven shows that under the military government of Velasco (1968-
1975) popular nationalism was fully embraced by state elites. However, as an official
ideology, popular nationalism was contested from within the state apparatus and—similar
extended beyond the empirical cases of this dissertation. In particular, this chapter
context of Latin America. The chapter also speculates about the legacies of distinct
and Peru, popular nationalism itself has been challenged by sectors excluded from its
55
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Figure 1. A State-focused Framework of Transformations of Nationalism
Cultural Scripts
- implicit frame of reference
- dual quality: grid for both states
and subordinate actors
62
Table 1: Types of Nationalism in Argentina, Mexico, and Peru
63