GRANT OF TITLE - Mandamus is not the proper remedy.
1. Laburada v. LRA - The judgment the Sps. seek to enforce is not yet executory and incontrovertible
GR NO. 101387
March 11, 1998
SPV
Topic: ​Nature of Registration Proceedings and Jurisdiction of Courts
Petitioners:​ Sps. Mariano and Erlinda Laburada
Respondents: ​Land Registration Authority
Ponente: ​Panganiban
FACTS
- Sps. Laburada were applying for the registration for Lot 3-A located in
Mandaluyong City.
- The trial court, acting as a land registration court, confirmed and ordered the
registration of the Sps’ title thereto.
o It then required the LRA to issue the corresponding decree of
registration, but LRA refused.
o Hence, Sps. Laburada filed an action for mandamus.
- LRA explained, stating that after verification of the records on file in the Register of
Deeds for the Province of Rizal, it was found that Lot 3-B of the subdivision plan
Psd-1372 being a portion of Lot No. 3, Block No. 159, Plan S.W.O. -7237, is covered
by a TCT issued in the name of Pura Escurdia Vda. de Buenaflor
o Basically Lot 3A might be a portion of parcels of land in other Court of
Land Registration Cases (#699, 875 and 917)
o Issuing the decree of registration sought by the Sps would result in
duplication of titles over the same parcels of land.
o The Sol-Gen then prayed for the dismissal of the action.
- Sps. Laburada contended that mandamus is available in this case, for the LRA
unlawfully neglected the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins
as a duty resulting from an office.
o LRA has the imperative duty to perform because, as land registration is
an in rem proceeding, the jurisdictional requirement of notices and
publication should be complied with.
▪ Since it did not file an opposition in the proceeding, it cannot
refuse to issue the decree.
o It is not the duty of the LRA to take the cudgels for the private persons in
possession of OCT and TCTs cited by LRA.
▪ It is the sole concern of said private person-holders of said titles
to institute in a separate but proper action whatever claim they
may have against the property subject of Sps. Laburada’s
application for registration.
- LRA, citing Ramos v Rodriguez, countered that procedural lapses may be ignored by
the Courts in the interest of substantive justice.
o A strict adherence to the rules would result in a situation where the LRA
would be compelled to issue a decree of registration over land which has
already been declared to and titled in the name of another.
ISSUE:​ W/N LRA can be compelled to issue the corresponding decree in favor of Sps.
Laburada – NO
HELD:
under the Land Registration Law.
o It will only become executory after the expiration of 1-year after the
entry of the final decree of registration.
- The LRA’s hesitation of issuing a decree of registration is reasonable, considering
the probable duplication of titles over the same parcel of land.
o Such issuance may contravene the policy and the purpose, and thereby
destroy the integrity, of the Torrens system of registration.
- The LRA is mandated to refer to the trial court any doubt it may have in regard to
the preparation and the issuance of a decree of registration.
o LRA officials act not as administrative officials but as officers of said court,
and their act is the act of the court.
- Land registration is an in rem proceeding and, therefore, the decree of registration
is binding upon and conclusive against all persons.
- A land registration court has no jurisdiction to order the registration of land already
decreed in the name of another in an earlier land registration case.
o A second decree for the same land would be null and void, since the
principle behind original registration is to register a parcel of land only
once.
o Thus, if it is proven that the land which petitioners are seeking to register
has already been registered in 1904 and 1905, the issuance of a decree of
registration to petitioners will run counter to said principle.
- The issuance of a decree of registration is part of the judicial function of courts and
is not a mere ministerial act which may be compelled through mandamus.
o It is a judicial act involving the exercise of discretion.
- It is not legally proper to require the LRA to issue a decree of registration.
o However, to avoid multiplicity of suits and needless delay, this Court
directs the LRA to determine with finality whether Lot 3-A is included in
the property described in TCT No. 6595, and to submit a report thereon.
Dispositive
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED but the case is REMANDED to the court of
origin in Pasig City. The Land Registration Authority, on the other hand, is ORDERED to
submit to the court a quo a report determining with finality whether Lot 3-A is included in
the property described in TCT No. 6595, within sixty (60) days from notice. After receipt of
such report, the land registration court, in turn, is ordered to ACT, with deliberate and
judicious speed, to settle the issue of whether the LRA may issue the decree of registration,
according to the facts and the law as herein discussed.
2. Heirs of Lopez v. De Castro
G.R. No. 112905
February 3, 2000
By: Sarah Zurita
Topic: NATURE OF REGISTRATION PROCEEDINGS & JURISDICTION OF COURTS
Petitioners: ​THE HEIRS OF PEDRO LOPEZ, EUGENIO LOPEZ DE LEON, PASCUAL LOPEZ DE
LEON, ANTONIO GUICO LOPEZ, FORTUNATO GUICO LOPEZ, MIGUEL GUICO LOPEZ, ERLINDA
LOCERO LOPEZ, TING LOPEZ DE LEON, RUFINA LAYAO LOPEZ, LUISITA LOPEZ DE LEON,
MACARIO LOPEZ DE LEON, FELISA LOPEZ DE LEON, PRINTIS L. DE LEON, FLOVIANA LOPEZ
VELASCO, LOURDES LOPEZ DE LEON, LAGRIMAS LOPEZ DE LEON, ROSARIO LOPEZ DE LEON,
RESURRECCION LOPEZ DE LEON and RICARDA LOPEZ DE LEON
Respondents: ​HONESTO C. DE CASTRO, MARIA SOCORRO DE CASTRO married to ANTONIO
PERIGRINA, FRANCISCO DE CASTRO, FAUSTINO DE CASTRO, EPIFANIA C. VDA. DE CASTRO,
and their successors-in- interes
Ponente: ​YNARES-SANTIAGO, J
FACTS: [​Application for registration of the same parcel of land filed 12 years apart in different
branches of the CFI; a certificate was issued in one case while the other was still pending.]
● July 1956: ​Lopez, ​et al​. filed an application for registration of a 69-hectare parcel of
land in Tagaytay with CFI Cavite. The court issued an order of general default,
excepting only the Dir. of Lands. (2ND REGISTRATION)
● June 1957: Asst. Fiscal filed a motion to lift the order of general default and
submitted an opposition on behalf of the municipality of Silang alleging that a
portion of the land applied for, which the municipality had leased to private
persons, had been its patrimonial property since 1930 or earlier.
● Applicants claimed that a part of the whole tract of land they sought to register
was their inheritance but was excluded in the application since it is located in
Laguna as well as that another lot that lies within Tagaytay City had been excluded
from the registration proceedings in CFI Laguna.
● Lower Court: denied motion to dismiss for lack of merit on the ground that the
oppositor municipality had no personality to intervene considering that the lot was
outside of its territorial limits
● Meanwhile, the Land Registration Commission discovered that the subject lot had
been decreed in favor of private respondents Honesto de Castro, ​et al​.
○ the land being initially owned by one Hermogenes Orte who sold the land
to the father of de Castro in 1932. The Deed of Sale was destroyed during
the Japanese occupation.
○ Epifania (wife) and their children continued possession of the property
who declared the land for assessment and taxation purposes in Cabuyao,
Laguna. However, upon learning that the property lies in Tagaytay City,
the applicants declared it in their names in said city. (1ST REGISTRATION)
● The cause of the conflicting claims over the same land was never explained
because the head of the geodetic engineers did not appear in court. Hence, the CFI
of Cavite issued an order declaring that the court had lost jurisdiction to hear the
case, without, however, dismissing the case.
● Heirs of Pedro Lopez filed a complaint for execution of judgment and cancellation
of land titles of the defendants, claiming that they had been unduly deprived
ownership and possession of the land due to wrongful registration by means of
fraud and misrepresentation.
ISSUE #1: W/N Cavite CFI was the proper venue for the case
RULING: YES
● Venue is procedural, not jurisdictional, and hence may be waived. It is meant to
provide convenience to the parties, rather than restrict their access to the courts as
it relates to the place of trial.
○ Thus, the last paragraph of Section 51 of Rep. Act No. 296 provided that
in land registration cases, the Secretary of Justice, who was then tasked
with the administration and supervision of all courts, may transfer land
registration courts "to any other place more convenient to the parties."
○ This implied that the Land Reg case could be retained in the Cavite if it
would be convenient to the applicants who had been used to transacting
business with that branch; the case did not have to be transferred to be
transferred to Tagaytay City.
● Petitioners applied for registration in 1956 with CFI Cavite. It was only in 1963 or 7
years after their application did CFI Tagaytay exist. It appears however that CFI
Cavite remained the venue for the registration as records were never transmitted
to CFI Tagaytay.
● The Cavite City branch of the CFI of Cavite thus correctly retained jurisdiction over
the application for registration because there was no jurisdictional question
involved in land reg. proceeding.
ISSUE #2: W/N the petitioners were given due notice
RULING: YES
● AS TO GENERAL ORDER OF DEFAULT
○ CFI Cavite is presumed to have regularly performed its task in accordance
with law especially with regard to notice requirements as required in Act
496
○ There is a presumption that the officials concerned performed their
duties regularly because it implies notice, whether actual or constructive,
on the part of said municipality that a land registration proceedings had
been filed
● Compliance with the requirement of notice and publication had the effect of
notifying all persons interested in the proceedings including the herein private
respondents.
● A proceeding in rem, such as land registration proceedings, requires constructive
seizure of the land as against all persons, including the state, who have rights to or
interests in the property.
● Constructive seizure of the land for registration is effected through publication of
the application for registration and service of notice to affected parties.
○ Consequently, when private respondents filed their own application for
registration of the same parcel of land, strictly speaking, the Tagaytay
City branch could no longer entertain the application for registration as
the res involved had been constructively seized by the Cavite City branch
of the same court.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION​: WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is DENIED, and the
dismissal of Civil Case No. TG-1028 is AFFIRMED. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the
Department of Justice so that an investigation against officials who were responsible for the
publication of two notices of hearing of an application for registration of the same parcel of
land may be conducted and the guilty officials duly sanctioned.
VENUE
3 Franco vda. De Arceo v. CA
GR NO. 81401
May 18, 1990
SPV
Topic: ​Venue
Petitioners: VIRGINIA FRANCO VDA. DE ARCEO, CARMELITA ARCEO, ZENAIDA ARCEO,
ROMEO ARCEO, RODOLFO ARCEO and MANUEL ARCEO
Respondents: ​HON. COURT OF APPEALS (Former 16th Division), PEDRO M. ARCEO, SOTERA
ARCEO, LORENZO ARCEO, and ANTONIO ARCEO
Ponente: ​Sarmiento
FACTS
- Sps. Abdon Arceo and Escolastica Geronimo were the owners of four parcels of
unregistered land in Pulilan, Bulacan (Lots 2582, 2595, 3054 and 8131).
 o Escolastica died on September 16, 1942 while Abdon passed away in
1953.
o They had one son, Esteban, who died on September 2, 1941.
o Esteban had five children, Jose, Pedro, Lorenzo, Antonio, and Sotera.
Pedro, Lorenzo, Antonio, and Sotera are the private respondents herein
while Jose's widow, Virginia (Jose died on March 8, 1970), and their
children are the petitioners.
- In 1941, the Arceos executed a deed of donation inter vivos in favor of Jose.
o Jose paid the taxes thereon since 1942, and subsequently took personal
possession and claimed to be the owner thereof.
- In 1950, the spouses executed another deed of donation inter vivos, disposing of
the properties further in favor of Jose.
- In 1941, the Arceos supposedly signed a deed of donation mortis causa and giving
away the properties in question in favor of all his grandchildren including Jose.
o It was notarized only on November 3, 1944, after Escolastica had died.
- In 1972, Virginia, together with her children, filed with the cadastral court an
application for registration in their names of the four parcels of land.
o Pedro and Lorenzo opposed, claiming that each of them are entitled to
one-third of lots no. 3054 and 8131.
- The cadastral court rejected all three documents and distributed the properties
according to the law on intestate succession.
- Virginia and her children shortly went to the CA which affirmed the decision of the
cadastral court and dismissed the appeal.
- Hence, this petition:
o Virginia argues that the cadastral court was bereft of the power to
determine conflicting claims of ownership, and that its authority was
solely to confirm an existing title, and that anyway, all the lots should
have been awarded to them by virtue of open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession since 1941 (1942, when Jose took possession of the
parcels) or otherwise, by acquisitive prescription.
o Pedro, Lorenzo, Antonio, and Sotera contend that the cadastral court had
the jurisdiction to decide questions of ownership of property; that the
issue of prescription was never ventilated below.
RATIO: The cadastral court has the authority to decide on the case; Virginia did not acquire
the lands by way of prescription; but there was a valid donation in favor of Jose (Virginia’s
husband).
ISSUE #1:​ W/N the cadastral court has jurisdiction to hear the case - YES
HELD:
- Where the issue of ownership, is ineluctably tied up with the question of right of
registration, the cadastral court commits no error in assuming jurisdiction over it.
o Registration would not be possible or would be unduly prolonged unless
the court first decided it.
- Under Section 2 of the Property Registration Decree, the jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court, sitting as a land registration court, is no longer as
circumscribed as it was under Act No. 496, the former land registration law.
- The Decree "has eliminated the distinction between the general jurisdiction vested
in the regional trial court and the limited jurisdiction conferred upon it by the
former law when acting merely as a cadastral court."
o The amendment was "aimed at avoiding multiplicity of suits, the change
has simplified registration proceedings by conferring upon the required
trial courts the authority to act not only on applications for 'original
registration' 'but also 'over all petitions filed after original registration of
title, with power to hear and determine all questions arising from such
applications or petitions.'"
- At any rate, the limited jurisdiction rule governing land registration courts is subject
to recognized exceptions, to wit,
(1) where the parties mutually agreed or have acquiesced in submitting
controversial issues for determination;
(2) where they have been given full opportunity to present their evidence; and
(3) where the court has considered the evidence already of record and is
convinced that the same is sufficient for rendering a decision upon such
controversial issues.
- The rule is not, in reality, one of jurisdiction, but rather, of mere procedure, which
may be waived.
ISSUE #2: ​W/N Virginia has acquired the property by acquisitive prescription – NO
- Virginia, et al. cite four events:
(1) In 1941, Jose entered upon the properties and until his death in 1970, worked
thereon;
(2) Upon his death, they, Virginia, et al., divided the same by virtue of an
extrajudicial partition;
(3) Ever since, Jose had paid taxes thereon until he died;
(4) Pedro, et al., have not lifted a finger to oust him, Jose, in possession, or
otherwise, to impugn his right. Virginia, et al. now say that barring the above
exhibits, they have anyway acquired the parcels by prescription.
- The fact that in 1941, Jose wrested possession thereof does not amount to adverse
possession because as a co-owner, he had the right of enjoyment, and his use
thereof can not by itself prejudice the right of his fellow co-owners.
- The fact that he paid taxes thereon is not controlling either because payment of
real estate taxes does not necessarily confer title upon a claimant.
- Hence, Virginia did not acquire the lands by way of prescription.
ISSUE #3:​ W/N there is a valid donation – YES
- The weight of authority is that a valid donation, once accepted, becomes
irrevocable, except on account of officiousness, failure by the donee to comply
with charges imposed in the donation, or by reason of ingratitude.
- This is an issue of fact; hence, the Court is bound by the factual finding of the CA.
Dispositive
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is SET ASIDE. The court a quo is ORDERED to
distribute the properties covered by the donation inter vivos, dated October (or September)
27, 1941, exhibit "J", according to the terms and conditions set forth therein, and in the
proportions indicated thereby. No costs.
4 SM Prime Holdings v. Madayag
G.R. No. 164687
February 12, 2009
By: Sarah Zurita
Topic: PD 1529
Petitioners:​ ​SM PRIME HOLDINGS, INC
Respondents: ​ANGELA V. MADAYAG
Ponente: ​NACHURA, ​J.
DOCTRINE:
As an incident to its authority to settle all questions over the title of the subject property, the
land registration court may resolve the underlying issue of whether the subject property
overlaps the petitioner’s properties without necessarily having to declare the survey plan as
void.
FACTS:
● LAND REG PROCEEDING: Madayag filed with RTC Urdaneta, Pangasinan an
application for registration of a parcel of land (1, 492 sqm) located in Brgy. Anonas
○ Attached to the application was a tracing cloth of Survey Plan
Psu-01-008438 approved by the Land Management Services (LMS) of the
DENR
● SM Prime Holdings, Inc. (SM) wrote to the the Regional Chief of DENR demanding
the cancellation of Madayag’s survey plan because the lot encroached on the
properties it recently purchased and that it was not notified of the survey
● SM also manifested its opposition to Madayag’s application for registration.
● Acting on DENR’s advice to file a formal petition for cancellation, SM filed the said
petition with the DENR.
● [Back to LAND REG PROCEEDING​:] SM filed an Urgent Motion to Suspend
Proceeding, alleging that the court should await the DENR resolution of the petition
for the cancellation of the survey plan "as the administrative case is prejudicial to
the determination" of the land registration case.
○ RTC granted the motion -- emphasizing that a survey plan is one of the
mandatory requirements in land registration proceedings, the RTC agreed
with SM that the cancellation of the survey plan would be prejudicial to
the petition for land registration.
● Madayag’s MR was denied.
● On appeal, CA granted: RTC committed grave abuse of discretion
○ the survey plan which was duly approved by the DENR should be
accorded the presumption of regularity, and that the RTC has the power
to hear and determine all questions arising from an application for
registration.
● SM’s CONTENTION: since the Madayag’s cause of action in the land registration
case depends heavily on the survey plan, it was only prudent for the RTC to
suspend the proceedings therein pending the resolution of the petition for
cancellation of the survey plan by the DENR. Petition for certiorari was not proper
considering that respondent was not arbitrarily deprived of her right to prosecute
her application for registration.
ISSUE: W/N the Land Registration Court (RTC) has jurisdiction
RULING: YES
● The fundamental purpose of the Land Registration Law (PD 1529) is to finally settle
title to real property in order to preempt any question on the legality of the title –
except claims that were noted on the certificate itself at the time of registration or
those that arose subsequent thereto. Consequently, once the title is registered
under the said law, owners can rest secure on their ownership and possession.
● The petition for cancellation raises practically the very same issues that the herein
petitioner raised in its opposition to the respondent’s application for registration.
○ Principally, it alleges that the survey plan should be cancelled because it
includes portions of the seven properties that it purchased from several
landowners, which properties are already covered by existing certificates
of title.
● It is well to note at this point that, in its bid to avoid multiplicity of suits and to
promote the expeditious resolution of cases, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529
eliminated the distinction between the general jurisdiction vested in the RTC and
the latter’s limited jurisdiction when acting merely as a land registration court.
Land registration courts, as such, can now hear and decide even controversial and
contentious cases, as well as those involving substantial issues. When the law
confers jurisdiction upon a court, the latter is deemed to have all the necessary
powers to exercise such jurisdiction to make it effective.
○ In view of the nature of a Torrens title, a land registration court has the
duty to determine whether the issuance of a new certificate of title will
alter a valid and existing certificate of title. An application for registration
of an already titled land constitutes a collateral attack on the existing
title, which is not allowed by law
○ But the RTC need not wait for the decision of the DENR in the petition to
cancel the survey plan in order to determine whether the subject
property is already titled or forms part of already titled property.
○ The court may now verify this allegation based on the respondent’s
survey plan vis-à-vis the certificates of title of the petitioner and its
predecessors-in-interest. After all, a survey plan precisely serves to
establish the true identity of the land to ensure that it does not overlap a
parcel of land or a portion thereof already covered by a previous land
registration, and to forestall the possibility that it will be overlapped by a
subsequent registration of any adjoining land.
● Should the court find it difficult to do so, the court may require the filing of
additional papers to aid in its determination of the propriety of the application,
based on Section 21 of P.D. No. 1529:
○ SEC. 21. Requirement of additional facts and papers; ocular inspection. –
The court may require facts to be stated in the application in addition to
those prescribed by this Decree not inconsistent therewith and may
require the filing of any additional papers.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION​:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision
dated March 19, 2004 and Resolution dated July 15, 2004 are AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial
Court of Urdaneta, Pangasinan is DIRECTED to continue with the proceedings in L.R.C. Case
No. U-1134 and to resolve the same with dispatch.
 5) Bureau of Forestry vs. CA
GR NO.L 37995
August 31, 1987
Petitioner: BUREAU OF FORESTRY, BUREAU OF LANDS and PHILIPPINE FISHERIES
COMMISSION
Respondent:​ ​COURT OF APPEALS and FILOMENO GALLO
By: Martin
FACTS
● 4 parcels of land situated in Buenavista, Iloilo containing an approximate area of
30.5943 hectares were the subject of an application for registration by Mercedes
Diago who alleged among others that she herself occupied said parcels of land
having bought them from the testate estate of the late Jose Ma. Nava who, in his
lifetime, had bought the lands in turn from Canuto Gustilo. The Director of Lands
opposed said application on the ground that neither the applicant nor her
predecessors-in-interest have sufficient title over the lands applied for, which could
be registered under the Torrens systems, and that they have never been in open,
continuous and exclusive possession of the said lands for at least 30 years prior to
the filing of the application.
● The Director of Forestry on the other hand anchored his opposition principally on
the ground that certain specific portions of the lands subject matter of the
application, with an area of approximately 194,080 square meters are mangrove
swamps and are within Timberland Block "B " of Buenavista, Iloilo.
● Respondent Filomeno Gallo, having purchased the subject parcels of land from
Mercedes Diago on April 27, 1965, moved to be substituted in place of the latter,
attaching to his motion an Amended Application for Registration of Title
substantially reproducing the allegations in the application of Mercedes Diago.
● Petitioner Philippine Fisheries Commission also moved to be substituted in place of
petitioner Bureau of Forestry as oppositor over a portion of the land sought to be
registered, supervision and control of said portion having been transferred from
the Bureau of Forestry to the Philippine Fisheries Commission.
● The trial court rendered its decision ordering the registration of the four (4) parcels
of land in the name of respondent Filomeno Gallo after excluding a portion
Identified as Lot "1-A" which is the site of the municipal hall of Buenavista town,
and subjecting Lots Nos. 1, 2 and 3 to the road-of-way of 15 meters width.
● CA affirmed the decision of the trial court.
● Petitioners contend that respondent court completely ignored the undisputed facts
that 1) the controverted area is within Timberland Block "B," L.C. Project No. 38,
L.C. Map No. 1971 of Buenavista, Iloilo and that 2) the certification of February 18,
1956 of the then Director of Forestry to the effect that the area in question is
needed for forest purposes.
● Respondent court in affirming the decision of the Iloilo trial court ruled that
although the controverted portion of 19.4080 hectares are mangrove and nipa
swamps within Timberland Block "B," L.C. Project No. 38, same cannot be
considered part of the public forest not susceptible of private ownership since
petitioners failed to submit convincing proof that these lands are more valuable for
forestry than for agricultural purposes, and the presumption is that these are
agricultural lands.
● Respondent court based its conclusion upon the premise that whether or not a
controverted parcel of land is forest land, is a question of fact which should be
settled by competent proofs, and if such a question be an issue in a land
registration proceeding, it is incumbent upon the Director of Forestry to submit to
the court convincing proofs that the land in dispute is not more valuable for
agriculture than for forest purposes. It is the position of respondent that
respondent court did "not hesitate to apply this presumption with full force
particularly where, as in the case at bar, the lands applied for have been possessed
and cultivated by the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest for a long number
of years without the government taking any positive step to dislodge the occupants
from their holdings which have passed from one to another by inheritance or by
purchase.
ISSUE
Whether or not the classification of lands of the public domain by the Executive Branch of
the Government into agricultural, forest or mineral can be changed or varied by the court
depending upon the evidence adduced before it.
HELD/RATIO
NO
● Admittedly the controversial area is within a timberland block as classification of
the municipality and certified to by the Director of Forestry on February 18, 1956 as
lands needed for forest purposes and hence they are portions of the public domain
which cannot be the subject of registration proceedings.
● Clearly therefore the land is public land and there is no need for the Director of
Forestry to submit to the court convincing proofs that the land in dispute is not
more valuable for agriculture than for forest purposes, as there was no question of
whether the land is forest land or not.
● Be it remembered that said forest land had been declared and certified as such by
the Director of the Bureau of Forestry on February 18, 1956, several
years ​before​ the original applicant of the lands for registration Mercedes Diago,
filed it on July 11, 1961.
● As provided for under Sec. 6 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, which was lifted
from Act No. 2874, the classification or reclassification of public lands into
alienable or disposable, mineral or forest lands is now a prerogative of the
Executive Department of the government and not of the courts. With these rules,
there should be no more room for doubt that it is not the court which determines
the classification of lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or mineral
but the Executive Branch of the Government, through the Office of the President.
Hence, it was grave error and/or abuse of discretion for the respondent court to
ignore the uncontroverted facts that (1) the disputed area is within a timberland
block and (2) as certified to by the then Director of Forestry, the area is needed
for forest purposes.
6. MARTINEZ v. CA
GR NO. ​L​31271
APRIL 29, 1974
TS
Topic:​ GRANT OF TITLE; VENUE
Petitioners:​ ROMEO MARTINEZ and LEONOR SUAREZ
Respondents: ​HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SECRETARY and UNDERSECRETARY OF PUBLIC
WORKS & COMMUNICATIONS
Ponente: ​ESGUERRA, J.
FACTS:
● Petitioners Spouses Romeo Martinez and Leonor Suarez owned 2 parcels of land
(fishponds) in Lubao, Pampanga. The property involved in this case is the 2​nd parcel
of land.
 ● The disputed property was originally owned by Montemayor who secured a ‘titulo
real’ in 1883. After his death it passed to his heirs who then sold it to Potenciano
Garcia.
● Garcia was prevented by municipal president Pedro Beltran from restoring the
dikes on the property, so he filed Civil Case No. 1407 w/ the CFI against Beltran to
restrain Beltran from molesting him in the possession of the 2​nd parcel. Garcia also
applied for a writ of preliminary injunction.
o The Court made the preliminary injunction permanent, and this was
affirmed by the SC.
● From June 22, 1914 the dikes around the 2​nd parcel remained closed until a portion
was again opened just before the outbreak of the Pacific War.
● In 1925 Garcia applied for registration of both parcels of land. The CFI granted it
over and against the opposition of the Atty-General and the Director of Forestry.
● Ownership of the parcels changed hands until eventually they were acquired by
petitioners.
● To avoid untoward incidents, the disputants agreed to refer the matter to the
Committee on Rivers and Streams which declared that the disputed property was
not a public river but a private fishpond.
● Petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 751 against Mayor Zagad, praying that the
latter be enjoined from molesting them in their possession of their property and in
the construction of the dikes.
o A writ of preliminary injunction was issued against the Mayor.
● 4 years later, while Civil Case No. 751 was pending, the Secretary of Public Works
and Communications ordered another investigation of the said parcel of land and
directing petitioners to remove the dikes they constructed, by virtue of the
authority vested in him by RA No. 2056 (‘​An Act To Prohibit, Remove and/or
Demolish the Construction of Dams, Dikes, Or Any Other Walls In Public Navigable
Waters, Or Waterways and In Communal Fishing Grounds, To Regulate Works in
Such Waters or Waterways And In Communal Fishing Grounds, And To Provide
Penalties For Its Violation, And For Other Purposes.​ ’).
o The order embodied a threat that the dikes would be demolished if
petitioners failed to comply w/in 30 days.
● Petitioners replied by instituting the present case. CFI ruled in their favor. CA
reversed CFI’s decision.
ISSUE: ​W/N Lot 2 of TCT No. 15856 is a river of the public domain. – ​YES.
● Petitioners assail the CA’s ruling (that the 2​nd parcel is a public stream and that said
title should be cancelled and the river covered reverted to public domain) by saying
that it is a collateral attack on the indefeasibility of the Torrens Title originally
issued in favor of their predecessor-in-interest Garcia, and thus amounts to ​res
judicata.
● However, Section 38 of the Land Registration Act cited by appellants ​expressly
makes a decree of registration, which ordinarily makes the title absolute and
indefeasible, subject to the exemption stated in Section 39 of the said Act among
which are:
o “liens, claims or rights arising or existing under the laws or Constitution of
the United States or of the Philippine Islands which the statute of the
Philippine Islands cannot require to appear of record in the registry.”
● Art. 339 of the old Civil Code states that property of public ownership includes: “
That destined to the public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports, and
bridges constructed by the State, and banks shores, roadsteads, and that of a
similar character.”
o The above-mentioned properties are parts of the public domain intended
for public use, are outside the commerce of men and, therefore, not
subject to private appropriation.
● Mercado v. Municipal President of Macabebe:​ ”the said certificate does not confer
upon her any right to the creek in question, inasmuch as the said creek, being of
the public domain, is included among the various exceptions enumerated in
Section 39 of Act 496 to which the said certificate is subject by express provision of
the law.”
● Dizon v. Rodriguez: “the incontestable and indefeasible character of a Torrens
certificate of title does not operate when the land covered thereby is not capable
of registration.”
● The authorities cited by petitioners as to the conclusiveness and incontestability of
a Torrens certificate of title do not apply​. The Land Registration Court has no
jurisdiction over non-registerable properties, such as public navigable rivers
which are parts of the public domain, and cannot validly adjudge the registration
of title in favor of a private applicant.
● Evidence submitted before the CFI shows that the 2​nd parcel is a river of the public
domain. The technical description shows that it is practically bounded on all sides
with rivers, and that “it is a branch of the main river that has been covered with
water since time immemorial and, therefore, part of the public domain.”
ISSUE#2: ​W/N the nullification of registration of Lot No. 2 is contrary to law. – ​NO.
● Petitioners cannot be deemed to be purchasers for value and in good faith because
in the deed executed in their favor, certain stipulations appeared, and were
accepted by them.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION​: FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment of the Court of Appeals
appealed from is in accordance with law, and the same is hereby AFFIRMED with costs
against the petitioners-appellants.
NOTES:
● The right of reversion or reconveyance to the State of the public properties
fraudulently registered and which are not capable of private appropriation or
private acquisition does not prescribe.
7. Republic v. CA
GR NO. 103882
November 25, 1998
SPV
Topic: ​Venue
Petitioners:​ Republic of the Philippines
Respondents: ​Court of Appeals and Republic Real Estate Corporation; Cultural Center of the
Philippines as Intervenor
Ponente: ​Sarmiento
FACTS
- RA 1899 authorized the reclamation of foreshore lands by chartered cities and
municipalities.
- The Pasay City Council passed Ordinance No. 121, for the reclamation of 300
hectares of foreshore lands in Pasay City
 - It is amended by Ordinance No. 158 which authorized the Republic Real Estate
Corporation ("RREC") to reclaim foreshore lands of Pasay City under certain terms
and conditions.
o Pasay City and RREC entered into an Agreement for the reclamation of
the foreshore lands in Pasay City.
- The Republic questioned the agreement stating that its subject matter is outside
the commerce of man, that the terms and conditions are violative of RA 1899, and
that the Agreement was executed without public bidding.
- RREC and Pasay City averred that the Agreement is within the commerce of man
and the phrase “foreshore land” within the contemplation of RA 1899 has a
broader meaning than the cited definition of the term in the Words and Phrases
and in the Webster's Third New International Dictionary and the plans and
specifications of the reclamation involved were approved by the authorities
concerned.
- CFI of Rizal: ordered orders the defendants to refrain from "further reclaiming or
committing acts of dispossession or dispoilation over any area within the Manila
Bay or the Manila Bay Beach Resort
- The Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals. However, on January 11, 1973,
before the appeal could be resolved, Presidential Decree No. 3-A issued, amending
Presidential Decree No. 3:
o The reclamation of areas under water, whether foreshore or inland, shall
be limited to the National Government or any person authorized by it
under a proper contract.
o All reclamations made in violation of this provision shall be forfeited to
the State without need of judicial action.
- CA: Dismissed the appeal of the Republic, ordering it to turn over to Pasay City the
ownership and possession over all vacant spaces in the 21-hectare area already
reclaimed by Pasay City and RREC at the time it took over the same.
- The Cultural Center of the Philippines ("CCP") filed a Petition in Intervention,
theorizing that it has a direct interest in the case being the owner of subject nine
(9) lots titled in its (CCP) name, which the CA ordered to be turned over to Pasay
City.
ISSUE: ​W/N the vacant spaces in the 21-hectare area reclaimed is owned by Pasay City and
RREC - NO
HELD:
- The CA erred in ordering the turn-over to Pasay City of the following titled lots:
Gloria Maris, Asean Garden, Folk Arts Theatre, CCP Parking Space, site of Boom na
Boom, Philcite, Star City, lot beside PICC.
- RREC and Pasay City never prayed for the transfer to Pasay City of subject lots, title
to which had long become indefeasible in favor of the rightful title holders, CCP and
GSIS.
- The annotation of a notice of lis pendens on the certificates of title covering the
said lots is of no moment.
o It did not vest in Pasay City and RREC any real right superior to the
absolute ownership thereover of CCP and GSIS.
o Besides, the nature of the action did not really warrant the issuance of a
notice of lis pendens.
- Sec. 14 of Rule 13, Revised Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a notice of lis
pendens is necessary when the action is for recovery of possession or ownership of
a parcel of land.
Sec. 14. Notice of lis pendens. — ​In an action affecting the title or the right of possession of
real property​, the plaintiff and the defendant, when affirmative relief is claimed in
his answer, ​may record in the office of the registry of deeds of the province in
which the property is situated a notice of the pendency of the action​. Said notice
shall contain the names of the parties and the object of the action or defense, and
a description of the property in that province affected thereby. Only from the time
of filing such notice for record shall a purchaser, or encumbrancer of the property
affected thereby, be deemed to have constructive notice of the pendency of the
action, and only of its pendency against the parties designated by their real names.
The notice of lis pendens herein above mentioned may be cancelled only upon order of the
court, after proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the
adverse party, or that it is not necessary to protect the rights of the party who
caused it to be recorded.
o In the present litigation, RREC and Pasay City, as defendants in the main
case, did not counterclaim for the turnover to Pasay City of the titled lots
aforementioned.
- Unmistakable, and cannot be ignored, is the germane provision of Section 48 of
P.D. 1529, that a certificate of title can never be the subject of a collateral attack.
o The issue of validity of a torrens title, whether fraudulently issued or not,
may be posed only in an action brought to impugn or annul it.
o It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding
instituted in accordance with law.
- Although Pasay City and RREC did not succeed in their undertaking to reclaim any
area within subject reclamation project, something compensable was
accomplished by them, we believe; and so hold, that Pasay City and RREC should be
paid for the said actual work done and dredge-fill poured in, worth P10,926,071.29.
NOTES:
- Pasay City Ordinance No. 121, as amended by Ordinance No. 158, and the
Agreement under attack, have been found to be outside the intendment and scope
of RA 1899, and therefore ultra vires and null and void.
- What is worse, the same Agreement was vitiated by the glaring absence of a public
bidding.
- There is no evidence to prove that RREC had really reclaimed 55 hectares.
o The letter of Minister Baltazar Aquino relied upon by RREC is no proof at
all that RREC had reclaimed 55 hectares. Said letter was just referring to a
tentative schedule of work to be done by RREC, even as it required RREC
to submit the pertinent papers to show its supposed accomplishment, to
secure approval by the Ministry of Public Works and Highways to the
reclamation plan, and to submit to a public bidding all contracts and
sub-contracts for subject reclamation project but RREC never complied
with such requirements and conditions sine qua non.
o No contracts or sub-contracts or agreements, plans, designs, and/or
specifications of the reclamation project were presented to reflect any
accomplishment.
- Contrary to what the Court of Appeals found, RREC had not reclaimed any area
with the prescribed elevation of 3.5 meters above MLLW, so much so that in 1978,
 it (RREC) opted to file with the former Ministry of Public Highways, a claim for
compensation of P30,396,878.20, for reclamation work allegedly done before the
CDCP started working on the reclamation of the CCP grounds.
8 Alvarez vs PICOP
GR. No. 162243
DATE: Dec. 3, 2009
Petitioners: Alvarez
Respondents: Picop
Ponente: CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
FACTS:
· PICOP filed with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) an
application to have its Timber License Agreement (TLA) No. 43 converted into an
Integrated Forest Management Agreement (IFMA).
· In the middle of the processing of PICOP’s application, however, PICOP refused to
attend further meetings with the DENR. Instead, on 2 September 2002, PICOP filed
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City a Petition for Mandamus against
then DENR Secretary Heherson T. Alvarez to compel the DENR Secretary to sign, execute
and deliver an IFMA to PICOP, as well as to
· Issue the corresponding IFMA assignment number on the area covered by the IFMA,
formerly TLA No. 43, as amended; b) to issue the necessary permit allowing petitioner to
act and harvest timber from the said area of TLA No. 43, sufficient to meet the raw
material requirements of petitioner’s pulp and paper mills in accordance with the
warranty and agreement of July 29, 1969 between the government and PICOP’s
predecessor-in-interest; and c) to honor and respect the Government Warranties and
contractual obligations to PICOP strictly in accordance with the warranty and agreement
dated July 29, [1969] between the government and PICOP’s predecessor-in-interest.
· RTC rendered a Decision granting PICOP's Petition for Mandamus
· Court of Appeals - affirmed the Decision of the RTC
· Thus this petition.
ISSUE: ​W/N the 1969 Document was a contract – NO
W/N Certification from the NCIP is required – YES
HELD/RATIO:
1969 DOCUMENT
· Section 2 speaks of the policy of the State to encourage Filipino and foreign
investments. It does not speak of how this policy can be implemented. Implementation
of this policy is tackled in Sections 5 to 12 of the same law, ​54 ​which PICOP failed to
mention, and for a good reason. None of the 24 incentives enumerated therein relates
to, or even remotely suggests that, PICOP's proposition that the 1969 Document is a
contract.
· PICOP could indeed argue that the enumeration is not exclusive. Certainly,
· granting incentives to investors, whether included in the enumeration or not, would be
an implementation of this policy. However, it is presumed that whatever incentives may
be given to investors should be within the bounds of the laws and the Constitution. The
declaration of policy in Section 2 cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be read to
provide an exception to either the laws or, heaven forbid, the Constitution. Exceptions
are never presumed and should be convincingly proven. Section 2 of the Investment
Incentives Act cannot be read as exempting investors from the Constitutional provisions (1)
prohibiting private ownership of forest lands; (2) providing for the complete control and
supervision by the State of exploitation activities; or (3) limiting exploitation agreements to
twenty- ve years, renewable for another twenty- five years. Section 4 (d) and (e), on the
other hand, is a recognition of rights already guaranteed under the Constitution. Freedom
from expropriation is granted under Section 9 of Article III 55 of the Constitution, while the
provision on requisition is a negative restatement of Section 6, Article XII. 56
· Refusal to grant perpetual and exclusive possession to PICOP of its concession area
would not result in the expropriation or requisition of PICOP's property, as these forest
lands belong to the State, and not to PICOP.
· The requirement for logging companies to preserve and maintain forest areas, including
the reforestation thereof, is one of the prices a logging company must pay for the
exploitation thereof. Forest lands are meant to be enjoyed by countless future
generations of Filipinos, and not just by one logging company. The requirements of
reforestation and preservation of the concession areas are meant to protect them, the
future generations, and not PICOP. Reforestation and preservation of the concession
areas are not required of logging companies so that they would have something to cut
again, but so that the forest would remain intact after their operations. That PICOP
would not accept the responsibility to preserve its concession area if it is not assured of
tenure thereto does not speak well of its corporate policies.
NCIP Certification
· ​PICOP had tried to put a cloud of ambiguity over Section 59 of Republic Act No. 8371
by invoking the de​ ​nition of Ancestral Domains in Section 3 (a) thereof, wherein the
possession by Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples (ICCs/IPs) must
have been continuous to the present. However, we noted the exception found in the
very same sentence invoked by PICOP:
· Ancestral domains — Subject to Section 56 hereof, refers to all areas generally
belonging to ICCs/IPs comprising lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural
resources therein, held under a claim of ownership, occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs,
by themselves or through their ancestors, communally or individually since time
immemorial, continuously to the present except when interrupted by war, force
majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth oras a consequence of government
projects or any other voluntary dealings entered into by government and private
· Ancestral domains, therefore, remain as such even when possession or occupation of
these areas has been interrupted by causes provided under the law, such as voluntary
dealings entered into by the government and private individuals/corporations.
Consequently, the issuance of TLA No. 43 in 1952 did not cause the ICCs/IPs to lose their
possession or occupation over the area covered by TLA No. 43.
· PICOP's position is anything but clear. What is clearly provided for in Section 59 is that it
covers "issuing, renewing or granting (of) any concession, license or lease, or entering
into any production sharing agreement". PICOP is implying that, when the government
changed the tenurial system to an IFMA, PICOP's existing TLA would just be upgraded or
modi ed, but would be the very same agreement, hence, dodging the inclusion in the
word "renewing". However, PICOP is conveniently leaving out the fact that its TLA
expired in 2002. If PICOP really intends to pursue the argument that the conversion of
the TLA into an IFMA would not create a new agreement, but would only be a
modi cation of the old one, then it should be willing to concede that the IFMA expired
as well in 2002. An automatic modi cation would not alter the terms and conditions of
the TLA except when they are inconsistent with the terms and conditions of an IFMA.
 Consequently, PICOP's concession period under the renewed TLA No. 43, which is from
the year 1977 to 2002, would remain the same.
· PICOP cannot rely on a theory of the case whenever such theory is beneficial to it, but
refute the same whenever the theory is damaging to it. In the same way, PICOP cannot
claim that the alleged Presidential Warranty is "renewable for other 25 years" and later
on claim that what it is asking for is not a renewal. Extensions of agreements must
necessarily be included in the term renewal. Otherwise, the inclusion of "renewing" in
Section 59 would be rendered inoperative.
· We are not sure whether PICOP's counsels are deliberately trying to mislead us, or are
just plainly ignorant of basic precepts of law. The term "claim" in the phrase "claim of
ownership" is not a document of any sort. It is an attitude towards something. The
phrase "claim of ownership" means "the possession of a piece of property with the
intention of claiming it in hostility to the true owner". 86 It is also de ned as "a party's
manifest intention to take over land, regardless of title or right".87 Other than in
Republic Act No. 8371, the phrase "claim of ownership" is thoroughly discussed in issues
relating to acquisitive prescription in Civil Law.
· Before PICOP's counsels could attribute to us an assertion that a mere attitude or
intention would stop the renewal or issuance of any concession, license or lease or any
production-sharing agreement, we should stress beforehand that this attitude or
intention must be clearly shown by overt acts and, as required by Section 3 (a), should
have been in existence "since time immemorial, continuously to the present except
when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a
consequence of government projects or any other voluntary dealings entered into by
government and private individuals/corporations". SIHCDA
· What is required in Section 59 of Republic Act No. 8379 is a Certi cation from the NCIP
that there was no overlapping with any Ancestral Domain. PICOP cannot claim that the
DENR gravely abused its discretion for requiring this Certi cation, on the ground that
there was no overlapping. We reiterate that it is manifestly absurd to claim that the
subject lands must rst be proven to be part of ancestral domains before a
certi cation that they are not can be required. As discussed in the assailed Decision,
PICOP did not even seek any certi cation from the NCIP that the area covered by TLA
No. 43, subject of its IFMA conversion, did not overlap with any ancestral domain.
APPLICANTS
9 Heirs of Ermac v. Heirs of Ermac
G.R. No. 149679
May 30, 2003
By: Sarah Zurita
Topic: APPLICANTS
Petitioners: ​HEIRS OF CLEMENTE ERMAC, namely: IRENEA E. SENO, LIBRADA E. MALINAO,
INES E. MIOZA, SOLEDAD E. CENIZA, RODULFO ERMAC and AMELITA E. BASUBAS
Respondents: ​HEIRS OF VICENTE ERMAC, namely: BENJAMIN, VIRGINIA, PRECIOSA, DANILO,
as HEIRS OF URBANO ADOLFO; BERNARDINO, CLIMACO, CESAR, ELSA, FLORAME and FE, all
surnamed ERMAC, as HEIRS OF CLIMACO ERMAC, ESTELITA ERMAC, ESTANESLAO DIONSON,
VICENTE DIONSON, EUFEMIA LIGARAY, EMIGDIO BUSTILLO and LIZA PARAJELE, LUISA DEL
CASTILLO
Ponente: ​PANGANIBAN, ​J.
FACTS:
● Respondents claim that they are the owners (they are also the current occupants)
of the various parcels of land that form part of Lot No. 666 which belonged
originally to Claudio Ermac
● Upon Claudio’s death, Lot No. 666 was inherited and partitioned by his children,
namely, Esteban, Pedro and Balbina.
○ Esteban was tasked to register the title but failed.
○ Clemente, Esteban’s son, applied for registration of the title, but did so in
his own name, and did not include his fathers brother and sister, nor his
cousins.
○ Despite having registered the lot in his name, Clemente did not disturb or
claim ownership over those portions occupied by his uncle, aunt and
cousins even up to the time of his death.
● Respondents ownership and possession had been peaceful and undisturbed, until
recently when the Petitioners filed an action for ejectment against them.
○ The filing of the said ejectment caused a cloud of doubt upon the
respondents ownership over their respective parcels of land, prompting
them to file this action for quieting of title.
● Petitioners denied the material allegations claimed that the respondents have no
cause of action against them.
○ it was Clemente and not his grandfather Claudio Ermac who is the
original claimant of dominion over Lot No. 666.
○ Clemente also effected the registration of the subject lot in his name.
○ Upon Clemente’s death, petitioners inherited Lot No. 666, and they
constructed their residential houses thereon.
○ respondents recent occupation of some portions of Lot No. 666 was only
tolerated by Clemente Ermac and the petitioners.
○ Petitioners also set up the defense of prescription and laches.
➔ RTC (CA affirmed): Claudio is the original owner
◆ supported by the admissions of Irene Seno (daughter of Clemente)
establishing facts the other heirs of Claudio Ermac are entitled to
two-thirds (2/3) of the lot.
ISSUE: W/N respondent Heirs can apply for the registration of their title?
RULING: YES
● Petitioners claim that the CA erred in relying on the hearsay and unsubstantiated
testimony of respondents, as well as on tax declarations and realty tax receipts, in
order to support its ruling that the land was owned by Claudio Ermac.
○ The credence given to the testimony of the witnesses for respondents is a
factual issue already passed upon and resolved by the trial and the
appellate courts.
○ Moreover, while tax declarations and realty tax receipts do not
conclusively prove ownership, they may constitute strong evidence of
ownership when accompanied by possession for a period sufficient for
prescription.
○ Considering that respondents have been in possession of the property for
a long period of time, there is legal basis for their use of tax declarations
and realty tax receipts as additional evidence to support their claim of
ownership.
OTHER ISSUES:
● Petitioners posit that pursuant to Section 32 of PD 1529 (the Property Registration
Decree), the certificate of title issued in favor of their predecessor-in-interest,
Clemente Ermac, became incontrovertible after the lapse of one year from its
issuance. Hence, it can no longer be challenged.
 ○ While it is true that Section 32 of PD 1529 provides that the decree of
registration becomes incontrovertible after a year, it does not altogether
deprive an aggrieved party of a remedy in law. The acceptability of the
Torrens System would be impaired, if it is utilized to perpetuate fraud
against the real owners.
○ Registering a piece of land under the Torrens System does not create or
vest title, because registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership.
○ A certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or title over the
particular property described therein.
○ Its issuance in favor of a particular person does not foreclose the
possibility that the real property may be co-owned with persons not
named in the certificate, or that it may be held in trust for another
person by the registered owner.
● Petitioners assert that the ownership claimed by respondents is barred by
prescription and laches, because it took the latter 57 years to bring the present
action. We disagree.
○ When a party uses fraud or concealment to obtain a certificate of title to
property, a constructive trust is created in favor of the defrauded party.
○ Since Claudio Ermac has already been established in the present case as
the original owner of the land, the registration in the name of Clemente
Ermac meant that the latter held the land in trust for all the heirs of the
former.Since respondents were in actual possession of the property, the
action to enforce the trust, and recover the property, and thereby quiet
title thereto, does not prescribe.
○ Because laches is an equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by
equitable considerations. It cannot be used to defeat justice or to
perpetuate fraud and injustice.
○ Its application should not prevent the rightful owners of a property to
recover what has been fraudulently registered in the name of another.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION​: WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
11 CHAVEZ VS. PEA
G.R. NO. 133250
JUL 9, 2002
By: DEINLA
Topic:​ LTD; Applicants
Petitioners:​ FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ
Respondents: ​PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY and AMARI COASTAL BAY DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION
Ponente: CARPIO, J.
FACTS:
● The government, through the Commissioner of Public Highways, signed a contract with the
Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP) to reclaim certain
foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay. The contract also included the construction of
Phases I and II of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road.
● Then President Marcos issued PD 1084 creating PEA. The PD tasked PEA to reclaim land,
including foreshore and submerged areas, and to develop, improve, acquire, lease and sell
any and all kinds of lands.
● On the same date, then President issued PD 1085 transferring to PEA the lands reclaimed in
the foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and
Reclamation Project (MCCRRP). Then President Marcos issued a memorandum directing
PEA to amend its contract with CDCP, so that all future works in MCCRRP shall be funded
and owned by PEA.
● Thereafter, then President Corazon Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517, granting and
transferring to PEA the parcels of land so reclaimed under the MCCRRP containing a total
area of 1,915,894 sqm. Subsequently, the Register of Deeds issued Transfer Certificates of
Titles in the name of PEA, covering the three reclaimed islands known as the Freedom
Islands.
● PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a private corporation, to
develop the Freedom Islands. PEA and AMARI entered into the JVA through negotiation
without public bidding. Then President Fidel Ramos approved the JVA.
● Senate President Ernesto Maceda denounced the JVA as the grandmother of all scams. As a
result, the Senate Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises, and the
Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, conducted a joint
investigation. Among the conclusions of their report are:
o (1) the reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI under the JVA are lands of the
public domain which the government has not classified as alienable lands and therefore
PEA cannot alienate these lands;
o (2) the certificates of title covering the Freedom Islands are thus void, and
o (3) the JVA itself is illegal.
● Then President Ramos issued Presidential Administrative Order No. 365 creating a Legal
Task Force to conduct a study on the legality of the JVA in view of the Senate Committee
Report which upheld the legality of it.
● The Philippine Daily Inquirer and Today published reports that there were on-going
renegotiations between PEA and AMARI under an order issued by then President Ramos
for an amended JVA.
● Petitioner Frank I. Chavez as a taxpayer, filed the instant Petition for Mandamus with
Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining
Order.
o The government stands to lose billions of pesos in the sale by PEA of the reclaimed lands
to AMARI.
o Petitioner prays that PEA publicly disclose the terms of any renegotiation of the JVA,
invoking the constitutional right of the people to information on matters of public
concern.
o The sale to AMARI of lands of the public domain is a blatant violation of Section 3,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting the sale of alienable lands of the public
domain to private corporations.
o He seeks to enjoin the loss of billions of pesos in properties of the State that are of public
dominion.
ISSUE: ​Whether the sale to AMARI of lands of the public domain is a violation of the
Constitution. YES.
RATIO:
● Indisputably, under the Amended JVA, AMARI will acquire and own a maximum of 367.5
hectares of reclaimed land which will be titled in its name. To implement the Amended JVA,
PEA delegated to the unincorporated PEA-AMARI joint venture PEAs statutory authority,
rights and privileges to reclaim foreshore and submerged areas in Manila Bay.
● Art. XII Sec. 3 of the 1987 Constitution provides: Private corporations or associations may
not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, for a period not
exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and not to
exceed one thousand hectares in area.
● In Ayog v. Cusi the Court explained the constitutional prohibition:
● Indeed, one purpose of the constitutional prohibition against purchases of public
agricultural lands by private corporations is to equitably diffuse land ownership or to
encourage owner-cultivatorship and the economic family-size farm and to prevent a
recurrence of cases like the instant case. Huge landholdings by corporations or private
persons had spawned social unrest.
● However, if the constitutional intent is to prevent huge landholdings, the Constitution
could have simply limited the size of alienable lands of the public domain that corporations
could acquire. The Constitution could have followed the limitations on individuals, who
could acquire not more than 24 hectares of alienable lands of the public domain under the
1973 Constitution, and not more than 12 hectares under the 1987 Constitution.
● If the constitutional intent is to encourage economic family-size farms, placing the land in
the name of a corporation would be more effective in preventing the break-up of
farmlands. If the farmland is registered in the name of a corporation, upon the death of the
owner, his heirs would inherit shares in the corporation instead of subdivided parcels of the
farmland. This would prevent the continuing break-up of farmlands into smaller and
smaller plots from one generation to the next.
● In actual practice, the constitutional ban strengthens the constitutional limitation on
individuals from acquiring more than the allowed area of alienable lands of the public
domain. Without the constitutional ban, individuals who already acquired the maximum
area of alienable lands of the public domain could easily set up corporations to acquire
more alienable public lands. An individual could own as many corporations as his means
would allow him. An individual could even hide his ownership of a corporation by putting
his nominees as stockholders of the corporation. The corporation is a convenient vehicle to
circumvent the constitutional limitation on acquisition by individuals of alienable lands of
the public domain.
● The constitutional intent, under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, is to transfer ownership
of only a limited area of alienable land of the public domain to a qualified individual. This
constitutional intent is safeguarded by the provision prohibiting corporations from
acquiring alienable lands of the public domain, since the vehicle to circumvent the
constitutional intent is removed. The available alienable public lands are gradually
decreasing in the face of an ever-growing population. The most effective way to insure
faithful adherence to this constitutional intent is to grant or sell alienable lands of the
public domain only to individuals. This, it would seem, is the practical benefit arising from
the constitutional ban.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE​, the petition is GRANTED. The Public Estates Authority and Amari Coastal Bay
Development Corporation are PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from implementing the Amended
Joint Venture Agreement which is hereby declared NULL and VOID ​ab initio.​
12 OH CHO vs DIRECTOR OF LANDS
by: Shanon / G.R. No. 48321 / August 31, 1946 / Ponente: PADILLA, J.
Topic:​ LTD: APPLICANTS
Petitioners: ​OH CHO
Respondents: ​DIRECTOR OF LANDS
Facts:
● Oh Cho, an alien, and his predecessors in interest have been in ​open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession of a lot from 1880 to the filing of the application for
registration in 1940.
● Director of Lands opposed Oh Cho’s application based on his lack of title to the lot, and
his disqualification, as alien, from acquiring lands of the public domain.
● The Solicitor General added that the lower court should’ve declared null and void the
sale of the lot to the Oh Cho.
● Oh Cho appealed.
o He invoked the benefits of the Public Land Act (CA 141) for his immediate
predecessors in interest.
Issue/Ruling: ​Whether Oh Cho was entitled to a decree of registration of the lot. (​ NO)
● Oh Cho failed to show that he had title to the lot that may be confirmed under the Land
Registration Act.
● He failed to show that he or any of his predecessors in interest had acquired the lot
from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, under the laws, orders and
decrees promulgated by the Spanish Government in the Philippines, or by possessory
information under the Mortgage Law.
● All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant,
belong to the public domain.
o An exception to the rule would be any land that should have been in the
possession of an occupant and of his predecessors in interest since time
immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption that the land
had never been part of the public domain or that it had been a private
property even before the Spanish conquest.
● Oh Cho does not come under the exception, for the earliest possession of the lot by his
first predecessor in interest began in 1880.
● Under the Public Land Act invoked by the Oh Cho, he is not entitled to a decree of
registration of the lot, because he is an alien disqualified from acquiring lands of the
public domain.
● Oh Cho’s immediate predecessors in interest would have been entitled to a decree of
registration of the lot had they applied for its registration; and that
o Oh Cho having purchased or acquired it, the right of his immediate
predecessors in interest to a decree of registration must be deemed also to
have been acquired by him.
o The benefits provided in the Public Land Act for Oh Cho’s immediate
predecessors in interest are or constitute a grant or concession by the State;
and before they could acquire any right under such benefits, Oh Cho’s
immediate predecessors in interest should comply with the condition
precedent for the grant of such benefits.
o The condition precedent is to apply for the registration of the land, of which
they had been in possession at least since 1894.
● Oh Cho’s immediate predecessors in interest failed to do.
o They did not have any vested right in the lot amounting to title, which was
transmissible to the Oh Cho.
o The only right is their possession of the lot, which, tacked to that of their
predecessors in interest, may be availed of by a qualified person to apply for
its registration but not by a person as the applicant who is disqualified.
● It is urged that the sale of the lot to Oh Cho should have been declared null and void.
o In a suit between vendor and vendee for the annulment of the sale, such
pronouncement would be necessary, if the court were of the opinion that it is
void.
o It is not necessary in this case where the vendors do not even object to the
application filed by the vendee.
13 Diaz vs. Republic
GR NO. 181502
February 2, 2010
Petitioner​: Florencia Diaz
Respondent: Republic of the Philippines
By: Martin
FACTS
● Petitioners late mother, Flora Garcia (Garcia), filed an application for registration of
a vast tract of land located in Laur, Nueva Ecija and Palayan City in the then CFI of
Nueva Ecija on August 12, 1976. She alleged that she possessed the land as owner
and worked, developed and harvested the agricultural products and benefits of the
same continuously, publicly and adversely for more or less 26 years.
● The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the OSG, opposed the application
because the land in question was within the Fort Magsaysay Military Reservation
(FMMR), established by virtue of Proclamation 237 in 1955. Thus, it was inalienable
as it formed part of the public domain.
● Significantly, on November 28, 1975, this Court already ruled in ​Director of Lands v.
Reyes​ that the property subject of Garcias application was inalienable as it formed
part of a military reservation.
● Reyes n ​ otwithstanding, the CFI ruled in Garcias favor in a decision
● The Republic eventually appealed the decision of the CFI to the CA. In its decision
penned by Justice Vicente V. Mendoza (Mendoza decision), the appellate court
reversed and set aside the decision of the CFI. The CA found that ​Reyes w ​ as
applicable to petitioners case as it involved the same property.
● During the pendency of the case in the CA, Garcia passed away and was substituted
by her heirs, one of whom was petitioner Florencia G. Diaz.
● Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the Mendoza decision. While the
motion was pending in the CA, petitioner also filed a motion for recall of the
records from the former CFI. Without acting on the motion for reconsideration, the
appellate court, with Justice Mendozaas ​ponente,​ issued a resolution upholding
petitioners right to recall the records of the case.
● Subsequently, however, the CA encouraged the parties to reach an amicable
settlement on the matter and even gave the parties sufficient time to draft and
finalize the same.
● The parties ultimately entered into a compromise agreement with the Republic
withdrawing its claim on the more or less 4,689 hectares supposedly outside the
FMMR. For her part, petitioner withdrew her application for the portion of the
property inside the military reservation. They filed a motion for approval of the
amicable settlement in the CA.
● The appellate court approved the compromise agreement.
● However, acting on a letter written by a certain Atty. Restituto S. Lazaro, the OSG
filed a motion for reconsideration of the CA resolution ordering the issuance of the
decree of registration. The OSG informed the appellate court that the tract of land
subject of the amicable settlement was still within the military reservation.
● On April 16, 2007, the CA issued an amended annulling the compromise agreement
entered into between the parties.
● Petitioner moved for reconsideration. For the first time, she assailed the validity of
the Mendoza decision the February 26, 1992 decision adverted to in the CAs
amended resolution. She alleged that Justice Mendoza was the assistant solicitor
general during the initial stages of the land registration proceedings in the trial
court and therefore should have inhibited himself when the case reached the CA.
His failure to do so, she laments, worked an injustice against her constitutional
right to due process. Thus, the Mendoza decision should be declared null and void.
The motion was denied.
● Thereafter, petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari in this Court. It was
denied for raising factual issues. She moved for reconsideration. This motion was
denied with finality on the ground that there was no substantial argument warranting
a modification of the Courts resolution. The Court then ordered that no further
pleadings would be entertained.
● Petitioner, however, insisted on filing a motion to lift entry of judgment and motion
for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration and to refer the case to the
Supreme Court ​en banc.​ The Court denied it considering that a second motion for
reconsideration is a prohibited pleading.
● Not one to be easily deterred, petitioner wrote identical letters, first addressed to
Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing (then Acting Chief Justice) and then to Chief
Justice Reynato S. Puno himself saying;
o “It is null and void because destiny placed Hon. Justice Vicente Mendoza
in a position in which it became possible for him to discharge the
minimum requirement of due process, [ the ability of the court to render
impartial justice, because Mr. Justice Mendoza became the ​ponente​ of the
Court of Appeals Decision, reversing the findings of the trial court,
notwithstanding the fact that he, as Assistant Solicitor General, was the
very person who appeared on behalf of the Republic, as the oppositor in
the very same land registration proceedings in which he lost.
ISSUE
Whether the private rights and possession prior to the
the establishment of the FMMR of the petitioner and her predecessors must be respected
HELD/RATIO
No
● Petitioner, however, argues that Proclamation 237 itself recognizes that its
effectivity is subject to private rights, if any there be.
● By way of a background, we recognized in ​Reyes​ that the property where the
military reservation is situated is forest land. Thus:
o Before the military reservation was established, the evidence is
inconclusive as to possession, for it is shown by the evidence that the
land involved is largely mountainous and forested. As a matter of fact, ​at
the time of the hearing, it was conceded that​ approximately 13,957
hectares of ​said land consist of public forest.​
● Concomitantly, we stated therein, and we remind petitioner now, that forest lands
are not registrable under CA 141.
 o Even more important, Section 48[b] of CA No. 141, as amended, applies
exclusively to public agricultural land. Forest lands or area covered with
forest are excluded. ​It is well-settled that forest land is incapable of
registration; and its inclusion in a title, whether such title be one issued
using the Spanish sovereignty or under the present Torrens system of
registration, nullifies the title.
● However, it is true that forest lands may be registered when they have been
reclassified as alienable by the President in a clear and categorical manner (upon
the recommendation of the proper department head who has the authority to
classify the lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable, timber and
mineral lands) coupled with possession by the claimant as well as that of her
predecessors-in-interest.
● Unfortunately for petitioner, she was not able to produce such evidence.
Accordingly, her occupation thereof, and that of her predecessors-in-interest,
could not have ripened into ownership of the subject land.​ ​This is because prior
to the conversion of forest land as alienable land, any occupation or possession
thereof cannot be counted in reckoning compliance with the thirty-year
possession requirement under Commonwealth Act 141 (CA 141) or the Public
Land Act. This was our ruling in ​Almeda v. CA.​ The rules on the confirmation of
imperfect titles do not apply unless and until the land classified as forest land is
released through an official proclamation to that effect. Then and only then will it
form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain.
● Coming now to petitioners contention that her private rights to the property,
meaning her and her predecessors possession thereof prior to the establishment
of the FMMR, must be respected, the same is untenable. As earlier stated, we
had already recognized the same land to be public forest even before the FMMR
was established.​ To reiterate:
o Before the military reservation was established, the evidence is
inconclusive as to possession, for it is shown by the evidence that the
land involved is largely mountainous and forested. As a matter of fact, at
the time of the hearing, it was conceded that approximately 13,957
hectares of said land consist of public forest.
● Therefore, even if possession was for more than 30 years, it could never ripen to
ownership.
● But even assuming that the land in question was alienable land before it was
established as a military reservation, there was nevertheless still a dearth of
evidence with respect to its occupation by petitioner and her
predecessors-in-interest for more than 30 years. In ​Reyes​, we noted:
● Evidently, Melecio Padilla, having died on February 9, 1900, barely five (5) years
after the inscription of the informacion possessoria, could not have converted the
same into a record of ownership twenty (20) years after such inscription, pursuant
to Article 393 of the Spanish Mortgage Law.
● During the lifetime of Melecio Padilla, only a small portion thereof was cleared and
cultivated under the kaingin system, while some portions were used as grazing
land. After his death, his daughter, Maria Padilla, caused the planting of vegetables
and had about forty (40) tenants for the purpose. During the Japanese occupation,
Maria Padilla died. x
● A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant, and the raising
thereon of cattle, do not constitute possession under claim of ownership. In that
sense, possession is not exclusive and notorious as to give rise to a presumptive
grant from the State. While grazing livestock over land is of course to be considered
with other acts of dominion to show possession, the mere occupancy of land by
grazing livestock upon it, without substantial inclosures, or other permanent
improvements, is not sufficient to support a claim of title thru acquisitive
prescription. The possession of public land, however long the period may have
extended, never confers title thereto upon the possessor because the statute of
limitations with regard to public land does not operate against the State unless the
occupant can prove possession and occupation of the same under claim of
ownership for the required number of years to constitute a grant from the State.
● Furthermore, the fact that the possessory information title on which petitioner also
bases her claim of ownership was found to be inexistent in ​Reyes,​ thus rendering
its probative value suspect, further militates against granting her application for
registration.
14 CITY MAYOR OF BAGUIO v. MASWENG
GR NO. ​180206
FEBRUARY 4, 2009
TS
Topic:​ GRANT OF TITLE; APPLICANTS
Petitioners: THE CITY GOVERNMENT OF BAGUIO CITY, represented by REINALDO BAUTISTA,
JR., City Mayor; THE ANTISQUATTING COMMITTEE, represented by ATTY. MELCHOR CARLOS
R. RAGANES, CITY BUILDINGS and ARCHITECTURE office, represented by OSCAR FLORES; and
PUBLIC ORDER and SAFETY OFFICE, Represented by EMMANUEL REYES
Respondents: ​ATTY. BRAIN MASWENG, Regional Officer-National Commission on Indigenous
People-CAR, ELVIN GUMANGAN, NARCISO BASATAN and LAZARO BAWAS
Ponente: ​TINGA, J.
FACTS:
● Baguio City Mayor Braulio Yaranon issued 3 Demolition Orders for the illegal
structures constructed by respondents (without obtaining building permits and in
violation of Sec. 69 of PD 705) on a portion of the Busol Watershed Reservation.
● The respondents were informed of the demolition. Consequently, they filed a
petition for injunction w/ issuance of TRO before the National Commission on
Indigenous Peoples, Cordillera Administrative Region (NCIP-CAR), Regional Hearing
Office, La Trinidad, Benguet, against the office of the City Mayor.
● Respondents claimed that the land where their residential houses stand are their
ancestral lands which they have been occupying and possessing openly and
continuously since time immemorial, and that their ownership has been expressly
recognized in Proc. No. 15 & recommended by the DENR for exclusion from the
coverage of the Busol Forest Reserve.
o They contend that the demolition of their houses is a violation of their
right of possession and ownership of ancestral lands accorded by the
Constitution.
● Regional Hearing Officer Atty. Masweng of the NCIP issued 2 assailed TROs
directing the City Gov’t. of Baguio to refrain from enforcing the Demolition Advice
and Demolition Orders.
● Subsequently, the NCIP issued the other assailed Resolution which granted the
preliminary injunction.
● The CA upheld the jurisdiction of the NCIP over the action. It also ruled that Baguio
City is not exempt from the coverage of RA 8371 (IPRA).
ISSUE#1: ​W/N NCIP has jurisdiction over the dispute. – ​YES.
● NCIP is the primary government agency responsible for the formulation and
implementation of policies, plans and programs to protect and promote the rights
 and well-being of indigenous cultural communities/indigenous peoples (ICCs/IPs)
and the recognition of their ancestral domains as well as their rights thereto.
o In order to fully effectuate its mandate, the NCIP is vested with
jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving the rights of ICCs/IPs.
o The only condition precedent to the NCIP’s assumption of jurisdiction
over such disputes is that the parties thereto shall have exhausted all
remedies provided under their customary laws and have obtained a
certification from the Council of Elders/Leaders who participated in the
attempt to settle the dispute that the same has not been resolved.
● NCIP Administrative Circular No. 1-03 dated April 9, 2003, known as the Rules on
Pleadings, Practice and Procedure Before the NCIP, reiterates the jurisdiction of the
NCIP over claims and disputes involving ancestral lands and enumerates the actions
that may be brought before the commission, as provided in Sec. 5, Rule III (see
notes).
● In order to determine whether the NCIP has jurisdiction over the dispute in
accordance with the foregoing provisions, it is necessary to resolve, on the basis of
the allegations in their petition, whether private respondents are members of
ICCs/IPs.
o This is seen in respondents’ petition which stated that they were
members of the Ibaloi tribe and detailed their ancestry.
o Clearly then, the allegations in the petition, which axiomatically
determine the nature of the action and the jurisdiction of a particular
tribunal, squarely qualify it as a “dispute(s) or controversy(s) over
ancestral lands/domains of ICCs/IPs” within the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the NCIP-RHO.
● The IPRA, furthermore, endows the NCIP with the power to issue temporary
restraining orders and writs of injunction.
MAIN ISSUE: ​W/N private respondents’ ancestral land claim was indeed recognized by
Proclamation No. 15. – ​NO
● Before a writ of preliminary injunction may be issued, petitioners must show that
there exists a right to be protected and that the acts against which injunction is
directed are violative of said right.
● However, Proclamation No. 15 ​does not appear to be a definitive recognition of
private respondents’ ancestral land claim.
● The proclamation merely identifies the Molintas and Gumangan families, the
predecessors-in-interest of private respondents, as claimants of a portion of the
Busol Forest Reservation but does not acknowledge vested rights over the same.
o In fact, Proclamation No. 15 ​explicitly withdraws the Busol Forest
Reservation from sale or settlement.
● The fact remains, too, that the Busol Forest Reservation was declared by the Court
as ​inalienable​ in ​Heirs of Gumangan v. Court of Appeals.
o The declaration of the Busol Forest Reservation as such ​precludes its
conversion into private property.
o The courts are not endowed with jurisdictional competence to adjudicate
forest lands.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION​: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 96895 dated April 16, 2007 and its Resolution dated
September 11, 2007 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Case No. 31-CAR-06 entitled, Elvin
Gumangan, Narciso Basatan and Lazaro Bawas v. Office of the City Mayor of Baguio City, et
al. is DISMISSED.
NOTES:
Proclamation No. 15
“Pursuant to the provisions of section eighteen hundred and twenty-six of Act Numbered
Twenty-seven Hundred and eleven[,] I hereby establish the Busol Forest Reservation to be
administered by the Bureau of Forestry for the purpose of conserving and protecting water
and timber, the protection of the water supply being of primary importance and all other
uses of the forest are to be subordinated to that purpose. I therefore withdraw from sale or
settlement the following described parcels of the public domain situated in the Township of
La Trinidad, City of Baguio, Mountain Province, Island of Luzon, to wit:”
Section 5, Rule III
Sec. 5. Jurisdiction of the NCIP.—The NCIP through its Regional Hearing Offices shall exercise
jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs and all cases pertaining to
the implementation, enforcement, and interpretation of R.A. 8371, including but not limited
to the following:
(1) Original and Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Regional Hearing Office (RHO):
ses involving disputes and controversies over ancestral lands/domains of ICCs/IPs;
b. Cases involving violations of the requirement of free and prior and informed consent of
ICCs/IPs;
c. Actions for enforcement of decisions of ICCs/IPs involving violations of customary laws or
desecration of ceremonial sites, sacred places, or rituals;
d. Actions for redemption/reconveyance under Section 8(b) of R.A. 8371; and
e. Such other cases analogous to the foregoing.
(2) Original Jurisdiction of the RHO:
a. Cases affecting property rights, claims of ownership, hereditary succession, and settlement
of land disputes, between and among ICCs/IPs that have not been settled under customary
laws; and
b. Actions for damages arising out of any violation of Republic Act No. 8371.
(3) Exclusive and Original Jurisdiction of the Commission:
a. Petition for cancellation of Certificate of Ancestral Domain Titles/Certificate of Ancestral
Land Titles (CADTs/ CALTs) alleged to have been fraudulently acquired by, and issued to, any
person or community as provided for under Section 54 of R.A. 8371. Provided that such
action is filed within one (1) year from the date of registration.
15 CITY MAYOR v. EBIO
GR. No. 178411
DATE: JUNE 23, 2010
By: EAY3
Topic: APPLICANTS
Petitioners: CITY MAYOR OF PARANAQUE
Respondents: EBIO
Ponente: VILLARAMA JR., J.
FACTS:
· Respondents claim that they are the absolute owners of a parcel of land consisting
Parañaque City and covered by Tax Declaration in the name of respondent Mario D.
Ebio.
· Said land was an accretion of Cut-cut creek. Respondents assert that the original
occupant and possessor of the said parcel of land was their great grandfather, Jose
Vitalez.
· In 1930, Jose gave the land to his son, Pedro Vitalez. From then on, Pedro continuously
and exclusively occupied and possessed the said lot.
· In 1966, after executing an a davit declaring possession and occupancy, Pedro was able
to obtain a tax declaration over the said property in his name. Since then, respondents
have been religiously paying real property taxes for the said property.
· Meanwhile, in 1961, respondent Mario Ebio married Pedro's daughter. Upon Pedro's
advice, the couple established their home on the said lot.
· Later on, Mario Ebio secured building permits from the Parañaque municipal office for
the construction of their house within the said compound.
· On April 21, 1987, Pedro executed a notarized Transfer of Rights ceding his claim over
the entire parcel of land in favor of Mario Ebio. Subsequently, the tax declarations under
Pedro's name were cancelled and new ones were issued in Mario Ebio's name.
· the Sangguniang Barangay of Vitalez passed a resolution seeking assistance from the
City Government of Parañaque for the construction of an access road along Cut-cut
Creek located in the said barangay.
· The proposed road, traversing the lot occupied by the respondents. When the city
government advised all the affected residents to vacate the said area, respondents
immediately registered their opposition thereto. The road project was temporarily
suspended.
· City Administrator Noli Aldip sent a letter to the respondents ordering them to vacate
the area within the next thirty (30) days, or be physically evicted from the said property.
They refused.
· respondents went to the RTC of Parañaque and applied for a writ of preliminary
injunction against petitioners. In the course of the proceedings, respondents admitted
before the trial court that they have a pending application for the issuance of a sales
patent before the DENR.
· the RTC issued an Order denying the petition for lack of merit. The trial court reasoned
that respondents were not able to prove successfully that they have an established right
to the property since they have not instituted an action for con rmation of title and
their application for sales patent has not yet been granted.
· CA - rendered Decision in favor of the respondents
· Petitioners appeal to the SC.
ISSUE: W/N the the respondents have acquired the lot – YES
HELD/RATIO:
· alluvial deposits along the banks of a creek do not form part of the public domain as the
alluvial property automatically belongs to the owner of the estate to which it may have
been added. The only restriction provided for by law is that the owner of the adjoining
property must register the same under the Torrens system; otherwise, the alluvial
property may be subject to acquisition through prescription by third persons.
· properties of public dominion cannot be acquired by prescription. No matter how long
the possession of the properties has been, there can be no prescription against the
State regarding property of public domain.29 Even a city or municipality cannot acquire
them by prescription as against the State.
· while it is true that a creek is a property of public dominion, 31 the land which is formed
by the gradual and imperceptible accumulation of sediments along its banks does not
form part of the public domain by clear provision of law.
· respondents assert that their predecessor-in-interest, Pedro Vitalez, had occupied and
possessed the subject lot as early as 1930. In 1964, respondent Mario Ebio secured a
permit from the local government of Parañaque for the construction of their family
dwelling on the said lot. In 1966, Pedro executed an a davit of possession and
occupancy allowing him to declare the property in his name for taxation purposes.
Curiously, it was also in 1966 when Guaranteed Homes, Inc., the registered owner of
Road Lot No. 8 (RL 8) which adjoins the land occupied by the respondents, donated RL 8
to the local government of Parañaque.
· From these ndings of fact by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals, only one
conclusion can be made: that for more than thirty (30) years, neither Guaranteed
Homes, Inc. nor the local government of Parañaque in its corporate or private capacity
sought to register the accreted portion. Undoubtedly, respondents are deemed to have
acquired ownership over the subject property through prescription. Respondents can
assert such right despite the fact that they have yet to register their title over the said
llot. It must be remembered that the purpose of land registration is not the acquisition
of lands, but only the registration of title which the applicant already possessed over the
land. Registration was never intended as a means of acquiring ownership.37 A decree of
registration merely confirms, but does not confer, ownership.
· Confirmation of an imperfect title over a parcel of land may be done either through
judicial proceedings or through administrative process. In the instant case, respondents
admitted that they opted to con rm their title over the property administratively by
filing an application for sales patent.
· Respondents' application for sales patent, however, should not be used to prejudice or
derogate what may be deemed as their vested right over the subject property. The sales
patent application should instead be considered as a mere super uity particularly since
ownership over the land, which they seek to buy from the State, is already vested upon
them by virtue of acquisitive prescription. Moreover, the State does not have any
authority to convey a property through the issuance of a grant or a patent if the land is
no longer a public land
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The January 31, 2007 Decision, as well
as the July 8, 2007 Resolution, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91350 are hereby
AFFIRMED.
With costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED.