Professional Documents
Culture Documents
SERRANO
VS.
GALLANT
MARITIME
The
LA
rendered
a
Decision
declaring
the
dismissal
of
petitioner
illegal
and
G.R.
No.
167614
March
24
2009
awarding
him
monetary
benefits:
the
amount
of
EIGHT
THOUSAND
SEVEN
Austria-‐Martinez,
J:
HUNDRED
SEVENTY
U.S.
DOLLARS
(US
$8,770.00),
representing
the
complainant's
salary
for
three
(3)
months
of
the
unexpired
portion
of
the
Section
10,
Republic
Act
(R.A.)
No.
8042:
aforesaid
contract
of
employment.
The
LA
based
his
computation
on
the
salary
period
of
three
months
only
—
rather
than
the
entire
unexpired
Sec.
10.
Money
Claims.
—
.
.
.
In
case
of
termination
of
overseas
portion
of
nine
months
and
23
days
of
petitioner's
employment
contract
—
employment
without
just,
valid
or
authorized
cause
as
defined
by
applying
the
subject
clause.
law
or
contract,
the
workers
shall
be
entitled
to
the
full
reimbursement
of
his
placement
fee
with
interest
of
twelve
Petitioner
also
appealed
on
the
sole
issue
that
the
LA
erred
in
not
applying
percent
(12%)
per
annum,
plus
his
salaries
for
the
unexpired
the
ruling
of
the
Court
in
Triple
Integrated
Services,
Inc.
v.
National
Labor
portion
of
his
employment
contract
or
for
three
(3)
months
for
Relations
Commission
that
in
case
of
illegal
dismissal,
OFWs
are
entitled
to
every
year
of
the
unexpired
term,
whichever
is
less.
their
salaries
for
the
unexpired
portion
of
their
contracts.
FACTS:
The
NLRC
corrected
the
LA's
computation
of
the
lump-‐sum
salary
awarded
Antonio
Serrano,
a
seafarer,
was
hired
by
Gallant
Maritime
Services,
Inc.
and
to
petitioner
by
reducing
the
applicable
salary
rate
from
US$2,590.00
to
Marlow
Navigation
Co.,
Ltd.
US$1,400.00
because
R.A.
No.
8042
"does
not
provide
for
the
award
of
overtime
pay,
which
should
be
proven
to
have
been
actually
performed,
and
On
March
19,
1998,
the
date
of
his
departure,
petitioner
was
constrained
for
vacation
leave
pay."
to
accept
a
downgraded
employment
contract
for
the
position
of
Second
Officer
upon
the
assurance
and
representation
of
respondents
that
he
Petitioner
filed
a
Motion
for
Partial
Reconsideration,
but
this
time
he
would
be
made
Chief
Officer
by
the
end
of
April
1998.
questioned
the
constitutionality
of
the
subject
clause.
The
NLRC
denied
the
motion.
Petitioner
filed
a
Petition
for
Certiorari
with
the
CA,
reiterating
the
Respondents
did
not
deliver
on
their
promise.
Hence,
petitioner
refused
to
constitutional
challenge
against
the
subject
clause.
stay
on
as
Second
Officer
and
was
repatriated
to
the
Philippines
on
May
26,
1998.
The
CA
affirmed
the
NLRC
ruling
on
the
reduction
of
the
applicable
salary
rate;
however,
the
CA
skirted
the
constitutional
issue
raised
by
petitioner.
Petitioner's
employment
contract
was
for
a
period
of
12
months
or
from
March
19,
1998
up
to
March
19,
1999,
but
at
the
time
of
his
repatriation
The
Arguments
of
Petitioner:
on
May
26,
1998,
he
had
served
only
two
(2)
months
and
seven
(7)
days
of
Petitioner
contends
that
the
subject
clause
is
unconstitutional
because
it
his
contract,
leaving
an
unexpired
portion
of
nine
(9)
months
and
twenty-‐
unduly
impairs
the
freedom
of
OFWs
to
negotiate
for
and
stipulate
in
their
three
(23)
days.
overseas
employment
contracts
a
determinate
employment
period
and
a
fixed
salary
package.
Petitioner
filed
with
the
Labor
Arbiter
(LA)
a
Complaint
against
respondents
for
constructive
dismissal
and
for
payment
of
his
money
claims
in
the
total
It
also
impinges
on
the
equal
protection
clause,
for
it
treats
OFWs
amount
of
US$26,442.73,
differently
from
local
Filipino
workers
by
putting
a
cap
on
the
amount
of
lump-‐sum
salary
to
which
OFWs
are
entitled
in
case
of
illegal
dismissal,
while
LMJT
1
LABOR
STANDARDS
CASE
DIGESTS
–
ATTY.
PETER
JOEY
USITA
(2018-‐2019)
setting
no
limit
to
the
same
monetary
award
for
local
workers
when
their
unexpired
portion
of
one
year
or
more
in
their
contracts,
but
none
on
the
dismissal
is
declared
illegal;
that
the
disparate
treatment
is
not
reasonable
claims
of
other
OFWs
or
local
workers
with
fixed-‐term
employment.
The
as
there
is
no
substantial
distinction
between
the
two
groups;
subject
clause
singles
out
one
classification
of
OFWs
and
burdens
it
with
a
peculiar
disadvantage.
Moreover,
petitioner
argues
that
the
decisions
of
the
CA
and
the
labor
tribunals
are
not
in
line
with
existing
jurisprudence
on
the
issue
of
money
-‐-‐
claims
of
illegally
dismissed
OFWs.
The
Government
has
failed
to
discharge
its
burden
of
proving
the
existence
of
a
compelling
state
interest
that
would
justify
the
perpetuation
of
the
Lastly,
petitioner
claims
that
the
subject
clause
violates
the
due
process
discrimination
against
OFWs
under
the
subject
clause.
clause,
for
it
deprives
him
of
the
salaries
and
other
emoluments
he
is
entitled
to
under
his
fixed-‐period
employment
contract.
Assuming
that,
as
advanced
by
the
OSG,
the
purpose
of
the
subject
clause
is
to
protect
the
employment
of
OFWs
by
mitigating
the
solidary
liability
of
ISSUE:
placement
agencies,
such
callous
and
cavalier
rationale
will
have
to
be
Whether
or
not
the
subject
clause
is
unconstitutional?
rejected.
There
can
never
be
a
justification
for
any
form
of
government
action
that
alleviates
the
burden
of
one
sector,
but
imposes
the
same
HELD:
burden
on
another
sector,
especially
when
the
favored
sector
is
composed
YES.
The
subject
clause
appears
facially
neutral,
for
it
applies
to
all
OFWs.
of
private
businesses
such
as
placement
agencies,
while
the
disadvantaged
However,
a
closer
examination
reveals
that
the
subject
clause
has
a
sector
is
composed
of
OFWs
whose
protection
no
less
than
the
Constitution
discriminatory
intent
against,
and
an
invidious
impact
on,
OFWs
at
two
commands.
The
idea
that
private
business
interest
can
be
elevated
to
the
levels:
level
of
a
compelling
state
interest
is
odious.
First,
OFWs
with
employment
contracts
of
less
than
one
year
vis-‐à-‐vis
OFWs
Moreover,
even
if
the
purpose
of
the
subject
clause
is
to
lessen
the
solidary
with
employment
contracts
of
one
year
or
more;
Second,
among
OFWs
with
liability
of
placement
agencies
vis-‐a-‐vis
their
foreign
principals,
there
are
employment
contracts
of
more
than
one
year;
and
Third,
OFWs
vis-‐à-‐vis
mechanisms
already
in
place
that
can
be
employed
to
achieve
that
purpose
local
workers
with
fixed-‐period
employment;
without
infringing
on
the
constitutional
rights
of
OFWs.
The
subject
clause
creates
a
sub-‐layer
of
discrimination
among
OFWs
whose
The
subject
clause
being
unconstitutional,
petitioner
is
entitled
to
his
contract
periods
are
for
more
than
one
year:
those
who
are
illegally
salaries
for
the
entire
unexpired
period
of
nine
months
and
23
days
of
his
dismissed
with
less
than
one
year
left
in
their
contracts
shall
be
entitled
to
employment
contract,
pursuant
to
law
and
jurisprudence
prior
to
the
their
salaries
for
the
entire
unexpired
portion
thereof,
while
those
who
are
enactment
of
R.A.
No.
8042.
illegally
dismissed
with
one
year
or
more
remaining
in
their
contracts
shall
be
covered
by
the
subject
clause,
and
their
monetary
benefits
limited
to
WHEREFORE,
the
Court
GRANTS
the
Petition.
The
subject
clause
"or
for
their
salaries
for
three
months
only.
three
months
for
every
year
of
the
unexpired
term,
whichever
is
less"
in
the
5th
paragraph
of
Section
10
of
Republic
Act
No.
8042
is
DECLARED
The
subject
clause
contains
a
suspect
classification
in
that,
in
the
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
computation
of
the
monetary
benefits
of
fixed-‐term
employees
who
are
illegally
discharged,
it
imposes
a
3-‐month
cap
on
the
claim
of
OFWs
with
an
LMJT
2
LABOR
STANDARDS
CASE
DIGESTS
–
ATTY.
PETER
JOEY
USITA
(2018-‐2019)
SAMEER
OVERSEAS
PLACEMENT
VS.
CABILLES
ANG
Pacific
Manpower
moved
for
the
dismissal
of
petitioner’s
claims
against
it.
G.R.
No.
170139
August
5,
2014
It
alleged
that
there
was
no
employer-‐employee
relationship
between
them.
Leonen,
J.:
Therefore,
the
claims
against
it
were
outside
the
jurisdiction
of
the
Labor
Arbiter.
FACTS:
Responding
to
an
ad
it
published
by
Sameer
Overseas
Placement
Agency,
The
Labor
Arbiter
dismissed
Joy’s
complaint
and
ruled
that
her
complaint
Joy
C.
Cabiles
submitted
her
application
for
a
quality
control
job
in
Taiwan.
was
based
on
mere
allegations.
The
Labor
Arbiter
found
that
there
was
no
Joy’s
application
was
accepted.
She
was
later
asked
to
sign
a
one-‐year
excess
payment
of
placement
fees,
based
on
the
official
receipt
presented
employment
contract
for
a
monthly
salary
of
NT$15,360.00
and
was
by
petitioner.
required
to
pay
a
placement
fee
of
P70,000.00
when
she
signed
the
employment
contract.
Joy
appealed
to
the
National
Labor
Relations
Commission.
The
NLRC
declared
that
Joy
was
illegally
dismissed
and
awarded
respondent
only
three
Joy
was
deployed
to
work
for
Taiwan
Wacoal,
Co.,
Ltd.
(Wacoal)
on
June
26,
(3)
months
worth
of
salary
in
the
amount
of
NT$46,080,
the
reimbursement
1997.
She
alleged
that
in
her
employment
contract,
she
agreed
to
work
as
of
the
NT$3,000
withheld
from
her,
and
attorney’s
fees
of
NT$300.
quality
control
for
one
year
but
in
Taiwan,
she
was
asked
to
work
as
a
cutter.
Sameer
appealed
to
the
CA,
the
CA
affirmed
the
decision
of
the
NLRC.
Sameer
Overseas
Placement
Agency
claims
that
on
July
14,
1997,
a
certain
Brought
to
the
fore
is
the
issue
on
the
constitutionality
of
the
last
paragraph
Mr.
Huwang
from
Wacoal
informed
Joy,
without
prior
notice,
that
she
was
of
Sec.
10
of
R.A.
No.
8042
which
has
been
declared
unconstitutional
in
terminated
and
that
“she
should
immediately
report
to
their
office
to
get
Serrano
v.
Gallant
Maritime
but
re-‐enacted
by
legislation
subsequent
to
her
salary
and
passport
and
was
asked
to
“prepare
for
immediate
Serrano.
Also
brought
for
discussion
is
the
proper
application
of
the
newly
repatriation.”
imposed
interest
rates
on
the
pecuniary
awards
given
to
Joy
in
view
of
Joy
claims
that
she
was
told
that
from
June
26
to
July
14,
1997,
she
only
Central
Bank
Circular
No.
799.
earned
a
total
of
NT$9,000.15
According
to
her,
Wacoal
deducted
NT$3,000
to
cover
her
plane
ticket
to
Manila.
ISSUES:
1. W/N
the
award
of
3-‐months’
worth
of
salary
to
Joy
was
legal
in
view
of
On
October
15,
1997,
Joy
filed
a
complaint
with
the
NLRC
against
petitioner
the
re-‐enactment
of
the
last
paragraph
of
Sec.
10
of
R.A.
No.
8042
which
and
Wacoal.
She
claimed
that
she
was
illegally
dismissed.
She
asked
for
the
was
previously
declared
as
unconstitutional?
return
of
her
placement
fee,
the
withheld
amount
for
repatriation
costs,
2. W/N
the
new
Central
Bank
circular
on
interest
rates
applies
to
the
payment
of
her
salary
for
23
months
as
well
as
moral
and
exemplary
award
of
reimbursement
of
placement
fee
and
other
deductions?
damages.
She
identified
Wacoal
as
Sameer
Overseas
Placement
Agency’s
foreign
principal.
HELD:
1. NO.
In
the
hierarchy
of
laws,
the
Constitution
is
supreme.
No
branch
or
Sameer
Overseas
Placement
Agency
alleged
that
Wacoal’s
accreditation
office
of
the
government
may
exercise
its
powers
in
any
manner
with
petitioner
had
already
been
transferred
to
the
Pacific
Manpower
&
inconsistent
with
the
Constitution,
regardless
of
the
existence
of
any
Management
Services,
Inc.
(Pacific)
as
of
August
6,
1997.
Thus,
petitioner
law
that
supports
such
exercise.
The
Constitution
cannot
be
trumped
asserts
that
it
was
already
substituted
by
Pacific
Manpower.
by
any
other
law.
All
laws
must
be
read
in
light
of
the
Constitution.
Any
law
that
is
inconsistent
with
it
is
a
nullity.
LMJT
3
LABOR
STANDARDS
CASE
DIGESTS
–
ATTY.
PETER
JOEY
USITA
(2018-‐2019)
Circular
No.
799
is
applicable
only
in
loans
and
forbearance
of
money,
goods,
Thus,
when
a
law
or
a
provision
of
law
is
null
because
it
is
inconsistent
with
or
credits,
and
in
judgments
when
there
is
no
stipulation
on
the
applicable
the
Constitution,
the
nullity
cannot
be
cured
by
reincorporation
or
interest
rate.
Further,
it
is
only
applicable
if
the
judgment
did
not
become
reenactment
of
the
same
or
a
similar
law
or
provision.
A
law
or
provision
final
and
executory
before
July
1,
2013.
We
add
that
Circular
No.
799
is
not
of
law
that
was
already
declared
unconstitutional
remains
as
such
unless
applicable
when
there
is
a
law
that
states
otherwise.
While
the
Bangko
circumstances
have
so
changed
as
to
warrant
a
reverse
conclusion.
Sentral
ng
Pilipinas
has
the
power
to
set
or
limit
interest
rates,
these
interest
rates
do
not
apply
when
the
law
provides
that
a
different
interest
rate
shall
We
are
not
convinced
by
the
pleadings
submitted
by
the
parties
that
the
be
applied.
“[A]
Central
Bank
Circular
cannot
repeal
a
law.
Only
a
law
can
situation
has
so
changed
so
as
to
cause
us
to
reverse
binding
precedent.
repeal
another
law.”
The
new
law
puts
our
overseas
workers
in
the
same
vulnerable
position
as
they
were
prior
to
Serrano.
Failure
to
reiterate
the
very
ratio
decidendi
of
Laws
are
deemed
incorporated
in
contracts.
“The
contracting
parties
need
that
case
will
result
in
the
same
untold
economic
hardships
that
our
reading
not
repeat
them.
They
do
not
even
have
to
be
referred
to.
Every
contract,
of
the
Constitution
intended
to
avoid.
Obviously,
we
cannot
countenance
thus,
contains
not
only
what
has
been
explicitly
stipulated,
but
the
statutory
added
expenses
for
further
litigation
that
will
reduce
their
hard-‐
earned
provisions
that
have
any
bearing
on
the
matter.”
There
is,
therefore,
an
wages
as
well
as
add
to
the
indignity
of
having
been
deprived
of
the
implied
stipulation
in
contracts
between
the
placement
agency
and
the
protection
of
our
laws
simply
because
our
precedents
have
not
been
overseas
worker
that
in
case
the
overseas
worker
is
adjudged
as
entitled
followed.
to
reimbursement
of
his
or
her
placement
fees,
the
amount
shall
be
subject
to
a
12%
interest
per
annum.
This
implied
stipulation
has
the
effect
2. On
the
interest
rate,
the
Bangko
Sentral
ng
Pilipinas
Circular
No.
799
of
of
removing
awards
for
reimbursement
of
placement
fees
from
Circular
June
21,
2013,
which
revised
the
interest
rate
for
loan
or
forbearance
No.
799’s
coverage.
from
12%
to
6%
in
the
absence
of
stipulation,
applies
in
this
case.
The
pertinent
portions
of
Circular
No.
799,
Series
of
2013,
read:
The
The
same
cannot
be
said
for
awards
of
salary
for
the
unexpired
portion
of
Monetary
Board,
in
its
Resolution
No.
796
dated
16
May
2013,
approved
the
employment
contract
under
Republic
Act
No.
8042.
These
awards
are
the
following
revisions
governing
the
rate
of
interest
in
the
absence
of
covered
by
Circular
No.
799
because
the
law
does
not
provide
for
a
specific
stipulation
in
loan
contracts,
thereby
amending
Section
2
of
Circular
No.
interest
rate
that
should
apply.
In
sum,
if
judgment
did
not
become
final
905,
Series
of
1982:
and
executory
before
July
1,
2013
and
there
was
no
stipulation
in
the
contract
providing
for
a
different
interest
rate,
other
money
claims
under
Section
1.
The
rate
of
interest
for
the
loan
or
forbearance
of
any
money,
Section
10
of
Republic
Act
No.
8042
shall
be
subject
to
the
6%
interest
per
goods
or
credits
and
the
rate
allowed
in
judgments,
in
the
absence
of
an
annum
in
accordance
with
Circular
No.
799.
This
means
that
respondent
is
express
contract
as
to
such
rate
of
interest,
shall
be
six
percent
(6%)
per
also
entitled
to
an
interest
of
6%
per
annum
on
her
money
claims
from
the
annum.
finality
of
this
judgment.
Section
2.
In
view
of
the
above,
Subsection
X305.1
of
the
Manual
of
Regulations
for
Banks
and
Sections
4305Q.1,
4305S.3
and
4303P.1
of
the
Manual
of
Regulations
for
Non-‐Bank
Financial
Institutions
are
hereby
amended
accordingly.
This
Circular
shall
take
effect
on
1
July
2013.
LMJT
4
LABOR
STANDARDS
CASE
DIGESTS
–
ATTY.
PETER
JOEY
USITA
(2018-‐2019)
SUNACE
INTERNATIONAL
MANAGEMENT
SERVICES,
INC.
vs.
NLRC
The
Labor
Arbiter,
rejected
Sunace’s
claim
that
the
extension
of
Divina’s
G.R.
No.
161757
January
25,
2006
contract
for
two
more
years
was
without
its
knowledge
and
consent
as
Carpio-‐Morales,
J.:
evidenced
showed
(Annex
“B”),
Sunace
and
Edmund
Wang
have
not
stopped
communicating
with
each
other
and
yet
the
matter
of
the
The
theory
of
imputed
knowledge
ascribes
the
knowledge
of
the
agent
to
the
contract’s
extension
and
Sunace’s
alleged
non-‐consent
thereto
has
not
been
principal
not
the
other
way
around.
Also,
the
agency
between
a
foreign
categorically
established.
principal
and
its
local
recruitment
agent
is
revoked
if
the
foreign
principal
directly
manages
the
business
(hiring
of
employee)
entrusted
to
the
local
What
Sunace
should
have
done
was
to
write
to
POEA
about
the
extension
recruitment
agent,
dealing
directly
with
third
persons.
and
its
objection
thereto,
copy
furnished
the
complain ant
herself,
her
foreign
employer,
Hang
Rui
Xiong
and
the
Taiwanese
broker,
Edmund
Wang.
FACTS:
And
because
it
did
not,
it
is
presumed
to
have
consented
to
the
extension
Sunace
International
Management
Services
(Sunace)
deployed
to
Taiwan
and
should
be
liable
for
anything
that
resulted
thereform.
Divina
A.
Montehermozo
(Divina)
as
a
domestic
helper
under
a
12-‐month
contract
effective
February
1,
1997.
The
deployment
was
with
the
assistance
The
Labor
Arbiter
rejected
Sunace’s
argument
that
it
is
not
liable
on
account
of
a
Taiwanese
broker,
Edmund
Wang,
President
of
Jet
Crown
International
of
Divina’s
execution
of
a
Waiver
and
Quitclaim
and
an
Affidavit
of
Co.,
Ltd.
Desistance.
Observed
the
Labor
Arbiter:
“Should
the
parties
arrive
at
any
agreement
as
to
the
whole
or
any
After
her
12-‐month
contract
expired
on
February
1,
1998,
Divina
continued
part
of
the
dispute,
the
same
shall
be
reduced
to
writing
and
signed
working
for
her
Taiwanese
employer,
Hang
Rui
Xiong,
for
two
more
years,
by
the
parties
and
their
respective
counsel
if
any,
before
the
Labor
after
which
she
returned
to
the
Philippines
on
February
4,
2000.
Arbiter.
The
settlement
shall
be
approved
by
the
Labor
Arbiter
after
being
satisfied
that
it
was
voluntarily
entered
into
by
the
parties
Shortly
after
her
return,
Divina
filed
a
complaint
before
the
NLRC
a gainst
and
after
having
explained
to
them
the
terms
and
consequences
Sunace,
one
Adelaide
Perez,
the
Taiwanese
broker,
and
the
employer-‐ thereof.
And
because
no
consideration
is
indicated
in
the
foreign
principal
alleging
that
she
was
jailed
for
three
months
and
that
she
documents,
we
strike
them
down
as
contrary
to
law,
morals,
and
was
underpaid.
public
policy.”
Divina
filed
also
claimed
that
under
her
original
one-‐year
contract
and
the
Sunace
elevated
the
case
to
the
Court
of
Appeals
which
dismissed
it
2-‐year
extended
contract
which
was
with
the
knowledge
and
consent
of
outright.
The
CA
affirmed
the
Labor
Arbiter
and
NLRCs
finding
that
Sunace
Sunace,
amounts
representing
income
tax
and
savings
were
deducted
from
knew
of
and
impliedly
consented
to
the
extension
of
Divinas
2-‐year
contract.
her
salary
and
while
the
amounts
deducted
in
1997
were
refunded
to
her,
It
went
on
to
state
that
It
is
undisputed
that
Sunace
was
continually
those
deducted
in
1998
and
1999
were
not.
communicating
with
Divina’s
foreign
employer.
It
thus
concluded
that
as
agent
of
the
foreign
principal,
petitioner
cannot
profess
ignorance
of
such
For
its
part,
Sunace
alleged
that
Divina’s
2-‐year
extension
of
her
contract
extension
as
obviously,
the
act
of
the
principal
extending
complainant’s
was
without
its
knowledge
and
consent,
hence,
it
had
no
liability
attaching
employment
contract
necessarily
bound
it.
to
any
claim
arising
therefrom,
and
Divina
in
fact
executed
a
Waiver/Quitclaim
and
Release
of
Responsibility
and
an
Affidavit
of
ISSUE: W/N
Sunace
was
solidarily
liable
with
the
foreign
principal
to
Divina
Desistance.
as
to
the
events
which
transpired
during
her
2-‐year
extension
in
Taiwan?
LMJT
5
LABOR
STANDARDS
CASE
DIGESTS
–
ATTY.
PETER
JOEY
USITA
(2018-‐2019)
LMJT
6
LABOR
STANDARDS
CASE
DIGESTS
–
ATTY.
PETER
JOEY
USITA
(2018-‐2019)
LMJT
7
LABOR
STANDARDS
CASE
DIGESTS
–
ATTY.
PETER
JOEY
USITA
(2018-‐2019)
her,
she
came
to
know
Andy
Baloran
and
Engr.
Leonardo
Domingo
through
of
accused-‐
appellant.
As
long
as
the
prosecution
is
able
to
establish
through
Joseph
Mendoza,
who
referred
her
and
her
son,
Noli,
to
them
in
connection
credible
testimonies
and
affidavits
that
the
accused-‐appellant
was
involved
with
their
own
applications
for
overseas
employment.
in
the
prohibited
recruitment,
a
conviction
for
the
offense
can
very
well
be
justified.
In
these
cases,
complainants
could
not
present
receipts
for
their
The
trial
court
rendered
as
decision
finding
her
guilty
or
illegal
recruitment
payment
because
accused-‐appellant
assured
them
she
would
take
care
of
in
large
scale
and
estafa
in
three
(3)
counts.
their
money.
ISSUE:
Direct
proof
of
previous
agreement
to
commit
a
crime
is
not
necessary
as
it
W/N
Luz
Gonzales-‐Flores
should
be
held
liable?
may
be
deduced
from
the
mode
in
which
the
offense
was
perpetrated,
or
inferred
from
the
acts
of
the
accused
which
point
to
a
joint
purpose
and
HELD:
design.
In
these
cases,
the
fact
is
that
there
was
conspiracy
among
accused-‐
YES.
appellant,
Domingo,
and
Baloran
in
recruiting
complainants
for
employment
ILLEGAL
RECRUITMENT
IN
LARGE
SCALE,
overseas.
The
evidence
shows
that
each
had
a
role
in
that
conspiracy.
the
essential
elements
of
which
are:
Domingo
posed
as
a
representative
of
the
luxury
liner
in
recruiting
crew
for
(1)
that
the
accused
engages
in
acts
of
recruitment
and
placement
of
the
vessel.
Baloran
represented
himself
as
the
person
who
would
actually
workers
defined
under
Art.
13
(b)
or
in
any
of
the
prohibited
activities
under
process
complainants’
travel
documents,
while
accused-‐appellant
acted
as
Art.
34
of
the
Labor
Code;
a
scout
for
job
applicants
and
a
collector
of
their
payments.
It
was
only
(2)
that
the
accused
has
not
complied
with
the
guidelines
issued
by
the
Mendoza
who
did
not
misrepresent
himself
as
someone
capable
of
helping
Secretary
of
Labor
and
Employment,
particularly
with
respect
to
the
complainants
go
abroad
nor
collect
money
from
them.
securing
of
a
license
or
an
authority
to
recruit
and
deploy
workers,
either
locally
or
overseas;
and
Both
elements
of
the
crime
were
established
in
these
cases,
namely,
(a)
(3)
that
the
accused
commits
the
unlawful
acts
against
three
or
more
accused
appellant
defrauded
complainant
by
abuse
of
confidence
or
by
persons,
individually
or
as
a
group.
means
of
deceit
and
(b)
complainant
suffered
damage
or
prejudice
capable
of
pecuniary
estimation
as
a
result.
Complainants
parted
with
their
money
Accused-‐appellant
contends
that
all
she
did
was
to
refer
complainants
to
upon
the
prodding
and
enticement
of
accused-‐appellant
on
the
false
Domingo,
Baloran,
and
Mendoza.
However,
under
Art.
13
(b)
of
the
Labor
pretense
that
she
had
the
capacity
to
deploy
them
for
employment
abroad.
Code,
recruitment
includes
“referral,”
which
is
defined
as
the
act
of
In
the
end,
complainants
were
neither
able
to
leave
for
work
overseas
nor
passing
along
or
forwarding
an
applicant
for
employment
after
initial
did
they
get
their
money
back,
thus
causing
them
damage
and
prejudice.
interview
of
a
selected
applicant
for
employment
to
a
selected
employer,
placement
officer,
or
bureau.
In
these
cases,
accused-‐appellant
did
more
than
just
make
referrals.
She
actively
and
directly
enlisted
complainants
for
supposed
employment
abroad,
even
promising
them
jobs
as
seamen,
and
collected
moneys
from
them.
The
failure
of
complainants
to
present
receipts
to
evidence
payments
made
to
accused-‐
appellant
is
not
fatal
to
the
prosecution
of
these
cases.
The
presentation
of
the
receipts
of
payments
is
not
necessary
for
the
conviction
LMJT
8
LABOR
STANDARDS
CASE
DIGESTS
–
ATTY.
PETER
JOEY
USITA
(2018-‐2019)
LMJT
9
LABOR
STANDARDS
CASE
DIGESTS
–
ATTY.
PETER
JOEY
USITA
(2018-‐2019)
LMJT
10
LABOR
STANDARDS
CASE
DIGESTS
–
ATTY.
PETER
JOEY
USITA
(2018-‐2019)
case,
Costales,
Almoite,
Sebolino
and
Sagun
were
already
rendering
service
to
the
company
as
employees
before
they
were
made
to
undergo
3. YES
apprenticeship.
The
company
itself
recognized
the
respondents’
status
through
relevant
operational
records.
This
reality
is
highlighted
by
the
CA
finding
that
the
respondents
occupied
positions
such
as
machine
operator,
scaleman
and
extruder
operator—tasks
The
Master
List
(of
employees)
that
the
petitioners
heavily
rely
upon
as
that
are
usually
necessary
and
desirable
in
Atlanta’s
usual
business
or
trade
proof
of
their
position
that
the
respondents
were
not
Atlanta’s
employees,
as
manufacturer
of
plastic
building
materials.
These
tasks
and
their
nature
at
the
time
they
were
engaged
as
apprentices,
is
unreliable
and
does
not
characterized
the
four
as
regular
employees
under
Article
280
of
the
Labor
inspire
belief.
Code.
Thus,
when
they
were
dismissed
without
just
or
authorized
cause,
without
notice,
and
without
the
opportunity
to
be
heard,
their
dismissal
was
The
list,
consisting
of
several
pages,
is
hardly
legible.
It
requires
extreme
illegal
under
the
law.
effort
to
sort
out
the
names
of
the
employees
listed,
as
well
as
the
other
data
contained
in
the
list.
For
this
reason
alone,
the
list
deserves
little
or
no
CENTURY
CANNING
VS.
CA
consideration.
As
the
respondents
also
pointed
out,
the
list
itself
contradicts
G.R.
No.
152894.
August
17,
2007
a
lot
of
Atlanta’s
claims
and
allegations,
thus:
it
lists
only
the
names
of
CARPIO,
J.:
inactive
employees;
even
the
names
of
those
the
NLRC
found
to
have
been
employed
by
Atlanta,
like
Costales
and
Almoite,
and
those
who
even
Atlanta
FACTS:
claims
attained
regular
status
on
January
11,
2006,55
do
not
appear
in
the
Century
Canning
Corporation
hired
Gloria
C.
Palad
as
“fish
cleaner”
at
list
when
it
was
supposed
to
account
for
all
employees
“as
of
May
6,
2006.
petitioner’s
tuna
and
sardines
factory.
Palad
signed
an
apprenticeship
We
note
that
the
list
contains
the
names
of
employees
from
1999
to
2004
agreement
with
petitioner
and
received
an
apprentice
allowance
of
P138.75
daily.
The
apprenticeship
program
was
approved
by
TESDA.
2. YES.
A
performance
evaluation
was
conducted,
where
petitioner
gave
Palad
a
The
fact
that
Costales,
Almoite,
Sebolino
and
Sagun
were
already
rendering
rating
of
N.I.
or
“needs
improvement”.
Furthermore,
according
to
the
service
to
the
company
when
they
were
made
to
undergo
apprenticeship
performance
evaluation,
Palad
incurred
numerous
tardiness
and
absences.
renders
the
apprenticeship
agreements
irrelevant
as
far
as
the
four
are
As
a
consequence,
petitioner
issued
a
termination
notice.
concerned.
Palad
then
filed
a
complaint
for
illegal
dismissal,
under-‐payment
of
wages,
Even
if
we
recognize
the
company’s
need
to
train
its
employees
through
and
non-‐payment
of
pro-‐rated
13th
month
pay.
The
Labor
Arbiter
dismissed
apprenticeship,
we
can
only
consider
the
first
apprenticeship
agreement
for
the
complaint
but
ordered
petitioner
to
pay
Palad
her
last
salary
and
her
the
purpose.
With
the
expiration
of
the
first
agreement
and
the
retention
of
pro-‐rated
13th
month
pay.
On
appeal,
the
NLRC
affirmed
with
modification
the
employees,
Atlanta
had,
to
all
intents
and
purposes,
recognized
the
the
LA’s
decision.
completion
of
their
training
and
their
acquisition
of
a
regular
employee
status.
To
foist
upon
them
the
second
apprenticeship
agreement
for
a
Palad
filed
a
special
civil
action
for
certiorari
with
the
CA.
second
skill
which
was
not
even
mentioned
in
the
agreement
itself,
is
a
The
Court
of
Appeals
held
that
the
apprenticeship
agreement
which
Palad
violation
of
the
Labor
Code’s
implementing
rules60
and
is
an
act
manifestly
signed
was
not
valid
and
binding
because
it
was
executed
more
than
two
unfair
to
the
employees,
to
say
the
least.
months
before
the
TESDA
approved
petitioner’s
apprenticeship
program.
It
LMJT
11
LABOR
STANDARDS
CASE
DIGESTS
–
ATTY.
PETER
JOEY
USITA
(2018-‐2019)
also
held
that
petitioner
illegally
dismissed
Palad
and
was
improperly
the
Labor
Code,
an
employment
is
deemed
regular
where
the
employee
apprised
of
the
required
standard
of
performance.
has
been
engaged
to
perform
activities
which
are
usually
necessary
or
desirable
in
the
usual
business
or
trade
of
the
employer.
ISSUES:
1. W/N
Palad
is
an
apprentice?
2. YES
2. W/N
Palad
was
illegally
dismissed?
Petitioner
failed
to
substantiate
its
claim
that
Palad
was
terminated
for
valid
HELD:
reasons.
In
fact,
the
NLRC
found
that
petitioner
failed
to
prove
the
authenticity
of
the
performance
evaluation
which
petitioner
claims
to
have
1. NO.
conducted
on
Palad,
where
Palad
received
a
performance
rating
of
only
27.75%.
Petitioner
merely
relies
on
the
performance
evaluation
to
prove
RA
7796,
which
created
the
TESDA,
has
transferred
the
authority
over
Palad’s
inefficiency.
It
was
likewise
not
shown
that
petitioner
ever
apprised
apprenticeship
programs
from
the
Bureau
of
Local
Employment
of
the
DOLE
Palad
of
the
performance
standards
set
by
the
company.
When
the
alleged
to
the
TESDA.
RA
7796
emphasizes
TESDA’s
approval
of
the
apprenticeship
valid
cause
for
the
termination
of
employment
is
not
clearly
proven,
as
in
program
as
a
pre-‐requisite
for
the
hiring
of
apprentices.
this
case,
the
law
considers
the
matter
a
case
of
illegal
dismissal.
In
this
case,
the
apprenticeship
agreement
was
entered
into
between
the
BERNARDO
VS.
NLRC
parties
before
petitioner
filed
its
apprenticeship
program
with
the
TESDA
for
G.R.
No.
122917.
July
12,
1999
approval.
Petitioner
and
Palad
executed
the
apprenticeship
agreement
on
PANGANIBAN,
J.:
17
July
1997
wherein
it
was
stated
that
the
training
would
start
on
17
July
1997
and
would
end
approximately
in
December
1997.
On
25
July
1997,
SEC
5
-‐
No
disabled
person
shall
be
denied
access
to
opportunities
for
suitable
petitioner
submitted
for
approval
its
apprenticeship
program,
which
the
employment.
A
qualified
disabled
employee
shall
be
subject
to
the
same
terms
and
TESDA
subsequently
approved
on
26
September
1997.
Clearly,
the
conditions
of
employment
and
the
same
compensation,
privileges,
benefits,
fringe
benefits,
incentives
or
allowances
as
a
qualified
able
bodied
person.
(Magna
Carta
apprenticeship
agreement
was
enforced
even
before
the
TESDA
approved
for
Disabled
Persons)
petitioner’s
apprenticeship
program.
Thus,
the
apprenticeship
agreement
is
void
because
it
lacked
prior
approval
from
the
TESDA.
FACTS:
Complainants
numbering
43,
are
deaf-‐mutes
who
were
hired
on
various
The
TESDA’s
approval
of
the
employer’s
apprenticeship
program
is
required
periods
from
1988
to
1993
by
respondent
Far
East
Bank
and
Trust
Co.
as
before
the
employer
is
allowed
to
hire
apprentices.
Prior
approval
from
the
Money
Sorters
and
Counters
through
a
uniformly
worded
agreement
called
TESDA
is
necessary
to
ensure
that
only
employers
in
the
highly
technical
“Employment
Contract
for
Handicapped
Workers”.
industries
may
employ
apprentices
and
only
in
apprentice-‐able
occupations.
Disclaiming
that
complainants
were
regular
employees,
respondent
Far
East
Since
Palad
is
not
considered
an
apprentice
because
the
apprenticeship
Bank
and
Trust
Company
maintained
that
complainants
were
hired
agreement
was
enforced
before
the
TESDA’s
approval
of
petitioner’s
temporarily
under
a
special
employment
arrangement
or
“pakiusap”
which
apprenticeship
program,
Palad
is
deemed
a
regular
employee
performing
resulted
from
overtures
made
by
some
civic
and
political
personalities.
the
job
of
a
“fish
cleaner.”
Clearly,
the
job
of
a
“fish
cleaner”
is
necessary
in
petitioner’s
business
as
a
tuna
and
sardines
factory.
Under
Article
280
of
LMJT
12
LABOR
STANDARDS
CASE
DIGESTS
–
ATTY.
PETER
JOEY
USITA
(2018-‐2019)
The
idea
of
hiring
handicapped
workers
was
acceptable
to
them
only
on
a
As
regular
employees,
they
are
entitled
to
security
of
tenure;
that
is,
their
special
arrangement
basis.
The
task
of
counting
and
sorting
of
bills
which
services
may
be
terminated
only
for
a
just
or
authorized
cause.
Because
were
being
performed
by
tellers
(tasks
that
are
logical
and
natural
part
of
respondent
failed
to
show
such
cause,
these
twenty-‐seven
petitioners
are
tellers'
functions)
have
been
assigned
to
deaf-‐mutes.
Moreover,
the
Bank
deemed
illegally
dismissed
and
therefore
entitled
to
back
wages
and
have
no
separate
items
in
its
plantilla
for
sorters
or
counters
even
from
the
reinstatement
without
loss
of
seniority
rights
and
other
privileges.
beginning,
thus,
the
tellers
themselves
did
the
sorting
and
counting
chores.
As
a
consequence
of
the
'pakiusap'
by
Arturo
Borjal,
the
tellers
were
relieved
2. YES
of
such
tasks
in
favor
of
the
deaf-‐mutes
without
creating
new
positions
in
The
term
limit
in
the
contract
was
premised
on
the
fact
that
the
petitioners
the
Bank,
as
there
is
no
position
in
any
bank
in
the
Philippines
which
deals
were
disabled,
and
that
the
bank
had
to
determine
their
fitness
for
the
with
purely
counting
and
sorting
of
bills
in
banking
operations.
position.
Indeed,
its
validity
is
based
on
Article
80
of
the
Labor
Code.
But
as
noted
earlier,
petitioners
proved
themselves
to
be
qualified
disabled
Complainants
alleged
that
they
were
all
hired
and
later
on
dismissed.
The
persons
who,
under
the
Magna
Carta
for
Disabled
Persons,
are
entitled
to
labor
arbiter
and,
on
appeal,
the
NLRC
ruled
against
the
petitioners.
The
LA
terms
and
conditions
of
employment
enjoyed
by
qualified
able-‐bodied
ruled
that
petitioners
were
not
regular
employees
while
the
NLRC
held
that
individuals;
hence,
Article
80
does
not
apply.
the
Magna
Carta
for
Disabled
Persons
was
not
applicable,
"considering
the
prevailing
circumstances/milieu
of
the
case.
The
noble
objectives
of
Magna
Carta
for
Disabled
Persons
are
not
based
merely
on
charity
or
accommodation,
but
on
justice
and
the
equal
ISSUES:
treatment
of
qualified
persons,
disabled
or
not.
In
the
present
case,
the
1. W/N
petitioners
were
regular
employees?
handicap
of
petitioners
(deaf-‐mutes)
is
not
a
hindrance
to
their
work.
The
2. W/N
the
provisions
of
the
Magna
Carta
for
the
Disabled
(RA
eloquent
proof
of
this
statement
is
the
repeated
renewal
of
their
7277),
on
proscription
against
discrimination
against
disabled
employment
contracts.
Why
then
should
they
be
dismissed,
simply
persons
applicable?
because
they
are
physically
impaired?
The
Court
believes,
that,
after
showing
their
fitness
for
the
work
assigned
to
them,
they
should
be
HELD:
treated
and
granted
the
same
rights
like
any
other
regular
employees.
1. YES.
The
contract
signed
by
petitioners
is
akin
to
a
probationary
employment,
during
which
the
bank
determined
the
employees'
fitness
for
the
job.
When
the
bank
renewed
the
contract
after
the
lapse
of
the
six-‐month
probationary
period,
the
employees
thereby
became
regular
employees.
No
employer
is
allowed
to
determine
indefinitely
the
fitness
of
its
employees.
Without
a
doubt,
the
task
of
counting
and
sorting
bills
is
necessary
and
desirable
to
the
business
of
respondent
bank.
With
the
exception
of
sixteen
of
them,
petitioners
performed
these
tasks
for
more
than
six
months.
Thus,
the
twenty-‐seven
petitioners
should
be
deemed
regular
employees
LMJT
13