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RULE 110 - PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES

A. Institution of Criminal Actions (Sec. 1)


- how is criminal action instituted
- when is it deemed instituted
- who is qualified to institute it: a) by complaint, de parte
b) by information, de oficio
Read: Jimenez vs. Sorongon, 687 SCRA 151
B. Sufficiency of Complaint or Information (Sec. 6)
- name of the accused
- name of offended party
- name of offense
- cause of accusation: qualifying and aggravating circumstances
- place of commission
- date of commission
Read: People vs. Valdez, 663 SCRA 272
Miguel vs. Sandiganbayan, 675 SCRA 560
People vs. Soria, 685 SCRA 483
C. Amendment vs. Substitution (Sec. 14)
- distinguish
- compare with rule 10
D. Place where action is to be instituted (Sec. 15)
- venue is jurisdictional in criminal cases
Read: Union Bank vs. People, 667 SCRA 113
E. Intervention of the offended party (Sec. 16); compare with rule 19
Desengano

DANTE LA. JIMENEZ, vs. HON. EDWIN SORONGON


G.R. No. 178607 December 5, 2012
Remedial Law; Parties; Every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest,
who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or by the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
-It is well-settled that "every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest[,]" "who
stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or by the party entitled to the avails of the suit." Interest
means material interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from
mere interest in the question involved. By real interest is meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished from mere
expectancy, or a future, contingent, subordinate or consequential interest. When the plaintiff or the defendant is not a real
party in interest, the suit is dismissible.

Same; Criminal procedure; Parties; Prosecutors; Office of the Solicitor General; All criminal actions commenced
by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of a public prosecutor. In
appeals of criminal cases before the Court of appeals and before this Court, the Office of the Solicitor General is
the appellate counsel of the People; The People is the real party in interest in a criminal case and only the Office
of the Solicitor General can represent the People in criminal proceedings pending in the Court of Appeals or in
the Supreme Court. -Procedural law basically mandates that "[a]ll criminal actions commenced by complaint or by
information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of a public prosecutor." In appeals of criminal cases before
the CA and before this Court, the OSG is the appellate counsel of the People, pursuant to section35(1), Chapter 12, Title
III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code. This section explicitly provides: SEC. 35. Powers and Functions. -The Office
of the Solicitor General shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its
officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matters requiring the services of lawyers.... It shall have
the following specific powers and functions: (1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals in all criminal proceedings; represent the Government and its officers in the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which the Government or any
officer thereof in his official capacity is a party. The People is the real party in interest in a criminal case and only the OSG
can represent the People in criminal proceedings pending the CA or in this Court. This ruling has been repeatedly
stressed in several cases and continues to be the controlling doctrine.

Facts
The Unlad Shipping & Management Corporation represented by Jimenez filed a complaint with the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City against Tsakos Maritime Services, Inc. (TMSI) represented by its incorporators,
Socrates Antzoulatos, Carmen Alamil, Marceli Gaza, and Markos Avgoustis. The complaint is regarding the illegal
recruitment of the latter by syndicated and in a large scale. The petitioner alleged that the respondents falsely represented
their stockholdings in TMSI’s articles of incorporation to secure a license to operate as a recruitment agency from the
Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA). Respondents filed their counter-affidavit denying the allegations. The
3rd Assistant City Prosecutor recommended the filing of an information and the City Prosecutor approved his
recommendation and filed the corresponding criminal information with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaluyong
City presided by Judge Rizalina T. Capco-Umali. Subsequently the City Prosecutor in its Resolution to withdraw the
information. Such was denied by the RTC since they found a probable cause to file action. Respondent filed an omnibus
(or a joint) motion for reconsideration and deferred enforcement of warrant of arrest which was denied by the RTC. Alamil
filed a motion for judicial determination of probable cause with a request to defer enforcement of the warrants of arrest.
RTC denied ruled that it had already found probable cause. The case was later re-raffled to Branch 214, presided by
Judge Edwin D. Sorongon. RTC granted respondent Alamil’s motion for reconsideration which was affirmed by the Court
of Appeals.
Issue
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the RTC that Jimenez lack legal personality
to file the petition on behalf of the People of the Philippines.
Held
No. Because it was settled that the People is the real party in interest in a criminal case and only the Office of the
Solicitor General can represent the People in criminal proceedings pending in the Court of Appeals or in the Supreme
Court. For criminal proceedings, private persons who are allowed to intervene are those persons who in effect incurred
damages from such criminal act. In the case at bar, the petitioner was not a party which was directly damaged. The
petitioner has no legal personality to assail the dismissal of the criminal case since the main issue raised by the petitioner
involved the criminal aspect of the case, The petitioner did not appeal to protect his alleged pecuniary interest as an
offended party of the crime, in the case, is the existence of probable cause but to cause the reinstatement of the criminal
action against the respondents. This involves the right to prosecute which pertains exclusively to the People, as
represented by the OSG.

Briñez
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PO2 EDUARDO VALDEZ and EDWIN VALDEZ
G.R. No. 175602 January 18, 2012
Criminal Procedure; Information; Pleadings and Practice; The real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the
caption or preamble of the information, or from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated,
which are mere conclusion of law, but by the actual recital of the facts in the complaint or information.- The real nature of
the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the information, or from the specification of the
provision of law alleged to have been violated, which are mere conclusion of law, but by the actual recital of the facts in
the complaint or information. In People v. Dimaano, 469 SCRA 647 (2005), the Court elaborated: For complaint or
information to be sufficient, it must state the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the
acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the
commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed. What is controlling is not the title of the
complaint, nor the designation of the offense charged or the particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these being
mere conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and the particular facts therein
recited. The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common
understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. No
information for a crime will be sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege the elements of the crime charged.
Every element of the offense must be stated in the information. What facts and circumstances are necessary to
be included therein must be determined by reference to the definitions and essentials of the specified crimes.
The requirement of alleging the elements of a crime in the information is to inform the accused of the nature of
the accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably prepare his defense. The presumption is that the
accused has no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.

Facts
The accused were tried for and convicted of three counts of murder on 2005 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
Quezon City. Co-accused Edwin withdrew from the appeal, leaving Eduardo as the sole accused in the resolution of the
appealed case. Accused herein seek acquittal. According to the State’s evidence of guilt, they averred that sometime in
March 2000, in one evening, Estrella Sayson, (Estrella) was at the canteen (which also includes a jai alaibetting station) in
Quezon City. Estrella was preparing for the celebration of the birthday of her second husband. Estrella’s son, the
deceased Moises, a former policeman, and his wife, Susan owned the said canteen and managed the betting station. At
about 9:00 o’clock in the evening, Estrella’s other sons Joselito and Ferdinand arrived at the canteen to greet their
stepfather. At about 10:00 o’clock in the evening, the celebration was interrupted with the arrival of Eduardo and Edwin,
who alighted from a motorcycle in front of the jai alai fronton. Accused asked the teller (Jonathan), while attending to
other customers, to come out. Moises, however, approached the accused and tried to pacify them. Estrella prevented
Moises not to go near the accused since she saw the latter armed with guns. Despite this, Moises proceeded and advised
the accused not to force Jonathan to go out of the fronton. Estrella then heard one of the accused-appellants threaten
Moises with the words “Gusto mo unahin na kita?” Moises replied “huwag.” Successive shots were thereafter heard,
leaving Moises dead. Ferdinand approached to help his brother but was then shot, even Joselito was shot, hitting his back
while running. The accused version of the story had been different but was not given merit by the lower court. The
information filed by the State includes conspiracy and treachery which qualifies the crime to murder. On appeal, accused
assails among others that the the State did not establish the qualifying circumstance of treachery as alleged in the
information.
Issue
Whether or not the information sufficiently alleged the attendance of treachery to convict the accused of three
counts of murder.
Held
No. The Court pronounced PO2 Valdez guilty of three homicides, instead of three murders, on account of the
informations not sufficiently alleging the attendance of treachery. However, it affirmed the CA’s decision on the credibility
of the witnesses and the presence of conspiracy between the two accused as proved in the facts alleged. Nevertheless,
the Court noted that treachery encompasses a wide variety of actions and attendant circumstances, the appreciation of
which is particular to a crime committed. Such variety generates the actual need for the State to specifically aver the
factual circumstances or particular acts that constitute the criminal conduct or that qualify or aggravate the liability for the
crime in the interest of affording the accused sufficient notice to defend himself. Further the Court laid down its decision in
People vs. Dimaano that “No information for a crime will be sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege the
elements of the crime charged. Every element of the offense must be stated in the information. “ Also, the Court ruled
that “The averments of the informations to the effect that the two accused “with intent to kill, qualified with treachery,
evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength did xxx assault, attack and employ personal violence upon” the
victims “by then and there shooting them with a gun, hitting them” on various parts of their bodies “which werethe direct
and immediate cause of their deaths” did not sufficiently set forth the facts and circumstances describing how treachery
attended each of the killings. It should not be difficult to see that merely averring the killing of a person by shooting him
with a gun, without more, did not show how the execution of the crime was directly and specially ensured without risk to
the accused from the defense that the victim might make. Indeed, the use of the gun as an instrument to kill was not per
se treachery, for there are other instruments that could serve the same lethal purpose. Nor did the use of the
term treachery constitute a sufficient averment, for that term, standing alone, was nothing but a conclusion of law, not an
averment of a fact. In short, the particular acts and circumstances constituting treachery as an attendant circumstance in
murder were missing from the informations.” The allegations in the information are controlling in the ultimate analysis.
Thus, when there is a variance between the offense charged in the information and that proved, and the offense as
charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved
included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged included in the offense proved.
Dizon

FERNANDO Q. MIGUEL vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN


G.R. No. 172035 July 4, 2012

Criminal Procedure; Information; Section 6, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (Rules) requires, inter
alia, that the information shall state the designation of the offense given by the statute and the acts or omissions imputed
which constitute the offense charge. –

In deference to the constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the nature and the cause of the accusation
against him, Section 6, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (Rules) requires, inter alia, that the
information shall state the designation of the offense given by the statute and the acts or omissions imputed which
constitute the offense charged. Additionally, the Rules requires that these acts or omissions and its attendant
circumstances "must be stated in ordinary and concise language" and "in terms sufficient to enable a person of common
understanding to know what offense is being charged x x x and for the court to pronounce judgment."

Same; Same; Same; The test of the information’s sufficiency is whether the crime is described in intelligible terms and
with such particularity with reasonable certainty so that the accused is duly informed of the offense charged. –

The test of the information’s sufficiency is whether the crime is described in intelligible terms and with such
particularity with reasonable certainty so that the accused is duly informed of the offense charged. In particular, whether
an information validly charges an offense depends on whether the material facts alleged in the complaint or information
shall establish the essential elements of the offense charged as defined in the law. The raison d’etre of the requirement in
the Rules is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense.

Same; Suspension; The suspension requires a prior hearing to determine "the validity of the information" filed against him,
"taking into account the serious and far reaching consequences of a suspension of an elective public official even before
his conviction." –

While the suspension of a public officer under this provision is mandatory, the suspension requires a prior hearing to
determine "the validity of the information" filed against him, "taking into account the serious and far reaching
consequences of a suspension of an elective public official even before his conviction." The accused public official’s right
to challenge the validity of the information before a suspension order may be issued includes the right to challenge the (i)
validity of the criminal proceeding leading to the filing of an information against him, and (ii) propriety of his prosecution on
the ground that the acts charged do not constitute a violation of R.A. No. 3019 or of the provisions on bribery of the
Revised Penal Code.

Same; Pre-Suspension Hearing; While a pre-suspension hearing is aimed at securing for the accused fair and adequate
opportunity to challenge the validity of the information or the regularity of the proceedings against him, no hard and fast
rule exists in regulating its conduct. –

While a pre-suspension hearing is aimed at securing for the accused fair and adequate opportunity to challenge the
validity of the information or the regularity of the proceedings against him, Luciano likewise emphasizes that no hard and
fast rule exists in regulating its conduct. With the purpose of a pre-suspension hearing in mind, the absence of an actual
hearing alone cannot be determinative of the validity of a suspension order.

Same; Right to be Heard; It is well settled that "to be heard" does not only mean oral arguments in court; one may be
heard also through pleadings. –

Since a pre-suspension hearing is basically a due process requirement, when an accused public official is given an
adequate opportunity to be heard on his possible defenses against the mandatory suspension under R.A. No. 3019, then
an accused would have no reason to complain that no actual hearing was conducted. It is well settled that "to be heard"
does not only mean oral arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard,
either through oral arguments or pleadings, has been accorded, no denial of procedural due process exists.
Facts
A letter-complaint was filed with the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao charging the petitioner, among others,
with violation of R.A. No. 3019, in connection with the consultancy services for the architectural aspect, the engineering
design, and the construction supervision and management of the proposed Koronadal City public market.
The Ombudsman found probable cause against the petitioner and some private individuals for violation of R.A.
No. 3019 and against the petitioner alone for Falsification of Public Document under Article 171, par. 4 of the Revised
Penal Code.
The Ombudsman filed the corresponding informations with the Sandiganbayan.
The petitioner failed to file his counter-affidavit despite multiple extension period asked and given which cause to
declare that he waived his right to submit countervailing evidence.
Prosecutor Ruiz asked the Sandiganbayan for the arraignment and trial of the petitioner and of the other accused
private individuals.
The petitioner filed a Motion to Quash and/or Reinvestigation for the criminal cases against him. The
Sandiganbayan denied the petitioner’s motion.
The petitioner was arraigned; he pleaded not guilty in both criminal cases.
The petitioner filed his "Vigorous Opposition" based on the "obvious and fatal defect of the information" in failing
to allege that the giving of unwarranted benefits and advantages was done through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or
gross inexcusable negligence.
The Sandiganbayan promulgated the assailed resolution suspending the petitioner pendente lite.
The petitioner moved for reconsideration of his suspension order and demanded for a pre-suspension hearing.
The Sandiganbayan denied his motion, prompting him to file this certiorari petition to challenge the validity of his
suspension order.
Issue
Whether or not the information, charging the petitioner with violation of R.A. No. 3019, is valid.
Held
The information for violation of R.A. No. 3019 is valid.
Section 6, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (Rules) requires, inter alia, that the information
shall state the designation of the offense given by the statute and the acts or omissions imputed which constitute the
offense charged.
The test of the information’s sufficiency is whether the crime is described in intelligible terms and with such
particularity with reasonable certainty so that the accused is duly informed of the offense charged.
In arguing against the validity of the information, the petitioner appears to go beyond the standard of a "person of
common understanding" in appreciating the import of the phrase "acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality." A
reading of the information clearly reveals that the phrase "acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality" was merely
a continuation of the prior allegation of the acts of the petitioner, and that he ultimately acted with evident bad faith and
manifest partiality in giving unwarranted benefits and advantages to his co-accused private individuals. This is what a
plain and non-legalistic reading of the information would yield.
Notably, in his petition, the petitioner would have us believe that this elemental phrase was actually omitted in the
information when, in his reaction to the OSP’s comment, what the petitioner actually disputes is simply the clarity of the
phrase’s position, in relation with the other averments in the information. Given the supposed ambiguity of the subject
being qualified by the phrase "acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality," the remedy of the petitioner, if at all, is
merely to move for a bill of particulars and not for the quashal of an information which sufficiently alleges the elements of
the offense charged.
Corpuz
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. BENJAMIN SORIA
G.R. No. 179031, November 14, 2012

"[W]here an offense may be committed in any of the different modes and the offense is alleged to have been committed in
two or more modes specified, the indictment is sufficient, notwithstanding the fact that the different means of committing
the same offense are prohibited by separate sections of the statute. The allegation in the information of the various ways
of committing the offense should be regarded as a description of only one offense and the information is not thereby
rendered defective on the ground of multifariousness."
Facts

According to the prosecution, Appellant Benjamin Soria, father of AAA, brought home merienda. After eating, AAA went to
the bedroom to rest. Appellant also entered the room and positioned himself on top of AAA, took off her clothes and
inserted his penis into her vagina. AAA felt intense pain from her breast down to her vagina and thus told her father that it
was painful. At that point, appellant apologized to his daughter, stood up, and left the room. The whole incident was
witnessed by AAA's brother, BBB. The pain persisted until AAA's vagina started to bleed. She was brought to the hospital
for treatment. AAA was taken into the custody of the DSWD. On the other hand, according to the defense, appellant
admitted that he was at home on the day and time of AAA's alleged rape but denied committing the same. He claimed that
the filing of the rape case against him was instigated by his wife, whom he confronted about her illicit affair with a man
residing in their community. According to appellant, he could not have molested AAA because he treated her well. AAA
was examined, which yielded to the result that the subject is in virgin state physically, and that there are no external signs
of any form of physical trauma. Appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.

Issue

Whether or not the allegations that caused ambiguity invalidate the Information or result in the automatic dismissal of the
case.

Held

No. The Information in this case did not specify with certainty whether appellant committed the rape through sexual
intercourse under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A, or rape by sexual assault as described in paragraph 2 thereof. The
Information stated that appellant inserted his penis into the genital of AAA, which constituted rape by sexual intercourse
under the first paragraph of Article 266-A. At the same time, the Information alleged that appellant used force and
intimidation to commit an act of sexual assault. While these allegations cause ambiguity, they only pertain to the mode or
manner of how the rape was committed and the same do not invalidate the Information or result in the automatic dismissal
of the case. Where an offense may be committed in any of the different modes and the offense is alleged to have been
committed in two or more modes specified, the indictment is sufficient, notwithstanding the fact that the different means of
committing the same offense are prohibited by separate sections of the statute. The allegation in the information of the
various ways of committing the offense should be regarded as a description of only one offense and the information is not
thereby rendered defective on the ground of multifariousness. Any objection from the appellant with respect to the
Information is held to have been waived failing any effort to oppose the same before trial. He therefore can be convicted
of rape through sexual intercourse or rape by sexual assault, depending on the evidence adduced during trial.

Enriquez
UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 192565. February 28, 2012
Facts
Union bank filed two complaints for sum of money with prayer for a writ of replevin against spouses Eddie and Eliza
Tamondong and a John Doe. The first complaint was filed before the RTC, Branch 109, Pasay City on April 13, 1998. The
second complaint was filed on March 15, 2000 and was raffled in the MeTC, Branch 47, Pasay City.
In both cases, Desi Tomas executed and signed the Certification against Forum Shopping. Then, she was charged
of deliberately violating Article 183 of the RPC (perjury) "by falsely declaring under oath in the Certificate against Forum
Shopping in the second complaint that she did not commence any other action or proceeding involving the same issue in
another tribunal or agency". The Certification was notarized in Makati City but was submitted and used in Pasay City,
while the Information against Union Bank and Tomas was filed in Makati.
Tomas filed a Motion to Quash on the grounds that the venue was improperly laid and that the facts do not
constitute an offense. On the first ground, Tomas argued that since it is the Pasay City Court where the Certificate was
submitted and used, it should have the jurisdiction over the case against her. The MeTC-Makati City denied the Motion to
Quash, ruling that it has jurisdiction over the case since the Certificate was notarized there and the allegations in the
Information sufficiently charged Tomas with perjury. Her subsequent Motion for Reconsideration was denied.
When the case was elevated to the RTC-Makati City, the petitioners prayed that the ruling of the MeTC-Makati
City be annulled and set aside on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. They also cited the rulings in US vs. Canet and
Ilusorio v. Bildner which state that "venue and jurisdiction should be in the place where the false document was
presented".
The petition, however, was found to have no merit as a recent jurisprudence, Sy Tiong Shiou v. Sy. In the Sy Tiong
Shiou case, the high court ruled that the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality where
the perjury was committed, or where any of its essential ingredients occured. The petitioners then filed this petition to the
Supreme Court to address the seeming conflict between the rulings in Illusorio v. Bildner and Sy Tiong Shiou v. Sy.
Issue
Where is the proper venue of perjury under Art. 183 of the RPC - the place, where the Certificate against Forum Shopping
was notarized or where the Certification was presented to the trial court?

Held
The place where the Certificate was notarized, the MeTC-Makati City, is the proper venue for the criminal action.
The criminal act charged was for the execution of an affidavit that contained a falsity. Art. 183 of the RPC is the
applicable provision for this case; and following so, the jurisdiction and venue should be determined on the basis of this
article which penalizes one who makes an affidavit upon any material matter before a competent person authorized to
administer an oath in cases in which the law so requires. The constitutive act of the offense is the making of an affidavit,
so, the criminal act is consummated when the statement containing a falsity is subscribed and sworn before a duly
authorized person.'
The SC finds the ruling in Sy Tiong as more in accord with Art. 183 of the RPC. The Court ruled that the crime of
perjury committed through the making of a false affidavit under Art. 183 of the RPC is committed at the time the affiant
subscribes and swears to his or her affidavit since it is at that time that all the elements of the crime of perjury are
executed. When the crime is committed through false testimony under oath in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor
civil, venue is at the place where the testimony under oath is given.
If in lieu of or as supplement to the actual testimony made in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil, a written
sown statement is submitted, venue may either be at the place where the sworn statement is submitted or where the oath
was taken as the taking of the oath and the submission are both material ingredients of the crime committed. In all cases,
the determination of venue shall be based on the acts alleged in the Information to be constitutive of the crime committed.

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