Cases 011419

Administrative Law 1
INTRODUCTION
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW is that branch of public law which fixes the organization of
the government and determines the competence of administrative authorities who
execute the law and makes available to the individual relief against administrative
action.
It is also that branch of public law dealing with the doctrines and principles
governing the powers and procedures of administrative agencies including
especially judicial review of administrative action.
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY refers to any governmental authority other than a

court or legislative body performing rule-making or adjudicatory functions.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW vs. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW prescribes the permanent framework of the system of

government and supplies the general plan of governmental organization;
whereas
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW carries into effect the general plan of governmental
organization as prescribed by the Constitution.
2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW prescribes the limitations on the exercise of governmental

powers so as to protect the rights of individuals against abuse of such powers;
whereas
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW provides for the relief to the individuals should there be
violations of their rights by official government action.
3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW stresses on the rights of citizens; whereas

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW gives stress on their duties to the government.
ADMINISTRATIVE BODY vs. COURT
1. An ADMINISTRATIVE BODY is composed of persons or individuals who are

considered experts in their particular fields; whereas
a COURT is a tribunal manned by persons who are learned in the field of law,
imparted and removed from the passing pressure of politics.
2. An ADMINISTRATIVE BODY has variety of functions; whereas

a COURT has only judicial function.
3. An ADMINISTRATIVE BODY is given a wider discretion in the exercise of its power

since it is not bound by the rigid technicalities as prescribed upon a court;
whereas
a COURT has to observe the principles and rules embodied in the Rules of Court.
TEST TO DETERMINE WHETHER A BODY/AGENCY IS ADMINISTRATIVE OR

JUDICIAL
Administrative → if its function is primarily regulatory even if it conducts hearings

and determines controversy to carry out its regulatory duty.
Judicial → if its primary duty is to decide legal rights between private parties
affecting their property or liberty.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
 The purpose of Administrative Law is the protection of the rights of the

individuals.
 Its subject matter is the nature and mode of powers exercised by
administrative bodies and their officers.
 It has for its basic functions the effective and efficient operation of the
government machinery.
 It originated from legislation and from the recognition of the legislature that it
cannot, on its own, cope with the various activities of men as they become
more progressive. Thus, having realized that the legislature and the courts
cannot adequately answer the needs of its citizens, the government created a
mechanism, an administrative agency or body, to cater the needs of the
individuals. For such reason, administrative agencies are also called the 4 th
branch of the government.
In almost every human activity, the government created administrative

agencies to regulate such undertaking.
BAR QUESTION: What are the types of administrative bodies or agencies?
They are the following:
1) Administrative agencies created to carry on governmental functions (BIR, BoC,

CSC, LRA)
2) Administrative agencies created to perform business services for the public
(Philippine Postal Authority, PNR, NFA, NHA)
3) Administrative agencies created to regulate businesses affected with public
interest (NTC, LTFRB, Insurance Commission, ERB, HLURB, Bureau of Mines and
Geosciences)
4) Administrative agencies created to regulate private businesses and individuals
under police power (SEC, Dangerous Drug Board, CID, PRC)
5) Administrative agencies that adjudicate and decide industrial controversies
(NLRC, POEA)
6) Administrative agencies that grant privileges (GSIS, SSS,PAO, Philippine Veterans
Administration)
7) Administrative agencies making the government a private party (COA)
8) Administrative agencies doing business activities (PAGCOR, PCSO)
SOURCES OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
1. Constitutional or statutory enactments creating administrative bodies.

2. Decisions of courts interpreting the charters of administrative bodies and defining
their powers, rights, inhibitions, among others, and the effects of their
determinations and regulations.
3. Rules and regulations issued by the administrative bodies in pursuance of the
purposes for which they were created.
4. Determinations and orders of the administrative bodies in the settlement of
controversies arising in their respective fields.
GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (GRP) vs. NATIONAL

GOVERNMENT
The Government of the Republic of the Philippines refers to the corporate

government entity through which the functions of the government throughout the
Philippines, including, save as the contrary appears from the context, the various
arms through which the political authority is made effective in the Philippines,
whether pertaining to the central government or to the provincial, city, municipal or
barangay subdivisions or other forms of local government.” (Sec 2(1) AC 1987)
On the other hand, National Government refers only to the central

government, consisting of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the
government, as distinguished from local governments and other governmental
entities.
National Government is definitely a part of the government of the Republic of

the Philippines but this refers to the entire machinery of the central government
namely executive, legislative and judicial branches of the government.
Bacani vs. National Coconut Corporation

100 S 468
Facts: Plaintiffs are court stenographers assigned in a case Sycip v. National

Coconut Corporation (NCC). Counsel for NCC requested said stenographers for
copies of the transcript of stenographic notes taken by them during the hearing.
Plaintiffs complied with the request by delivering to the counsel the needed
transcript. NCC paid for the said transcript at the rate of P1 per page. Upon
inspecting the books of this corporation, the Auditor General disallowed the
payment of these fees and sought the recovery of the amounts paid.
Defendants set up the defense that the NCC is a government entity within the
purview of Sec 2 of the Revised Admin Code of 1917 and, hence, it is exempt from
paying the stenographers’ fees under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
Under Sec. 16, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the Government of the Republic of
the Philippines is exempt from paying the legal fees provided for therein, and
among these fees are those which stenographers may charge for the transcript of
notes taken by them that may be requested by any interested person.
Issue: Whether or not the NCC may be considered as included in the term
“Government of the Republic of the Philippines” for purposes of the exemption of
the legal fees provided for in Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
Held: Government of the Republic of the Philippines refers to that

government entity through which the functions of the government are exercised as
an attribute of sovereignty, and in this are included those arms through which the
political authority is made effective whether they be provincial, municipal or other
form of local government. These are what we call municipal corporations.
They do not include entities which are to be given corporate personality

separate and distinct from the government and which are governed by the
Corporation Law, such as the National Coconut Corporation. Their powers, duties
and liabilities have to be determined in the light of that law and of their corporate
charters.
It is true that in Sec. 8, Rule 130, stenographers may only charge as fees
P0.30 for each page of the transcript of not less than 200 words before the appeal is
taken and P0.15 for each page after the filing of the appeal, but where, as in the
case at bar, the party has agreed and in fact has paid P1 per page for the services
rendered by the stenographers and has not raised any objections to the amount
pain until its proprietary was disputed by the Auditor General, the payment of the
fees become contractual and as such is valid even if it goes beyond the limit
prescribed by the court.
Central Bank vs. CA

63 SCRA 431
FACTS: Central Bank of the Philippines assailed the decision of the CA which
sentenced it to pay respondent Ablaza Construction and Finance Corporation
damages for breach of contract in that after having formally and officially awarded,
pursuant to the results of the usual bidding, to Ablaza in December 1965 the
"contract" for the construction of its San Fernando, La Union branch building and
allowed said contractor to commence the work up to about May, 1966, albeit
without any written formal contract having been executed, the Bank failed and
refused to proceed with the project, unless the plans were revised and a lower price
were agreed to by Ablaza, the Bank claiming that its action was pursuant to the
policy of fiscal restraint announced by the then new President of the Philippines on
December 30, 1965 and Memorandum Circular No. 1 dated December 31, 1965 of
the same President.
CB contends that there could be no perfected contract in this case because there is
no showing of compliance with the requirement that there must be a certification of
the availability of funds by the Auditor General pursuant to Section 607 of the
Revised Administrative Code which provides:
“Except in the case of a contract for personal service or for supplies to be carried in
stock, no contract involving an expenditure by the National Government of three
thousand pesos or more shall be entered into or authorized until the Auditor General
shall have certified to the officer entering into such obligation that funds have been
duly appropriated for such purpose and that the amount necessary to cover the
proposed contract is available for expenditure on account thereof.”
ISSUE: Whether or not Central Bank is part of the National Government?
HELD: NO.
SC: It is our considered view that contracts entered into by petitioner Central bank
are not within the contemplation of Sections 607 and 608 cited by it. Section 607
specifically refers to "expenditure of the National Government" and that the tern
Natl. govt. may not be deemed to include the CB.
To be sure, the CB is a government instrumentality. But it was created as an

autonomous body under RA 265, "to administer the monetary and banking system
of the republic".
It does not depend on the National Government for the financing of its
operations; it. is the national Government that occasionally, resorts to-it for the
needed budgetary accommodations. Under Section 14 of the Bank's Charter, the
Monetary Board may authorize such expenditures by the CB as are in the interest of
the effective administration and operation of the bank. Its prerogative to incur such
liabilities and expenditures is not subject to any prerequisite found in any stature or
regulation not expressly applicable to it. Relevant to the issue in this case, it is not
subject, like the Social Security Commission, to section 1901 and related provisions
of the Revised Administrative Code, which require national government,
construction to be done by or under the supervision of the Bureau of Public Works.
For these reasons, the provisions of the RAC invoked by the bank do not apply to it.
To our knowledge, in no other instance has' the Bank considered itself subject
thereto.
Note: Under the Oct. 9, 1989 Minute Resolution, the University of the Philippines
does not fall within the term Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP)
IRON AND STEEL AUTHORITY (ISA) vs. CA

249 SCRA 539
FACTS: ISA was created in order, generally, to develop and promote the iron and
steel industry in the Philippines. P.D. No. 272 initially created petitioner ISA for a
term of 5 years counting from 9 August 1973. When ISA's original term expired on
10 October 1978, its term was extended for another 10 years by Executive Order
No. 555 dated 31 August 1979. It institutes expropriation proceedings covering the
properties of Maria Kristina Fertilizers, but while the case was pending, the statutory
term of ISA expired, so GRP substituted it.
ISSUE: Whether or not ISA may be properly substituted by the GRP?
HELD: Yes.
SC: ISA is a non-incorporated authority, thus GRP could substitute.

The Iron and Steel Authority (ISA) is a non-incorporated agency or instrumentality of
the Republic of the Philippines, or more precisely of the Government of the Republic
of the Philippines. When the statutory term of a non-incorporated agency expires,
the powers duties and functions as well as the assets and liabilities of that agency
revert back to and are reassumed by, the Republic of the Philippines, in the absence
of special provisions of law specifying some other disposition thereof.
 For incorporated agencies, GRP may not substitute because they have an
independent personality.
FONTANILLA vs. MALIAMAN

194 SCRA 486
FACTS: The Supreme Court ruled in one case that the National Irrigation
Administration (NIA) is a government agency performing primarily proprietary
function and therefore, is liable for the tortuous act of its driver, Hugo Garcia.
This is a motion for reconsideration where NIA, through the Solicitor General
maintains that it is a governmental agency performing governmental function and
thus, it should not be held liable for the tortuous act of its driver who is its special
agent.
ISSUE: Whether or not NIA is a part of the "Government of the Philippines'"?
HELD: The Supreme Court held that while it is true that NIA is a service agency of
the government aimed at promoting public interest and public welfare, such fact
does not make it essentially and purely a governmental functioning corporation. NIA
was created for 'the purpose of "constructing, improving, rehabilitating, and
administering all national irrigation systems in the Philippines, including all
communal and pump irrigation projects." Certainly, the state and the community as
a whole are largely benefited by the services the agency renders, but these
functions are only incidental to the principal aim of the agency.
Furthermore, the NIA is a government agency with a juridical personality,

separate and distinct from the government. It is not a mere agency of the
government and hence, it is not part of the Government of the Philippines because
it is a corporate body performing proprietary functions. Therefore, it may be held
liable for the damages caused by the negligent act of its driver who is not its special
agent.
Philosophy at work
“Philosophy may not give you a living but it makes your life worth living.”
DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION
Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts cannot and will not
determine a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an
administrative tribunal, especially where the question demands the exercise of
sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and
services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters
of fact and where a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the purposes of
the regulatory statute which is to be administered.
The doctrine applies where a claim is originally cognizable in courts, and

comes into play whenever enforcement of a claim requires the resolution of issues
which, under a regulatory scheme have been placed within the special competence
of an administrative body; in such case, the judicial process is suspended pending
referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view.
The purpose of the doctrine is not only to give the administrative agency the
opportunity to decide the controversy by itself correctly, but also to prevent
unnecessary and premature resort to courts.
Ex: exercise of power of the Bureau of Immigration. The Bureau may even look into
the issue of citizenship as an incident thereto.
Board of Commissioners of the Commission on Immigration and

Deportation (BoC) vs. dela Rosa
May 31, 1991
Facts: The Bureau of Immigration recognized Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather

of William Gatchalian, as a natural born Filipino citizen. The latter .was also admitted
as a Filipino citizen. The new Board of Commissioners however reversed the Board
of Special Inquiry’s decision and ordered the exclusion of William Gatchalian as a
Filipino citizen. William filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with injunction
before the RTC Manila presided by Judge De La Rosa. Petitioners filed a Motion to
Dismiss alleging that respondent Judge has no jurisdiction over the Board of
Commissioners and/or Board of Special Inquiry.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court is competent to take cognizance of the case?
Held: The court is not empowered to look into this question: whether or not a
person is an alleged alien. This is within the competence of the BOI. The Bureau of
Immigration has the exclusive authority to hear and try cases involving alleged
aliens, and in the process, determine also their citizenship.
The Primary Jurisdiction of the Bureau of Immigration over deportation

proceedings admits of an exemption, i.e. judicial intervention may be resorted to in
cases where the claim of citizenship is so substantial that there are reasonable
grounds to believe that the claim is correct. The Bureau of Immigration is not of
equal rank as the RTC, hence its decisions may be appealed to, and may be
reviewed through a special civil action for certiorari by the RTC.
Qualitrans Limousine Service, Inc. v. Royal Class Limousine Service

179 SCRA 569
FACTS: The Land Transportation Commission (LTC) rendered a decision granting

Qualitrans a Certificate of Public Convenience to operate a garage (tourist) air
conditioned service within the City of Manila and from said place to any point in
Luzon and vice versa. Meanwhile, an order was issued by the LTC granting a
provisional permit in favor of private respondent on the same routes as that of the
petitioner.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration before the LTC to correct the
route. It also filed a case before the RTC, which was denied. The Court of-Appeals
dismissed petitioner's petitions and directed it to respect the issuance of a
Certificate of Public Convenience in favor of respondents.
ISSUE: Whether or not the LTC has jurisdiction over the case?
HELD: Yes. Applying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the LTC has the power to
look into the controversy notwithstanding the fact that it is a petition for declaratory
relief. What is important is not the nomenclature or the name attached by the
parties to their pleadings, but what the petition alleges.
Actually, the petition although named as “petition for declaratory relief”, is a

petition to declare the rights given by the LTC to the Royal Class. The LTC has the
power to modify, revise or set aside the CPC by applying the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction.
Moreover, the LTC as well as most of the administrative bodies are now
empowered to award damages pursuant to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
Marina Properties Corp. v. CA and HL Carlos Construction

294 S 273
FACTS: Petitioner Marina is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of real

estate development. Among its projects was Marina Bay Homes Condo Project with
respondent HL Carlos Construction as principal contractor, particularly of Phase 3.
As an incentive to complete the construction, Marina allowed Carlos to purchase a
condo unit and they entered into a Contract to Purchase and Sell. But after paying
more than half, Petitioner refused for the delivery of said unit which prompted
respondent to file 2 cases:
1. Collection for a sum of money corresponding to unpaid billings from their

construction contract before the RTC.
2. Complaint for specific performance with damages for Marina’s unilateral
cancellation of their contract to buy and to sell a condominium unit before the
HLURB.
Marina alleged that the case before the HLRUB should be dismissed on the ground
of litis pendentia and forum shopping.
ISSUE # 1.: Whether or not the filling of the two cases at the same time is proper?
HELD : It is proper because the 2 cases involved 2 different issues and causes of
action.:
1. arising from unpaid billings of Marina
2. arising from Marina’s unilateral cancellation of their contract.
ISSUE #2: Whether or not private respondent was guilty of forum shopping?
HELD: NO. Private respondent was not guilty of forum shopping when it sued
Marina before the HLURB. Forum Shopping is the act of a party against whom an
adverse judgment has been rendered in one forum and seeks another opinion in
another forum. They are grounded on the same cause of action on the supposition
that one or the other might look with favor upon the party.
There was hardly a duplication of the civil case filed to collect a sum of money
corresponding to unpaid billings from their construction contract from that before
the HLURB.
Arranza v. BF Homes
333 SCRA 800
FACTS: Petitioners filed a case against BF Homes, Inc. for specific performance to
enforce their rights as purchasers of subdivision lots as regards their rights of way,
open spaces, roads and security with the HLURB. BF Homes was then under
receivership – It claims that under PD No. 902- A, SEC has jurisdiction over the case
because it involves action for claims against BF Homes, which is under receivership.
ISSUE: Which body has jurisdiction over the case?
HELD: The HLURB has jurisdiction over the case which involves specific
performance against a subdivision developer filed by a purchaser of subdivision lots
under PD No. 957. The fact that BF Homes is under receivership does not divest the
HLURB of the jurisdiction over the case because the case does not involve pecuniary
matters which is under the jurisdiction of SEC as provided by PD 902- A.
Solid Homes, Inc. v. Payawal

177 SCRA 72
FACTS: Teresita Payawal filed a complaint against Solid Homes, Inc. before the RTC
alleging that Solid Homes contracted to sell to her a subdivision lot in Marikina.
Solid Homes executed a Deed of Sale after her payment of the agreed price but it
failed to deliver the corresponding certificate of Title despite Payawal’s repeated
demands because the Solid Homes had mortgaged the property to a financing
company.
Solid Homes moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the court
had no jurisdiction, this being vested in the NHA under PD 957 (now HLURB).
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction to try and decide cases involving
real estate business and practices under Section 1 of PD 957?
HELD: NO.
The National Housing Authority (now HLURB) has exclusive jurisdiction over cases
involving real estate business and practices under Section 1 of PD 957.
NHA shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following
nature:
a) Unsound real estate business and practices

b) Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or
condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer,
broker and salesmen.
c) Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory
obligation.
Note: Section 1 of PD 957 as Amended by PD #1344- Empowers the National

Housing Authority to issue Writs of Execution in the Enforcement of its decision
under PD957.
CT Torres Enterprises, Inc. v. Hibionada

191 SCRA 268
FACTS: Petitioners, as agent of Pleasantville Development Corporation sold a

subdivision lot on installment to private respondent Efren Diongon. The installation
payments having been completed, Diongon demanded delivery of the Certificate of
Title of the subject land. He consequently filed a complaint for specific performance
and damages in the RTC.
CT Torres filed a Motion to Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction contending that the
competent body to hear and decide the case was the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB).
ISSUE: Whether or not RTC has jurisdiction to hear and decide the case?
HELD: NO.
PD # 957 otherwise known as "The Subdivision and Condominium Buyer's

Protective Decree" provides that the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive
authority to regulate the real estate trade and business. Regulatory functions
conferred on the NHA under PDs 957, 1344 and other related laws were transferred
to the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission which was renamed Housing and
Land Use Regulatory Board(HLURB)
The matters within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB are the following:
1. Unsound real estate business practices;

2. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or
condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker
or salesman; and
3. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations
filed by buyers, of subdivision lot or condominium unit against the owner,
developer, dealer, broker or salesman.
Note: The HLURB is competent to award damages although this is essentially a

judicial power exercisable ordinarily only by the courts. In the exercise of its powers,
the HLURB must interpret and apply contracts, and award damages whenever
appropriate.
On 2/7/1981, by virtue of EO 648, the regulatory functions of NHA were

transferred to the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC). But pursuant
to EO 90 dated 12/17/1986, the functions of the HSRC were transferred to the
HLURB.
Fabia vs. CA
363 SCRA 433
Although the doctrine of primary jurisdiction exhorts the referral of the

instant case to the SEC for its resolution, however, RA 8799 (30 May 2000),The
Securities Regulation Code, has amended PD 902 – A, and transferred the
jurisdiction of the SEC over intra-corporate cases (all those enumerated under Sec.
5 of PD 902-A) to the courts of general jurisdiction or the appropriate Regional Trial

Courts.
PAL vs. Kurangking,

389 SCRA 588
On 15 December 2000, the Court, in A.M. No. 00-8-10-Sc, adopted the Interim
Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation and directed the transfer the SEC to
RTCs, all petitions for rehabilitation filed by corporations, partnerships and
association under PD 902 –A in accordance with the amendatory provisions of RA
8799.
Padua vs. Ranada

390 SCRA 664
The laws and the TRB Rules of Procedure have provided the remedies of an
interested Expressway user, that is, to file a petition for review of the adjusted toll
rates with the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB), The TRB is the agency assigned to
supervise the collect on of toll fees and the operation of toll facilities petitioner
Zialcita’s argument that the provisional toll rate adjustment are exorbitant,
oppressive, onerous and unconscionable is a question of the fact requiring
knowledge of the formula used and the factors considered in determining the
assailed rates. This task is within the province of the IRB. Further , PD 1112
explicitly provides that “the decisions of the Toll Regulatory Board on petitioners for
the increase of toll rate shall be appeasable to the Office of the President within 10
days from the promulgation thereof”.
Philosophy at work
“Man is not what he is but he is what he is not.” – Jean-Paul Sartre

POWERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES
Generally, administrative bodies can only exercise those powers which are
either conferred by the Constitution or statute or those which are necessarily
implied from their exercise.
Administrative bodies commonly exercise 2 basic powers:

1. quasi-legislative or rule-making power → enables them to promulgate
implementing rules and regulations.
2. quasi judicial or adjudicatory power → enables them to interpret and apply
such regulations
A. QUASI-LEGISLATIVE POWER
Congress may validly delegate to administrative agencies the authority to

promulgate rules and regulations in order to implement a given legislation and
effectuate its policies. The power of administrative agencies to promulgate rules in
the implementation of a statute is necessarily limited to what is provided for in the
legislative enactment. In order to be valid, the rules and regulations:
1) must be germane to the objects and purposes of the statute;
1) must conform to the standards that the law prescribes; and
2) must relate solely to carrying into effect the general provisions of the law.
If the implementing rules and regulations are issued in excess of the rule-making
authority of the agency, it is without binding effect upon the courts. At best, the
same may be treated as administrative interpretations of the law and such as, they
may be set aside by the Supreme Court in the final determination of what the law
means.
Legislative Power Quasi-legislative Power

Power to make laws and the power to Power of administrative agencies to
fix a legislative policy issue administrative rules and
regulations in order to implement the
law and the legislative policy fixed by
the legislature
Cannot be delegated by legislature to Power of subordinate legislation
administrative agencies
Requisites for a valid delegation
a) the law must be complete in itself; it must set forth a policy to be executed
(Completeness test)
b) the law must fix a standard, the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or
determinable, to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his
functions (Sufficient Standard Test)
To avoid an undue delegation of legislative power to administrative

authorities, the law itself authorizing the promulgation of the rules and regulations
must be complete in all its terms and provisions so as not to leave the judgment
or discretion to determine what the law shall be. A law is considered complete
when the subject, the manner, and, the extent of its operations are stated in it.
The" test of completeness is whether its provisions are sufficiently definite and
certain to enable one to know his rights and obligations under the law.
If the law is incomplete, the law must offer a sufficient standard to specify
the limits of the delegate’s authority announce the legislative policy and specify
the conditions under which it is to be implemented. The standard is usually
embodied in the law itself and this serves as a guide to indicate the extent and
the limit of the discretion of administrative authorities may exercise under the
statute.
Requisites for the validity of Administrative Regulations:

1) Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature.

The authority to promulgate the regulation is usually conferred by the charter
itself of the administrative body or by life law it, is supposed to enforce.
2) It must be within the scope of the authority given by the legislature.

It is necessary that the authority delegated be properly exercised, that is,
that the regulation promulgated must not be ultra vires or beyond the limits
of the authority conferred.
3) It must be promulgated m accordance with the prescribed procedure.

The promulgation of administrative regulations of general application does
not require previous notice and hearing the only exception being, where the
legislature itself requires it and mandates that the regulation be based on
certain facts as determined at an appropriate investigation.
But where the regulation is in effect a settlement of controversy between

specific parties, it is considered an administrative adjudication and so will
require notice and hearing."
Note: If' the rules and regulations are product of the administrative agency's
quasi-legislative function, the grant of prior notice and hearing to the
affected parties is not a. requirement of" due process. If, on the other hand,
these rules and regulations are promulgated by the administrative agency in
the exercise of its quasi-judicial function, prior notice and hearing are
essential to their validity.
4) It must be reasonable.
The rules and regulations must not be unreasonable and arbitrary as to
violate due process. They must show a reasonable relation to the purposes
for which they are authorized to be issued.
Kinds of Administrative Rules and Regulations
1. Supplementary or detailed legislation – these are rules and regulations

intended to fill in the details of legislation
Example: Rules and Regulations implementing the Labor Code.
2. Interpretative legislation – these are rules and regulations construing or

interpreting the provisions of a statute to be enforced and they are binding on all
concerned until they are changed.
Examples: BIR Circulars, CB Circulars
a.) They have the effect of law and are entitled to great respect; they have in
their favor the presumption of legality.
b.) The erroneous application of the law by public officers does not bar a
subsequent correct application of law.
3. Contingent legislation – these are rules and regulations made by an

administrative authority on the existence of certain facts or things upon which the
enforcement of the law depends.
Example: The Congress gives the President the authority to allocate calamity
loans pursuant to Presidential Decree 1177.The allocation is contingent upon the
happening of an event. There is still no undue delegation of legislative power
because the executive department is simply implementing what the law provides.
What the President is required in this kind of act is simply the execution of the act,
not in the making of the law. He becomes a mere agent of Congress in
ascertaining and declaring the event upon which its expressed will is to take
effect.
Note: The function of prescribing rates by an administrative agency may be either a

legislative or an administrative function.
If it were a legislative function, the grant of prior notice and hearing to

affected parties is not a requirement of due process. In the exercise of its quasi-
judicial function, prior notice and hearing are essential to the validity of such rates.
When the rules laid down by an administrative agency are meant to apply to all
enterprises of a given kind throughout the country, they may partake of a legislative
character. If it applies exclusively to a particular party, based upon a finding of fact,
it is a quasi-judicial function in character.
People v. Maceren
798 CRA 450
FACTS: A 1967 regulation penalizing electro fishing in fresh water fisheries,

promulgated by the Sec .of Agriculture and Natural Resources was challenged by
the accused for not being in conformity with the fisheries law, such act not being
penalized by the law itself.
ISSUE: Whether or not such regulation made by an administrative agency is valid?
HELD: Such regulation is not valid because the fisheries law does not expressly
punish electro fishing. As electro fishing is not banned under that law, the Dept.
Secretary and the Commission of Fisheries are powerless to penalize it. Hence, they
exceeded in their authority to promulgate regulations because such was not made
in accordance with the law.
Republic v. Migrino
189 S 300
FACTS: PCGG chair Jovito Salonga created an Anti-Graft Board to investigate the
unexplained wealth of AFP Personnel. He ordered an investigation on Lt. Col. Tecson
who argued that PCGG has no jurisdiction over him since there was no allegation of
his association with Marcos.
ISSUE: Whether or not PCGG has the power to investigate and prosecute Lt. Col.
Tecson for violation of R.A. 3019 (Anti-graft) and R.A. 1379 (Forfeiture of unlawfully
required wealth) without relation to recovery of ill gotten wealth of Marcos?
HELD: PCGG has no power to investigate and prosecute for an ordinary case under
R.A. 3019 and R.A. 1379 such as in the case of Lt. Col. Tecson. It cannot do more
than what it was empowered to do. Its powers are limited to the recovery of the ill
gotten wealth of the Marcoses, their relatives and cronies.
PCCG still has the power to investigate and prosecute for violations under
R.A. 3019 and 1379 as long as it is in relation to the ill gotten wealth of the
Marcoses because its power is limited to such purpose.
Federacion Español Profesores vs. Sec. Quisumbing

Jan. 26,1988
FACTS: Sec. Quisumbing issued an order abolishing the Spanish subject as part of
the curriculum and allowed Arabic as a voluntary subject. Federacion Espanol
protested that there was violation of due process because there was no notice and
hearing.
ISSUE: Whether or not the order is valid?
HELD: It is valid.
Find out first the power performed by administrative bodies.
Quisumbing was performing a quasi-legislative .function so there was no.

need for notice and hearing. If quasi – judicial – there must be due process and
hearing.
Dadole v. COA
393 S 262
FACTS: RTC and MTC judges of Mandaue City were receiving monthly allowances of P
1, 500 for each judge. However, the DBM issued Local Budget Circular No. 55, which
provides that the additional monthly allowances by a Local Govt. unit should not
exceed P 1, 000 in provinces and cities and P 700 in municipalities. The legal basis of
LBC 55 is Sec. 458 of RA 7160, which allows the grant of additional allowances to
judges “when the finances of the city govt. allows.”
ISSUE: Whether or not LBC 55 goes beyond the law it seeks to implement?
HELD: Yes, because RA 7160 does not authorize setting a maximum limit to the
additional allowances granted to judges. Hence, the finances of a city govt. may allow
the grant of additional allowances higher than P 1, 000 if the revenues of the said city
govt. exceed its annual expenditures. Therefore LBC 55 is void.
The circular is also void because the DBM exceeded its powers in
implementing the circular and it lacks publication.
Philippine Bank of Communication v. CIR

302S 241
FACTS: PBCOM files a claim for tax refund and tax credits of overpaid income tax
for the year 1985 and 1986.
The Court of Tax Appeals denied the request of PBCOM on the ground that it
was filed beyond the 2-year reglementary period provided for by Sec. 230 of the
National Internal Revenue Code. PBCOM, however, insisted its claim relying on
Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 785 issued by the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue changing the prescriptive period of 2 years to 10 years.
ISSUE: Whether or not RMC 785 is a valid administrative memorandum circular?
HELD: RMC 7-85 is not valid because it is inconsistent with sec. 230 of NIRC which
provides for a 2 year reglementary period. By doing so, the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue did not simply interpret the law, rather, it legislated guidelines
contrary to the statute passed by Congress.
Lupangco v. CA
60 S 848
FACTS: PRC issued an order requiring that the candidates for CPA board exams are
not allowed to participate in any review classes or receive materials within 3-day
period prior to the examination day. The order was questioned by the students.
ISSUE: Whether or not Resolution No. 105 is a valid resolution by PRC?
HELD: Resolution No. 105 is not valid. It is unreasonable and arbitrary. It infringes
the examinee’s right to liberty to take whatever measures they deem proper in
order that they will successfully hurdle the CPA board exams. It also violates the
academic freedom of schools.
CIR v. CA and Fortune Tobacco Corporation

261 S 236
FACTS: The Commissioner of Internal Revenue Liwayway Vinzons-Chato Revenue

Memorandum Circular (RMC) No. 37-93 reclassifying HOPE, MORE, and CHAMPION
cigarettes, owned by Fortune Tobacco, as foreign brands because they were listed in
the World Tobacco Directory as belonging to foreign companies and are required to
pay 55% ad valorem tax.
Fortune Tobacco requested for review, reconsideration and recall of RMC 37-
93 with the BIR but was denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not RMC 37-93 is a valid exercise of quasi-legislative powers?

HELD: No, because the BIR did not interpret the law; rather, it legislated under its
quasi-judicial authority, requiring notice, hearing and publication, which were not
complied with in this case. There must be compliance with due process.
The circular also violated the constitutional mandate that taxation must be
uniform and equitable because only HOPE, MORE, and CHAMPION were classified as
foreign brands considering that there are other cigarettes bearing foreign brands.
The circular, then, may be considered adjudicatory in nature and is thus

violative of due process following the Ang Tibay doctrine because the measure
suffers from lack of uniformity of taxation. The other cigarettes bearing foreign
brands were not similarly included within the scope of the circular.
Philippine Consumers Foundation v. DECS

8/31/1987
FACTS: Petitioner questioned DECS order authorizing tuition fee increase of 15% to
20%. DECS reconsidered and decreased it to 10% - 15%. Petitioner was not
contended and filed a petition for prohibition before the courts saying that DECS has
no power to increase school fees and the order constitutes a denial of substantive
and procedural due process.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Dept. order is valid?
HELD: The order is a valid exercise of quasi-legislative power because it applies to

all. Thus, prior hearing is not needed.
Section 57 (3) of BP Blg 232, otherwise known as The Educator Act of 1982,
vests the DECS with the power to regulate the educational system in the country. In
the absence of a statute stating otherwise, this power includes the power to
prescribe school fees and as such, the power should be considered lodged with the
DECS, if it is to properly and effectively discharge its functions and duties under the
law.
Nasipit Lumber v. NWPC

289 SCRDA 670
The Labor Code, as amend by RA 6727 (Wages Rationalization Act), grants the
National Wages and Productivity Commission (NWPC) the power to prescribe rules
and guidelines for the determination of appropriate wages in the country. Hence,
guidelines issued by the Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity Board (RTWPB)
without the approval of or worse, contrary to those promulgated by the NWPC, are
ineffectual, void and cannot be the source of rights and privileges.
Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura & de Los Angeles vs. HDMF

333 SCRA 777
FACTS: Petitioner is a law firm, exempted from Pag-ibig Fund coverage because of
its superior retirement plan. A board resolution was passed though saying that in
order to be exempted it must have a plan providing for both provident retirement
and housing benefits superior to those provided under the Pag-ibig Fund.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Board Resolutions is valid?
HELD: The board resolution is not valid. Where the Board of Trustees of the Home
Development Mutual Fund (HDMF) required in section 1, Rule VII of the 1995
Amendments to the Rules and Regulations implementing PD 1752, as amended by
RA 7742, that employers should have both provident/retirement and housing
benefits for all its employees in order to qualify for exemption from the Pag-ibig
Fund Coverage, it effectively amended Section 19 of PD 1752 which merely requires
as a pre-condition for exemption from coverage the existence of either a superior
provident / retirement plan or a superior housing plan, and not the concurrence of
both plans. And when the HDMF Board subsequently abolished that exemption
through its 1996 Amendments, it repealed Section 19 of PD 1752. Such amendment
and subsequent repeal of section 19 are both invalid, as they are not within the
delegated power of the Board.
Sanz v. Abad Santos
FACTS: The board of examiners for nursing issued an order requiring a periodic
inspection on nursing schools and prohibits the graduates of those schools which do
not comply with the minimum standards imposed by the board. The validity of the
order was assailed.
ISSUE: Whether or not such order is valid?
HELD: The order is valid. It is an exercise of quasi-legislative power; thus prior

hearing is not needed. RA 877 as amended by RA 4704 (The Phil. Nursing Act),
empowers the Board of Examiners to promulgate rules and regulations as may be
necessary to carry out the provisions of this act. It is also empowered to inspect
nursing colleges and schools and vests it with authority “to issue, suspend, revoke
or reissue certificates of registration fro practice of nursing.” Thus, statutory
authority plainly exists for petitioner board to conduct periodic inspections of
nursing schools in order to discharge its supervisory and regulatory functions vested
in it under the Phil. Nursing Act.
Ople v. Torres
293 S 141
FACTS: Pres. Ramos issued AO no. 308 w/c provides for the establishment of a
national computerized identification reference system w/c was challenged by Sen.
Ople for being an encroachment of legislative power to enact laws and for being
violative of the citizen’s night to privacy.
ISSUE: WON AO no. 308 is a valid administrative order?
HELD: It is not valid because it establishes a system of identification that is all

encompassing in scope and affects the life and liberty of every Filipino citizen.
Hence, it is on the lawmaking domain of Congress. The task of the executive is only
to execute laws.
Further, it violated the citizen’s right to privacy.

Conte v. COURT OF APPEALS

264 S 20
FACTS: Petitioners are SSS employees. Upon their retirement, they availed of RA
660 and SSS resolution No. 56. COA disallowed all the claims, saying it violated RA
4968 (Teves Retirement Law) which specially bars the creation of insurance or
retirement plan other than the GSIS government law for GSIS government
employees.
HELD: Resolution 56 contravenes the Teves Retirement Law. This is an act

arrogating unto itself the power solely belonging to Congress.
The rule-making power of a public administrative body is a delegated

legislative power, which it may not use either to abridge the authority given to it by
the Congress or the Constitution or to enlarge its power beyond the scope intended.
The SSS, in promulgating Res. 56 which provided a supplementary pension/
retirement plan in contravention of the Teves Retirement Law (Sec 28 of CA 186 as
amended by RA 4968), cannot, in the guise of rule-making, legislative or amend
laws or worse, render them nugatory.
B. QUASI-JUDICIAL POWER
This is the administrative body’s power of adjudication. Quasi-judicial power

is the power of the administrative authorities to make determinations of facts in the
performance of their official duties and to apply the law as they construe it to the
facts so found. The exercise of this power is only incidental to their main function,
which is the enforcement of the law.
The quasi-judicial power, which is incidental to the power of regulation vested

in the administrative body, is often expressly conferred by the legislature through
specific provisions in the charter of the agency. The justification for the grant as
against the contention that it violates the doctrine of separation of power is that the
power is needed to enable the administrative officers to perform their executive
duties.
Procedural due process should be complied with in the exercise of its quasi-
judicial powers. It requires prior notice and hearing. For an administrative body to
be considered and to act as quasi-judicial, there must be an express empowerment
by law. Absent express empowerment, jurisdiction should be construed to mean
mere regulatory and supervisory, not judicial powers. Adjudicative power must
always be read and exercised as being in aid of the principal function of an
administrative body. In other words, the grant of quasi-judicial power should not be
only power conferred but should instead be only incidental to the administrative
agency’s main task of implementing the law in the specific fields of its expertise.
Otherwise, the agency becomes a specialized court of justice under the judicial
branch.
Conditions for the Exercise of Administrative body’s Quasi-judicial Power
The proper exercise of the quasi-judicial power requires compliance of two

conditions, to wit:
1. The administrative body must properly acquire jurisdiction.
Without jurisdiction, determinations made by the administrative bodies

are absolutely null and without any legal effect whatsoever. These acts are
subject to direct and even collateral attack and may be assailed at any time
since they are regarded as invalid ab initio.
Before the administrative body uses its power of adjudication, it must

first determine whether it is authorized by law to take cognizance of the
controversy submitted before it. It must likewise decide whether it is
competent to act upon the matter. Thus, the basis is the law itself. The law
must confer on the administrative agency the power to adjudicate the
controversy. Otherwise, the matter is resolvable not by the administrative
agency but the courts.
To illustrate this, It is used to be that any action for specific

performance should be filed before the courts. However, with the passage of
Presidential Decrees Nos. 957 and 1344, the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB) is given the exclusive authority to take cognizance
of the action for specific performance with damages filed by a disgruntled lot
or condominium buyers against the developer, broker, realtor or in cases of
any unfair real estate practices committed by the developer. Thus, if such
actions are filed with the court, the latter will dismiss the case on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction.
2. Due Process must be observed in the conduct of the proceedings.
The lack of notice and hearing essential to due process will, as a general rule,
invalidate the administrative proceedings. Nevertheless, it is incorrect to say
that this right is indispensable for there are some instances when it can validly
be omitted.
PCGG v. Judge Peña

Feb. 7, 1989
FACTS: PCGG issued a freeze order to two export garment firms who filed an
injunction before RTC to restrain PCGG.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC can validly restrain PCGG?
HELD: The RTC cannot restrain PCGG Under its charter, the PCGG exercises quasi-
judicial power; thus it is deemed a co-equal body of RTC.
Quasi Judicial is the term applied to the action or discretion of public

administrative officers who are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the
existence of facts and draw conclusions from them as a basis for their official action,
and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature. A quasi-judicial proceeding involves
the taking and evaluation of evidence, determining facts based upon the evidence
presented and rendering an order or decision supported by the facts proved.
UP Board of Regents v. CA and Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine

313 SCRA 404
FACTS: Private respondent is a citizen of India and was enrolled in the doctoral
program in Anthropology of the UP College. She was able to graduate with the
degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Anthropology. However, in a decision issued by
the Board of Regents, it ordered for the withdrawal of private respondent’s
doctorate degree.
The Committee submitted report findings at least 90 instances or portions in

private respondent’s thesis, which were lifted from sources without proper or due
acknowledgment (a case of plagiarism).
Respondent maintains that petitioners are estopped from withdrawing her

doctorate degree.
ISSUE: Whether or not the UP Board of Regents can withdraw the doctorate degree
of the respondent.
HELD: Yes, it can. There was no violation of due process because she was given
opportunity to be heard. Due process in the administrative context does not require
a trial type proceeding.
Various committees had been created to investigate the case and in all
proceedings, the respondent was given the opportunity to defend herself. Under the
UP Charter, the Board of Regents is the highest governing body of the University of
the Philippines. It has the power to confer degrees upon the recommendation of the
University council. It follows that if the conferment of a degree is founded on error
or fraud, the Board of Regents is also empowered, subject to the observance of due
process, to withdraw what it has granted without violating the student’s rights.
The pursuit of academic excellence is the university’s concern. It should be

empowered, as an act of self-defense, to take measures to protect it from serious
threats to its integrity.
Cariño v. CHR
204 S 483
FACTS: Public School Teachers went into what they called “mass concerted actions”
for failure of the public authorities to act upon their grievances. As a result, they
were preventively suspended and temporarily replaced. Others were eventually

dismissed from their works.
A petition was filed before the RTC, which was dismissed. Thus, it was raised
to the Supreme Court on certiorari. Meanwhile, respondents raised also the matter
to the Commission on Human Rights (CHR). A dialogue was then scheduled by CHR
and a subpoena was issued to the DECS Secretary. Sec. Cariño contends that the
CHR has no jurisdiction over the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CHR has the power under the Constitution to try and
decide the case.
HELD: No, the CHR has no such power to adjudicate. It was not meant by the
fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country. The
Commission may however investigate, i.e. receive evidence and make findings of
fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights.
But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of
a court of justice, or even a quasi – judicial agency.
Eastern Telecom v. International Communication Corporation

435 S 55
FACTS: Petitioner applied for and was granted by NTC a Provisional Authority (PA) to
install, operate and provide local exchange service in different cities and provinces
including Navotas and Metro Manila. Respondent ICC was also given PA by NTC to
operate in Manila and Navotas, which are already covered by authority given to
petitioner. Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for review, questioning the PA
granted to respondents.
ISSUE: Whether or not NTC has the authority to grant respondent a Provisional
Authority?
HELD: YES it has the authority to grant respondent a PA to provide local exchange
service as the regulatory agency which has jurisdiction over all telecom entities. The
power of the NTC in granting or denying a provisional authority to operate a local
exchange carrier is a quasi-judicial function and hence it has the power to grant
respondent PA considering that it has the expertise in determining the capabilities
of respondent.
Rule against Forum Shopping
The rule against forum shopping applies to quasi-judicial/administrative

proceedings. Before an administrative complaint may be lodged in any
administrative tribunal, the following requirements must first be complied:
1.) The complaint must be under oath (verified)
2.) There must be certification that no similar complaint is filed in any
other tribunal.
Forum shopping – is the act of filing multiple suits involving the same parties for
the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of
obtaining a favorable judgment.
It is an act of a party against whom an adverse judgment has

been rendered in one forum, of seeking another (other than by appeal or by a
special civil action for certiorari) or of instituting two or more actions or proceedings
grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one or the other would make a
favorable disposition.
In this jurisdiction, a party is not permitted to pursue simultaneous remedies in

two different forums. Where forum-shopping is deemed to exist, the summary
dismissal of both actions is warranted.
The test to determine whether a party has violated the rule against forum
shopping is where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final
judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other.
The requisites of res judicata are:

1. identity of parties,
2. identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on
the same facts, and
3. the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment
rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful,
amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.
The first agency who takes cognizance of a case excludes all other agencies
with concurrent jurisdiction. But there is no forum shopping when the action does
not involve the same cause.
If an action is filed in an administrative body and another in the NBI – no

forum shopping because NBI has no power to adjudicate.
If one involves civil liability and the other criminal liability – no forum shopping.
If one is filed in an administrative body and another before the Commission on

Human Rights
(CHR) – no violation of rule against forum shopping
Marina Properties Corp. v. CA and HL Carlos Construction

294 S 273
FACTS: Petitioner Marina is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of real

estate development. Among its projects was Marina Bay Homes Condo Project with
respondent HL Carlos Construction as principal contractor, particularly of Phase 3.
As an incentive to complete the construction, Marina allowed Carlos to purchase a
condo unit and they entered into a Contract to Purchase and Sell. But after paying
more than half, Petitioner refused for the delivery of said unit which prompted
respondent to file 2 cases:
1. Collection for a sum of money corresponding to unpaid billings from their

construction contract before the RTC.
2. Complaint for specific performance with damages for Marina’s unilateral
cancellation of their contract to buy and to sell a condominium unit before
the HLURB.
Marina alleged that the case before the HLRUB should be dismissed on the ground
of litis pendentia and forum shopping.
ISSUE # 1: Whether or not the filling of the two cases at the same time is proper?
HELD : It is proper because the 2 cases involved 2 different issues and causes of
action.:
1. arising from unpaid billings of Marina

2. arising from Marina’s unilateral cancellation of their contract.
ISSUE #2: Whether or not private respondent was guilty of forum shopping?
HELD: NO. Private respondent was not guilty of forum shopping when it sued
Marina before the HLURB. Forum Shopping is the act of a party against whom an
adverse judgment has been rendered in one forum and seeks another opinion in
another forum. They are grounded on the same cause of action on the supposition
that one or the other might look with favor upon the party.
There was hardly a duplication of the civil case filed to collect a sum of
money corresponding to unpaid billings from their construction contract
Montemayor v. Bundalian
405 S 264
FACTS: The Phil. Commission against Graft and Corruption (PCAGC) made an
investigation for the alleged unexplained wealth of petitioner Montemayor, as
Regional Director of DPWH based on the unverified letter complaint of respondent
Bundalian, mainly due to Montemayor’s acquisition of a house in the US worth P3..9
M. As a result, he was dismissed from service with forfeiture of gov’t. benefits.
Petitioner contends that he was denied process; that his guilt was not proven by
substantial evidence and that the case was rendered moot and academic due to an
earlier dismissal of similar cases before the Ombudsman.
ISSUES:
1. Was he denied of due process? No, because he was given opportunity to explain
his side, and
it is a sufficient compliance of due process.
2. Was his guilt not proved by substantial evidence? It was proven by substantial
evidence.
3. Whether or not the earliest dismissal of similar cases before the Ombudsman
rendered the admin case before the PCAGG moot and academic? Was there forum
shopping?
HELD: There was no forum shopping. The decision of the Ombudsman does not
operate as res judicata because such doctrine is applicable only to judicial or quasi-
judicial proceedings, not to the exercise of admin powers. PCAGC’S investigation
was admin in nature.
HLC Construction v. Emily Homes Subdivision Homeowners Association

(EHSHA)
411 S 504
What if there are numerous complainants?
FACTS: Respondents Emily Homes Subdivision Homeowners Association and the

150 individual members filed an action for breach of contract, damages and
attorney’s fees with the RTC against petitioner-developer alleging that petitioner
used substandard materials in the construction of their houses. Petitioner filed a
motion to dismiss claiming that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the case and that
the respondent’s certification on non forum shopping was defective because it was
signed only by the president of EHSHA and not by all its members.
ISSUE #1: Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction?
HELD: No, it is HLURB which has jurisdiction because the case involves specific
performance of contractual obligations filed by the subdivision lot owners against
the developers.
ISSUE #2: Whether or not the respondents certification on non-forum shopping is

defective? NO, it is already a substantial compliance, despite the rule that all the
plaintiffs must sign, considering that it is not practicable to do so. Further, the
plaintiffs are properly represented by their president.
Velasquez v. Hernandez
437 S 358
CSC & Ombudsman

1 is admin in nature, 1 is criminal in nature
FACTS: The complainant teachers filed a case before the Ombudsman against
respondent Hernandez for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for
allegedly soliciting, accepting, and receiving sums of money, in exchange for

transfer or promotion of complainant teachers or for direct bribery. The Ombudsman
ordered the withdrawal of the information against respondent.
Meanwhile, after a committee investigated the alleged misconduct, it

recommended the filing of administrative and criminal complaint against
respondent. So, a formal charge was filed against respondent before the Civil
Service Commission (CSC).
The CSC found respondent guilty of the charges against her and ordered her
dismissal from service. Respondent contends that the case before the CSC should
be dismissed because of lack of certification of non-formal shopping.
ISSUE: Whether or not the case before the CSC should be dismissed because of
lack of certification of non-forum shopping?
HELD: The case should not be dismissed.
Forum shopping would find no application in this case because the action
filed before the CSC-CAR is administrative in nature while that filed before the office
of the Ombudsman deals with criminal accountability of respondent for violation of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Act. The rule against forum shopping does not apply
because the 2 cases, although based on the same facts, they do not raise identical
causes of action and issues.
Fiscal Autonomy
Fiscal autonomy is the autonomy given to certain administrative bodies to have

freedom from control and limitations except those provided by law.
Only few administrative bodies are granted fiscal autonomy. They are the following:
1. Judiciary
2. the 3 constitutional commissions
3. Ombudsman
If an admin body is not granted with fiscal autonomy, it is with limitations and
restrictions by the Commission on Audit (COA)
Fiscal autonomy – freedom from outside control and limitations, other than those
provided by law. It is the freedom to allocate and utilize funds granted by law in
accordance with law and pursuant to its own wisdom as its needs may require from
time to time.
CHR Employees Association v. CHR

444 S 300
FACTS: The Commission on Human Rights (CHR) adopted an upgrading and

reclassification scheme among selected positions in the commission by virtue of RA
8522 (General Appropriations Act of 1998) authorizing the constitutional
commissions and offices enjoying fiscal autonomy to do so.
The scheme however was disapproved by the Department of Budget

Management (DBM). But the CSC approved such scheme of reclassification of
positions.
Meanwhile petitioner CHREA requested the CSC to affirm the CSC–NCR

recommendation to deny the reclassification scheme due to DBM’s disapproval, but
was denied.
ISSUE #1: Whether or not CHR enjoys fiscal autonomy?
HELD #1: No, because although it is a commission created by the constitution,

there is no provision in the constitution that grants CHR fiscal autonomy unlike the
other constitutional commissions.
ISSUE #2: Whether or not the fact that CHR is a member of the Constitutional
Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG) clothed it with fiscal autonomy?
HELD #2: No, because fiscal autonomy is a constitutional grant, not one obtainable
by mere membership.
ISSUE #3: Whether or not having vested with fiscal autonomy vests the agency
with the authority to reclassify, upgrade and create positions without approval of
DBM?
HELD #3: No, they are still subject to the approval of the DBM.
CSC v. DBM
July 22, 2005
Fiscal Autonomy – automatic release in full of what has been appropriated by the
legislature. It cannot be subjected to any restrictions. They should be given
preference.
FACTS: The CSC seeks to compel the DBM to release the balance of its budget for
the fiscal year 2002 amounting to P 5, 807.392.30. According to the CSC, this
balance was intentionally withheld by DBM on the basis of its “no report, no release
policy, which according to it, is a violation of the principle of fiscal autonomy and,
hence, unconstitutional.
DBM contends that the reason for the delay in releasing the balance was due
to shortfall in revenues.
ISSUE #1: Whether or not the “no report, no release policy” of the DBM may be
validly enforced against offices vested with fiscal autonomy?
HELD #1: It cannot be validly enforced against them without violating Art. XIA,
sec.5 of the constitution, which provides that the CSC shall enjoy fiscal autonomy.
Their approved appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released.
Meaning, no condition to fund releases to it may be imposed.
ISSUE #2: Whether or not shortfall in revenues is a valid reason to justify delay in
the release of CSC budget?
HELD #2:
1. In this case the alleged shortfall is totally unsubstantiated.
2. But even if there is a shortfall, that does not justify non-compliance of the
automatic release of budget because it would defeat such provision of the
law. The agencies with fiscal autonomy should be given priority in the release
of their approved appropriations over all other agencies. Retention or
reduction of appropriations is generally allowed when there is unmanageable
budget deficit, but those vested with fiscal autonomy are exempted. The
budget for these agencies shall be automatically and regularly released
subject to availability of funds. This condition refers only to a situation where
the total revenue collections are so low that they are not sufficient to cover
the total appropriations for all entities vested with fiscal autonomy.
Other Powers of Administrative Agencies
Discretionary and Ministerial
Discretionary power is the power of administrative agencies to act officially on

certain cases referred to them according to the dictates of their own judgment and
conscience and not controlled by the judgment or conscience of others.
Ministerial power is the power of administrative agencies in the discharge of the

officer’s function which is imperative and requires neither judgment nor discretion
on his part.
Investigatory or Inquisitorial Powers
Investigatory or inquisitorial power, also known as the examining power,

refers to the authority of the administrative agency to gather evidence. This
consists in requiring the disclosure of information by means accounts, records or
documents through the issuance of subpoena or subpoena duces tecum, the
attendance of witnesses and compelling their testimonies and the filing of
statements.
This power must be conferred by law. This is the power to gather

information and even inspect in the premises and to call on witnesses and issue
subpoenas but which in the latter case, is a power that must be conferred upon
the administrative officer. The power to investigate and inquire carries with it the
power to issue subpoena.
Power to issue Subpoena
The power to issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum is not inherent in
administrative bodies. It is settled that these bodies may summon witness and
require the production of evidence only when: (a) duly allowed by law, and (b)
always only in connection with the matter they are authorized to investigate. The
fact that an administrative body has been authorized to conduct an investigation
does not necessarily mean it can also summon witnesses and take testimony in the
absence of a clear grant of this power from the legislature.
Under the Administrative Code of 1987 (Sec. 13, Book VII of EO 292),
administrative and quasi-judicial bodies shall have the power in any contested case
to require the attendance of witnesses or the production of books, papers,
documents and other pertinent data, upon request of any party before or during the
hearing upon showing of general relevance.
Further, when authority to take testimony or receive evidence is conferred

upon any administrative officer or any non-judicial person, committee, or other
body, such authority shall include the power to administer oaths, summon
witnesses and require the production of documents by a subpoena duces tecum
( Sec. 37).
Distinguish administrative subpoena from judicial subpoena
The purpose of administrative subpoena is not to prove a pending charge but

to discover evidence on the basis of which a charge may be filed if the evidence so
justifies. On the other hand, the purpose of a judicial subpoena is to prove a charge.
Q. Suppose the law does not confer such power to the administrative body, how
may it compel witness to appear before it?
A: The administrative body must apply to the court for the issuance of subpoena.
Power to punish for contempt
Like the subpoena power, the power to punish for contempt is essentially
judicial and cannot be claimed as an inherent right by the administrative body. The
power to punish for contempt should be clearly defined and granted by law and its
penalty determined. In the absence of such provision of law, administrative bodies
do not possess inherent power to contempt.
EO 292 provides that unless otherwise provide by law, the agency may, in
case of disobedience, invoke the aid of the Regional Trail Court within whose
jurisdiction the contested case being heard falls. The Court may punish refusal as
contempt (Sec. 13, Chapter 3, Bk VII).
Where the administrative agency is given the power to punish for

contempt, its exercise of the power is limited to making effective the power to elicit
testimony and it cannot be exercised in furtherance of administrative functions. This
limitation is derived from the nature of the power to punish for contempt as
inherently judicial and from the existence of the power to punish for contempt as
being essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings and
consequently, in the administration of justice.
The power to punish for contempt is intended not for the protection of the
administrative officers but to safeguard the integrity of the functions that they
perform.
Validity of Implementing Rules or Interpretative Policies
Administrative bodies, corollary to their obligation to enforce the law, must

perforce have the competence to interpret, at first instance, the meaning of the
laws that they are to execute. Such interpretations are however not binding upon
the courts but carry persuasive weight. When an administrative agency renders an
opinion or issues a statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law and
the administrative interpretation is at best advisory for it is the courts that finally
determine what the law means.
Requisites for the validity of Administrative Rules and Regulations
1. Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature

It is usually conferred by the charter of the administrative agency or by the law it is
supposed to enforce.
2. It must be within the scope of the authority given by the legislature.

The regulation promulgated must not be ultra vires or beyond the limits of the
authority conferred.
3. It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure.

Promulgation of administrative rules and regulations of general application does not
require previous notice and hearing. The only exception is where the legislature
requires it and mandates that the regulation be based on certain facts as
determined in an appropriate investigation. If the regulation is in effect a settlement
of controversy between specific parties, it is considered an administrative
adjudication and so will require notice and hearing.
4. It must be reasonable.
It must not be unreasonable and arbitrary as to violate due process. It must show a
reasonable relation to the purposes for which it is authorized to be issued.
5. It must be published.
Publication must be in full, or it is no publication at all.
The following, however, need not be published:
1. interpretative rules and regulations

2. those which are merely internal in nature (regulating only the personnel of the
administrative agency and not the public)
3. letter of instruction issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules and
guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their
duties.
Caltex, Inc. v. CA
292 SCRA 273
Issuances by an administrative agency have the force and effect of law, and when
the issuances are of “general applicability”, publication is necessary as a
requirement of due process.
Philippine Trading Corp. v. COA

309 SCRA 177
DBM-CCC No. 10 which has issued by the DBM pursuant to Sec. 23 of RA

6758 and which completely disallows payment of allowances and other
compensation to government officials and employees is of no force and effect due
to the absence of publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation. The fact that it was reissued and then submitted for publication in the
O.G. does not cure the defect and retroact to the time that above mentioned items
were disallowed in audit because publication is required as a condition precedent to
the affectivity of a law to inform the public of the contents of the law or rules and
regulations before their rights and interests are affected by the same.
De Jesus v. COA
294 SCRA 152
The circular issued by the DBM to implement the Salary Standardization Law, which
discontinues the payment of allowances and fringe benefits previously granted on
top of basic salary, was ineffective for lack of publication in the Official Gazette or in
a newspaper of general circulation as required by law.
Republic v. Express Telecommunication Co., Inc.

373 S 317
FACTS: The 1978 Rules of Practice and Procedure of NTC provides that the NTC
may, on its own initiative, grant the relief prayed for.
Extelcom contends that the NTC should have applied the revised rules which
were filed with the office of the National Administrative Register on Feb. 3, 1993.
These rules deleted the phrase “on its own initiative”. Hence, a provisional authority
may be issued only upon filing of a proper motion before the NTC.
The revised rules of 1993 however have not been published in a newspaper
of general circulation but where filed with the UP Law Center on Feb. 3, 1993.
ISSUE: Which rule should govern?
HELD: The 1978 rules should govern because of the absence of publication of the
Revised Rules. The filing of the Revised Rules with the UP Law Center does not cure
the defect or is not enough for the rules to become effective. Publication is a
condition sine qua non for its effectivity.
Pesigan v. Angeles
129 S 174
At issue in this case is the enforceability, before publication in the official

gazette of EO 626-A, providing for the confiscation and forfeiture by the gov’t. of
carabaos transported from one province to another.
EO 626- A was date Oct. 25, 1980 but was published only on June 14, 1982.
FACTS: The Pesigans transported carabaos from Camarines Sur to Batangas on

April 2, 1982. On the way, the carabaos were confiscated by gov’t. authorities based
on EO 626-A.
ISSUE: Whether or not the EO should be enforced against the Pesigans on April 2,
1982?
HELD: No, because EO 626-A was only published on June 14, 1982. Without such
publication , such law, was not yet effective.
Pilipinas Kao v. CA
372 S 548
FACTS: The Bureau of Investments (BOI) reduced the tax credits on net value
earned and net local content applied for by petitioners in 1980 and 1989. Pilipinas
Kao assailed such reduction.
The Manual of Operations, which provides for the base figure in reducing
petitioners tax Credits, however, was not published.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Manual of Operations is valid and effective despite its
lack of publication.
HELD: The Manual of Operations, as it was issued to implement the Investment

Code, needs to be published to become effective. Hence, for lack of
publication, it is not effective.
The Manual of Operations is not just an internal rule affecting only the
personnel of BOI. It affects the petitioners and other enterprises. It affects the right
of the public.
Additional requisites for Administrative rules with penal sanctions:
1. the law must itself declare as punishable the violation of the administrative rule
or regulation
2. the law should define or fix the penalty for the violation of the administrative rule
of regulation.
Philosophy at work
“Ubermensch” – Friedrich Nietzsche

ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS
Proceedings before Administrative Bodies
An administrative body has the power or authority to promulgate its own

rules of procedure in order for it to carry out its objective, which the law has
conferred upon its creation. The rules and regulations promulgated by these
administrative bodies must be liberally construed to promote justice, to effect
promptness in the disposition of cases and to obtain just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of cases.
Proceedings before administrative bodies partake the nature of a judicial

proceeding as it involves the taking of evidence and of evaluation of the same; facts
are determined based upon the evidence presented, and their decision and orders
are based on such facts.
In other words proceedings before administrative bodies require the

determination of facts just like in judicial proceeding. The quasi- judicial officer is
required to ascertain the applicable laws upon the determination of the facts of the
case.
However, unlike in a judicial proceeding, the administrative authorities are

not strictly bound by the rigid technicalities observed in courts. The administrative
authorities can interpret their own rules and may even dispense with any particular
rule and in so doing, they have a wider degree of discretion. So long as they are
guided by the principle of justice and fair play and that there is no arbitrariness in
the conduct of the proceeding, there can be no question in the procedure observed
by the administrative officer.
A Rule in the Rules of Court may be applied suppletorily in the conduct of

administrative proceedings. In fact it is common among administrative agencies to
provide a provision that rules and regulations observed by the court may likewise be
observed in these agencies.
Due Process
Substantive due process – requires that the law itself is fair, reasonable and just.
Procedural due process – refers to the method or manner by which the law is
enforced.
Requirements of Administrative Due Process
1. The case must be tried by an impartial tribunal;

2. There must be due notice and hearing or opportunity to be heard;
3. The procedure at the hearing must be consistent with the essentials of a fair
trial;
4. Proceedings must be conducted in such a way that there will be opportunity
for a court to determine whether the applicable rules of law and procedure
were observed;
Note: Violation of any of these would render the decision null and void.
1. The case must be tried by an impartial tribunal
Fabella v. CA
282 S 256
FACTS: Sec. Cariño filed administrative cases against the teachers of Mandaluyong
High School. Said teachers have taken part in the mass action in violation of civil
service laws and regulations. An investigating committee was created by Sec.
Cariño to conduct the administrative hearings.
The teachers filed before the RTC questioning the composition/proceedings of

the said committee. DECS investigating committee however rendered a decision
finding the teachers guilty and ordering their immediate dismissal. Respondents
questioned the said order contending that it violated their right to due process.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents were denied due process?
HELD: They were denied of due process.

RA 4760, known as the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, specifically covers
administrative proceedings involving public school teachers. Section 9 of said law
expressly provides that the committee to hear public school teacher’s
administrative cases should be composed of the following:
1. The School Superintendent of the division as chairman

2. A representative of the local or any existing provincial or national teacher’s
organization
3. A supervisor of the division.
In the present case, the various committees formed by DECS to hear the
administrative charges against private respondents did not include “a
representative of the local or any existing provincial or national teacher’s
organization.” Hence, the teachers were denied of due process.
Emin v. de Leon
378 S 143
FACTS: Some teachers in Kidapawan were found to have forged their certificates of
eligibility. When questioned, they all pointed petitioner Emin, a Non- Formal
Education Supervisor, as the person who gave them the RA 6850 certificates of
eligibility they had attached to their appointment for fee. Petitioner was formerly
charged with the CSC.
ISSUE #1: Whether or not the CSC has original jurisdiction over the case against
petitioner?
HELD: CSC has no jurisdiction. Under RA 4670 or the Magna Carta for Public School
Teachers, original jurisdiction over admin cases against public school teachers
should be lodged before an investigating committee.
However, the proceedings conducted can no longer be nullified on procedural

grounds because of the principle of estoppel by laches. It was shown that the CSC
had afforded petitioners sufficient opportunity to be heard and defend himself
against the charges against him. He even participated in the hearings.
ISSUE #2: Whether or not petitioner was denied of the process?
HELD: No. He avers that he was not allowed to cross-examine. But in admin
proceedings, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied. He
did not even ask for cross-examination during the hearing. What is important is that
petitioner was given sufficient opportunity to be heard and defend himself.
Alcala et. al. v. Villar

416 S 147
FACTS: Respondent Villar is the School Principal of Lanao National High School,
Pilar, Cebu City. Petitioners, as teachers of said school, filed a complaint for
dishonesty against respondent; that he gave complainants reimbursements and
loyalty benefits which are less than what they are entitled. Respondent contends
that he was authorized by complainants to deduct said benefits and pay to E & E
Lending Investors.
The case was investigated and resolved by the Office of the Ombudsman finding
Villar guilty of dishonesty and dismissed him from service.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Ombudsman has jurisdiction?

HELD: No, Under RA 4670, it must be lodged first before an investigating

committee. But the decision of Ombudsman should not be annulled because
petitioner was amply afforded due process, the essence of which is an opportunity
to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action.
In this case, respondents had filed a counter–affidavit and a motion for

reconsideration; he also participated in the hearing before the Ombudsman and was
given opportunity to cross-examine witnesses against him. Hence Villar, can no
longer question the proceeding under the principle of estoppel by laches.
Cruz v. CSC
370 S 650
FACTS: Zenaida Paitim, the Municipal Treasurer of Bulacan, and Gilda Cruz, a co
employee were charged and found guilty of dishonesty, grave misconduct and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service by the Civil Service
Commission. Paitim took the civil service exam in behalf of Gilda Cruz.
Petitioners alleged that their right to due process was violated since
respondent CSC acted as the investigator, complainant, prosecutor, and the judge
all at the same time.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a violation of due process?
HELD: NO.
The CSC is mandated to hear and decide administrative cases instituted by it or
before it directly or on appeal, including actions of its officers and the agencies
attached to it. The fact that the CSC itself filed the complaint does not mean that it
could not be an impartial judge. As an administrative body, its decisions are based
on substantial findings. Factual findings of administrative bodies, being considered
experts in their field, are binding on the Supreme Court.
2. There must be due notice and hearing or opportunity to be heard
Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC) v. Republic of the

Philippines (RP)
August 20, 1990
FACTS: RP filed an action for quo warranto saying that some portion of the
Expressway be withdrawn from PNCC’S franchise because PNCC had long fully
recovered its investments. PNCC & RP later compromised.
The PNCC was then authorized to collect the maintenance fees in a reduced
amount. It shall no longer exercise supervision and control over the construction of
additional facilities, as well as the operation of the subject portion of the
expressways which is transferred to DPWH thru the Toll Regulatory Board, in
coordination with PNCC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the maintenance fees to be collected from the motorists
using the questioned portions of the expressway require public hearings before the
Toll Regulatory Board?
HELD: Not necessarily.
A public hearing is mandatory only in cases of petitions for increases in toll rates the
purpose of which is to give users of the expressway who will be adversely affected,
an opportunity to contest the validity of such increase.
Indeed, no affected toll buyer shall be prejudiced where the collectible rates
are reduced as in this case.
Note: Due notice and opportunity to be heard – means the right not only to present
the evidence on one’s behalf but also a reasonable opportunity to know the claims
of the complainants.
Republic v. Express Telecom

373 S 319
Where the order refers to a single revival of the archived application of

Bayantel in NTC Case No. 92-426, it cannot be said that oppositor Extelcom’s right
to procedural due process was prejudiced if it was not given an opportunity to
question the motion for revival. There is no denial of due process where it will still
have the opportunity to be heard during the full blown adversarial hearings that will
follow.
A party may be declared in default in an administrative proceeding. So if

there is a directive but the respondent did not file the answer within the prescribed
period, the administrative officer may consider such party in default. And thus, the
complainant may then proceed with the presentation of his evidence ex parte,
unless there is waiver likewise of such presentation and that pleading be made
clearly on the basis on such submission of a position paper.
CIR v. CA and Fortune Tobacco Corporation

261 S 236
FACTS: The Commissioner of Internal Revenue Liwayway Vinzons-Chato Revenue

Memorandum Circular (RMC) No. 37-93 reclassifying HOPE, MORE, and CHAMPION
cigarettes, owned by Fortune Tobacco, as foreign brands because they were listed in
the World Tobacco Directory as belonging to foreign companies and are required to
pay 55% ad valorem tax.
Fortune Tobacco requested for review, reconsideration and recall of RMC 37-
93 with the BIR but was denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not due process was observed by the CIR?
HELD: No. The circular violated the constitutional mandate that taxation must
be uniform and equitable because only HOPE, MORE, and CHAMPION were classified
as foreign brands considering that there are other cigarettes bearing foreign brands.
The circular, then, may be considered adjudicatory in nature and is thus

violative of due process following the Ang Tibay doctrine because the measure
suffers from lack of uniformity of taxation. The other cigarettes bearing foreign
brands were not similarly included within the scope of the circular.
Zambales Chromite Mining vs.CA

94 S 261
FACTS: Director Gozon rendered a decision adverse to Zambales Chromite while he

was still director of Bureau of Mines. Pending appeal, Gozon was promoted as
secretary of the DENR; thus, he is reviewing his own decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is violation of due process?
HELD: There was a violation of due process because the Chromite Mining cannot
expect a fair decision in the appealed case.
The palpably flagrant anomaly of the Secretary of DENR reviewing his own
decision, as director of mines is a mockery of administrative justice. The decision of
the reviewing officer would be biased. Inevitably, it would be the same view since
being human, he would not admit that he was mistaken in his first view of the case.
A sense of proportion and consideration for the fitness of things should have
deterred Secretary Gozon from reviewing his own decision as director of mines. He
should have asked his Undersecretary to undertake the review.
Singson v. NLRC
FACTS: Labor Arbiter Aquino rendered a decision adverse to Singson. Aquino was
later promoted as NLRC Commissioner. The decision was appealed to his division
and he took part in resolving the case on appeal. But he did not participate in the
deliberation of the motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was violation of due process?
HELD: There was violation of due process.
Petitioner was denied due process when Commissioner Aquino participated as

presiding commissioner of the 2nd division of the NLRC. In reviewing private
respondent PAL’s appeal, he was reviewing his own decision as a former labor
arbiter. Litigants are entitled to a review of 3 commissioners who are impartial right
from the start of the process of review. Commissioner Aquino can hardly be
considered impartial since he was the arbiter who decided the case under review.
He should have inhibited himself from any participation in the case.
CSC v. Lucas
301 S 560
FACTS: Raquel Linatok, an assistant information officer of the Dept. of Agriculture,

filed with the Office of the Secretary of Agriculture a complaint against respondent
Jose Lucas, a photographer of the same agency, for misconduct allegedly for
touching her thigh.
The Board of Personnel Inquiry (BOPI) of the Dept. of Agriculture found

respondent guilty of simple misconduct, and recommends the penalty of suspension
for 1 month and 1 day. The secretary approved the recommendation.
When respondent appealed the decision to the CSC, the CSC found him guilty
of grave misconduct imposing on him the penalty of dismissal from service.
The CA however set aside the CSC resolution saying that Lucas was denied of
due process because he was not informed of the charge of grave misconduct
against him.
ISSUE: Whether or not Lucas was denied due process when the CSC found him
guilty of grave misconduct on a charge of simple misconduct?
HELD: Lucas was denied of due process. A basic requirement of due process is that
a person must be duly informed of the charges against him and that a person
cannot be convicted of an offense which he was not charged.
In this case, Lucas was found guilty of grove misconduct by the CSC when the
charge against him was only simple misconduct.
Note: In court proceedings, there must be formal hearing. In admin cases, there
may be no formal hearing especially if such is waived by the respondent. Admin
cases may be decided simply by submitting pleadings by the parties.
UP Board of Regents vs. CA and Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine

313 SCRA 404
FACTS: Private respondent is a citizen of India and was enrolled in the doctoral
program in Anthropology of the UP College. She was able to graduate with the
degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Anthropology. However, in a decision issued by
the Board of Regents, it ordered for the withdrawal of private respondent’s
doctorate degree.
The Committee submitted report findings at least 90 instances or portions in

private respondent’s thesis, which were lifted from sources without proper or due
acknowledgment (a case of plagiarism).
ISSUE: Whether or not due process was observed by petitioner in withdrawing PR’s
doctorate degree?
HELD: Yes, due process was properly observed. There was no violation of due
process because she was given opportunity to be heard. Due process in the
administrative context does not require a trial type proceeding.
Various committees had been created to investigate the case and in all
proceedings, the respondent was given the opportunity to defend herself. Under the
UP Charter, the Board of Regents is the highest governing body of the University of
the Philippines. It has the power to confer degrees upon the recommendation of the
University council. It follows that if the conferment of a degree is founded on error
or fraud, the Board of Regents is also empowered, subject to the observance of due
process, to withdraw what it has granted without violating the student’s rights.
The pursuit of academic excellence is the university’s concern. It should be

empowered, as an act of self-defense, to take measures to protect it from serious
threats to its integrity.
NAPOCOR v. NLRC
272 S 704
FACTS: NAPOCOR (NPC) entered into an agreement with private respondent (PR)
Westinghouse as principal contractor and Power Contractors, Inc. (PCI) as
subcontractor for the construction of power plant in Bataan. Over 6,000 workers
were hired by PCI who were eventually terminated without any separation pay. PR
workers then filed illegal dismissal cases against PCI.
The labor Arbiter ordered petitioner and Westinghouse impleaded as

additional respondents. Copies of the order were not served on respondents
Westinghouse. A copy was served to ACCRA but it filed a manifestation that it did
not enter its appearance for Westinghouse. The OSG entered its appearance for
NPC. During the proceeding, however, Atty. Mallo represented NPC under the
designation “Counsel for respondents, special Attorney–OSG”.
NPC, Westinghouse and PCI were held solidarily liable to pay the money
claims. A copy of the decision was served on NPC thru the deputized special
attorney.
The OSG was not served with a copy of the decision. Attys. Mallo and Alcantara, the
special attys.–OSG filed a motion for Extension of time to file appeal. They filed an
appeal but it was filed out of the, hence the issuance of writ of execution. NPC
contends that since its lawyer, the OSG, was never served a copy of the Labor
Arbiter’s decision, its right to due process was violated.
ISSUE: Whether or not the NPC was denied due process?
HELD: Yes, because the copy of the decision must be served to the OSG which is
the petitioner’s principal counsel. The deputized special attorney has no legal
authority to decide whether or not an appeal should be made. Service of copy of the
decision on the deputized special attorney is insufficient and not valid and binding
on the Solicitor General. Hence, the period to appeal should be reckoned from the
date the OSG received a copy of the decision. Since service was not made to the
OSG, the period to file an appeal did not commence to run.
As to Westinghouse, it was also denied due process because it was held liable
in a case where jurisdiction over it was not acquired. Hence, the decision against it
is null and void.
Lincoln Gerald vs. NLRC

July 23, 1990
FACTS: Lincoln Gerald complained that he was deprived of due process because the
notice adverse to him was furnished to his former counsel who failed to inform him
and failed to file the necessary pleadings.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was denial of due process?
HELD: There was no denial of due process. Notices were sent to counsel of record,
not to the client. Records show that petitioner’s former counsel did not withdraw his
appearance. Hence, service of a copy of the decision was valid.
In other words, there must be notice and application filed before the
administrative agency of such withdrawal as counsel. In the absence of such
application and the approval by the administrative agency, the counsel continues to
be the counsel of record. Thus, any notice given to the counsel is binding and is a
notice on the client.
PPA v. Sargasso Construction and Development Corp.

435 S 512
FACTS: Respondent filed a complaint with the RTC for specific performance against
petitioner. PPA was represented by the Govt. Corporate Counsel and Atty. Madarang
with collaboration forom the Legal Services Dept. of petitioner, thru Atty. Mancile.
The RTC ruled in favor of respondents.
July 3, 1998 – petitioner, thru the Office of the Govt. Corporate Counsel (OGCC) filed
MFR.
Jan. 26, 1999 – motion was denied.
Feb. 16, 1999 – petitioner was served a copy of said order thru its legal Dept.
Feb. 26, 1999 – petitioner thru the GCC, filed a notice of appeal and was given due
course.
Respondents filed a motion to dismiss contending that petitioner’s notice of appeal

was filed 6 days after the period allowed by law.
Petitioner answered that the decision was served on its legal services Dept. and not
on the OGCC as its lead counsel, hence the period to perfect its appeal never
commenced.
ISSUE: Whether or not the service of the notice of the decision to the petitioner’s
legal department, is not sufficient?
HELD: Service of the decision to the legal Dept. is already binding upon petitioner.
The petitioner was represented by both the OGCC and its legal service Dept.; hence,
the copies of the decision of the RTC may be served either to both. Further,
petitioner, thru the OGCC admitted that the decision was served to it on June 22,
1998.
Note: In criminal cases, the accused has the right to counsel in custodial
investigation. This is not applicable in admin cases because there is no duty on the
part of the admin tribunal to require respondents to be represented by counsel. It is
at the option of the respondent if he wishes to be assisted by a counsel regardless
of the gravity of the charge.
DOH v. Camposano
457 S 438
FACTS: Some concerned employees of DOH-NCR filed a complaint before the DOH
resident Ombudsman against respondents for an alleged anomalous purchase of
some medical supplies. The Ombudsman recommends the filing of a formal
administrative charge against respondents for dishonesty and grave misconduct.
Exec. Sec. Torres issued Admin Order 298 creating an ad hoc committee to
investigate the case. It was then indorsed to the Presidential Commission on Anti-
Graft and Corruption (PCAGC). President Ramos also found respondents guilty and
recommends the case to the Health Secretary for appropriate action.
The Health Sec. ordered the dismissal of respondents.
ISSUE #1: Whether or not the PCAGC has jurisdiction to investigate the case?
HELD: Although under EO 151 the PCAGC has jurisdiction to investigate only
complaints against presidential appointees allegedly involved in graft and
corruption, the investigation was authorized under A0 298, which is within the
power of the Chief Executive considering that he has full control of the Executive
Dept. to which the respondents belong.
Also, the PCAGC is now given the authority to investigate non-presidential

appointees who may have acted in conspiracy with presidential appointees.
ISSUE #2: Whether or not respondents were denied due process by the health
secretary’s failure to consider the facts and the law of the case?
HELD: YES, respondents were denied of due process. The Health Secretary ordered
the dismissal of respondents based on the recommendation of the PCAGC and the
president, without considering the law and the facts of the controversy, which is a
requirement of due process in admin proceedings.
Note: Guilt cannot be pronounced nor penalty imposed, unless due process is first
observed. This is the essence of fairness and the rule of law in a democracy.
Alba v. Nitorreda
254 S 753
The right to appeal is not natural right nor part of due process. It is only a
statutory privilege. Hence, the law itself may deprive a party the right to appeal –
there is no denial of due process, such as that provided in Sec. 27 of the
Ombudsman Act.
Lumiqued v. Exevea
282 S 125
FACTS: 3 admin charges were filed against Arsenio Lumiqued, Regional Director of
DAR-CAR for malversation thru falsification of official documents by falsifying
gasoline receipts, for making unliquidated cash advances and for oppression and
harassment against subordinate employee, the PR herein.
The complaints were referred to the DOJ for appropriate action DOJ created a
committee to investigate the complaints against Lumiqued and the respondent
prosecutors were assigned to investigate the case.
During the investigation, Lumiqued submitted a counter-affidavit and was

repeatedly asked if he wished to be assigned by a counsel but he replied that he is
confident to defend himself. Meanwhile, Lumiqued died. The investigating
committee found him administratively liable and the office of the President ordered
Lumiqued’s dismissal from service with forfeiture of retirement benefits.
ISSUE #1: Whether or not assistance of counsel is indispensable in admin

proceedings?
HELD: No, it is not indispensable in admin proceedings. The essence of due process
is simply the opportunity to explain one’s side.
ISSUE #2: Whether or not petitioner’s contention that Lumiqued’s right to counsel
could not be waived unless the waiver is in writing and in the presence of counsel is
correct?
HELD: Such contention is untenable and misplaced because such right is afforded
to a suspect or an accused during custodial investigation. It can therefore be
invoked only in criminal proceedings. The case at bar is an admin proceeding.
Hence, such right cannot be invoked.
ISSUE #3: Whether or not Lumiqued’s death prior to the resolution of the case
terminates the proceeding?
HELD: NO. Jurisdiction acquired is not lost upon the death of respondent. The
proceeding will still proceed.
Codinielo v. Exec. Sec.

August 4, 1997
FACTS: A party complained of denial of due process because there was no

participation in the formal hearing or investigation but nonetheless such party was
given the opportunity to file and in fact did file a motion for reconsideration.
HELD: There was here a cure of whatever infirmity because there was opportunity
given to the adverse party to be heard. So whatever defect in due process was
cured by the subsequent act of the party in filing a motion for reconsideration
wherein he argued his position where he presented his evidence.
Pepsi Cola v. NLRC

300 S 66
FACTS: Private Respondent (PR) Rene Estilo sued petitioner before the Regional
Arbitration of NLRC for illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages and other
monetary claims.
Executive Labor Arbiter Oscar Uy sent notices to the parties to appear before
him on a certain date but only respondent’s lawyer appeared. So, the Labor Arbiter
instead directed the parties to submit their position papers within 20 days.
Thereafter, the case is deemed submitted for decision.
Petitioners Pepsi Cola submitted its position paper and supporting evidence
which controverted the allegations and various claims of PR stating that PR was not
dismissed but voluntarily resigned after petitioner found him guilty of serious
misconduct and dishonesty.
PR did not submit any paper. The Labor Arbiter rendered decision dismissing the
complaint of PR. PR appealed with the NLRC and the latter set aside the decision
stating that PR was not afforded the opportunity to be heard by just deciding the
case based on Pepsi’s position paper alone.
ISSUE: Whether or not PR was not affordable with opportunity to be heard?
HELD: PR was afforded the opportunity to be heard. He has been duly accorded an
opportunity to submit his position paper in the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter,
but he failed to comply with the order. When PR appealed, he was given opportunity
to present his side. Thus, the fundamental rule of due process that mandates notice
and opportunity to be heard has been amply met.
Padua v. Ranada
390 S 663
FACTS: The Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) issued Resolution No. 2001-89 authorizing
provisional toll rate adjustments at the Metro Manila Skyway due to the request of
Citra Metro Manila Toll ways Corp. (CITRA). Such resolution was issued in accordance
with the Rules of Practice Governing Hearing before the TRB. Petitioners Ceferino
Padua and Eduardo Zialcita as tax and toll payers contested the validity of the
resolution for being made without the benefit of any public hearing and that it
violated the constitution when it did not express clearly and distinctly the facts and
the law on which the resolution was based.
ISSUE #1: Whether or not petitioners’ petitions are proper?
HELD: No, they are procedurally impermissible. The TRB Rules of Procedure itself
provided remedies of an interested Expressway user. They must first file a petition
before the TRB. Petitioners’ recourse is against the doctrine of primary jurisdiction
and exhaustion of admin remedies.
ISSUE #2: Whether or not public hearing is necessary in this case?
HELD: No, LOI No. 1334–A itself provides that the TRB may grant and issue ex-parte
to any petitioner without need of notice, publication or hearing, provisional authority
to collect, pending hearing and decision on the merits of the petition, the increase
in rates such LOI has the force and effect of law. This is to attract
investment in govt. infrastructure projects.
Hence, hearing is not necessary for the grant of provisional toll rate
adjustment. All that is necessary are a.) the finding that the main petition is
sufficient in form and substance, b.) the submission of an affidavit showing that the
increase in rates substantially conforms to the formula, c.) the submission of a
bond.
ISSUE #3: Whether or not the facts and the law on which Res. 2001-89 is based
must be stated.
HELD: Not necessarily because such rule applies only to a decision of a court of
justice, not TRB.
Cardinal Primary Rights in Administrative Proceedings

(Ang Tibay Case)
1. The right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one’s case and
submit evidence in support thereof;
2. The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
3. The decision must have something to support itself;
4. The evidence on which the decision is based must be substantial;
5. The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or
at least contained in the record disclosed to the parties affected;
6. The board or its judges must act on its or their own independent
consideration of the law and the fact of the controversy, and not simply
accept the views of the subordinate in arriving at a decision; and
7. The decision must be rendered in such a manner that the parties to the
proceeding can know the various issues involved and the reason for the
decision rendered.
The right to a hearing simply means the right to present evidence on his
behalf and also the right to know the allegations of the other party and the
opportunity to controvert these findings
Padua vs. Ranada

390 SCRA 663
An administrative agency may be empowered to approve provisionally

when demanded by urgent public need rates of public utilities without a hearing,
the reason being that provisional rates are by their nature temporary and subject to
adjustment in conformity with the definitive rates approved after final hearing.
There is nothing irregular that the TRB resolution No. 2001 89 authorizing
provisional toll rate adjustments at the Metro Manila Skyway effective January 1,
2002 was signed by the TRB Executive Directors and four TRB Directors, none of
whom personally attended the hearing. An administrative agency may employ other
persons, such as a hearing officer, examiner or investigator, to receive evidence,
conduct hearing and make reports, on the basis of which the agency shall render its
decision.
Note: There is no violation of due process where the investigation is conducted not
by the officer duly authorized to render a decision but one who is a subordinate of
that duly authorized officer, because the matter of conducting investigations may
be delegated by the superior to a subordinate.
But there is a violation of due process where on the basis of a complaint, an

ocular inspection is conducted in the premises of the company which is subject of
the complaint and on the basis of the ocular inspection and interrogation of the
witnesses – the laborers, the administrative agency makes a decision.
A decision based simply on ocular inspection and interrogation of laborers is

not the decision contemplated by law as to fall under the concept of observance of
due process, because ocular inspection is not the main trial. There is the
requirement for the conduct of a formal investigation.
There is also a violation of due process where the public officer respondent is
adjudged guilty of an offense of which he was not charged.
Malinao vs. Reyes

55 SCRA 616
FACTS: Petitioner Virginia Malinao filed an administrative case against respondent

Mayor Wilfredo Red in the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Marinduque, charging him
with abuse of authority and denial of due process. (The Mayor filed a case against
Malinao before the Ombudsman.) The Sanggunian found respondent Mayor guilty of
the charge and imposed on him the penalty of one-month suspension. The decision
however was signed only by one member of the Sanggunian who did so as
“Presiding Chairman, Blue Ribbon Committee, Sangguniang, Panlalawigan.”
ISSUE: Whether or not the decision is valid?
HELD: NO. In order to render a decision in administrative cases involving elective

local officials, the decision of the Sanggunian must be “in writing, stating clearly
and distinctly the facts and the reasons for such decision. Member Sotto admits that
the draft decision he prepared had only his signature due to the reluctance of some
kagawad to affix their signatures. Consequently the draft never became a decision.
Notice and Hearing
When an administrative proceeding is quasi-judicial in character, a fair and

open hearing is essential to the validity of the proceeding. However, it is incorrect to
say that this right is indispensable for there are some cases when it can be validly
omitted. It is not essential in all cases that a formal notice and hearing be done so
long as the requisites of due process are observed. The following are the instances
where notice and hearing in administrative proceedings are not required.
1.) The arrest of criminal offenders before the filing of charges against them;
2.) The distraint of property of delinquent taxpayers to prevent unlawful
concealment of such property. However, notice and hearing is necessary in
case of sale of the property of a delinquent payer.
3.) The granting of preliminary attachments ex parte;
4.) The issuance of preliminary injunction ex parte;
5.) The suspension of officers or employees pending an investigation;
In case of preventive suspension, no notice and hearing is necessary whereas
in case of suspension, notice and hearing is required.
6.) Removal of an acting employee;
7.) Cancellation of a passport where no abuse of discretion is committed by the
Sec. of Foreign Affairs (since this is a mere privilege)
8.) Grant of provisional authority for increased rates, or to engage in a particular
line of business
9.) Summary abatement of nuisance per se which affects the immediate safety
of persons or property.
In granting a franchise, there must be notice and hearing since this is an

order which substantially alters the rights of the parties under an existing line. The
parties should be made to present their own respective position.
However, if the order is merely to clarify matters or mere clerical errors, they
may be made even without notice and hearing since they do not alter or prejudice
the rights, which have already accrued.
Time for Rendering Administrative Decisions
As a general rule, the law itself provides for the time frame within which the
agency must terminate and must issue a resolution. The period is only directory.
Administrative Appeals and Review
The right to appeal is not a natural right. It can only be exercised within the
provisions of the law. Unless otherwise provided by law or executive order, relief
from administrative determination may be had by filing a motion for reconsideration
or by asking a review of the same by the superior authorities, whose decision may
further be brought to the regular courts of justice, in accordance with the procedure
specified by the law.
Q: Upon appeal of a decision, must there be trial de novo?
A: As a general rule, no trial de novo is necessary since the superior officer only
reviews the decision of the subordinate officer. The parties have already been
afforded with formal hearing, although the superior officer at his discretion may
issue an order and may conduct a trial de novo.
Q: May the Executive Secretary, acting by the authority of the President, reverse a
decision of the Department Secretary, which had been appealed before the Office of
the president?
A: The recognized rule is that under our constitutional set-up, the Executive
Secretary who acts for, in behalf and under the authority of the President has an
undisputed jurisdiction to affirm, modify or even reverse any order that a
Department Secretary may issue. The assumed authority of the executive secretary
should be accepted for only the President can rightfully say that the Executive
Secretary is not authorized to do so. Unless therefore, the action taken by the
Executive Secretary is disapproved by the President, it remains the act of the
President and cannot be assailed.
Q: Supposing that a decision of the Department Secretary is appealed before the

Office of the Executive Secretary but the Assistant Executive Secretary reversed it.
May the Department Secretary complain that the reversal is invalid because he is of
higher rank?
A: NO. The Assistant Executive Secretary has the power to reverse the decision
appealed from since he is acting under the authority of the President. In the same
manner, it is only the President who could say that his action is illegal or improper.
Q: Supposing that A appeals the decision of the Regional Director B and in the
meantime the Department Secretary resigned, so B was promoted to the latter’s
position, is B’s decision on the review valid?
A: NO. It is essential that the reviewing officer must not be the same person who
rendered the decision sought to be reviewed. Otherwise, there is denial of due
process. The proper thing to do is for B to inhibit himself from the case and allow
another person or subordinate officer to handle or decide the appealed case.
Right against Self-Incrimination
The right against self-incrimination is available in all kinds of proceedings,

whether civil, criminal or administrative. But such right is available only to natural
persons and not to a juridical person.
Thus, an administrative agency may require an organization (corporation,

partnership or association) to furnish it with records of books although these may
incriminate such an organization. The reason for the exclusion of juridical persons
from the no self-incrimination rule is the need for administrative bodies tasked by
legislature to ensure the compliance with law and public policy. Generally, when the
law requires that certain records be kept, these records are withdrawn from the
protective mantle of the no self-incrimination clause (Shapiro doctrine).
Philosophy at work
“The only true knowledge is knowing that you know nothing.” - Socrates
EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies lays down the rule that
where the law provides for remedies against the action of an administrative board,
body or officer, relief to the courts against such action can be sought only after
exhausting all the remedies provided for. This doctrine applies only when there is a
law authorizing the taking of a particular step or remedy. If there is no law
prescribing for this procedure, there is no need for exhaustion of administrative
remedies. Thus, judicial relief may be immediately sought.
A case filed without first exhausting administrative remedies may be

dismissed outright and the court may refer the case to the appropriate
administrative agency.
Failure to exhaust administrative remedies is not jurisdictional. A petition to

exhaust administrative remedies may affect the cause of action but not the
jurisdiction of the court. The rule which provides that administrative remedies must
first be exhausted merely implies the absence of a cause of action and does not
affect the jurisdiction of the court either over the parties, if they have been
summoned properly, or over the subject matter of the case.
Before a party may be allowed to seek judicial recourse, he is required to

resort to all administrative remedies. Whenever there is an available administrative
remedy provided by law, no judicial recourse can be made until all such remedies
have been availed of and exhausted.
3 reasons for the doctrine:
1. in order to give admin tribunal the opportunity to correct errors it may have
committed in the course of admin proceedings;
2. to prevent unnecessary resort to courts;
3. the principle of separation of powers which enjoins the judiciary from
interfering in matters falling within the primary competence of the
administrative agencies.
Where the law requires a certain remedy, it must be complied with.

Ex. Petition for Certiorari – not allowed if no motion for reconsideration (MFR)
first
The aggrieved party should not merely initiate the prescribed administrative
procedures to obtain relief but must make sure that the case is pursued until the
total disposition of admin tribunal.
Doctrine of exhaustion of admin Doctrine of prima5ry jurisdiction

remedies
If a law provides for a remedy or The court cannot and will not take
relief against an administrative cognizance of an action brought
action, the court is not the proper before it if such requires the
body to decide on the matter until all knowledge and expertise of an
administrative remedies has been administrative agency.
exhausted.
Applies when the claim is originally Applies when the claim is within the
cognizable by an administrative concurrent jurisdiction of an
tribunal administrative tribunal and the courts
Both deals with the proper relationship between courts and administrative
bodies.
Both principles do not apply where the issue involved is a pure question of
law.
Delta Ventures v. Cabato

327 S 522
FACTS: There was a decision rendered by the Labor Arbiter which was subject of an
alias writ of execution. On the basis of that writ, the property of the respondent Mr.
Ongpin in the labor case was levied.
Petitioner, claiming ownership over the real property levied, filed with the RTC
a complaint for injunction and damages, with a prayer for issuance of a temporary
restraining order against the sheriff. The labor Arbiter and PR-laborers were also
impleaded as defendants.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court may take cognizance of the complaint filed by
petitioners and consequently provide the injunctive relief sought.
HELD: NO. The action before the court was really in the nature of a labor case
incident, which should warrant the exhaustion of administrative remedies. In other
words, since the relief that the party wants to get from the court was in the nature
of prohibition i.e. one to prohibit the sheriff from executing the decision over the
property likewise claimed by Deltaventures, the court should not act on the matter.
The body that has the authority to take cognizance of the same issue is the
NLRC because this is an incident arising from the labor case and where the law has
provided a remedy, the aggrieved individual must avail of such remedy.
Further, in denying petitioner’s petition for injunction, it is a time-honored

principle that being a co-equal body of the NLRC, the RTC has no jurisdiction to issue
any restraining order or injunction to enjoin the execution of any decision of the
NLRC.
Note: There may be a waiver of the doctrine of exhaustion of admin remedy if there
is no timely objection of failure to comply w/ such exhaustion
Sec. 187 of the LGC provides for remedy of a party who questions the validity of
local tax measure
Within 30 days – appeal to Secretary of Justice (secretary must decide w/in 60

days)
Applying the doctrine of exhaustion of admin remedies, the direct filing of the
complaint before a court is not proper.
Q: But suppose the provision of law only gives discretion on the admin officer to
exercise a function or not such as to review a case (such as that provided before in
the Local Tax Code), should the doctrine necessarily be applied?
A: No need to apply the doctrine because it imposes no obligation on such officer.
Aurillo vs. Rabi

392 SCRA 604
When Regional State Prosecutor (RSP) Aurillo motu proprio took over the
preliminary investigation of IS No 95-043 after the same had already been
dismissed by the city prosecutor and ordered the assistant regional state prosecutor
to conduct a preliminary investigation of the case, he exercised not only
administrative supervision but control over the city prosecutor. By doing so, Aurillo
nullified the resolution of the inquest prosecutor as approved by the city prosecutor
and deprived Rabi as the aggrieved party in IS 95-013 of his right to file a motion for
reconsideration and said motion were denied to appeal to the Secretary of Justice.
The office of the RSP, does not conduct any preliminary investigation or prosecute
any criminal case in court at all. The bulk of his work consists of administrative
supervision over city and provincial fiscals and their assistants.
As to whether Rabis’ petition w/ the RTC was premature for failure to exhaust
admin remedies, the instant case false w/in the exception because Rabi did not
have adequate time to seek redress from the Sec. of Justice whose offices are
located in Manila while he was in Tacloban City.
Corsiga v. Defensor
391 S 274
FACTS: PR Romeo Ortizo was the Senior Engineer B in the National Irrigation
Administration (NIA) in a certain irrigation system in Region VI. Petitioner Eduardo
Corsiga, then Regional Irrigation Manager of NIA Reg. VI, issued an order reassigning
PR Ortiza to another station..
Aggrieved, PR requested exemption from the policy of rotation because such

policy does not apply to him. Petitioner denied the request. PR filed a compliant w/
the RTC for prohibition and injunction.
ISSUE: Whether or not RTC has jurisdiction over the case?
HELD: No, it is the CSC that has jurisdiction over personal actions by all govt.
employees w/ original charter such as the NIA.
Hence, PR’s action is premature and he has no cause of action to ventilate in

court. He failed to exhaust administrative remedies. The instant case is not one of
the exceptions for the exhaustion of remedies because there are still certain facts to
be settled in admin bodies and the case does not involve pure question of law.
Note: Personnel actions – (Civil Service Commission) CSC has jurisdiction
As to cases falling within the jurisdiction of the CSC, the following steps
should be followed:
Decisions of lower level officials → Agency head → CSC → CA
Laguna CATV Network V. Maraan

392 S 221
FACTS: PRs filed w/ the DOLE Region IV separate complaints for underpayment of
wages & non payment of other employee benefits pursuant to Art. 128 of the labor
Code.
DOLE Region IV conducted an inspection & found that petitioner violated the
laws on payment of wages & other benefits. DOLE requested petitioner to correct its
violations but the latter refused.
Regional Director (RD) Alex Maraan ordered the sheriff to collect in cash from
petitioner the amount specified in the writ of execution or to attach its goods &
chattels after petitioner failed to pay the employees. The sheriff subsequently levied
on Doctor Bailon’s (of Laguna) L300 Van & garnished his bank deposits.
Petitioner filed MFR but was denied. Petitioner then, instead of appealing to
the Sec. of labor, filed appeal w/ the CA because accordingly, an appeal to the Sec.
of labor would be an exercise in futility considering that the said appeal will be filed
w/ the Regional Office & it will surely be disapproved
.
CA denied petitioner’s motion stating that it failed to exhaust admin remedies.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner failed to exhaust admin remedies?
HELD: Yes, Art. 128 of the labor code provides that an order issued by the duly
authorized representative of the Sec. of Labor may be appealed to the latter. Thus,
petitioner should have first appealed to the Sec. of Labor instead of filing w/ the CA
a motion for extension of time to file a petitioner for review.
The instant ease also does not fall under any of the exceptions of the rule on
exhaustion of admin remedies.
Exceptions to the Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

1. When the issue is purely legal
It is only the court which has the power to rule with finality such legal issue. If
the petition stated that the decision of the administrative officer is contrary to law
and jurisprudence, then what is being raised here is purely a question of law and
this is not within the competence of the administrative officer.
The question of whether respondent’s transfer to the position of Regional

Director of the Public Attorney’s Office, which was made without her consent,
amounts to a removal without cause is a legal issue (Dimaisip vs. Bacal GR 139382,
6 December 2000);
The issue of whether or not the decision of the Sangguniang Panlungsod in

disciplinary cases is appealable to the Office of the President, as well as the
propriety of taking an oath of office anew by respondent Barangay Captain Laxina,
are questions of law. (Mendoza v. Laxina 406 SCRA 156)
NAPOCOR v. Province of Misamis
FACTS: An action was filed by the province against NAPOCOR for the collection of
delinquent real property taxes pursuant to PD 464 or Real Property Tax Code.
NAPOCOR filed a motion to dismiss alleging that PD 242 should apply – prescribes
administrative settlement instead.
HELD: Here, the issue is clearly a legal one i.e. which law applies. Thus, the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply in the case.
In Castro vs. Gloria (363 SCRA 423), the Court ruled that the issue of
whether or not petitioner’s dismissal from the service is the proper penalty for the
first offense of disgraceful and immoral conduct is a pure question of law. Hence,
the doctrine may be dispensed with and judicial action may be immediately
resorted to by petitioner.
2. The Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency
This doctrine means that when the respondent is a department secretary who
acts as an alter ego of the President, it bears the implied or assumed approval of
the latter. Under this doctrine, the acts of the Department Secretary acting as
agents or alter egos of the President are considered the acts of the President
himself unless the President has disapproved the official act made by the
Department Secretary or when the president is required to act personally on the
matter.
Dimaisip vs. CA
FACTS: There was an order by the Director in favor of Dimaisip awarding to him a
fishpond. But on appeal to the Department Secretary, the decision of the Director
was a set aside and the Secretary awarded the fishpond in favor of Buenaflor.
Dimaisip filed an action not before the administrative agency, not before the
office of the President, but before the court. So, the issue is whether or not this was
valid.
ISSUE: Whether or not Dimaisip’s resort to the court is valid?
HELD: The SC ruled that this is an exception to the rule on exhaustion of

administrative remedies because the decision was one made by the Department
Secretary who is an alter ego of the President.
Note: In Calo v. Fuentes, the SC made a reversal of its earlier decision in Dimaisip v.
CA.
Calo vs. Fuentes
FACTS: The Director of Lands and Dept. Sec awarded homestead application to
Fuentes. Calo initially filed an appeal before the Office of the President. But even
before the Office of the President could act on the matter, he withdrew such appeal.
HELD: The withdrawal of such an appeal before the Office of the President was fatal
because it was the last act required of him in compliance with the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies.
But in many other cases decided by the SC, it went back to its earlier ruling such as
that in the case of:
Quisumbing v. Gumban
193 S 523
FACTS: DECS Secretary Quisumbing transferred Mrs. Yap to South Cotabato. The
order was contested not before the Office of the Secretary but before the sala of
Judge Gumban. Department Secretary filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that
there should be exhaustion.
HELD: The court ruled that there was no need for exhaustion of administrative
remedies because the act complained of was one made by the Department
Secretary as the alter ego of the President.
How to reconcile these contradictory rulings:
A: The first basis is to look the provisions of the law i.e., where the law itself
prescribes remedy, then, there must be compliance with the doctrine of exhaustion
of administrative remedies. But if the law is silent – there is no such provision
requiring exhaustion – there is no need to exhaust administrative remedies.
Example: Under PD 1281, the matter of the conflicting mining claims is now
within the competence of the Bureau of Mines. The matter of resolving conflicting
mining claims is now purely administrative. Thus, under PD 1281, the authority
which has the say on the matter is the Director of Bureau of Mines. But his decision
is appealable to the Department Secretary of Natural Resources and from the
decision of the DENR Secretary, if the party is still aggrieved, the same may be
elevated to the Office of the President.
So, there is in this case the need to comply with the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies. The doctrine of qualified political agency does not apply
here because there is a provision in the law requiring that an appeal be taken from
the decision of the Department Secretary to the President within a period of 5 days.
The law itself even provides that the decision of the president on the matter of
conflicting claims is final and executory.
Of course, it does not mean that the party has no remedy. Even if the
provision of law makes the decision of the Office of the President final and executory
but the same has been made in abuse of authority, then it can be the subject of
judicial review.
3. Where the action of the administrative officer is clearly devoid of

authority or is patently illegal.
We know that in the conduct of administrative investigation, there must be
observance of procedural due process. One requirement is the need for the service
of summons. Supposing there was no service of summons and the decision was
rendered and this was the subject of a case filed before the court.
Q: Is there still need to comply with the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative

remedies?
A: NO, because the action here of the administrative officer is clearly and obviously
devoid of any authority, patently illegal, contrary to law.
4. When the administrative body is in estoppel.

If in the course of the proceeding before the administrative agency there is
representation made by the administrative officer that it is only an action before the
court that can resolve the issue and on the basis of this declaration, such court
action was taken, the administrative agency is already in estoppel to state that the
matter ought to be decided within the administrative level.
5. Where the application of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative

remedies will only cause grave and irreparable damage or injury to any of
the parties.
6. Where the doctrine does not provide for a plain, speedy and adequate
remedy.
7. If further pendency of the case for the administrative agency will only
delay the proceedings and thus you are deprived of your right to file an
action before the court.
8. The doctrine, of exhaustion of administrative remedies applies only as

to public lands.
It does not apply where the subject of controversy involves a private property.
In such situation, the body that has the power to take cognizance of the matter is
the regular court.
9. If the exhaustion of administrative remedies will only result in the

denial of due process.
Llorena v. Lacson
May 30, 1960
FACTS: A laborer was dismissed by the mayor because of the loss of a piano. The
law requires that the action must be taken before the Office of the President.
Laborer did not comply with this requirement, saying that since he is uneducated
(barely reached the 4th grade), he is exempted.
HELD: lack of education is not a defense. There must still be compliance with the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Sabello v. DECS
Dec. 26, 1989
FACTS: School Principal Sabello was found guilty in a criminal case. He was
reinstated because there was an absolute pardon given to him. But he was
reinstated as a mere classroom teacher. He did not file his appeal with the DECS,
but went directly to the court. Saying poverty denied him the services of the lawyer.
HELD: The case was allowed to continue. The rule on exhaustion of administrative
remedies and the application of the exceptions is not a fast and rigid rule.
In the case of Sabello, the Court granted the petition of the petitioner. Sabello
claimed that poverty denied him the services of a lawyer. On that basis, the Court
set aside this requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies and looked into
the merits of the case and so, he was reinstated to the position of school principal.
In this situation, where the interest of justice requires, the Court rules that
there was no need to exhaust administrative remedies because poverty deprived
the petitioner access to lawyers.
Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency or Alter Ego Doctrine

In the absence of a constitutional provision or a statute to the contrary, the

official acts of a department secretary are deemed acts of the President himself
unless disapproved by the latter
The power of the DILG to investigate administrative complaints is based on

the alter-ego principle or the doctrine of qualified political agency (Joson vs. Torres,
290 SCRA 281). Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single
executive, “all executive and administrative organizations are adjusts of the
Executive Department and the heads of the various executive departments are
assistants and agents of the Chief Executive.”
Except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or

law to act in person, or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act
personally the multifarious executive and administrative departments, and the acts
of the Secretary of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular
course of business, are, unless, disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive
presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive (Fortich vs. Corona. 298 SCRA 705).
Province of Camarines Norte vs. Province of Quezon

367 SCRA 91
The claim of respondents (Quezon Prov. Gov. Rodriguez and Calaug Mayor
Lim) that the DENR technical team conducted the survey (to make a delineation of
the boundary separating the Provinces is baseless. The authority of the team
emanated from the Special Order No. 1179 duly issued by the DENR Secretary, the
alter ego of the President. Being an alter ego, the acts of the DENR Secretary are
presumed to be the acts of the President unless expressly repudiated by the latter.
The DENR team was precisely created to comply with the SC Decision to conduct
the survey.
Philosophy at work
“Roll Sisyphus! Roll!” – Albert Camus

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL AND REVIEW
When provided by law, appeal from an administrative determination may be

made to a higher or superior administrative officer or body. (Basis: Power of
Control).
Power of Control Power of Supervision

Power of the president over the The power of the president over
executive branch of government, administrative disciplinary cases
including all executive officers from against elective local officials is
cabinet secretary to the lowliest clerk derived from his power of general
supervision over local government.
It is the power of the president to The power of insuring that laws are
alter or modify or nullify or set aside faithfully executed, or that the
what a subordinate officer had done subordinate officers act within the
in the performance of his duties and bounds of the law.
to substitute the judgment of the
former with that of the latter
Includes the power of supervision
Supervision is not incompatible with discipline which must be construed to authorize

the President to order an investigation of the act or conduct of local officials (Joson
vs. Torres, 290 SCRA281)
The power to discipline evidently includes the power to investigate. As the

Disciplining Authority, the president has the power derived from the Constitution
itself to investigate complaints against local elective officials.
AO 23, however, delegates the power to investigate to the DILG or a special

investigation Committee as may be constituted by the Disciplining Authority. This is
not undue delegation as what is delegated by the President is the power to
investigate not the power to discipline.
Hence, jurisdiction over administrative disciplinary cases against elective local

officials is lodged in two authorities:
- The disciplining authority (the president) and

- The investigating authority (the DILG Secretary, who may act by
himself or constitute an investigating committee.
- In lieu of the DILG Secretary, the disciplining authority may designate a
special investigating committee.
The Executive Secretary, acting by authority of the President, may reverse a

Decision of the Director that had been affirmed by the Department Secretary
The argument that the Executive Secretary is equal in rank with other department
heads is incorrect for he acts by “authority of the President.”
His decision should thus be given full faith and credit by the courts His assumed
authority should be accepted for only the President can rightfully say that he is not
authorized to do so.
Review of Administrative Decisions by the Courts
Review by Administrative Review by the Courts

Agencies
The superior administrative official is Since the authority of the court is
authorized, in the exercise of his simply to find out whether there is
discretion, to receive additional substantial evidence in support of the
evidence conclusion reached by the
administrative officer, its power to
review is limited only to all the
evidence already submitted by the
parties.
It cannot be compelled by the parties
for them to submit new evidence,

precisely because its role is not to
determine conflicting claims which a
power is given to the administrative
body.
It is within the prerogative of the The role of the court is simply to find
superior admin officer to order the out whether the evidence supports
conduct of a new hearing or trial de the decision – whether or not there is
novo. In the exercise of his discretion, substantial evidence to support the
and even the admission of new finding made by the administrative
evidence. officer.
Findings of facts of administrative bodies are as a rule not subject to judicial review
and must be accorded not only utmost respect but even finality as long as such
decisions are confined to matters within their respective jurisdiction and are
supported by substantial evidence (San Sebastian College vs. CA, 197 SCRA 139;
labor Congress of the Philippines vs. NLRC, 29 SCRA 469).
Philsa International Placement & Services Corp. vs. Labor Secretary

356 SCRA 174
Findings of the POEA regarding alleged contract substitution constitute

question of fact which may not be disturbed if supported by substantial evidence.
Cosep v. NLRC
290 S 705
But if there is a misappreciation of facts by the quasi-judicial agency like the

NLRC, thereby impairing petitioner’s right to security of tenure, or where the factual
findings lack support, the Court is compelled to deviate from this well established
rule. Even decisions of Administrative agencies which are declared “final” by law are
not exempt from the judicial review when so warranted.
Malonzo vs. COMELEC

269 SCRA 295
In cases filed before administrative and quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be

deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of
relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion.
Neugene Marketing v. CA
303 SCRA 295
The rule that the appellate court will not generally disturb the factual findings
of the trial court does not apply where the Securities and Exchange Commission
overlooked certain facts of substance and value which if considered would affect the
result of the case.
Oarde vs. CA
280 SCRA 235
Certifications issued by administrative agencies or officers that a certain

person is a tenant are merely provisional and not conclusive on the courts.
Bautista vs. Araneta

326 SCRA 234
FACTS: Bautista claimed he is a tenant, but the owner of the land – Araneta, denies
it. DARAB ruled that he is a tenant. This was reversed by the CA.
HELD: CA can reverse DARAB’s finding that he is a tenant.

The Supreme Court rejected petitioner’s claim that he is a tenant by virtue of the
factual finding of the DARAB considering that DARAB mainly relied on the
certifications issued in favor of petitioner in holding that he is a tenant of the
disputed landholding.
Certifications issued by administrative agencies or officers that a certain person is a

tenant are merely provisional and not conclusive on courts. The SC court is not
necessarily bound by these findings especially if they are conclusions that are not
supported by substantial evidence.
Note: Tenancy is not purely a factual relationship dependent on what the alleged
tenant does upon the land. It is also a legal relationship that can only be created
with the consent of the true and lawful landholder.
Questions which may be subject of judicial review:
1. Questions of Law involves the constitutionality of law, treaty, ordinance or

administrative order.
a. jurisdiction of the administrative agency
b. there is an error committed by the administrative officer
2. Question of Fact
General Rule: Factual findings of administrative bodies are accorded respect, if not
finality.
Exceptions, if:
a. The decision is not supported by substantial evidence.
b. The findings are vitiated by fraud, imposition or collusion.
c. The procedure is irregular.
d. Palpable or serious errors have been committed.
e. When grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness or capriciousness is manifest.
f. The law explicitly authorizes review of factual matters.
g. There is conflict in the factual findings not only at the Ombudsman level, but
even at the appellate court.
3. Mixed Questions of Law and Fact (Brandeis Doctrine of Assimilation of Facts)

This doctrine lays down the rule that when a finding of fact is so intimately
involved and dependent upon the question of law, the court will, in order to resolve
the question of law, examine the factual setting including the evidence adduced
thereto. (Findings of facts are necessary in order to determine the findings of law).
Fabian v. Agustin
Feb. 14, 2003
The Ombudsman Investigation Officer found DPWH District Engineer Agustin

guilty of grave misconduct as well as irregular or immoral conduct and
recommended his dismissal from the service, which finding was approved by
Ombudsman Desierto with modification that the offense is only misconduct and that
the penalty is suspension from office for one year without pay. Eventually, Deputy
Ombudsman Guerrero dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence
imposing the one-year suspension. Later, the CA rendered an amended Decision
this time affirming the Guerrero dismissal of the case.
Such conflict in the factual findings compels the Supreme Court to deviate
from the general rule and review the evidence. In this case, the Court reversed the
CA amended Decision and ordered respondent’s dismissal from the service with
forfeiture of retirement benefits and with prejudice to his reemployment in the
government.
All errors or decisions of administrative bodies involving questions of law are

subject to judicial review consistent with Sec. 5(2-e), art. VIII, 1987 Constitution
which provides that: “All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.”
Appeal by Certiorari Special Civil Action for Certiorari (Rule

(Rule 45) 65)
Only questions of law may be The only question that may be raised is
raised (Sec 1, Rule 43) whether or not the respondent (tribunal or
officer exercising judicial function) has acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion.
The parties are : The petitioner is the aggrieved party and the
The appellant as petitioner and respondent is the tribunal or officer exercising
the appellee as respondent judicial function who is alleged to have acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion.
Filed before CA; within 15 days The party benefited by the act complained of
is included as respondent.
Questions of Law Questions of Facts

If the facts are established or admitted, A question of fact arises when there is a
their legal effect is a question of law for conflict in testimony. The question must
the court to determine be resolved by the court. No question of
fact exists if only one conclusion is
possible from the facts established
There is a question of law in a given There is a question of fact when the
case when the doubt or difference doubt or difference arises as to the
arises as to what the law is on a certain truth or the falsehood of alleged facts.
state of facts.
Tuazon vs. CA
118 SCRA 4464
In Brandeis Doctrine of Assimilation of Facts, the more important issue, which

is law, assimilates the facts. Thus, questions of facts and of law are subject to
judicial review. For instance the issue of tenancy involves legal questions as tenancy
is not a purely factual relationship dependent on what the alleged tenants do upon
the land but it is also a legal relationship.
Sanado vs.CA
356 SCRA 546
If a party disagrees with the decisions of the Office of the President, he

should elevate the matter by petition for review before the Court of Appeals for the
latter’s exercise of the power of juridical review. (Rule 43).
Matuguina Integrated Wood Products (MIWP) v.

263 SCRA 508
The issue of whether or not petitioner MIWP is an alter ego of Milagros

Matuguina, the losing party – respondent in the MNR case is one of fact, and which
should have been threshed out in said administrative proceedings, and not in the
prohibition proceedings in the trial court, where it is precisely the failure of the
respondent Minister of Natural Resources to proceed as mandated by law in the
execution of its order which is under security.
Republic vs. Imperial

303 SCRA 127
The classification of public lands is a function of the executive branch,

especially the Director of lands, (now the Director of the Lands Management
Bureau) and the decision of the director of lands when approved by the DENR
Secretary as to questions of fact is conclusive and not subject to review by the court
in the absence of any showing that such decision of findings is tainted with fraud or
mistake (In Re: Petition seeking for Clarification as to the Validity and Forceful Effect
of Two Final and Executory but Conflicting Decisions of the SC, 321 SCRA 62.)
Bureau of Patents: where there is a question as to whether or not such a trade

name causes confusion, or similar to a prior registered trade name or trademark,
such issue is one belonging to the courts.
Bureau of Immigration : it is within its jurisdiction:

- to exclude an alien on the ground that he is not a Filipino citizen
- whether or not a person is authorized to reside or is an immigrant or
an alien.
If the issue of citizenship is put into issue, then it is within the power of the
court to order the administrative agency to defer action on the matter in order for
the court to look into the issue of citizenship. The issue of citizenship is one within
the exclusive authority of the court and not of the administrative agency.
COA: (PD 1445) the findings made by the auditor on the matter of claims or
settlement of accounts may be the subject of an appeal to the COA within a period
of six 6 months from the findings made by the auditor. And from the decision of the
COA, the same may be the subject of judicial review within a period of 30 days as
mandated by PD 1445.
CRIMINAL AND CIVIL IMMUNITIES
General Rule: Administrative bodies are not allowed to grant criminal and civil
immunities to persons.
Exceptions: where the law itself authorizes the grant of such immunity to the
individual.
1) Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) pursuant to Sec

5, E.O. 14 as amended by E.O. 14-A. The PCGG has the power to grant
criminal, civil and administrative immunity to persons who testify on
the matter of alleged acquisition of ill-gotten wealth by associates of
the Marcoses; and the
2) Office of the Ombudsman, pursuant to Section 17 of RA 6770, may

grant immunity from criminal prosecution to any person whose
testimony or possession and production of documents and evidence
may be necessary in any proceeding or hearing being conducted by
the Office of the Omsbudman.
THREE-FOLD RESPONSIBILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS AND EMPOYEES
A basic principle of the law on public officers is that a public official or

employee is under a three-fold responsibility for violation of duty or for a wrongful
act or omission – a public officer may be held civilly, criminally and administratively
liable for a wrongful doing (Tecson vs. Sandiganbayan, 318 SCRA 80).
A criminal prosecution will not constitute a prejudicial question even if the

same facts and circumstances are attendant in the administrative proceedings. A
finding of guilt in the criminal case will not necessarily result in a finding of liability
in the administrative case. Neither would the results in one conclude the other.
(Gatahalian Promotions Talents Pool vs. Naldoza, 315 SCRA 406).
Thus, an absolution from a criminal charge is not a bar to an administrative

prosecution or vice versa. The court in dismissing the criminal complaint was simply
saying that the prosecution was unable to prove the guilt of petitioner beyond
reasonable doubt. The absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean an
absence of any evidence whatsoever for there is another class of evidence which,
though insufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt, is adequate in
administrative cases; the substantial evidence rule in administrative proceedings
merely requires such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion (Ocampo vs. Ombudsman, 322 SCRA 22).
Administrative offenses do not prescribe (Floria vs. Sunga, 368 SCRA 551).
(Prescriptive period for criminal case is 15 years, while administrative case is
imprescriptible; Sec 20 of the Ombudsman Act provides that no investigation is
needed – this is merely directive)
The withdrawal of a complaint or the desistance of a complainant does not

necessarily warrant the dismissal of an administrative complaint (Guro vs. Duronio,
397 SCRA 1).
In instances, however, where an administrative case cannot proceed without

the active cooperation of the complainant, the Supreme Court may find itself with
hardly any alternatives but to dismiss the complaint. (Dagsa-an vs. Conag, 290
SCRA 12).
An administrative complaint against public officers cannot just be withdrawn

at any time by the simple expediency of the complainant suddenly claiming a
change of mind (Nones vs. Ormita, 390 SCRA 320).
An affidavit of desistance will not automatically result to the dismissal of an

administrative case or to the exoneration of respondent. This is because the
complainant is merely a witness in an administrative case. It cannot, by his own
desistance, divest the court of its jurisdiction for the court has an interest apart from
complainant’s own in determining the truth and, when necessary imposing
sanctions against erring court employees (Jacob vs. Tambo, 369 SCRA 148).
While a reelected official may no longer be held administratively liable for

signing a questionable contract before his reelection, this will not prejudice the
filing of any case other than administrative case against him (Garcia vs. Mojica, 314
SCRA 207).
LOYAO, JR vs. CAUBE

A.M. No, P-02-1599. April 30, 2003
FACTS: Clerk of Court Caube issued summons to plaintiffs although there was no
case pending against them. Caube called them so that they could forge an amicable
settlement with their creditors. Caube was dismissed. Pending appeal he died.
HELD: The death or retirement of any judicial officer from the service does not
preclude the finding of any administrative liability of which he shall still be
answerable.
SC: This jurisdiction that was ours at the time of the filing of the administrative
complaint was not lost by the mere fact that the respondent public official had
ceased in office during the pendency of the case. The Court retains its jurisdiction
either to pronounce the respondent public official innocent of the charges or declare
him guilty thereof. A contrary rule would be fraught with injustice with dreadful and
dangerous implications…If innocent, respondent public official merits vindication of
his name and integrity as he leaves the government which he has served well and
faithfully; if guilty, he deserves to receive the corresponding censure and a penalty
proper and impossible under the situation.
To be sure, respondent Caube’s death has permanently foreclosed the

prosecution of any other actions, be it criminal or civil, against him for his
malfeasance in office. We are, however, not precluded from imposing the
appropriate administrative sanctions against him.
DOCTRINE OF FORGIVENESS AND CONDONATION
Under this doctrine, public officials cannot be subject to disciplinary action for
administrative misconduct committed during a prior term.
The doctrine is not only founded on the theory that an official’s re-election
expresses the sovereign will of the electorate to forgive, or condone any act or
omission constituting a ground for administrative discipline which was committed
during his previous term, but also dictated by public policy, otherwise his second
term may just be devoted to defending himself in the said cases to the detriment of
public service. The doctrine cannot however apply to criminal acts which the
reelected official may have committed during his previous term.
Aguinaldo v. Santos
212 SCRA 768
FACTS: DILG Secretary Santos filed an administrative case against Governor

Aguinaldo for disloyalty to the republic. The penalty of such is dismissal. Pending
the administrative case, he ran for the same elective position and got elected as
governor.
HELD: Applying the doctrine of forgiveness and condonation, Gov. Aguinaldo could
not be held administratively liable for a prior act committed.
Why? It is because the previous term is distinct from the succeeding term. Where no
sanction was meted for an act during a previous term, definitely, no sanction should
be allowed for such act committed during a previous term in a subsequent term of
office.
Who may appeal?
Paredes vs. CSC

192 SCRA 84
Civil Service law “does not contemplate a review of decisions exonerating

officers or employees from administrative charges.
Section 39(a), in relation to Section 37 (a) of PD 807 which provides that ‘Appeals,
where allowable, shall be made by the party adversely affected by the decision “x x
x “ was interpreted by the Court: “The phrase ‘party adversely affected by the
decision’ refers to the government employee against whom the administrative case
is filed for the purpose of disciplinary action which may take the form of suspension
(of more than 30 days, demotion in rank or salary, transfer, removal or dismissal
from office. Parenthetically, the Philippine Civil service law does not allow the
complainant to appeal a decision exonerating or absolving a civil service employee.
Note: In CSC v. Dacoycoy (306 S 426), the govt. agency which may be prejudiced
by the decision, may appeal. By this ruling, the SC expressly abandoned and
overruled prior decisions holding that the Civil Service Law “does not contemplate a
review decisions exonerating officers or employees from administrative charges”
enunciated in Paredes v. CSC.
Sec 39 & 37 of CSL: penalty of suspension for less than 30 days; or more fine
of less than 1 month salary; or reprimand – is final and executory.
RES JUDICATA IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASES
Decisions and orders of administrative agencies have, upon their finality, the
force and binding effect of a final judgment within the purview of the res judicata
doctrine. The rule of res juidcata thus forbids the reopening of a matter once
determined by competent authority acting within their exclusive jurisdiction.
Once an issue has been adjudicated in a valid final judgment of a competent

court, it can no longer be controverted anew and should be finally laid to rest.
Exception to the doctrine of res judicata:
1. Where the are supervening events which make it imperative, in the higher
interest of justice, to modify a final judgment to harmonize it with prevailing
circumstances (Teodoro vs. Carague, 206 SCRA 4290.
2. Where the applicability of the doctrine would involve the sacrifice of justice to
technicality (De Leon vs.CA), as when it would amount to a denial of justice or
a bar for a vindication of a legitimate grievance (Suarez vs. CA, 194 SCRA
183);
3. Where the parties involve have waived it or do not timely raise it as a

defense (Teodoro vs. Carague).
4. The doctrine of res judicata does not apply to question of citizenship (Labo vs.
COMELEC).
BID vs. dela Rosa

197 SCRA 855
Every time the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial

or administrative case, whatever the court or administrative authority decides as to
such citizenship is generally not considered as res judicata, hence, it has to be
threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand.
The doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial and quasi-judicial

proceedings, not to the exercise of administrative powers. The doctrine embraces
two concepts:
1. bar by prior judgment par. (b) of Rule 39, Sec. 47; and
2. conclusiveness of judgment under par. (c) thereof
Ocho vs. Calos

345 SCRA 488
FACTS: Calos’ land was subjected to CARP. His property was distributed through
Operation Land Transfer (OLT). Calos questioned the qualifications of beneficiaries.
PARAD ruled that the land be returned to Calos since the beneficiaries are already
landowners. DARAB reversed PARAD. CA held that Polinar (one of the beneficiaries)
is disqualified since he already owns land.
HELD: Res judicata applie. Thus, DARAB’s decision that Polinar does not own land is
final and conclusive on the Courts.
Conclusiveness of judgment bars the re-litigation of particular facts or issues

in another litigation between the same parties on a different claim or causes of
action.
Thus, the decision of the DAR hearing officer in admin case 006-90, which
had long attained finality, that petitioner Ocho is not the owner of other agricultural
lands, foreclosed any inquiry on the same issue involving the same parties and
property.
Although the action instituted by the Calos in Adm Case 006-90 (Anomalies in
OLT Transfer Action) is different from the action in Adm case X-014 (Annulment of
Deeds of Assignment, Emancipation Patents and TCT’s, retention and Recovery of
Possession and Ownership), the concept of conclusiveness of judgment still applies
because the identity of causes of action is not required but merely identity of issues.
In other words, it does not matter that the issues are different. The issue here
(DAR) is one of cancellation of title and recovery of possession and ownership,
whereas, the issue in the CA pertains to whether or not this person is the owner of
another agricultural land. But nonetheless, since the facts are the same, the issues
are related, even if the causes are different; the doctrine of res judicata still applies.
Montemayor vs. Bundalian

405 SCRA 265
The decision of the Ombudsman does not operate as res judicata in the case
before the Presidential Commission Against Graft and Corruption (PCAGC) subject of
the review. The doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial
proceedings, not on the exercise of administrative powers.
Petitioner DPWH Regional Director Montemayor was investigated by the

Ombudsman for his possible criminal liability for the acquisition of the Burbank
property in violation of RA 3019. For the same alleged misconduct, petitioner, as a
presidential appointee, was investigated by the PCAGC by virtue of the
administrative power and control of the President over him. As the PCAGC
investigation of petitioner was administrative in nature, the doctrine of res judicata
finds no application in this case.
Philosophy at work
“A man who dies before he dies, does not die when he dies.” - Martin Heidegger
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICES
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE (PNP)

Section 6, Art. XVI of the 1987 Constitution provides: The state shall establish
and maintain one police force, which shall be national in scope and civilian in
character to be administered and controlled by a National Police Commission
(NAPOLCOM). The authority of local executives shall be provided by law.
The authority of local executives over the elements of the PNP shall be
provided by law. Thus, you have RA 6975 as amended by RA 8851
Manalo v. Sistoza
August 11, 1999
FACTS: Pres. Aquino appointed respondents to PNP Superintendents and Directors

without the approval of the Commission on Appointments. RA 6976 mandates that
CA confirmation is needed. Manalo argued that PNP is akin to AFP where
appointment to colonel and naval captain requires confirmation.
HELD: CA confirmation is not needed
The Philippine National Police is separate and distinct from the Armed Forces
of the Philippines. The Constitution, no less, sets forth the distinction. Under Section
4 of Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution:
“The Armed Forces of the Philippines shall be composed of a citizen armed force
which shall undergo military training and service, as may be provided by law. It shall
keep a regular force necessary for the security of the State.”
On the other hand, Section 6 of the same article of the Constitution ordains that:
“The state shall establish and maintain one police force, which shall be national in
scope and civilian in character to be administered and controlled by a national
police commission. The authority of local executives over the police units in their
jurisdiction shall be provided by law.”
To distinguish the police force from the armed force, congress enacted republic act
6976 which states in part:
Section 2. Declaration of policy – it is hereby declared to be the policy of the State

to promote peace and order, ensure public safety and further strengthen local
government capability aimed towards the effective delivery of the basic services to
the citizens through the establishment of a highly efficient and competent police
force that is national in scope and civilian in character.
The police force shall be organized, trained and equipped primarily for the
performance of police functions. Its national scope and civilian character shall be
paramount. No element of the police force shall be military nor shall any position
thereof be occupied by active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
Thereunder, the police force is different from and independent of the armed
forces and the ranks in the military are not similar to those in the Philippine National
Police. Thus, directors and chief superintendent of the PNP, such as the herein
respondent police officers, do not fall under the first category of presidential
appointees requiring the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
Important Provisions of RA 69775 (DILG Act of 1990)
Section 8. No retired or resigned military officer or police official shall be

appointed within one 1 year from the time of his resignation or retirement. In other
words, the prohibition is only for a period of 1 year from his separation from the
military or police service. Thereafter, the President is empowered to appoint such
retired or resigned military officer or police official.
Section 12 = defines the relationship between the DILG and the Department of
national Defense.
The primary role of the Department of National Defense through the Armed Forces
of the Philippines (AFP) is to secure and preserve the external security of the State.
In other words, the AFP has the primary, the principal role of preserving external
security.
Under the DILG are several offices, bureaus, i.e. PNP, the National Police
Commission (which exercises administrative control and supervision over the PNP),
Bureau of Jail and Management.
What is the role of DILG through the PNP?
- it has the primary role of preserving the internal security of the State.
- But where there are serious threats, through the national security of the state
and in the interest of public order, the President may upon the
recommendation of the Peace and Order Council, may call upon the Armed
Forces to reassume the primary responsibility of preserving not only the
external but also the internal security of the state.
Section 39 = compulsory retirement of officers and non-officers upon reaching the

age of 56 years.
In case an officer with the rank of Chief Superintendent, Director or the

Deputy Director General, the National Police Commission may allow his retention in
the service for an unextendible period of one year.
Positions Covered: Director General, the Deputy Director General, the Chief of the
PNP, the Director, and down the line is the Chief Superintendent.
Section 45 = citizen’s complaints.
Authorizes the filing by the private individual of a complaint against a member of

the PNP;
1. offense calls for a penalty punishable by a fine 0f 5-day salary or suspension,

the citizen’s complaint shall be filed before the Chief of Police.
2. where the penalty is not more than 30 days suspension, the complaint may
be filed before the mayor;
3. where the penalty is more than that period of suspension – more than a one
month of suspension as penalty or even dismissal from the service, a citizen
may file a such administrative complaint before the People’s Law
Enforcement Board (PLEB).
There is created a PLEB in every municipality, city or legislative district – composed

of:
1. a member of the Sanggunian

2. Barangay Captain; and
3. Impeccable citizens of the place (known for probity and independence)
The membership in the PLEB is a civic duty. This is one instance where an officer
aware of a private individual may be called upon to render public service, to
membership in the People’s Law Enforcement Board.
Section 45 = disciplinary action imposed by the PNP Regional Director or the PLEB
involving demotion or dismissal from the service, may be appealable to the Regional
Appellate Board. (RAB).
Decision of the PLEB is final unless the penalty is demotion or dismissal from
service. It will be appealed within 10 days from receipt of decision to:
a. Regional Appellate Board (RAB) = cases taken cognizance of by the Regional

Director or the PLEB;
b. National Appellate Board (NAB) = cases taken cognizance of by the Chief of
the PNP
RAB is given a period of 60 days to decide on such an appeal.

If no such decision is made on such appeal by the RAB, then it means that the
decision appealed from has become final and executory but subject to the right by
the aggrieved individual to appeal to the DILG Secretary.
So notwithstanding the lapse of the 60 day period and no action taken on

such appealed case by the RAB, the matter can still be the subject of an appeal to
the DILG Secretary.
It is erroneous to state that the appeal may be taken to the NAPOLCOM

because the NAPOLCOM takes cognizance of appealed cases only through its
recognized disciplinary machineries-RAB and NAB.
Cabada v. Alunan
260 SCRA 839
FACTS: The aggrieved individual filed the appeal addressed to the DILG Secretary in
his capacity as ex-officio Chairman of the NAPOLCOM.
HELD: His appeal is not deemed an appeal to the NAPOLCOM
Section 45 of the DILG Act of 1990 (RA 6976) clearly shows that the NAPOLCOM
exercises appellate Jurisdiction only on the following cases and through
a.) the National Appellate Board (NAB) in personnel disciplinary actions involving
demotion or dismissal from the service imposed by the PNP Chief; and
b.) the RAB in administrative cases against policemen and over decisions in
claims for police benefits:
The NAPOLCOM has no appellate jurisdiction over decisions rendered by the NAB
and the RAB. Consequently, the NAPOLCOM did not have authority over the appeal
and the petition for review and just because both mentioned the DILG Secretary as
Chairman of the NAPOLCOM did not bring them within the jurisdiction of the
NAPOLCOM.
Section 46= members of the PNP are no longer subject to the provisions of court
martial proceedings nor under the provisions of the CA 408 known as the Articles of
War.
The PNP shall be national scope and civilian in character. Meaning, all members
of the PNP are now subject to the authority of civilian courts. So, if cases are to be
filed against the members of the PNP, the cases, if evidence warrants, should be
filed before the regular courts and not before courts martial pursuant to the
provision of PD 1850 and the matters are tried under the civilian laws.
Courts martial are not judicial bodies but are implementing arms of the executive
branch. It is an administrative body under the executive branch and not a judicial
body.
The Sandiganbayan is a regular court. The ranks in the PNP service that belongs
to the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan are:
 From the rank of Provincial Director up-salary grade 27 and up (high
ranking officer
 below salary grade 27, superintendent is a low ranking officer of the
PNP.
Section 47 = preventive suspension
General Rule: Preventive suspension of a public officer must be for a fixed period–
90 days, 60 days, etc.
Exceptions:
1. the preventive suspension from office of a PNP member criminally charged
with grave offense where the suspension cannot be lifted before that time
2. where there may be indefinite preventive suspension – such as under RA
3019 in relation to the RA 1379 (III-gotten Wealth.)
The reason why PNP members are treated differently is that they carry
weapons and the badge of the law which can be used to harass or intimidate
witnesses against them. ( Himagan vs. People , 237 SCRA 538-541)
Section 51 defines the powers of local government executives over PNP units.
The Regional Police Director has the prerogative to name the five (5) eligible
police officers for the position of the chief of police from a pool of eligible officers
screened by the Senior Officer Promotion and Selection Board, PNP, Camp Crame ,
Quezon City, without interference from the local executives.
As deputy of the National Police Commission, the authority of the mayor is
very limited –in reality he has no power of appointment and has only the limited
power of selecting one from among the list of the five eligible police officer to be
named the chief of police.
The mayor cannot require the Regional Police Director to include the name of
any officer, no matter how qualified, in the list of five to be submitted to the mayor
(Andaya vs. Regional Trial Court. Cebu City, Br. 20. 319 SCRA 696).
In the provincial level, the Provincial Governor is limited to list the names of 5
eligible police officers as screened by the Senior Police Officer’s Promotion and
Selection Board of the PNP, Camp Crame, Quezon City.
General Rule: The power of local executives is one of operational supervision and
control. Meaning, the Local Chief Executives shall exercise operational supervisions
and control over the PNP units within his territorial jurisdiction.
Exception:
Within a period of 30 days immediately before a national, local, or barangay

elections and 30 days thereafter, the local chief executives do not have operational
control and supervision. It is the COMELEC which has the operational control over
the PNP units within 30 days before and 30 days after the elections pursuant to
Section 51 of the PNP Law.
Operational supervisions and control exercised by the local chief executives over
the PNP units.
 The power to direct, oversee and even inspect police units, police
forces, and the power to employ and deploy PNP units through the Station
Commander to ensure public safety and the maintenance of peace and
order within the territorial jurisdiction of the local chief executives
 The power to employ and deploy units and elements of the PNP
through the police station commander to ensure the maintenance of
peace and order within the territorial jurisdiction.
Section 52 = withdrawal of operational power
The President may upon consultation with the Provincial Governor and the
Congressman, suspend the power of operational supervision and control of any
Local Chief Executive over police units on any of the following grounds:
a. abuse of authority by the local chief executives;
b. frequent unauthorized absences; (Note that this is also one of the grounds for
the Institution of disciplinary action against a local executive official under
Section 60 of RA 7160;)
c. providing material support to criminal elements if the local chief executive is

in cahoots, or maintains an army of goons who are members of the PNP;
d. engaging in acts inimical to national security.
ALUNAN vs. ASUNCION

323 SCRA 623
FACTS: DILG Sec. Alunan issued Resolution 93-032 stopping the members of the
Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) from exercising certain police powers – power to
arrest, investigate commission of offenses as well as the power to effect seizures.
The resolution classifies them as merely civilian components of the PNP. The
resolution was questioned as violative of the DILG Law (RA 6975).
HELD: the questioned resolution implements RA 6975.
Resolution No. 93-032 issued by the NAPOLCOM which strips members of the
Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) with police powers (such as effecting arrest,
search and seizures and the investigation of the commission of crimes), and instead
classifies them as civilian personnel of the PNP does not violate RA 6975 but
actually implements it.
RA 6975 had the effect of revising the whole police force system and
substitute a new unified one in its place. The new police force absorbed the
members of the former NAPOLCOM, Philippine Constabulary (PC) and Integrated
National Police, all the three of which were accordingly abolished.
With the abolition of the PC, including necessarily the CIS, RA 5750, which
provides for the qualifications, selection and appointment of civilian investigation
agents of the CIS as well as their powers as peace officers, has been rendered
inutile. RA 5750 has been superseded by RA 6975.
Accordingly, police powers have been reserved for such uniformed PNP
personnel. Hence, those former CIS agents who opted not to join the uniformed
personnel of the PNP are effectively denied police powers.
OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL
The Solicitor General is the lawyer of the government, any of its agencies and
officials in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services
of a lawyer. This is so provided under Sec. 11 of PD no. 478. The exception is when
such officials or agents
1. are being charged criminally or

2. are being civilly sued for damages arising from a felony
The reason here is that, the government as the principal, cannot commit a wrong.
The illegal acts or omission committed by the agent cannot be imputed on the
principal.
Orbos vs. Civil Service Commission

12 Sept. 1990
FACTS: DOTC Secretary Orbos made a reorganization in the DOTC. Madarang

questioned the appointment of Ayug and Maglayon. He subsequently filed an appeal
before the CSC – which ruled that Madarang should be appointed instead. Orbos
refused to heed CSC since the matter of appointment is one solely belonging to the
sound discretion of the appointing authority. OSG represented DOTC. CSC
questioned this.
HELD: OSG can validly represent DOTC.

When confronted with a situation where one government office takes an adverse
position against another government agency, the Solicitor General should not
refrain from performing his duty as the lawyer of the government. It is incumbent
upon him to present to the court what he considers would legally uphold the best
interest of the government although it may run counter to a client’s position. In
such an instance, the government office adversely affected by the position taken by
the Solicitor General if it still believes in the merit of its case may appear in its own
behalf through its legal personnel or representative.
In situations where the other agency has already filed a pleading which is
inconsistent with the stand taken by the Solicitor General, the Solicitor General may
seek permission from the courts not to represent such agency and for that agency
to represent itself through its own in-house counsel.
Virata v. Sandiganbayan
272 SCRA 663
Sec. 35 Chapter 123, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987 (EO 292),
which reproduces the powers of the OSG enumerated in PD 478, provides that the
OSG shall deputize legal officers of government bureaus, agencies and offices to
assist the Solicitor General and represent the Government in cases involving their
respective officers, and call on any office or instrumentally of the Government for
such service assistance.
NPC vs. NLRC

272 SCRA 706
When authorized by the President or head of office, the OSG also represents
GOCCs. The OSG is the principal counsel of the National Power Corporation (NPC).
As such copies of orders and decisions served on the deputized special attorney,
acting as agent or representative of the Solicitor General, are not binding until they
are actually received by the Solicitor General. The proper basis for computing the
reglementary period to file an appeal and for determining whether a decision has
attained finally is service on the OSG and not on the special attorney
Urbano vs. Chavez & Co vs. Chavez

183 SCRA 347
FACTS: DILG Secretary Luis Santos was charged before the Ombudsman. He was
represented by OSG
HELD: OSG cannot represent Santos.

The Office of the Solicitor General is not authorized to represent a public official at
any stage of a criminal case or in a civil suit for damages arising from a felony. This
applies to all public officials and employees in the executive, legislative and judicial
branches of the government.
A public official who is sued in a criminal case is actually sued in his personal
capacity inasmuch as his principal, the State, can never be the author of a wrongful
act. In the same light, any pecuniary liability a public official may be held to account
on the occasion of a civil suit for damages arising from a felony committed by him is
for his own account. The State is not liable for the same.
Go v. Chavez
183 SCRA 347
FACTS: Solicitor General Frank Chavez was interviewed by Business World and he
uttered defamatory remarks. Go filed a civil action for damages arising form these
utterances of malicious remarks. Chavez was represented by the Office of the
Solicitor General.
HELD: Chavez should not be represented by the Office of the Solicitor General
because the case for damages cannot be attributable to the state. If ever there is a
judgment for the payment of damages, the government cannot be made
answerable therefore.
Of course, it does not mean that the Solicitor General should not represent a
government official sued in his official capacity where such representation would be
adverse to a position taken by another government office.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
The Supreme Court, in the leading case of Deloso vs. Domingo (191 S 545),
stated that the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman encompasses all kinds of
malfeasance, misfeasance and non-feasance committed by any public officer and
employee during their tenure of office.
The Supreme Court cited the constitutional mandate that it being the protector
of the people, is mandated and is bound to act promptly on any case brought before
it in any form or manner. Thus, any act or omission of a public officer when such
appears to be illegal, improper and unjust or inefficient may be the subject of
investigation by the Ombudsman.
(The findings or resolutions of the Ombudsman will not be looked into. If the case
has not yet been filed before the court, the Ombudsman has Jurisdiction over it but
if it has been filed with the court, the Ombudsman loses power over it.)
Deloso v. Domingo
191 S 545
FACTS: Deloso was the mayor of Botolan and was elected Governor of Zambales.
Sometime in the evening of April 22, 1988, Gov. Deloso with his convoy of security
of men composed of civilian and military personnel attended a basketball victory
party. While on their way to a barangay in Botolan, they were allegedly ambushed.
Not one of the convoy of Gov. Deloso was injured or killed. However, it was found in
the investigation that Deloso's men were actually the ambushers. So cases were
filed against the governor and his escorts before the court martial because at that
time there was yet ho RA 6975.
Deloso claimed in the preliminary investigation by the Ombudsman that the

crime of multiple murders allegedly committed by him was not office-related, and
therefore the Ombudsman has no authority to conduct preliminary investigation
against his person.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ombudsman has jurisdiction.
HELD: YES.
The Office of the Ombudsman covers all kinds of offense - all misfeasance,
malfeasances and non-feasances committed by public officers and employees.
Kinds of Jurisdiction of the Ombudsman
1. Primary
The Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction over offenses cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan. If other agencies have, in the meantime, investigated the case, at
any time of the proceeding, the Ombudsman can take over the investigation.
RA 1975 as amended by RA 8249 provides for the jurisdiction of the

Sandiganbayan:
1. Office related offenses
2. Regardless of penalty
3. High Ranking officer (Salary grade of 27 up)
NOTE: Even if below salary grade 27, they can still be under the
Sandiganbayan. The law expressly includes these.
1. Prosecutors
2. Regional Director and above
3. Municipal Mayor
4. Senior Superintendent
5. Head of Offices LGU's
2. Shared/Concurrent
These are cases wherein the Ombudsman exercises Jurisdiction together with
the RTC and MTC.
High Ranking Officers------file with the Sandiganbayan

Low Ranking Officers-------file information before the MTC or RTC
Sanchez v. Demetriou
227 SCRA 637
FACTS: Rape and Homicide cases were filed against Sanchez. Prior to that, there
was an invitation extended to the Mayor by police authorities. While he was already
in the police quarter, some witnesses pointed to him as the culprit, which led to his
arrest. On the spot, an inquest proceeding was undertaken. Sanchez questioned the
authority of the DOJ prosecutors conducting the preliminary investigation on the
ground that it is only the Ombudsman, which has the power to conduct preliminary
investigation against a public officer.
HELD: The authority of the Ombudsman is one of shared and concurrent jurisdiction
with other investigating body of the government such as the DOJ. Hence, there is no
infirmity in the filing of the information before she regular courts, in this case the
RTC.
Olivarez v. Ombudsman
248S 701
A permit was applied for by the Baclaran Cooperative to establish a fair. But
Olivarez disapproved it despite it being resolved already by the Sanggunian. Graft
charges were filed against Olivarez because he granted it to another. The Supreme
Court said that it would not intervene with the decision of the Ombudsman.
Q: Is there a need for conduct of a preliminary investigation?

A: No. Because there was already an investigation conducted by the OSP. The
Ombudsman will simply review whether the findings of the OSP are of accord. This
is an exercise of discretion
The authority of the Ombudsman covers all elective and appointive officials under
Section 21 of RA 7160 except members of Congress, members of the judiciary,
impeachable officers.
PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION BY THE OMBUDSMAN
Garcia vs. Mojica

314 SCRA 207
FACTS: Mayor Garcia signed the anomalous purchase of asphalt 4 days before the
local elections. Garcia was re-elected, Ombudsman then preventively suspended
him. Garcia claims that he could no longer be placed under preventive suspension
because of his re-election citing the case of AGUINALDO.
HELD: The Ombudsman can still issue preventive suspension order even if the act
in question happened during a previous term.
The power of the Ombudsman to issue preventive suspension order is provided for
under Section 24 or R.A. 6670. The power to investigate is separate and distinct
from the power to impose administrative sanctions. The power to investigate is also
separate and distinct from the power to preventively suspend a local elective
official.
But because of Garcia’s re-election, he cannot be sanctioned administratively

because the subject of the administrative complaint was committed during a
previous term despite the fact that the act complained of happened 4 days before
the elections. What is determinative is the time of commission i.e. during a previous
term. It does not matter that it took place a few days before the elections. There
was here a presumed knowledge on the part of the people re-electing him to the
same office. Thus, there was condonation as in the AGUINALDO case.
The power of the Ombudsman to preventively suspend any officer of

employee “under his authority” means that he can preventively suspend all officials
under investigation by his office regardless of the branch of the government in
which they are employed, excepting those removable by impeachment, members of
Congress and the Judiciary.
 To initiate impeachment, the Ombudsman can investigate
Yabut v. Ombudsman
233 SCRA 311
FACTS: While Vice Mayor Yabut was in traffic, a fistfight ensued between him and
an American. While investigation for simple misconduct and oppression was on-
going, he was preventively suspended for 90 days. His penalty was 90 day
suspension. Yabut now asks that the period of preventive suspension must be
credited to whatever penalty of suspension that may be imposed by the
Ombudsman.
HELD: the period of preventive suspension cannot be credited

A preventive suspension decreed by the Ombudsman by virtue of his authority
under Section 21 of RA 6770 in relation to Section 9 of Administrative Order No. 07,
is not meant to be a penalty .the period of preventive suspension cannot be
credited to whatever penalty that may be meted out.
Buenaseda v. Flavier
226 SCRA 646
FACTS: DOH Sec. Flavier filed graft cases against several employees including the
Chief (Dr. Buenaseda) of the Hospital of the National Center for Mental Health. After
filing their answer, the Ombudsman issued preventive suspension order. The
respondents contended that there was yet no formal hearing conducted on the
matter and so, the issuance of the preventive suspension order violated due
process.
HELD: They can be preventively suspended.

Being a mere order for preventive suspension, the questioned order of the
Ombudsman was validly issued even without a full blown hearing and the formal
presentation of evidence by the parties.
The moment criminal or administrative complaint is filed with the

Ombudsman, the respondent is deemed to be “in the authority” and he can proceed
to determine whether said respondent should be placed under preventive
suspension.
Castillo-Co v. Barbers
290 CSRA 719
FACTS: Gov. Castillo was charged with graft practices because she purchased
reconditioned heavy equipment when the requirement is for brand new ones.
Castillo contends that she can only be preventively suspended for 60 days since
that was what is provided under LGC.
HELD: She can be suspended for 6 months

The provisions under the LGC are different from that under the Ombudsman Act. So,
administrative proceedings taken by the Ombudsman pursuant to the Ombudsman
law ought to be followed. In other words, the Ombudsman can mete out the
maximum preventive suspension of six (6) months.
A preventive suspension can be decreed on an official under investigation

after charges are brought and even before the charges are heard since the same is
not in the nature of a penalty. The length of the period of suspension within the six-
month limit prescribed by Sec. 24 of RA 6770, like the evaluation of the strength of
the evidence, lies in the discretion of the Ombudsman.
Yasay vs. Desierto

300 SCRA 494
The matter of imposing the period of preventive suspension up to six months

lies within the discretion of the Ombudsman. The Supreme Court cannot substitute
its own judgment for the Ombudsman on this matter, absent clear showing of grave
abuse of discretion.
Generally, the SC will not interfere into the exercise of the discretion by the
Ombudsman. Although in the case of Garcia vs. Mojica, the SC ruled that the
imposition of six (6) months preventive suspension on Mayor Garcia was
unreasonable and so the SC reduced the period. As a general rule however, the
matter is within the discretion of the Office of the Ombudsman.
Appeal
Alba v. Nitorreda
254 SCRA 753
FACTS: DECS Asst. Regional Director Alba was charged of being partial to the owner
of the school in Tagum. He was found guilty but cannot appeal because of Sec. 27 of
RA 6770
HELD: No violation of right to appeal.
Section 27 of RA 6770 and Section 7, Rule 111 of Administrative order No. 7 (known
as the Rules of Procedure of the office of the Ombudsman), denying the right of
appeal and providing for the finality of the decision where the penalty imposed is
public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more that 1 month or a fine
equivalent to 1 month salary, is constitutional and not tantamount to a deprivation
of property without due process of law.
The right to appeal is not natural right nor part of due process. All other
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman which imposed penalties that are not
enumerated in Section 27 are not final, unappealable and immediately executory. In
these other cases, the respondent therein has the right to appeal to the Court of
Appeals within ten days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or
decision. An appeal timely filed will stay the immediate implementation of the
decision. In all these other cases therefore, the judgment imposed therein will
become final after the lapse of the reglementary period of appeal if no appeal is
perfected or, an appeal therefrom having been taken, the judgment in the appellate
tribunal becomes final.
Lapid v. CA.
334 SCRA 741
FACTS: Lapid was suspended for 1 year. Pending appeal, the NB DILG and
Ombudsman wants the penalty immediately executed.
HELD: penalty cannot be immediately executed since no law allows it. This case
was decided before A0-14-A
A decision of the Ombudsman finding him liable for misconduct and imposing
the penalty of one year suspension without pay, is not among those listed in the
Ombudsman Act of 1989 as final and unappealable.
There is no general legal principle that mandates that all decisions of quasi-
judicial and administrative agencies are immediately executory. Decisions rendered
by the SEC and the Civil Aeronautics Board, for example, are not immediately
executory and are stayed when an appeal is filed before the Court of Appeals.
On the other hand, the decisions of the Civil Service Commission, under the
Administrative Code, and the Office of the President under the Local Government
Code are immediately executor even pending appeal because the pertinent laws
under which the decisions were rendered mandate them to be so.
The provisions of the last two cited laws expressly provide for the execution
pending appeal of their final orders or decisions. Section 68 of the Local
Government Code only applies to administrative decisions rendered by the Office of
the President or the appropriate Sanggunian against elective local government
officials. Similarly, the provisions in the Administrative Code of 1987 mandating the
execution pending review applies specifically to administrative decisions of the Civil
Service Commissions involving members of the Civil Service. There is no basis in
law for the proposition that the provisions of the Administrative Code and the Local
Government Code on execution pending review should be applied suppletorily to
the provisions of the Ombudsman Act as there is nothing in the Ombudsman Act
which provides for such suppletory application.
Lopez vs. CA and Romero Liggayu

389 SCRA 570
FACTS: Liggayu, Manager of the Legal Department of the PCSO, was found guilty by
the Ombudsman of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service for issuing
a subpoena in excess of his authority as Resident Ombudsman of PCSO and was
meted the penalty of six months and one day suspension without pay.
HELD: Suspension cannot be executed pending appeal

The legislature has seen fit to grant a stay of execution pending appeal from
disciplinary cases where the penalty imposed by the Office of the Ombudsman is
not public censure, reprimand, or suspension of not more than one month, or a fine
not equivalent to a month salary.
The CA committed no grave abuse of discretion in issuing the Writ of

Preliminary Injunction enjoining the execution of private respondent Liggayu’s
suspension pending appeal. Considering that Liggayu appealed from the decision of
the Office of the Ombudsman, the stay of execution of the penalty of suspension
should therefore issue as a matter of right. The fact that the Ombudsman Act gives
parties the right to appeal from its decisions should not generally carry with it the
stay of these decisions pending appeal.
General Rule: The filing of an appeal will stay the immediate execution of the
penalty
Exception: when the law itself allows the execution ( this may have been repealed
by AO-14-A dated 8/17/2000 issued by the Ombudsman which states that an appeal
shall not stop the decision of the Ombudsman from being executory; he is entitled
to back wages though )
Fabian vs. Desierto

295 SCRA 470
Appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative

disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the 1977
Rules of Civil Procedure. In so holding, the SC declared unconstitutional Sec. 27 of
RA 6770 which provided that decisions of the office of the Ombudsman may be
appealed to the Supreme Court by way of petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Such provision was violative of Section 30, Article VI of
the Constitution, as it expanded the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court without its
advice and consent.
Villavert v. Desierto
23 February 2000
Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure precludes appeals from quasi-
judicial agencies, like the Office of the Ombudsman, to the Supreme Court.
Consequently, such appeals in administrative cases should be taken to the Court of
Appeals.
Marquez v. Desierto
June 23, 2001
FACTS: Ombudsman ordered the bank manager of Union bank to produce the bank
record of Lagdameo, who is subject to a fact finding investigation pertaining to
alleged graft practices.
HELD: The fact-finding examination is a fishing expedition which does not warrant
an exception from the Bank Secrecy Law, RA 1405.
Before an in camera inspection may be allowed:
1. There must be a pending case before the court

2. The account must be clearly identified
3. The inspection must be limited to the subject matter of the pending case
4. The bank personnel and the account holder must be notified to be present during
the inspection
5. Such inspection may cover only the account specified in the pending case.
In the case at bar, there is yet no pending litigation before any court of
competent authority. There is only an investigation by the Ombudsman.
Exceptions to the Bank Secrecy Law:
1. In the course of an examination by the bank pursuant to an authority given by

the Central Bank
2. An authority given to the auditor for the conduct of an audit
3. Upon written permission of the depositor
4. In cases of impeachment proceedings
5. Where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the controversy
6. Upon order of competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty on the
part of the public officer
COMMISSION ON AUDIT
Under the 1987 Constitution, Article 9B Section 2, Paragraph l, the COA has
the power, authority and duty to examine, audit and settle all accounts pertaining
to the revenues and receipts and disbursements of government funds. So, anything
requiring the disbursements of funds for the use of property is subject to audit by
the COA.
Under Article 9B Section 2 Paragraph 2, the COA has the power to promulgate
rules and regulations on auditing and accounting, including those for the prevention
and disallowance on irregular and improper, unnecessary or unconscionable
expenditure or use of public funds and properties.
NHA vs. COA

226 SCKA 65
FACTS: There was a loan agreement entered into by the Republic through NHA with
the KFW, a German entity. Under the contract, the German firm would finance the
urban housing—the Dagatdagatan
Project of the government. There was a need to extend the loan contract and one of
the conditions for the renewal of the contract was the extension of the services
contract of the German consultant. COA disallowed the extension.
HELD: COA’s disallowance was valid. The claim that renewal of NHA’s foreign loan
with German entity would have been jeopardized if NHA did not agree to the
extension of a foreign consultant’s services is no justification for not complying with
the constitutional mandate prohibiting unnecessary expenses of public funds which
is beyond compromise.
CIR v. COA
218 S 204
Under the law, upon the recommendation of the BIR, the Department of
Finance, which has the supervision and control over the BIR, .may grant an
informer's reward pursuant to the provision of the NIRC.
But the matter of disallowing the informer’s reward may still be the subject of
review by the courts. The court may determine whether the disallowance made by
the COA of the grant of informer’s reward is proper or not. Thus, it is within the
power of the court to rule on the disallowance made by COA.
DBP v. COA
373 S 356
The COA’s jurisdiction covers all government agencies, offices, bureaus and
units, including GOCCs, and even non-government entities enjoying subsidy from
the government. However, nothing in section 26 of PD 1445 states that COA’s
power to examine and audit government banks is exclusive, thereby preventing

private audit of government agencies concurrently with the COA audit. The Central
Bank has concurrent jurisdiction to examine and audit government banks. But still,
the COA’s audit prevails over that of the Central Bank since the COA is the
constitutionally mandated auditor of government banks. The Central Bank is also
devoid of authority to allow or disallow expenditures of government banks since this
function belongs exclusively to the COA.
Rodrigo, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan

303 S 309
The findings of COA is not binding on the other investigatory office of the
government, such as the Office of the Ombudsman, from taking cognizance of a
criminal complaint on matters covered by the audit report.
As a rule, the audit report is given respect. But nonetheless, if the

Ombudsman finds basis to proceed the conduct of investigation, it is within its
power to disregard the findings of COA.
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG)
EO 1 (Feb. 28, 1986) mandates the PCGG to recover ill-gotten wealth

accumulated by the Marcoses, their immediate families, relatives, subordinates,
associates and cronies, whether such properties are found in the Philippines or
abroad. This includes the power to take over or sequester all business enterprises or
entities controlled or owned by them. PCGG has the power to take over or place
under its control any property or office within its authority.
No civil action shall prosper against the PCGG or any member thereof for the
discharge of their functions and duties.
EO 2 empowers the PCGG to freeze all assets and properties in the

Philippines and likewise prohibit any person from transferring or concealing such
property alleged to be ill-gotten
EO 14 and EO 14-A mandate the PCGG to file and prosecute all cases before
the Sandiganbayan which has the exclusive jurisdiction to try and hear cases of the
PCGG. Section 5 of E.O. 14 as amended, empowers the PCGG to grant immunity
from criminal prosecution of any person who testifies.
Baseco v. PCGG
150 S 181
The PCGG cannot perform acts of ownership or dominion over sequestered

properties. The essence of the sequestration order is not an act of ownership. It is
simply an act to conserve properties to prevent further dissipation of assets alleged
to be ill-gotten. Since the PCGG is not the owner of the sequestered assets, it is not
allowed to vote sequestered shares of stocks or even elect members of the board of
director concerned (Cojuangco vs. Azcuna, April 16, 1991). The reason here is that
PCGG is a mere conservator and not an owner of the sequestered property.
The exception to this rule is in case of a take over of a business belonging to

the government of whose capitalization comes from government funds, but now in
the hands of the private business. In such situation, the PCGG may vote on the
sequestered shares not as an act of ownership but to conserve properties already in
the hands of private business but which used to be owned by the government or the
capitalization comes from the government.
Two clear “public character” exceptions under which the government is granted the
authority to vote the shares:
(1) Where government shares are taken over by private persons or entities
who/which registered them in their own names, and
(2) Where the capitalization or share that were acquired with public funds
somehow landed in private hands (Republic v. COCOFED, 372 SCRA 463;
Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 402 SCRA 85)
Republic v. COCOFED
372 SCRA 463
The sequestered UCPB shares having been conclusively shown to have been
purchased with coconut levies, the Court holds that these funds and shares are at
the very least, affected with public interest; thus private respondents even if they
are the registered shareholder cannot be accorded the right to vote them.
The coconut levy funds are not only affected with public interest, they are in
fact prima facie public funds. They also partake of the nature of taxes which are
enforced proportional contribution from persons and properties, exacted by the
state by virtue of its sovereignty for the support of the government and for all public
needs.
The PCGG has no authority to sell sequestered property as it is not the owner
of the property it sequesters. It is only an overseer, a protector and a preserver.
Under Sector 5 of Executive order No. 14, the PCGG is authorized to grant
immunity from criminal prosecution to any person who testifies. As ruled by the
Supreme Court in Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (173 SCRA 72), the PCGG, pursuant
to E.O. No. 14, in relation with Section 3 of the same Executive Order, may grant
criminal and civil immunities. The Sandigangbayan though has the jurisdiction to
look into the validity of the immunity granted by the PCGG.
Republic v. Sandigangbayan
173 S 72
FACTS: There was a grant of civil immunity to Jose Campos, such immunity was
extended to his son. Jose Campos, Jr. Whether or not the PCGG is empowered to
grant civil immunity? Note that section 5 of E.O. 14 talks only of immunity given by
PCGG in criminal cases.
HELD: Section 5 must be related to section 3 of E.O. 14 as amended which provides

for the procedure and the applicable laws in the prosecution of civil cases and
applying the provision of the New Civil Code, Article 2028 the mandate is to
conciliate civil cases. Therefore, the grant of civil immunity in the civil case to the
son (Jose Campos, Jr.) was within the power of the PCGG.
Republic v. Sandiganbayan
258 S 686
FACTS: A representative of the PCGG, Atty. Ramirez issued a sequestration order

over the assets and properties of Dio Island resort in Leyte Allegedly owned by the
Romualdezes.
HELD: To be valid, a sequestration order must be issued with the authority of 2

commissioners. Under the rules promulgated, the PCGG may issue writ of
sequestration upon the authority of at least two commissioners when the
commission has reasonable grounds to believe that the issuance thereof is
warranted. But the PCGG may not delegate its authority to sequester to its
representatives and subordinates and any such delegation is invalid and ineffective.
The power to sequester, therefore carriers with it the corollary duty to make a
preliminary determination of whether there is a reasonable basis for sequestering a
property alleged to be ill-gotten. The absence of such prior determination by the
PCGG is a fatal defect which renders the sequestration void ab initio and thus, not
subject to ratification by the PCGG.
HELD: The order was invalid even though it was ratified by the Commission. The
writ of sequestration is null and void since the issuance made by the representative
of the PCGG did not conform to the rules implementing the law. No ratification by
the PCGG can cure the defect, such non compliance is a fatal defect.
Republic vs. Migrino

30 August 1990
FACTS: PCGG initiated an investigation on the alleged ill-gotten wealth of Col.

Tecson, yet there were no allegations that Tecson is related to the Marcoses.
HELD: PCGG has no jurisdiction: Ombudsman has.

The PCGG is the agency empowered to bring proceedings for forfeiture of property
allegedly acquired unlawfully before February 25, 1986, while the power to
investigate cases of ill-gotten or unexplained wealth acquired after that date is
vested in the Ombudsman (Republic vs. Sandiganbayan 237 SCRA 242) and if
warranted the Solicitor general may file the forfeiture petition with the
Sandiganbayan.
Republic vs Sandiganbayan
407 SCRA 13
Where there is no jurisdiction to waive, as the PCGG cannot exercise

investigative or prosecutorial powers never granted to it, then respondent Major
General Ramas could not be deemed to have waived any defect in the filing by the
PCGG of the forfeiture petition by filing an answer with counterclaim. Parties may
raise lack of jurisdiction at any stage of the proceeding. Ramas’ position alone as
Commanding General of the Philippine Army does not suffice to make him a
‘Subordinate’ of former president Marcos for purposes of EO 1 and its amendments.
It is precisely a prima facie showing that the ill-gotten wealth was accumulated by a
‘subordinate’ of Marcos that vests jurisdiction on PCGG failing in this the PCGG
should have recommended the instant case to the Ombudsman.
PCGG vs. Peña

April 12, 1988
FACTS: There was a freeze order issued by the PCGG over the assets and records of
two government firms. This freeze order was contested before the RTC. Based on a
complaint, the RTC issued a restraining order.
HELD: The RTC has no jurisdiction over PCGG. The SC applied the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative remedies. The PCGG is a co-
equal body with the RTC and co-equal bodies have no power to control the other. It
is only the Sandiganbayan which has the exclusive jurisdiction over the PCGG.
CENTRAL BANK
The actions of the Monetary Board in proceedings on insolvency are explicitly

declared under Section 29 of the Central Bank Act (RA. 265, as amended by EO 289)
to be “Final and executory.” They may not be set aside, except upon ‘convincing
proof that the action is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith” (Central Bank vs.
Judgo dela Cruz 12 November 1990).
The Central Bank can close down a bank for insolvency without prior notice
and hearing. The close now and hear later policy that empowers the Central Bank to
take over a bank before it could even disprove the CB’s findings of insolvency is
intended to prevent the unwarranted dissipation of the bank assets and protect its
depositors, creditors, stockholders and the public.
Central Bank v. Triumph Saving Bank

220 SCRA 536
Section 29 of the Central Bank Act does not require prior notice and hearing
before a bank may be directed to stop operations and place under receivership
because that would only create more liabilities and destroy evidence of fraud.
Requisites before the Central Bank can close down a bank for insolvency
without prior notice and hearing:
1. There must be an examination pursuant to the authority of the Central Bank.

In other words the examining department of the Central bank is given the
power by the latter to look into the accounts and records of the bank in
question.
2. On the basis of such examination, a report has to be submitted to the
Monetary Board; and
3. The Monetary Board on the basis of such report finding that further operation
would only cause danger to the bank and to the public, then it can order the
immediate closure of the bank.
Of course under the law, the aggrieved bank is given the opportunity to sue the
Central Bank within a period of ten 10 days from the date of closure.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM (DAR)
Republic Act No. 6657 explicitly recognizes the effectivity and applicability of PD
229, vesting the Department of Agrarian Reform with original jurisdiction, generally,
over all cases involving agrarian laws, although under Section 57 of said act, it
restores to the Regional Trial Court original and exclusive jurisdiction over;
1. petitions for the determination of just compensation to be paid to the
landowner ; and
2. the prosecution of all criminal offenses under the Act ( Tangub vs. Court of
appeals, 03 December 1990)
Under Sec. 50 of RA 6657, it is the DAR which is vested with

1. primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters; and
2. the exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the
implementation of Agrarian reform (includes determination of just
compensation) except those falling under the exclusive original jurisdiction of
the department agriculture and the DENR.
DAR”s exclusive original jurisdiction is exercised through hierarchically-arranged

agencies of the DAR, namely.
1. DARAB (Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board)

2. RARAD ( Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator);and
3. PARAD (Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator)
- All cases under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the DAR must commence
in the PARAD of the province where the property is situated.
- The DARAB only has appellate jurisdiction to review the order and findings of
the PARAD.
Roxas & Co. v. CA

321 SCRA 106
FACTS: DAR determined that the property in Nasugbu, Batangas should be brought
under CARP. Presidential Proclamation 15-20 declared the same area as tourist
zone.
HELD: DAR authorities must not simply disregard the proclamation because it has
the effect of a law unless the same is repealed. The character of a parcel of land is
not determined merely by a process of elimination – the actual use which the land is
capable should be the primordial factor. Presidential Proclamation No. 1520, which
declared Nasugbu, Batangas as a tourist zone has the force and effect of law unless
repealed as it cannot be disregarded by DAR or any other department of
Government.
Since it governs the extraordinary method of expropriating private property,

the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) should be strictly construed.
Section 50 Section 57
Refers to administrative proceedings Refers to judicial proceedings in
which may be subject to judicial inquiry determining just compensation
Confers to the DAR the primary Confers the exclusive original jurisdiction
jurisdiction to determine agrarian reform to the RTC to hear and decide petitions
matters and the exclusive authority over for the determination of just
all matters pertaining to the compensation.
implementation of agrarian reforms
which necessary includes the
determination of just compensation to be
paid to the landowner
Preliminary determination made by the RTC is not exercising appellate

DAR in the matter of the value of the jurisdiction
land placed under the CARP and the just
compensation.
Under Section 11 Rule 13 of the DARAB Rules, the decision of the adjudicator
in the summary administrative proceeding on land-valuation and preliminary
determination and payment of just compensation shall not be appealable to the
DARAB but shall be filed directly with the RTC which shall be constituted as a
special agrarian reform court. So, this is still an exercise of original exclusive
jurisdiction of the RTC.
This is consistent with the doctrine of primary jurisdiction and the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies. It only means that primary jurisdiction is
lodged in the DAR as an administrative agency to determine in a preliminary
manner the just compensation.
The STAGES required under Section 50 under this agrarian

(administrative) proceeding:
1. The land bank determines a preliminary determination as to the value of land

placed under the CARP and the compensation to be paid to the landowner.
2. The DAR initiates the acquisition of agricultural land by notifying the owner of
the property of the desire of the government to place the property under the
coverage of the CARP together with the notice and the valuation as initially
determined by the Land bank;
3. Within 30 days from notice given by the DAR, the landowner must decide
whether to accept or reject the offer made by the DAR;
4. If there is rejection by the landowner, there will be a summary administrative
proceeding held by the PARAD or RARAD, as the case may be, depending on
the value of the land, for purposes of determining just compensation;
5. Parties interested in the transaction are required to submit their respective
evidence
6. The DAR adjudicator must decide the matter within 30 days from submission
of the case;
7. If the landowner still finds the price unsatisfactory, the he can bring the case
immediately and directly to the RTC within 15 days from receipt of notice of
such decision. There is no need to bring it to the DARAB.
Philippine Veterans Bank v. CA

322 SCRA 140
FACTS: PVB’s properties were placed under CARP, PVB filed its appeal before the
RTC beyond the 15 day period as required under Section 11, Rule 13 of the
DARAB rules. The RTC dismissed the petition.
HELD: The 15 day period to file the petition for just compensation is mandatory.
The jurisdiction of the courts is not any less original and exclusive because the
question is first passed upon by the DAR, as the judicial proceedings are not a
continuation of the administrative determination. Hence, as the petition of the
landowner PVB was filed beyond the 15-day period provided in Rule XIII, Sec. 11
of the DARAB Rules, the trial court correctly dismissed the case (for judicial
determination of the just compensation) and the CA correctly affirmed the order
of dismissal.
Laguna Estate Dev’t Corp. v. CA.

335 SCRA 38
FACTS: CARP beneficiaries filed a case before the DAR to compel LEDC to grant
them an easement of right of way
HELD: DARAB has no power to grant to the beneficiaries a right of way

(easement) since there is no tenancy relationship between the parties.
For the DARAB to have jurisdiction ever the case, there must be TENANCY
relationship between the parties. In the instant case, there exist no tenancy
relationship between the petitioner estate and the beneficiaries.
The following indispensable elements must be established:
1. The parties are the land-owner and the tenant or agricultural lessees.
2. The subject matter of the relationship is agricultural land
3. There must be consent between the parties to the tenancy relationship
4. The purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural
production
5. There is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural
lessees; and
6. The harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or
agricultural lessees
Obviously, in this case, the issue of a right of way or easement over private
property without tenancy relation is outside the jurisdiction of the DARAB . This is
not an agrarian issue. Jurisdiction is vested in a court of general jurisdiction.
PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR)

Under PD 1869, the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation or

PAGCOR has the authority to operate gambling joints in any part of the Philippines,
whether on land or water.
It Was formerly PD 1066A, then amended to PD 1067B which granted

franchise to operate gambling casinos; further amended on June 2, 1978 as PD 1399
with the objectives of "Responding through Responsible Gaming" before being
amended again by PD 1869 to centralize and integrate all gambling activities under
one authority. Public welfare is the root of all legislation made by Congress.
The original law creating PAGCOR was PD 1077 in January 1, 1977. Its
operation was still limited then. However, the government realized that PAGCOR is a
good source of revenue. In fact, it was and still is the third largest revenue-earning
agency of the government after BIR and Bureau of Customs. Thus, the government
granted it more powers to operate. Enacting PD 1869 on July 1983 amended its
charter.
PD 1869 mandates the creation of a gaming corporation called PAGCOR,

which is possessed of two (2) characteristics:
1. As a government institution
PAGCOR has a regulatory function. It tries to centralize all forms of gambling
in one gaming corporation.
2. As a corporation
PAGCOR as a corporation is empowered to establish, maintain and operate in
any part of the Philippines (even if such move is objected to by the local
government unit). According to the Supreme Court, public welfare is the objective
for establishing this institution.
No local government unit may impose local tax on PAGCOR because it has its
own charter. It is exempt from all kinds of taxes that the local government unit
imposes or plans to impose. PAGCOR remits annually to the National Government or
to the Office of the President's Social Fund. It also remits to the city local
government unit where it is situated and that is the local government's share.
PAGCOR also funds projects of certain organizations.
Employees of PAGCOR are still covered by Civil Service Laws but since
PAGCOR has a board, they may be granted other privileges.
LAND TRANSPORATION OFFICE (LTO)

and
LAND TRANSPORTATION AND FRANCHISING REGULATORY BOARD
(LTFRB)
The LTO and the LTRRB are under the supervision of the Department of
Transportation and Communication (DOTC)
The DOTC, through the LTO and LTFRB, is mandated to implement laws pertaining to
land transportation under RA 4136 otherwise known as the Land Transportation and
Traffic Code.
The LTO has the duty to register vehicles and licensing of drivers.
The LTFRB under E.O. 202, is tasked for the regulation of public utility or for-hire
vehicles and the grant franchises or certificates of public convenience.
Section 458 of the local government Code confers to the LGUs the regulation of
operation of tricycles-for-hire and grant of franchises for the operation thereof,
subject to the guidelines issued by the DOTC.
The duty of LTO is not affected by Section 458 of the LGC. Still the LTO is mandated
to require the registration of these tricycles-for-hire. R.A. 4136 mandates the
registration of all kinds of motor vehicles used or operated on or upon any public
highway in the Philippines.
Hutchison Ports Philippines Limited v. SBMA

339 SCRA 434
FACTS: SBMA conducted bidding for the operation of container terminal in Subic
Bay. Of the 3 bidders, only 2 qualified, ICTSI and HPPL Before the opening of the
sealed bidding, HPPL wanted to disqualify ICTSI since it is the operator of the Manila
International Container Port MICP under EO 212, there is prohibition as to the
operation of the same operator of another similar facility.
ICTSI appealed such protest to the Office of the President pending appeal.
SBMA awarded the bid to HPPL. Exec. Sec. Torres recommended the re bidding of
the project. HPPL argued that there was already a perfected contract because the
SBMA Board of Directors already awarded the contract to it.
HELD: Petitioner HPPL has not shown that it has a clear right to be declared as the
winning bidder with finality. The award given by the SBMA was not yet final and
thus, can still be assailed.
Petitioner HPPL has not sufficiently shown that it has a clear and
unmistakable right to be declared the winning bidder with finality, such that SBMA
can be compelled to negotiate a concession contract. As a chartered institution, the
SBMA is always under the direct control of the Office of the President, particularly,
when contracts and/or project undertaking by the SBMA entail substantial amounts
of money.
Specifically. LOI 620 dated October 27, 1997 mandates that the approval of
the President is required in all contracts of the national government office, agencies
and instrumentalities, including GOCC’s involving P2 Million and above, awarded
thru public bidding or negotiations. Though the SBMA Board of Directors, by
resolution, may have declared HPPL as the winning bidder, said award cannot be
said to be final and unassailable. The SBMA Board of Directors and other officers are
subjects to the control and supervision of the office of the President. The President
may, within his authority, overturn or reverse any award made by the SBMA Board
of Director for justifiable reasons. The discretion to accept or reject any bid or even
recall the award thereof, is of such wide latitude that the courts will not generally
interfere with the exercise thereof by the executive department, unless such
exercise is used to shield unfairness or injustice. When the President issued the
memorandum setting aside the award previously declared by SBMA in favor of HPPL
and directing that a re-bidding be conducted, the same was within the authority of
the President and was a valid exercises of his prerogative.
Philosophy at work
“The rest is silence” – robert

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Administrative Law 1

ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY refers to any governmental authority other than a

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW vs. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW prescribes the permanent framework of the system of

2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW prescribes the limitations on the exercise of governmental

3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW stresses on the rights of citizens; whereas

ADMINISTRATIVE BODY vs. COURT

1. An ADMINISTRATIVE BODY is composed of persons or individuals who are

2. An ADMINISTRATIVE BODY has variety of functions; whereas

3. An ADMINISTRATIVE BODY is given a wider discretion in the exercise of its power

TEST TO DETERMINE WHETHER A BODY/AGENCY IS ADMINISTRATIVE OR

Administrative → if its function is primarily regulatory even if it conducts hearings

 The purpose of Administrative Law is the protection of the rights of the

In almost every human activity, the government created administrative

BAR QUESTION: What are the types of administrative bodies or agencies?

They are the following:

1) Administrative agencies created to carry on governmental functions (BIR, BoC,

SOURCES OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

1. Constitutional or statutory enactments creating administrative bodies.

GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (GRP) vs. NATIONAL

The Government of the Republic of the Philippines refers to the corporate

On the other hand, National Government refers only to the central

National Government is definitely a part of the government of the Republic of

Bacani vs. National Coconut Corporation

Facts: Plaintiffs are court stenographers assigned in a case Sycip v. National

Held: Government of the Republic of the Philippines refers to that

They do not include entities which are to be given corporate personality

Central Bank vs. CA

ISSUE: Whether or not Central Bank is part of the National Government?

To be sure, the CB is a government instrumentality. But it was created as an

IRON AND STEEL AUTHORITY (ISA) vs. CA

ISSUE: Whether or not ISA may be properly substituted by the GRP?

SC: ISA is a non-incorporated authority, thus GRP could substitute.

FONTANILLA vs. MALIAMAN

ISSUE: Whether or not NIA is a part of the "Government of the Philippines'"?

Furthermore, the NIA is a government agency with a juridical personality,

DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION

The doctrine applies where a claim is originally cognizable in courts, and

Board of Commissioners of the Commission on Immigration and

Facts: The Bureau of Immigration recognized Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather

The Primary Jurisdiction of the Bureau of Immigration over deportation

Qualitrans Limousine Service, Inc. v. Royal Class Limousine Service

FACTS: The Land Transportation Commission (LTC) rendered a decision granting

Actually, the petition although named as “petition for declaratory relief”, is a

Marina Properties Corp. v. CA and HL Carlos Construction

FACTS: Petitioner Marina is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of real

1. Collection for a sum of money corresponding to unpaid billings from their

ISSUE: Which body has jurisdiction over the case?

Solid Homes, Inc. v. Payawal

a) Unsound real estate business and practices

Note: Section 1 of PD 957 as Amended by PD #1344- Empowers the National

CT Torres Enterprises, Inc. v. Hibionada

FACTS: Petitioners, as agent of Pleasantville Development Corporation sold a

PD # 957 otherwise known as "The Subdivision and Condominium Buyer's

1. Unsound real estate business practices;

Note: The HLURB is competent to award damages although this is essentially a

On 2/7/1981, by virtue of EO 648, the regulatory functions of NHA were

Although the doctrine of primary jurisdiction exhorts the referral of the

5 of PD 902-A) to the courts of general jurisdiction or the appropriate Regional Trial

PAL vs. Kurangking,

Padua vs. Ranada

“Man is not what he is but he is what he is not.” – Jean-Paul Sartre

POWERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES

Administrative bodies commonly exercise 2 basic powers: