(1) CONSUELO LEGARDA vs. N.M. SALEEBY October 2, 1915 G.R. No.

L-8936

FACTS: Consuelo Legarda and N.M. Saleeby are owners of adjoining lots in Ermita, Manila. Between
their lots is a stone wall which is located on the lot of the plaintiffs. On March 2, 1906, Consuelo and her
husband presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration to register their lot. The registration was
allowed on October 25, 1906. They were then issued an original certificate and the title was registered.
Both included the wall. On March 25, 1912, the predecessor of N.M. Saleeby presented a petition in the
Court of Land Registration for registration. The court decreed the registration of the land which also
included the wall. The plaintiffs Consuelo and Mauro, her husband, discovered that the wall has also
been registered to N.M. Saleeby.They presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for
adjustment and correction of the error where the wall was indicated in both registrations. However, the
lower court contended that during the pendency of the petition for the registration of the defendant’s
land, they failed to make any objection to the registration of said lot, including the wall, in the name of
the defendant.

ISSUE: WON the defendant is the owner of the wall and the land occupied by it?

RULING: NO. The lower court’s decision would call for the plaintiffs to be always alert and see to it that
no other parties will register the wall and its land. Else, if they spotted someone registering such wall in
their own name, plaintiff must immediately oppose. Such would become defeat the real purpose of the
Torrens system of land registration.

The real purpose of that system is to quiet title to land; to put a stop forever toany question of the
legality of the title, except claims which were noted at the time of registration, in the certificate, or
which may arise subsequent thereto. That being the purpose of the law, it would seem that once a title
is registered the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or
sitting in the mirador de su casa, to avoid the possibility of losing his land.

So who owns the land? According to Torrens system, the plaintiffs. Under our law, once a party registers
the land, final and in good faith, no third parties may claim interest on the same land. The rights of all
the world are foreclosed by the decree of registration.

The registration, under the Torrens system, does not give the owner any better title than he had. The
registration of a particular parcel of land is a bar to future litigation over the same between the same
parties. It is a notice to the world and no one can plead ignorance of the registration. Adopting the rule
which we believe to be more in consonance with the purposes and the real intent of the torrens system,
we are of the opinion and so decree that in case land has been registered under the Land Registration
Act in the name of two different persons, the earlier in date shall prevail. The presumption is that the
purchaser has examined every instrument of record affecting the title. This presumption is
IRREBUTABLE. It cannot be overcome by proof of innocence or good faith. Otherwise the very purpose
and object of the law requiring a record would be destroyed. The rule is that all persons must take
notice of the facts which the public record contains is a rule of law. The rule must be absolute. Any
variation would lead to endless confusion and useless litigation.

DECISION: Judgment of the lower court was revoked. The wall and the land where it sits is awarded to
the plaintiffs.
(2) Republic v. Court of Appeals and Naguit, G.R. No. 144057 (January 17, 2005)

Alienation of Public Agricultural Lands

FACTS: On January 5, 1993, Naguit filed a petition for registration of title of a parcel of land. The
application sought a judicial confirmation of imperfect title over the land.

The public prosecutor, appearing for the government, and Angeles opposed the petition. The court
issued an order of general default against the whole world except as to Angeles and the government.

The evidence revealed that the subject parcel of land was originally declared for taxation purposes in
the name of Urbano in 1945. Urbano executed a Deed of Quitclaim in favor of the heirs of Maming,
wherein he renounced all his rights to the subject property and confirmed the sale made by his father to
Maming sometime in 1955 or 1956. Subsequently, the heirs of Maming executed a deed of absolute
sale in favor of respondent Naguit who thereupon started occupying the same.

Naguit constituted Blanco, Jr. as her attorney-in-fact and administrator. The administrator introduced
improvements, planted trees in addition to existing coconut trees which were then 50 to 60 years old,
and paid the corresponding taxes due on the subject land.

Naguit and her predecessors-in-interest had occupied the land openly and in the concept of owner
without any objection from any private person or even the government until she filed her application for
registration.

The OSG argued that the property which is in open, continuous and exclusive possession must first be
alienable. Since the subject land was declared alienable only on October 15, 1980, Naguit could not
have maintained a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, as required by Section 14 of the
Property Registration Decree, since prior to 1980, the land was not alienable or disposable.

The OSG suggested an interpretation that all lands of the public domain which were not declared
alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to original registration, no matter
the length of unchallenged possession by the occupant.

ISSUE: Whether or not it is necessary under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree that the
subject land be first classified as alienable and disposable before the applicant’s possession under a
bona fide claim of ownership could even start.

RULING: Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, governing original registration proceedings,
provides:

SECTION 14. Who may apply.— The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an
application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:

(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

(2) Those who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under the provisions
of existing laws.
There are three obvious requisites for the filing of an application for registration of title under Section
14(1) – that the property in question is alienable and disposable land of the public domain; that the
applicants by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation, and; that such possession is under a bona fide claim
of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

The OSG's interpretation would render paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually inoperative and even
precludes the government from giving it effect even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural lands as
alienable and disposable. The unreasonableness of the situation would even be aggravated considering
that before June 12, 1945, the Philippines was not yet even considered an independent state.

The more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires the property sought to be
registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed.
If the State, at the time the application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the property for
alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the government is still reserving the right to utilize the
property; hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse
possession even if in good faith. However, if the property has already been classified as alienable and
disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already an intention on the part of the State to abdicate its
exclusive prerogative over the property.

In this case, the 3 requisites for the filing of registration of title under Section 14(1) had been met by
Naguit. The parcel of land had been declared alienable; Naguit and her predecessors-in-interest had
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land evidenced by
the 50 to 60-year old trees at the time she purchased the property; as well as the tax declarations
executed by the original owner Urbano in 1954, which strengthened one's bona fide claim of ownership.

(3) HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN (Represented by Sally Malabanan) vs REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
PROMULGATED: SEPTEMBER 3, 2013 PONENTE: J. BERSAMIN

This case is a resolution of the Motions for Reconsideration, filed by the parties who both assail the
decision of the Court promulgated on April 29, 2009. In the decision, the Court upheld the ruling of the
Court of Appeals which denied the application of the petitioners for the registration of a parcel of land
situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite, on the ground that they had not established by sufficient
evidence their right to the registration in accordance with either section 14 (1) or 14 (2) of the
Property Registration Decree (P.D. 1529).

On February 20, 1998, applicant Mario Malabanan, who had purchased the property from Eduardo
Velazco, filed an application for land registration covering the property in the RTC in Tagaytay City,
Cavite, claiming that the property formed part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain,
and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, uninterrupted, public and
adverse possession and occupation of the land for more than 30 years, thereby entitling him to the
judicial confirmation of his title. To prove such, Malabanan presented during trial a certification issued
by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the DENR. The RTC rendered
judgment granting Malabanan’s application for land registration. The Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) appealed the judgment to the CA, arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove that the property
belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC erred in finding
that he had been in possession of the property in the manner and for the length of time required by law
for confirmation of imperfect title. The CA promulgated its decision reversing the RTC and dismissing
the application for registration of Malabanan. Citing the ruling in Republic v. Herbieto (Herbieto), the
CA declared that under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, any period of possession prior
to the classification of the land as alienable and disposable was inconsequential and should be excluded
from the computation of the period of possession. Noting that the CENRO-DENR certification stated that
the property had been declared alienable and disposable only on March 15, 1982, Velazco’s possession
prior to March 15, 1982 could not be tacked for purposes of computing Malabanan’s period of
possession.

DISCUSSION:

Classifications of land according to ownership

Land may be classified as either of public dominion or of private ownership. It is of public dominion if it:
(a) is intended for public use; or (b) belongs to the State, without being for public use, and is intended
for some public service or for the development of the national wealth. Land belonging to the State that
is not of such character, or although of such character but no longer intended for public use or for public
service forms part of the patrimonial property of the State. Land that is other than part of the
patrimonial property of the State, provinces, cities and municipalities is of private ownership if it
belongs to a private individual. Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine (Jura Regalia), all lands of the public
domain belong to the State. All lands not appearing to be clearly under private ownership are presumed
to belong to the State. Also, public lands remain part of the inalienable land of the public domain unless
the State is shown to have reclassified or alienated them to private persons.

Classifications of public lands according to alienability

1935 Constitution: lands of the public domain were classified into - agricultural, timber and mineral.
Section 10, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution: lands of the public domain were classified into -
agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral, timber or forest, and grazing
land, with the reservation that the law might provide other classifications.

1987 Constitution adopted the classification under the 1935 Constitution into agricultural, forest or
timber, and mineral, but added national parks. Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, only
agricultural lands of the public domain may be alienated; all other natural resources may not be.

Alienable and disposable lands of the State fall into two categories:

(a) patrimonial lands of the State, or those classified as lands of private ownership under Article 425 of
the Civil Code, without limitation; and

(b) lands of the public domain, or the public lands as provided by the Constitution, but with the
limitation that the lands must only be agricultural.

Consequently, lands classified as forest or timber, mineral, or national parks are not susceptible of
alienation or disposition unless they are reclassified as agricultural. A positive act of the Government is
necessary to enable such reclassification, and the exclusive prerogative to classify public lands under
existing laws is vested in the Executive Department, not in the courts. If, however, public land will be
classified as neither agricultural, forest or timber, mineral or national park, or when public land is no
longer intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth, thereby effectively
removing the land from the ambit of public dominion, a declaration of such conversion must be made in
the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or by a Presidential proclamation in cases where the
President is duly authorized by law to that effect.

Disposition of alienable public lands

Section 11 of the Public Land Act (CA No. 141) provides the manner by which alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain, i.e., agricultural lands, can be disposed of: (1) For homestead settlement; (2)
By sale; (3) By lease; and (4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles; (a) By judicial legalization;
or (b) By administrative legalization (free patent).

The core of the controversy herein lies in the proper interpretation of Section 11(4), in relation to
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, which expressly requires possession by a Filipino citizen of the land
since June 12, 1945, or earlier. Bearing in mind such limitations under the Public Land Act, the applicant
must satisfy the following requirements in order for his application to come under Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree, to wit:

1. The applicant, by himself or through his predecessor-in-interest, has been in possession and
occupation of the property subject of the application;

2. The possession and occupation must be open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious;

3. The possession and occupation must be under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership;

4. The possession and occupation must have taken place since June 12, 1945, or earlier; and

5. The property subject of the application must be an agricultural land of the public domain.

In sum, these are the rules relative to the disposition of public land or lands of the public domain,
namely:

(1) As a general rule and pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the
State and are inalienable. Lands that are not clearly under private ownership are also presumed to
belong to the State and, therefore, may not be alienated or disposed;

(2) Exceptions:

(a) Agricultural lands of the public domain are rendered alienable and disposable through any of the
exclusive modes enumerated under Section 11 of the Public Land Act. If the mode is judicial
confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, the agricultural land subject of
the application needs only to be classified as alienable and disposable as of the time of the application,
provided the applicant’s possession and occupation of the land dated back to June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Thereby, a conclusive presumption that the applicant has performed all the conditions essential to a
government grant arises, and the applicant becomes the owner of the land by virtue of an imperfect or
incomplete title. By legal fiction, the land has already ceased to be part of the public domain and has
become private property.

(b) Lands of the public domain subsequently classified or declared as no longer intended for public use
or for the development of national wealth are removed from the sphere of public dominion and are
considered converted into patrimonial lands or lands of private ownership that 3 may be alienated or
disposed through any of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code. If the mode of
acquisition is prescription, whether ordinary or extraordinary, proof that the land has been already
converted to private ownership prior to the requisite acquisitive prescriptive period is a condition sine
qua non in observance of the law (Article 1113, Civil Code) that property of the State not patrimonial in
character shall not be the object of prescription.

In the case at bar, the petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that they and their
predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land since June 12, 1945. Without satisfying the
requisite character and period of possession - possession and occupation that is open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious since June 12, 1945, or earlier - the land cannot be considered ipso jure
converted to private property even upon the subsequent declaration of it as alienable and disposable.
Prescription never began to run against the State, such that the land has remained ineligible for
registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. Likewise, the land continues to be
ineligible for land registration under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree unless Congress
enacts a law or the President issues a proclamation declaring the land as no longer intended for public
service or for the development of the national wealth. PETITION DENIED

(4) OFFICE OF THE CITY MAYOR OF PARAÑAQUE CITY v. MARIO D.EBIO AND HIS CHILDREN/HEIRS

G.R. No. 178411 June 23, 2010

FACTS: Respondents claim to be absolute owners of a 406 sqm. parcel of land in Parañaque City covered
by Tax in the name of respondent Mario D. Ebio. Said land was an accretion of Cut-cut creek.

Respondents assert that the original occupant and possessor land was their great grandfather, Jose
Vitalez, which was given to his son, Pedro Valdez, in 1930. From then on, Pedro continuously and
exclusively occupied and possessed the said lot. In 1966, after executing an affidavit declaring
possession and occupancy. He also paid taxes for the land.

Meanwhile, in 1961, respondent Mario Ebio married Pedro’s daughter, Zenaida. In April 1964 and in
October 1971, Mario Ebio secured building permits from the Parañaque municipal office for the
construction of their house within the land. On April 21, 1987, Pedro transferred his rights over the land
in favor of Ebio.

On March 30, 1999, the Office of the Sangguniang Barangay of Vitalez passed Resolution No. 08, series
of 1990 seeking assistance from the City Government of Parañaque for the construction of an access
road along Cut-cut Creek located in the said barangay. The proposed road will run from Urma Drive to
the main road of Vitalez Compound traversing the lot occupied by the respondents. Respondents
immediately opposed and the project was suspended.

In January 2003, however, respondents were surprised when several officials from the barangay and
the city planning office proceeded to cut eight (8) coconut trees planted on the said lot.

On March 28, 2005, the City Administrator sent a letter to the respondents ordering them to vacate the
area within the next thirty (30) days, or be physically evicted from the said property. Respondents sent a
reply asserting their claim over the subject property and expressing intent for a further dialogue. The
request remained unheeded.
Threatened of being evicted, respondents went to the RTC of Parañaque City on April 21, 2005 and
applied for a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners

.ISSUE: Whether or not the State may build on the land in question.

HELD: No.

It is an uncontested fact that the subject land was formed from the alluvial deposits that have gradually
settled along the banks of Cut-cut creek. This being the case, the law that governs ownership over the
accreted portion is Article 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, which remains in effect, in relation
to Article 457 of the Civil Code.

ART. 84. Accretions deposited gradually upon lands contiguous to creeks, streams, rivers, and
lakes, by accessions or sediments from the waters thereof, belong to the owners of such lands.

Art. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they
gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters.

It is therefore explicit from the foregoing provisions that alluvial deposits along the banks of a creek do
not form part of the public domain as the alluvial property automatically belongs to the owner of the
estate to which it may have been added. The only restriction provided for by law is that the owner of the
adjoining property must register the same under the Torrens system; otherwise, the alluvial property
may be subject to acquisition through prescription by third persons

In contrast, properties of public dominion cannot be acquired by prescription. No matter how long the
possession of the properties has been, there can be no prescription against the State regarding property
of public domain. Even a city or municipality cannot acquire them by prescription as against the State.

Hence, while it is true that a creek is a property of public dominion, the land which is formed by the
gradual and imperceptible accumulation of sediments along its banks does not form part of the public
domain by clear provision of law.

(5) REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND TANCINCO

GR No. L-61647 October 12, 1984 132 SCRA 514

Facts: Respondents, Benjamin Tancinco, Azucena Tancinco Reyes, Maria Tancinco Imperial and Mario C.
Tancinco are registered owners of a parcel of land covered by TCT # T-89709 situated in Barrio Ubinan,
Meycauayan, Bulacan bordering on the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers.

On June 24, 1974, the private respondents filed an application for the registration of the three lots
adjacent to their fishpond property.

On April 5, 1974, Assistant Provincial Fiscal Armando C. Vicente, in representation of the Bureau of
Lands filed a written opposition to the application for registration.

The Lower Court rendered a decision granting the application on the finding that the lands in question
are accretions to the private respondents fishponds.

CA affirmed Lower Courts decision.

Republic contended that there is no accretion to speak of under Article 457 of the new Civil Code
because what actually happened is that the private respondents simply transferred their dikes further
down the river bed of Meycauayan river, and thus, if there is any accretion to speak of, it is the man-
made and artificial and not the result of the gradual and imperceptible sedimentation by the waters of
the river.

Issue: Whether or not the accretion can be a valid subject of registration.

Held: That the testimony of the private respondents lone witness to the effect that as early as 1939
there already existed such alleged alluvial deposits, deserves no merit. It should be noted that the lots in
question were not included in the survey of their adjacent property conducted on May 10, 1940 and in
the Cadastral Survey of the entire Municipality of Meycauayan conducted between the years 1958 to
1960. The alleged accretion was declared for taxation purposes only in 1972 or 33 years after it had
supposedly permanently formed. The only valid conclusion therefore is that the said areas could not
have been there in 1939. They existed only after the private respondents transferred their dikes towards
the bed of the Meycauayan River in 1951. What private respondents claim as accretion is really an
encroachment of a portion of the Meycauayan River by reclamation.

The lower court cannot validly order the registration of lots 1 and 2 in the names of the private
respondents. These lots were portions of the bed of the Meycauayan River and are therefore classified
as property of the public domain. They are not open to registration under the Land registration Act. The
adjudication of the lands in question as property in the names of the private respondents is null and
void.