Secretary of National Defense vs. Manalo G.R. No.

180906, October 7, 2008

Facts: The brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo, farmers from Bulacan who were suspected of being
members of the New People’s Army, were forcibly taken from their home, detained in various locations,
and tortured by CAFGU and military units. After several days in captivity, the brothers Raymond and
Reynaldo recognized their abductors as members of the armed forces led by General Jovito Palparan.
They also learned that they were being held in place for their brother, Bestre, a suspected leader of the
communist insurgents. While in captivity, they met other desaperacidos (including the still-missing
University of the Philippines students Karen Empeno and Sherlyn Cadapan) who were also suspected of
being communist insurgents and members of the NPA. After eighteen months of restrained liberty,
torture and other dehumanizing acts, the brothers were able to escape and file a petition for the writ of
amparo.

Issue: Whether or not the right to freedom from fear is or can be protected by existing laws.

Held: Yes. The right to the security of person is not merely a textual hook in Article III, Section 2 of the
Constitution. At its core is the immunity of one’s person against government intrusion. The right to
security of person is “freedom from fear,” a guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity and security.

To whom may the oppressed, the little ones, the desaperacidos, run to, if the Orwellian sword of the
State, wielded recklessly by the military or under the guise of police power, is directed against them? The
law thus gives the remedy of the writ of amparo, in addition to the rights and liberties already protected
by the Bill of Rights. Amparo, literally meaning “to protect,” is borne out of the long history of Latin
American and Philippine human rights abuses—often perpetrated by the armed forces against farmers
thought to be communist insurgents, anarchists or brigands. The writ serves to both prevent and cure
extralegal killings, enforced disappearances, and threats thereof, giving the powerless a powerful remedy
to ensure their rights, liberties, and dignity. Amparo, a triumph of natural law that has been embodied in
positive law, gives voice to the preys of silent guns and prisoners behind secret walls.

onsti II case digest: REYES VS GONZALES

WRIT OF AMPARO

DEFINITION:
Is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty,or security is violated or threatened with
violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or
entity.

FACTS:

Petitioner and 49 others were arrested in the Manila Peninsula Hotel Seige and were charged of the
crime of rebellion under the Revised Penal Code. DILG issued Hold Departure Order in the interest of
national security and public safety.

On December 13, 2007, RTC issued an order dismissing the charge for Rebellion against the petitioner
and 17 others for lack of probable cause. That petitioners and other accused civilians were arrested
because they ignored the call of the police despite the deadline given to them to come out from the 2nd
Floor of the Hotel and submit themselves to the police authorities.

Counsel for petitioner file thru the DOJ for the lifting of the HDO since despite the dismissal of the crime
of rebellion, he was held by the BID officials at NAIA as his name is included in the Hold Departure List.
This happens every time he left for abroad.

Writ of Amparo was filed on the ground that the respondents violated the petitioner’s constitutional
right to travel.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner’s right to liberty has been violated or threatened with violation by the
issuance of the subject HDO, which would entitle him to the privilege of the writ of amparo.

HELD:

No. The writ is a remedy for any person whose wright to life, liberty or security is violated or threatened
with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private person or
entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearance or threats thereof.

Liberty has been defined as the right to exist and the right to be free form arbitrary restraint or
servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed from arbitrary into mere freedom from physical restraint of the
person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the facilities he has been
endowed by his Creator.

Security is the freedom of persons from fear, freedom from threat.

In the case at bar, the restriction on petitioner;s right to travel as a consequence of the pendency of the
criminal case filed against him was not unlawful. Petitioner has also failed to establish that his right to
travel was impaired in the manner and to the extent that it AMOUNTED to a serious violation of his right
to life, liberty and security for which there exists no readily available legal recourse or remedy.

RODRIGUEZ VS ARROYO

August 28, 2018Gracezyl Blancoconstitutional law, Political Law, rodriguez vs arroyo, writ of amparo
cases

NORIEL H. RODRIGUEZ VS GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO, GEN. VICTOR S. IBRADO, PDG JESUS AME
VERSOZA, LT. GEN. DELFIN BANGIT, MAJ. GEN. NESTOR Z. OCHOA, P/CSUPT. AMETO G. TOLENTINO,
P/SSUPT. JUDE W. SANTOS, COL. REMIGIO M. DE VERA, AN OFFICER NAMED MATUTINA, LT. COL. MINA,
CALOG, GEORGE PALACPAC UNDER THE NAME HARRY, ANTONIO CRUZ, ALDWIN BONG PASICOLAN AND
VINCENT CALLAGAN

G.R. NO. 191805

NOVEMBER 15, 2011

FACTS: Noriel Rodriguez (petitioner) is a member of Alyansa Dagiti Mannalon Iti Cagayan, a peasant
organization affiliated with Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP).

Under the Oplan Bantay Laya, the military tagged KMP members as an enemy of the state, making its
members an easy target of extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances.
On September 6, 2009, Rodriguez just alighted from a tricycle driven by Hermie Antonio Carlos in Brgy.
Tapel, Cagayan, when 4 men forcibly took him and forced him to get inside a car where more men in
civilian clothing were waiting (1 was holding a .45 caliber pistol).

The men started punching Rodriguez inside the car, and forced him to confess that he is a member of the
New People’s Army (NPA). Rodriguez remained silent until they reached a military camp belonging to the
17th Infantry Battalion of the Philippine Army.

Rodriguez was then subjected to beatings and torture by members of the Philippine Army. Members of
the army wanted him to admit that he is an NPA member and then pinpoint other NPA members and
camp locations. Since Rodriguez cannot answer, he is repeatedly beaten and tortured. Rodriguez was
also coerced to sign several documents to declare that he is a surenderree.

On September 17, 2009, Rodriguez’s mother and brother came to see him (accompanied by members of
the CHR – Pasicolan, Cruz and Callagan). They insisted to take Rodriguez home with them to Manila.

Rodriguez arrived in Manila on September 18. Callagan and 2 military members went inside their house
and took pictures for around 30 minutes despite Rodriguez’s effort to stop them.

On November 3, Rodriguez and his girlfriend notices that several suspicious-looking men are following
them on the streets, jeepney and MRT.

On December 7, Rodriguez filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo and Petition for the Writ of Habeas
Data with Prayers for Protection Orders, Inspection of Place, and Production of Documents and Personal
Properties dated 2 December 2009.

The petition was filed against former President Arroyo, Gen. Ibrado, PDG. Versoza, Lt. Gen. Bangit, Major
General (Maj. Gen.) Nestor Z. Ochoa, P/CSupt. Tolentino, P/SSupt. Santos, Col. De Vera, 1st Lt. Matutina,
Calog, George Palacpac, Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan.
Respondents contend that Rodriguez is a double agent, and had been working as their
informant/infiltrator in the fight against NPA rebels.

Then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, through the solicitor-general, insisted on her immunity from
suits (by virtue of her position as president).

Supreme Court granted the writs after finding that the petition sufficiently alleged the abduction and
torture of Rodriguez by members of the Philippine Army. SC directed the Court of Appeals to hear the
petition.

CA ruled in favor of Rodriguez and found Ibrado, Versoza, Bangit, Ochoa, Tolentino, Santos, De Vera and
Matutina liable for his abduction and torture. As to Calog and Palacpac, the case was dismissed for lack
of merit. On President Arroyo, the case was dismissed on account of her immunity from suits.

ISSUE:

WON President Arroyo should be dropped as a respondent by virtue of her presidential immunity from
suit

WON the doctrine of command responsibility can be used in writs of amparo and habeas data cases.

HELD:

(1) CA’s rationale does not stand anymore since the presidential immunity from suits only applies during
her incumbency. “Incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court during the
period of their incumbency and tenure but not beyond.”

“A non-sitting President does not enjoy immunity from suit, even for acts committed during the latter’s
tenure. We emphasize our ruling therein that courts should look with disfavor upon the presidential
privilege of immunity, especially when it impedes the search for truth or impairs the vindication of a
right.”
Term vs Tenure: The term means the time during which the officer may claim to hold the office as of
right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another.

The tenure represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds office. The tenure may be
shorter than the term for reasons within or beyond the power of the incumbent. The intent of the
framers of the 1987 Constitution is to limit the president’s immunity from suits during their tenure (and
not term).

“It is clear that former President Arroyo cannot use the presidential immunity from suit to shield herself
from judicial scrutiny that would assess whether, within the context of amparo proceedings, she was
responsible or accountable for the abduction of Rodriguez.”

(2) Yes. The doctrine of command responsibility may be used to determine whether respondents are
accountable for and have the duty to address the abduction of Rodriguez in order to enable the courts to
devise remedial measures to protect his rights.

Proceedings under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo do not determine criminal, civil or administrative
liability, but this should not abate the applicability of the doctrine of command responsibility.

“In the context of amparo proceedings, responsibility may refer to the participation of the respondents,
by action or omission, in enforced disappearance. Accountability, on the other hand, may attach to
respondents who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the
burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary
diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance.”

“Despite maintaining former President Arroyo in the list of respondents in G.R. No. 191805, and allowing
the application of the command responsibility doctrine to amparo and habeas data proceedings,
Rodriguez failed to prove through substantial evidence that former President Arroyo was responsible or
accountable for the violation of his rights to life, liberty and property. He likewise failed to prove through
substantial evidence the accountability or responsibility of respondents Maj. Gen. Ochoa, Cruz, Pasicolan
and Callagan.”
SC affirmed the decision of the CA, but with modifications. The case is dismissed with respect to
respondents former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, P/CSupt. Ameto G. Tolentino, and P/SSupt. Jude
W. Santos, Calog, George Palacpac, Antonio Cruz, Aldwin Pasicolan and Vicent Callagan for lack of merit.

Gamboa v. Chan, G.R. No. 193636, 24 July 2012

31

JUL

FACTS

Gamboa alleged that the Philippine National Police in Ilocos Norte (PNP–Ilocos Norte) conducted a series
of surveillance operations against her and her aides, and classified her as someone who keeps a Private
Army Group (PAG). Purportedly without the benefit of data verification, PNP–Ilocos Norte forwarded the
information gathered on her to the Zeñarosa Commission, thereby causing her inclusion in the Report’s
enumeration of individuals maintaining PAGs. Contending that her right to privacy was violated and her
reputation maligned and destroyed, Gamboa filed a Petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data
against respondents in their capacities as officials of the PNP-Ilocos Norte.

ISSUE

Whether or not the petition for the issuance of writ of habeas data is proper when the right to privacy is
invoked as opposed to the state’s interest in preserving the right to life, liberty or security.
RULING

NO.

The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy,
honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one’s
right to the truth and to informational privacy. It seeks to protect a person’s right to control information
regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such information is being collected through unlawful
means in order to achieve unlawful ends. It must be emphasized that in order for the privilege of the
writ to be granted, there must exist a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right
to life, liberty or security on the other.

In this case, the Court ruled that Gamboa was unable to prove through substantial evidence that her
inclusion in the list of individuals maintaining PAGs made her and her supporters susceptible to
harassment and to increased police surveillance. In this regard, respondents sufficiently explained that
the investigations conducted against her were in relation to the criminal cases in which she was
implicated. As public officials, they enjoy the presumption of regularity, which she failed to overcome.
[T]he state interest of dismantling PAGs far outweighs the alleged intrusion on the private life of
Gamboa, especially when the collection and forwarding by the PNP of information against her was
pursuant to a lawful mandate. Therefore, the privilege of the writ of habeas data must be denied.

Navarro vs. Court of Appeals, 313 SCRA 153 (1999)

FACTS:

Two local media men, Stanley Jalbuena, Enrique Lingan, in Lucena City wnet to the police station to
report alledged indecent show in one of the night establishment shows in the City. At the station, a
heated confrontation followed between victim Lingan and accused policeman Navarro who was then
having drinks outside the headquarters, lead to a fisticuffs. The victim was hit with the handle of the
accused's gun below the left eyebrow, followed by a fist blow, resulted the victim to fell and died under
treatment. The exchange of words was recorded on tape, specifically the frantic exclamations made by
Navarro after the altercation that it was the victim who provoked the fight. During the trial, Jalbuena, the
other media man , testified. Presented in evidence to confirm his testimony was a voice recording he had
made of the heated discussion at the police station between the accused police officer Navarro and the
deceased, Lingan, which was taken without the knowledge of the two.
ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the voice recording is admissible in evidence in view of RA 4200, which prohibits
wire tapping.

2. Whether the mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the
offended party and lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong may be appreciated in favor of the
accused.

HELD:

1. The answer is affirmative, the tape is admissible in view of RA 4200, which prohibits wire tapping.
Jalbuena's testimony is confirmed by the voice recording he had made.

The law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of private communications (Ramirez v
Cpourt of Appeals, 248 SCRA 590 [1995]). Snce the exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan was
not private, its tape recording is not prohibited.

2. The remarks of Lingan, which immediately preceded the acts of the accused, constituted sufficient
provocation. Provocation is said to be any unjust or improper conduct of the offended party capable of
exciting, annoying or irritating someone. The provocation must be sufficient and must immediately
precede the act; and in order to be sufficient, it must be adequate to excite a person to commit the
wrong, which must be accordingly proportionate in gravity. The mitigating circumstance of lack of
intention to commit so grave a wrong must also be considered. The exclamations made by Navarro after
the scuffle that it was Lingan who provoked him showed that he had no intent to kill the latter.

RAMIREZ V CA

NOV

G.R. No. 93833 | September 28, 1995 | J. Katipunan

Facts:
A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro Ramirez in the Quezon City RTC alleging that the
private respondent, Ester Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter’s office, allegedly vexed, insulted and
humiliated her in a “hostile and furious mood” and in a manner offensive to petitioner’s dignity and
personality,” contrary to morals, good customs and public policy.”

In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought damages. The
transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made
by petitioner.

As a result of petitioner’s recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the
confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the Pasay RTC for violation of
Republic Act 4200, entitled “An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of
private communication, and other purposes.”

Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information, which the RTC later on granted, on the ground that
the facts charged do not constitute an offense, particularly a violation of R.A. 4200.

The CA declared the RTC’s decision null and void and denied the petitioner’s MR, hence the instant
petition.

Issue:

W/N the Anti-Wiretapping Act applies in recordings by one of the parties in the conversation
Held:

Yes. Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, ” An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and Other Related
Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes,” provides:

Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement,
to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device
commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or
however otherwise described.

The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all
the parties to any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape
recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute
ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication. The
statute’s intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of
the qualifier “any”. Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, “even a (person)
privy to a communication who records his private conversation with another without the knowledge of
the latter (will) qualify as a violator” under this provision of R.A. 4200.

A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the respondent court’s conclusion
that in enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers indeed contemplated to make illegal, unauthorized tape
recording of private conversations or communications taken either by the parties themselves or by third
persons.

The nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The substance of the same
need not be specifically alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly
overhearing, intercepting or recording private communications by means of the devices enumerated
therein. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private communication by
means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As the
Solicitor General pointed out in his COMMENT before the respondent court: “Nowhere (in the said law)
is it required that before one can be regarded as a violator, the nature of the conversation, as well as its
communication to a third person should be professed.”
Petitioner’s contention that the phrase “private communication” in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not
include “private conversations” narrows the ordinary meaning of the word “communication” to a point
of absurdity. The word communicate comes from the latin word communicare, meaning “to share or to
impart.” In its ordinary signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting
signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in a conversation, or signifies
the “process by which meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals through a common system
of symbols (as language signs or gestures)”

These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive
communications of “meanings or thoughts” which are likely to include the emotionally-charged
exchange, on February 22, 1988, between petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of the latter’s
office. Any doubts about the legislative body’s meaning of the phrase “private communication” are,
furthermore, put to rest by the fact that the terms “conversation” and “communication” were
interchangeably used by Senator Tañada in his Explanatory Note to the Bill.

ZULUETA VS. CA

ZULUETA VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 107383, February 20, 1996

Petitioner: Cecilia Zulueta

Respondents: Court of Appeals and Alfredo Martin

Ponente: J. Mendoza
Facts:

This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila (Branch X) which ordered petitioner to return documents and papers taken by her
from private respondent's clinic without the latter's knowledge and consent.

Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982, petitioner
entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and
private respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband's clinic and took
157 documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours,
greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and photographs. The documents and
papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from the
practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband.

Issue:

(1) Whether or not the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence;

Held:

(1) No. Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional
injunction declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable" is no less
applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's infidelity) who is
the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the
prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a "lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order
requires otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained
inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding."

The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and
cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by
contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the
constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.

The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged.
Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse
while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any
communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified
exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to
share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes
to the other.

The review for petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

Waterouse Drug Corporation v. NLRC

Posted on April 2, 2013 by winnieclaire

Standard

G.R. No. 113271. October 16, 1997

Facts: Antonia Melodia Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by Waterous Drug Corp.

YSP Inc., a supplier of medicine, sold to Waterous, thru Catolico, 10 bottles of Voren Tablets at P384 per
unit. However, previews P.O.s issued to YSP, Inc. showed that the price per bottle is P320.00. Verification
was made to YSP, Inc. to determine the discrepancy and it was found that the cost per bottle was indeed
overpriced.

YSP, Inc. Accounting Department (Ms. Estelita Reyes) confirmed that the difference represents refund of
jack-up price of ten bottles of Voren tablets per sales invoice, which was paid to Ms. Catolico. Said check
was sent in an envelope addressed to Catolico.

Catolico denied receiving the same. However, Saldana, the clerk of Waterous Drug Corp. confirmed that
she saw an open envelope with a check amounting P640 payable to Catolico.

Waterous Drug Corp. ordered the termination of Catolico for acts of dishonesty.

NLRC: Dismissed the Petition. Evidence of respondents (check from YSP) being rendered inadmissible, by
virtue of the constitutional right invoked by complainants.

Petitioners: In the light of the decision in the People v. Marti, the constitutional protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures refers to the immunity of one’s person from interference by
government and cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the
ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.

Issue: W/N the check is admissible as evidence

Held: Yes.

Ratio: (People vs. Marti) Marti ruling: The Bill of Rights does not protect citizens from unreasonable
searches and seizures perpetrated by private individuals.

It is not true, as counsel for Catolico claims, that the citizens have no recourse against such assaults. On
the contrary, and as said counsel admits, such an invasion gives rise to both criminal and civil liabilities.
Despite this, the SC ruled that there was insufficient evidence of cause for the dismissal of Catolico from
employment Suspicion is not among the valid causes provided by the Labor Code for the termination of
Employment.

MARQUEZ vs DESIERTO

MARQUEZ vs DESIERTO

G.R. NO. 135882

June 27, 2001

Pardo, J.

FACTS: Marquez, branch manager of Union Bank Julia Vargas, received an Order from Ombudsman to
produce several bank documents for purposes of inspection in camera. The Ombudsman wanted to
conduct such in camera inspection on the accounts based on a trail of manager’s checks by a certain
Trivinio who purchased 51 managers checks for a total amount of P272M. Marquez agreed to the
inspection.

Marquez wrote to the Ombudsman saying that the accounts in question cannot readily be identified and
asked for time to respond to the order. The Ombudsman replied that the Bank should have preserved
records despite the accounts being dormant.
Ombudsman issued order to direct Marquez to produce the bank documents due to the unjustified delay
by the Bank since the in camera inspection had already been extended twice.

Marquez filed for declaratory relief to clear the rights of petitioners under the bank secrecy law

ISSUE/S: Whether the in camera inspection orders are allowed as an exception to the bank secrecy law?
NO

RULING: The in camera inspection is not allowed. There being no pending case before a court of
competent jurisdiction.

An exception to the bank secrecy law is when the money deposited is the subject matter of a litigation.

Therefore, it may be allowed on the ground of a pending case when:

o The case is pending in court of competent jurisdiction

o The account must be clearly identified

o Inspection is limited to the subject matter of the pending case

o The Bank personnel and account holder must be notified to be present during the inspection

o Such inspection may cover only the account identified in the pending case

The order for in camera inspection is based on a pending investigation of the Ombudsman for violations
of RA 3019, Sec 3(e)(g). Clearly, there is no pending litigation yet before a court of competent authority.
It is only an investigation by the Ombudsman. (In contrast to Ejercito v. Sandiganbayan. Interestingly,
time is of the essence. A different ruling in Ejercito was enunciated because there was already a pending
investigation months before the ruling made in this case as to the exemption in the power of the
Ombudsman.)

January 20, 2017

GR No. 127685. July 23, 1998

FACTS:

This is a petition raised by Senator Blas Ople to invalidate the Administrative Order No. 308 or the
Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System issued by President Fidel V. Ramos.

The petitioner contends that the implementation of the said A.O. will violate the rights of the citizens of
privacy as guaranteed by the Constitution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not A.O. No. 308 violates the right of privacy.

HELD:

Yes.

The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition independently of its identification with liberty; in
itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional protection.

The right of privacy is guaranteed in several provisions of the Constitution:

"Sections 3 (1), 1, 2, 6, 8 and 17 of the Bill of Rights

"Sec. 3. The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order
of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law."

"Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the laws."

"Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized."

"Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be
impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the
interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law."

"Sec. 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form
unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged."

"Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself."

The right to privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is the burden of
government to show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by some compelling state interest and that it is
narrowly drawn. A.O. No. 308 is predicated on two considerations: (1) the need to provide our citizens
and foreigners with the facility to conveniently transact business with basic service and social security
providers and other government instrumentalities and (2) the need to reduce, if not totally eradicate,
fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations by persons seeking basic services. It is debatable
whether these interests are compelling enough to warrant the issuance of A.O. No. 308.

But what is not arguable is the broadness, the vagueness, the overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 which if
implemented will put our people's right to privacy in clear and present danger. The possibilities of abuse
and misuse of the PRN, biometrics and computer technology are accentuated when we consider that the
individual lacks control over what can be read or placed on his ID, much less verify the correctness of the
data encoded. They threaten the very abuses that the Bill of Rights seeks to prevent.

The petition is granted and declared the Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National
Computerized Identification Reference System" null and void for being unconstitutional.