Manuel Antonio Romero

Intelligibility and Proof in Cartesian Philosophy

Abstract: In this paper I argue that the way of acquiring knowledge that is present in Cartesian philosophy allows
leaving aside the synthesis for the justification of truths and consequently that the method of analysis is itself sufficient.
I will attempt to show that the abandonment by Descartes of some methods of proof used in the philosophical tradition
is the result of an inversion in the way of understanding knowledge and demonstration. Specifically, I will try to
demonstrate that the prevalence of analysis over synthesis is a consequence of Cartesian intuitionism. First I discuss the
relationships between Descartes’ method and subjectivism. Secondly, I show the problem solving procedure used in
Descartes’ Geometry. Finally I examine how Descartes conceived the method of analysis and how this leads him to
distance himself from the idea of needing purely formal methods of proof.

The Geometry of Descartes is rather unique among mathematical texts because, while it constitutes an
evident progress for this discipline, it does not present theorem proofs or a set of axioms, but instead
focuses on the application of a problem solving method. Descartes claims that the discovery of a
universal method applicable to all disciplines of human knowledge, and resulting in finding the truth in
these, has its genesis in this geometrical method (AT VI, 20)1, which would mean that the investigation
of truth is related to the resolution of problems rather than to the formal proof of truths. Actually, there
is an important relationship between Descartes’ discovery and the development of a method for solving
mathematical problems, specifically geometrical problems. I am referring to the emergence of
analytical geometry, which Descartes uses to solve some geometric problems that have been studied
since ancient times.2 He states that the fundamentals of his method are based on an ancient one: the
analysis method, which according to Descartes was hidden but encloses the secret of the admirable
method which he claims to have rediscovered (AT X, 373) and that has enabled fruitful results. If in
fact the universal method, which is derived from the analysis, comes from the method exemplified in
the Geometry and it ignores the method of proof in the traditional Euclidian sense, we must admit that
either the Cartesian system is not properly supported, given that the results that constitute it have not
been proven following the axiomatic method, or that the notion of justifying the truth in Cartesian
philosophy is different from that which we commonly consider to be the appropriate one.

1
All references to Descartes from Oeuvres de Descartes (AT) ed. C. Adam and P. Tannery (Paris: Cerf, 1897-1913).
2
See Pappus problem (AT VI, 374).

1
From the earliest known texts on the method of analysis in Greek geometry, it appears in correlation
with the synthesis. In an ancient text by Pappus of Alexandria (Hintikka & Remes, 1974), the analysis
is described as a heuristic method, which is completed by the synthesis, providing the formal proof of
what has been discovered through analysis. The complementary nature of these methods has led some
interpreters of Descartes3 to search in his philosophy for that which corresponds to the synthesis,
whose paradigmatic example is Euclidian geometry. However, Descartes expresses in various passages
that synthesis, beyond being a way of presenting, adds nothing to the discovery of truth (AT II, 83,
637) and that generally, formal methods such as syllogism “are of no aid in perceiving the truth about
objects” (AT X, 440).

I will attempt to show that the way of acquiring knowledge that is present in Cartesian philosophy
allows leaving aside the synthesis for the justification of truths and consequently that the method of
analysis is itself sufficient. If in fact some formal procedures of proof can be ignored, it can be
concluded that in Cartesian philosophy a new way of validating the contents of a knowledge system is
foreshadowed, implying a new form of conceiving some aspects of logic.

I argue that the prevalence of analysis over synthesis, and the fact that the former can be established as
not only a heuristic method or one for the resolution of problems but as a demonstrative method, is a
consequence of Cartesian intuitionism. In other words, considering the way knowledge operates, one
finds that the same procedure of discovering truths leads to the justification of these, which makes a
synthetic presentation unnecessary in terms of the validation of objects of knowledge.

In order to show how the Cartesian method of analysis is constituted in a method that allows truths to
be both discovered and proven, I would like to focus the first section of this paper on relationships
between the method and modern subjectivism, of which Descartes is considered to be the founder. I
intend to show the relationships between the Cartesian intuitionism and obtaining certainty, in this way
observing what Descartes’ conception of truth consists of and under which rational justification should
be constructed; such rational justification finally takes shape in the method which Descartes identifies
with the analysis. Second, I will show the overall problem solving procedure which Descartes carries
out in the area of geometry, allowing for the observation of how during the search and the discovery of
solutions a validation of contents is solidified, given the assumptions for obtaining certainty presented
3
See, e. g., Beck (1952), Schouls (1972), Clarke (1982), Grosholz (1991), Flagge & Bonnen (1999).

2
in the first part. Finally, as a result of the above, I examine how Descartes conceived the method of
analysis and how this leads him to distance himself from the idea of needing formal methods of proof.

Method and subjectivism

From the title of the first rule4, Descartes makes it clear that the method presented is not specific to any
science; on the contrary, it refers to the proper use of the mind on all matters that can be subject of
human knowledge. The significant implication of this preliminary warning is the fact that the
unification of the method implies a unification of science and an undifferentiated way of dealing with
the various issues of human knowledge.

For the tradition, the diversity of methods responds to various objects. Every science is susceptible to a
different kind of certainty, given the different degrees of intelligibility of its own objects5. This
diversity of intelligibility due to the nature of the objects is framed and conditioned by ontology itself
from both Greek and medieval philosophy. The sciences are divided according to their objects and
each science’s own method responds equally to the peculiar object of each. According to the nature of
each kind of knowledge, there is a different degree of precision and certainty, because the objects that
each science deals with differ and thus the faculties that deal with them also change. To the extent that
the objects differ, the work of the intellect will differ equally in the differentiated apprehension of
them. By establishing the unity of science according to the unity of the intellect, that which was
originally conceived as something constituting the nature of objects and setting the conditions for
knowledge, is now located in the human mind itself, so that the essence of things can only be accessed
through the knowledge of the mind. The uniqueness of the method as well as the unity of science
proposed by Descartes supposes a unity of objects and a consequent cognoscibility of these objects.
The universal human capacity to access the truth of all things makes it necessary for these objects of
knowledge to be, in some way, homogenous, to be accessible to understanding and to be grasped with
the same degree of certainty.

4
“The end of study should be to direct the mind towards the enunciation of sound and correct judgments on all matters that
come before it” (AT X, 35).
5
See Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics: “For it is the mark of an educated man to look for precision in each class of things
just so far as the nature of the subject admits; it is evidently equally foolish to accept probable reasoning from a
mathematician and to demand from a rhetorician scientific proofs” (1094a).

3
The immediate objects of knowledge, to the extent that they are immediate, are objects of intuition and
are themselves ideas6. In other words, to the extent that the division of sciences responded to the
diversity of objects and that this diversity was located in its differentiated essential qualities, there was
a diversity of knowledge, a variety of methods. But since they are homogenous, or, given that they do
not differ in terms of objects of thought, the method can be unified and in this way all objects can be
known with the same degree of certainty. Additionally, the criteria needed to evaluate the truth of an
idea and to decide whether an adequate representation is carried out, do not depend on the object which
the idea represents, which is essentially mediated by the idea itself. The main rule offered by Descartes
in order to not exceed the limits of certainty, consists of dealing only with objects that are presented
with irrefutable evidence making the slightest doubt impossible (AT X, 362). Objects that do not offer
the possibility of doubt and lead to immediate assent are simple objects, allowing no room for error
(AT X, 365, 368, 373). Descartes calls simple objects of understanding “simple natures”: “Hence here
we shall treat of things only in relation to our understanding’s awareness of them, and shall call those
only simple, the cognition of which is so clear and so distinct that they cannot be analysed by the mind
into others more distinctly known” (AT X, 418).

That which is simple, which has no parts, is already sufficiently understood by understanding and is
evident and true. However, in the case of a complex idea, certainty in relation to it will depend on
understanding it, based on its simple parts, which leads to a notion of understanding as a step from
complex to simple, in other words, as reduction of the complex to its constituent parts. So, when the
complex is put in simple terms, we obtain sufficient evidence to attain certainty and consequently the
contents are understood and validated. For Descartes, this is what constitutes knowledge. The presence
of contents in the mind in terms of its simple elements, or atoms of evidence7 that constitute them,
allows certainty in any field of knowledge.

To not remain in these pure simple ideas that are objects of intuition, it is necessary to have a faculty or
procedure to move from one idea to another and, showing their relationships, establish certainty in the
chain’s reasoning. This is possible by means of deduction: “By which we understand all necessary
inference from other facts that are known with certainty” (AT X, 369). In the same way in which the

6
The concept of “idea” in Cartesian philosophy is itself problematic. They can be understood as propositions, images or
representations of things. See for example AT II, 25; AT VII, 36-37.
7
I use the term “atoms of evidence” first used by Hamelin (1911). See also Beck (1958) and Hartland-Swann (1947).

4
evidence of particular things is recognized by way of intuition, it is also through intuition that each step
in making a deduction is known with certainty when the deduction is made. If the links in the chain of
reasoning are seen, it can be guaranteed that the entire chain is connected, even when one cannot see
the entire chain at once (AT X, 370). Thus, once you have evidence of an idea given its simple nature
and the recognition of that evidence has been carried out by intuition, we proceed to build a chain of
reasoning in which the links between the parts are also evident and ultimately depend on initial
evidence. Even in this process that Descartes calls “deduction”, the active action of intuition is required
to ensure the certainty of overall reasoning upon grasping it in a single act of thought. It is then true
because it has a unity that is in some way simple and is object of intuition.

Then we have a conception of knowledge in which the only judge of truth is the understanding that can
validate only those contents that are presented as simple natures. This is made possible thanks to the
uniqueness of science which is a result of the unification of its objects as ideas. These ideas have in
themselves the distinctive marks of their truth. Thus, in reducing complex to simple, certainty is
reached and the contents are validated for the understanding.

The arguments and their form are valid under the evidence acquired by intuition. In this sense, the
formal aspect of knowledge is a consequence of the material aspect, since the only reasoning that is
valid is that which has been reduced to simple terms characterized by their evidence. The form is
generated from the relationships established by the mind between simple components and these
relationships are the result of evidence perceived in the contents involved in reasoning. The form is not
separate from the content but is a product of it, so deductive schemes like syllogism or the proof from
axioms are not needed, because in the very act of understanding, an already valid logical form is given.
In this way, Descartes’ method does not start from formal processes, given that these will require an
ulterior process of validation based on contents; a situation that makes them unnecessary and reaffirms,
in Cartesian philosophy, the logical priority of matter over form.

Reduction and order in the Geometry

The possibility of obtaining certainty comes from the reduction of complex to simple and by operating
these simple natures. To clarify how these operations of reduction are performed, Descartes makes use

5
of Mathematics, because the recognition of the simplicity of its objects does not present
inconveniences present in other disciplines: “For there is this difference between the two cases, viz.
that the primary notions that are the presuppositions of geometrical proofs harmonize with the use of
our senses, and are already granted by all” (AT IX, 121). The best way to begin to understand the
method and the proper way to use it consists in using Mathematics in order to apply it later to other
disciplines (AT X, 442). In examining the characteristics of the objects of its own and the relationships
established between them, we can find the characteristics that allow a high level of evidence and
objects can then be sought in any other discipline, as well as operations that are applicable to all
knowledge.

The method presented by Descartes in the Geometry is a method for solving problems. This solution
depends on the reduction of simple concepts and the relationships between these that should result from
evident links. In Rule XII, Descartes says that there are certain common notions that serve as bonds
between the simple natures we have referred to (AT X, 419). If intuition is capable of conceiving
simple ideas and even evident relationships between them, it can also connect them in order to build a
complete system of knowledge for any given problem. Descartes gives as examples of these common
notions “things that are the same as a third thing are the same as one another” and “things which do not
bear the same relation to a third thing, have some diversity from each other”. These examples suggest
that differences can be found from common notions and established between simple natures and things
in general. That is, they allow for comparison between parts, which will result in the establishment of
an order that, in so far as it is based on knowledge and evidence of simple natures, is an order given by
understanding. “The secret of the art” is in this order produced by the comparison between parts which
Descartes states and explains in Rule VI: In order to separate out what is quite simple from what is
complex, and to arrange these matters methodically, we ought, in the case of every series in which we
have deduced certain facts the one from the other, to notice which fact is simple, and to mark the
interval, which separates all the others from this (AT X, 381).

There is a series of things and we seek the simplest among them, which according to what has been
stated corresponds to the most evident, then we seek dependency between them that must be given by
bonds or common notions. Only in the comparison between the parts can a degree of evidence be
established and be stratified or graded between them, so that the process requires the disposition of the

6
parts to be the result of the comparison based on the evidence and as thus, to be an operation of
understanding. The term that has the most evidence must be constituted as the beginning of the chain of
reasoning and as the point of comparison, what Descartes referred to as “absolute” (AT X, 381). All
things can be called absolute or relative in terms of the order imposed by understanding, that is, as long
as a comparison or relationship is established between them, allowing them to be ordered hierarchically
to solve difficulties that appear in a problem. The comparison leads to the establishment of some terms
as relative and only in the relationship and comparison with each other, based on the absolute term, that
is, in the establishment of its dependence, the solution of problems can be ensured (AT X, 440). Thus,
when faced with a complex problem, the simple parts must be looked for, corresponding to a reduction
that takes place to find evidence and to be able to establish an explanatory system with clear
relationships between the parts. This reduction ends when a simple nature is reached, in other words,
when it is sensed as evident that one of the parts included in the problem serves as the absolute term
from which an explanation is reconstructed.

The foundation of the method is the order which, as such, has been produced by thought according to
the conditions of intelligibility. To illustrate this point, Descartes gives an example:

Thus if we wish to make out some writing in which the meaning is disguised by the use of a cypher, though the order
here fails to present itself, we yet make up an imaginary one, for the purpose both of testing all the conjectures we
may make about single letters, words or sentences, and in order to arrange them so that when we sum them up we
shall be able to tell all the inferences that we can deduce from them (AT X, 404-405).

Faced with the unknown, several possibilities are tried, in other words, several orders are tested and
when intelligible results are produced it can be concluded that this order is adequate and its parts have
been linked correctly. Within this series produced for the purpose of solving a problem, there should be
a first term that serves as a measurement unity for the others and conditions the relationships that exist
between them. So, returning to the example, we assume that an x stands for m as the first possibility of
the order, this assumption implies that other signs that follow x in the cipher text cannot be k, because
such letters do not concur in any word. The notion of order is relational and the first element taken to
build it becomes the main pattern, or the unit for this. The comparison between simples generates an
order in which each involved part takes its place given its relationship with the initial term. Precisely
the relationships that unite the parts in a clear and certain manner are those in which comparisons are
established according to order or measurement, or according ‒ using the words of the Discourse ‒ to

7
the proportions among the objects. If the proportions among the objects hold, perfectly measurable
degrees, hierarchies and chains of reasoning can be established that are evident for the mind and that
are subject to intuition of simple natures as a thread of certainty. This fundamental aspect of
relationships is largely what Descartes finds in the method of mathematicians and that can be applied
with great results if taken to other areas.

But for all that I had no intention of trying to master all those particular sciences that receive in common the name of
Mathematics; but observing that, although their objects are different, they do not fail to agree in this, that they take
nothing under consideration but the various relationships or proportions which are present in these objects (AT VI,
20).

In the conjunction of simplicity of objects of mathematics and the relationships that are established
between them, Descartes sees the secret of the method. This way of conceiving relationships between
ideas constitutes a rejection of the way in which knowledge should be organized in accordance with the
Aristotelian ideal, because now it is not about disposing of and classifying things according to genus
and species, but of establishing measurable relationships between parts thanks to their evidence.

The first paragraph of the Geometry gives an exact account of this method:

Any problem in geometry can easily be reduced to such terms that a knowledge of the lengths of certain straight
lines is sufficient for its construction. Just as arithmetic consists of only four or five operations, namely, addition,
subtraction, multiplication, division and the extraction of roots, so in geometry, to find required lines it is merely
necessary to add or subtract other lines; or else, taking one line which I shall call the unity in order to relate it as
closely as possible to numbers, and which can in general be chosen arbitrarily, and having given two other lines, to
find a fourth line which shall be to one of the given lines as the other is to unity; or, again, to find a fourth line which
is to one of the given lines as unity is to the other; or, finally, to find one, two, or several mean proportionals
between unity and some other line (AT VI, 369).

First, it reduces some terms to lengths: only in so far as the involved terms that are quantifiable in a
problem can be simplified so that it is possible to find a solution. In other words, by interpreting or
translating the lines to the magnitude of its lengths, these can be treated as simple objects and to that
extent be objects of intuition, which allows for relationships to be established between them, producing
an order that is given by the ability of these objects to be quantified. This explains why Descartes chose
the lines as a single geometric object, as these can be translated to simple magnitudes and so be objects
of intuition. The object of geometry is homogenous: it only deals with magnitudes of certain involved
lines. Just as the homogeneity of contents of understanding constitute the factor that makes it possible
for science to be one and that it can reach certainty in any discipline of knowledge, because only
8
evident bonds can be established when the parts can interact according to the same respect or
perspective; similarly, the geometry can obtain certainty, as it can establish quantifiable relationships
between these lengths. The beginning of Descartes’ Geometry contrasts with Euclidian geometry, given
that in the Elements the objects to be dealt with are postulated or defined: points, lines, circles, angles,
triangles; in principle there is a multiplicity of objects.

Second, the need for an initial term, an absolute, is necessary to serve as unity. The relationships of
proportionality are established from this unity, in this case, between the lines. The translation of lines to
the established unity makes possible the arithmetic (algebraic) operation of the terms and thus evidence
in terms of intuition, it also makes the order that will be established possible and that will ultimately
provide intelligibility.

Third, all operations performed between the magnitude of the lines must result in other magnitudes that
can be represented by lines. When Descartes reduces the geometric terms to arithmetic terms, he
ensures that his operations are closed8. This has as important consequence that all objects dealt with by
the discipline can be related under the same terms according to the relationships of proportionality, thus
constituting a part of the same relational scheme that is precisely what is sought after for knowledge.
The homogeneity of algebraic terms used by Descartes to solve problems, which interpreted in a purely
mathematical way are practically untreatable, allows some expressions which up until then were
considered impossible9, as well as their operation. By putting geometry in algebraic terms, one has a
powerful structure that allows for some procedures to be performed that were not possible with
geometry alone. Later on, Descartes specifies the algebraic method in geometry even further:

If, then, we wish to solve any problem, we first suppose the solution already effected, and give names to all the lines
that seem needful for its construction, ‒to those that are unknown as well as to those that are known. Then, making
no distinction between known and unknown lines, we must unravel the difficulty in any way that shows most
naturally the relations between these lines, until we find it possible to express a single quantity in two ways. This
will constitute an equation (AT VI, 372).

Relationships are established among the parts of the problem in accordance with an order that enables a
better systematization of the problem and then move from one term to another in the best possible way,
8
A set A has closure under an operation * if for members a and b belonging to the set A, a * b produces a member of the
set A.
9
For instance, 𝑥 2 + 𝑥 represents in geometrical terms the addition of a line and an area, which is impossible, but
algebraically it is just the addition of two numerical quantities.

9
producing the highest degree of intelligibility. As in the example of the encoded text, a value is
assigned to the unknown and relationships are sought between simple terms until an intelligible system
of relationships is reached that constitutes the solution. The understanding not only observes but
includes intermediate terms that allow links to be established between the parts, these terms correspond
to the auxiliary constructions in the Geometry.

The general procedure presented in these passages by Descartes can be understood simply as putting
the unknown in terms of the known and in this way give it meaning and understand it. So, first, the
lines are translated to the numbers that correspond to their magnitudes, making them accessible to
understanding because they are objects of intuition; then, relationships are established between the
terms, which are clearly stated and represented by an equation, to finally solve the equation, something
which implies a reduction of complex to simple or of the unknown to the known, given that by
knowing the relationship between terms that are known beforehand and those that want to be found, the
equation can be solved. When solving an equation, a process of simplification is carried out with the
purpose of explicitly stating the relationships between the involved parts. Thus, by means of Algebra,
Descartes is able to develop a method for solving problems that allows the relationship between the
known and the unknown to be clearly stated. The procedure of translating geometric entities to
algebraic relationships allows for the discovery of these relationships, making his method of finding
intelligibility schemes a heuristic method.

The solution of a problem thus corresponds to the establishment of the conditions of intelligibility of a
term within a relational scheme. This can only be done with the participation of an understanding that
imposes absolute terms, accounts for the relationships between this and the problem’s involved parts,
and is capable of following the chain of reasoning to the point its intelligibility is certain. Only
someone who understands the process, from the translation to evident terms, and has carried it out in
full, imposing order and including the necessary constructions to establish evident relationships, has the
certainty that these relationships are maintained and that the solution is correct. The rational
justification of any mathematical proposition is then given by the action of understanding that is
capable of grasping the intelligible configuration, resulting from the relationships between the parts.
This only occurs for the mind that carries out the solution of a problem and which in this act of thought
gives certainty.

10
Cartesian method of analysis

Descartes identifies the method of investigating truth, set forth above, with the method of analysis.
Based on what we said, we can clarify in which sense this analysis is sufficient to prove and how it
depends on Descartes’ conception of knowledge. This way of understanding knowledge makes the
synthesis expendable and generates a different way of understanding demonstration and in general
terms, rational justification.

To explain why synthesis is expendable within the Cartesian system, I will refer to part of the Reply to
Second Objections (AT IX, 121) where we find the more developed exposition of these aspects.
Descartes receives the following advice from Mersenne, “provide arguments in geometrical fashion”.
However, Descartes affirms that he has followed the geometers method, but that the method of proof in
geometric method can vary. In other words, Descartes states that he has used a geometric method but
that this method does not have as an essential feature starting with a group of axioms and advancing
until reaching theorems, instead it is defined by another more important notion for Cartesian
demonstration: the notion of order. He says: “Now there are two things that I distinguish in the
geometrical mode of writing, viz. the order and the method of proof. The order consists merely in
putting forward those things first that should be known without the aid of the subsequently, and
arranging all other matters so that their proof depends solely on what precedes them.”

Therefore, even though the way of proving may vary, the important thing is that when going from one
element to another within a chain of reasoning, those that come afterwards depend on those that come
first. Descartes makes an emphasis on the fact that order depends on knowledge, things depend on
others and can be ordered in a discourse in so far as some are more known than others. The step must
always be made from the known to the unknown so that whatever comes first justify what comes
afterwards. So, in any kind of more geometrico proof that is carried out, the propositions or elements
that are discovered depend logically on the previous ones and the legitimate step towards them can be
made thanks to having knowledge of the first. Therefore, in the reduction to simplicity and in the
connection of homogenous terms according to evidence, the proof is constituted. In other words, it is
not about discovering a hidden order underlying in nature, but an order that depends on thought that

11
comes forth from the certainty obtained by the subject. In this way, the order of the being is considered
in terms of the order of understanding making intelligibility possible. That is why, Descartes says that
“things themselves must be considered only in so far as they are objects of the understanding” (AT X,
399).

The idea of the analysis as a solely heuristic method10 that requires synthesis to complete the proof is
put aside in Cartesian philosophy, because in the analysis we already have a proof given that the
precepts of the order hold. In so far as the known order is respected, there are evident links between the
parts and there is an intelligible system that allows the solution of problems to be reached and thus
generate knowledge. The proof depends on evidence reached by the understanding when relating the
known with the unknown and by having, on its terms, a proper order that makes the totality
comprehensible.

Although both the analysis and the synthesis share the order, allowing both to be constituted in proof,
there is one significant difference between the two:

Further, the method of proof is two-fold, one being analytic, the other synthetic. Analysis shows the true way by
which a thing was methodically discovered (inventa) and derived (...). Synthesis contrariwise (...) does indeed
clearly demonstrate its conclusions, and it employs a long series of definitions, postulates, axioms, theorems and
problems (AT VII, 155).

Therefore we have analysis as a way to show the true path of discovery. The idea that discovery
characterized the analysis is maintained, but in this case the heuristic character is closely related to the
truth and consequently to the proof. This is true and even one could say that the proof reaches the truth
or that this path is the true path, precisely because it is discovered. That is, when the analytical
procedure is followed, a truth is discovered in such a way that the person who carries out the procedure
“understands” and “makes it as much his own” (AT VII, 155). The demonstration does not depend on
formal procedures that dictate what is correct; the correction depends on the one who performs the
proof. The objects of knowledge determine the understanding, given that the chains of intelligibility

10
Galileo says: “Hence there are two kinds of method, one for discovering the truth, which is known as analysis, or
the method of resolution, and which can also be called the method of discovery”, in Beaney (2003). Something similar is
said in Port Royal Logic: “We distinguish two kinds of method: the one for the discovery of truth is called analysis or the
method of resolution or the method of invention; the second, used to make others understand the truth, is called synthesis or
the method of composition or the method of instruction”, in Raftopoulos (2003).

12
depend on material relationships between parts that are produced thanks to the subject’s intervention
and the conditions imposed by the subject in the search for intelligibility. This is precisely what is in
play here, because in the discovery of one way, of an order that is perfectly understood, a system of
relationships is established producing intelligibility, consequently certainty and consequently truth, in
other words, a proof is constituted.

The sole production of a rational scheme according to the rules of intelligibility makes the explanation
correct and it is unnecessary to have a synthesis as a confirmation. A synthetic proof can only be given
once the principles involved in it have been validated by way of analysis. The elements included in the
discovery, thanks to which they have taken their place and have been perfectly understood, are
presented in the synthesis, but this one does not show how they have been reached and consequently it
is not understood, and there is no certainty regarding them. A synthetic proof can be developed
following the order, given that, to be accepted, each part will depend only on the previous ones, but the
principles of the proof or the common notions should be taken only as suppositions. In order to the
principles being not only suppositions but true, their discovery is necessary by way of analysis. A
synthetic proof can be performed by somebody if the principles are accepted by the one who carries out
the proof, which does not imply that they have been validated, so that she does not understand the true
character of the system as a whole and therefore does not grasp it as an absolute.

Only one who reflects, meditates on the reasons, one who follows its order, who sees the relationships
between the parts, who sees how consequences depend on principles and vice versa, understands and
consequently demonstrates and is convinced of the truth. The proof is not performed with the intention
of convincing others, here persuasion works on oneself: only when one is convinced of the truth, this is
true and consequently proved. The fact of abandoning the synthesis and giving primacy to the analysis
in Cartesian philosophy is not simply a thing about preference between two equally acceptable methods
of proof. To the extent that the new criterion of truth for Descartes is the self-verification that depends
on the subject, it is no longer enough to teach that which has been discovered in the world, because this
does not teach the truth of the principles which can only be done by showing the true way of discovery
that is evident for the person who performs the proof; a proof in which each part is completely
validated. Thus, the main thing now is certainty, which is obtained in the analysis while the
communicability of that which was discovered is located on a second plane, or, in the synthesis.

13
Ancient and medieval prioritized the transmission and preservation of knowledge, precisely because of
the way they understood knowledge, grasping what was in the world; for Descartes, knowledge
depends on certainty that is expresses and is based on the analysis.

As we have seen, analysis is the establishment of dependency relationships between parts according to
a unity in terms of the understanding. These relationships between parts that Descartes called
proportions allow a system of science to be developed. Showing relationships based on the simple
concepts constituted in the basis of certainty, makes it possible to demonstrate and show the true way in
which the parts are connected. That is, the way to solve problems consists in translating these terms that
can be managed by understanding, allowing relationships to be established between the terms
according to a common frame of reference. This is clearly seen in the method used in the Geometry, as
geometric figures are translated to algebra, allowing operation with homogenous magnitudes that are
easily related keeping in mind that the comparisons that are established between them are carried out
by way of the order. Irrespective of what the objects may be, these can be understood and consequently
demonstrated, if they are put into simple evident terms that allow for the construction of a configuration
of intelligible and certain relationships.

Faced with any problems of knowledge, the operation that should be performed is that of reducing
complex concepts involved to simple natures or to those atoms of evidence that can be related ‒ in so
far as they are simple objects of thought ‒ according to one respect and be configured in such a way
that understanding can guarantee its certainty, thus responding to the demand of Cartesian intuitionism
of validating the contents of any science starting with the subject. In these terms it can be stated that
demonstration for Descartes is the same as understanding. One who perfectly understands the
configuration of the parts, their relationships and how some depend on others, has demonstrated, as
long as the contents have been validated. This reduction is a translation that goes from complex to
simplicity of the objects of thought. We could say then, that in the reduction of complex to simple, the
problems or the issues that need to be explained are put in the language of thought, which is of easy
operation and results in the comprehension of the relationships between the parts and consequently the
demonstration of the contents.

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The abandonment by Descartes of some proof methods used by his predecessors, as well as the
prevalence given to the analysis, is the result of an inversion in the way of understanding knowledge
and proof. The purpose of the performing a proof can no longer be to transmit an understanding of the
world, but must achieve the certainty that belongs to the subject, who needs to be convinced of the truth
by conducting the observation of contents. The analysis is understood as a method of understanding as
well as method of proof. That is why the task of searching the truth cannot be conceived as anything
other than an investigation of the limits of understanding:

Now no more useful inquiry can be proposed than that which seeks to determine the nature and the scope of human
knowledge. This is why we state this very problem succinctly in the single question, which we deem should be
answered at the very outset with the aid of the rules which we have already laid down. This investigation should be
undertaken once at least in his life by anyone who has the slightest regard for truth, since in pursuing it the true
instruments of knowledge and the whole of inquiry come to light (AT X, 397).

In summary, aspects such as the Cartesian method, the demonstrative ideal that is sought with this, the
development of mathematics through Analytical Geometry and even the search for metaphysical
principles on which other sciences are based, are inseparable aspects of the subjectivist vision of
knowledge advocated by Descartes. Thus, although at times there are some difficulties in the Cartesian
philosophy in its purpose of moving definitively away from tradition, in general the continuity of its
system can be defended, as can its coherence in regards to the position of the subject in knowledge as
definitive judge for the validation of truth.

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