738 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Razon vs. Inciong

*
No. 51809. December 19, 1980.

ABRAHAM RAZON, petitioner, vs. HON. AMADO G. INCIONG, as

Deputy Minister of Labor; NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION (NLRC); and PHILIPS ELECTRICAL LAMPS, INC.,
respondents.

Labor Law; Labor Relations; Reinstatement with back wages; Dismissal of

employee set aside for being unjustified and the charges not having been proved,
and the alleged incompetence of an employee which could justify his dismissal was
discovered only by the employer after two years.—We agree with the Solicitor
General Additionally, we have to note that the only serious charge against peti-

_______________

* SECOND DIVISION
 VOL. 101, DECEMBER 19, 1980 739

Razon vs. Inciong

tioner which would have justified his dismissal is his alleged incompetence and yet
private respondent appears to have discovered it only after almost two years from
petitioner’s employment.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Absence of an employee’s appeal to the Labor
Arbiter’s ruling against his reinstatement not a bar to his appeal; Res judicata
cannot be invoked in labor relations proceedings. Reasons.—It is true that the
petitioner did not appeal the ruling of the Labor Arbiter that he was not entitled to
reinstatement but he did raise the question in his appeal to the Secretary of Labor.
Under the circumstances the principle of res judicata may not be invoked
considering that labor relations proceedings are “non-litigation and summary in
nature, without regard to legal technicalities obtaining in courts of law.” (Rule XIII,
Sec. 5, implementing Regulations of the Labor Code).

APPEAL by certiorari from the resolution of the National Labor Relations

Commission.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

Appeal by certiorari to set aside the Resolution dated December 6, 1977

(Annex C, Petition) of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and
the Order dated February 1, 1979 (Annex E, Petition) of the Deputy Minister
of Labor which ordered the private respondent Philips Electrical Lamps, Inc. to
pay to petitioner P1,100 as separation pay. Petitioner’s prayer is for
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and backwages.
The factual background is as follows:
On April 17, 1974, Philips Electrical Lamps. Inc. employed Abraham Razon
as Supervisor of its Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) Department. On January 8,
1976, the company filed with the Ministry of Labor an application to terminate
his services because of alleged animosities between Razon on the one hand and
his colleagues, supervisors and subordinates on the other hand; for alleged
misrepresentation as to his qualifications, i.e. he posed as an experienced
electronic expert but could not
740 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Razon vs. Inciong

troubleshoot on his own even minor CRT problems; and for alleged weird
disposition in that he challenged his subordinates to fistfights, shouted at them
and even padlocked the CRT doors.
Petitioner in turn filed with the Department of Labor on January 13, 1976, a
complaint for illegal dismissal. Conciliation proceedings were unavailing so the
case proceeded to compulsory arbitration and in a decision dated December
29, 1976, the Labor Arbiter ruled that Razon was not guilty of the charges
against him but did not order his reinstatement because “the trust and confidence
of the company on the complainant is already in doubt.” The Labor Arbiter
instead ordered that Razon be paid separation pay equivalent to his salary from
the date of his dismissal to the date of the decision.
The company appealed to the NLRC on the ground that since Razon was
not entitled to reinstatement he was likewise not entitled to separation pay. On
December 6, 1977, the NLRC modified the appealed decision. It ruled that
Razon “is entitled to separation pay equivalent to one-half month pay for every
year of service.” Dissatisfied because the amount awarded to him was reduced,
Raison appealed to the Secretary of Labor praying, inter alia, that the
Commissioners decision “be reviewed, reconsidered and reversed specifically
on the denial of reinstatement and backwages.” But on February 1, 1979, the
Deputy Minister of Labor dismissed the appeal. Hence, the present appeal to us
by certiorari where the following question is posed:

“In the face of a finding that an employee is not guilty of the charges imputed
against him by his employer, is it not an error in law, or a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction to merely award him separation pay and not to
reinstate him with backwages as provided by law?”

The decision of the Labor Arbiter states the petitioner is not guilty of the charges
leveled against him and this implicitly confirmed by the NLRC in its resolution.
For this reason the Solicitor General who represents the public respondents
submits:
 VOL. 101, DECEMBER 19, 1980 741
Razon vs. Inciong

“1. There was no clear and positive pronouncement by the Labor Arbiter
and the NLRC that the respondent company had totally and
completely lost its trust and confidence in petitioner.
2. There was no finding that petitioner had willfully breached the trust and
confidence of the company so as to justify his dismissal under Article
283 (d) of the Labor Code.
3. The mere fact that petitioner may have always consulted the
company’s Plant Manager and former immediate superior of petitioner
for only about three months (p. 16, t.s.n., April 27, 1976), and that
petitioner and his immediate superior, Hansel Arroyo, are antagonistic
to each other, do not constitute substantial evidence to warrant the
conclusion that the company may have lost its trust and confidence in
petitioner.
4. In the language of this Honorable Court, ‘the law, in protecting the
rights of the laborer, authorizes neither oppression nor self-destruction
of the employer. Where, therefore, it could be shown that the result
would be neither oppressive nor self-destructive, it cannot be asserted
dogmatically that an outright termination of employment is justified’
(PAL. v. PALE A, 57 SCRA 489, 493). In the case at bar,
respondent company failed to demonstrate, and there was no finding
by either the Labor Arbiter or the NLRC, that the continued
employment of petitioner, even in his managerial position, would result
in the company’s oppression or self-destruction. As a matter of fact,
there was no finding that as a proximate result of petitioner’s
employment, the company suffered business reverses.
5. Dismissal of petitioner would, under the circumstances, be too severe
and drastic a penalty (See San Miguel Corp. v. Sec. of Labor, L-
39195, May 16, 1975; & PAL v. PALE A, supra). It would be more
in consonance with the social justice and protection to labor provisions
of the Constitution to order the reinstatement of petitioner, with
backwages from the time of his dismissal up to the time of his
reinstatement (Art. 280, Labor Code).”

We agree with the Solicitor General Additionally, we have to note that the only
serious charge against petitioner which would have justified his dismissal is his
alleged incompetence and yet private respondent appears to have discovered it
only after almost two years from petitioner’s employment.
It is true that the petitioner did not appeal the ruling of the Labor Arbiter that
he was not entitled to reinstatement but he
742 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Razon vs. Inciong

did raise the question in his appeal to the Secretary of Labor. Under the
circumstances the principle of res judicata may not be invoked considering that
labor relations proceedings are “non-litigation and summary in nature, without
regard to legal technicalities obtaining in courts of law.” (Rule XIII, Sec. 5,
Implementing Regulations of the Labor Code.)
WHEREFORE, the orders appealed from are hereby reversed and the
private respondent is ordered to reinstate the petitioner with backwages from
the time of his dismissal to the time of his reinstatement. No special
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
*
Barredo (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez and De Castro,
JJ., concur.

Petition granted.

Notes.—Laborers who worked 7 days a week and were receiving 25%

Sunday differential for 3 months prior to the implementation of R.A. 1880 are
entitled to the benefits arising from said statute. (National Waterworks and
Sewerage Authority vs. NAWASA Consolidated Unions, 79 SCRA 246).
Salary adjustment pursuant to the implementation of R.A. 1880 should
exclude cost of board and lodging furnished by the employer as it is included in
the computation of overtime pay. (NAWASA vs. NAWASA Consolidated
Unions, 79 SCRA 246).
Lack of clearance issued by the Secretary of Labor on lay-off of employees
is not indispensable where the facts show that the employer filed its application
16 days before the intended lay-off and because of union opposition, the matter
was brought to the NLRC which later issued the clearance sought.

_______________

* Justice Ramon C. Fernandez was designated to sit temporarily in the Second Division
in lieu of Justice Ramon C. Aquino who did not take part.
 VOL. 101, DECEMBER 19, 1980 743
Razon vs. Inciong

(MDII Supervisors and Confidential Employees Asso. vs. Presidential

Assistant on Legal Affairs, 79 SCRA 41).
The complainant has the burden to prove his side of the controversy. Failure
to do so means that the NLRC could rely on the evidence offered by the other
party. (Montemayor vs. Sec. of Labor, 80 SCRA 692).
Employees belonging to a religious sect which prohibit affiliation of their
members with any labor organization are excluded from the application and
coverage of a closed-shop agreement. (Anucension vs. National Labor
Union, 80 SCRA 350).
Dismissal under Termination Pay Law is not entitled to reinstatement but
only to a certain compensation. (Jaguar Transportation Co., Inc. vs.
Cornista, 83 SCRA 77).
Employee who was illegally dismissed is entitled to receive his backwages
from date of his illegal dismissal. The period of pendency of decision of a case
should not be deducted in the computation of backwages. (New Manila Candy
Workers Union vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 86 SCRA 37).
The statutory remedy requiring reinstatement of employees dismissed due to
the unfair labor practice of the employer is not unconstitutional. (Bradman
Company, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 78 SCRA 10).

——o0o——