You are on page 1of 49

MMDA v Bel-Air Village Association, Inc.

GR 135962 March 27, 2000

FACTS:
On December 30, 1995, respondent received from petitioner a notice requesting
the former to open its private road, Neptune Street, to public vehicular traffic
starting January 2, 1996. On the same day, respondent was apprised that the
perimeter separating the subdivision from Kalayaan Avenue would be
demolished.

Respondent instituted a petition for injunction against petitioner, praying for


the issuance of a TRO and preliminary injunction enjoining the opening of
Neptune Street and prohibiting the demolition of the perimeter wall.

ISSUE:
WON MMDA has the authority to open Neptune Street to public traffic as an
agent of the state endowed with police power.

HELD:
A ‘local government’ is a “political subdivision of a nation or state which is
constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs”. It is a “body
politic and corporate” – one endowed with powers as a political subdivision of
the National Government and as a corporate entity representing the
inhabitants of its territory (LGC of 1991).
Our Congress delegated police power to the LGUs in Sec.16 of the LGC of
1991. It empowers the sangguniang panlalawigan, panlungsod and bayan to
“enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the
general welfare of the [province, city or municipality] and its
inhabitants pursuant to Sec.16 of the Code and in the proper exercise of the
[LGU’s corporate powers] provided under the Code.”
There is no syllable in RA 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let
alone legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the LGUs, there is no
grant of authority in RA 7924 that allows the MMDA to enact ordinances and
regulations for the general welfare of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA
is merely a “development authority” and not a political unit of government since
it is neither an LGU or a public corporation endowed with legislative power.
The MMDA Chairman is not an elective official, but is merely appointed by the
President with the rank and privileges of a cabinet member.
In sum, the MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the
community. It is the LGUs, acting through their respective legislative
councils, that possess legislative power and police power.
The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any ordinance or
resolution ordering the opening of Neptune Street, hence, its proposed opening
by the MMDA is illegal

Amigable vs Cuenca
G.R. No. L-26400
43 SCRA 360 February 29, 1972

Petitioner: Victoria Amigable

Respondent: Nicolas Cuenca, as Commissioner of Public Highways and the


Republic of the Philippines

FACTS: Victoria Amigable rightfully owned a lot in Cebu City which was
used by the government for Mango and Gorordo Avenues without her
permission and without proper negotiation of sales. Because of this, she filed a
case in CFI Cebu.

Defendants argue that 1) Action was premature; 2) Right of action has already
been prescribed; 3) Government cannot be sued without its consent and; 4)
Cebu already agreed to use the land as such.

CFI rendered a decision which states that Amigable cannot restore and
recover her ownership and possession of the said land and thus dismissed the
complaint on grounds that state may not be sued without its consent.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Amigable may rightfully sue the government
without its consent

HELD: In the case of Ministerio vs Court of First Instance of Cebu, it was


held that when the government takes away She could then bring an action to
recover possession of the land anytime, because possession is one of the
attributes of ownership. However, since such action is not feasible at this time
since the lot has been used for other purposes, the only relief left is for the
government to make due compensation of the exact amount, price or value of
the lot at the time of the taking.

property from a private landowner for public use without going through the
legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may
properly maintain a suit against the government without violating the doctrine
of governmental immunity from suit without its consent.
In the case at bar, since no annotation in favor of the government
appears at the back of the certificate of title and plaintiff has not executed any
deed of conveyance of any portion of the lot to the government, then she
remains as the rightful owner of the lot.

Petition is partly GRANTED.

City Government of Quezon City vs. Ericta [GR L-34915, 24 June 1983]
First Division, Gutierrez Jr. (J): 5 concur

Facts:
Section 9 of Ordinance 6118, S-64, entitled "Ordinance Regulating the
Establishment, Maintenance and Operation of Private Memorial Type Cemetery
Or Burial Ground Within the Jurisdiction of Quezon City and Providing
Penalties for the Violation thereof" provides that at least 6% of the total area of
the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased
persons who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5
years prior to their death, to be determined by competent City Authorities, and
where the area so designated shall immediately be developed and should be
open for operation not later than 6 months from the date of approval of the
application.
For several years, section 9 of the Ordinance was not enforced by city
authorities but 7 years after the enactment of the ordinance, the Quezon City
Council passed a resolution requesting the City Engineer, Quezon City, to stop
any further selling and/or transaction of memorial park lots in Quezon City
where the owners thereof have failed to donate the required 6% space intended
for paupers burial.
Pursuant to this petition, the Quezon City Engineer notified Himlayang
Pilipino, Inc. in writing that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 would be
enforced. Himlayang Pilipino reacted by filing with the Court of First Instance
(CFI) of Rizal (Branch XVIII at Quezon City), a petition for declaratory relief,
prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction (Special Proceeding Q-
16002) seeking to annul Section 9 of the Ordinance in question for being
contrary to the Constitution, the Quezon City Charter, the Local Autonomy Act,
and the Revised Administrative Code. There being no issue of fact and the
questions raised being purely legal, both the City Government and Himlayang
Pilipino agreed to the rendition of a judgment on the pleadings. The CFI
rendered the decision declaring Section 9 of Ordinance 6118, S-64 null and
void. A motion for reconsideration having been denied, the City Government
and City Council filed the petition or review with the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether the setting aside of 6% of the total area of all private cemeteries
for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers is tantamount to taking of
private property without just compensation.
Held: There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least
6% of the total area of all private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of
deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or
the general welfare of the people.
The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain
area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the
municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for
this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries.
The expropriation without compensation of a portion of private
cemeteries is not covered by Section 12(t) of Republic Act 537, the Revised
Charter of Quezon City which empowers the city council to prohibit the burial
of the dead within the center of population of the city and to provide for their
burial in a proper place subject to the provisions of general law regulating
burial grounds and cemeteries.
When the Local Government Code, Batas Pambansa 337 provides in
Section 177 (q) that a Sangguniang panlungsod may "provide for the burial of
the dead in such place and in such manner as prescribed by law or ordinance"
it simply authorizes the city to provide its own city owned land or to buy or
expropriate private properties to construct public cemeteries.
This has been the law and practice in the past and it continues to the
present. Expropriation, however, requires payment of just compensation.
The questioned ordinance is different from laws and regulations
requiring owners of subdivisions to set aside certain areas for streets, parks,
playgrounds, and other public facilities from the land they sell to buyers of
subdivision lots. The necessities of public safety, health, and convenience are
very clear from said requirements which are intended to insure the
development of communities with salubrious and wholesome environments.
The beneficiaries of the regulation, in turn, are made to pay by the subdivision
developer when individual lots are sold to homeowners.

THE METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY vs. VIRON


TRANSPORTATION CO., INC
G.R. No. 170656 August 15, 2007

FACTS: The present petition for review on certiorari, rooted in the traffic
congestion problem, questions the authority of the Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority (MMDA) to order the closure of provincial bus terminals
along Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA) and major thoroughfares of Metro
Manila.

Executive Order (E.O.) No. 179, with the pertinent provisions contain:
WHEREAS, the MMDA has recommended a plan to decongest traffic by
eliminating the bus terminals now located along major Metro Manila
thoroughfares and providing more convenient access to the mass transport
system to the commuting public through the provision of mass transport
terminal facilities that would integrate the existing transport modes, namely
the buses, the rail-based systems of the LRT, MRT and PNR and to facilitate
and ensure efficient travel through the improved connectivity of the different
transport modes;
Section 2. PROJECT OBJECTIVES. – In accordance with the plan proposed by
MMDA
Section 3. PROJECT IMPLEMENTING AGENCY. – The Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority (MMDA), is hereby designated as the implementing
Agency for the project.

As the above-quoted portions of the E.O. noted, the primary cause of


traffic congestion in Metro Manila has been the numerous buses plying the
streets and the inefficient connectivity of the different transport modes; and the
MMDA had “recommended a plan to decongest traffic by eliminating the bus
terminals now located along major Metro Manila thoroughfares and providing
more and convenient access to the mass transport system to the commuting
public through the provision of mass transport terminal facilities”which plan is
referred to under the E.O. as the Greater Manila Mass Transport System
Project (the Project).
The E.O. thus designated the MMDA as the implementing agency for the
Project.
Pursuant to the E.O., the Metro Manila Council (MMC), the governing board
and policymaking body of the MMDA, issued Resolution No. 03-07 series of
20037 expressing full support of the Project. Recognizing the imperative to
integrate the different transport modes via the establishment of common bus
parking terminal areas, the MMC cited the need to remove the bus terminals
located along major thoroughfares of Metro Manila.8
On February 24, 2003, Viron Transport Co., Inc. (Viron), a domestic
corporation engaged in the business of public transportation with a provincial
bus operation, filed a petition for declaratory relief before the RTC of Manila.
Chairman Fernando, was “poised to issue a Circular, Memorandum or Order
closing, or tantamount to closing, all provincial bus terminals along EDSA and
in the whole of the Metropolis under the pretext of traffic regulation.” This
impending move, it stressed, would mean the closure of its bus terminal in
Sampaloc, Manila and two others in Quezon City.
The trial court sustained the constitutionality and legality of the E.O.
pursuant to R.A. No. 7924, which empowered the MMDA to administer Metro
Manila’s basic services including those of transport and traffic management.

ISSUE: W/N EO is unconstitutional

HELD: YES. The authority of the President to order the implementation of


the Project notwithstanding, the designation of the MMDA as the implementing
agency for the Project may not be sustained. It is ultra vires, there being no
legal basis therefor.
It bears stressing that under the provisions of E.O. No. 125, as amended,
it is the DOTC, and not the MMDA, which is authorized to establish and
implement a project such as the one subject of the cases at bar. Thus, the
President, although authorized to establish or cause the implementation of the
Project, must exercise the authority through the instrumentality of the DOTC
which, by law, is the primary implementing and administrative entity in the
promotion, development and regulation of networks of transportation, and the
one so authorized to establish and implement a project such as the Project in
question.
By designating the MMDA as the implementing agency of the Project, the
President clearly overstepped the limits of the authority conferred by law,
rendering E.O. No. 179 ultra vires.

In another vein, the validity of the designation of MMDA flies in the


absence of a specific grant of authority to it under R.A. No. 7924.
SECTION 2. Creation of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority. — . . .
The MMDA shall perform planning, monitoring and coordinative functions, and
in the process exercise regulatory and supervisory authority over the delivery of
metro-wide services within Metro Manila, without diminution of the autonomy
of the local government units concerning purely local matters
In light of the administrative nature of its powers and functions, the MMDA is
devoid of authority to implement the Project as envisioned by the E.O; hence, it
could not have been validly designated by the President to undertake the
Project. It follows that the MMDA cannot validly order the elimination of
respondents’ terminals
This Court commiserates with the MMDA for the roadblocks thrown in
the way of its efforts at solving the pestering problem of traffic congestion in
Metro Manila. These efforts are commendable, to say the least, in the face of
the abominable traffic situation of our roads day in and day out. This Court
can only interpret, not change, the law, however. It needs only to be reiterated
that it is the DOTC ─ as the primary policy, planning, programming,
coordinating, implementing, regulating and administrative entity to promote,
develop and regulate networks of transportation and communications ─ which
has the power to establish and administer a transportation project like the
Project subject of the case at bar.

PITC V ANGELES
263 scra 420

Facts:
PITC issued Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 under which
applications to the PITC for importation from the People’s Republic of China
must be accompanied by a viable and confirmed export program of Philippine
products.
PITC barred Remington and Firestone from importing products from
China on the ground that they were not able to comply with the requirement of
the said administrative order. Thereafter they filed a petition for prohibition
and mandamus against the said order of PITC in which the trial court upheld
and declared to be null and void for being unconstitutional.
The court contends further authority to process and approve applications
for imports SOCPEC and to issue rules and regulations pursuant to LOI 144
has already been repealed by EO 133 issued on February 27, 1987. Hence, the
PITC filed a certiorari seeking the reversal of the said decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not PITC’s Administrative Order 89-08-01 is valid.

HELD: The Supreme Court held that PITC is empowered to issue such order;
nevertheless, the said AO is invalid within the context of Article 2 of the New
Civil Code. The Court cited Tanada vs Tuvera which states that all statues
including those of local application and private laws shall be published as
condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication in the
Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation unless a different
effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. The AO under consideration is one of
those issuances which should be published for its effectivity since it is punitive
in character.

Tañada vs. Tuvera 136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985) 146 SCRA 446 (December
29, 1986)

136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985)

FACTS:
Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public
concern as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be
published in the Official Gazette, petitioners filed for writ of mandamus to
compel respondent public officials to publish and/or cause to publish various
presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations,
executive orders, letters of implementations and administrative orders.

The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the


dismissal of the case, contending that petitioners have no legal personality to
bring the instant petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or
statute becomes valid and enforceable.

HELD:
Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the
Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The
clear object of this provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the
various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens.
Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the
application of the maxim ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It would be the
height of injustive to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression
of a law which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in
the Official Gazette…. The word “shall” therein imposes upon respondent
officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the constitutional
right of the people to be informed on matter of public concern is to be given
substance and validity.

The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general


applicability is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a
person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically
informed of its contents. The Court declared that presidential issuances of
general application which have not been published have no force and effect.

TAÑADA VS. TUVERA


146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)

FACTS: This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on


April 24, 1985. Respondent argued that while publication was necessary as a
rule, it was not so when it was “otherwise” as when the decrees themselves
declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability


and laws which are not as to their publication;
2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general
circulation.

HELD:

The clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and
not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be
omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law
effective immediately upon approval, or in any other date, without its previous
publication.
“Laws” should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for
strictly speaking, all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some
that do not apply to them directly. A law without any bearing on the public
would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra
vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public
interest eve if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of
the people only, and not to the public as a whole.

All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be
published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after
publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to


inform the public of the content of the law.

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in
the Official Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity.
The Supreme Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to
repeal or modify it if it finds it impractical.

The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible.

J. Cruz:

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of
skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious
pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless
their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to
make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like
a scabbarded saber that cannot faint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is
drawn.

El Banco Espanol-Filipino vs. Palanca

G.R. No. L-11390, March 26, 1918

* JURISDICTION, HOW ACQUIRED: Jurisdiction over the property which is the


subject of the litigation may result either from a seizure of the property under
legal process, whereby it is brought into the actual custody of the law, or it
may result from the institution of legal proceedings wherein, under special
provisions of law, the power of the court over the property is recognized and
made effective.
* The action to foreclose a mortgage is said to be a proceeding quasi in rem, by
which is expressed the idea that while it is not strictly speaking an action in
rem yet it partakes of that nature and is substantially such.

* DUE PROCESS IN FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS: Property is always


assumed to be in the possession of its owner, in person or by agent; and he
may be safely held, under certain conditions, to be affected with knowledge
that proceedings have been instituted for its condemnation and sale.

FACTS: Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y Limquingco mortgaged various


parcels of real property in Manila to El Banco Espanol-Filipino. Afterwards,
Engracio returned to China and there he died on January 29, 1810 without
returning again to the Philippines. The mortgagor then instituted foreclosure
proceeding but since defendant is a non-resident, it was necessary to give
notice by publication. The Clerk of Court was also directed to send copy of the
summons to the defendant’s last known address, which is in Amoy, China. It is
not shown whether the Clerk complied with this requirement. Nevertheless,
after publication in a newspaper of the City of Manila, the cause proceeded and
judgment by default was rendered. The decision was likewise published and
afterwards sale by public auction was held with the bank as the highest bidder.
On August 7, 1908, this sale was confirmed by the court. However, about
seven years after the confirmation of this sale, a motion was made by Vicente
Palanca, as administrator of the estate of the original defendant, wherein the
applicant requested the court to set aside the order of default and the
judgment, and to vacate all the proceedings subsequent thereto. The basis of
this application was that the order of default and the judgment rendered
thereon were void because the court had never acquired jurisdiction over the
defendant or over the subject of the action.

ISSUE:

* Whether or not the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the defendant and
the subject matter of the action

* Whether or not due process of law was observed

RULING:

On Jurisdiction

The word “jurisdiction” is used in several different, though related, senses since
it may have reference (1) to the authority of the court to entertain a particular
kind of action or to administer a particular kind of relief, or it may refer to the
power of the court over the parties, or (2) over the property which is the subject
to the litigation.

The sovereign authority which organizes a court determines the nature and
extent of its powers in general and thus fixes its competency or jurisdiction
with reference to the actions which it may entertain and the relief it may grant.

How Jurisdiction is Acquired

Jurisdiction over the person is acquired by the voluntary appearance of a party


in court and his submission to its authority, or it is acquired by the coercive
power of legal process exerted over the person.

Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of the litigation may result
either from a seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought
into the actual custody of the law, or it may result from the institution of legal
proceedings wherein, under special provisions of law, the power of the court
over the property is recognized and made effective. In the latter case the
property, though at all times within the potential power of the court, may never
be taken into actual custody at all. An illustration of the jurisdiction acquired
by actual seizure is found in attachment proceedings, where the property is
seized at the beginning of the action, or some subsequent stage of its progress,
and held to abide the final event of the litigation. An illustration of what we
term potential jurisdiction over the res, is found in the proceeding to register
the title of land under our system for the registration of land. Here the court,
without taking actual physical control over the property assumes, at the
instance of some person claiming to be owner, to exercise a jurisdiction in rem
over the property and to adjudicate the title in favor of the petitioner against all
the world.

In the terminology of American law the action to foreclose a mortgage is


said to be a proceeding quasi in rem, by which is expressed the idea that while
it is not strictly speaking an action in rem yet it partakes of that nature and is
substantially such. The expression "action in rem" is, in its narrow application,
used only with reference to certain proceedings in courts of admiralty wherein
the property alone is treated as responsible for the claim or obligation upon
which the proceedings are based. The action quasi rem differs from the true
action in rem in the circumstance that in the former an individual is named as
defendant, and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interest therein
to the obligation or lien burdening the property. All proceedings having for their
sole object the sale or other disposition of the property of the defendant,
whether by attachment, foreclosure, or other form of remedy, are in a general
way thus designated. The judgment entered in these proceedings is conclusive
only between the parties.

It is true that in proceedings of this character, if the defendant for whom


publication is made appears, the action becomes as to him a personal action
and is conducted as such. This, however, does not affect the proposition that
where the defendant fails to appear the action is quasi in rem; and it should
therefore be considered with reference to the principles governing actions in
rem.

Webb v. de Leon [GR 121234, 23 August 1995], also Gatchalian v. de Leon


[GR 121245], and

Lejano v. de Leon [GR 121297]

Second Division, Puno (J) : 2 concur, 1 on leave

Facts: This was a highly-publicized case (dubbed as Vizconde Massacre, and


involves a son of a Philippine Senator). On 19 June 1994, the National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI) filed with the Department of Justice (DOJ) a letter-
complaint charging petitioners Hubert Webb, Michael Gatchalian. Antonio J.
Lejano and 6 other persons, with the crime of Rape with Homicide. Forthwith,
the DOJ formed a panel of prosecutors headed by Assistant Chief State
prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuño to conduct the preliminary investigation of those
charged with the rape and killing on 30 June 1991 of Carmela N. Vizconde, her
mother Estrellita Nicolas-Vizoonde, and sister Anne Marie Jennifer in their
home at Parañaque. During the preliminary investigation, the NBI presented
the sworn statements of Maria Jessica Alfaro, 2 former housemaids of the
Webb family, Carlos Cristobal (a plane passenger), Lolita Birrer (live-in partner
of Biong), 2 of Vizconde’s maids, Normal White (a security guard) and Manciano
Gatmaitan (an engineer). The NBI also submitted the autopsy report involving
Estrellita (12 stab wounds), Carmela (9 stab wounds), and Jennifer (19 stab
wounds); and the genital examination of Carmela confirming the presence of
spermatozoa. The NBI submitted photocopies of the documents requested by
Webb in his Motion for Production and Examination of Evidence and
Documents, granted by the DOJ Panel. Webb claimed during the preliminary
investigation that he did not commit the crime as he went to the United States
on 1 March 1991 and returned to the Philippines on 27 October 1992. The
others — Fernandez, Gatchalian, Lejano, Estrada, Rodriguez and Biong —
submitted sworn statements, responses, and a motion to dismiss denying their
complicity in the rape-killing of the Vizcondes. Only Filart and Ventura failed to
file their counter-affidavits though they were served with subpoena in their last
known address. On 8 August 1995, the DOJ Panel issued a 26-page Resolution
"finding probable cause to hold respondents for trial" and recommending that
an Information for rape with homicide be filed against Webb, et. al. On the
same date, it filed the corresponding Information against Webb, et. al. with the
RTC Parañaque. Docketed as Criminal Case 95-404 and raffled to Branch 258
presided by Judge Zosimo V. Escano. It was, however, Judge Raul de Leon,
pairing judge of Judge Escano, who issued the warrants of arrest against
Webb, et. al. On 11 August 1995, Judge Escano voluntarily inhibited himself
from the case to avoid any suspicion about his impartiality considering his
employment with the NBI before his appointment to the bench. The case was
re-raffled to branch 274, presided by Judge Amelita Tolentino who issued new
warrants of arrest against Webb, et. al. On 11 August 1995, Webb voluntarily
surrendered to the police authorities at Camp Ricardo Papa Sr., in Taguig.
Webb, et. al. filed petitions for the issuance of the extraordinary writs of
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with application for temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction with the Supreme Court to: (1)
annul and set aside the Warrants of Arrest issued against petitioners by
respondent Judges Raul E. de Leon and Amelita Tolentino in Criminal Case No.
95- 404; (2) enjoin the respondents from conducting any proceeding in the
aforementioned criminal case; and (3) dismiss said criminal case or include
Jessica Alfaro as one of the accused therein. Gatchalian and Lejano likewise
gave themselves up to the authorities after filing their petitions before the
Court.

Issue: Whether the attendant publicity of the case deprived Webb, et.al, of their
right to fair trial.

Held: Pervasive and prejudicial publicity under certain circumstances can


deprive an accused of his due process right to fair trial. Herein, however,
nothing in the records that will prove that the tone and content of the publicity
that attended the investigation of petitioners fatally infected the fairness and
impartiality of the DOJ Panel. The DOJ Panel is composed of an Assistant
Chief State Prosecutor and Senior State Prosecutors; and their long experience
in criminal investigation is a factor to consider in determining whether they
can easily be blinded by the klieg lights of publicity. At no instance in the case
did Webb, et. al. seek the disqualification of any member of the DOJ Panel on
the ground of bias resulting from their bombardment of prejudicial publicity.
Further , on the contention of the denial of their constitutional right to due
process and violation of their right to an impartial investigation, records show
that the DOJ Panel did not conduct the preliminary investigation with indecent
haste. Webb, et. al. were given fair opportunity to prove lack of probable cause
against them. Still, the Supreme Court reminds a trial judge in high profile
criminal cases of his/her duty to control publicity prejudicial to the fair
administration of justice. The ability to dispense impartial justice is an issue in
every trial and in every criminal prosecution, the judiciary always stands as a
silent accused. More than convicting the guilty and acquitting the innocent, the
business of the judiciary is to assure fulfillment of the promise that justice
shall be done and is done, and that is the only way for the judiciary to get an
acquittal from the bar of public opinion.

Ang Tibay v. CIR [GR 46496, 27 February 1940]

En Banc, Laurel (J): 6 concur


Facts: Toribio Teodoro, the manager and proprietor of Ang Tibay,
laid off 89 laborers, who were members of the National Labor Union (NLU), due
to alleged shortages of leather materials. The National Labor Union filed a
complaint for unfair labor practice against Ang Tibay, alleging therein, among
others, that Toribio dominates the National Workers’ Brotherhood (NWB) of Ang
Tibay, another union in the company, and that Toribio discriminated against
the NLU and unjustly favoring the NWB, which he allegedly dominated. The
Court of Industrial Relations ruled in favor of NLU, due to the failure of Ang
Tibay to present records of the Bureau of Customs and Books of Accounts of
native dealers in leather and thus to disprove NLU’s allegation that the lack of
leather materials as a scheme to discharge NLU members.
The Supreme Court, however, reversed the decision, finding no
substantial evidence that the 89 workers were dismissed due to their union
affiliation or activities. Thus, the Solicitor General, in behalf of the Court of
Industrial Relations filed a motion for reconsideration, while the NLU filed a
motion for new trial, praying that the case be remanded to the Court of
Industrial Relations.

Issue: Whether the CIR’s freedom from the rigidity of procedural requirements
prescribe special
requirements of due process in administrative cases.

Held: The Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) is not narrowly constrained by


technical rules of procedure, and the Act requires it to "act according to justice
and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities
or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence
but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable."
The fact, however, that the CIR may be said to be free from the rigidity of
certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in justiciable cases
coming
before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential
requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative
character. There are cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in
proceedings of this character, to wit:
a. Right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected
to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. The liberty
and property of the citizen shall be protected by the rudimentary requirements
of fair play.
b. The tribunal must consider the evidence presented, after the party is given
an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish
the rights which he asserts. The right to adduce evidence, without the
corresponding duty on the part of the board to consider it, is vain. Such right is
conspicuously futile if the person or persons to whom the evidence is presented
can thrust it aside without notice or consideration.
c. While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it
does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having
something to support its decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to
support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached. This principle emanates
from the more fundamental principle that the genius of constitutional
government is contrary to the vesting of unlimited power anywhere. Law is both
a grant and a limitation upon power.
d. Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but
the evidence must be "substantial." Substantial evidence is more than a mere
scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion." The statute provides that 'the rules of
evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling.' The
obvious purpose of this and similar provisions is to free administrative boards
from the compulsion of technical rules so that the mere admission of matter
which would be deemed incompetent in judicial proceedings would not
invalidate the administrative order. But this assurance of a desirable flexibility
in administrative procedure does not go so far as to justify orders without a
basis in evidence having rational probative force. Mere uncorroborated hearsay
or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence. The decision must be
rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the
record
and disclosed to the parties affected. Only by confining the administrative
tribunal to the evidence disclosed to the parties, can the latter be protected in
their right to know and meet the case against them. It should not, however,
detract from their duty actively to see that the law is enforced, and for that
purpose, to use the authorized legal methods of securing evidence and
informing itself of facts material and relevant to the controversy. Boards of
inquiry may be appointed for the purpose of investigating and determining the
facts in any given case, but their report and decision are only advisory. (Section
9, CA 103.) The CIR may refer any industrial or agricultural dispute of any
matter under its consideration or
advisement to a local board of inquiry, a provincial fiscal, a justice of the peace
or any public official in any part of the Philippines for investigation, report and
recommendation, and may delegate to such board or public official such
powers and functions as the CIR may deem necessary, but such delegation
shall not affect the exercise of the Court itself of any of its powers (Section 10)
f. The CIR or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not
simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. It may be
that the volume of work is such that it is literally impossible for the titular
heads of the CIR personally to decide all controversies coming before them.
There is no statutory authority to authorize examiners or other subordinates to
render final decision, with right to appeal to board or commission, to
solve the difficulty.
g. The CIR should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a
manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues
involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this
duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.

** Philcomsat v Alcuaz 180 SCRA 218 (1989)

Facts: Herein petitioner is engaged in providing for services involving


telecommunications. Charging rates for certain specified lines that were
reduced by order of herein respondent Jose Alcuaz commissioner of the
National Telecommunications Commission. The rates were ordered to be
reduced by fifteen percent (15%) due to Executive Order No. 546 which granted
the NTC the power to fix rates. Said order was issued without prior notice and
hearing.

Issue: Whether or Not E.O. 546 is unconstitutional.

Held: Yes. Respondents admitted that the application of a policy like the fixing
of rates as exercised by administrative bodies is quasi-judicial rather than
quasi-legislative. But respondent’s contention that notice and hearing are not
required since the assailed order is merely incidental to the entire proceedings
and temporary in nature is erroneous. Section 16(c) of the Public Service Act,
providing for the proceedings of the Commission, upon notice and hearing,
dictates that a Commission has power to fix rates, upon proper notice and
hearing, and, if not subject to the exceptions, limitations or saving provisions.

It is thus clear that with regard to rate-fixing, respondent has no authority to


make such order without first giving petitioner a hearing, whether the order be
temporary or permanent, and it is immaterial whether the same is made upon
a complaint, a summary investigation, or upon the commission's own motion
as in the present case.

WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is GRANTED and the order of respondents is
hereby SET ASIDE.
G.R. No. L46496 February 27, 1940
ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO TEODORO, manager and propietor,
andNATIONAL WORKERS BROTHERHOOD, petitioners,vs.THE COURT OF
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and NATIONAL LABOR UNION, INC

Facts: There was agreement between Ang Tibay and the National Labor
Union, Inc (NLU). The NLU alleged that the supposed lack of leather material
claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme adopted to systematically
discharge all the members of the NLU, from work. And this averment is desired
to be proved by the petitioner with the records of the Bureau of Customs and
Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather. That National Worker's
Brotherhood Union of Ang Tibay is a company or employer union dominated by
Toribio Teodoro, which was alleged by the NLU as an illegal one. The CIR,
decided the case and elevated it to the Supreme Court, but a motion for new
trial was raised by the NLU. But the Ang Tibay filed a motion for opposing the
said motion.

Issue: Whether or Not, the motion for new trial is meritorious to be granted.

Held: To begin with the issue before us is to realize the functions of the CIR.
The CIR is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the law of
its creation which is the Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an
administrative board than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation.
It is not intended to be a mere receptive organ of the government. Unlike a
court of justice which is essentially passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is
invoked and deciding only cases that are presented to it by the parties litigant,
the function of the CIR, as will appear from perusal of its organic law is more
active, affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial
functions in the determination of disputes between employers and employees
but its functions are far more comprehensive and extensive. It has jurisdiction
over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any
question, matter controversy or disputes arising between, and/ or affecting
employers and employees or laborers, and landlords and tenants or farm-
laborers, and regulates the relations between them, subject to, and in
accordance with, the provisions of CA 103.

As laid down in the case of Goseco v. CIR, the SC had the occasion to point out
that the CIR is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and
equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or
legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but
may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable.

The fact, however, that the CIR may be said to be free from rigidity of certain
procedural requirements does not mean that it can in justiciable cases coming
before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential
requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative
character. There cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in
proceedings of this character:

(1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one's cause and
submit evidence in support thereof;
(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
(3) The decision must have something to support itself;
(4) The evidence must be substantial;
(5) The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing; or at
least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected;
(6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the
views of a subordinate;
(7) The Board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision
in such manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various Issue
involved, and the reason for the decision rendered.

The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable
to the parties adversely affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a
new trial should be, and the same is hereby granted, and the entire record of
this case shall be remanded to the CIR, with instruction that it reopen the case
receive all such evidence as may be relevant, and otherwise proceed in
accordance with the requirements set forth. So ordered.

** Ateneo de Manila University v Capulong 222 SCRA 644 (1993)

Facts: Leonardo H. Villa, a first year law student of Petitioner University, died
of serious physical injuries at Chinese General Hospital after the initiation rites
of Aquila Legis. Bienvenido Marquez was also hospitalized at
the Capitol Medical Center for acute renal failure occasioned by the serious
physical injuries inflicted upon him on the same occasion. Petitioner Dean
Cynthia del Castillo created a Joint Administration-Faculty-Student
Investigating Committee which was tasked to investigate and submit a report
within 72 hours on the circumstances surrounding the death of Lennie Villa.
Said notice also required respondent students to submit their written
statements within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt. Although respondent
students received a copy of the written notice, they failed to file a reply. In the
meantime, they were placed on preventive suspension. The Joint
Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating Committee, after receiving the
written statements and hearing the testimonies of several witness, found a
prima facie case against respondent students for violation of Rule 3 of the Law
School Catalogue entitled "Discipline." Respondent students were then required
to file their written answers to the formal charge. Petitioner Dean created a
Disciplinary Board to hear the charges against respondent students. The Board
found respondent students guilty of violating Rule No. 3 of the Ateneo Law
School Rules on Discipline which prohibits participation in hazing activities.
However, in view of the lack of unanimity among the
members of the Board on the penalty of dismissal, the Board left the imposition
of the penalty to the University Administration. Accordingly, Fr. Bernas
imposed the penalty of dismissal on all respondent students. Respondent
students filed with RTC Makati a TRO since they are currently enrolled. This
was granted. A TRO was also issued enjoining petitioners from dismissing the
respondents. A day after the expiration of the temporary restraining order,
Dean del Castillo created a Special Board to investigate the charges of hazing
against respondent students Abas andMendoza. This was requested to be
stricken out by the respondents and argued that the creation of the Special
Board was totally unrelated to the original petition which alleged lack of due
process. This was granted and reinstatement of the students was ordered.

Issue: Was there denial of due process against the respondent students.

Held: There was no denial of due process, more particularly procedural due
process. Dean of theAteneo Law School, notified and required respondent
students to submit their written statement on the incident. Instead of filing a
reply, respondent students requested through their counsel, copies of the
charges. The nature and cause of the accusation were adequately spelled out in
petitioners' notices. Present is the twin elements of notice and hearing.

Respondent students argue that petitioners are not in a position to file the
instant petition under Rule 65 considering that they failed to file a motion for
reconsideration first before the trial court, thereby by passing the latter and the
Court of Appeals. It is accepted legal doctrine that an exception to the doctrine
of exhaustion of remedies is when the case involves a question of law, as in this
case, where the issue is whether or not respondent students have been
afforded procedural due process prior to their dismissal
from Petitioner University.

Minimum standards to be satisfied in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions


in academic institutions, such as petitioner university herein, thus:

(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any
accusation against them;
(2) that they shall have the right to answer the charges against them with the
assistance of counsel, if desired:
(3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them
(4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and
(5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or
official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case
CARLOS SUPERDRUG CORP. vs. DSWD, ET. AL GR No. 166494, June 29,
2007

GR No. 166494, June 29, 2007

FACTS:

Petitioners, belonging to domestic corporations and proprietors operating


drugstores in the Philippines, are praying for preliminary injunction assailing
the constitutionality of Section 4(a) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9257, otherwise
known as the “Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003.” On February 26, 2004,
R.A. No. 9257, amending R.A. No. 7432, was signed into law by President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and it became effective on March 21, 2004. Section
4(a) of the Act states:

SEC. 4. Privileges for the Senior Citizens. – The senior citizens shall be entitled
to the following:

(a) the grant of twenty percent (20%) discount from all establishments relative
to the utilization of services in hotels and similar lodging establishments,
restaurants and recreation centers, and purchase of medicines in all
establishments for the exclusive use or enjoyment of senior citizens, including
funeral and burial services for the death of senior citizens;

The establishment may claim the discounts granted under (a), (f), (g) and (h)
as tax deduction based on the net cost of the goods sold or services rendered:
Provided, That the cost of the discount shall be allowed as deduction from
gross income for the same taxable year that the discount is granted. Provided,
further, That the total amount of the claimed tax deduction net of value added
tax if applicable, shall be included in their gross sales receipts for tax purposes
and shall be subject to proper documentation and to the provisions of the
National Internal Revenue Code, as amended.

Ÿ The DSWD, on May 8, 2004, approved and adopted the Implementing Rules
and Regulations of RA No. 9275, Rule VI, Article 8 which contains the proviso
that the implementation of the tax deduction shall be subject to the Revenue
Regulations to be issued by the BIR and approved by the DOF. With the new
law, the Drug Stores Association of the Philippines wanted a clarification of the
meaning of tax deduction. The DOF clarified that under a tax deduction
scheme, the tax deduction on discounts was subtracted from Net Sales
together with other deductions which are considered as operating expenses
before the Tax Due was computed based on the Net Taxable Income. On the
other hand, under a tax credit scheme, the amount of discounts which is the
tax credit item, was deducted directly from the tax due amount.

Ÿ The DOH issued an Administrative Order that the twenty percent discount
shall include both prescription and non-prescription medicines, whether
branded or generic. It stated that such discount would be provided in the
purchase of medicines from all establishments supplying medicines for the
exclusive use of the senior citizens.

Ÿ Drug store owners assail the law with the contention that granting the
discount would result to loss of profit and capital especially that such law
failed to provide a scheme to justly compensate the discount.

ISSUE: WON Section 4(a) of the Expanded Senior Citizens Act is


unconstitutional or not violative of Article 3 Section 9 of the Constitution which
provides that private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation and the equal protection clause of Article 3 Section 1.

HELD:

Ÿ The permanent reduction in their total revenues is a forced subsidy


corresponding to the taking of private property for public use or benefit. This
constitutes compensable taking for which petitioners would ordinarily become
entitled to a just compensation. Just compensation is defined as the full and
fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The
measure is not the taker’s gain but the owner’s loss. The word just is used to
intensify the meaning of the word compensation, and to convey the idea that
the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real,
substantial, full and ample.

Ÿ The law grants a twenty percent discount to senior citizens for medical and
dental services, and diagnostic and laboratory fees; admission fees charged by
theaters, concert halls, circuses, carnivals, and other similar places of culture,
leisure and amusement; fares for domestic land, air and sea travel; utilization
of services in hotels and similar lodging establishments, restaurants and
recreation centers; and purchases of medicines for the exclusive use or
enjoyment of senior citizens. As a form of reimbursement, the law provides that
business establishments extending the twenty percent discount to senior
citizens may claim the discount as a tax deduction.

Ÿ The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the power of
eminent domain, has general welfare for its object. Police power is not capable
of an exact definition, but has been purposely veiled in general terms to
underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough
room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances,
thus assuring the greatest benefits. Accordingly, it has been described as “the
most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does
to all the great public needs.” It is “[t]he power vested in the legislature by the
constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and
reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not
repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and
welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same.”

MMDA vs Bel Air Village Association

Date: March 27, 2000

Petitioner: Metropolitan Manila Development Authority

Respondent: Bel Air Village Association Inc

Ponente: Puno

Facts: MMDA is a government agency tasked with the delivery of basic services
in Metro Manila. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. is a non-stock, non-profit
corporation whose members are homeowners in Bel-Air Village, a private
subdivision in Makati City. BAVA is the registered owner of Neptune Street, a
road inside Bel-Air Village.

Ÿ On December 30, 1995, respondent received from petitioner, through its


Chairman, a notice dated December 22, 1995 requesting respondent to open
Neptune Street to public vehicular traffic starting January 2, 1996. BAVA was
apprised that the perimeter wall separating the subdivision from the adjacent
Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished.

Ÿ On January 2, 1996, BAVA instituted against petitioner before the RTC a


civil case for injunction. Respondent prayed for the issuance of a TRO and
preliminary injunction enjoining the opening of Neptune Street and prohibiting
the demolition of the perimeter wall. The trial court issued a temporary
restraining order the following day. After due hearing, the trial court denied the
issuance of preliminary injunction.

Ÿ On appeal, the CA rendered a Decision on the merits of the case finding that
the MMDA has no authority to order the opening of Neptune Street, a private
subdivision road and cause the demolition of its perimeter walls. It held that
the authority is lodged in the City Council of Makati by ordinance.

Issue: WON the MMDA has authority to open Neptune Road to the public
Held: No.MMDA claims that it has the authority to open Neptune
Street to public traffic because it is an agent of the state endowed with police
power in the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. One of these basic
services is traffic management which involves the regulation of the use of
thoroughfares to insure the safety, convenience and welfare of the general
public. It is alleged that the police power of MMDA was affirmed by this Court
in the consolidated cases of Sangalang v. IAC. From the premise that it has
police power, it is now urged that there is no need for the City of Makati to
enact an ordinance opening Neptune street to the public.

Police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. It has been defined as the


power vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and
establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and
ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the Constitution,
as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and for
the subjects of the same. The power is plenary and its scope is vast and
pervasive, reaching and justifying measures for public health, public safety,
public morals, and the general welfare.

It bears stressing that police power is lodged primarily in the National


Legislature. It cannot be exercised by any group or body of individuals not
possessing legislative power. The National Legislature, however, may delegate
this power to the President and administrative boards as well as the lawmaking
bodies of municipal corporations or local government units. Once delegated,
the agents can exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred on them
by the national lawmaking body.

Metropolitan or Metro Manila is a body composed of several local government


units - i.e., twelve (12) cities and five (5) municipalities, namely, the cities of
Caloocan, Manila, Mandaluyong, Makati, Pasay, Pasig, Quezon, Muntinlupa,
Las Pinas, Marikina, Paranaque and Valenzuela, and the municipalities of
Malabon, , Navotas, , Pateros, San Juan and Taguig. With the passage of RA
7924 in 1995, Metropolitan Manila was declared as a "special development and
administrative region" and the Administration of "metro-wide" basic services
affecting the region placed under "a development authority" referred to as the
MMDA.

The implementation of the MMDA’s plans, programs and projects is


undertaken by the local government units, national government agencies,
accredited people’s organizations, non-governmental organizations, and the
private sector as well as by the MMDA itself. For this purpose, the MMDA has
the power to enter into contracts, memoranda of agreement and other
cooperative arrangements with these bodies for the delivery of the required
services within Metro Manila.

Clearly, the scope of the MMDA’s function is limited to the delivery of the seven
(7) basic services. One of these is transport and traffic management which
includes the formulation and monitoring of policies, standards and projects to
rationalize the existing transport operations, infrastructure requirements, the
use of thoroughfares and promotion of the safe movement of persons and
goods. It also covers the mass transport system and the institution of a system
of road regulation, the administration of all traffic enforcement operations,
traffic engineering services and traffic education programs, including the
institution of a single ticketing system in Metro Manila for traffic violations.
Under this service, the MMDA is expressly authorized "to set the policies
concerning traffic" and "coordinate and regulate the implementation of all
traffic management programs." In addition, the MMDA may "install and
administer a single ticketing system," fix, impose and collect fines and
penalties for all traffic violations.

It will be noted that the powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts:
formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation,
management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system and
administration. There is no syllable in R. A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA
police power, let alone legislative power. Even the Metro Manila Council has
not been delegated any legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the
local government units, there is no provision in R. A. No. 7924 that empowers
the MMDA or its Council to "enact ordinances, approve resolutions and
appropriate funds for the general welfare" of the inhabitants of Metro Manila.
The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a "development authority." It is
an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating
with the various national government agencies, people’s organizations, non-
governmental organizations and the private sector for the efficient and
expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area. All its
functions are administrative in nature and these are actually summed up in
the charter itself

Petitioner cannot seek refuge in the cases of Sangalang v. Intermediate


Appellate Court where we upheld a zoning ordinance issued by the Metro
Manila Commission (MMC), the predecessor of the MMDA, as an exercise of
police power. The first Sangalang decision was on the merits of the petition,
while the second decision denied reconsideration of the first case and in
addition discussed the case of Yabut v. Court of Appeals.

Contrary to petitioner’s claim, the two Sangalang cases do not apply to the case
at bar. Firstly, both involved zoning ordinances passed by the municipal
council of Makati and the MMC. In the instant case, the basis for the proposed
opening of Neptune Street is contained in the notice of December 22, 1995 sent
by petitioner to respondent BAVA, through its president. The notice does not
cite any ordinance or law, either by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati
City or by the MMDA, as the legal basis for the proposed opening of Neptune
Street. Petitioner MMDA simply relied on its authority under its charter "to
rationalize the use of roads and/or thoroughfares for the safe and convenient
movement of persons." Rationalizing the use of roads and thoroughfares is one
of the acts that fall within the scope of transport and traffic management. By
no stretch of the imagination, however, can this be interpreted as an express or
implied grant of ordinance-making power, much less police power. Misjuris

Secondly, the MMDA is not the same entity as the MMC in Sangalang.
Although the MMC is the forerunner of the present MMDA, an examination of
Presidential Decree (P. D.) No. 824, the charter of the MMC, shows that the
latter possessed greater powers which were not bestowed on the present
MMDA. Jjlex

In 1990, President Aquino issued Executive Order (E. O.) No. 392 and
constituted the Metropolitan Manila Authority (MMA). The powers and
functions of the MMC were devolved to the MMA. It ought to be stressed,
however, that not all powers and functions of the MMC were passed to the
MMA. The MMA’s power was limited to the "delivery of basic urban services
requiring coordination in Metropolitan Manila." The MMA’s governing body, the
Metropolitan Manila Council, although composed of the mayors of the
component cities and municipalities, was merely given the power of: (1)
formulation of policies on the delivery of basic services requiring coordination
and consolidation; and (2) promulgation of resolutions and other issuances,
approval of a code of basic services and the exercise of its rule-making power.
Under the 1987 Constitution, the local government units became primarily
responsible for the governance of their respective political subdivisions. The
MMA’s jurisdiction was limited to addressing common problems involving basic
services that transcended local boundaries. It did not have legislative power. Its
power was merely to provide the local government units technical assistance in
the preparation of local development plans. Any semblance of legislative power
it had was confined to a "review [of] legislation proposed by the local legislative
assemblies to ensure consistency among local governments and with the
comprehensive development plan of Metro Manila," and to "advise the local
governments accordingly."

When R.A. No. 7924 took effect, Metropolitan Manila became a "special
development and administrative region" and the MMDA a "special development
authority" whose functions were "without prejudice to the autonomy of the
affected local government units." The character of the MMDA was clearly
defined in the legislative debates enacting its charter.

It is thus beyond doubt that the MMDA is not a local government unit or a
public corporation endowed with legislative power. It is not even a "special
metropolitan political subdivision" as contemplated in Section 11, Article X of
the Constitution. The creation of a "special metropolitan political subdivision"
requires the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected. R. A. No. 7924 was not submitted to the
inhabitants of Metro Manila in a plebiscite. The Chairman of the MMDA is not
an official elected by the people, but appointed by the President with the rank
and privileges of a cabinet member. In fact, part of his function is to perform
such other duties as may be assigned to him by the President, whereas in local
government units, the President merely exercises supervisory authority. This
emphasizes the administrative character of the MMDA.

Clearly then, the MMC under P. D. No. 824 is not the same entity as the MMDA
under R. A. No. 7924. Unlike the MMC, the MMDA has no power to enact
ordinances for the welfare of the community. It is the local government units,
acting through their respective legislative councils, that possess legislative
power and police power. In the case at bar, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Makati City did not pass any ordinance or resolution ordering the opening of
Neptune Street, hence, its proposed opening by petitioner MMDA is illegal and
the respondent Court of Appeals did not err in so ruling. We desist from ruling
on the other issues as they are unnecessary. Esmso
We stress that this decision does not make light of the MMDA’s noble efforts to
solve the chaotic traffic condition in Metro Manila. Everyday, traffic jams and
traffic bottlenecks plague the metropolis. Even our once sprawling boulevards
and avenues are now crammed with cars while city streets are clogged with
motorists and pedestrians. Traffic has become a social malaise affecting our
people’s productivity and the efficient delivery of goods and services in the
country. The MMDA was created to put some order in the metropolitan
transportation system but unfortunately the powers granted by its charter are
limited. Its good intentions cannot justify the opening for public use of a
private street in a private subdivision without any legal warrant. The promotion
of the general welfare is not antithetical to the preservation of the rule of law.

G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987 RESTITUTO YNOT, petitioner, vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE STATION COMMANDER,
INTEGRATED NATIONAL POLICE, BAROTAC NUEVO, ILOILO and THE
REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF ANIMAL INDUSTRY, REGION IV,
ILOILO CITY, respondents.
On January 13, 1984, the petitioner transported six carabaos in a pump
boat from Masbate to Iloilo when the same was confiscated by the police
station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for the violation of E.O. 626-A. A
case was filed by the petitioner questioning the constitutionality of executive
order and the recovery of the carabaos. After considering the merits of the case,
the confiscation was sustained and the court declined to rule on the
constitutionality issue. The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate
Appellate Court but it also upheld the ruling of RTC.

Issue:Is E.O. 626-A unconstitutional?

Ruling: The Respondent contends that it is a valid exercise of police power


to justify EO 626-A amending EO 626 in asic rule prohibiting the slaughter of
carabaos except under certain conditions. The supreme court said that The
reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to
be achieved by the questioned measure is missing the Supreme Court do not
see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can
prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed
anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously,
retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter there,
any more than moving them to another province will make it easier to kill them
there
The Supreme Court found E.O. 626-A unconstitutional. The executive act
defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed
punishment, which was carried out forthright. Due process was not properly
observed. In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the
police station commander, were returned to the petitioner only after he had
filed a complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. The
measure struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a
chance to be heard, thus denying due process.

Agustin vs Edu

Generally Accepted Principles of International Law – Police Power

Facts:Agustin is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car. He is assailing the


validity of Letter of Instruction No 229 which requires all motor vehicles to have
early warning devices particularly to equip them with a pair of “reflectorized
triangular early warning devices”. Agustin is arguing that this order is
unconstitutional, harsh, cruel and unconscionable to the motoring public.
Cars are already equipped with blinking lights which is already enough to
provide warning to other motorists. And that the mandate to compel motorists
to buy a set of reflectorized early warning devices is redundant and would only
make manufacturers and dealers instant millionaires.

ISSUE: Whether or not the said is EO is valid.

HELD: Such early warning device requirement is not an expensive


redundancy, nor oppressive, for car owners whose cars are already equipped
with 1) ‘blinking-lights in the fore and aft of said motor vehicles,’ 2) ‘battery-
powered blinking lights inside motor vehicles,’ 3) ‘built-in reflectorized tapes on
front and rear bumpers of motor vehicles,’ or 4) ‘well-lighted two (2) petroleum
lamps (the Kinke) . . . because: Being universal among the signatory countries
to the said 1968 Vienna Conventions, and visible even under adverse
conditions at a distance of at least 400 meters, any motorist from this country
or from any part of the world, who sees a reflectorized rectangular early
warning device installed on the roads, highways or expressways, will conclude,
without thinking, that somewhere along the travelled portion of that road,
highway, or expressway, there is a motor vehicle which is stationary, stalled or
disabled which obstructs or endangers passing traffic. On the other hand, a
motorist who sees any of the aforementioned other built-in warning devices or
the petroleum lamps will not immediately get adequate advance warning
because he will still think what that blinking light is all about. Is it an
emergency vehicle? Is it a law enforcement car? Is it an ambulance? Such
confusion or uncertainty in the mind of the motorist will thus increase, rather
than decrease, the danger of collision.

On Police Power

The Letter of Instruction in question was issued in the exercise of the police
power. That is conceded by petitioner and is the main reliance of respondents.
It is the submission of the former, however, that while embraced in such a
category, it has offended against the due process and equal protection
safeguards of the Constitution, although the latter point was mentioned only in
passing. The broad and expansive scope of the police power which was
originally identified by Chief Justice Taney of the American Supreme Court in
an 1847 decision, as “nothing more or less than the powers of government
inherent in every sovereignty” was stressed in the aforementioned case of Edu
v. Ericta thus: “Justice Laurel, in the first leading decision after the
Constitution came into force, Calalang v. Williams, identified police power with
state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or
property in order to promote the general welfare. Persons and property could
thus ‘be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the
general comfort, health and prosperity of the state. Shortly after independence
in 1948, Primicias v. Fugoso reiterated the doctrine, such a competence being
referred to as ‘the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals,
peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people.’ The
concept was set forth in negative terms by Justice Malcolm in a pre-
Commonwealth decision as ‘that inherent and plenary power in the State
which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare
of society.’ In that sense it could be hardly distinguishable as noted by this
Court in Morfe v. Mutuc with the totality of legislative power. It is in the above
sense the greatest and most powerful attribute of government. It is, to quote
Justice Malcolm anew, ‘the most essential, insistent, and at least illimitable
powers,’ extending as Justice Holmes aptly pointed out ‘to all the great public
needs.’ Its scope, ever expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to
anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an
efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring
the greatest benefits. In the language of Justice Cardozo: ‘Needs that were
narrow or parochial in the past may be interwoven in the present with the well-
being of the nation. What is critical or urgent changes with the time.’ The police
power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from precisely defined,
rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon
its government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend
thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct
unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures calculated to insure
communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare.”

It was thus a heavy burden to be shouldered by Agustin, compounded by the


fact that the particular police power measure challenged was clearly intended
to promote public safety. It would be a rare occurrence indeed for this Court to
invalidate a legislative or executive act of that character. None has been called
to our attention, an indication of its being non-existent. The latest decision in
point, Edu v. Ericta, sustained the validity of the Reflector Law, an enactment
conceived with the same end in view. Calalang v. Williams found nothing
objectionable in a statute, the purpose of which was: “To promote safe transit
upon, and avoid obstruction on roads and streets designated as national
roads . . .” As a matter of fact, the first law sought to be nullified after the
effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, the National Defense Act, with petitioner
failing in his quest, was likewise prompted by the imperative demands of public
safety.

Agustin v Edu (1979) 88 SCRA 195

Facts:

Leovillo Agustin, the owner of a Beetle, challenged the constitutionality of


Letter of Instruction 229 and its implementing order No. 1 issued by LTO
Commissioner Romeo Edu. His car already had warning lights and did not
want to use this.

The letter was promulgation for the requirement of an early warning device
installed on a vehicle to reduce accidents between moving vehicles and parked
cars.

The LTO was the issuer of the device at the rate of not more than 15% of the
acquisition cost.

The triangular reflector plates were set when the car parked on any street or
highway for 30 minutes. It was mandatory.

Petitioner: 1. LOI violated the provisions and delegation of police power, equal
protection, and due process/
2. It was oppressive because the make manufacturers and car dealers
millionaires at the expense f car owners at 56-72 pesos per set.

Hence the petition.

The OSG denied the allegations in par X and XI of the petition with regard to
the unconstitutionality and undue delegation of police power to such acts.

The Philippines was also a member of the 1968 Vienna convention of UN on


road signs as a regulation. To the petitioner, this was still an unlawful
delegation of police power.

Issue:

Is the LOI constitutional? If it is, is it a valid delegation of police power?

Held: Yes on both. Petition dismissed.

Ratio:

Police power, according to the case of Edu v Ericta, which cited J. Taney, is
nothing more or less than the power of government inherent in every
sovereignty.

The case also says that police power is state authority to enact legislation that
may interfere with personal liberty or property to promote the general welfare.

Primicias v Fulgoso- It is the power to describe regulations to promote the


health, morals, peace, education, good order, and general welfare of the people.

J. Carazo- government limitations to protect constitutional rights did not also


intend to enable a citizen to obstruct unreasonable the enactment of measures
calculated to insure communal peace.

There was no factual foundation on petitioner to refute validity.

Ermita Malate Hotel-The presumption of constitutionality must prevail in the


absence of factual record in over throwing the statute.
Brandeis- constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual
foundation in overthrowing the statute.

Even if the car had blinking lights, he must still buy reflectors. His claims that
the statute was oppressive was fantastic because the reflectors were not
expensive.

SC- blinking lights may lead to confusion whether the nature and purpose of
the driver is concerned.

Unlike the triangular reflectors, whose nature is evident because it’s installed
when parked for 30 minutes and placed from 400 meters from the car allowing
drivers to see clearly.

There was no constitutional basis for petitioner because the law doesn’t violate
any constitutional provision.

LOI 229 doesn’t force motor vehicle owners to purchase the reflector from the
LTO. It only prescribes rge requirement from any source.

The objective is public safety.

The Vienna convention on road rights and PD 207 both recommended


enforcement for installation of ewd’s. Bother possess relevance in applying
rules with the decvlaration of principles in the Constitution.

On the unlawful delegation of legislative power, the petitioners have no settled


legal doctrines.

HUBERT J. P. WEBB, VS. HONORABLE RAUL E. DE LEON G.R. No. 121234,


August 23, 1995

HUBERT J. P. WEBB, VS. HONORABLE RAUL E. DE LEON

G.R. No. 121234, August 23, 1995

FACTS:

On June 19, 1994, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) filed with the
Department of Justice a letter-complaint charging petitioners Hubert Webb,
Michael Gatchalian, Antonio J. Lejano and six (6) other persons with the crime
of Rape and Homicide of Carmela N. Vizconde, her mother Estrellita Nicolas-
Vizconde, and her sister Anne Marie Jennifer in their home at Number 80 W.
Vinzons, St., BF Homes Paranaque, Metro Manila on June 30, 1991.

Forthwith, the Department of Justice formed a panel of prosecutors headed by


Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Jovencio R. Zuno to conduct the preliminary
investigation.

ARGUMENTS:

Petitioners fault the DOJ Panel for its finding of probable cause. They assail the
credibility of Jessica Alfaro as inherently weak and uncorroborated due to the
inconsistencies between her April 28, 1995 and May 22, 1995 sworn
statements. They criticize the procedure followed by the DOJ Panel when it did
not examine witnesses to clarify the alleged inconsistencies.

Petitioners charge that respondent Judge Raul de Leon and, later, respondent
Judge Amelita Tolentino issued warrants of arrest against them without
conducting the required preliminary examination.

Petitioners complain about the denial of their constitutional right to due


process and violation of their right to an impartial investigation. They also
assail the prejudicial publicity that attended their preliminary investigation.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the DOJ Panel likewise gravely abused its discretion in
holding that there is probable cause to charge them with the crime of rape and
homicide
2. Whether or not respondent Judges de Leon and Tolentino gravely abused
their discretion when they failed to conduct a preliminary examination before
issuing warrants of arrest against them

3. Whether or not the DOJ Panel denied them their constitutional right to due
process during their preliminary investigation

4. Whether or not the DOJ Panel unlawfully intruded into judicial prerogative
when it failed to charge Jessica Alfaro in the information as an accused.

HELD:

1. NO.

2. NO.

3. NO. There is no merit in this contention because petitioners were given all
the opportunities to be heard.

4. NO.

REASONS:

1. The Court ruled that the DOJ Panel did not gravely abuse its discretion
when it found probable cause against the petitioners. A probable cause needs
only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not, a crime has been
committed and was committed by the suspects. Probable cause need not be
based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence
establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence
establishing absolute certainty of guilt.

2. The Court ruled that respondent judges did not gravely abuse their
discretion. In arrest cases, there must be a probable cause that a crime has
been committed and that the person to be arrested committed it. Section 6 of
Rule 112 simply provides that “upon filing of an information, the Regional Trial
Court may issue a warrant for the accused. Clearly the, our laws repudiate the
submission of petitioners that respondent judges should have conducted
“searching examination of witnesses” before issuing warrants of arrest against
them.

3. The DOJ Panel precisely ed the parties to adduce more evidence in their
behalf and for the panel to study the evidence submitted more fully.

4. Petitioner’s argument lacks appeal for it lies on the faulty assumption that
the decision whom to prosecute is a judicial function, the sole prerogative of
the courts and beyond executive and legislative interference. In truth, the
prosecution of crimes appertains to the executive department of government
whose principal power and responsibility is to see that our laws are faithfully
executed. A necessary component of this power is the right to prosecute their
violators (See R.A. No. 6981 and section 9 of Rule 119 for legal basis).

With regard to the inconsistencies of the sworn statements of Jessica Alfaro,


the Court believes that these have been sufficiently explained and there is no
showing that the inconsistencies were deliberately made to distort the truth.

With regard to the petitioners’ complaint about the prejudicial publicity that
attended their preliminary investigation, the Court finds nothing in the records
that will prove that the tone and content of the publicity that attended the
investigation of petitioners fatally infected the fairness and impartiality of the
DOJ Panel. Petitioners cannot just rely on the subliminal effects of publicity on
the sense of fairness of the DOJ Panel, for these are basically unbeknown and
beyond knowing.

El Banco Espanol-Filipino vs. Vicente Palanca G.R. No. L-11390, March


26, 1918
El Banco Espanol-Filipino vs. Palanca
G.R. No. L-11390, March 26, 1918

* JURISDICTION, HOW ACQUIRED: Jurisdiction over the property which is the


subject of the litigation may result either from a seizure of the property under
legal process, whereby it is brought into the actual custody of the law, or it
may result from the institution of legal proceedings wherein, under special
provisions of law, the power of the court over the property is recognized and
made effective.
* The action to foreclose a mortgage is said to be a proceeding quasi in rem, by
which is expressed the idea that while it is not strictly speaking an action in
rem yet it partakes of that nature and is substantially such.
* DUE PROCESS IN FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS: Property is always
assumed to be in the possession of its owner, in person or by agent; and he
may be safely held, under certain conditions, to be affected with knowledge
that proceedings have been instituted for its condemnation and sale.

FACTS:

Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y Limquingco mortgaged various parcels of real


property in Manila to El Banco Espanol-Filipino. Afterwards, Engracio returned
to China and there he died on January 29, 1810 without returning again to the
Philippines. The mortgagor then instituted foreclosure proceeding but since
defendant is a non-resident, it was necessary to give notice by publication. The
Clerk of Court was also directed to send copy of the summons to the
defendant’s last known address, which is in Amoy, China. It is not shown
whether the Clerk complied with this requirement. Nevertheless, after
publication in a newspaper of the City of Manila, the cause proceeded and
judgment by default was rendered. The decision was likewise published and
afterwards sale by public auction was held with the bank as the highest bidder.
On August 7, 1908, this sale was confirmed by the court. However, about
seven years after the confirmation of this sale, a motion was made by Vicente
Palanca, as administrator of the estate of the original defendant, wherein the
applicant requested the court to set aside the order of default and the
judgment, and to vacate all the proceedings subsequent thereto. The basis of
this application was that the order of default and the judgment rendered
thereon were void because the court had never acquired jurisdiction over the
defendant or over the subject of the action.

ISSUE:

* Whether or not the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the defendant and
the subject matter of the action
* Whether or not due process of law was observed

RULING:

On Jurisdiction

The word “jurisdiction” is used in several different, though related, senses since
it may have reference (1) to the authority of the court to entertain a particular
kind of action or to administer a particular kind of relief, or it may refer to the
power of the court over the parties, or (2) over the property which is the subject
to the litigation.
The sovereign authority which organizes a court determines the nature and
extent of its powers in general and thus fixes its competency or jurisdiction
with reference to the actions which it may entertain and the relief it may grant.

How Jurisdiction is Acquired

Jurisdiction over the person is acquired by the voluntary appearance of a party


in court and his submission to its authority, or it is acquired by the coercive
power of legal process exerted over the person.

Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of the litigation may result
either from a seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought
into the actual custody of the law, or it may result from the institution of legal
proceedings wherein, under special provisions of law, the power of the court
over the property is recognized and made effective. In the latter case the
property, though at all times within the potential power of the court, may never
be taken into actual custody at all. An illustration of the jurisdiction acquired
by actual seizure is found in attachment proceedings, where the property is
seized at the beginning of the action, or some subsequent stage of its progress,
and held to abide the final event of the litigation. An illustration of what we
term potential jurisdiction over the res, is found in the proceeding to register
the title of land under our system for the registration of land. Here the court,
without taking actual physical control over the property assumes, at the
instance of some person claiming to be owner, to exercise a jurisdiction in rem
over the property and to adjudicate the title in favor of the petitioner against all
the world.

In the terminology of American law the action to foreclose a mortgage is said to


be a proceeding quasi in rem, by which is expressed the idea that while it is not
strictly speaking an action in rem yet it partakes of that nature and is
substantially such. The expression "action in rem" is, in its narrow application,
used only with reference to certain proceedings in courts of admiralty wherein
the property alone is treated as responsible for the claim or obligation upon
which the proceedings are based. The action quasi rem differs from the true
action in rem in the circumstance that in the former an individual is named as
defendant, and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interest therein
to the obligation or lien burdening the property. All proceedings having for their
sole object the sale or other disposition of the property of the defendant,
whether by attachment, foreclosure, or other form of remedy, are in a general
way thus designated. The judgment entered in these proceedings is conclusive
only between the parties.

It is true that in proceedings of this character, if the defendant for whom


publication is made appears, the action becomes as to him a personal action
and is conducted as such. This, however, does not affect the proposition that
where the defendant fails to appear the action is quasi in rem; and it should
therefore be considered with reference to the principles governing actions in
rem.

Philippine International Trading Corporation vs Angeles GR 108461 21 October


1996

11

Wednesday

Mar 2015

Posted by Rachel Chan in Case Digests, Constitutional Law II ≈ Leave a


comment

Facts: PITC is a GOCC created during Marcos regime to undertake trades


between Philippines and SOCPEC. During Aquino’s presidency she made PITC
one of DTI’s line agencies. This does not mean, however, that PITC has lost the
authority to issue AOs. PITC issued SOCPEC 89-08-01 where importation from
China must be accompanied by a viable and confirmed Export Program of
Philippine Products to PROC carried out by the improper himself or through a
tie-up with a legitimate importer with 1-1 ratio. Domestic corporations,
Remington and Firestone applied and were granted to import. Both failed to
comply with export credits with 1-1 ratio and their imports were withheld. Both
assailed the constitutionality of the AO. RTC decided in favour of Remington
and Firestone for AO was not published contrary to Article 2 of NCC. Hence the
petition for review on certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not SOCPEC 89-08-01 is valid on the ground of violating the
publication requirement?

Decision: Decision affirmed. The original AO issued on August 30, 1989, under
which the respondents filed their applications for importation, was not
published in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. The
questioned Administrative Order, legally, until it is published, is invalid within
the context of Article 2 of Civil Code. The AO under consideration is one of
those issuances which should be published for its effectivity, since its purpose
is to enforce and implement an existing law pursuant to a valid delegation, i.e.,
P.D. 1071, in relation to LOI 444 and EO 133.

Page

of

45

Constitutional Law II Cases Due Process

WEBB V DE LEON

247 SCRA 652

Facts:

On June 19, 1994, the National Bureau of Investigation filed with the DOJ a
letter-complaint charging petitioners Hubert Webb, Michael Gatchalian,
Antonio J. Lejano and 6 other persons with the crime of Rape and Homicide of
Carmela N. Vizconde, her mother Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde, and her sister
Anne Marie Jennifer in their home at Number 80 W. Vinzons, St., BF Homes,
Paranaque, Metro Manila on June 30, 1991. Forthwith, the DOJ formed a
panel of prosecutors headed by Asst Chief State Prosecutor Jovencio R. Zuno
to conduct the preliminary investigation. The DOJ Panel for its finding of
probable cause. The credibility of Jessica Alfaro was assailed as inherently
weak and uncorroborated due to her inconsistencies between her April 28,
1995 and May 22, 1995 sown statements. They criticize the procedure followed
by the DOJ Panel when it did not examine witnesses to clarify the alleged
inconsistencies. Petitioners charge that respondent Judge Raul de Leon and
respondent Judge Amelita Tolentino issued warrants of arrest against them
without conducting the required preliminary examination. Complain about the
denial of their constitutional right to due process and violation of their right to
an impartial investigation. They also assail the prejudicial publicity that
attended their preliminary investigation.

ISSUES:
(1) Did the DOJ Panel gravely abuse its discretion in holding that there is
probable cause to charge accused with crime of rape and homicide? (2) Did
respondent judges de Leon and Tolentino gravely abuse their discretion when
they failed to conduct a preliminary examination before issuing warrants of
arrest against the accused? (3) Did the DOJ Panel deny them their
constitutional right to due process during their preliminary investigation? (4)
Did the DOJ Panel unlawfully intrude into judicial prerogative when it failed to
charge Jessica Alfaro in the information as an accused?

HELD:

(1) NO. Valid determination -- A probable cause needs only to rest on evidence
showing that more likely than not, a crime has been committed and was
committed by the suspects. Probable cause need not be based on clear and
convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond
reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute
certainty of guilt. (2) NO. Valid arrest -- In arrest cases, there must be a
probable cause that a crime has been committed and that the person arrested
committed it. Section 6 of Rule 112 provides that

“upon filing of an information, the RTC may issue a warrant for the accused.”
Clearly then, our laws repudiate the submission that respondent judges should
have conducted “searching examination of witnesses” before issuing warrants
of arrest against them.

(3) NO. There is no merit in this contention because petitioners were given all
the opportunities to be heard. The DOJ Panel precisely requested the parties to
adduce more evidence in their behalf and for the panel to study the evidence
submitted more fully. (4) NO. Petitioner's argument lacks appeal for it lies on
the faulty assumption that the decision whom to prosecute is a judicial
function, the sole prerogative of courts and beyond executive and legislative
interference. In truth, the prosecution of crimes appertains to the executive
department whose principal power and responsibility is to see that our laws are
faithfully executed. A necessary component of this right is to prosecute their
violators.

State Prosecutors v Muros


236 SCRA 505, 19 September 1994 Facts:

The state prosecutors who are members of the DOJ Panel of Prosecution filed a
complaint against respondent Judge Muro on the ground of ignorance of the
law, grave misconduct and violation of the provisions in the Code of Judicial
Conduct. The case at bar involves the prosecution of the 11 charges against
Imelda Marcos in violation of the Central Bank Foreign Exchange Restriction in
the Central Bank Circular 960. The respondent judge dismissed all 11 cases
solely on the basis of the report published from the 2 newspapers, which the
judge believes to be reputable and of national circulation, that the Pres. of the
Philippines lifted all foreign exchange restrictions. The

respondent‟s

decision was founded on his belief that the reported announcement of the
Executive Department in the newspaper in effect repealed the CB 960 and
thereby divested the court of its jurisdiction to further hear the pending case
thus motu propio dismissed the case. He further contends that the
announcement of the President as published in the newspaper has made such
fact a public knowledge that is sufficient for the judge to take judicial notice
which is discretionary on his part.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in


taking notice on the statement of the president lifting the foreign exchange
published in the newspaper as basis for dismissing the caes?

Ruling:

The Supreme Court held the respondent judge guilty for gross ignorance of the
law. It cannot comprehend his

assertion that there is no need to wait for the publication of the circular no.
1353 which is the basis of the President‟s

announcement in the newspaper, believing that the public announcement is


absolute and without qualification and is immediately effective and such
matter becomes a public knowledge which he can take a judicial notice upon in
his discretion. It is a mandatory requirement that a new law should be
published for 15 days in a newspaper of general circulation
before its effectivity. When the President‟s statement was published in the
newspaper,

the respondent admitted of not having seen the official text of CB circular 1353
thus it was premature for him to take judicial notice on this matter which is
merely based on his personal knowledge and is not based on the public
knowledge that the law requires for the court to take judicial notice of. For the
court to take judicial notice, three material requisites should be presented: (1)

The matter must be one of common and general knowledge; (2)

It must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain;

(3)

It must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court.

The court ruled that the information he obtained from the newspaper is one of
hearsay evidence. The judge erred in taking cognizant of a law that was not yet
in force and ordered the dismissal of the case without giving the prosecution
the right to be heard and of due process. The court ordered for the dismissal of
the judge from service for gross ignorance of the law and grave abuse of
discretion for dismissing the case motu proprio and for erring in exercising his
discretion to take judicial notice on matters that are hearsay and groundless
with a reminder the power to take judicial notice is to be exercised by the
courts with caution at all times.

Mirasol vs. DPWH

Facts: On 19 February 1968, Secretary Antonio V. Raquiza of the Department


of Public Works and Communications issued AO 1, which, among others,
prohibited motorcycles on limited access highways. Accordingly, petitioners
filed an Amended Petition on February 8, 2001 wherein petitioners sought the
declaration of nullity of the aforesaid administrative issuances. Moreover,
petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or
preliminary injunction to prevent the enforcement of the total ban on
motorcycles along the entire breadth of North and South Luzon Expressways
and the Manila-Cavite (Coastal Road) Toll Expressway under DO 215.

Issue: Is DPWH Administrative Order No.1, DO 74 violative of the right to


travel? Are all motorized vehicles “created equal”?

Held: DO 74 and DO 215 are void because the DPWH has no authority to
declare certain expressways as limited access facilities. Under the law, it is the
DOTC which is authorized to administer and enforce all laws, rules and
regulations in the field of transportation and to regulate related activities. The
DPWH cannot delegate a power or function which it does not possess in the
first place.

We find that it is neither warranted nor reasonable for petitioners to say that
the only justifiable classification among modes of transport is the motorized
against the non-motorized. Not all motorized vehicles are created equal. A 16-
wheeler truck is substantially different from other light vehicles. The first may
be denied access to some roads where the latter are free to drive. Old vehicles
may be reasonably differentiated from newer models.46 We find that real and
substantial differences exist between a motorcycle and other forms of transport
sufficient to justify its classification among those prohibited from plying the toll
ways. Amongst all types of motorized transport, it is obvious, even to a child,
that a motorcycle is quite different from a car, a bus or a truck. The most
obvious and troubling difference would be that a two-wheeled vehicle is less
stable and more easily overturned than a four-wheeled vehicle.

JAKA FOOD PROCESSING CORPORATION, vs. DARWIN PACOT, ROBERT


PAROHINOG, DAVID BISNAR, MARLON DOMINGO, RHOEL LESCANO and
JONATHAN CAGABCAB.
G.R. No. 151378. March 28, 2005

Facts: Respondents were earlier hired by petitioner JAKA Foods Processing


Corporation until the latter terminated their employment because the
corporation was “in dire financial straits”. It is not disputed, however, that the
termination was effected without JAKA complying with the requirement under
Article 283 of the Labor Code regarding the service of a written notice upon the
employees and the Department of Labor and Employment at least one (1)
month before the intended date of termination. Respondents filed complaints
for illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages and nonpayment of service
incentive leave and 13th month pay against JAKA. The Labor Arbiter rendered
a decision declaring the termination illegal and ordering JAKA to reinstate
respondents with full backwages, and separation pay if reinstatement is not
possible. The Court of Appeals reversed said decision and ordered respondent
JAKA to pay petitioners separation pay equivalent to one (1) month salary, the
proportionate 13th month pay and, in addition, full backwages from the time
their employment was terminated.

Issue: What are the legal implications of a situation where an employee is


dismissed for cause but such dismissal was effected without the employer’s
compliance with the notice requirement under the Labor Code?

Held: It was established that there was ground for respondents’ dismissal, i.e.,
retrenchment, which is one of the authorized causes enumerated under Article
283 of the Labor Code. Likewise, it is established that JAKA failed to comply
with the notice requirement under the same Article. Considering the factual
circumstances in the instant case, the Court deem it proper to fix the
indemnity at P50, 000.00. The Court of Appeals have been in error when it
ordered JAKA to pay respondents separation pay equivalent to one (1) month
salary for every year of service. “In all cases of business closure or cessation of
operation or undertaking of the employer, the affected employee is entitled to
separation pay. This is consistent with the state policy of treating labor as a
primary social economic force, affording full protection to its rights as well as
its welfare. The exception is when the closure of business or cessation of
operations is due to serious business losses or financial reverses; duly proved,
in which case, the right of affected employees to separation pay is lost for
obvious reasons.”

Tax Case Digest: British American Tobacco V. Camacho (2008)


British American Tobacco v. Camacho (2008)

G.R. No. 163583 August 20, 2008

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

Lessons Applicable: Court of Tax Appeals Jurisdiction, Regional Trial Court


Jurisdiction, Equal Protection and Uniformity of Taxation (constitutional
issue), BIR Power to Conduct Resurvey and Reclassification (delegated by
express legislation)

Laws Applicable:

FACTS:

June 2001, petitioner British American Tobacco introduced and sold Lucky
Strike, Lucky Strike Lights and Lucky Strike Menthol Lights cigarettes w/ SRP
P 9.90/pack - Initial assessed excise tax: P 8.96/pack (Sec. 145 [c])

February 17, 2003: RR 9-2003: Periodic review every 2 years or earlier of the
current net retail price of new brands and variants thereof for the purpose of
the establishing and updating their tax classification

March 11, 2003: RMO 6-2003: Guidelines and procedures in establishing


current net retail prices of new brands of cigarettes and alcohol products

August 8, 2003: RR 22-2003: Implement the revised tax classification of


certain new brands introduced in the market after January 1, 1997 based on
the survey of their current net retail prices. This increased the excise tax to
P13.44 since the average net retail price is above P 10/pack. This cause
petitioner to file before the RTC of Makati a petition for injunction with prayer
for issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction sought to enjoin the implementation of Sec. 145 of the NIRC, RR No.
1-97, 9-2003, 22-2003 and 6-2003 on the ground that they discriminate
against new brands of cigarettes in violation of the equal protection and
uniformity provisions of the Constitution

RTC: Dismissed

While petitioner's appeal was pending, RA 9334 amending Sec. 145 of the 1997
NIRC among other took effect on January 1, 2005 which in effect increased
petitioners excise tax to P25/pack

Petitioner filed a Motion to Admit attached supplement and a supplement to


the petition for review assailing the constitutionality of RA 9334 and praying a
downward classification of Lucky Strike products at the bracket taxable at P
8.96/pack since existing brands are still taxed based on their price as of
October 1996 eventhough they are equal or higher than petitioner's product
price.

Philip Morris Philippines Manufacturing Incorporated, Fortune Tobacco Corp.,


Mighty Corp. and JT International Intervened.

Fortune Tobacco claimed that the CTA should have the exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over the decision of the BIR in tax disputes

ISSUE:

W/N the RTC rather than the CTA has jurisdiction.

W/N RA 9334 of the classification freeze provision is unconstitutional for


violating the equal protection and uniformity provisions of the Constitution

W/N RR Nos. 1-97, 9-2003, 22-2003 and RA 8243 even prior to its amendment
by RA 9334 can authorize the BIR to conduct resurvey and reclassification.

HELD:

1. Yes. The jurisdiction of the CTA id defined in RA 1125 which confers on the
CTA jurisdiction to resolve tax disputes in general. BUT does NOT include
cases where the constitutionality of a law or rule is challenged which is a
judicial power belonging to regular courts.

2. No. In Sison Jr. v. Ancheta, the court held that "xxx It suffices then that the
laws operate equally and uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances
or that all persons must be treated in the same manner, the conditions not
being different, both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. If
the law be looked upon in tems of burden on charges, those that fall within a
class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some
in the group equally binding on the rest. xxx" Thus, classification if rational in
character is allowable. In Lutz v. Araneta: "it is inherent in the power to tax
that a state be free to select the subjects of taxation, and it has been repeatedly
held that 'inequalities which result from a singling out of one particular class
for taxation, or exemption infringe no constitutional limitation" SC previously
held: "Equality and uniformity in taxation means that all taxable articles or
kinds of property of the same class shall be taxed at the same rate. The taxing
power has the authority to make reasonable and natural classifications for
purposes of taxation"

Under the the rational basis test, a legislative classification, to survive an equal
protection challenge, must be shown to rationally further a legitimate state
interest. The classifications must be reasonable and rest upon some ground of
difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation

A legislative classification that is reasonable does not offend the constitutional


guaranty of the equal protection of the laws. The classification is considered
valid and reasonable provided that: (1) it rests on substantial distinctions; (2) it
is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it applies, all things being equal, to
both present and future conditions; and (4) it applies equally to all those
belonging to the same class.

Moreover, petitioner failed to clearly demonstrate the exact extent of such


impact as the price is not the only factor that affects competition.

3. NO. Unless expressly granted to the BIR, the power to reclassify cigarette
brands remains a prerogative of the legislature which cannot be usurped by the
former. These are however modified by RA 9334.

Nolasco v COMELEC
FACTS

A disqualification case was filed against Meycauayan, Bulacan Mayor-elect


Florentino Blanco for alleged performing acts which are grounds for
disqualification under the Omnibus Election Code – giving money to influence,
induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing election functions:
for committing acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy, and for spending an
amount for his campaign in excess of what is allowed by the law.

The COMELEC First Division required both parties to submit their position
papers. The case was decided against Blanco.

A reconsideration was moved by Blanco in the COMELEC En Banc. Nolasco,


the vice-mayor-elect took part as intervenor, urging that should Blanco be
finally disqualified, the mayoralty position be turned over to him. The parties
were allowed to file their memoranda. En Banc denied Blanco and Nolasco’s
motions thus this petition for certiorari.

Issues:

1. WON Blanco was denied due process and equal protection of laws

2. WON the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in proclaiming


Alarilla as the duly elected mayor

Held:

1. Blanco was not denied due process and equal protection of the laws. He was
given all the opportunity to prove that the evidence on his disqualification was
not strong. Blanco’s contention that the minimum quantum of evidence was
not met is untenable. What RA 6646 and the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
require is a mere evidence of guilt that should be strong to justify the
COMELEC in suspending a winning candidate’s proclamation.

2. Nolasco, not Alarilla, is adjudged as the Mayor of Meycauayan. It is already a


settled principle in the case of Reyes v COMELEC that the candidate with the
second highest number of votes cannot be proclaimed winner in case the
winning candidate be disqualified. There cannot be an assumption that the
second placer would have received the other votes otherwise it is a judgment
substituting the mind of a voter. It cannot be assumed that the second placer
would have won the elections because in the situation where the disqualified
candidate is excluded, the condition would have substantially changed.

You might also like