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ANNULMENT THROUGH ARTICLE 36

CHI MING TSOI VS CA
Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao Tsoi was married in 1988. After the celebration of their wedding,
they proceed to the house of defendant’s mother. There was no sexual intercourse between
them during their first night and same thing happened until their fourth night. In an effort to
have their honeymoon in a private place, they went to Baguio but Gina’s relatives went with
them. Again, there was no sexual intercourse since the defendant avoided by taking a long walk
during siesta or sleeping on a rocking chair at the living room.
Since May 1988 until March 1989 they slept together in the same bed but no attempt of sexual
intercourse between them. Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical
examination to a urologist in Chinese General Hospital in 1989. The result of the physical
examination of Gina was disclosed, while that of the husband was kept confidential even the
medicine prescribed.
There were allegations that the reason why Chi Ming Tsoi married her is to maintain his
residency status here in the country. Gina does not want to reconcile with Chi Ming Tsoi and
want their marriage declared void on the ground of psychological incapacity. On the other
hand, the latter does not want to have their marriage annulled because he loves her very much,
he has no defect on his part and is physically and psychologically capable and since their
relationship is still young, they can still overcome their differences. Chi Ming Tsoi submitted
himself to another physical examination and the result was there is not evidence of impotency
and he is capable of erection.
ISSUE: Whether Chi Ming Tsoi’s refusal to have sexual intercourse with his wife constitutes
psychological incapacity.
HELD:
The abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his marriage is strongly indicative of a
serious personality disorder which to the mind of the Supreme Court clearly demonstrates an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance tot the marriage within the
meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code.

If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential
marital obligations and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals
attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Furthermore, one of
the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is to procreate children thus constant
non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity and wholeness of the marriage.

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2. RECOVERY OF OWNERSHIP
HILARIO VS ALLAN SALVADOR

Hilario filed a complaint with the RTC against Salvador alleging that they were the co-owners of
the parcel of land where Salvador constructed his house without their knowledge and refused
to vacate despite their demands.

Salvodor filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. He
contended that the complaint did not state the assessed value of the property, which
determines the jurisdiction of the court.

Hilario maintained that the RTC had jurisdiction since their action was an accion
reinvindicatoria, an action incapable of pecuniary estimation; thus, regardless of the assessed
value of the subject property, exclusive jurisdiction fell within the said court. Also, in their
opposition to Salvador's motion to dismiss, they mentioned the increase in the assessed value
of the land in the amount of P3.5 million. Moreover, they maintained that their action was also
one for damages exceeding P20,000.00, over which the RTC had exclusive jurisdiction.

Issue: Whether or not the RTC had jurisdiction over the complaint filed by Hilario.

Held:

The nature of the action and which court has original and exclusive jurisdiction is determined by
the material allegations of the complaint, the type of relief prayed for by the plaintiff and the
law in effect when the action is filed, irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are entitled to some
or all of the claims asserted therein.

The complaint did not contain an allegation stating the assessed value of the property. Absent
any allegation in the complaint of the assessed value of the property, it could not thus be
determined whether the RTC or the MTC had original and exclusive jurisdiction over the action.

The law also explicitly excluded from the determination of the jurisdictional amount the
demand for interest, damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and costs.

Since the RTC had no jurisdiction over the action, all the proceedings therein, including the
decision of the RTC, were null and void.

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3. DRUGS WITH A MINOR
People vs Michael Padua

The accused, Edgar Allan Ubalde and Michael Padua, a minor, seventeen (17) years old, sold,
delivered and gave away to PO1 Roland A. Panis, a police poseur-buyer, one (1) folded
newsprint containing 4.86 grams of marijuana.

Padua’s counsel manifested that his client was willing to withdraw his plea of not guilty and
enter a plea of guilty to avail of the benefits granted to first-time offenders under Section 70
of Rep. Act No. 9165. The prosecutor interposed no objection. Thus, Padua was re-
arraigned and pleaded guilty. He was sentenced to suffer an indeterminate sentence of six (6)
years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months
of reclusion temporal as maximum and a fine of P500,000.00.

Padua subsequently filed a Petition for Probation alleging that he is a minor and a first-time
offender who desires to avail of the benefits of probation under Presidential Decree No.
968 (P.D. No. 968), otherwise known as “The Probation Law of 1976” and Section 70 of Rep. Act
No. 9165. He further alleged that he possesses all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications under the said laws. However, Judge Agnes Reyes-Carpio issued an Order
denying the Petition for Probation on the ground that under Section 24 of Rep. Act No. 9165,
any person convicted of drug trafficking cannot avail of the privilege granted by the Probation
Law.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for probation filed by Padua, a minor, be granted?

RULING: NO.

It is clear under Section 24 of Rep. Act No. 9165 that any person convicted of drug trafficking
cannot avail of the privilege of probation, to wit:

SEC. 24. Non-Applicability of the Probation Law for Drug Traffickers and Pushers. – Any person
convicted for drug trafficking or pushing under this Act, regardless of the penalty imposed by
the Court, cannot avail of the privilege granted by the Probation Law or Presidential Decree
No. 968, as amended.

The law is clear and leaves no room for interpretation. Any person convicted for drug trafficking
or pushing, regardless of the penalty imposed, cannot avail of the privilege granted by the
Probation Law or P.D. No. 968. If a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be
given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This is what is known as
the plain-meaning rule or verba legis. It is expressed in the maxim, index animi sermo, or

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speech is the index of intention. Furthermore, there is the maxim verba legis non est
recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no departure.

The intention of the legislators in Section 24 of Rep. Act No. 9165 is to provide stiffer and
harsher punishment for those persons convicted of drug trafficking or pushing while extending a
sympathetic and magnanimous hand in Section 70 to drug dependents who are found guilty of
violation of Sections 11 and 15 of the Act. The law considers the users and possessors of illegal
drugs as victims while the drug traffickers and pushers as predators. Hence, while drug
traffickers and pushers, like Padua, are categorically disqualified from availing the law on
probation, youthful drug dependents, users and possessors alike, are given the chance to mend
their ways. The CA also correctly stated that had it been the intention of the legislators to
exempt from the application of Section 24 the drug traffickers and pushers who are minors and
first time offenders, the law could have easily declared so.

A person arrested for using illegal or dangerous drugs is meted only a penalty of 6 months
rehabilitation in a government center, as minimum, for the first offense under Section 15 of Rep.
Act No. 9165, while a person charged and convicted of selling dangerous drugs shall suffer life
imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from P500,000.00 to P10,000,000.00 under Section 5,
Rep. Act No. 9165.

Padua’s right under Rep. Act No. 9344, the “Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006” was not
violated.

Furthermore, suspension of sentence under Section 38 of Rep. Act No. 9344 could no longer
be retroactively applied for petitioner’s benefit. Section 38 of Rep. Act No. 9344 provides that
once a child under 18 years of age is found guilty of the offense charged, instead of pronouncing
the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under
suspended sentence.

Section 40 of Rep. Act No. 9344, however, provides that once the child reaches 18 years of age,
the court shall determine whether to discharge the child, order execution of sentence, or
extend the suspended sentence for a certain specified period or until the child reaches the
maximum age of 21 years. Petitioner has already reached 21 years of age or over and thus,
could no longer be considered a child for purposes of applying Rep. Act 9344. Thus, the
application of Sections 38 and 40 appears moot and academic as far as his case is concerned.

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4. ADOPTION
CANG VS CA
FACTS:
Anna Marie filed a petition for legal separation upon learning of her husband's extramarital
affairs, which the trial court approved the petition. Herbert sought a divorce from Anna Marie in
the United States. The court granted sole custody of the 3 minor children to Anna, reserving the
rights of visitation to Herbert.
The brother and sister-in-law of Anna filed for the adoption of the 3 minor children. Herbert
contest the adoption, but the petition was already granted by the court. CA affirmed the decree
of adoption, holding that Art. 188 of the FC requires the written consent of the natural parents
of the children to be adopted, but the consent of the parent who has abandoned the child is
not necessary. It held that Herbert failed to pay monthly support to his children. Herbert
elevated the case to the Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the 3 minor children be legally adopted without the written consent of a natural
parent on the ground that Herbert has abandoned them.

RULING:

Yes.
Article 188 amended the statutory provision on consent for adoption, the written consent of the
natural parent to the adoption has remained a requisite for its validity. Rule 99 of the Rules of
the Court requires a written consent to the adoption signed by the child, xxx and by each of its
known living parents who is not insane or hopelessly intemperate or has not abandoned the
child.
Article 256 of the Family Code requires the written consent of the natural parent for the decree
of adoption to be valid unless the parent has abandoned the child or that the parent is "insane
or hopelessly intemperate."
In reference to abandonment of a child by his parent, the act of abandonment imports "any
conduct of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and
relinquish all parental claims to the child." It means "neglect or refusal to perform the natural
and legal obligations of care and support which parents owe their children."

In this case, however, Herbert did not manifest any conduct that would forego his parental
duties and relinquish all parental claims over his children as to, constitute abandonment.
Physical abandonment alone, without financial and moral desertion, is not tantamount to
abandonment. While Herbert was physically absent, he was not remiss in his natural and legal
obligations of love, care and support for his children. The Court find pieces of documentary
evidence that he maintained regular communications with his wife and children through letters
and telephone, and send them packages catered to their whims.

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5. RA 7610
Amployo vs People

Alvin Amployo was charged with violation of RA 7610 for touching, mashing and playing the
breasts of Kristine Joy Mosguera, an 8 year old Grade 3 pupil without her consent. Amployo
contends that the element of lewd design was not established since: (1) the incident happened
at 7am, in a street near the school with people around; (2) the breast of an 8 year old is still very
much underdeveloped; and (3) suppose h intentionally touched her breast, it was merely to
satisfy a silly whim. He also argues that the resultant crime is only acts of lasciviousness under
Art 336 RPC and not child abuse under RA 7610 as the elements thereof had not been proved.

Issues: WON lewd design was established; WON Amployo violated RA 7610.

Held:

*Before an accused can be convicted of child abuse through lascivious conduct on a minor
below 12 years of age, the requisites for acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC
must be met in addition to the requisites for sexual abuse under Section 5 of Rep. Act No.
7610.The first element is lewd design.

The term ‘lewd is commonly defined as something indecent or obscene;[12] it is characterized

by or intended to excite crude sexual desire. That an accused is entertaining a lewd or unchaste
design is necessarily a mental process the existence of which can be inferred by overt acts
carrying out such intention,i.e., by conduct that can only be interpreted as lewd or lascivious.
The presence or absence of lewd designs is inferred from the nature of the acts themselves and
the environmental circumstances. What is or what is not lewd conduct, by its very nature,
cannot be pigeonholed into a precise definition.

Lewd design was established. Amployo cannot take refuge in his version of the story as he has
conveniently left out details which indubitably prove the presence of lewd design. It would
have been easy to entertain the possibility that what happened was merely an accident if it only
happened once. Such is not the case, however, as the very same petitioner did the very same
act to the very same victim in the past.

*The first element of RA 7610 obtains. petitioner’s act of purposely touching Kristine Joy’s
breasts (sometimes under her shirt) amounts to lascivious conduct.

The second element is likewise present. As we observed in People v. Larin,[24] Section 5 of Rep.
Act No. 7610 does not merely cover a situation of a child being abused for profit, but also one in
which a child engages in any lascivious conduct through coercion or intimidation. As case law
has it, intimidation need not necessarily be irresistible. As to the third element, there is no
dispute that Kristine Joy is a minor, as she was only eight years old at the time of the incident in
question.

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