I.

Introduction
A. Scope
B. Review of Consti I

Marbury v Madison Art. VIII, Sec. 1. –The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court
(Midnight Judges) and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.

Extract in
Marbury on
“essence of
judicial duty”

“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the
law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and
interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the
operation of each.

So if a law be in opposition to the constitution; if both the law and the constitution
apply to a particular case, so that the court must either decide that case
conformably to the law, disregarding the constitution; or conformably to the
constitution, disregarding the law; the court must determine which of these
conflicting rules governs the case.

This is of the very essence of judicial duty.”

FACTS (from Wikipedia, just read the

original your life will be better for it)
• In the presidential elections of 1800, Thomas Jefferson
defeated Federalist John Adams.
• Despite the fact that the election was decided on Feb 17, 1801, Jefferson
did not take office until Mar 4, 1801.
o John Adams, as outgoing president, remained in power until then

o The Federalist-controlled 6 Congress also th

remained in power during this time

• During this lame-duck session, Congress
passed the Judiciary Act of 1801.
o Established 10 new district courts o Expanded the number of circuit
courts from 3 to 6
o Added additional judges to each circuit
o Gave the president the authority to appoint Federal judges and
justices of the peace o Reduced the number of Supreme Court
Justices from 6 to 5, effective upon the next vacancy in the Court
• On Mar 3, 1801, just before his term was to end (literally the day before),
Adams appointed 16 Federalist circuit judges and 42 Federalist justices of
the peace to offices created by the Judiciary Act of 1801
o These “Midnight Judges” included
William Marbury, an ardent Federalist
• The following day, the appointments were
approved en masse by the Senate
o To be completed, these commissions had to be delivered to
those appointed
o The task fell to John Marshall who, even though recently
 appointed Chief Justice of the US, continued as acting
Secretary of State at President Adams's personal request
• While the majority of the commissions were delivered, they could not be
delivered before Adam’s term as president expired
• It was assumed that the new Secretary of State, James Madison, would
deliver the appointments since the function was routine in nature.
• However, Thomas Jefferson, upon swearing in as President, ordered Levi
Lincoln (acting Secretary of State until James Madison could assume the post)
NOT to deliver the remaining appointments
• Without the commissions, the appointees were unable to assume the
offices and duties to which they had been appointed.
• In Jefferson's opinion, the undelivered commissions, not having
been delivered on time, were void.
• The newly sworn-in Democratic-Republican 7th Congress immediately set
about voiding the Judiciary Act of 1801 with their own Judiciary Act of 1802
which reversed the act of 1801 so that the Judicial branch once again operated
under the dictates of the original Judiciary Act of 1789.
o In addition, it replaced the Court's two annual sessions with
one session to begin on the first
Monday in February, and "canceled the Supreme Court term
scheduled for June of that year [1802] ... seeking to delay a ruling
on the constitutionality of the repeal act until months after the new
judicial system was in operation".
• This is a case for mandamus seeking to compel James Madison to
deliver to William Marbury his commission as Justice of the peace
for the county of Washington, in the district of Columbia

Javellana v Executive FACTS

Secretary (Martial Law) The Plebiscite Case
1. On March 16, 1967, Congress of the Philippines passed
Resolution No. 2, which was amended by Resolution No. 4 of said
body, adopted on June 17, 1969, calling a Convention to propose
amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines.
2. Said Resolution No. 2, as amended, was implemented by
Republic Act No. 6132, approved on August 24, 1970, pursuant to the
provisions of which the election of delegates to the said Convention
was held on November 10, 1970, and the 1971 Constitutional
Convention began to perform its functions on June 1, 1971.
3. While the Convention was in session on September 21, 1972, the
President issued Proclamation No. 1081 placing the entire
Philippines under Martial Law.
4. On November 29, 1972, the Convention approved its Proposed
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines. The next day, November
30, 1972, the President of the Philippines issued Presidential Decree
No. 73, “submitting to the Filipino people for ratification or rejection the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines proposed by the 1971
Constitutional Convention, and appropriating funds therefor,” as well as
setting the plebiscite for said ratification or rejection of the Proposed
Constitution on January 15, 1973.
5. On December 7, 1972, Charito Planas filed a case against the
Commission on Elections, the Treasurer of the Philippines and the
Auditor General, to enjoin said “respondents or their agents from
implementing Presidential Decree No. 73, in any manner, until further
orders of the Court,” upon the grounds, inter alia, that said Presidential
Decree “has no force and effect as law because the calling … of such
plebiscite, the setting of guidelines for the conduct of the same, the
prescription of the ballots to be used and the question to be answered
by the voters, and the appropriation of public funds for the purpose,
are, by the Constitution, lodged exclusively in Congress …,” and “there
is no proper submission to the people of said Proposed Constitution
 set for January 15, 1973, there being no freedom of speech, press and
assembly, and there being no sufficient time to inform the people of the
contents thereof.”
6. On December 17, 1972, the President had issued an order
temporarily suspending the effects of Proclamation No. 1081, for the
purpose of free and open debate on the Proposed Constitution.
7. On December 23, the President announced the postponement of
the plebiscite for the ratification or rejection of the Proposed
Constitution. No formal action to this effect was taken until January 7,
1973, when General Order No. 20 was issued, directing “that the
plebiscite scheduled to be held on January 15, 1978, be postponed
until further notice.” Said General Order No. 20, moreover, “suspended
in the meantime” the “order of December 17, 1972, temporarily
suspending the effects of Proclamation No. 1081 for purposes of free
and open debate on the proposed Constitution.”
8. Because of these events relative to the postponement of the
aforementioned plebiscite, the Court deemed it fit to refrain, for the
time being, from deciding the aforementioned cases, for neither the
date nor the conditions under which said plebiscite would be held were
known or announced officially. Then, again, Congress was, pursuant to
the 1935 Constitution, scheduled to meet in regular session on January
22, 1973, and since the main objection to Presidential Decree No. 73
was that the President does not have the legislative authority to call a
plebiscite and appropriate funds therefor, which Congress
unquestionably could do, particularly in view of the formal
postponement of the plebiscite by the President reportedly after
consultation with, among others, the leaders of Congress and the
Commission on Elections the Court deemed it more imperative to defer
its final action on these cases.
9. “In the afternoon of January 12, 1973, the petitioners in Case G.R.
No. L-35948 filed an “urgent motion,” praying that said case be decided
“as soon as possible, preferably not later than January 15, 1973.”
10. The next day, January 13, 1973, which was a Saturday, the Court
issued a resolution requiring the respondents in said three (3) cases to
comment on said “urgent motion” and “manifestation,” “not later than
Tuesday noon, January 16, 1973.” Prior thereto, or on January 15,
1973, shortly before noon, the petitioners in said Case G.R. No. L-
35948 riled a “supplemental motion for issuance of restraining order
and inclusion of additional respondents,” praying: “… that a restraining
order be issued enjoining and restraining respondent Commission on
Elections, as well as the Department of Local Governments and its
head, Secretary Jose Roño; the Department of Agrarian Reforms and
its head, Secretary Conrado Estrella; the National Ratification
Coordinating Committee and its Chairman, Guillermo de Vega; their
deputies, subordinates and substitutes, and all other officials and
persons who may be assigned such task, from collecting, certifying,
and announcing and reporting to the President or other officials
concerned, the so-called Citizens’ Assemblies referendum results
allegedly obtained when they were supposed to have met during the
period comprised between January 10 and January 15, 1973, on the
two questions quoted in paragraph 1 of this Supplemental Urgent
Motion.”
11. On the same date January 15, 1973 the Court passed a resolution
requiring the respondents in said case G.R. No. L-35948 to file “file an
answer to the said motion not later than 4 P.M., Tuesday, January 16,
1973,” and setting the motion for hearing “on January 17, 1973, at 9:30
a.m.” While the case was being heard, on the date last mentioned, at
noontime, the Secretary of Justice called on the writer of this opinion
and said that, upon instructions of the President, he (the Secretary of
Justice) was delivering to him (the writer) a copy of Proclamation No.
1102, which had just been signed by the President. Thereupon, the
 writer returned to the Session Hall and announced to the Court, the
parties in G.R. No. L-35948 inasmuch as the hearing in connection
therewith was still going on and the public there present that the
President had, according to information conveyed by the Secretary of
Justice, signed said Proclamation No. 1102, earlier that morning.

The Ratification Case

1. On January 20, 1973, just two days before the Supreme Court decided the
sequel of plebiscite cases, Javellana filed this suit against the respondents
to restrain them from implementing any of the provisions of the proposed
Constitution not found in the present 1935 Constitution. This is a petition
filed by him as a Filipino citizen and a qualified and registered voter and as
a class suit, for himself and in behalf of all citizens and voters similarly
situated. Javellana also alleged that the President had announced the
immediate implementation of the new constitution, thru his Cabinet,
respondents including.
2. Respondents are acting without or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing
the said proposed constitution upon ground that the President as
Commander-in-Chief of the AFP is without authority to create the Citizens
Assemblies; without power to approve proposed constitution; without power
to proclaim the ratification by the Filipino people of the proposed
constitution; and the election held to ratify the proposed constitution was
not a free election, hence null and void.
3. Following that, petitioners prayed for the nullification of Proclamation No.
1102 and any order, decree, and proclamation which have the same import
and objective.

ISSUE: Whether or not the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 is a
justiciable question.
1. Whether or not the constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional
Convention has been ratified validly conforming to the applicable
constitutional and statutory provisions.
2. Whether or not the proposed Constitution has been acquiesced in
(with or without valid ratification) by the people.
3. Whether or not the petitioners are entitled for relief.
4. Whether or not the proposed Constitution by the 1971 Constitutional
Convention in force.

Rulings:
It is a justiciable and a non-political question.
1. To determine whether or not the new constitution is in force
depends upon whether or not the said new constitution has been ratified in
accordance with the requirements of the 1935 Constitution. It is well settled
that the matter of ratification of an amendment to the constitution should be
settled applying the provisions of the constitution in force at the time of the
alleged ratification of the old constitution.
2. The issue whether the new constitution proposed has been ratified
in accordance with the provisions of Article XV of the 1935 Constitution is
justiciable as jurisprudence here and in the US (from whom we patterned
our 1935 Constitution) shall show.

2. The Constitution was not validly ratified as held by six (6) members of the
court.
a. The Constitution does not allow Congress or anybody else to vest
in those lacking the qualifications and having the disqualifications
mentioned in the Constitution the right of suffrage.
b. The votes of persons less than 21 years of age render the
proceedings in the Citizen’s assemblies void. Proceedings held in
such Citizen’s Assemblies were fundamentally irregular, in that
 persons lacking the qualifications prescribed in Article V Section 1
of the 1935 Constitution were allowed to vote in said Assemblies.
And, since there is no means by which the invalid votes of those
less than 21 years of age can be separated or segregated from
those of the qualified voters, the proceedings in the Citizen’s
Assemblies must be considered null and void.
c. Viva voce voting for the ratification of the constitution is void.
Article XV of the 1935 Constitution envisages with the term “votes
cast” choices made on ballots – not orally or by raising hands – by
the persons taking part in plebiscites. This is but natural and
logical, for, since the early years of the American regime, we had
adopted the Australian Ballot System, with its major
characteristics, namely, uniform official ballots prepared and
furnished by the Government and secrecy in the voting, with the
advantage of keeping records that permit judicial inquiry, when
necessary, into the accuracy of the election returns.
d. The plebiscite on the constitution not having been conducted
under the supervision of COMELEC is void. The point is that, such
of the Barrio Assemblies as were held took place without the
intervention of the COMELEC and without complying with the
provisions of the Election Code of 1971 or even of those of
Presidential Decree No. 73. The procedure therein mostly followed
is such that there is no reasonable means of checking the
accuracy of the returns filed by the officers who conducted said
plebiscites. This is another patent violation of Article X of the 1935
Constitution which form part of the fundamental scheme set forth
in the 1935 Constitution, as amended, to insure the “free, orderly,
and honest” expression of the people’s will. For this, the alleged
plebiscite in the Citizen’s Assemblies is null and void, insofar as
the same are claimed to have ratified the revised Constitution

3. No majority vote has been reached by the Court.

a. Four (4) of its members, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and
Esguerra hold that “the people have already accepted the 1973
Constitution.”
b. Two (2) members of the Court hold that there can be no free expression,
and there has even been no expression, by the people qualified to vote all
over the Philippines, of their acceptance or repudiation of the proposed
Constitution under Martial Law. Justice Fernando states that “(I)f it is
conceded that the doctrine stated in some American decisions to the effect
that independently of the validity of the ratification, a new Constitution once
accepted acquiesced in by the people must be accorded recognition by the
Court, I am not at this stage prepared to state that such doctrine calls for
application in view of the shortness of time that has elapsed and the
difficulty of ascertaining what is the mind of the people in the absence of the
freedom of debate that is a concomitant feature of martial law.”
c. Three (3) members of the Court express their lack of knowledge and/or
competence to rule on the question. Justices Makalintal and Castro are
joined by Justice Teehankee in their statement that “Under a regime of
martial law, with the free expression of opinions through the usual media
vehicle restricted, (they) have no means of knowing, to the point of judicial
certainty, whether the people have accepted the Constitution.”

4. The Court is not prepared to concede that the acts the officers and offices
of the Executive Department, in line with Proclamation No. 1102, connote
recognition of or acquiescence to the proposed Constitution.
a. A department of the Government cannot “recognize” its own acts.
Recognition normally connotes the acknowledgment by a party of the acts
of another. Individual acts of recognition by members of Congress do not
constitute congressional recognition, unless the members have performed
 said acts in session duly assembled. This is a well-established principle of
Administrative Law and of the Law of Public Officers. The compliance by
the people with the orders of martial law government does not constitute
acquiescence to the proposed Constitution. Neither does the Court
prepared to declare that the people’s inaction as regards Proclamation No.
1102, and their compliance with a number of Presidential orders, decrees
and/or instructions, some or many of which have admittedly had salutary
effects, issued subsequently thereto, amounts to a ratification, adoption or
approval of said Proclamation No. 1102. The intimidation is there, and
inaction or obedience of the people, under these conditions, is not
necessarily an act of conformity or acquiescence.
b. As regards the applicability to these cases of the “enrolled bill” rule, it is well
to remember that the same refers to a document certified to the President
for his action under the Constitution by the Senate President and the
Speaker of the House of Reps, and attested to by the respective
Secretaries of both Houses, concerning legislative measures approved by
said Houses. Whereas, Proclamation No. 1102 is an act of the President
declaring the results of a plebiscite on the proposed Constitution, an act
which Article X of the 1935 Constitution denies the executive department of
the Government.
c. In all other respects and with regard to the other respondent in said case,
petitions therein should be given due course, there being more than prima
facie showing that the proposed Constitution has not been ratified in
accordance with Article XV of the 1935 Constitution, either strictly,
substantially, or has been acquiesced in by the people or majority thereof;
that said proposed Constitution is not in force and effect; and that the 1935
Constitution is still the Fundamental Law of the Land, without prejudice to
the submission of said proposed Constitution to the people at a plebiscite
for its ratification or rejection in accordance with Articles V, X and XV of the
1935 Constitution and the provisions of the Revised Election Code in force
at the time of such plebiscite.

5. Being the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new
Constitution being considered in force and effect.
a. Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar,
Antonio and Esguerra hold that it is in force by virtue of the people’s
acceptance thereof; 4 members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal,
Castro, Fernando and Teehankee cast no vote thereon on the premise
stated in their votes on the third question that they could not state with
judicial certainty whether the people have accepted or not accepted the
Constitution; and 2 members of the Court, voted that the Constitution
proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention is not in force; with the
result, there are not enough votes to declare that the new Constitution is
not in force.

Lagman v Medialdea FACTS: On May 23, 2017, President Rodrigo Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216,
declaring Martial Law in the whole island of Mindanao and the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus therein. On May 25, the president submitted a
written report to Congress on the factual basis of the Martial Law declaration (as
required by the Constitution).
The main basis of the declaration was the attack of the Maute terrorist group in
Marawi City. According to the report, the Maute group is an affiliate of ISIS which is
aiming to establish an Islamic caliphate in Marawi City (and might spread its control
in all the other parts of Mindanao). It also cited the ongoing rebellion and lawless
violence that has plagued Mindanao for decades.
Proclamation 216 is now assailed by several petitioners:

LAGMAN PETITION
Representatives Edcel C. Lagman, Tomasito s. Villarin, Gary C. Alejano, Emmanuel
A. Billones, and Teddy Brawner Baguilat, Jr. filed this petition to assail the
President’s declaration of Martial Law.
Its main contention is that, the president’s declaration has no sufficient and factual
basis – arguing that acts of terrorism are not equated with rebellion or invasion.
Lagman also contends that the seeming affiliation with ISIS is only mere
propaganda, designed to create an appearance of capability for the Maute group.
The petition also cited several facts in the president’s report which was refuted by
several media networks and news articles because they turned out to be false or
untrue. Among these was the report about the attack on Amai Pakpak Hospital, the
ransack of the Landbank of the Philippines, and the burning of several schools.

CULLAMAT PETITION
The Cullamat Petition on the other hand avers that the president fails to show any
acts of rebellion and invasion outside Marawi City. Hence, the declaration of Martial
Law for the whole island of Mindanao has no sufficient basis. Cullamat also
reiterated the false facts in the president’s report, as pointed out in the Lagman
petition.

MOHAMAD PETITION
The Mohamad Petition also avers that the power to declare Martial Law is a remedy
of last resort. It contends that the extraordinary powers of the President should be
dispensed sequentially, i.e., first, the power to call out the armed forces; second, the
power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and finally, the power to
declare martial law.

OSG’S CONSOLIDATED COMMENT

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that the court should only review
Proclamation 216 under the lens of grave abuse of discretion, and not on the
correctness of facts.

The OSG also further argues that the sufficiency of the factual basis should be
examined based on the facts/information that were available to the president at the
time he made the determination. Doing otherwise will impose an impossible standard
on the president’s exercise of discretion.

ISSUES:
1. WON the petition is reviewable by the court under Section 18,
Article VII.
2. WON the power of this Court to review the sufficiency of the
factual basis [of] the proclamation of martial law or the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is independent of the
actual actions that have been taken by Congress jointly or
separately.
3. WON the power of judicial review by this Court involves the
calibration of graduated powers granted the President as
Commander-in-Chief, namely (1) calling out powers, (2)
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and (3)
declaration of martial law.
4. WON there were sufficient factual [basis] for the proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus.
HELD:
1.) YES. The only requisite to challenge the validity of the suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus and declaration of martial law is that the petitioner
should be a citizen. He need not even be a taxpayer.

2.) YES. A plain reading of Section 18, Article VII reveals that it specifically grants
authority to the Court to determine the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus.
This is completely independent from Congress’ duty to review.

It is meant to provide an additional safeguard against possible abuse by the

President in the exercise of his power to declare martial law or suspend the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus.

The Court may strike down the presidential proclamation in an appropriate

proceeding filed by any citizen on the ground of lack of sufficient factual basis. On
the other hand, Congress may revoke the proclamation or suspension, such a
revocation shall not be set aside by the President.

The Court is not allowed to “undertake an independent investigation beyond the

pleadings.” On the other hand, Congress may take into consideration not only data
available prior to, but likewise events supervening the declaration. Unlike the Court,
Congress could probe deeper and further; it can delve into the accuracy of the facts
presented before it.

The Court’s review power is only passive; it is only initiated by the filing of a petition
“in an appropriate proceeding” by a citizen. On the other hand, Congress’ review
mechanism is automatic in the sense that it may be activated by Congress itself at
any time after the proclamation or suspension was made.

The court held that it can simultaneously exercise its power of review with, and
independently from, the power to revoke by Congress. Corollary, any perceived
inaction or default on the part of Congress does not deprive or deny the Court of its
power to review.

3.) NO. The power of judicial review does not extend to calibrating the President’s
decision pertaining to which extraordinary power should he use to avail in a given set
of facts or conditions. To do so would be tantamount to an incursion into the
exclusive domain of the Executive and an infringement on the prerogative that solely,
at least initially, lies with the President.

The sequence of “graduated powers” does not refer to a sequence, arrangement, or

order which the Commander-in-Chief must follow. This so-called “graduation of
powers” does not dictate or restrict the manner by which the President decides
which power to choose.

4.) YES. In reviewing the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or
suspension, the Court considers only the information and data available to the
President prior to or at the time of the declaration.

The determination by the Court of the sufficiency of factual basis must be limited only
to the facts and information mentioned in the Report and Proclamation.

The Court held that the President, in issuing Proclamation No. 216, had sufficient
factual bases tending to show that actual rebellion exists. The President only has to
ascertain if there is probable cause for a declaration of Martial Law and the
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.

The petitioners’ counter-evidence were derived solely from unverified news articles
on the internet, with neither the authors nor the sources shown to have affirmed the
contents thereof.

As the Court has consistently ruled, news articles are hearsay evidence, twice
removed, and are thus without any probative value, unless offered for a purpose
 other than proving the truth of the matter asserted.

The alleged false and/or inaccurate statements are just pieces and parcels of the
Report; along with these alleged false data is an arsenal of other independent facts
showing that more likely than not, actual rebellion exists.

C. Introduction to Bill of Rights

Aquino Jr v Enrile FACTS:

● These cases are all petitions for habeas corpus, the petitioners having been
arrested and detained by the military by virtue of the President's
Proclamation No. 1081
● The petitioners were arrested and held pursuant to General Order No. 2 of
the President (September 22, 1972), "for being participants or for having
given aid and comfort in the conspiracy to seize political and state power in
the country and to take over the Government by force ..."
● General Order No. 2 was issued by the President in the exercise of the
powers he assumed by virtue of Proclamation No. 1081 (September 21,
1972) placing the entire country under martial law.
● The portions of the proclamation immediately in point read as follows:
● xxx xxx xxx
● NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the
Philippines by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Article VII, Section
10, Paragraph (2) of the Constitution, do hereby place the entire Philippines
as defined in Article I, Section 1 of the Constitution under martial law and, in
my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the
Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any
act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws and
decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my
direction.
● In addition, I do hereby order that all persons presently detained, as well as
all others who may hereafter be similarly detained for the crimes of
insurrection or rebellion, and all other crimes and offenses committed in
furtherance or on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection
therewith, for crimes against national security and the law of nations, crimes
against public order, crimes involving usurpation of authority, rank, title and
improper use of names, uniforms and insignia, crimes committed by public
officers, and for such other crimes as will be enumerated in orders that I
shall subsequently promulgate, as well as crimes as a consequence of any
violation of any decree, order or regulation promulgated by me personally
or promulgated upon my direction shall be kept under detention until
otherwise ordered released by me or by my duly designated representative.
ISSUE:

W/N the declaration of martial law by the President was valid. (YES)
W/N the Court may inquire into the validity of Proclamation of Martial Law. (The court
may not)

HELD:
● In the first place I am convinced (as are the other Justices), without need
of receiving evidence as in an ordinary adversary court proceeding, that a
state of rebellion existed in the country when Proclamation No. 1081 was
issued. It was a matter of contemporary history within the cognizance not
only of the courts but of all observant people residing here at the time.
Many of the facts and events recited in detail in the different "Whereases" of
the proclamation are of common knowledge. The state of rebellion
continues up to the present. The argument that while armed hostilities go
on in several provinces in Mindanao there are none in other regions except
in isolated pockets in Luzon, and that therefore there is no need to maintain
 martial law all over the country, ignores the sophisticated nature and
ramifications of rebellion in a modern setting. It does not consist simply of
armed clashes between organized and identifiable groups on fields of their
own choosing. It includes subversion of the most subtle kind, necessarily
clandestine and operating precisely where there is no actual fighting.
Underground propaganda, through printed news sheets or rumors
disseminated in whispers; recruitment of armed and ideological adherents,
raising of funds, procurement of arms and material, fifth-column activities
including sabotage and intelligence — all these are part of the rebellion
which by their nature are usually conducted far from the battle fronts. They
cannot be counteracted effectively unless recognized and dealt with in that
context.

● Secondly, my view, which coincides with that of other members of the Court
as stated in their opinions, is that the question of validity of Proclamation
No. 1081 has been foreclosed by the transitory provision of the 1973
Constitution [Art. XVII, Sec. 3(2)] that "all proclamations, orders, decrees,
instructions, and acts promulgated, issued, or done by the incumbent
President shall be part of the law of the land and shall remain valid, legal,
binding and effective even after ... the ratification of this Constitution ..." To
be sure, there is an attempt in these cases to resuscitate the issue of the
effectivity of the new Constitution. All that, however, is behind us now. The
question has been laid to rest by our decision in Javellana vs. Executive
Secretary (L-36142, 50 SCRA 30, March 31, 1973), and of course by the
existing political realities both in the conduct of national affairs and in our
relations with other countries.

Finally, the political-or-justiciable question controversy indeed, any inquiry by this

Court in the present cases into the constitutional sufficiency of the factual bases for
the proclamation of martial law — has become moot and purposeless as a
consequence of the general referendum of July 27-28, 1973. The question
propounded to the voters was: "Under the (1973) Constitution, the President, if he so
desires, can continue in office beyond 1973. Do you want President Marcos to
continue beyond 1973 and finish the reforms he initiated under Martial Law?" The
overwhelming majority of those who cast their ballots, including citizens between 15
and 18 years, voted affirmatively on the proposal. The question was thereby
removed from the area of presidential power under the Constitution and transferred
to the seat of sovereignty itself. Whatever may be the nature of the exercise of that
power by the President in the beginning — whether or not purely political and
therefore non-justiciable — this Court is precluded from applying its judicial yardstick
to the act of the sovereign.

Enrile v Salazar FACTS:

(Rebellion & Hernandez)
● Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested by law
enforcement officers led by Dir. Alfredo Lim of the NBI by virtue of warrant
issued by RTC judge Salazar.
● Enrile, spouses Panlilio, and Gregorio Honasan were charged with the
crime of rebellion w/ murder and multiple frustrated murder committed
during the period of failed coup.
● Enrile was held by the NBI w/o bail, none having been recommended by
the warrant.
● Enrile filed for a petition of habeas corpus alleging he was deprived of
constitutional rights for (1) being held to answer a criminal offence w/c does
not exist in statute books, (2) having no prelim. investigation conducted
denying him of due process, (3) being denied right to bail, and (4) having no
judge to personally determine probable cause.
● Applicability and validity of Hernandez ruling was also being questioned on
the case.
○ Hernandez was repealed by a PD issued by Pres. Marcos.
○ Enrile contends that Hernandez charged murders and other
 common crimes committed as a necessary means for the
commission of rebellion whereas in the present case, he was
charged murder and frustrated murder committed on the occasion
but not in furtherance of rebellion.

ISSUES:
W/N Hernandez ruling is still a binding doctrine - YES
W/N Hernandez, if still binding, is applicable to the case at hand - NO

HELD:
● In view of the majority, Hernandez ruling remains a good law.
● This view is reinforced by the fact that not too long ago, the incumbent
Pres. Cory Aquino, in exercising her powers under the Freedom
Constitution, saw fit to repeal a PD of the former regime which sought to
nullify Hernandez by enacting a new provision of RPC.
● The President in effect by legislative fiat reinstated Hernandez as a binding
doctrine with the effect of law. The Court cannot change this because they
can only interpret laws.

Although still a binding doctrine, Hernandez however Enrile is correct. There is no

such crime as rebellion with murder. Common crimes such as murder are absorbed
by rebellion. Thus, he can only be charged with rebellion which is bailable.

Enrile v Sandiganbayan ENRILE WAS CHARGED WITH PLUNDER. THE SANDIGANBAYAN WOULDN'T
(Plunder & Bail) LET HIM POST BAIL. HENCE THIS CASE. Enrile says he should be allowed
because the only valid reasons for him not to be allowed to post bail is (i) where the
The only allusion to the offense is punishable by reclusion perpetua , and (ii) when evidence of guilt is
Constitution this case has strong. He argues neither of these conditions are present.
is the defense that its
Enrile’s constitutional right FACTS:
to be able to post bail…. 1. June 5, 2014. Ombudsman charged Enrile and others with plunder at the
So ayun Sandiganbayan in relation to the diversion and misuse of PDAF funds.
2. Enrile filed his Motion praying to be allowed to post bail should probable
The right to bail is cause be found against him. Sandiganbayan denied Enrile’s motion. The
expressly afforded by warrant to his arrest was issued and he surrender voluntarily
Section 13, Article III 3. Enrile filed a motion for Detention at the PNP General Hospital and Motion
to Fix Bail. He argued he should be allowed for the following reasons:
a. Prosecution hasn’t established that the evidence of his guilt is
par. 3 of Sec. 5, Rule 114: strong.
(a) That he is a recidivist, b. Although charged w/ plunder, his penalty would only be recl.
quasi-recidivist, or habitual temporal and not recl. perpetua because of mitigating circs. of
delinquent, or has voluntary surrender and his age (over 70)
committed the crime c. He wasn't a flight risk because of his age and physical condition.
aggravated by the 4. Sandiganbayan denied the motion again.their answer:
circumstance of reiteration; a. It’s only after the prosec. shall have presented evidence and the
(b) That he has previously Court shall have made a determination that the evidence of guilt is
escaped from legal not strong against Enrile can he demand bail as a matter of right.
confinement, evaded b. For purposes of bail, the presence of mitigating circumstance/s is
sentence, or violated the not taken into consideration. These circumstances will only be
conditions of his bail appreciated in the imposition of the proper penalty after finding of
without valid justification; guilt.
(c) That he committed the c. The court can take into consideration argument C but it is
offense while under premature for the Court to fix the amount of bail without an anterior
probation, parole, or showing that the evidence of guilt against accused Enrile is not
conditional pardon; (d) strong.
That the circumstances of 5. Enrile comes to the SC arguing he is bailable as a matter of right.
his case indicate the According to him, he doesn't fall under the exemptions from the right upon
probability of flight if concurrence of two (2) circumstances: (i) where the offense is punishable
released on bail; or (e) by reclusion perpetua , and (ii) when evidence of guilt is strong.
That there is undue risk a. Again, he argues that he wouldn't be sentenced by reclusion
that he may commit perpetua even if convicted.
another crime during the ISSUES: WoN Enrile should be allowed to post bail. (YES)
pendency of the appeal.
HELD:
1. Bail Protects the right of the accused to due process and to be presumed innocent
a. Article III, Sec. 14 (2) of the 1987 Constitution provides that in all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved. This right is safeguarded by the constitutional right to be released
on bail. The purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused
at trial and so the amount of bail should be high enough to assure the
presence of the accused when so required, but no higher than what may be
reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose.
2. Bail may be granted as a matter of right or of discretion
a. General Rule: Accused is bailable UNLESS he’s charged with a capital
offense or one punishable with Rec. Perp. AND the evidence of guilt is
strong.
b. ON THE OTHER HAND, granting of bail is discretionary (1) upon
conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment; or (2) if the RTC has imposed a penalty of
imprisonment exceeding six years, provided none of the circumstances
enumerated under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 (refer to margin)
3. Admission to bail in offenses punished by death or life imprisonment or reclusion
perpetua is subject to judicial discretion
a. In resolving bail applications of the accused who is charged with a capital
offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, the trial judge is expected to comply with the guidelines
outlined in Cortes v. Catral, to wit:
i. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion,
notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or
require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of
the Rules of Court, as amended);
ii. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the
application for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution
refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is
strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound
discretion;
iii. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the
summary of evidence of the prosecution;
iv. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused
upon the approval of the bailbond Otherwise petition should be
denied.
4. Enrile’s poor health justifies his admission to bail.
The SC took note of the Philippine's responsibility to the international community
arising from its commitment to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. We
therefore have the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every
person to liberty and due process and for detainees to avail of such remedies which
safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. Quoting from Government of Hong Kong
SAR vs. Olalia, the SC emphasized:
a. x x x uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and
dignity of every person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II
of our Constitution which provides: “The State values the dignity of every
human person and guarantees full respect for human rights.” The
Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and
promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process,
ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the
proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide without delay on the
legality of the detention and order their release if justified. In other
words, the Philippine authorities are under obligation to make
available to every person under detention such remedies which
 safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include
the right to be admitted to bail. (emphasis in decision)
LEONEN DISSENT
1. He discussed the procedures of granting bail but lol. This isn't CrimPro
class
2. Bail isn't a matter of right in crimes reclusion perpetua. Furthermore, this is
unequal treatment favoring Enrile over other accused Our precedents show
that when there are far less powerful, less fortunate, poorer accused in
crimes punishable the same way, this court has had no difficulty denying a
motion to fix bail or motion to set bail where the crime charged carries the
imposable penalty of reclusion perpetua
He found medical and humanitarian grounds inappropriate. This wasn't even in
Enrile’s arguments. The court didn't say anything about whether or not the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights mandates that bail must be granted in instances where
the accused is of advanced age and frail health

Ilagan v Enrile FACTS:

● May 10, 1985: Atty. Ilagan was arrested by PC-Inx’ ‘[‘P while in Davao City
and detained in Camp Catitipan on the basis of a mission order allegedly
issued by Enrile (Ministry of National Defense).
● May 10, 1985: 15 lawyers from IBP Davao visited him, among them, Atty.
Arellano was also arrested and detained on the basis of an unsigned
mission order.
● May 13, 1985: military sent word that Atty. Risonar will also be arrested by
virtue of a mission order signed by Gen. Echavarria.
● Petition for writ of habeas corpus was filed on behalf of the 3 lawyers
alleging violation of the Constitution and this is part of a military campaign
to harass lawyers involved in national security issues.
Respondents argued the ff:
a. Writ of habeas corpus is suspended.
b. Court lacks the authority to inquire into the cause and validity of
detention of persons.
● May 23, 1985: During the hearing, detained attorneys were ordered
released on recognizance of the principal counsel of lawyers namely:
retired C.J. Concepcion and Associate J. J.B.L. Reyes. May 24, 1985:
lawyers were not actually released. Respondents argue that the lawyers
were held not because of lawyering but because of alleged involvement
with NPA and CPP.
● May 28, 1985: Respondents filed an urgent manifestation stating that an
information for rebellion was filed on May 27, 1985 against RTC Davao and
a Warrant of arrest was issued, thus the writ should be dismissed for being
moot and academic.
● May 30, 1985: Lawyers filed an opposition stating that they were not given
the benefit of preliminary investigation and were denied due process.

ISSUE: WoN the petition for writ of habeas corpus may still be used as remedy? --
NO

HELD: Petition for habeas corpus denied. Petitioners detained.

● WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS IS NO LONGER APPLICABLE:
○ Function of writ is to inquire into the legality of one’s detention
○ Incarceration is by virtue of judicial order in relation to a criminal case
thus remedy no longer lies.
○ Rule 102 Sec. 4: “person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in
custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge...and the
court or judge had jurisdiction...writ shall not be allowed; or if
jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, persons shall not be
discharged by reason of any informality or defect”.
○ If detained attorneys question their detention because of improper
 arrest or that no preliminary investigation has been conducted, the
remedy is not a petition for a writ of habeas corpus but a motion before
the trial court to quash the Warrant of Arrest and/or Information…
○ Habeas corpus would not lie after the warrant of commitment was
issued by the Court on the basis of the Information filed
○ As regards the preliminary investigation requirement, 1985 ROC
provides that exception may lie if the Information is filed by the City
Fiscal before the RTC.
■ “absence of such investigation did not impair the validity of the
Information or otherwise render it defective. Much less did it affect
the jurisdiction of the CFI. The right to a preliminary investigation,
being waivable, does not argue against validity of the proceedings,
the most that could have been done being to remand the case in
order that such investigation can be conducted.”
“absence of preliminary investigation does not go to the jurisdiction of
the Court but merely to the regularity of the proceedings. It could
even be waived. Indeed, it is frequently waived.”

Brocka et. al v Enrile FACTS:

● Petitioners were arrested on January 28, 1985 by elements of the Northern
Police District following the forcible and violent dispersal of a demonstration
held in sympathy with the jeepney strike called Alliance of Concerned
Transport Organization (ACTO)
● They were charged with Illegal Assembly before the RTC
● Except for Brocka, et al. (charged as leaders of the offence and for whom
no bail was recommended), other petitioners were released on bail of P3k
each
● Brocka, et al.’s provisional release was ordered only upon an urgent
petition for bail for which daily hearings from February 1-7, 1985 were held;
RTC Judge Miriam Defensor Santiago issued a resolution directing the
release of the (5) accused
● Despite service of the order of release on Feb. 9, Brocka, et al remained
in detention, respondents having invoked a Preventive Detention Order
(PDA) allegedly issued by Pres. Marcos against them on Jan. 28
● Neither the original, duplicate copy, nor certified true copy of the PDA was
every shown to them
● Subsequently, on Feb. 11, 1985 Brocka, et al were charged of Inciting to
Sedition without prior notice to their counsel; informations filed
recommended no bail
● They were released provisionally on Feb. 14 on orders of Pres. Marcos

ISSUE: W/N enjoining the criminal prosecution is legal? Yes.

HELD: SC that where there is manifest bad faith that accompanies the filing of
criminal charges, as in the instant case where Brocka, et al. were barred from
enjoying provisional release until such time that charges were filed, and where a
sham preliminary investigation was hastily conducted, charges that are filed as a
result should lawfully be enjoined.

The general rule is that criminal prosecution may not be restrained or stayed by
injunction, preliminary or final. EXCEPT:
a. To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused
b. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice/avoid oppression or
municipality of actions
c. When there is pre-judicial question which is sub judice
d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority
e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation
f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent
g. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense
h. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution
 i. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust of vengeance
j. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to
quash on that ground has been denied
k. Preliminary injunction has been issued by the SC to prevent the threatened
unlawful arrest of petitioners

● Brocka, et al. have cited the circumstances to show that the criminal
proceedings had become a case of persecution, having been undertaken
by state officials in bad faith
● PDA was issued on Jan. 28 but was invoked only on Feb. 9; PDAs shall
be invoked within 24 hours (in Metro MNL) / 48 hours (outside MNL);
despite subpoenas for its production, the prosecution merely presented a
photocopy of the invoked PDA
● The hasty filing of the 2nd offense, premised on a spurious and
inoperational PDA, certainly betrays respondent’s bad faith and malicious
intent to pursue criminal charges against Brocka, et al.
● Ilagan case: “individuals against whom PDAs have been issued should be
furnished with the original, and the duplicate original, and a certified true
copy issued by the official having official custody of the PDA, at the time of
the apprehension”
The tenacious invocation of a spurious and inoperational PDA and the sham and
hasty preliminary investigation were clear signals that the prosecutors intended to
keep Brocka, et al. in detention until the second offense of "Inciting to Sedition" could
be facilitated and justified without need of issuing a warrant of arrest anew

Ocampo et.al v Enriquez (check old digests)

Marcos Burial in LNMB

1. Historical Overview of the Bill of Rights

US Bill of Rights

Amendment 1 - Freedom of Religion, Press, Expression

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances.

Amendment 2 - Right to Bear Arms

A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear
Arms, shall not be infringed.

Amendment 3 - Quartering of Soldiers

No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war,
but in a manner to be prescribed by law.
Amendment 4 - Search and Seizure
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Amendment 5 - Trial and Punishment, Compensation for Takings.

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or
indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual
service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation.

Amendment 6 - Right to Speedy Trial, Confrontation of Witnesses

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence.

Amendment 7 - Trial by Jury in Civil Cases

In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be
preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States, than
according to the rules of the common law.

Amendment 8 - Cruel and Unusual Punishment

Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.

Amendment 9 - Construction of Constitution

The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained
by the people.

Amendment 10 - Powers of the States and People

The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved
to the States respectively, or to the people.

French Declaration of the Rights of Man

1. Men are born and remain free and equal in rights. Social distinctions may be founded
only upon the general good.
2. The aim of all political association is the preservation of the natural and
imprescriptible rights of man. These rights are liberty, property, security, and resistance
to oppression
3. The principle of all sovereignty resides essentially in the nation. No body nor
individual may exercise any authority which does not proceed directly from the nation
4. Liberty consists in the freedom to do everything which injures no one else; hence the
exercise of the natural rights of each man has no limits except those which assure to the
other members of the society the enjoyment of the same rights. These limits can only be
determined by law.
5. Law can only prohibit such actions as are hurtful to society. Nothing may be prevented
which is not forbidden by law, and no one may be forced to do anything not provided for
by law.
6. Law is the expression of the general will. Every citizen has a right to participate
personally, or through his representative, in its foundation. It must be the same for all,
whether it protects or punishes. All citizens, being equal in the eyes of the law, are
equally eligible to all dignities and to all public positions and occupations, according to
 their abilities, and without distinction except that of their virtues and talents.
7. No person shall be accused, arrested, or imprisoned except in the cases and according to the forms
prescribed by law. Any one soliciting, transmitting, executing, or causing to be executed, any arbitrary
order, shall be punished. But any citizen summoned or arrested in virtue of the law shall submit without
delay, as resistance constitutes an offense.
8. The law shall provide for such punishments only as are strictly and obviously necessary, and no one shall
suffer punishment except it be legally inflicted in virtue of a law passed and promulgated before the
commission of the offense.
9. As all persons are held innocent until they shall have been declared guilty, if arrest shall be deemed
indispensable, all harshness not essential to the securing of the prisoner's person shall be severely
repressed by law.
10. No one shall be disquieted on account of his opinions, including his religious views, provided their
manifestation does not disturb the public order established by law.
11. The free communication of ideas and opinions is one of the most precious of the rights of man. Every
citizen may, accordingly, speak, write, and print with freedom, but shall be responsible for such abuses of
this freedom as shall be defined by law.
12. The security of the rights of man and of the citizen requires public military forces. These forces are,
therefore, established for the good of all and not for the personal advantage of those to whom they shall
be intrusted.
13. A common contribution is essential for the maintenance of the public forces and for the cost of
administration. This should be equitably distributed among all the citizens in proportion to their means.
14. All the citizens have a right to decide, either personally or by their representatives, as to the necessity of
the public contribution; to grant this freely; to know to what uses it is put; and to fix the proportion, the
mode of assessment and of collection and the duration of the taxes.
15. Society has the right to require of every public agent an account of his administration.
16. A society in which the observance of the law is not assured, nor the separation of powers defined, has no
constitution at all.
17. Since property is an inviolable and sacred right, no one shall be deprived thereof except where public
necessity, legally determined, shall clearly demand it, and then only on condition that the owner shall
have been previously and equitably indemnified.

The Magna Carta

2. International Human Rights Law

UNITED NATIONS DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

· Rights are Universal, Inalienable, and Indivisible
· Rights that are shared equally by everyone regardless of sex, race, nationality, and economic background
· Rene Cassin: 4 Pilars
o 1st pillar: dignity
o 2nd pillar: liberty
o 3rd pillar: equality
o 4th pillar: fraternity
o The roof: the conditions by which one may be able to to realize the rights he/she has within the state and
society
o Each pillar under the roof represents a major historical milestone that shaped the ideas derived from the
articles
o ln a sense, the sequence of the articles correspond to the historical appearance of successive
generations and visions of human rights
· 1st Pillar
o Articles 1 and 2
o stands for the universality of human dignity
· 2nd Pillar
o Articles 3-19
o invokes first generation rights like those civil liberties and other liberal rights fought for during the
Enlightenment
· 3rd Pillar
o Articles 20-29
o address the second generation of rights
 o Related to ideas championed during the Industrial Revolution
· 4th Pillar
o Article 27
o focuses on the third generation of human rights
o Advocated during the late 19th century to the early 20th century as well as during the post-colonial era

Generations of Rights
1st generation rights
⊡ right to life
⊡ equality before the law
⊡ freedom of speech
⊡ the right to a fair trial
⊡ freedom of religion
⊡ voting rights.
2nd generation rights
⊡ right to be employed in just and favorable condition
⊡ rights to food, housing and health care, as well as social security and unemployment benefits.
3rd generation rights
⊡ Right to self-determination
⊡ Right to economic and social development
⊡ Right to a healthy environment
⊡ Right to participation in cultural heritage

International Covenant on Civil and and Political Rights

https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%20999/volume-999-i-14668-english.pdf

International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights

https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/ProfessionalInterest/cescr.pdf

UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People [ IP ] (summarized, or paraphrased, or copy pasted pag di
 kaya rephrase)

Guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations

Affirms that IPs are equal to all other peoples, while recognizing that right of all peoples to be different, to consider
themselves different, and to be respected as such.

Affirming also that all peoples contribute to the diversity and richness of civilizations and cultures, which constitute
the common heritage of humankind

Vinuya v Executive FACTS:

Secretary This is an original Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with an
application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against the
Office of the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of the DFA, the Secretary of the
DOJ, and the OSG.

Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a non-stock, non-profit

organization registered with the SEC, established for the purpose of providing aid to
the victims of rape by Japanese military forces in the Philippines during the Second
World War.

Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have approached the Executive Department
through the DOJ, DFA, and OSG, requesting assistance in filing a claim against the
Japanese officials and military officers who ordered the establishment of the “comfort
women” stations in the Philippines. But officials of the Executive Department
declined to assist the petitioners, and took the position that the individual claims of
the comfort women for compensation had already been fully satisfied by Japan’s
compliance with the Peace Treaty between the Philippines and Japan.

Hence, this petition where petitioners pray for this court to (a) declare that
respondents committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
discretion in refusing to espouse their claims for the crimes against humanity and
war crimes committed against them; and (b) compel the respondents to espouse
their claims for official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan before
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and other international tribunals.

Respondents maintain that all claims of the Philippines and its nationals relative to
the war were dealt with in the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 and the bilateral
Reparations Agreement of 1956.

On January 15, 1997, the Asian Women’s Fund and the Philippine government
signed a Memorandum of Understanding for medical and welfare support programs
for former comfort women. Over the next five years, these were implemented by the
Department of Social Welfare and Development.

ISSUE:
WON the Executive Department committed grave abuse of discretion in not
espousing petitioners’ claims for official apology and other forms of reparations
against Japan.

RULING:
Petition lacks merit. From a Domestic Law Perspective, the Executive Department
has the exclusive prerogative to determine whether to espouse petitioners’ claims
against Japan.
Political questions refer “to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of
the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality
of a particular measure.”

One type of case of political questions involves questions of foreign relations. It is

well-established that “the conduct of the foreign relations of our government is
committed by the Constitution to the executive and legislative–‘the political’–
departments of the government, and the propriety of what may be done in the
exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision.” are
delicate, complex, and involve large elements of prophecy. They are and should be
undertaken only by those directly responsible to the people whose welfare they
advance or imperil.

But not all cases implicating foreign relations present political questions, and courts
certainly possess the authority to construe or invalidate treaties and executive
agreements. However, the question whether the Philippine government should
espouse claims of its nationals against a foreign government is a foreign relations
matter, the authority for which is demonstrably committed by our Constitution not to
the courts but to the political branches. In this case, the Executive Department has
already decided that it is to the best interest of the country to waive all claims of its
nationals for reparations against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of 1951. The wisdom
of such decision is not for the courts to question.

The President, not Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing the conditions
which prevail in foreign countries, and especially is this true in time of war. He has
his confidential sources of information. He has his agents in the form of diplomatic,
consular and other officials.

The Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners’ cause would
be inimical to our country’s foreign policy interests, and could disrupt our relations
with Japan, thereby creating serious implications for stability in this region. For the to
overturn the Executive Department’s determination would mean an assessment of
the foreign policy judgments by a coordinate political branch to which authority to
make that judgment has been constitutionally committed.

From a municipal law perspective, certiorari will not lie. As a general principle, where
such an extraordinary length of time has lapsed between the treaty’s conclusion and
our consideration – the Executive must be given ample discretion to assess the
foreign policy considerations of espousing a claim against Japan, from the
standpoint of both the interests of the petitioners and those of the Republic, and
decide on that basis if apologies are sufficient, and whether further steps are
appropriate or necessary.

In the international sphere, traditionally, the only means available for individuals to
bring a claim within the international legal system has been when the individual is
able to persuade a government to bring a claim on the individual’s behalf. By taking
up the case of one of its subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action or
international judicial proceedings on his behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own
right to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect for the rules of international law.

Within the limits prescribed by international law, a State may exercise diplomatic
protection by whatever means and to whatever extent it thinks fit, for it is its own
right that the State is asserting. Should the natural or legal person on whose behalf it
is acting consider that their rights are not adequately protected, they have no remedy
in international law. All they can do is resort to national law, if means are available,
 with a view to furthering their cause or obtaining redress. All these questions remain
within the province of municipal law and do not affect the position internationally.
Even the invocation of jus cogens norms and erga omnes obligations will not alter
this analysis. Petitioners have not shown that the crimes committed by the Japanese
army violated jus cogens prohibitions at the time the Treaty of Peace was signed, or
that the duty to prosecute perpetrators of international crimes is an erga omnes
obligation or has attained the status of jus cogens.

The term erga omnes (Latin: in relation to everyone) in international law has been
used as a legal term describing obligations owed by States towards the community
of states as a whole. Essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations
of a State towards the international community as a whole, and those arising vis-à-
vis another State in the field of diplomatic protection. By their very nature, the former
are the concern of all States. In view of the importance of the rights involved, all
States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they are obligations
erga omnes.

The term “jus cogens” (literally, “compelling law”) refers to norms that command
peremptory authority, superseding conflicting treaties and custom. Jus cogens norms
are considered peremptory in the sense that they are mandatory, do not admit
derogation, and can be modified only by general international norms of equivalent
authority

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED.

Poe v COMELEC FACTS:

1. Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares was found abandoned as a newborn
infant in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo by a certain Edgardo Militar (Edgardo) on 3
September 1968. Parental care and custody over petitioner was passed on by
Edgardo to his relatives, Emiliano Militar (Emiliano) and his wife. Three days after, 6
September 1968, Emiliano reported and registered petitioner as a foundling with the
name of Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar in the Office of the Civil Registrar of
Iloilo City (OCR-Iloilo).

2. When she was 5 years old, she was adopted by celebrity spouse Fernando Poe
Jr. and Susan Roces and her named was changed to Mary Grace Natividad Sonora
Poe. Poe enrolled and pursued a degree in Development Studies at the University of
the Philippines but she opted to continue her studies abroad and left for the United
States of America (U.S.) in 1988.

3. Subsequently, she married Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzarez, a dual citizen

of the Philippines and US. On October 18, 2001, Grace has become a naturalized
American citizen.

4. Poe went back to the Philippines to help his father with his Presidential campaign
but the untimely demise of his father and her desire to be with her grieving mother
made her decide to permanently move back to the Philippines.

5. The couple began preparing for their resettlement including notification of their
children's schools that they will be transferring to Philippine schools for the next
semester; coordination with property movers for the relocation of their household
goods, furniture and cars from the U.S. to the Philippines; and inquiry with Philippine
authorities as to the proper procedure to be followed in bringing their pet dog into the
country..

6. On May 26, 2005, Grace came back to the Philippines. They briefly stay with her
mother until they were able to buy a condominium in San Juan. Later on, they were
able to buy a residential lot in Corinthian Hills, Quezon City to established their
residence. Grace took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-
acquisition Act of 2003.

7. She was later on appointed by President Noynoy Aquino as Chairman of the

MTRCB. Before assuming her post, Poe executed an “Affidavit of Renunciation of
Allegiance to the USA and Renunciation of American Citizen.

8. On 2 October 2012, Grace filed with the COMELEC her Certificate of Candidacy
(COC) for Senator for the 2013 Elections wherein she answered "6 years and 6
months" to the question "Period of residence in the Philippines before May 13,
2013." Petitioner obtained the highest number of votes and was proclaimed Senator
on 16 May 2013.

9. On 15 October 2015, petitioner filed her COC for the Presidency for the May 2016
Elections. In her COC, the petitioner declared that she is a natural-born citizen and
that her residence in the Philippines up to the day before 9 May 2016 would be ten
(10) years and eleven (11) months counted from 24 May 2005 (the day she returned
to the Philippines instead of the day she regained her Philippine citizenship). The
petitioner attached to her COC an "Affidavit Affirming Renunciation of U.S.A.
Citizenship" subscribed and sworn to before a notary public in Quezon City on 14
October 2015

10. Because of this, several petitons were filed alleging that Grace does not qualify
to run for the presidency since she is not a natural born citizen and she does not
satisfy the 10-year residency requirement.

11. Estrella Elamparo – claims that Grace is not a natural born citizen since she
was a foundling. She further claims that international law does not confer natural
status on foundling. She futher claims that Poe still fell short of the ten-year
residency requirement of the Constitution as her residence could only be counted at
the earliest from July 2006, when she reacquired Philippine citizenship under the
said Act.||.

12. Tatad, Contreras and Valdez – They claimed that since the Philippines adheres
to the principle of jus sanguinis, persons of unknown parentage, particularly
foundlings, cannot be considered natural-born Filipino citizens since blood
relationship is determinative of natural-born status. They further claimed that she
should have counted her residency from the time he reacquired Philippine
citizenship not from the time she went back to the Philippines.|

13. Because of the petitions, the Comelec cancelled Poe’s COC. Hence, this
petition.

ISSUE/s:
I. W/N the Comelec has the jurisdiction in the case at bar? (NO)
II. W/N Poe is a natural born citizen? (YES)
III. W/N Poe satisfies the 10 year residency requirement? (YES)

RULING: The petition was granted and the Court reversed the Comelec’s
decision.

RATIO:
ISSUE No. 1
"Disqualification" different from those for a declaration of "ineligibility."
"Disqualification" proceedings, as already stated, are based on grounds specified in
§12 and §68 of the Omnibus Election Code and in §40 of the Local Government
Code and are for the purpose of barring an individual from becoming a candidate or
from continuing as a candidate for public office. In a word, their purpose is to
eliminate a candidate from the race either from the start or during its progress.
"Ineligibility," on the other hand, refers to the lack of the qualifications prescribed in
the Constitution or the statutes for holding public office and the purpose of the
proceedings for declaration of ineligibility is to remove the incumbent from office.|||
Consequently, that an individual possesses the qualifications for a public office does
not imply that he is not disqualified from becoming a candidate or continuing as a
candidate for a public office and vice versa. We have this sort of dichotomy in our
Naturalization Law. (C.A. No. 473) That an alien has the qualifications prescribed in
§2 of the Law does not imply that he does not suffer from any of [the]
disqualifications provided in §4.|||
Three reasons may be cited to explain the absence of an authorized proceeding for
determining before election the qualifications of a candidate.
First is the fact that unless a candidate wins and is proclaimed elected, there is no
necessity for determining his eligibility for the office. Second is the fact that the
determination of a candidates' eligibility, e.g., his citizenship or, as in this case, his
domicile, may take a long time to make, extending beyond the beginning of the term
of the office. Third is the policy underlying the prohibition against pre-proclamation
cases in elections for President, Vice President, Senators and members of the
House of Representatives. (R.A. No. 7166, § 15)
That is why the Comelec resolution states that:
Grounds. — Any candidate who, in action or protest in which he is a party, is
declared by final decision of a competent court, guilty of, or found by the
Commission to be suffering from any disqualification provided by law or the
Constitution.
A Petition to Disqualify a Candidate invoking grounds for a Petition to Deny to or
Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy or Petition to Declare a Candidate as a Nuisance
Candidate, or a combination thereof, shall be summarily dismissed.
Such that, as presently required, to disqualify a candidate there must be a
declaration by a final judgment of a competent court that the candidate sought
to be disqualified "is guilty of or found by the Commission to be suffering from
any disqualification provided by law or the Constitution."
A candidate cannot be disqualified without a prior finding that he or she is suffering
from a disqualification "provided by law or the Constitution," neither can the
certificate of candidacy be cancelled or denied due course on grounds of false
representations regarding his or her qualifications, without a prior authoritative
finding that he or she is not qualified, such prior authority being the necessary
measure by which the falsity of the representation can be found. The only exception
that can be conceded are self-evident facts of unquestioned or unquestionable
veracity and judicial confessions. Such are, anyway, bases equivalent to prior
decisions against which the falsity of representation can be determined.||Thus, the
COMELEC has exceeded its jurisdiction in cancelling Poe’s COC

ISSUE No. 2
The Solicitor General offered official statistics from the Philippine Statistics Authority
(PSA) that from 1965 to 1975, the total number of foreigners born in the Philippines
was 15,986 while the total number of Filipinos born in the country was 10,558,278.
The statistical probability that any child born in the Philippines in that decade is
natural-born Filipino was 99.83%. For her part, petitioner presented census statistics
for Iloilo Province for 1960 and 1970, also from the PSA. In 1960, there were
962,532 Filipinos and 4,734 foreigners in the province; 99.62% o the population
were Filipinos. In 1970, the figures were 1,162,669 Filipinos and 5,304 foreigners, or
99.55%. Also presented were figures for the child producing ages (15- 49). In 1960,
there were 230,528 female Filipinos as against 730 female foreigners or 99.68%. In
the same year, there were 210,349 Filipino males and 886 male aliens, or 99.58%.
In 1970, there were 270,299 Filipino females versus 1,190 female aliens, or 99.56%.
That same year, there were 245,740 Filipino males as against only 1,165 male aliens
or 99.53%.
Moreover, the Court ruled that as a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-
born citizens. While the 1935 Constitution's enumeration is silent as to foundlings,
there is no restrictive language which would definitely exclude foundlings either.
Because of silence and ambiguity in the enumeration with respect to foundlings,
there is a need to examine the intent of the framers. It was later found out that
During the debates on this provision, the illegitimate children with a foreign father of
a mother who was a citizen of the Philippines, and also foundlings was considered to
be expressly included in the provision; but this amendment was defeated primarily
because the Convention believed that the cases, being too few to warrant the
inclusion of a provision in the Constitution to apply to them, should be governed by
statutory legislation. Moreover, it was believed that the rules of international law were
already clear to the effect that illegitimate children followed the citizenship of the
mother, and that foundlings followed the nationality
of the place where they were found, thereby making unnecessary the inclusion in the
Constitution of the proposed amendment.
The Court find no such intent or language permitting discrimination against
foundlings. On the contrary, all three Constitutions guarantee the basic right to equal
protection of the laws. All exhort the State to render social justice. Of special
consideration are several provisions in the present charter: Article II, Section 11
which provides that the "State values the dignity of every human person and
guarantees full respect for human rights," Article XIII, Section 1 which mandates
Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and
enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and
political inequalities . . ." and Article XV, Section 3 which requires the State to defend
the "right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special
protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions
prejudicial to their development." Certainly, these provisions contradict an intent to
discriminate against foundlings on account of their unfortunate status. Foundlings
are likewise citizens under international law|| That the Philippines is not a party to the
1930 Hague Convention nor to the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness does not mean that their principles are not binding. While the
Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague Convention, it is a signatory to the
Universal Declaration on Human Rights, Article 15 (1) of which effectively affirms
Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention. Article 2 of the 1961 "United Nations
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness" merely "gives effect" to Article 15 (1)
of the UDHR. In Razon v. Tagitis, this Court noted that the Philippines had not signed
or ratified the "International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from
Enforced Disappearance." Yet, we ruled that the proscription against enforced
disappearances in the said convention was nonetheless binding as a "generally
accepted principle of international law.
Current legislation reveals the adherence of the Philippines to this generally
accepted principle of international law. In particular, R.A. No. 8552, R.A. No. 8042
and this Court's Rules on Adoption, expressly refer to "Filipino children." In all of
them, foundlings are among the Filipino children who could be adopted. Likewise, it
has been pointed that the DFA issues passports to foundlings. Passports are by law,
issued only to citizens. This shows that even the executive department, acting
through the DFA, considers foundlings as Philippine citizens.

ISSUE No. 3
When petitioner immigrated to the U.S. in 1991, she lost her original domicile, which
is the Philippines. There are three requisites to acquire a new domicile: 1. Residence
or bodily presence in a new locality; 2. an intention to remain there; and 3. an
intention to abandon the old domicile. To successfully effect a change of domicile,
one must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona
fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new
one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose. In other words, there
must basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose
to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the
change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for
the new domicile must be actual.
The evidence of petitioner is overwhelming and taken together leads to no other
conclusion that she decided to permanently abandon her U.S. residence (selling the
house, taking the children from U.S. schools, getting quotes from the freight
 company, notifying the U.S. Post Office of the abandonment of their address in the
U.S., donating excess items to the Salvation Army, her husband resigning from U.S.
employment right after selling the U.S. house) and permanently relocate to the
Philippines and actually re-established her residence here on 24 May 2005 (securing
T.I.N., enrolling her children in Philippine schools, buying property here, constructing
a residence here, returning to the Philippines after all trips abroad, her husband
getting employed here). Indeed, coupled with her eventual application to reacquire
Philippine citizenship and her family's actual continuous stay in the Philippines over
the years, it is clear that when petitioner returned on 24 May 2005 it was for
good.|||
Moreover, petitioner's explanation that she misunderstood the query in 2012 (period
of residence before 13 May 2013) as inquiring about residence as of the time she
submitted the COC, is bolstered by the change which the COMELEC itself
introduced in the 2015 COC which is now "period of residence in the Philippines up
to the day before May 09, 2016”. The Court ruled that the petitioner’s mistake was
done in good faith.
It was grave abuse of discretion for the COMELEC to treat the 2012 COC as a
binding and conclusive admission against petitioner. It could be given in evidence
against her, yes, but it was by no means conclusive. There is precedent after all
where a candidate's mistake as to period of residence made in a COC was
overcome by evidence. In Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC, the candidate
mistakenly put seven (7) months as her period of residence where the required
period was a minimum of one year. We said that "[i]t is the fact of residence, not a
statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining
whether or not an individual has satisfied the constitution's residency qualification
requirement." The COMELEC ought to have looked at the evidence presented and
see if petitioner was telling the truth that she was in the Philippines from 24 May
2005. Had the COMELEC done its duty, it would have seen that the 2012 COC and
the 2015 COC both correctly stated the pertinent period of residency.

3. Reframing rights before new technologies and social media

Vivares v STC P.336 Consti 2 DIgest

In January 2012, Angela Tan, a high school student at St. Theresa’s College (STC),
uploaded on Facebook several pictures of her and her classmates (Nenita Daluz and
Julienne Suzara) wearing only their undergarments.
Thereafter, some of their classmates reported said photos to their teacher, Mylene
Escudero. Escudero, through her students, viewed and downloaded said pictures.
She showed the said pictures to STC’s Discipline-in-Charge for appropriate action.
Later, STC found Tan et al to have violated the student’s handbook and banned them
from “marching” in their graduation ceremonies scheduled in March 2012.
The issue went to court but despite a TRO (temporary restraining order) granted by
the Cebu RTC enjoining the school from barring the students in the graduation
ceremonies, STC still barred said students.
Subsequently, Rhonda Vivares, mother of Nenita, and the other mothers filed a
petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas data against the school. They argued,
among others, that:
1. The privacy setting of their children’s Facebook accounts was set at “Friends
Only.” They, thus, have a reasonable expectation of privacy which must be
respected.

2. The photos accessed belong to the girls and, thus, cannot be used and
reproduced without their consent. Escudero, however, violated their rights by saving
digital copies of the photos and by subsequently showing them to STC’s officials.
Thus, the Facebook accounts of the children were intruded upon;

3. The intrusion into the Facebook accounts, as well as the copying of information,
data, and digital images happened at STC’s Computer Laboratory;
They prayed that STC be ordered to surrender and deposit with the court all soft and
 printed copies of the subject data and have such data be declared illegally obtained
in violation of the children’s right to privacy.

The Cebu RTC eventually denied the petition. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for writ of habeas data is proper.

HELD: Yes, it is proper but in this case, it will not prosper.

Contrary to the arguments of STC, the Supreme Court ruled that:
1. The petition for writ of habeas data can be availed of even if this is not a case of
extralegal killing or enforced disappearance; and
2. The writ of habeas data can be availed of against STC even if it is not an entity
engaged in the business of “gathering, collecting, or storing data or information
regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party”.
First, the Rule on Habeas Data does not state that it can be applied only in cases of
extralegal killings or enforced disappearances. Second, nothing in the Rule would
suggest that the habeas data protection shall be available only against abuses of a
person or entity engaged in the business of gathering, storing, and collecting of data.
Right to Privacy on Social Media (Online Networking Sites)
The Supreme Court ruled that if an online networking site (ONS) like Facebook has
privacy tools, and the user makes use of such privacy tools, then he or she has a
reasonable expectation of privacy (right to informational privacy, that is). Thus,
such privacy must be respected and protected.
In this case, however, there is no showing that the students concerned made use of
such privacy tools. Evidence would show that that their post (status) on Facebook
were published as “Public”.
Facebook has the following settings to control as to who can view a user’s posts on
his “wall” (profile page):
(a) Public – the default setting; every Facebook user can view the photo;
(b) Friends of Friends – only the user’s Facebook friends and their friends can view
the photo;
(c) Friends – only the user’s Facebook friends can view the photo;
(d) Custom – the photo is made visible only to particular friends and/or networks of
the Facebook user; and
(e) Only Me – the digital image can be viewed only by the user.
The default setting is “Public” and if a user wants to have some privacy, then he must
choose any setting other than “Public”. If it is true that the students concerned did set
the posts subject of this case so much so that only five people can see them (as they
claim), then how come most of their classmates were able to view them. This fact
was not refuted by them. In fact, it was their classmates who informed and showed
their teacher, Escudero, of the said pictures. Therefore, it appears that Tan et al
never use the privacy settings of Facebook hence, they have no reasonable
expectation of privacy on the pictures of them scantily clad.
STC did not violate the students’ right to privacy. The manner which the school
gathered the pictures cannot be considered illegal. As it appears, it was the
classmates of the students who showed the picture to their teacher and the latter,
being the recipient of said pictures, merely delivered them to the proper school
authority and it was for a legal purpose, that is, to discipline their students according
to the standards of the school (to which the students and their parents agreed to in
the first place because of the fact that they enrolled their children there).

ISAA v Greenpeace FACTS

On 24 September 2010, a Memorandum of Undertaking was executed
between International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications,
Inc. (ISAAA), University of the Philippines Los Baños Foundation, Inc. (UPLBFI)
and UP Mindanao Foundation, Inc. (UPMFI), in pursuance of a collaborative
research and development project on eggplants that are resistant to the fruit and
shoot borer. Other partner agencies involved were UPLB through its Institute of
Plant Breeding, Maharastra Hybrid SeedCompany (MAHYCO) of India, Cornell
University and the Agricultural Biotechnology Support Project II (ABSPII) of USAID.

The UPLB Field Trial Proposal states that the pest-resistant crop subject of the field
trial was described as a “bio-engineered eggplant.” The crystal toxin genes
from the soil bacterium Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) were incorporated into the
eggplant genome to produce the protein CrylAc which is toxic to target insect
pests. The latter is said to be highly specific to lepidopteran larvae such as fruit
and shoot borer (FSB), the most destructive insect pest of eggplant.

NCBP issued a Certificate of Completion of Contained Experiment which was

conducted from 2007 to 3 March 2009 stating that during the conduct of
experiment, all the biosafety measures have been complied with and no untoward
incident has occurred.
On 16 March 2010 and 28 June 2010, the Bureau of Plant Industry (BPI) issued
biosafety permits to UPLB.

Field testing commenced on various dates in the following approved trial sites:
Kabacan,North Cotabato; Sta. Maria, Pangasinan; Pili, Camarines Sur; Bago Oshiro,
Davao City;and Bay, Laguna.

On 26 April 2012, Greenpeace, MASIPAG and individual respondents

(Greenpeace, et.al.) filed a petition for writ of kalikasan and writ of continuing
mandamus with prayer for the issuance of Temporary Environmental Protection
Order (TEPO) alleging that the Bt talong field trials violate their constitutional
right to health and a balanced ecology considering that:
- The required Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) under
PD 1151 was
not secured prior to the
project implementation
- There is no independent, peer-reviewed study on the safety of
Bt talong for human consumption and the environment
- There was a study conducted showing adverse effects on rats
who were fed Bt corn, local scientists likewise attested to the
harmful effects of GMOs to human and animal health
- Bt crops can be directly toxic to non-target species
- There is a failure to comply with the required public consultation
under Sections 26 and 27 of the Local Government Code
- The case calls for the application of the precautionary principle, it
being a classic environmental case where scientific evidence as to
the health, environmental and socio-economic safety is insufficient
or uncertain and preliminary scientific evaluation indicates
reasonable grounds for concern that there are potentially
dangerous effects on human health and the environment
The following reliefs are prayed for by
Greenpeace, et.al., to wit:
- Issuance of a TEPO enjoining BPI and Fertilizer and Pesticide
Authority (FPA) of the Department of Agriculture (DA) from
processing for field testing and registering as herbicidal product Bt
talong in the Philippines, stopping all pending field testing, and
ordering the uprooting of planted Bt talong; and
- Issuance of a writ of continuing mandamus commanding the ISAAAI,
et.al.: (1) to submit to an environmental impact statement system
under the Environmental Management Bureau of the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR-EMB); (2) to
submit an independent, comprehensive, and rigid risk
assessment, field tests report, and regulatory compliance reports; (3)
to submit all issued certifications on public information,
public consultation, public participation and consent from
 the LGUs affected by the field testing; (4) to submit an
acceptable draft of an amendment of the NBF and DAO 2002-08;
and (5) for BPI of DA to conduct balanced nationwide public
information on the nature of Bt talong and Bt talong field
trial, and a survey of its social acceptability.

On 2 May 2012, the SC issued the writ of kalikasan against ISAAA, EMB, BPI, FPA
and UPLB, ordering them to file a verified return.
The contentions of the respondents are as follows:
- All environmental laws were complied with, including public
consultations in the affected communities
- The Bt talong project is not covered by the Philippine
Environmental Impact Statement Law
- There is a plethora of scientific works and literature, peer-reviewed,
on the safety of Bt talong for human consumption
- Allegations regarding the safety of Bt talong are irrelevant in the field
trial stage as none of the eggplants will be consumed by humans or
animals
- There is a non-observance of the rule on hierarchy of courts
- Greenpeace, et.al. have no legal standing as they do not stand to
suffer any direct injury as a result of the Bt talong field tests
- The precautionary principle does not apply since the field testing is
only a part of a continuing study to ensure that the field trials have no
significant and negative impact on the environment

SC, in a Resolution dated 10 July 2012, referred the case to the Court of Appeals.
On 12 September 2012, the parties submitted the following procedural issues
before the CA: (1) whether Greenpeace, et.al. has legal standing to file the
petition for writ of kalikasan; (2) whether the petition has been rendered moot and
academic by the alleged termination of the Bt talong field testing; and (3) whether
the case presented a justiciable controversy

CA, in a Resolution dated 12 October 2012, resolved that: (1) the

Greenpeace, et.al. possess legal standing; (2) the case is not yet moot since it is
capable of repetition yet evading review; and (3) the alleged non-compliance
with environmental and local government laws present justiciable controversies
for resolution by the court.

On 17 May 2013, CA rendered a decision in favor of the Greenpeace, et.al. finding

that the precautionary principle set forth in Section 1, Rule 20 of the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases (the Rules) finds relevance in the case.

CA rejected the Motions for Reconsideration filed by ISAAA, EMB/BPI/FPA, UPLB

and UPLBFI rejecting the argument that CA violated UPLB’s right to academic
freedom. The writ stops the field trials of Bt talong as a procedure, it does not stop Bt
talong research. Thus, there is no assault on academic freedom. CA further justified
its ruling by expounding on the theory that introducing a genetically modified plant
into our ecosystem is an “ecologically imbalancing act.”

Before the SC is a consolidated petition of ISAAAI, EMB/BPI/FPA, UPLB and

UPLBFI to reverse the CA decision permanently enjoining the conduct of field
trials for Genetically Modified eggplants.

ISSUES AND RULING

1. WON Greenpeace, et.al. has a legal standing
Yes. The liberalized rule on standing is now enshrined in the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases which allows the filing of a citizen suit in
environmental cases. The provision on citizen suits in the Rules “collapses the
 tradional rule on personal and direct interest, on the principle that humans are
stewards of nature,” and aims to “further encourage the protection of the
environment.”

2. WON the case is moot and academic

No. The case falls under the “capable of repetition yet evading review”
exception to the mootness principle, the human and environmental health hazards
posed by the introduction of a genetically modified plant which is a very popular
staple vegetable among Filipinos is an issue of paramount public interest

3. WON there is a violation of the doctrines of primary jurisdiction

and exhaustion of administrative remedies
No. The provisions of DAO 2002-08 do not provide a speedy or adequate remedy
for the respondents to determine the questions of unique national and local
importance raised in this case that pertain to laws and rules for environmental
protection, thus Greenpeace, et.al. is justified in coming to the Supreme Court

4. WON the law on environmental impact statement/assessment

applies on projects involving the introduction and propagation of
GMOs in the country

Yes. EO 514 mandates that concerned departments and agencies, most particularly
petitioners DENR-EMB, BPI and FPA, to make a determination whether the EIS
system should apply to the release of GMOs into the environment and issue joint
guidelines on the matter.

The Philippine EIS System (PEISS) is concerned primarily with assessing the direct
and indirect impacts of a project on the biophysical and human environment and
ensuring that these impacts are addressed by appropriate environmental
protection and enhancement measures. It aids proponents in incorporating
environmental considerations in planning their projects as well as in determining the
environment’s impact on their project.” There are six stages in the regular EIA
process. The proponent initiates the first three stages while EMB takes the lead in
the last three stages. Public participation is enlisted in most stages.

Even without the issuance of EO 514, GMO field testing should

have at least been considered for EIA under existing regulations of EMB on
new and emerging technologies, to wit:

g) Group V (Unclassified Projects): These are the

projects not listed in any of the groups, e.g. projects
using new processes/technologies with uncertain
impacts. This is an interim category – unclassified
projects will eventually be classified into their
appropriate groups after EMB evaluation. (Emphasis
supplied)

All government agencies as well as private corporations, firms and

entities who intend to undertake activities or projects which will affect the
quality of environment are required to prepare a detailed Environmental
Impact Statement (EIS) prior to undertaking such development activity.

An environmentally critical project (ECP) is considered by the EMB as

“likely to have significant adverse impact that may be sensitive,
irreversible and diverse” and which “include activities that have significant
environmental consequences.”
In this context, and given the overwhelming scientific attention worldwide on
the potential hazards of GMOs to human health and the environment, their
release into the environment through field testing would definitely fall under the
category of ECP

5. WON there is neglect or unlawful omission committed by the public

respondents in the processing and evaluation of the applications for
Bt talong field testing

Yes. It must be stressed that DAO 2002-08 and related DA order are not the only
legal bases for regulating field trials of GM plants and plant products. EO 514
clearly provides that the NBF applies to the development, adoption and
implementation of all biosafety policies, measures and guidelines and
in making biosafety decisions concerning the research, development,
handling and use, transboundary movement, release into the environment and
management of regulated articles.

The NBF requires the use of precaution, as provided in Section 2.6 which
reads:

2.6. Using Precaution. – In accordance with

Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration of 1992 and the
relevant provisions of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety,
in particular Article 1, 10 (par. 6) and 11 (par. 8), the
precautionary approach shall guide biosafety decisions. The
principles and elements of this approach are hereby
implemented through the decision-making system in the
NBF.

It likewise contains general principles and minimum guidelines that

the concerned agencies are expected to follow and which their
respective rules and regulations must conform with. In cases of conflict in
applying the principles, the principle of protecting the public interest and
welfare shall always prevail, and no provision of the NBF shall be
construed as to limit the legal authority and mandate of heads of departments
and agencies to consider the national interest and public welfare in making
biosafety decisions.

Notably, Section 7 of NBF mandates a more transparent, meaningful

and participatory public consultation on the conduct of field trials
beyond the posting and publication of notices and information sheets,
consultations with some residents and government officials, and submission of
written comments, provided in DAO 2002-08.

The Supreme Court found that ISAAAI, et.al. simply adhered to the
procedures laid down by DAO 2002-08 and no real effort was made to
operationalize the principles of NBF in the conduct of field testing of Bt talong.
Said failure means that the DA lacks mechanisms to mandate applicants to
comply with international biosafety protocols. For these reasons, the DAO
2002-08 should be declared invalid.

Parenthetically, during the hearing at the CA, Atty. Segui of the

EMB was evasive in answering the questions on whether his office
undertook the necessary evaluation on the possible environmental impact
of Bt talong field trials and the release of GMOs into the environment in
general. While he initially cited lack of budget and competence as reasons for
 their inaction, he later said that an amendment of the law should be
made since projects involving GMOS are not covered by Proclamation No.
2146, entitled “Proclaiming Certain Areas and Types of Projects as
Environmentally Critical and Within the Scope of the Environmental
Impact Statement System Established Under Presidential Decree No. 1586”.

The Supreme Court took the above as an indication of the DENR-EMB’s

lack of serious attention to their mandate under EO 514 to ensure that
environmental assessments are done and impacts identified in biosafety
decisions.

Section 6 of EO 514 likewise directed the DOST, DENR, DA and

DOH to ensure the allocation of funds for the implementation of the
NBF as it was intended to be a multi- disciplinary effort involving the
different government departments and agencies.

The petitioners government agencies clearly failed to fulfil their mandates in

the implementation of the NBF

6. WON the Precautionary Principle applies

Yes. The precautionary principle originated in Germany in the 1960s,

expressing the normative idea that governments are obliged to
“foresee and forestall” harm to the environment. The Rules incorporated
the principle in Part V, Rule 20, which states:

SEC.1. Applicability. – When there is a lack of full

scientific certainty in establishing a causal link between
human activity and environmental effect, the court shall
apply the precautionary principle in resolving the case
before it.

The constitutional right of the people to a balanced and

healthful ecology shall be given the benefit of the doubt.

SEC 2. Standards for application. – In applying the

precautionary principle, the following factors, among others,
may be considered: (1) threats to human life or health; (2)
inequity to present or future generations; or (3) prejudice to
the environment without legal consideration of the
environmental rights of those affected.

When the features of uncertainty, possibility of irreversible harm,

and possibility of serious harm coincide, the case for the precautionary
principle is strongest. The Supreme Court found all three (3) conditions
present.

While the goal of increasing crop yields to raise farm incomes is laudable,
independent scientific studies revealed uncertainties due to unfulfilled
economic benefits from Bt crops and plants, adverse effects on the
environment associated with the use of GE technology in agriculture, and
serious health hazards from consumption of GM foods. For a biodiversity- rich
country like the Philippines, the natural and unforeseen consequences of
contamination and genetic pollution would be disastrous and irreversible.
 Alongside the aforesaid uncertainties, the non-implementation of the NBF
in the crucial stages of risk assessment and public consultation, including
the determination of the applicability of the EIS requirements to the GMO
field testing, are compelling reasons for the application of the precautionary
principle.

There exists a preponderance of evidence that the release of the

GMOs into the environment threatens to damage our ecosystems and
not just the field trial sites, and eventually the health of our people once
the Bt eggplants are consumed as food.

Adopting the precautionary approach, the Supreme Court ruled that the
principles of the NBF need to be operationalized first by the coordinated
actions of the concerned departments and agencies before allowing the
release into the environment of genetically modified eggplant.

Further, the precautionary approach entailed inputs from stakeholders,

including marginalized famers, not just the scientific community. This proceeds
from the realization that acceptance of uncertainty is not only a scientific issue, but
is related to public policy and involves an ethical dimension

DISPOSITIVE PORTION
1. The conduct of Bt talong field testing is permanently enjoined.
2. DAO 2002-08 is declared null and void.
3. Any application for contained use, field testing, propagation and
commercialization, and importation of GMOs is temporarily enjoined until a
new administrative order is promulgated in accordance with law.

Disini Jr. et.al. v P. 224 of Consti 2 Digest

Secretary of Justice