Petitioners Vs Vs Respondents Azcuna, Yorac, Sarmiento, Arroyo & Chua and Rene A.V. Saguisag Cesar A. Sevilla & Associates

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 127255. August 14, 1997.]
JOKER P. ARROYO, EDCEL C. LAGMAN, JOHN HENRY R. OSMEÑA,

WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA, AND RONALDO B. ZAMORA , petitioners, vs .
JOSE DE VENECIA, RAUL DAZA, RODOLFO ALBANO, THE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, AND THE
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE , respondents.
Azcuna, Yorac, Sarmiento, Arroyo & Chua and Rene A.V. Saguisag for petitioners.
Cesar A. Sevilla & Associates for De Venecia.
SYNOPSIS
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition challenging the validity of Republic Act
No. 8240, which amends certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code by
imposing so-called sin taxes on the manufacture and sale of beer and cigarettes.
Petitioners brought this suit against herein respondents claiming that the latter violated
Rule VIII, Section 35, Rule XVII, Section 103, Rule XIX, Section 112, Rule XVI, Section 97,
Rule XX Section 121-122, Rule XXI Section 123 and Rule XVIII Section 109 of the House
Rules. For this matter, petitioners assert that violation of the House Rules is a violation of
the Constitution thereof. AEDISC
In its decision, the Supreme Court nds no ground for holding that congress
committed grave abuse of discretion in enacting Republic Act 8240. It is clear from the
facts of the case that what is alleged to have been violated in the enactment of R.A. 8240
are merely internal rules of procedure of the House rather than the constitutional
requirement for the enactment of a law, that is, Article VI, Section 26-27 of the 1987
Constitution, pertaining to the existence of the quorum. The established rule is that courts
cannot declare an act of the legislature void on account merely of noncompliance with
rules of procedure made by itself. Verily, it follows that the case at hand does not present
a situation in which a branch of the government has gone beyond the constitutional limit of
its jurisdiction so as to call for the exercise of Article VIII, Section I.
Moreover, under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of House No. 7198 by speaker
of the House and President of the Senate and certi cation by secretaries of both Houses
of Congress that it was passed on November 21, 1996 are conclusive of its due
enactment. In view of the foregoing, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is dismissed.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; PARLIAMENTARY RULES

ARE MERELY PROCEDURAL AND COURTS HAVE NO CONCERN WITH THEIR
OBSERVANCE; FAILURE TO CONFORM THEREWITH WILL NOT INVALIDATE ACTION
WHEN THE REQUISITE NUMBER OF MEMBERS HAVE AGREED THERETO. — Cases, both
here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the courts the power to inquire
into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to comply with its own
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rules, in the absence of showing that there was a violation of a constitutional provision or
the rights of private individuals. In Osmeña v. Pendatun , it was held: "At any rate, courts
have declared that 'the rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation,
modi cation or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them.' And it has been said
that 'Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their observance, the courts have
no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.' Consequently,
'mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a
deliberative body) when the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular
measure.'"
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RULES MUST NOT IGNORE CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRAINTS OR
VIOLATE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS. — In United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co ., the rule was
stated thus: "The Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of
proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental
rights, and there should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of
proceeding established by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained. But within
these limitations all matters of method are open to the determination of the House, and it
is no impeachment of the rule to say that some other way would be better, more accurate,
or even more just. It is no objection to the validity of a rule that a different one has been
prescribed and in force for a length of time. The power to make rules is not one which
once exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous power, always subject to be exercised by
the House, and within the limitations suggested, absolute and beyond the challenge of any
other body or tribunal." CIHAED
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — In this case no rights of private individuals are
involved but only those of a member who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose
to transfer the dispute to this Court. We have no more power to look into the internal
proceedings of a House than members of that House have to look over our shoulders, as
long as no violation of constitutional provisions is shown. Petitioners must realize that
each of the three departments of our government has its separate sphere which the others
may not invade without upsetting the delicate balance on which our constitutional order
rests. Due regard for the working of our system of government, more than mere comity,
compels reluctance on our part to enter upon an inquiry into an alleged violation of the
rules of the House. We must accordingly decline the invitation to exercise our power.
4. REMEDIAL LAW; COURTS; CANNOT DECLARE AN ACT OF LEGISLATURE VOID
FOR NONCOMPLIANCE WITH ITS OWN RULES OF PROCEDURE. — If, then, the established
rule is that courts cannot declare an act of the legislature void on account merely of
noncompliance with rules of procedure made by itself, it follows that such a case does not
present a situation in which a branch of the government has "gone beyond the
constitutional limits of its jurisdiction" so as to call for the exercise of our Art. VIII, §1
power.
5. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES; THERE IS NO RULE REQUIRING THAT THE CHAIR MUST RESTATE
THE MOTION AND CONDUCT A VIVA VOCE OR NOMINAL VOTING. — No rule of the House
of Representatives has been cited which speci cally requires that in cases such as this
involving approval of a conference committee report, the Chair must restate the motion
and conduct a viva voce or nominal voting. On the other hand, as the Solicitor General has
pointed out, the manner in which the conference committee report on H. No. 7198 was
approved was by no means a unique one. It has basis in legislative practice. It was the way
the conference committee report on the bills which became the Local Government Code of
1991 and the conference committee report on the bills amending the Tariff and Customs
Code were approved. Indeed, it is no impeachment of the method to say that some other
way would be better, more accurate and even more just. The advantages or disadvantages,
the wisdom or folly of a method do not present any matter for judicial consideration. In the
words of the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, "this Court cannot provide a second opinion on
what is the best procedure. Notwithstanding the deference and esteem that is properly
tendered to individual congressional actors, our deference and esteem for the institution
as a whole and for the constitutional command that the institution be allowed to manage
its own affairs precludes us from even attempting a diagnosis of the problem."
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; NO CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION REQUIRING THAT THE YEAS AND
NAYS OF THE MEMBERS BE TAKEN EVERYTIME A HOUSE HAS TO VOTE; EXCEPTIONS. —
Nor does the Constitution require that the yeas and the nays of the Members be taken
every time a House has to vote, except only in the following instances: upon the last and
third readings of a bill, at the request of one- fth of the Members present, and in repassing
a bill over the veto of the President. Indeed, considering the fact that in the approval of the
original bill the votes of the Members by yeas and nays had already been taken, it would
have been sheer tedium to repeat the process.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; PARLIAMENTARY RULES; QUESTION REGARDING MOTION TO
APPROVE AND RATIFY CONFERENCE COMMITTEE REPORT, NOT A QUESTION OF
PRIVILEGE ENTITLED TO PRECEDENCE. — Petitioners claim that they were prevented
from seeking reconsideration allegedly as a result of the precipitate suspension and
subsequent adjournment of the session. It would appear, however, that the session was
suspended to allow the parties to settle the problem, because when it resumed at 3:40
p.m. on that day Rep. Arroyo did not say anything anymore. While it is true that the Majority
Leader moved for adjournment until 4 p.m. of Wednesday of the following week, Rep.
Arroyo could at least have objected if there was anything he wanted to say. It is thus
apparent that petitioners' predicament was largely of their own making. Instead of
submitting the proper motions for the House to act upon, petitioners insisted on the
pendency of Rep. Arroyo's question as an obstacle to the passage of the bill. But Rep.
Arroyo's question was not, in form or substance, a point of order or a question of privilege
entitled to precedence. And even if Rep. Arroyo's question were so, Rep. Albano's motion
to adjourn would have precedence and would have put an end to any further consideration
of the question.
8. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI; GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION, DEFINED. — The phrase "grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction" has a settled meaning in the jurisprudence of procedure. It means
such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment by a tribunal exercising judicial or
quasi judicial power as to amount to lack of power. As Chief Justice Concepcion himself
said in explaining this provision, the power granted to the courts by Art. VIII, §1 extends to
cases where "a branch of the government or any of its o cials has acted without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction."
9. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES; CONTINUED INTERPELLATION OF SPONSOR, AN
ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF PRESENCE OF QUORUM. — Here, the matter complained of
concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with which the Court should not be
concerned. To repeat, the claim is not that there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo
was effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyo's earlier
motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been defeated, as the roll call
established the existence of a quorum. The question of quorum cannot be raised
repeatedly — especially when the quorum is obviously present — for the purpose of
delaying the business of the House. Rep. Arroyo waived his objection by his continued
interpellation of the sponsor for in so doing he in effect acknowledged the presence of a
quorum.
10. ID.; ID.; ENROLLED BILL DOCTRINE; SIGNING OF HOUSE BILL BY THE SPEAKER
OF THE HOUSE AND PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE AND CERTIFICATION BY THE
SECRETARIES OF BOTH HOUSES, CONCLUSIVE OF ITS DUE ENACTMENT. — Under the
enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. No. 7198 by the Speaker of the House and the
President of the Senate and the certi cation by the secretaries of both Houses of
Congress that it was passed on November 21, 1996 are conclusive of its due enactment.
The enrolled bill doctrine, as a rule of evidence, is well established. It is cited with approval
by text writers here and abroad. The enrolled bill rule rests on the following considerations:
. . . As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled
Act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the o cial attestations of the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the
President of the United States, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the legislative
and executive departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of
enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect due to
coequal and independent departments requires the judicial department to act upon that
assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner
stated; leaving the court to determine, when the question properly arises, whether the Act,
so authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution. To overrule the doctrine now, as
the dissent urges, is to repudiate the massive teaching of our cases and overthrow an
established rule of evidence.
11. ID.; ID.; JOURNAL; CONCLUSIVE WITH RESPECT TO MATTERS THAT ARE
REQUIRED BY THE CONSTITUTION TO BE RECORDED THEREIN. — The Journal is regarded
as conclusive with respect to matters that are required by the Constitution to be recorded
therein. With respect to other matters, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the
Journals have also been accorded conclusive effect. Thus, in United States v. Pons , this
Court spoke of the imperatives of public policy for regarding the Journals as "public
memorials of the most permanent character," thus: "They should be public, because all are
required to conform to them; they should be permanent, that rights acquired today upon
the faith of what has been declared to be law shall not be destroyed tomorrow, or at some
remote period of time, by facts resting only in the memory of individuals." As already
noted, the bill which became R.A. No. 8240 is shown in the Journal. Hence its due
enactment has been duly proven.
12. ID.; SUPREME COURT; WITHOUT JURISDICTION TO SET ASIDE LEGISLATIVE
ACTION AS VOID BECAUSE THE COURT THINKS THE HOUSE DISREGARDED ITS OWN
RULES. — It would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department
for this Court either to set aside a legislative action as void because the Court thinks the
House has disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to allow those defeated in the
political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can nd their
remedy in that department itself. The Court has not been invested with a roving
commission to inquire into complaints, real or imagined, of legislative skullduggery. It
would be acting in excess of its power and would itself be guilty of grave abuse of its
discretion were it to do so. The suggestion made in a case may instead appropriately be
made here: petitioners can seek the enactment of a new law or the repeal or amendment
of R.A. No. 8240. In the absence of anything to the contrary, the Court must assume that
Congress or any House thereof acted in the good faith belief that its conduct was
permitted by its rules, and deference rather than disrespect is due the judgment of that
body.
ROMERO, J., separate opinion:
1. POLITICAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; ENROLLED BILL DOCTRINE;
APPLICATION MUST BE LIMITED TO MINOR MATTERS RELATING TO FORM AND
FACTUAL ISSUES WHICH DO NOT MATERIALLY ALTER THE ESSENCE AND SUBSTANCE
OF THE LAW. — Reliance on the enrolled bill theory is not to be discontinued but its
application must be limited to minor matters relating more to form and factual issues
which do not materially alter the essence and substance of the law itself.
2. ID.; ID.; BILL; INTRODUCTION OF SEVERAL PROVISIONS IN THE BICAMERAL
CONFERENCE COMMITTEE REPORT VIOLATED THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROSCRIPTION
AGAINST ANY AMENDMENT UPON THE LAST READING. — The introduction of several
provisions in the Bicameral Conference Committee Report did not only violate the
pertinent House and Senate Rules de ning the limited power of the conference committee
but that the Constitutional proscription against any amendment upon the last reading of a
bill was likewise breached. Hence, in view of these lapses, I thought that judicial review
would have been proper in order to uphold the Constitution. This the majority, however,
disregarded invoking the same principle which should have justi ed the Court in
questioning the actuations of the legislative branch.
PUNO; J.; concurring and dissenting opinion:
1. REMEDIAL LAW; SUPREME COURT; POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
CONGRESSIONAL RULES; BOUNDARIES. — In the 1891 case of US. v. Ballin, (144 US 1
[1891]) the US Supreme Court rst de ned the boundaries of the power of the judiciary to
review congressional rules. Ballin clearly con rmed the jurisdiction of courts to pass upon
the validity of congressional rules, i.e., whether they are constitutional. Ballin was followed
in 1932 by the case of US v. Smith (286 US 6 [1932]). The Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice
Brandeis, assumed jurisdiction over the dispute relying on Ballin. It exercised jurisdiction
although "the question primarily at issue relates to the construction of the applicable rules,
not to their constitutionality." Smith, of course, involves the right of a third person and its
ruling falls within the test spelled out in Ballin. Smith was followed by the 1948 case of
Christoffel v. United States (338 US 89 [1948]). A majority of the Court, with Mr. Justice
Murphy, as ponente, de ned the issue as "what rules the House had established and
whether they have been followed." The US Supreme Court pursued the same line in 1963 in
deciding the case of Yellin v. United States (374 US 109 [1963]). In the benchmark case of
Baker v. Carr , (369 US 186 [1962]), the US Supreme Court assumed jurisdiction to hear a
petition for re-appointment of the Tennessee legislature ruling that "the political question
doctrine, a tool for maintenance of government order, will not be so applied as to promote
only disorder" and that "the courts cannot reject as 'no law suit,' a bona fide controversy as
to whether some action denominated 'political' exceeds constitutional authority." THEDCA
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — In the Philippine setting , there is more compelling reason for
courts to categorically reject the political question defense when its interposition will
cover up abuse of power. For Section 1, Article VIII of our Constitution was intentionally
cobbled to empower courts ". . . to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government." This power is new and was not granted to our courts in
the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions n . It was not also xeroxed from the US Constitutional or
any foreign state constitution. In Tolentino, I endorsed the view of former, Senator Salonga
that this novel provision stretching the latitude of judicial power is distinctly Filipino and its
interpretation should not be depreciated by undue reliance on inapplicable foreign
jurisprudence. In resolving the case at bar, the lessons of our own history should provide
us the light and not the experience of foreigners.
3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; LAW-MAKING POWER;
ENROLLED BILL, DEFINED. — An enrolled bill is one which has been duly introduced, nally
enacted by both Houses, signed by the proper o cers of each House and approved by the
President. It is a declaration by the two Houses, through their presiding o cers, to the
President that a bill, thus attested, has received in due the sanction of the legislative
branch of the government, and that it is delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional
requirement that all bills which pass Congress shall be presented to him.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ENROLLED BILL DOCTRINE; RULES. — The enrolled bill originated in
England where there is no written Constitution controlling the legislative branch of the
government, and the acts of Parliament, being regarded in their nature as judicial — as
emanating from the highest tribunal in the land — are placed on the same footing and
regarded with the same veneration as the judgment of the courts which cannot be
collaterally attacked. In England, the conclusiveness of the bill was premised on the
rationale that "an act of parliament thus made is the exercise of the highest authority that
this kingdom acknowledges upon earth. And it cannot be altered, amended, dispensed
with, suspended or repealed, but in the same forms and by the same authority of
parliament; for it is a maxim in law that it requires the same strength to dissolve as to
create an obligation. Over the years, the enrolled bill theory has undergone important
mutations. Some jurisdictions have adopted the modi ed entry or a rmative
contradiction rule. Under this rule, the presumption in favor of the enrolled bill is not
conclusive. The rule concedes validity to the enrolled bill unless there affirmatively appears
in the journals of the legislature a statement that there has not been compliance with one
or more of the constitutional requirements. Other jurisdictions have adopted the Extrinsic
Evidence Rule which holds that an enrolled bill is only prima facie evidence that it has been
regularly enacted. The prima facie presumption, however, can be destroyed by clear,
satisfactory and convincing evidence that the constitutional requirements in enacting a law
have been violated. For this purpose, journals and other extrinsic evidence are allowed to
be received. Some limit the use of extrinsic evidence to issues of fraud or mistakes.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; MODERN RATIONALE. — The modern rationale for the enrolled bill
theory was spelled out in Field v. Clark, viz.: . . . "The signing by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, and, by the President of the Senate, in open session, of an enrolled bill, is
an o cial attestation by the two houses of such bill as one that has passed Congress. It is
a declaration by the two Houses, through their presiding o cers, to the President, that a
bill, thus attested, has received, in due form, the sanction of the legislative branch of the
government, and that it is delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional requirement
that all bills which pass Congress shall be presented to him. And when a bill, thus attested,
receives his approval, and is deposited in the public archives, its authentication as a bill
that has passed Congress should be deemed complete and unimpeachable. As the
President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the
custody of the Secretary of State, and having the o cial attestations of the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the President of the
United States, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive
departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and
executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect due to coequal and
independent departments requires the judicial department to act upon the assurance, to
accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the
courts to determine, when the question properly arises, whether the Act, so authenticated,
is in conformity with the Constitution.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID; CONCLUSIVE PRESUMPTION RULE SHOULD BE ABANDONED. —
The enrolled bill doctrine no longer enjoys its once unassailable respectability in United
States. Sutherland reveals that starting in the 1940's, ". . . the tendency seems to be toward
the abandonment of the conclusive presumption rule and the adoption of the third rule
leaving only a prima facie presumption of validity which may be attacked by any
authoritative source of information." It is high time we re-examine our preference for the
enrolled bill doctrine. It was in the 1947 case of Mabanag v. Lopez Vito , (78 Phil. 1 [1947])
that this Court, with three (3) Justices dissenting, rst embraced the rule that a duly
authenticated bill or resolution imports absolute verity and is binding on the courts. In the
1969 case of Morales v. Subido , (27 SCRA 131, 134-135) we reiterated our delity to the
enrolled bill doctrine. Signi cantly, however, Morales diluted the conclusiveness rule of the
enrolled bill doctrine. The ponencia stressed: "All we hold is that with respect to matters
not expressly required to be entered on the journal, the enrolled bill prevails in the event of
any discrepancy." In the 1974 case of Astorga v. Villegas, (56 SCRA 714) we further diluted
the enrolled bill doctrine when we refused to apply it after the Senate President declared
his signature on the bill as invalid. We ruled: As far as Congress itself is concerned, there is
nothing sacrosanct in the certi cation made by the presiding o cers. It is merely a mode
of authentication. The law-making process in Congress ends when the bill is approved by
both Houses, and the certi cation does not add to the validity of the bill or cure any defect
already present upon its passage. In other words it is the approval by Congress and not
the signatures of the presiding o cers that is essential. Finally in 1994 came the case of
Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, et al. , and its companion cases. These cases show that
we have not blindly accepted the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill. Even in Tolentino, Mr.
Justice Mendoza was cautious enough to hold that "no claim is here made that the
enrolled bill is absolute." I respectfully submit that it is now time for the Court to make a
de nitive pronouncement that we no longer give our unquali ed support to the enrolled bill
doctrine. There are compelling reasons for this suggested change in stance. For one, the
enrolled bill is appropriate only in England where it originated because in England there is
no written Constitution and the Parliament is supreme. For another, many of the courts in
the United States have broken away from the rigidity and unrealism of the enrolled bill in
light of contemporary developments in lawmaking. And more important, our uncritical
adherence to the enrolled bill is inconsistent with our Constitution, laws and rules. In
Mabanag, we relied on Section 313 of the Old Code of Civil Procedure as amended by Act
No. 2210 as a principal reason in embracing the enrolled bill. This section, however has
long been repealed by our Rules of Court. A half glance at our Rules will show that its
section on conclusive presumption does not carry the conclusive presumption we give to
an enrolled bill. But this is not all. The conclusiveness of an enrolled bill which all too often
results in the suppression of truth cannot be justi ed under the 1987 Constitution. The
Preamble of our Constitution demands that we live not only under a rule of law but also
under a regime of truth. Our Constitution also adopted a national policy requiring full public
disclosure of all state transactions involving public interest. Any rule which will defeat this
policy on transparency ought to be disfavored. And to implement these policies, this Court
was given the power to pry open and to strike down any act of any branch or
instrumentality of government if it amounts to grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. It is time to bury the enrolled bill for its ction of conclusiveness
shuts off truth in many litigations. We cannot dispense justice based on ction for the
search for justice is the search for truth. I submit that giving an enrolled bill a mere prima
facie presumption of correctness will facilitate our task of dispensing justice based on
truth.
7. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI; GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION; NEGATED IN CASE AT BAR. — I do not nd any grave abuse of discretion
committed by the public respondents to justify granting petition. As the ponencia points
out, the petition merely involves the complaint that petitioner was prevented from raising
the question of quorum. The petition does not concern violation of any rule mandated by
the Constitution. Nor does it involve the right of a non-member of the House which
requires constitutional protection. The rules on how to question the existence of a quorum
are procedural in character. They are malleable by nature for they were drafted to help the
House enact laws. As well stated, these rules are servants, not masters of the House. Their
observance or non-observance is a matter of judgment call on the part of our legislators
and it is not the business of the Court to reverse this judgment when untainted by grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
VITUG, J., concurring opinion:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SUPREME COURT; WITH POWER TO DETERMINE
WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON ANY BRANCH OF
GOVERNMENT; GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, CONSTRUED. — When the 1987
Constitution has embodied, in its circumscription of judicial power under Section 1, Article
VIII, of the Constitution, the determination of whether or not there is grave abuse of
discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government, the Supreme Court,
upon which that great burden has been imposed, could not have been thought of as
likewise being thereby tasked with the awesome responsibility of overseeing the entire
bureaucracy. The term grave abuse of discretion has long been understood in our
jurisprudence as, and con ned to, a capricious and whimsical or despotic exercise of
judgment as amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — Absent a clear case of grave abuse of discretion, like
the patent disregard of a Constitutional proscription, I would respect the judgment of
Congress under whose province the speci c responsibility falls and the authority to act is
vested. To do otherwise would be an unwarranted intrusion into the internal affairs of a co-
equal, independent and coordinate branch of government. At no time, it would seem to me,
has it been intended by the framers of the fundamental law to cause a substantial
deviation, let alone departure, from the time-honored and accepted principle of separation,
but balanced, powers of the three branches of government. There is, of course, a basic
variant between the old rule and the new Charter on the understanding of the term "judicial
power." Now, the Court is under mandate to assume jurisdiction over, and to undertake
judicial inquiry into, what may even be deemed to be political questions provided, however,
that grave abuse of discretion — the sole test of justiciability on purely political issues — is
shown to have attended the contested act. DEICTS
DECISION
MENDOZA , J : p

This is a petition for certiorari and/or prohibition challenging the validity of Republic
Act No. 8240, which amends certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code by
imposing so-called "sin taxes" (actually specific taxes) on the manufacture and sale of beer
and cigarettes.
Petitioners are members of the House of Representatives. They brought this suit
against respondents Jose de Venecia, Speaker of the House of Representatives, Deputy
Speaker Raul Daza, Majority Leader Rodolfo Albano, the Executive Secretary, the Secretary
of Finance, and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, charging violation of the rules of the
House which petitioners claim are "constitutionally mandated" so that their violation is
tantamount to a violation of the Constitution. cdphil
The law originated in the House of Representatives as H. No. 7198. This bill was
approved on third reading on September 12, 1996 and transmitted on September 16, 1996
to the Senate which approved it with certain amendments on third reading on November
17, 1996. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing
provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill.
The bicameral conference committee submitted its report to the House at 8 a.m. on
November 21, 1996. At 11:48 a.m., after a recess, Rep. Exequiel Javier, chairman of the
Committee on Ways and Means, proceeded to deliver his sponsorship speech, after which
he was interpellated. Rep. Rogelio Sarmiento was rst to interpellate. He was interrupted
when Rep. Arroyo moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. Rep. Antonio Cuenco objected to
the motion and asked for a head count. After a roll call, the Chair (Deputy Speaker Raul
Daza) declared the presence of a quorum. 1 Rep. Arroyo appealed the ruling of the Chair,
but his motion was defeated when put to a vote. The interpellation of the sponsor
thereafter proceeded.
Petitioner Rep. Joker Arroyo registered to interpellate. He was fourth in the order,
following Rep. Rogelio Sarmiento, Rep. Edcel C. Lagman and Rep. Enrique Garcia. In the
course of his interpellation, Rep. Arroyo announced that he was going to raise a question
on the quorum, although until the end of his interpellation he never did. What happened
thereafter is shown in the following transcript of the session on November 21, 1996 of the
House of Representatives, as published by Congress in the newspaper issues of
December 5 and 6, 1996:
MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move that we now approve and ratify the
conference committee report.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). Any objection to the motion?
MR. ARROYO. What is that, Mr. Speaker?
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There being none, approved.
(Gavel)
MR. ARROYO. No, no, no, wait a minute, Mr. Speaker, I stood up. I want to
know what is the question that the Chair asked the distinguished sponsor.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There was a motion by the Majority
Leader for approval of the report, and the Chair called for the motion.
MR. ARROYO. Objection, I stood up, so I wanted to object.

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is suspended for one
minute.
(It was 3:01 p.m.)
(3:40 p.m., the session was resumed)
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is resumed.
MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move to adjourn until four o'clock, Wednesday,
next week.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is adjourned until four
o'clock, Wednesday, next week.
(It was 3:40 p.m.)
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives
and the President of the Senate and certi ed by the respective secretaries of both Houses
of Congress as having been nally passed by the House of Representatives and by the
Senate on November 21, 1996. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Fidel V.
Ramos on November 22, 1996.
Petitioners claim that there are actually four different versions of the transcript of
this portion of Rep. Arroyo's interpellation: (1) the transcript of audio-sound recording of
the proceedings in the session hall immediately after the session adjourned at 3:40 p.m.
on November 21, 1996, which petitioner Rep. Edcel C. Lagman obtained from the
operators of the sound system; (2) the transcript of the proceedings from 3:00 p.m. to
3:40 p.m. of November 21, 1996, as certi ed by the Chief of the Transcription Division on
November 21, 1996, also obtained by Rep. Lagman; (3) the transcript of the proceedings
from 3:00 p.m. to 3:40 p.m. of November 21, 1996 as certi ed by the Chief of the
Transcription Division on November 28, 1996, also obtained by Rep. Lagman; and (4) the
published version abovequoted. According to petitioners, the four versions differ on three
points, to wit: (1) in the audio-sound recording the word "approved," which appears on line
13 in the three other versions, cannot be heard; (2) in the transcript certi ed on November
21, 1996 the word "no" on line 17 appears only once, while in the other versions it is
repeated three times; and (3) the published version does not contain the sentence "(Y)ou
better prepare for a quorum because I will raise the question of the quorum," which
appears in the other versions.
Petitioners' allegations are vehemently denied by respondents. However, there is no
need to discuss this point as petitioners have announced that, in order to expedite the
resolution of this petition, they admit, without conceding, the correctness of the
transcripts relied upon by the respondents. Petitioners agree that for purposes of this
proceeding the word "approved" appears in the transcripts.
Only the proceedings of the House of Representatives on the conference committee
report on H. No. 7198 are in question. Petitioners' principal argument is that R.A. No. 8240
is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the House; that these
rules embody the "constitutional mandate" in Art. VI, §16(3) that "each House may
determine the rules of its proceedings" and that, consequently, violation of the House rules
is a violation of the Constitution itself. They contend that the certi cation of Speaker De
Venecia that the law was properly passed is false and spurious.
More speci cally, petitioners charge that (1) in violation of Rule VIII, §35 and Rule
XVII, §103 of the rules of the House, 2 the Chair, in submitting the conference committee
report to the House, did not call for the yeas or nays, but simply asked for its approval by
motion in order to prevent petitioner Arroyo from questioning the presence of a quorum;
(2) in violation of Rule XIX, §112, 3 the Chair deliberately ignored Rep. Arroyo's question,
"What is that . . . Mr. Speaker?" and did not repeat Rep. Albano's motion to approve or
ratify; (3) in violation of Rule XVI, §97, 4 the Chair refused to recognize Rep. Arroyo and
instead proceeded to act on Rep. Albano's motion and afterward declared the report
approved; and (4) in violation of Rule XX, §§121-122, Rule XXI, §123, and Rule XVIII, §109, 5
the Chair suspended the session without rst ruling on Rep. Arroyo's question which, it is
alleged, is a point of order or a privileged motion. It is argued that Rep. Arroyo's query
should have been resolved upon the resumption of the session on November 28, 1996,
because the parliamentary situation at the time of the adjournment remained upon the
resumption of the session.
Petitioners also charge that the session was hastily adjourned at 3:40 p.m. on
November 21, 1996 and the bill certi ed by Speaker Jose De Venecia to prevent petitioner
Rep. Arroyo from formally challenging the existence of a quorum and asking for a
reconsideration.
Petitioners urge the Court not to feel bound by the certi cation of the Speaker of the
House that the law had been properly passed, considering the Court's power under Art.
VIII, §1 to pass on claims of grave abuse of discretion by the other departments of the
government, and they ask for a reexamination of Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance , 6 which
a rmed the conclusiveness of an enrolled bill, in view of the changed membership of the
Court.
The Solicitor General led a comment in behalf of all respondents. In addition,
respondent De Venecia led a supplemental comment. Respondents' defense is anchored
on the principle of separation of powers and the enrolled bill doctrine. They argue that the
Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of the rules of the House and that there
is no justi cation for reconsidering the enrolled bill doctrine. Although the Constitution
provides in Art. VI, §16(3) for the adoption by each House of its rules of proceedings,
enforcement of the rules cannot be sought in the courts except insofar as they implement
constitutional requirements such as that relating to three readings on separate days
before a bill may be passed. At all events, respondents contend that, in passing the bill
which became R.A. No. 8240, the rules of the House, as well as parliamentary precedents
for approval of conference committee reports on mere motion, were faithfully observed.
In his supplemental comment, respondent De Venecia denies that his certi cation of
H. No. 7198 is false and spurious and contends that under the journal entry rule, the judicial
inquiry sought by the petitioners is barred. Indeed, Journal No. 39 of the House of
Representatives, covering the sessions of November 20 and 21, 1996, shows that "On
Motion of Mr. Albano, there being no objection, the Body approved the Conference
Committee Report on House Bill No. 7198." 7 This Journal was approved on December 2,
1996 over the lone objection of petitioner Rep. Lagman. 8
After considering the arguments of the parties, the Court finds no ground for holding
that Congress committed a grave abuse of discretion in enacting R.A. No. 8240. This case
is therefore dismissed.
First. It is clear from the foregoing facts that what is alleged to have been violated in
the enactment of R.A. No. 8240 are merely internal rules of procedure of the House rather
than constitutional requirements for the enactment of a law, i.e. , Art. VI, §§26-27.
Petitioners do not claim that there was no quorum but only that, by some maneuver
allegedly in violation of the rules of the House, Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from
questioning the presence of a quorum. cdrep
Petitioners contend that the House rules were adopted pursuant to the
constitutional provision that "each House may determine the rules of its proceedings" 9
and that for this reason they are judicially enforceable. To begin with, this contention
stands the principle on its head. In the decided cases, 1 0 the constitutional provision that
"each House may determine the rules of its proceedings" was invoked by parties, although
not successfully, precisely to support claims of autonomy of the legislative branch to
conduct its business free from interference by courts. Here petitioners cite the provision
for the opposite purpose of invoking judicial review.
But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the
courts the power to inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress
failed to comply with its own rules, in the absence of showing that there was a violation of
a constitutional provision or the rights of private individuals. In Osmeña v. Pendatun , 1 1 it
was held: "At any rate, courts have declared that 'the rules adopted by deliberative bodies
are subject to revocation, modi cation or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting
them.' And it has been said that 'Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their
observance, the courts have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the
legislative body.' Consequently, 'mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not
invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative body) when the requisite number of members
have agreed to a particular measure.'"
In United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co., 1 2 the rule was stated thus: "The Constitution
empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore
constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and there should be a reasonable
relation between the mode or method of proceeding established by the rule and the result
which is sought to be attained. But within these limitations all matters of method are open
to the determination of the House, and it is no impeachment of the rule to say that some
other way would be better, more accurate, or even more just. It is no objection to the
validity of a rule that a different one has been prescribed and in force for a length of time.
The power to make rules is not one which once exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous
power, always subject to be exercised by the House, and within the limitations suggested,
absolute and beyond the challenge of any other body or tribunal."
I n Crawford v. Gilchrist, 1 3 it was held: "The provision that each House shall
determine the rules of its proceedings does not restrict the power given to a mere
formulation of standing rules, or to the proceedings of the body in ordinary legislative
matters; but in the absence of constitutional restraints, and when exercised by a majority
of a constitutional quorum, such authority extends to a determination of the propriety and
effect of any action as it is taken by the body as it proceeds in the exercise of any power, in
the transaction of any business, or in the performance of any duty conferred upon it by the
Constitution."
I n State ex rel. City Loan & Savings Co. v. Moore, 1 4 the Supreme Court of Ohio
stated: "The provision for reconsideration is no part of the Constitution and is therefore
entirely within the control of the General Assembly. Having made the rule, it should be
regarded, but a failure to regard it is not the subject-matter of judicial inquiry. It has been
decided by the courts of last resort of many states, and also by the United States Supreme
Court, that a legislative act will not be declared invalid for noncompliance with rules."
I n State v. Savings Bank, 15 the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut declared
itself as follows: "The Constitution declares that each house shall determine the rules of its
own proceedings and shall have all powers necessary for a branch of the Legislature of a
free and independent state. Rules of proceedings are the servants of the House and
subject to its authority. This authority may be abused, but when the House has acted in a
matter clearly within its power, it would be an unwarranted invasion of the independence of
the legislative department for the court to set aside such action as void because it may
think that the House has misconstrued or departed from its own rules of procedure."
In McDonald v. State, 1 6 the Wisconsin Supreme Court held: "When it appears that an
act was so passed, no inquiry will be permitted to ascertain whether the two houses have
or have not complied strictly with their own rules in their procedure upon the bill,
intermediate its introduction and nal passage. The presumption is conclusive that they
have done so. We think no court has ever declared an act of the legislature void for non-
compliance with the rules of procedure made by itself , or the respective branches thereof,
and which it or they may change or suspend at will. If there are any such adjudications, we
decline to follow them."
Schweizer v. Territory 1 7 is illustrative of the rule in these cases. The 1893 Statutes
of Oklahoma provided for three readings on separate days before a bill may be passed by
each house of the legislature, with the proviso that in case of an emergency the house
concerned may, by two-thirds vote, suspend the operation of the rule. Plaintiff was
convicted in the district court of violation of a law punishing gambling. He appealed
contending that the gambling statute was not properly passed by the legislature because
the suspension of the rule on three readings had not been approved by the requisite two-
thirds vote. Dismissing this contention, the State Supreme Court of Oklahoma held:
We have no constitutional provision requiring that the legislature should
read a bill in any particular manner. It may, then, read or deliberate upon a bill as it
sees t, either in accordance with its own rules, or in violation thereof, or without
making any rules. The provision of section 17 referred to is merely a statutory
provision for the direction of the legislature in its action upon proposed measures.
It receives its entire force from legislative sanction, and it exists only at legislative
pleasure. The failure of the legislature to properly weigh and consider an act, its
passage through the legislature in a hasty manner, might be reasons for the
governor withholding his signature thereto; but this alone, even though it is shown
to be a violation of a rule which the legislature had made to govern its own
proceedings, could be no reason for the court's refusing its enforcement after it
was actually passed by a majority of each branch of the legislature, and duly
signed by the governor. The courts cannot declare an act of the legislature void
on account of noncompliance with rules of procedure made by itself to govern its
deliberations. McDonald v. State, 80 Wis. 407, 50 N.W. 185; In re Ryan, 80 Wis.
414, 50 N.W. 187; State v. Brown, 33 S.C. 151, 11 S.E. 641; Railway Co. v. Gill, 54
Ark. 101, 15 S.W. 18.
We conclude this survey with the useful summary of the rulings by former Chief
Justice Fernando, commenting on the power of each House of Congress to determine its
rules of proceedings. He wrote:
Rules are hardly permanent in character. The prevailing view is that they
are subject to revocation, modi cation or waiver at the pleasure of the body
adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern
with their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.
Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect of
nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members have agreed to a
particular measure. The above principle is subject, however, to this quali cation.
Where the construction to be given to a rule affects persons other than members
of the legislative body the question presented is necessarily judicial in character.
Even its validity is open to question in a case where private rights are involved. 1 8
In this case no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member
who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to this Court.
We have no more power to look into the internal proceedings of a House than members of
that House have to look over our shoulders, as long as no violation of constitutional
provisions is shown.
Petitioners must realize that each of the three departments of our government has
its separate sphere which the others may not invade without upsetting the delicate
balance on which our constitutional order rests. Due regard for the working of our system
of government, more than mere comity, compels reluctance on our part to enter upon an
inquiry into an alleged violation of the rules of the House. We must accordingly decline the
invitation to exercise our power.
Second. Petitioners, quoting former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion's
sponsorship in the Constitutional Commission, contend that under Art. VIII, §1, "nothing
involving abuse of discretion [by the other branches of the government] amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction is beyond judicial review." 19 Implicit in this statement of the
former Chief Justice, however, is an acknowledgment that the jurisdiction of this Court is
subject to the case and controversy requirement of Art. VIII, §5 and, therefore, to the
requirement of a justiciable controversy before courts can adjudicate constitutional
questions such as those which arise in the eld of foreign relations. For while Art. VIII, §1
has broadened the scope of judicial inquiry into areas normally left to the political
departments to decide, such as those relating to national security, 20 it has not altogether
done away with political questions such as those which arise in the eld of foreign
relations. As we have already held, under Art. VIII, §1, this Court's function is merely [to]
c he c k whether or not the governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the
constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view. In the
absence of a showing . . . [of] grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction,
there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power. . . . It has no power to
look into what it thinks is apparent error. 21
If, then, the established rule is that courts cannot declare an act of the legislature
void on account merely of noncompliance with rules of procedure made by itself, it follows
that such a case does not present a situation in which a branch of the government has
"gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction" so as to call for the exercise of
our Art. VIII, §1 power. prcd
Third. Petitioners claim that the passage of the law in the House was "railroaded."
They claim that Rep. Arroyo was still making a query to the Chair when the latter declared
Rep. Albano's motion approved.
What happened is that, after Rep. Arroyo's interpellation of the sponsor of the
committee report, Majority Leader Rodolfo Albano moved for the approval and rati cation
of the conference committee report. The Chair called out for objections to the motion.
Then the Chair declared: "There being none, approved." At the same time the Chair was
saying this, however, Rep. Arroyo was asking, "What is that . . . Mr. Speaker?" The Chair and
Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently
objected to the Majority Leader's motion, the approval of the conference committee report
had by then already been declared by the Chair, symbolized by its banging of the gavel.
Petitioners argue that, in accordance with the rules of the House, Rep. Albano's
motion for the approval of the conference committee report should have been stated by
the Chair and later the individual votes of the Members should have been taken. They say
that the method used in this case is a legislator's nightmare because it suggests unanimity
when the fact was that one or some legislators opposed the report.
No rule of the House of Representatives has been cited which speci cally requires
that in cases such as this involving approval of a conference committee report, the Chair
must restate the motion and conduct a viva voce or nominal voting. On the other hand, as
the Solicitor General has pointed out, the manner in which the conference committee
report on H. No. 7198 was approved was by no means a unique one. It has basis in
legislative practice. It was the way the conference committee report on the bills which
became the Local Government Code of 1991 and the conference committee report on the
bills amending the Tariff and Customs Code were approved.
In 1957, the practice was questioned as being contrary to the rules of the House.
The point was answered by Majority Leader Arturo M. Tolentino and his answer became
the ruling of the Chair. Mr. Tolentino said:
Mr. TOLENTINO. The fact that nobody objects means a unanimous action
of the House. Insofar as the matter of procedure is concerned, this has been a
precedent since I came here seven years ago, and it has been the procedure in this
House that if somebody objects, then a debate follows and after the debate, then
the voting comes in.
xxx xxx xxx

Mr. Speaker, a point of order was raised by the gentleman from Leyte, and I
wonder what his attitude is now on his point of order. I should just like to state
that I believe that we have had a substantial compliance with the Rules. The Rule
invoked is not one that refers to statutory or constitutional requirement, and a
substantial compliance, to my mind, is su cient. When the Chair announces the
vote by saying "Is there any objection?" and nobody objects, then the Chair
announces "The bill is approved on second reading." If there was any doubt as to
the vote, any motion to divide would have been proper. So, if that motion is not
presented, we assume that the House approves the measure. So I believe there is
substantial compliance here, and if anybody wants a division of the House he can
always ask for it, and the Chair can announce how many are in favor and how
many are against. 22
Indeed, it is no impeachment of the method to say that some other way would be
better, more accurate and even more just. 2 3 The advantages or disadvantages, the
wisdom or folly of a method do not present any matter for judicial consideration. 2 4 In the
words of the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, "this Court cannot provide a second opinion on
what is the best procedure. Notwithstanding the deference and esteem that is properly
tendered to individual congressional actors, our deference and esteem for the institution
as a whole and for the constitutional command that the institution be allowed to manage
its own affairs precludes us from even attempting a diagnosis of the problem." 2 5
Nor does the Constitution require that the yeas and the nays of the Members be
taken every time a House has to vote, except only in the following instances: upon the last
and third readings of a bill, 2 6 at the request of one- fth of the Members present, 2 7 and in
repassing a bill over the veto of the President. 2 8 Indeed, considering the fact that in the
approval of the original bill the votes of the Members by yeas and nays had already been
taken, it would have been sheer tedium to repeat the process.
Petitioners claim that they were prevented from seeking reconsideration allegedly
as a result of the precipitate suspension and subsequent adjournment of the session. 2 9 It
would appear, however, that the session was suspended to allow the parties to settle the
problem, because when it resumed at 3:40 p.m. on that day Rep. Arroyo did not say
anything anymore. While it is true that the Majority Leader moved for adjournment until 4
p.m. of Wednesday of the following week, Rep. Arroyo could at least have objected if there
was anything he wanted to say. The fact, however, is that he did not. The Journal of
November 21, 1996 of the House shows:
ADJOURNMENT OF SESSION
On motion of Mr. Albano, there being no objection, the Chair declared the
session adjourned until four o'clock in the afternoon of Wednesday, November 27,
1996.
It was 3:40 p.m. Thursday, November 21, 1996. (Emphasis added)
This Journal was approved on December 2, 1996. Again, no one objected to its
approval except Rep. Lagman.
It is thus apparent that petitioners' predicament was largely of their own making.
Instead of submitting the proper motions for the House to act upon, petitioners
insisted on the pendency of Rep. Arroyo's question as an obstacle to the passage of
the bill. But Rep. Arroyo's question was not, in form or substance, a point of order or a
question of privilege entitled to precedence. 3 0 And even if Rep. Arroyo's question were
so, Rep. Albano's motion to adjourn would have precedence and would have put an end
to any further consideration of the question. 3 1
Given this fact, it is di cult to see how it can plausibly be contended that in signing
the bill which became R.A. No. 8240, respondent Speaker of the House acted with grave
abuse of his discretion. Indeed, the phrase "grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction" has a settled meaning in the jurisprudence of procedure. It means
such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment by a tribunal exercising judicial or
quasi judicial power as to amount to lack of power. As Chief Justice Concepcion himself
said in explaining this provision, the power granted to the courts by Art. VIII, §1 extends to
cases where "a branch of the government or any of its o cials has acted without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction." 3 2
Here, the matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the
House with which the Court should not be concerned. To repeat, the claim is not that there
was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the
presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyo's earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had
already been defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a quorum. The question
of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly — especially when the quorum is obviously present
— for the purpose of delaying the business of the House. 3 3 Rep. Arroyo waived his
objection by his continued interpellation of the sponsor for in so doing he in effect
acknowledged the presence of a quorum. 3 4
At any rate it is noteworthy that of the 111 members of the House earlier found to
be present on November 21, 1996, only the ve, i.e. petitioners in this case, are questioning
the manner by which the conference committee report on H. No. 7198 was approved on
that day. No one except Rep. Arroyo, appears to have objected to the manner by which the
report was approved. Rep. John Henry Osmeña did not participate in the bicameral
conference committee proceedings. 3 5 Rep. Lagman and Rep. Zamora objected to the
report 3 6 but not to the manner it was approved; while it is said that, if voting had been
conducted, Rep. Tañada would have voted in favor of the conference committee report. 3 7
Fourth. Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. No. 7198 by the Speaker of
the House and the President of the Senate and the certi cation by the secretaries of both
Houses of Congress that it was passed on November 21, 1996 are conclusive of its due
enactment. Much energy and learning is devoted in the separate opinion of Justice Puno,
joined by Justice Davide, to disputing this doctrine. To be sure, there is no claim either here
or in the decision in the EVAT cases [Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance] that the enrolled bill
embodies a conclusive presumption. In one case 38 we "went behind" an enrolled bill and
consulted the Journal to determine whether certain provisions of a statute had been
approved by the Senate. Cdpr
But, where as here there is no evidence to the contrary, this Court will respect the
certi cation of the presiding o cers of both Houses that a bill has been duly passed.
Under this rule, this Court has refused to determine claims that the three-fourths vote
needed to pass a proposed amendment to the Constitution had not been obtained,
because "a duly authenticated bill or resolution imports absolute verity and is binding on
the courts." 3 9 This Court quoted from Wigmore on Evidence the following excerpt which
embodies good, if old-fashioned democratic theory:
The truth is that many have been carried away with the righteous desire to
check at any cost the misdoings of Legislatures. They have set such store by the
Judiciary for this purpose that they have almost made them a second and higher
Legislature. But they aim in the wrong direction. Instead of trusting a faithful
Judiciary to check an ine cient Legislature, they should turn to improve the
Legislature. The sensible solution is not to patch and mend casual errors by
asking the Judiciary to violate legal principle and to do impossibilities with the
Constitution; but to represent ourselves with competent, careful, and honest
legislators, the work of whose hands on the statute-roll may come to re ect credit
upon the name of popular government. 4 0
This Court has refused to even look into allegations that the enrolled bill sent to the
President contained provisions which had been "surreptitiously" inserted in the conference
committee:
[W]here allegations that the constitutional procedures for the passage of
bills have not been observed have no more basis than another allegation that the
Conference Committee "surreptitiously" inserted provisions into a bill which it had
prepared, we should decline the invitation to go behind the enrolled copy of the
bill. To disregard the "enrolled bill" rule in such cases would be to disregard the
respect due the other two departments of our government. 4 1
It has refused to look into charges that an amendment was made upon the last
reading of a bill in violation of Art. VI, §26(2) of the Constitution that "upon the last reading
of a bill, no amendment shall be allowed." 42
In other cases, 4 3 this Court has denied claims that the tenor of a bill was otherwise
than as certified by the presiding officers of both Houses of Congress.
The enrolled bill doctrine, as a rule of evidence, is well established. It is cited with
approval by text writers here and abroad. 4 4 The enrolled bill rule rests on the following
considerations:
. . . As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by
Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the
o cial attestations of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the
President of the Senate, and of the President of the United States, carries, on its
face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the
government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the
laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect due to coequal and
independent departments requires the judicial department to act upon that
assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in
the manner stated; leaving the court to determine, when the question properly
arises, whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution. 4 5
To overrule the doctrine now, as the dissent urges, is to repudiate the massive
teaching of our cases and overthrow an established rule of evidence.
Indeed, petitioners have advanced no argument to warrant a departure from the rule,
except to say that, with a change in the membership of the Court, the three new members
may be assumed to have an open mind on the question of the enrolled bill rule. Actually,
not three but four (Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, and Quiason, JJ .) have departed from the Court
since our decision in the EVAT cases and their places have since been taken by four new
members (Francisco, Hermosisima, Panganiban, and Torres, J J .) Petitioners are thus
simply banking on the change in the membership of the Court.
Moreover, as already noted, the due enactment of the law in question is con rmed
by the Journal of the House of November 21, 1996 which shows that the conference
committee report on H. No. 7198, which became R.A. No. 8240, was approved on that day.
The keeping of the Journal is required by the Constitution. Art. VI, §16(4) provides:
Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time
publish the same, excepting such parts as may, in its judgment, affect national
security; and the yeas and nays on any question shall, at the request of one- fth
of the Members present, be entered in the Journal.
Each House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings.
The Journal is regarded as conclusive with respect to matters that are required by
the Constitution to be recorded therein. 4 6 With respect to other matters, in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, the Journals have also been accorded conclusive effect. Thus, in
United States v. Pons , 4 7 this Court spoke of the imperatives of public policy for regarding
the Journals as "public memorials of the most permanent character," thus: "They should be
public, because all are required to conform to them; they should be permanent, that rights
acquired today upon the faith of what has been declared to be law shall not be destroyed
tomorrow, or at some remote period of time, by facts resting only in the memory of
individuals." As already noted, the bill which became R.A. No. 8240 is shown in the Journal.
Hence its due enactment has been duly proven.
xxx xxx xxx
It would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department for

this Court either to set aside a legislative action as void because the Court thinks the
House has disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to allow those defeated in the
political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can nd their
remedy in that department itself. The Court has not been invested with a roving
commission to inquire into complaints, real or imagined, of legislative skullduggery. It
would be acting in excess of its power and would itself be guilty of grave abuse of its
discretion were it to do so. The suggestion made in a case 4 8 may instead appropriately be
made here: petitioners can seek the enactment of a new law or the repeal or amendment
of R.A. No. 8240. In the absence of anything to the contrary, the Court must assume that
Congress or any House thereof acted in the good faith belief that its conduct was
permitted by its rules, and deference rather than disrespect is due the judgment of that
body. 4 9 cdtech
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C .J ., Padilla, Melo, Kapunan, Francisco and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ ., concur.
Regalado, J ., concurs in the result.
Bellosillo, J ., took no part due to relationship to parties.
Panganiban, J ., took no part; former counsel of a party.
Torres, Jr., J ., took no part; on leave during deliberations.
Separate Opinions
ROMERO , J ., concurring :
In ling this separate opinion for the dismissal of the instant petition, I am not
backtracking from the dissent which I expressed in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance . 1 I
am somewhat bothered that if I do not elaborate, the vote which I cast today might be
wrongly construed as an implied abandonment of, and inconsistent with, my rm stance in
Tolentino.
The landmark case of Tolentino, just like the one under consideration, involved a
similar challenge to the constitutionality of a signi cant tax measure namely, Republic Act
No. 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax (EVAT) Law. There, a
number of issues, both substantive and procedural, were posed by petitioners, each of
which was discussed by the majority opinion of Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza who,
incidentally, is also the ponente of instant decision. At any rate, it is worth noting that I did
not entirely disagree with each and every argument of the opinion, most especially those
touching upon substantive issues. My main objection in Tolentino, it will be recalled,
focused instead on what I perceived was a substantial breach and disregard by the
Legislature of vital constitutional requirements ordaining the procedures to be followed in
the passage of a bill which, in my opinion, the majority seemed to have cavalierly put to
rest by hiding under the cloak of the enrolled bill theory 2 and the precept that the Court is
not the proper forum for the enforcement of internal legislative rules allegedly violated. 3
To me, the position then taken by the majority exhibited blind adherence to otherwise
sound principles of law which did not, however, t the facts as presented before the Court.
Hence, I objected, not so much because I found these principles unwise or obsolete, but
rather because they were applied, or misapplied, to a case which I believe did not call for
their application. cdtai

When I differed from the majority opinion which applied the enrolled bill theory, I was
very careful to emphasize that reliance thereon is not to be discontinued but that its
application must be limited to minor matters relating more to form and factual issues
which do not materially alter the essence and substance of the law itself. Thus:
"As applied to the instant petition, the issue posed is whether or not the
procedural irregularities that attended the passage of House Bill No. 11197 and
Senate Bill No. 1630, outside of the reading and printing requirements which were
exempted by the Presidential certi cation, may no longer be impugned, having
been 'saved' by the conclusiveness on us of the enrolled bill. I see no cogent
reason why we cannot continue to place reliance on the enrolled bill, but only with
respect to matters pertaining to the procedure followed in the enactment of bills in
Congress and their subsequent engrossment, printing errors, omission of words
and phrases and similar relatively minor matters relating more to form and
factual issues which do not materially alter the essence and substance of the law
itself .
Certainly, courts cannot claim greater ability to judge procedural
legitimacy, since constitutional rules on legislative procedure are easily mastered.
Procedural disputes are over facts — whether or not the bill had enough votes, or
three readings, or whatever — not over the meaning of the constitution.
Legislators, as eyewitnesses, are in a better position than a court to rule on the
facts. The argument is also made that legislatures would be offended if courts
examined legislative procedure.
Such a rationale, however, cannot conceivably apply to substantive

changes in a bill introduced towards the end of its tortuous trip through Congress,
catching both legislators and the public unawares and altering the same beyond
recognition even by its sponsors.
This issue I wish to address forthwith." 4
As regards the principle that the Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement
of internal legislative rules, both the majority and I were actually of one mind such that I
was quick to qualify the extent of the Court's review power in respect of internal
procedures in this wise:
"I wish to consider this issue in light of Article VIII, Sec. 1 of the
Constitution which provides that '(j)udicial power includes the duty of the courts
of justice . . . to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.' We are also guided by the principle that a
court may interfere with the internal procedures of its coordinate branch only to
uphold the Constitution." 5
I differed, however, from the majority insofar as that principle was applied. In this
respect, I showed that the introduction of several provisions in the Bicameral Conference
Committee Report did not only violate the pertinent House and Senate Rules de ning the
limited power of the conference committee but that the Constitutional proscription
against any amendment upon the last reading of a bill was likewise breached. Hence, in
view of these lapses, I thought that judicial review would have been proper in order to
uphold the Constitution. This the majority, however, disregarded invoking the same
principle which should have justi ed the Court in questioning the actuations of the
legislative branch.
At this juncture, I wish to reiterate my continuing adherence to the aforesaid reasons
I cited in the Tolentino dissent. At the same time, I realize that the arguments I raised in my
dissent would not hold true in the instant petition.
For one thing, unlike in Tolentino, the rules of the House of Representatives allegedly
violated by respondents in the instant petition are purely internal rules designed for the
orderly conduct of the House's business. They have no direct or reasonable nexus to the
requirements and proscriptions of the Constitution in the passage of a bill which would
otherwise warrant the Court's intervention. Likewise, the petitioners are not in any way
complaining that substantial alterations have been introduced in Republic Act No. 8240.
The thrust of petitioners' arguments in attacking the validity of the law is merely with
respect to the fact that Rep. Joker Arroyo was effectively prevented from invoking the
question of quorum and not that the substance thereof offends constitutional standards.
This being the case, I do not now feel called upon to invoke my previous argument that the
enrolled bill theory should not be conclusive as regards "substantive changes in a bill
introduced towards the end of its tortuous trip through Congress," when it is palpably
unwarranted under the circumstances of instant petition.
PUNO , J ., concurring and dissenting :
I concur in the result. I do appreciate the ne legal disquisition of Mr. Justice

Mendoza to justify the dismissal of the case at bar. Nevertheless, I have to express my
views on the alleged non-justiciability of the issue posed by the petitioner as well as the
applicability of the archaic enroll bill doctrine in light of what I perceive as new wrinkles in
our law brought about by the 1987 Constitution and the winds of changing time.
I
With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed by the petitioner are non-
justiciable. Nor do I agree that we will trivialize the principle of separation of power if we
assume jurisdiction over the case at bar. Even in the United States, the principle of
separation of power is no longer an impregnable impediment against the interposition of
judicial power on cases involving breach of rules of procedure by legislators.
Rightly, the ponencia uses the 1891 case of US v. Ballin, 1 as a window to view the
issues before the Court. It is in Ballin where the US Supreme Court rst de ned the
boundaries of the power of the judiciary to review congressional rules. 2 It held:
"xxx xxx xxx
"The Constitution, in the same section, provides, that each house may
determine the rules of its proceedings." It appears that in pursuance of this
authority the House had, prior to that day, passed this as one of its rules:
Rule XV
3. On the demand of any member, or at the suggestion of the Speaker, the
names of members su cient to make a quorum in the hall of the House who do
not vote shall be noted by the clerk and recorded in the journal, and reported to the
Speaker with the names of the members voting, and be counted and announced
in determining the presence of a quorum to do business. (House Journal, 230,
Feb. 14, 1890) cdll
The action taken was in direct compliance with this rule. The question,
therefore, is as to the validity of this rule, and not what methods the Speaker may
of his own motion resort to for determining the presence of a quorum, nor what
matters the Speaker or clerk may of their own volition place upon the journal.
Neither do the advantages or disadvantages, the wisdom or folly, of such a rule
present any matters for judicial consideration. With the courts the question is only
one of power. The Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of
proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate
fundamental rights, and there should be a reasonable relation between the mode
or method of proceedings established by the rule and the result which is sought to
be attained. But within these limitations all matters of method are open to the
determination of the House, and it is no impeachment of the rule to say that some
other way would be better, more accurate, or even more just. It is no objection to
the validity of a rule that a different one has been prescribed and in force for a
length of time. The power to make rules is not one which once exercised is
exhausted. It is a continuous power, always subject to be exercised by the House,
and within the limitations suggested, absolute and beyond the challenge of any
other body or tribunal."
Ballin, clearly con rmed the jurisdiction of courts to pass upon the validity of
congressional rules, i.e., whether they are constitutional. Rule XV was examined by the
Court and it was found to satisfy the test: (1) that it did not ignore any constitutional
restraint; (2) it did not violate any fundamental right; and (3) its method has a
reasonable relationship with the result sought to be attained. By examining Rule XV, the
Court did not allow its jurisdiction to be defeated by the mere invocation of the
principle of separation of powers.
Ballin was followed in 1932 by the case of US v. Smith. 3 I n Smith, the meaning of
sections 3 and 4 of Rule XXXVIII of the US Senate was in issue, viz.:
"xxx xxx xxx
"3. When a nomination is con rmed or rejected, any Senator voting in the
majority may move for a reconsideration on the same day on which the vote was
taken, or on either of the next two days of actual executive session of the Senate;
but if a noti cation of the con rmation or rejection of a nomination shall have
been sent to the President before the expiration of the time within which a motion
to reconsider may be made, the motion to reconsider shall be accompanied by a
motion to request the President to return such noti cation to the Senate. Any
motion to reconsider the vote on a nomination may be laid on the table without
prejudice to the nomination, and shall be a final disposition of such motion.
4. Nominations con rmed or rejected by the Senate shall not be returned
by the Secretary to the President until the expiration of the time limited for making
a motion to reconsider the same, or while a motion to reconsider is pending,
unless otherwise ordered by the Senate."
It appears that the nomination of Mr. Smith as member of the Federal Power
Commission has been con rmed by the US Senate. The resolution of con rmation was
sent to the US President who then signed the appointment of Mr. Smith. The Senate,
however, reconsidered the confirmation of Mr. Smith and requested the President to return
its resolution of con rmation. The President refused. A petition for quo warranto was led
against Mr. Smith. The Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Brandeis, assumed jurisdiction
over the dispute relying on Ballin. It exercised jurisdiction although "the question primarily
at issue relates to the construction of the applicable rules, not to their constitutionality."
Significantly, the Court rejected the Senate interpretation of its own rules even while it held
that it must be accorded the most sympathetic consideration.
"xxx xxx xxx
"Sixth. To place upon the standing rules of the Senate a construction
different from that adopted by the Senate itself when the present case was under
debate is a serious and delicate exercise of judicial power. The Constitution
commits to the Senate the power to make its own rules; and it is not the function
of the Court to say that another rule would be better. A rule designed to ensure
due deliberation in the performance of the vital function of advising and
consenting to nominations for public o ce, moreover, should receive from the
Court the most sympathetic consideration. But the reasons, above stated, against
the Senate's construction seem to us compelling. We are confirmed in the view we
have taken by the fact, since the attempted reconsideration of Smith's
con rmation, the Senate itself seems uniformly to have treated the ordering of
immediate noti cation to the President as tantamount to authorizing him to
proceed to perfect the appointment.
Smith, of course, involves the right of a third person and its ruling falls within the test
spelled out in Ballin.
Smith was followed by the 1948 case of Christoffel v. United States. 4 Christoffel
testi ed before the Committee on Education and Labor of the House of Representatives.
He denied he was a communist and was charged with perjury in the regular court. He
adduced evidence during the trial that the committee had no quorum when the perjurious
statement was given. Nonetheless, he was convicted in view of the judge's charge to the
members of the jury that to nd Christoffel guilty, they had to nd beyond a reasonable
doubt that —
"xxx xxx xxx
". . . the defendant Christoffel appeared before a quorum of at least thirteen
members of the said Committee, and that at least that number must have been
actually and physically present . . . If such a Committee so met, that is, if thirteen
members did meet at the beginning of the afternoon session of March 1, 1947,
and thereafter during the progress of the hearing some of them left temporarily or
otherwise and no question was raised as to the lack of a quorum, then the fact
that the majority did not remain there would not affect, for the purposes of this
case, the existence of that Committee as a competent tribunal provided that
before the oath was administered and before the testimony of the defendant was
given there were present as many as 13 members of that Committee at the
beginning of the afternoon session . . ."
Christoffel objected to the charge on the ground that it allowed the jury to assume
there was a continuous quorum simply because it was present at the start of the meeting
of the Committee. Under the House rules, a quorum once established is presumed to
continue until the lack of quorum is raised. Again, the court assumed jurisdiction over the
case. A majority of the Court, with Mr. Justice Murphy, as ponente, de ned the issue as
"what rules the House had established and whether they have been followed." It held:
"xxx xxx xxx
"Congressional practice in the transaction of ordinary legislative business

is of course none of our concern, and by the same token the considerations which
may lead Congress as a matter of legislative practice to treat as valid the conduct
of its committees do not control the issue before us. The question is neither what
rules Congress may establish for its own governance, nor whether presumptions
of continuity may protect the validity of its legislative conduct. The question is
rather what rules the House has established and whether they have been
followed. It of course has the power to de ne what tribunal is competent to exact
testimony and the conditions that establish its competency to do so. The heart of
this case is that by the charge that was given it the jury was allowed to assume
that the conditions of competency were satis ed even though the basis in fact
was not established and in face of a possible nding that the facts contradicted
the assumption. llcd
We are measuring a conviction of crime by the statute which de ned it. As

a consequence of this conviction, petitioner was sentenced to imprisonment for a
term of from two to six years. An essential part of a procedure which can be said
fairly to in ict such a punishment is that all the elements of the crime charged
shall be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. An element of the crime charged in
the instant indictment is the presence of a competent tribunal, and the trial court
properly so instructed the jury. The House insists that to be such a tribunal a
committee must consist of a quorum, and we agree with the trial court's charge
that to convict, the jury had to be satis ed beyond a reasonable doubt that there
were 'actually and physically present' a majority of the committee.
Then to charge, however, that such requirement is satis ed by a nding
that there was a majority present two or three hours before the defendant offered
his testimony, in the face of evidence indicating the contrary , is to rule as a matter
of law that a quorum need not be present when the offense is committed. This
not only seems to us contrary to the rules and practice of the Congress but denies
petitioner a fundamental right. That right is that he be convicted of crime only on
proof of all the elements of the crime charged against him. A tribunal that is not
competent is no tribunal, and it is unthinkable that such a body can be the
instrument of criminal conviction."
The minority complained that the "House has adopted the rule and practice that a
quorum once established is presumed to continue unless and until a point of no quorum is
raised. By this decision, the Court, in effect, invalidates that rule . . ." The minority view
commanded only the vote of three (3) justices.
The US Supreme Court pursued the same line in 1963 in deciding the case of Yellin v .
United States. 5 Yellin was indicted on ve counts of willfully refusing to answer
questions put to him by a sub-committee of the House Committee on Un-American
Activities. He was convicted by the District Court of contempt of Congress on four
counts. The conviction was a rmed by the Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit. On
certiorari, he assailed his conviction on the ground that the Committee illegally denied
his request to be heard in executive session. He alleged there was a violation of
Committee Rule IV which provides that "if a majority of the Committee or sub-
committee, duly appointed as provided by the rules of the House of Representatives,
believes that the interrogation of a witness in a public hearing might endanger national
security or unjustly injure his reputation, or the reputation of other individuals, the
Committee shall interrogate such witness in an executive session for the purpose of
determining the necessity or admissibility of conducting such interrogation thereafter
in a public hearing." In a 5-4 decision, the Court, speaking thru Mr. Chief Justice Warren,
held:
"xxx xxx xxx
"Yellin should be permitted the same opportunity for judicial review when
he discovers at trial that his rights have been violated. This is especially so when
the Committee's practice leads witnesses to misplaced reliance upon its rules.
When reading a copy of the Committee's rules, which must be distributed to every
witness under Rule XVII, the witness' reasonable expectation is that the
Committee actually does what it purports to do, adhere to its own rules. To
foreclose a defense based upon those rules, simply because the witness was
deceived by the Committee's appearance of regularity, is not fair. The Committee
prepared the groundwork for prosecution in Yellin's case meticulously. It is not too
exacting to require that the Committee be equally meticulous in obeying its own
rules."
It additionally bears stressing that in the United States, the judiciary has pruned the
"political thicket." In the benchmark case of Baker v. Carr, 6 the US Supreme Court
assumed jurisdiction to hear a petition for re-apportionment of the Tennessee
legislature ruling that "the political question doctrine, a tool for maintenance of
government order, will not be so applied as to promote only disorder" and that "the
courts cannot reject as 'no law suit,' a bona de controversy as to whether some action
denominated 'political' exceeds constitutional authority."
In the Philippine setting , there is a more compelling reason for courts to
categorically reject the political question defense when its interposition will cover up
abuse of power. For section 1, Article VIII of our Constitution was intentionally cobbled to
empower courts ". . . to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government." This power is new and was not granted to our courts in
the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions n . It was not also xeroxed from the US Constitution or
any foreign state constitution. The CONCOM granted this enormous power to our courts in
view of our experience under martial law where abusive exercises of state power were
shielded from judicial scrutiny by the misuse of the political question doctrine. Led by the
eminent former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, the CONCOM expanded and sharpened
the checking powers of the judiciary vis-a-vis the Executive and the Legislative
departments of government. In cases involving the proclamation of martial law and
suspension of the privilege of habeas corpus, it is now beyond dubiety that the
government can no longer invoke the political question defense. Section 18 of Article VII
completely eliminated this defense when it provided:
"xxx xxx xxx
"The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding led by any

citizen, the su ciency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or
the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must
promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution,
nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor
authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over
civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the
privilege of the writ."
The CONCOM did not only outlaw the use of the political question defense in
national security cases. To a great degree, it diminished its use as a shield to protect other
abuses of government by allowing courts to penetrate the shield with the new power to
review acts of any branch or instrumentality of the government ". . . to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction." In Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, 7 I posited the following postulates:
"xxx xxx xxx
"Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in
such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and
to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government."
Former Chief Justice Roberto R. Concepcion, the sponsor of this provision
in the Constitutional Commission explained the sense and the reach of judicial
power as follows:
'xxx xxx xxx
'. . . In other words, the judiciary is the nal arbiter on the question of
whether or not a branch of government or any of its o cials has acted
without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to
constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. This
is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this
nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means
that the courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of this
nature, by claiming that such matters constitute political question.'
The Constitution cannot be any clearer. What it granted to this Court is not
a mere power which it can decline to exercise. Precisely to deter this
disinclination, the Constitution imposed it as a duty of this Court to strike down
any act of a branch or instrumentality of government or any of its o cials done
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Rightly
or wrongly, the Constitution has elongated the checking powers of this Court
against the other branches of government despite their more democratic
character, the President and the legislators being elected by the people.
It is, however, theorized that this provision is nothing new. I beg to disagree
for the view misses the signi cant changes made in our constitutional canvass to
cure the legal de ciencies we discovered during martial law. One of the areas
radically changed by the framers of the 1987 Constitution is the imbalance of
power between and among the three great branches of our government — the
Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary. To upgrade the powers of the
Judiciary, the Constitutional Commission strengthened some more the
independence of courts. Thus, it further protected the security of tenure of the
members of the Judiciary by providing 'No law shall be passed reorganizing the
Judiciary when it undermines the security of tenure of its Members.' It also
guaranteed fiscal autonomy to the Judiciary.
More, it depoliticalized appointments in the judiciary by creating the
Judicial and Bar Council which was tasked with screening the list of prospective
appointees to the judiciary. The power of con rming appointments to the
judiciary was also taken away from Congress. The President was likewise given a
speci c time to ll up vacancies in the judiciary — ninety (90) days from the
occurrence of the vacancy in case of the Supreme Court and ninety (90) days
from the submission of the list of recommendees by the Judicial and Bar Council
in case of vacancies in the lower courts. To further insulate appointments in the
judiciary from the virus of politics, the Supreme Court was given the power to
'appoint all o cials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the Civil
Service Law.' And to make the separation of the judiciary from the other branches
of government more watertight, it prohibited members of the judiciary to be '. . .
designated to any agency performing quasi judicial or administrative functions.'
While the Constitution strengthened the sinews of the Supreme Court, it reduced
the powers of the two other branches of government, especially the Executive.
Notable of the powers of the President clipped by the Constitution is his power to
suspend the writ of habeas corpus and to proclaim martial law. The exercise of
this power is now subject to revocation by Congress. Likewise, the su ciency of
the factual basis for the exercise of said power may be reviewed by this Court in
an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen. cdt
The provision de ning judicial power as including the 'duty of the courts of
justice . . . to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government' constitutes the capstone of the efforts of the
Constitutional Commission to upgrade the powers of this court vis-a-vis the other
branches of government. This provision was dictated by our experience under
martial law which taught us that a stronger and more independent judiciary is
needed to abort abuses in government. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
In sum, I submit that in imposing to this Court the duty to annul acts of
government committed with grave abuse of discretion, the new Constitution
transformed this Court from passivity to activism. This transformation, dictated
by our distinct experience as a nation, is not merely evolutionary but
revolutionary. Under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, this Court approached
constitutional violations by initially determining what it cannot do; under the 1987
Constitution, there is a shift in stress — this Court is mandated to approach
constitutional violations not by nding out what it should not do but what it must
do. The Court must discharge this solemn duty by not resuscitating a past that
petrifies the present.
I urge my brethren in the Court to give due and serious consideration to this new
constitutional provision as the case at bar once more calls us to de ne the parameters of
our power to review violations of the rules of the House. We will not be true to our trust as
the last bulwark against government abuses if we refuse to exercise this new power or if
we wield it with timidity. To be sure, it is this exceeding timidity to unsheath the judicial
sword that has increasingly emboldened other branches of government to denigrate, if not
defy, orders of our courts. In Tolentino, 8 I endorsed the view of former Senator Salonga
that this novel provision stretching the latitude of judicial power is distinctly Filipino and its
interpretation should not be depreciated by undue reliance on inapplicable foreign
jurisprudence. In resolving the case at bar, the lessons of our own history should provide
us the light and not the experience of foreigners.
II
Again with due respect, I dissent from the majority insofar as it relied on the enrolled
bill doctrine to justify the dismissal of the petition at bar.
An enrolled bill is one which has been duly introduced, nally enacted by both
Houses, signed by the proper o cers of each House and approved by the President. 9 It is
a declaration by the two Houses, through their presiding o cers, to the President that a
bill, thus attested, has received in due form the sanction of the legislative branch of the
government, and that it is delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional requirement
that all bills which pass Congress shall be presented to him.
The enrolled bill originated in England where there is no written Constitution
controlling the legislative branch of the government, and the acts of Parliament, being
regarded in their nature as judicial — as emanating from the highest tribunal in the land —
are placed on the same footing and regarded with the same veneration as the judgment of
the courts which cannot be collaterally attacked. 1 0 In England, the conclusiveness of the
bill was premised on the rationale that "an act of parliament thus made is the exercise of
the highest authority that this kingdom acknowledges upon earth. And it cannot be altered,
amended, dispensed with, suspended or repealed, but in the same forms and by the same
authority of parliament; for it is a maxim in law that it requires the same strength to
dissolve as to create an obligation. 1 1
Over the years, the enrolled bill theory has undergone important mutations. Some
jurisdictions have adopted the modi ed entry or a rmative contradiction rule . Under this
rule, the presumption in favor of the enrolled bill is not conclusive. The rule concedes
validity to the enrolled bill unless there affirmatively appears in the journals of the
legislature a statement that there has not been compliance with one or more of the
constitutional requirements. 1 2 Other jurisdictions have adopted the Extrinsic Evidence
Rule which holds that an enrolled bill is only prima facie evidence that it has been regularly
enacted. The prima facie presumption, however, can be destroyed by clear, satisfactory
and convincing evidence that the constitutional requirements in enacting a law have been
violated. For this purpose, journals and other extrinsic evidence are allowed to be received.
1 3 Some limit the use of extrinsic evidence to issues of fraud or mistakes. 1 4
These variants developed after a re-examination of the rationale of the enrolled bill.
The modern rationale for the enrolled bill theory was spelled out in Field v. Clark, 1 5 viz.:
xxx xxx xxx
"The signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and, by the
President of the Senate, in open session, of an enrolled bill, is an o cial
attestation by the two houses of such bill as one that has passed Congress. It is a
declaration by the two Houses, through their presiding o cers, to the President,
that a bill, thus attested, has received, in due form, the sanction of the legislative
branch of the government, and that it is delivered to him in obedience to the
constitutional requirement that all bills which pass Congress shall be presented to
him. And when a bill, thus attested, receives his approval, and is deposited in the
public archives, its authentication as a bill that has passed Congress should be
deemed complete and unimpeachable. As the President has no authority to
approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the
Secretary of State, and having the o cial attestations of the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the President of
the United States, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and
executive departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of
enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect due
to coequal and independent departments requires the judicial department to act
upon the assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills
authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the courts to determine, when the
question properly arises, whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity with
the Constitution.
The principle of separation of powers is thus the principal prop of the enrolled bill
doctrine. The doctrine is also justi ed as a rule of convenience. Supposedly, it avoids
di cult questions of evidence. 1 6 It is also believed that it will prevent the ling of too
many cases which will cast a cloud of uncertainty on laws passed by the legislature. As
explained in Ex Pacte Wren 1 7 "if the validity of every act published as law is to be tested by
examining its history, as shown by the journals of the two houses of the legislature, there
will be an amount of litigation, di culty, and painful uncertainty appalling in its
contemplation, and multiplying a hundredfold the alleged uncertainty of the law." The
conclusiveness of the enrolled bill is also justi ed on the ground that journals and other
extrinsic evidence are conducive to mistake, if not fraud.
These justi cations for the enrolled bill theory have been rejected in various
jurisdictions in the United States. In his Dissenting Opinion in Tolentino v. Secretary of
Finance, and its companion cases, 1 8 Mr. Justice Regalado cited some of the leading
American cases which discussed the reasons for the withering, if not demise of the
enrolled bill theory, viz.:
"xxx xxx xxx
"Even in the land of its source, the so-called conclusive presumption of
validity originally attributed to that doctrine has long been revisited and quali ed ,
if not altogether rejected. On the competency of judicial inquiry, it has been held
that "(u)nder the 'enrolled bill rule'by which an enrolled bill is sole expository of its
contents and conclusive evidence of its existence and valid enactment, it is
nevertheless competent for courts to inquire as to what prerequisites are xed by
the Constitution of which journals of respective houses of Legislature are required
to furnish the evidence.
In fact, in Gwynn vs. Hardee, etc., et al., the Supreme Court of Florida
declared:
(1) While the presumption is that the enrolled bill, as signed by the
legislative o ces and led with the secretary of state , is the bill as it passed, yet
this presumption is not conclusive, and when it is shown from the legislative
journals that a bill though engrossed and enrolled, and signed by the legislative
officers, contains provisions that have not passed both houses, such provisions
will be held spurious and not a part of the law. As was said by Mr. Justice
Cockrell in the case of Wade vs. Atlantic Lumber Co., 51 Fla. 628, text 633, 41 So.
72, 73:
'This Court is rmly committed to the holding that when the journals
speak they control, and against such proof the enrolled bill is not
conclusive.'
More enlightening and apropos to the present controversy is the decision

promulgated on May 13, 1980 by the Supreme Court of Kentucky in D & W Auto
Supply, et al. vs. Department of Revenue, et al., pertinent excerpts wherefrom are
extensively reproduced hereunder.
. . . In arriving at our decision we must, perforce, reconsider the validity of a

long line of decisions of this court which created and nurtured the so-called
'enrolled bill' doctrine.
xxx xxx xxx
[1] Section 46 of the Kentucky Constitution sets out certain procedures that
the legislature must follow before a bill can be considered for final passage. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
. . . Under the enrolled bill doctrine as it now exists in Kentucky, a court may
not look behind such a bill, enrolled and certi ed by the appropriate o cers, to
determine if there are any defects. cdta
xxx xxx xxx

. . . In Lafferty, passage of the law in question violated this provision, yet
the bill was properly enrolled and approved by the governor. In declining to look
behind the law to determine the propriety of its enactment, the court enunciated
three reasonsfor adopting the enrolled bill rule. First, the court was reluctant to
scrutinize the processes of the legislature, an equal branch of government.
Second, reasons of convenience prevailed, which discouraged requiring the
legislature to preserve its records and anticipated considerable complex litigation
if the court ruled otherwise. Third, the court acknowledged the poor record-keeping
abilities of the General Assembly and expressed a preference for accepting the
final bill as enrolled, rather than opening up the records of the legislature. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Nowhere has the rule been adopted without reason, or as a result of
judicial whim. There are four historical bases for the doctrine. (1) An enrolled bill
was a 'record' and, as such, was not subject to attack at common law. (2) Since
the legislature is one of the three branches of government, the courts, being
coequal, must indulge in every presumption that legislative acts are valid. (3)
When the rule was originally formulated, record-keeping of the legislatures was so
inadequate that a balancing of equities required that the nal act, the enrolled bill,
be given e cacy. (4) There were theories of convenience as expressed by the
Kentucky court in Lafferty.
The rule is not unanimous in the several states, however and it has not
been without its critics. From an examination of cases and treaties, we can
summarize the criticism as follows: (1) Arti cial presumptions , especially
conclusive ones, are not favored. (2) Such a rule frequently (as in the present
case) produces results which do not accord with facts or constitutional
provisions. (3) The rule is conducive to fraud, forgery, corruption and other
wrongdoings. (4) Modern automatic and electronic record-keeping devices now
used by legislatures remove one of the original reasons for the rule. (5) The rule
disregards the primary obligation of the courts to seek the truth and to provide a
remedy for a wrong committed by any branch of government. In light of these
considerations, we are convinced that the time has come to re-examine the
enrolled bill doctrine.
[2] This court is not unmindful of the admonition of the doctrine of stare
decisis. The maxim is "Stare decisis et non quieta movere," which simply
suggests that we stand by precedents and to disturb settled points of law. Yet,
this rule is not in exible , nor is it of such a nature as to require perpetuation of
error or logic. As we stated in Daniel's Adm'r v. Hoofnel, 287 Ky 834, 155 S.W.2d
469, 471-72 (1941)."
The force of the rule depends upon the nature of the question to be
decided and the extent of the disturbance of rights and practices which a
change in the interpretation of the law or the course of judicial opinions
may create. Cogent considerations are whether there is clear error and
urgent reasons 'for neither justice nor wisdom requires a court to go from
one doubtful rule to another,' and whether or not the evils of the principle
that has been followed will be more injurious than can possibly result from
a change.'
Certainly, when a theory supporting a rule of law is not grounded on
facts, or upon sound logic, or is unjust, or has been discredited by actual
experience, it should be discarded, and with it the rule it supports.
[3] It is clear to us that the major premise of the Lafferty decision, the poor
record-keeping of the legislature, has disappeared. Modern equipment and
technology are the rule in record-keeping by our General Assembly. Tape
recorders, electric typewriters, duplicating machines, recording equipment, printing
presses, computers, electronic voting machines, and the like remove all doubts
and fears as to the ability of the General Assembly to keep accurate and readily
accessible records.
It is also apparent that the 'convenience' rule is not appropriate in today's
modern and developing judicial philosophy. The fact that the number and
complexity of lawsuits may increase is not persuasive if one is mindful that the
overriding purpose of our judicial system is to discover the truth and see that
justice is done. The existence of difficulties and complexities should not deter this
pursuit and we reject any doctrine or presumption that so provides.
Lastly, we address the premise that the equality of the various branches of
government requires that we shut our eyes to constitutional failing and other
errors of our copartners in government. We simply do not agree. Section 26 of the
Kentucky Constitution provides that any law contrary to the constitution is 'void.'
The proper exercise of judicial authority requires us to recognize any law which is
unconstitutional and to declare it void. Without elaborating the point, we believe
that under section 228 of the Kentucky Constitution it is our obligation to 'support
. . . the Constitution of the commonwealth.' We are sworn to see that violations of
the constitution — by any person, corporation, state agency or branch or
government — are brought to light and corrected. To countenance an arti cial rule
of law that silences our voices when confronted with violations of our
constitution is not acceptable to this court.
We believe that a more reasonable rule is the one which Professor
Sutherland describes as the 'extrinsic evidence.' . . . Under this approach there is a
prima facie presumption that an enrolled bill is valid, but such presumption may
be overcome by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence establishing that
constitutional requirements have not been met.
We therefore overrule Lafferty v. Huffman and all other cases following the
so-called enrolled bill doctrine, to the extent that there is no longer a conclusive
presumption that an enrolled bill is valid. . . ."
Clearly, the enrolled bill doctrine no longer enjoys its once unassailable
respectability in United States. Sutherland reveals that starting in the 1940's, ". . . the
tendency seems to be toward the abandonment of the conclusive presumption rule and
the adoption of the third rule leaving only a prima facie presumption of validity which may
be attacked by any authoritative source of information." 1 9
It is high time we re-examine our preference for the enrolled bill doctrine. It was in the
1947 case of Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, 2 0 that this Court, with three (3) justices
dissenting, rst embraced the rule that a duly authenticated bill or resolution imports
absolute verity and is binding on the courts. In 1963, we rmed up this ruling in Casco
Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez, 2 1 thus:
"xxx xxx xxx
"Hence, 'urea formaldehyde' is clearly a nished product which is patently

distinct and different from 'urea' and 'formaldehyde,' as separate articles used in
the manufacture of the synthetic resin known as 'urea formaldehyde.' Petitioner
contends, however, that the bill approved in Congress contained the copulative
conjunction 'and' between the term 'urea' and 'formaldehyde,' and that the
members of Congress intended to exempt 'urea' and 'formaldehyde' separately as
essential elements in the manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called 'urea
formaldehyde,' not the latter as a nished product, citing in support of this view
the statements made on the oor of the Senate, during the consideration of the
bill before said House, by members thereof. But said individual statements do not
necessarily re ect the view of the Senate. Much less do they indicate the intent of
the House of Representatives (see Song Kiat Chocolate Factory vs. Central Bank,
54 Off Gaz. 615; Mayor Motors Inc. vs. Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
L-15000 [March 29, 1961]; Manila Jockey Club, Inc. vs. Games and Amusement
Board, L-12727 [February 19, 1960]). Furthermore, it is well settled that enrolled
bill — which uses the term 'urea formaldehyde' instead of 'urea and formaldehyde'
— conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by
Congress and approved by the President (Primicias vs. Paredes, 61 Phil. 118, 120;
Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1; Macias vs. Comm. on Elections, L-18684,
Sept. 14, 1961). If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it
was certi ed by the o cers of Congress and approved by the Executive — on
which we cannot speculate without jeopardizing the principle of separation of
powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic system — the
remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree." cdti
In the 1969 case of Morales v. Subido, 2 2 we reiterated our delity to the enrolled bill
doctrine, viz.:
". . . We cannot go behind the enrolled Act to discover what really
happened. The respect due to the other branches of the Government demands
that we act upon the faith and credit of what the o cers of the said branches
attest to as the o cial acts of their respective departments . Otherwise we would
be cast in the unenviable and unwanted role of a sleuth trying to determine what
actually did happen in the labyrinth of law-making, with consequent impairment
of the integrity of the legislative process. The investigation which the petitioner
would like this Court to make can be better done in Congress. After all, House
cleaning — the immediate and imperative need for which seems to be suggested
by the petitioner — can best be effected by the occupants thereof . Expressed
elsewise, this is a matter worthy of the attention not of an Oliver Wendell Holmes
but of a Sherlock Holmes."
Significantly, however, Morales diluted the conclusiveness rule of the enrolled bill
doctrine. The ponencia stressed:
"By what we have essayed above we are not of course to be understood as
holding that in all cases the journals must yield to the enrolled bill. To be sure
there are certain matters which the Constitution expressly requires must be
entered on the journal of each house. To what extent the validity of a legislative
act may be affected by a failure to have such matters entered on the journal, is a
question which we do not now decide. All we hold is that with respect to matters
not expressly required to be entered on the journal, the enrolled bill prevails in the
event of any discrepancy."
In the 1974 case of Astorga v. Villegas , 2 3 we further diluted the enrolled bill
doctrine when we refused to apply it after the Senate President declared his signature on
the bill as invalid. We ruled:
"xxx xxx xxx
"Petitioner's argument that the attestation of the presiding o ces of
Congress is conclusive proof of a bill's due enactment, required, it is said, by the
respect due to a co-equal department of the government, is neutralized in this
case by the fact that the Senate President declared his signature on the bill to be
invalid and issued a subsequent clari cation that the invalidation for his
signature meant that the bill he had signed had never been approved by the
Senate. Obviously this declaration should be accorded even greater respect than
the attestation it invalidated, which it did for a reason that is undisputed in fact
and indisputable in logic.
As far as Congress itself is concerned, there is nothing sacrosanct in the
certi cation made by the presiding o cers . It is merely a mode of authentication.
The law-making process in Congress ends when the bill is approved by both
Houses, and the certi cation does not add to the validity of the bill or cure any
defect already present upon its passage. In other words it is the approval by
Congress and not the signatures of the presiding o cers that is essential . Thus
the (1935) Constitution says that "[e]very bill passed by the Congress shall, before
it becomes law, be presented to the President." In Brown vs. Morris, supra, the
Supreme Court of Missouri, interpreting a similar provision in the State
Constitution, said that the same "makes it clear that the indispensable step is the
nal passage and it follows that if a bill , otherwise fully enacted as a law, is not
attested by the presiding o cer , the proof that it has 'passed both houses' will
satisfy the constitutional requirement."
Petitioner agrees that the attestation in the bill is not mandatory but argues
that the disclaimer thereof by the Senate President, granting it to have been
validly made, would only mean that there was no attestation at all, but would not
affect the validity of the statute. Hence, it is pointed out, Republic Act No. 4065
would remain valid and binding. This argument begs the issue. It would limit the
court's inquiry to the presence or absence of the attestation and to the effect of its
absence upon the validity of the statute. The inquiry, however, goes farther.
Absent such attestation as a result of the disclaimer, and consequently there
being no enrolled bill to speak of, what evidence is there to determine whether or
not the bill had been duly enacted. In such a case the entries in the journal should
be consulted.
The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary
record. The Constitution requires it. While it is true that the journal is not
authenticated and is subject to the risk of misprinting and other errors, the point is
irrelevant in this case. This Court is merely asked to inquire whether the text of
House Bill No. 9266 signed by the Chief Executive was the same text passed by
both Houses of Congress. Under the speci c facts and circumstances of this
case, this Court can do this and resort to the Senate journal for the purpose. The
journal discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on
the oor and approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text
sent to the President and signed by him. This Court is not asked to incorporate
such amendments into the alleged law, which admittedly is a risky undertaking,
but to declare that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become
law. This We do, as indeed both the President of the Senate and the Chief
Executive did, when they withdrew their signatures therein. In the face of the
manifest error committed and subsequently recti ed by the President of the
Senate and by the Chief Executive, for this Court to perpetuate that error by
disregarding such recti cation and holding that the erroneous bill has become
law would be to sacri ce truth to ction and bring about mischievous
consequences not intended by the law-making body."
I n 1993 , the enrolled bill doctrine was again used as a secondary rationale in the
case of Philippine Judges Association v. Prado. 2 4 In this case, the judges claimed that the
pertinent part of section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 repealing the franking privilege of the
judiciary appeared only in the Conference Committee Report. In rejecting this contention,
this Court ruled:
"While it is true that a conference committee is the mechanism for
compromising differences between the Senate and the House, it is not limited in
its jurisdiction to this question. Its broader function is described thus:
'A conference committee may deal generally with the subject matter
or it may be limited to resolving the precise differences between the two
houses. Even where the conference committee is not by rule limited in its
jurisdiction, legislative custom severely limits the freedom with which new
subject matter can be inserted into the conference bill. But occasionally a
conference committee produces unexpected results, results beyond its
mandate. These excursions occur even where the rules impose strict
limitations on conference committee jurisdiction. This is symptomatic of
the authoritarian power of conference committee (Davies, Legislative Law
and Process: In a Nutshell, 1986 Ed., p. 81).'
prcd
It is a matter of record that the Conference Committee Report on the bill in

question was returned to and duly approved by both the Senate and the House of
Representatives. Thereafter, the bill was enrolled with its certi cation by Senate
President Neptali A. Gonzales and Speaker Ramon V. Mitra of the House of
Representatives as having been duly passed by both Houses of Congress. It was
then presented to and approved by President Corazon C. Aquino on April 3, 1992.
Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court may not inquire
beyond the certi cation of the approval of a bill from the presiding o cers of
Congress. Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez laid down the rule that the
enrolled bill is conclusive upon the Judiciary (except in matters that have to be
entered in the journals like the yeas and nays on the nal reading of the bill). The
journals are themselves also binding on the Supreme Court, as we held in the old
(but still valid) case of U.S. vs. Pons, where we explained the reason thus:
'To inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine
legislature when they are, as we have said, clear and explicit, would be to
violate both the letter and spirit of the organic laws by which the Philippine
Government was brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and
independent department of the Government, and to interfere with the
legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature.'
Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners'
charges that an amendment was made upon the last reading of the bill that
eventually became R.A. No. 7354 and that copies thereof in its nal form were not
distributed among the members of each House. Both the enrolled bill and the
legislative journals certify that the measure was duly enacted i.e., in accordance
with the Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. We are bound by such o cial
assurances from a coordinate department of the government, to which we owe, at
the very least, a becoming courtesy."
Finally in 1994 came the case of Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance , et al. and its
companion cases. 2 5 Involved in the case was the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7716,
otherwise known as the Expanded Value Added Tax Law. The majority 2 6 partly relied on
the enrolled bill doctrine in dismissing challenges to the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7716.
It held:
"xxx xxx xxx
"Fourth. Whatever doubts there may be as to the formal validity of Republic
Act No. 7716 must be resolved in its favor. Our cases manifest rm adherence to
the rule that an enrolled copy of a bill is conclusive not only of its provisions but
also of its due enactment. Not even claims that a proposed constitutional
amendment was invalid because the requisite votes for its approval had not been
obtained or that certain provisions of a statute had been 'smuggled' in the printing
of the bill have moved or persuaded us to look behind the proceedings of a
coequal branch of the government. There is no reason now to depart from this
rule.
No claim is here made that the 'enrolled bill' rule is absolute. In fact in one
case we 'went behind' an enrolled bill and consulted the Journal to determine
whether certain provisions of a statute had been approved by the Senate in view
of the fact that the President of the Senate himself, who had signed the enrolled
bill, admitted a mistake and withdrew his signature, so that in effect there was no
longer an enrolled bill to consider.
But where allegations that the constitutional procedures for the passage of
bills have not been observed have no more basis than another allegation that the
Conference Committee 'surreptitiously' inserted provisions into a bill which it had
prepared, we should decline the invitation to go behind the enrolled copy of the
bill. To disregard the 'enrolled bill' rule in such cases would be to disregard the
respect due the other two departments of our government."
These cases show that we have not blindly accepted the conclusiveness of the
enrolled bill. Even in Tolentino, Mr. Justice Mendoza was cautious enough to hold that "no
claim is here made that the enrolled bill is absolute." I respectfully submit that it is now
time for the Court to make a de nitive pronouncement that we no longer give our
unquali ed support to the enrolled bill doctrine. There are compelling reasons for this
suggested change in stance. For one, the enrolled bill is appropriate only in England where
it originated because in England there is no written Constitution and the Parliament is
supreme. For another, many of the courts in the United States have broken away from the
rigidity and unrealism of the enrolled bill in light of contemporary developments in
lawmaking. 27 And more important, our uncritical adherence to the enrolled bill is
inconsistent with our Constitution, laws and rules. In Mabanag , 28 we relied on section 313
of the Old Code of Civil Procedure as amended by Act No. 2210 as a principal reason in
embracing the enrolled bill. This section, however has long been repealed by our Rules of
Court. A half glance at our Rules will show that its section on conclusive presumption does
not carry the conclusive presumption we give to an enrolled bill. But this is not all. The
conclusiveness of an enrolled bill which all too often results in the suppression of truth
cannot be justi ed under the 1987 Constitution. The Preamble of our Constitution
demands that we live not only under a rule of law but also under a regime of truth. Our
Constitution also adopted a national policy 2 9 requiring full public disclosure of all state
transactions involving public interest. Any rule which will defeat this policy on transparency
ought to be disfavored. And to implement these policies, this Court was given the power to
pry open and to strike down any act of any branch or instrumentality of government if it
amounts to grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It is time
to bury the enrolled bill for its ction of conclusiveness shuts off truth in many litigations .
We cannot dispense justice based on ction for the search for justice is the search for
truth. I submit that giving an enrolled bill a mere prima facie presumption of correctness
will facilitate our task of dispensing justice based on truth.
III
In sum, I respectfully submit that the Court has jurisdiction over the petition at bar
and that issues posed by petitioner are justiciable. Nonetheless, I do not nd any grave
abuse of discretion committed by the public respondents to justify granting said petition.
As the ponencia points out, the petition merely involves the complaint that petitioner was
prevented from raising the question of quorum. The petition does not concern violation of
any rule mandated by the Constitution. Nor does it involve the right of a non-member of the
House which requires constitutional protection. The rules on how to question the existence
of a quorum are procedural in character. They are malleable by nature for they were
drafted to help the House enact laws. As well stated, these rules are servants, not masters
of the House. Their observance or non-observance is a matter of judgment call on the part
of our legislators and it is not the business of the Court to reverse this judgment when
untainted by grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Davide, Jr., J ., concurs.
VITUG , J ., concurring :
When the 1987 Constitution has embodied, in its circumscription of judicial power
under Section 1, Article VIII, of the Constitution, the determination of whether or not there
is grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government, the
Supreme Court, upon which that great burden has been imposed, could not have been
thought of as likewise being thereby tasked with the awesome responsibility of overseeing
the entire bureaucracy. The term grave abuse of discretion has long been understood in
our jurisprudence as, and con ned to, a capricious and whimsical or despotic exercise of
judgment as amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
I see nothing of that sort in the case at bar. Absent a clear case of grave abuse of
discretion, like the patent disregard of a Constitutional proscription, I would respect the
judgment of Congress under whose province the speci c responsibility falls and the
authority to act is vested. To do otherwise would be an unwarranted intrusion into the
internal affairs of a co-equal, independent and coordinate branch of government. At no
time, it would seem to me, has it been intended by the framers of the fundamental law to
cause a substantial deviation, let alone departure, from the time-honored and accepted
principle of separation, but balanced, powers of the three branches of government. There
is, of course, a basic variant between the old rule and the new Charter on the understanding
of the term "judicial power." Now, the Court is under mandate to assume jurisdiction over,
and to undertake judicial inquiry into, what may even be deemed to be political questions
provided, however, that grave abuse of discretion — the sole test of justiciability on purely
political issues — is shown to have attended the contested act.
All taken, I most humbly reiterate my separate opinion in Tolentino vs. Secretary of
Finance and companion cases (G.R. No. 115455, etc., 235 SCRA 630) and vote to deny the
instant petition. cdtai
Footnotes
1. JOURNAL No. 39, pp. 66, 68; Rollo, pp. 210, 212; Transcript of November 21, 1996 session,
pp. 39-52; Rollo, pp. 368-381; Petition, p. 6. par. 10; Rollo, p. 8.
2. Rule VIII. §35. Voting. — Every member present in the session shall vote on every question put
unless he inhibits himself on account of personal pecuniary interest therein.
Rule XVII. §103. Manner of Voting. — The Speaker shall rise to put a question
saying "As many as are in favor of (as the question may be), say Aye" and, after the
affirmative vote is counted, "As many as are opposed, say Nay . . ."
3. Rule XIX. §112. Reading and Withdrawal of Motions. — The Speaker shall state the motion
or, if in writing, shall cause it to be read by the Secretary General before being debated. A
motion may be withdrawn any time before its approval.
4. Rule XVI. §97. Recognition of Member. — When two or more members rise at the same time,
the Speaker shall recognize the Member who is to speak first.
5. Rule XX. §121. Definition. — Questions of privilege are those affecting the duties, conduct,
rights, privileges, dignity, integrity or reputation of the House or of its members,
collectively or individually.
§122. Precedence. — Subject to the ten-minute rule, questions of privilege shall
have precedence over all other questions, except a motion to adjourn and a point of
order.
Rule XXI. §123. Definition and Precedence. — A privileged motion pertains to a
subject matter which, under the rules, takes precedence over others.
The order of precedence of privileged motions is determined in each case by the

rules.
Rule XVIII. §109. Who May Vote; Procedure; Exceptions. — When a bill, report or
motion is adopted or lost, a member who voted with the majority may move for its
reconsideration on the same or succeeding session day. The motion shall take
precedence over all other questions, except a motion to adjourn, a question of privilege,
and a point of order.
6. 235 SCRA 630 (1994).
7. Rollo, p. 228.
8. Id., p. 229.
9. Art. VI, §16(3).
10. E. g., United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co., 144 U.S. 1, 36 L.Ed. 321 (1862); Exxon Corp. v.
FTC, 589 F.2d 582 (1978); Murray v. Buchanan, 674 F.2d 14 (1982); Metzenbaum v.
Federal Energy Regulatory Com'n., 675 F.2d 1282 (1982). See also Osmeña v. Pendatun,
109 Phil. 863 (1960).
11. 109 Phil. at 870-71. See also EVAT cases [Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance], 235 SCRA 630.
12. 144 U.S. at 5.36 L.Ed. at 324-25 (emphasis added).
13. 64 Fla. 41; 59 So. 963, 968 (1912) (emphasis added).
14. 124 Ohio St. 256, 177 N.E. 910, 911 (1931) (emphasis added).
15. 79 Conn. 141, 64 Atl. 5, 9-10 (1906) (emphasis added).
16. 80 Wis. 407, 50 N.W. 185, 186 (1891) (emphasis added).
17. 5 Okl. 297, 47 Pac. 1094 (1897) (emphasis added).

18. ENRIQUE M. FERNANDO, CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES ANNOTATED 188-189
(1977); Pacete v. Secretary of the Commission on Appointments, 40 SCRA 58 (1971).
19. Petition, p. 25, quoting the sponsorship speech of former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion,
chairman of the Committee on Judiciary of the Constitutional Commission, in 1
RECORDS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 436 (Session of July 10, 1986).
20. Gonzales v. Macaraig, 191 SCRA 452 (1990); See Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668, 695
(1989); Lansang v. Garcia, 42 SCRA 448 (1971).
21. Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 199 SCRA 692, 701 (1991); Llamas
v. Orbos, 202 SCRA 849, 857 (1991); Lansang v. Garcia, 42 SCRA at 480-481 (emphasis
added).
22. 4 CONG. REC. 413-414 (Feb. 15, 1957).

23. United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co., 144 U.S. at 5, 36 L.Ed. at 324-25; State v. Lewis, 186
S.E. 625, 630 (1936).
24. United States v. Smith, 286 U.S. 6, 76 L.Ed. 954 (1931).
25. Gregg v. Barrett, 771 F.2d 539, 549 (1985).
26. Art. VI, §26(2).

27. Id., §16(4).
28. Id., §27(1).
29. Id., p. 17; id., p. 19.

30. INOCENCIO PAREJA, RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMENTED AND
ANNOTATED 331 (1963); REYNALDO FAJARDO, PRINCIPLES OF PARLIAMENTARY
PROCEDURE 157-158, 172-173 (1963).
31. Rule XIX, §13.
32. 1 RECORDS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 436 (Session of July 10, 1986).
33. ALICE STURGIS, STANDARD CODE OF PARLIAMENTARY PROCEDURE, 17 (1950).

34. PAUL MASON, MANUAL OF LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE 335 (1953).
35. Conference Committee Report, Rollo, p. 36; Petition, p. 14; Rollo, p. 16.
36. Ibid.
37. Petition, p. 14; Rollo, p. 16.
38. Astorga v. Villegas, 56 SCRA 714 (1974).

39. Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1, 12 (1947).
40. Id. at 17, quoting 4 JOHN WIGMORE, TREATISE ON THE LAW ON EVIDENCE §1350 at 702
(1940). This excerpt is preserved in the Chadbourne edition of this locus classicus. See 4
WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE §1350 at 834 (James H. Chadbourne, ed. 1972).
41. EVAT cases [Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance], 235 SCRA at 672. Cf . Morales v. Subido, 27
SCRA 131 (1969).
42. Philippine Judges Ass'n v. Prado, 227 SCRA 703, 710 (1993); Morales v. Subido, 27 SCRA
131.
43. Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. v. Gimenez, 7 SCRA 347 (1963); Resins, Inc. v. Auditor
General, 25 SCRA 754 (1968).
44. 4 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE §1350 (James H. Chadbourne, ed. 1972); 6 MANUEL V. MORAN,
COMMENTS ON THE RULES OF COURT 115 (1980); 7 VICENTE J. FRANCISCO, THE
REVISED RULES OF COURT (Pt. II) 454 (1973).
45. Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 672, 36 L.Ed. 294, 303 (1891).
46. The following are required to be entered on the Journal: (1) The yeas and nays on the third
and final reading of a bill (Art. VI, §26(2)); (2) the yeas and nays on any question, at the
request of one-fifth of the members present (Id., §16(4)); (3) the yeas and nays upon
repassing a bill over the President's veto (Id., §27(1); and (4) the President's objection to
a bill which he has vetoed. (Id.)
47. 34 Phil. 729, 735 (1916), quoting State ex rel. Herron v. Smith, 44 Ohio 348 (1886).
48. Gregg v. Barrett, 771 F.2d 529.
49. Metzenbaum v. Federal Energy Regulatory Com'n., 675 F.2d 1282.
ROMERO, J ., concurring:
1. 235 SCRA 630.
2. Id., at p. 672: "Fourth. Whatever doubts there may be as to the formal validity of Republic Act
No. 7716 must be resolved in its favor. Our cases manifest firm adherence to the rule
that an enrolled copy of a bill is conclusive not only of its provisions but also of its due
enactment. Not even claims that a proposed constitutional amendment was invalid
because the requisite votes for its approval had not been obtained or that certain
provisions of a state had been 'smuggled' in the printing of the bill have moved or
persuaded us to look behind the proceedings of a coequal branch of the government.
There is no reason now to depart from this rule.
No claim is here made that the 'enrolled bill' rule is absolute. In fact in one case
we 'went behind' an enrolled bill and consulted the Journal to determine whether
certain provisions of a statute had been approved by the Senate in view of the fact that
the President of the Senate himself, who had signed the enrolled bill, admitted a
mistake and withdrew his signature, so that in effect there was no longer an enrolled
bill to consider.
But where allegations that the constitutional procedures for the passage of bills
have not been observed have no more basis than another allegation that the
Conference Committee 'surreptitiously' inserted provisions into a bill which it had
prepared, we should decline the invitation to go behind the enrolled copy of the bill. To
disregard the 'enrolled bill' rule in such cases would be to disregard the respect due the
other two departments of our government."
3. Id., at p. 675: "Moreover, this Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of these
internal Rules. To the contrary, as we have already ruled, 'parliamentary rules are merely
procedural and with their observance the courts have no concern.' Our concern is with
the procedural requirements of the Constitution for the enactment of laws. As far as
these requirements are concerned, we are satisfied that they have been faithfully
observed in these cases."
4. Id., pp. 778-779; emphasis supplied.

5. Id., p. 780; emphasis supplied; compare to note 3, supra.
PUNO, J ., concurring and dissenting:
1. 144 US 1 (1891).
2. The case involved the validity of a law which allegedly was passed in violation of House Rule
XV which provided that members present in the chamber but not voting would be
"counted and announced in determining the presence of a quorum to do business."
3. 286 US 6 (1932).
4. 338 US 89 (1948).
5. 374 US 109 (1963).

6. 369 US 186 (1962); see also Bond vs. Floyd, 385 US 116 (1966).
7. 235 SCRA 630.
8. Supra.
9. Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Rev. ed., p. 624.
10. Price v. Moundsville, 64 Am. St. Rep. 878, 879; 43 W. Virginia 523 [1897].
11. Carr v. Coke, 47 Am. St. Rep. 801, 803 [1895]; see also Note on ex rel. Reed v. Jones, 23
L.R.A. 211 [1893]. The rule of conclusiveness is similar to the common law rule of the
inviolability of the Sheriff's return. The Sheriff is considered as an officer of the King just
as a parliamentary act is deemed as a regal act and no official can dispute the King's
word. Dallas, Sutherland Statutes and Statutory Construction, Vol. 1, 4th ed., pp. 408-418
(1972).
12. Sutherland, op cit., p. 410.

13. Sutherland, Vol. I, Section 1405 (3rd ed., 1943).
14. See e.g., Mogilner v. Metropolitan Plan Communication, 236 Ind. 298, 140 N.E. 2d 220
[1957].
15. Op. cit, footnote No. 2.
16. 50 Am. Jur. Statutes, S. 150 (1938) 4 J. Wigmore Evidence, S. 1350 (3rd ed. 1940)
17. 63 Miss 512 (1886).
18. Op cit, pp. 729-732 (1994).

19. Sutherland, op. cit., pp. 224-225.
20. 78 Phil. 1 (1947).
21. 7 SCRA 374.

22. 27 SCRA 131, 134-135.
23. 56 SCRA 714.
24. 227 SCRA 703.

25. Supra.
26. Justices Cruz, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo and Puno dissented.
27. See writer's dissenting opinion in Tolentino, supra, p. 818.

28. Op cit.
29. Section 28 of Article II of the Constitution.
n Note from the Publisher: Written as "1972 Constitutions" in the original document.

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EN BANC

[G.R. No. 127255. August 14, 1997.]

JOKER P. ARROYO, EDCEL C. LAGMAN, JOHN HENRY R. OSMEÑA,

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; PARLIAMENTARY RULES

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MR. ARROYO. Objection, I stood up, so I wanted to object.

xxx xxx xxx

Each House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings.

It would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department for

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is DISMISSED.

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Such a rationale, however, cannot conceivably apply to substantive

PUNO , J ., concurring and dissenting :

I concur in the result. I do appreciate the ne legal disquisition of Mr. Justice

"Congressional practice in the transaction of ordinary legislative business

We are measuring a conviction of crime by the statute which de ned it. As

"The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding led by any

More enlightening and apropos to the present controversy is the decision

. . . In arriving at our decision we must, perforce, reconsider the validity of a

xxx xxx xxx

"Hence, 'urea formaldehyde' is clearly a nished product which is patently

It is a matter of record that the Conference Committee Report on the bill in

The order of precedence of privileged motions is determined in each case by the

17. 5 Okl. 297, 47 Pac. 1094 (1897) (emphasis added).

22. 4 CONG. REC. 413-414 (Feb. 15, 1957).

26. Art. VI, §26(2).

29. Id., p. 17; id., p. 19.

33. ALICE STURGIS, STANDARD CODE OF PARLIAMENTARY PROCEDURE, 17 (1950).

38. Astorga v. Villegas, 56 SCRA 714 (1974).

4. Id., pp. 778-779; emphasis supplied.

5. 374 US 109 (1963).

12. Sutherland, op cit., p. 410.

18. Op cit, pp. 729-732 (1994).

21. 7 SCRA 374.

24. 227 SCRA 703.

27. See writer's dissenting opinion in Tolentino, supra, p. 818.

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