Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 94308 June 16, 1994

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RUBEN E. ILAOA and ROGELIO E. ILAOA, accused-appellants.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

Pfc. Reynaldo P. Angeles was dispatched in the early morning of 5 November 1987 to Tinio St., Sta. Maria Phase I, Balibago, Angeles City, where the
decapitated body of a man, later identified through his voter’s identification card as Nestor de Loyola, was found in a grassy portion thereof. Apart
from the decapitation, the deceased bore forty-three (43) stab wounds in the chest as well as slight burns all over the body. The head was found
some two (2) feet away from the corpse.

Five persons, Ruben E. Ilaoa, Rogelio E. Ilaoa, Rodel E. Ilaoa, Julius Eliginio and Edwin Tapang, were charged for the gruesome murder of Nestor de
Loyola. However, only the brothers Ruben and Rogelio stood trial since the other accused escaped and were never apprehended.

On 15 June 1990, the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City found Ruben and Rogelio guilty of murder with the attendant circumstances of evident
premeditation, abuse of superior strength and cruelty, and imposed upon them the penalty of "life imprisonment." 1 The conviction was based on
the following circumstantial evidence:

One. The deceased Nestor de Loyola was seen at about eleven o’clock in the evening of 4 November 1987, in a drinking session with his
compadre Ruben Ilaoa together with Julius Eliginio, Edwin Tapang and a certain "Nang Kwang" outside Ruben’s apartment. 2

Two. The drunken voices of Ruben and Nestor engaged in an apparent argument were later on heard. 3 Nestor was then seen being kicked
and mauled by Ruben and his brother Rodel, Julius Eliginio and Edwin Tapang. 4 Nestor was crying all the while, "Pare, aray, aray!" Afterwards,
Nestor, who appeared drunk, was seen being "dragged" 5 into Ruben Ilaoa’s apartment. Nestor was heard saying, "Pare, bakit ninyo ako
ginaganito, hirap na hirap na ako!" 6

Three. Ruben Ilaoa and Julius Eliginio borrowed Alex Villamil’s tricycle at about two o’clock the following morning allegedly for the purpose of
bringing to the hospital a neighbor who was about to give birth. Ruben was seen driving the tricycle alone, with a sack which looked as though it
contained a human body, placed in the sidecar. The tricycle was returned an hour later to Alex who noticed bloodstains on the floor. The latter
thought that they were those of the pregnant woman.

Four. Blood was found on Ruben’s shirt when he was asked to lift it during the investigation by the police. 7 Moreover, Ruben’s hair near his
right forehead was found partly burned and his shoes were splattered with blood. 8 Susan Ocampo, Ruben’s live-in partner, was likewise seen in
the early morning of 5 November 1987 sweeping what appeared to be blood at the entrance of their apartment. 9

In this appeal, brothers Ruben and Rogelio Ilaoa argue for their acquittal. They contend that the circumstantial evidence relied upon by the trial
court for their conviction failed to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Specifically, they assail the finding of evident premeditation,
abuse of superior strength and cruelty as totally unwarranted.

We affirm Ruben Ilaoa’s guilt having been satisfactorily established by the evidence on hand, albeit circumstantial. However, we reverse the
conviction of Rogelio as we find it patently baseless.

In finding Rogelio guilty of murder, the court a quo relied solely on the testimony that he helped his brother Ruben drag Nestor de Loyola inside
Ruben’s apartment where the deceased was last seen alive. Apart from such testimony, however, there is nothing else to link Rogelio to the killing.

To warrant a conviction on the basis of circumstantial evidence, three requisites must concur: (a) there must be more than one circumstance; (b)
the circumstances from which the inferences are derived are proven; and, (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to prove the guilt
of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. 10 In the case at bench, it does not require much analysis to conclude that the circumstance relied upon
to establish Rogelio Ilaoa’s guilt, i.e., the alleged dragging of the deceased to his brother’s apartment, is totally inadequate for a conviction, having
miserably failed to meet the criteria. This is especially so where the veracity of such circumstance is even open to question. While Antonio Ramos
and Abdulia Logan testified that Rogelio Ilaoa helped his brother drag the deceased to his apartment, Eustancia Bie who claimed to have witnessed
the same incident positively testified that it was Ruben Ilaoa and Julius Eliginio who did so. 11 Rogelio Ilaoa was not mentioned. Not having been
adequately established, in addition to being uncorroborated, such circumstance alone cannot be the basis of Rogelio’s conviction.

Ruben’s case, however, is a totally different matter. Unlike that of his brother, Ruben Ilaoa’s fate was most definitely assured by the unbroken
chain of circumstances which culminated in the discovery of Nestor de Loyola’s decapitated body in the early morning of 5 November 1987.

As found by the trial court, in the late evening of 4 November 1987, appellant Ruben Ilaoa was engaged in a drinking session with the deceased
Nestor de Loyola together with several others. Ruben was heard arguing with Nestor. A few moments later, Ruben mauled and kicked the
deceased with the help of their drinking companions just outside Ruben’s apartment. As the deceased cried "Aray! Aray!" and "Pare, bakit n’yo ako
ginaganito? Hirap na hirap na ako!" appellant dragged the deceased with the help of Julius Eliginio to the apartment from where a man’s cries
were continued to be heard later. To further seal the case against him, Ruben borrowed Alex Villamil’s tricycle at two o’clock in the morning of 5
November 1987 on the pretext that a neighbor was about to give birth and had to be rushed to the hospital. However, he was seen driving the
tricycle alone with a sack placed in the sidecar. The sack looked as if it contained a human body. 12 Then, an hour later, or at three o’clock in the
morning, the tricycle was returned with bloodstains on the floor.

For his defense, appellant Ruben Ilaoa does not dispute the testimony of an eyewitness that he was driving the tricycle at past two o’clock in the
morning with the sack in the sidecar. However, he claims that the sack contained buntot ng pusa, a local term for marijuana, not a human body,
which he delivered to a designated place in Fields Avenue as a favor to his compadre Nestor de Loyola whom he could not refuse. Moreover, it was
the vomit discharged by his drinking companions that was being swept clean by his girlfriend at the entrance of their apartment in the early
morning of 5 November 1987, not blood as the witnesses asseverated.
We find the version of the prosecution more persuasive than the defense. The fact that appellant quarreled with the deceased, then mauled and
pulled him to the apartment where the latter was last seen alive, in addition to borrowing a tricycle which was found with bloodstains when
returned, sufficiently point to Ruben as the culprit responsible for the crime. The fact that the deceased was his compadre, hence, presumably
would have no motive to kill the latter, is not enough to exculpate appellant. It is a matter of judicial knowledge that persons have been killed or
assaulted for no apparent reason at all, 13 and that friendship or even relationship is no deterrent to the commission of a crime. 14

If we are to believe appellant Ruben, we will not be able to account for the blood found on the floor of the tricycle after it was brought back to the
owner. Ruben himself could not explain away such testimony for he belied the excuse that the tricycle was needed to rush a pregnant woman to
the hospital, which was the explanation he gave to Alex Villamil when he borrowed it. We cannot even consider that the story about the blood on
the tricycle was simply concocted by Alex Villamil to incriminate Ruben because the latter was his friend, as Ruben himself has admitted. 15 In fact
he could think of no reason for Alex Villamil to testify falsely against him. 16

Despite the foregoing, however, we hold appellant liable only for homicide, not murder, on the ground that the qualifying circumstances alleged in
the information, namely, abuse of superior strength, cruelty and evident premeditation, were not sufficiently proved to be appreciated against
appellant.

Abuse of superior strength cannot be considered because there was no evidence whatsoever that appellant was physically superior to the
deceased and that the former took advantage of such superior physical strength to overcome the latter’s resistance to consummate the offense.
17 The fact that Nestor de Loyola’s decapitated body bearing forty-three (43) stab wounds, twenty-four (24) of which were fatal, 18 was found
dumped in the street is not sufficient for a finding of cruelty where there is no showing that appellant Ruben Ilaoa, for his pleasure and
satisfaction, caused Nestor de Loyola to suffer slowly and painfully and inflicted on him unnecessary physical and moral pain. 19 Number of
wounds alone is not the criterion for the appreciation of cruelty as an aggravating circumstance. 20 Neither can it be inferred from the mere fact
that the victim’s dead body was dismembered. 21 Evident premeditation cannot likewise be considered. There is nothing in the records to show
that appellant, prior to the night in question, resolved to kill Nestor de Loyola, nor is there proof to show that such killing was the result of
meditation, calculation or resolution on his part. On the contrary, the evidence tends to show that the series of circumstances which culminated in
the killing constitutes an unbroken chain of events with no interval of time separating them for calculation and meditation. Absent any qualifying
circumstance, Ruben Ilaoa should only be held liable for homicide.

The penalty prescribed for homicide in Art. 249 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and in
the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the maximum shall be taken from the medium period of reclusion temporal, which is
fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months, while the minimum shall be taken from the
penalty next lower in degree, which is prision mayor, in any of its periods, the range of which is six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years.

In line with present jurisprudence, the civil indemnity fixed by the court a quo for the death of Nestor de Loyola is increased from P30,000.00 to
P50,000.00.

WHEREFORE, the judgment finding accused RUBEN E. ILAOA guilty beyond reasonable doubt is AFFIRMED but only for homicide, instead of
murder. Consequently, he is sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of eight (8) years, ten (10) months and twenty (20) days of prision mayor
medium, as minimum, to sixteen (16) years, four (4) months and ten (10) days of reclusion temporal medium as maximum. In addition, accused-
appellant RUBEN E. ILAOA is ordered to pay the heirs of Nestor de Loyola P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and, as fixed by the court a quo, P46,765.00
as actual damages, P10,000.00 as reasonable attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation, and P10,000.00 for moral damages.

Accused-appellant ROGELIO E. ILAOA, however, is ACQUITTED of the crime charged for obvious insufficiency of evidence.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, Davide, Jr., Quiason and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 141914. November 21, 2002]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PEDRO MONDIJAR Y GALLARES, accused-appellant.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

On appeal is the decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Cataingan, Masbate, Branch 49, dated March 17, 1999, in Criminal Case No. 812, finding
appellant Pedro Mondijar y Gallares guilty of the murder of Pamfilo Aplacador[2] and imposing upon him the penalty of death. Because appellant
was more than seventy-nine (79) years old at the time of the commission of the offense, the sentence was commuted to reclusion perpetua,
pursuant to Article 47[3] of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659.

Appellant and the victim were neighbors in Cataingan, Masbate. Although appellant was the father-in-law of the victim, apparently, there was bad
blood between them. In a previous incident, the son-in-law (Aplacador) had stabbed appellant.[4] Whatever their quarrel, it was never patched up.
A month later, the ill feelings erupted anew with fatal results for Aplacador.

In an information dated June 16, 1994 appellant was charged with murder committed as follows:

That sometime on February 26, 1994 at about 6:30 oclock in the evening more or less, at Barangay Domorog, Municipality of Cataingan, Province
of Masbate, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused with intent to kill, evident premeditation, treachery,
did there and then wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, attack, assault, stab, hack, with the use of a sharp and pointed bolo, one PAMFILO
APLACADOR hitting him at the different parts of his body which was the direct and the logical cause of his instantaneous death.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[5]

Upon arraignment, accused pleaded not guilty. Trial then ensued.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) summed up the prosecutions version in its brief, as follows:

Around six oclock in the evening of February 26, 1994, while prosecution witness Josephine Lebuga was at the back of her house located at Sitio
Mangga, Domorog, Cataingan, Masbate feeding her pigs, she heard a commotion and shouting at the house of her neighbor appellant Pedro
Mondijar. Appellants house is about fifteen (15) meters away from Lebugas house, thus, the sound coming from appellants house was audible to
Lebuga from where she was standing. Lebuga heard the voice of appellants son-in-law, the deceased Panfilo Aplacador begging appellant Pay, dont
kill me because I am your son. Then she heard appellant reply, Okay lets go to your house. After feeding her pigs, Lebuga went inside her house
(citation omitted).

Around six thirty in the evening of the same day, prosecution witness Rogelio Booc was walking along Mangga Street, Cataingan, Masbate, on his
way home. While working (sic), he saw his neighbor, herein appellant, on the road about fifty (50) meters away, walking behind Aplacador and
holding a long bolo about thirty (30) inches in length. Appellant hit Aplacador on the neck with the bolo, thereby decapitating him. When
Aplacador fell down, appellant picked up the detached head and threw it about five armslength away from its body. Afraid of what he saw, Booc
ran towards his house which is about two hundred meters away from the scene of the incident. Booc informed his wife about the incident and
they closed all the windows of their house because they feared for their lives (citation omitted).

The following morning, February 27, 1994, instead of reporting the incident to the police, Booc went to appellants house and told appellant that he
saw a dead body lying along Mangga Street which looked like appellants son-in-law. He told appellant to proceed to Domorog to seek the help of
barangay councilor in getting Aplacadors body. Afraid that he might be killed, appellant did not heed Boocs advise but instead went to Burias
Island, Masbate (citation omitted).

On that same day, prosecution witness Lilia Condrillon learned about the tragic death of her brother. She proceeded to the Philippine National
Police Station of Cataingan, Masbate and filed a Complaint for the death of Aplacador with policeman Romy Meliton (citation omitted). Appellant
was subsequently arrested by the police (citation omitted). An autopsy conducted on the remains of Aplacador revealed that he sustained the
following mortal wounds:

1. 12 cm. Hacking wound right auricular[6] area reaching the brain stem;
2. 12 cm. Hacking wound right zygomatic area reaching the brain stem;
3. 10 cm. hacking wound right lower mandible;
4. multiple hacking wounds neck through and through.[7]

Dr. Allen Ching, who conducted the post-mortem examination of Aplacadors remains, testified that the victim died of cardio-respiratory arrest due
to multiple stab wounds in the neck.[8]

For his part, appellant admitted killing the victim, but claimed that he only acted in self-defense. He testified that on February 26, 1994 at about
6:30 in the evening, he and his wife were in their house when Aplacador arrived as if looking for trouble. When appellant asked what Aplacador
wanted, he did not reply but gritted his teeth. Appellant then told Aplacador to go home so there would be no trouble. Appellant proposed that he
would accompany Aplacador on his way home. Appellant then got his bolo (minasbad), so he would use it to cut coconut leaves, which he would
burn as a torch to light his way back home. When the two were about 50 meters from appellants house, Aplacador, who was walking ahead of
appellant, faced the latter and said, I will stab you now. Aplacador then tried to stab him with his knife, but appellant parried the blow. Aplacador
lunged again with his knife at appellant but missed because the latter was able to move backward. Thereafter, appellant hacked Aplacador twice,
but was not sure whether he hit him for by then it was already dark. Appellant then went home and slept with his wife. The following day, he went
to Burias Island. He also declared that a month before the incident, Aplacador stabbed him on the knee, thereby causing him to limp.[9] He
claimed, however, that he did not bear a grudge against Aplacador. He likewise denied hacking the victim for being a wife-beater. Appellant
insisted that he killed Aplacador because the latter tried to kill him.[10]

The trial court found the prosecutions version credible and convicted appellant. Its judgment reads:
ACCORDINGLY, the court finds the accused Pedro Mondijar guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER and hereby imposes upon him
the penalty of DEATH and shall indemnify the legal heirs the amount of P50,000 for the death of Pamfilo Aplacador, P 30,000 for moral damages
and P20,000 for exemplary damages.

Considering the age of the accused (over 70 years), pursuant to Sec. 25 of R.A. 7659, he is therefore entitled to a suspension of the execution of his
death sentence (in case the herein death sentence is affirmed by the Honorable Supreme Court), thus, the death sentence shall be commuted to
the penalty of reclusion perpetua with all the accessory penalties under the code.

With costs de officio.[11]

Hence, this appeal assigning the following as errors:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES OF TREACHERY, ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH AND EVIDENT
PREMEDITATION AGAINST THE ACCUSED WHICH WERE NOT PROVEN BY THE PROSECUTION.

II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER AS DEFINED AND
PENALIZED UNDER ART. 248 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE AS AMENDED BY RA 7659 INSTEAD OF PLAIN HOMICIDE.[12]

Considering the aforecited errors, we find that the issues before us pertain to: (1) the propriety of appellants conviction for the offense charged;
and (2) the presence of treachery, abuse of superior strength, and evident premeditation as qualifying circumstances.

On the first issue, appellant merely insists that prosecution witnesses did not prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. However, he does not cite
any particulars for our consideration to support his contention.

For the appellee, the OSG counters that by claiming self-defense, appellant admitted killing the victim. Hence, the burden of proof was shifted to
appellant to show that the killing was justified.

The OSG points out that appellant failed to establish unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, one of the elements necessary for self-defense
to be sustained. Aplacadors gritting of his teeth hardly constituted unlawful aggression, says the OSG, adding that appellants act of continuously
hacking the victim after the latter fell down and was disarmed is unjustified because the supposed aggression had already ceased. According to the
OSG, appellant exceeded the limits of necessity to suppress an alleged attack, and the number and location of the hacking wounds sustained by
the deceased belied appellants claim of self-defense.

The OSGs contentions are well-taken. When an accused invokes self-defense, he effectively admits the killing, and the onus probandi shifts upon
him to show clearly and convincingly that the killing is justified and that no criminal liability is incurred.[13] For self-defense to prosper, the
accused must satisfy the following requisites: (a) unlawful aggression by the victim, (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or
repel it, and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused.[14] The accused must rely upon his own evidence and not on the
weakness of the prosecution[15] in order to establish self-defense.

Assuming arguendo that the victim, Aplacador, did try to stab appellant, we agree with the OSG that appellant went beyond reasonable necessity
in trying to prevent or repel the assault. The victim was not only disabled by multiple hack wounds; he was in fact decapitated. The nature and
number of wounds inflicted upon the victim show that appellants intentions went beyond trying to protect his person but sought to deliver serious
harm, thus rendering self-defense unavailing in this case.[16] Appellants claim of self-defense is, in our view, dubious. A plea of self-defense cannot
be appreciated where it is not only uncorroborated by independent and competent evidence but is extremely doubtful by itself.[17]

On the second issue, appellant first argues that the trial court erred in appreciating alevosia as attending the killing of Aplacador. According to
appellant, treachery was not proven because the prosecution failed to show how the killing commenced or how the act unfolded. For treachery to
exist, the mode of attack must be thought of by the offender, and not spring from the unexpected turn of events. Further, appellant states that the
prior stabbing incident between him and the victim should have forewarned the latter of the possibility of an impending attack. In other words,
appellant avers there was no sudden and unexpected attack on the victim.

For the appellee, the OSG contends that treachery was established beyond reasonable doubt. According to the OSG, when Aplacador pleaded with
appellant not to kill him, and appellant told him to go home and that appellant would accompany him in going home, the victim was lulled into
complacency. Hence, appellants attack was completely unanticipated by the victim. That the victim was decapitated shows the severity and
suddenness of appellants blow, argues the OSG.

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof
which tend directly and specially to ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might
make.[18] For treachery to qualify the act of killing to murder, two elements must concur: (1) the culprit employed means, methods, and forms of
execution which tended directly and specially to insure the offenders safety from any defensive or retaliatory act on the part of the offended party,
which means that no opportunity was given the latter to do so; and (2) that the offender consciously adopted the particular means, method, or
form of attack employed by him.[19] The essence of treachery is a swift and unexpected attack on the unarmed victim without the slightest
provocation on the part of the victim.[20] Treachery is never presumed but must be proven with moral certainty like the offense itself.[21]

In that light, we find the prosecutions evidence insufficient to sustain a finding that alevosia qualified the killing to murder. The prosecutions sole
eyewitness, Rogelio Booc, merely testified that appellant hacked the victim. There is no showing from his bare testimony as to how the hacking
incident commenced. When the evidence does not establish how the assault started, treachery cannot be appreciated.[22] Moreover, no evidence
was adduced to show that appellant consciously adopted the means he employed to ensure the victims death without risk unto himself. That
appellant offered to accompany the victim home does not suffice to show that the offer was deliberately adopted by appellant as means to
deceive the victim, much less lull him into lowering his defenses. Significantly, the relations between appellant and the victim were marred by ill
feelings. A month before the incident, Aplacador had stabbed and wounded appellant. Clearly, appellant and the victim had no love lost between
them. They did not trust each other. Recurrence of violent quarrel between them was not out of the question. Otherwise put, the victim could not
discount the possibility that appellant might retaliate for the previous stabbing, or otherwise seek to cause the victim bodily harm once an
opportunity offered itself. Where an argument or quarrel preceded a killing, treachery cannot be appreciated since the victim could be said to have
been forewarned and could anticipate aggression from the assailant.[23]

Appellant next contends that it was error for the trial court to find that abuse of superior strength characterized the killing, as it is highly
improbable for a man of more than 70 years to be superior in strength to a man much younger. In addition, both the victim and the appellant were
armed with bolos, adds appellant, so they were equally situated and there was no inequality of forces between them.

The OSG stresses, however, that appellant took advantage of superior strength as his bolo was bigger than that of the victim. This advantage in
weapons allowed appellant to hack the victim with impunity. The OSG further points out the fact that appellant was not wounded, even
superficially, despite his claim that the victim had tried to stab him, validating an indicium of inequality in their weapons and strength.

As previously held, there is abuse of superior strength if the assailant purposely used excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense
available to the person attacked.[24] In the instant case it is not disputed that both appellant and the victim were armed. That appellants bolo is
much longer than that of the victim would not show that appellant purposely used a greater force to his advantage. At the time of the incident,
appellant was already seventy-nine (79) years old, while the victim was much younger. A month before the incident, appellant was stabbed on the
knee, thereby causing him to limp. This handicap would indicate in terms of health, strength, agility, and superiority actually lies with the victim.
Hence, we agree with appellant that there was no abuse of superior strength in this case.

Lastly, appellant argues that a close scrutiny of the prosecutions evidence clearly shows its failure to prove evident premeditation. The
prosecution, according to appellant, failed to show that he had conceived a plan to kill his son-in-law. Appellant insists that the incident happened
so fast there was no sufficient time for him to hatch a deliberate plan of attack. Instead, he merely relied upon and acted on the basis of mans
natural instinct of self-preservation.

For the circumstance of evident premeditation to be appreciated, the prosecution must present clear and positive evidence of the planning and
preparation undertaken by the offender prior to the commission of the crime.[25] Settled is the rule that evident premeditation, like any other
circumstance that qualifies a killing to murder, must be established beyond reasonable doubt as conclusively and indubitably as the killing
itself.[26] To consider evident premeditation, it is necessary that the following requisites be met: (a) the time when the accused determined to
commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that the accused clung to his determination; and (c) a lapse of time, between the determination
to commit the crime and the execution thereof, sufficient to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act.[27] In the present case, no
evidence was presented by the prosecution as to when and how appellant planned and prepared for the killing of the victim. There is no showing
of any notorious act evidencing a determination to commit the crime which could prove appellants criminal intent. Hence, we cannot agree that
there was evident premeditation here, on appellants part.

Further, the OSG submits that appellants act of nonchalantly picking up the victims head, and throwing it about five arms length away, constitutes
scoffing at the body of the deceased. However, since this was not alleged in the information, this cannot be appreciated as a qualifying
circumstance. While appellants act is condemnable, it cannot be considered here to qualify or aggravate the offense. For the 2000 Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure requires that the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be specifically alleged in the information.[28] Although said
Rules took effect only on December 1, 2000, well after the killing of Aplacador, it is a rule favorable to the appellant. Thus, it should be given
retrospective application in his favor. Inasmuch as the circumstance of scoffing at the victims corpse was not alleged in the information, it may not
be considered to qualify or aggravate the offense.

For failure of the prosecution to properly prove the qualifying circumstances of treachery, abuse of superior strength, and evident premeditation,
we conclude that appellant could only be declared guilty of homicide.

Coming now to the proper penalty to be imposed, Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code[29] provides that the penalty for homicide is reclusion
temporal. The special mitigating circumstance that the offender is more than 70 years old having been established in this case,[30] the penalty of
reclusion temporal ought to be imposed in its minimum period.[31] Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, appellant could only be penalized
with an indeterminate penalty ranging from 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 12 years and 1 day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum.[32]

As to damages, the trial court properly imposed the amount of P50,000 as civil indemnity and P30,000 as moral damages for the pain, grief and
shock suffered by the heirs of Pamfilo Aplacador. However, since there is no aggravating circumstance present in this case, the award of exemplary
damages is not called for.[33]

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cataingan, Masbate, Branch 49, in Criminal Case No. 812 finding appellant PEDRO
MONDIJAR Y GALLARES, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder is MODIFIED. Appellant is declared guilty of HOMICIDE only, and
he is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and
one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum. He is also ordered to pay the heirs of the victim, Pamfilo Aplacador, the sum of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity and P30,000.00 as moral damages. Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. 132791 & 140465-66. September 2, 2002]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ARNEL BERNAL, accused-appellant.

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

Accused-appellant Arnel B. Bernal seeks reversal of the judgment of conviction promulgated by Branch 2 of the Regional Trial Court of the First
Judicial Region stationed in Bangued, Abra, on November 4, 1997, sentencing him to death for the crime of Murder with the aggravating
circumstances of evident premeditation and habitual drunkenness, and likewise separately sentencing him to suffer the prison terms of 10 years
and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum to 17 years of reclusion temporal as maximum for the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearms and
Ammunition (Presidential Decree No. 1866), and 2 years and 4 months with disqualification from holding public office and deprivation of the right
of suffrage for violation of Resolution No. 2735 of the COMELEC otherwise known as the Gun Ban.

The criminal cases were commenced with the filing of three informations for the crime of murder, and violations of Presidential Decree No. 1866
and Resolution No. 2735 of the COMELEC, pertinently reading as follows:

Criminal Case No. 1645

That on or about February 6, 1995, at Zone 5, in the Municipality of Bangued, Province of Abra, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above named accused, with the intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation and while armed with a caliber .38
revolver Smith and Wesson without serial number (rcovered) (sic), did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniusly (sic) shot twice from
behind one PEDRITO BERALAS, hitting him on his head, which caused his death shortly thereafter, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the
offended party.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[1]

Criminal Case No. 1647

That on or about the 6th day of February, 1995, at around 9:30 oclock in the evening, in the Municipality of Bangued, Province of Abra, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, not authorize, by law, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
kept in his possession, custody and direct control one caliber 38 Revolver Smith and Session (sic) without serial number with three (3) live
ammunitions for caliber .38 revolver and two (2) empty shells for caliber .38 (recovered), without first securing the necessary license to possess
the daid (sic) firearms and without lawful permit to carry the same; that the offense was also committed during the election period in violation of
firearm ban.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]

Criminal Case No. 1646

That on or about February 6, 1995, at around 9:30 oclock in the evening, at Zone 5, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this honorable Court,
the said accused, person not authorized by law, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously keep in his possession, custody and control
one (1) caliber .38 Smith and Wesson without serial number with three (3) live ammunition for caliber .38 revolver and two (2) empty shells for
caliber .38 revolver (recovered), without first securing the necessary permit from the COMELEC to carry the same outside his residence.

SO ORDERED.[3]

Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, the cases were tried jointly.

The inculpatory facts adduced by the prosecution during trial are succinctly summarized in the Peoples brief as follows:

In the evening of February 6, 1995, appellant, Pedrito Beralas, Felix Bernal, Fernando Bernal and Rey Bernal were on board a tricycle on their way
to the Benedisco pub house located along Zamora St., Zone 5, Bangued, Abra (p. 3, Decision). Upon reaching the pub house, Pedrito invited the
group to go inside to dance. Pedrito, Rey and Arnel went inside while Felix and Fernando were left outside (pp. 10-13, TSN, September 18, 1995).

Later, Fernando went inside to look for the three (appellant, Rey and Pedrito). He saw them in a sleeping position inside Benedisco. Upon seeing
the three (appellant, Rey and Pedrito), Fernando returned to where Felix was and told him to start the tricycle engine as they would bring home
appellant, Rey and Pedrito. Fernando first brought Pedrito out of the pub house and had him seated at the passengers seat inside the tricycle.
Thereafter, he returned and got appellant who was roused when they reached the tricycle. After that, Fernando fetched Rey. While the two
(Fernando and Rey) were already at the gate of Benedisco, Fernando heard a gunshot. When Fernando looked at the tricycle where his
companions were, he saw appellant holding a gun. Immediately, he rushed to the tricycle where Pedrito was. Then, Fernando heard a second
gunshot. According to Fernando, he knew that appellant shot Pedrito. Consequently, Fernando attacked appellant and held him. The two
(Fernando and appellant) grappled for possession of the gun. While they were thus grappling, some policemen arrived (pp. 13-17, TSN, September
18, 1995).

Police Superintendent Sarte called up the police station and ordered his men to pick up appellant for investigation (p. 10, ibid.).

Subsequently, Police Superintendent Sarte inspected the tricycle. He saw Pedrito inside who appeared dead because of the bullet wound at his
head (ibid.).

After that, Felix and Fernando brought Pedrito to Seares Clinic. Pedrito was already dead upon arrival at said clinic (pp. 17-18, TSN, September 18,
1995).

Dr. Milagros Burgos, municipal health officer of Bangued, Abra, testified that she conducted an autopsy on Pedritos cadaver on February 7, 1995 at
9:45 in the morning at the Baquiran Funeral Homes. Dr Burgos found out that rigor mortis had already set in when she conducted the autopsy. She
found two (2) gunshots wounds. The point of entry of the first wound was in the parietal area which is located at lower left side of the back of the
head. The other gunshot wound was beside the other wound. Dr. Burgos opined that the assailant could have been at the back or behind the
victim when the enemy shot the victim because the entry points of the wounds were at the back (pp. 3-9, TSN, September 18, 1995).

SPO4 Napoleon Pascual, officer-in-charge of the Firearm and Explosives Unit (FEU) of Abra, PNP Command, testified that appellant is not a holder
of any license or authorized to possess any kind of firearm. He also testified that the gun used in killing Pedrito is not a licensed firearm (p. 11,
Decision). A certification (Exhibit K) was issued stating that appellant is not a duly licensed firearm holder.[4]

Accused-appellant denied culpability and offered his own recollection of the incident. Accused-appellant narrated that when he was only 2 years
old, his father was killed by victim Pedrito Beralas. This he learned from his mother and other relatives. Accused-appellant admitted that, on
February 6, 1995, he joined the victim and his group in their drinking spree. It was at that time that the alleged killing of the father of accused-
appellant by victim Pedrito was brought up. Accused-appellant maintained that Pedrito confessed to killing his father. But accused-appellant
insisted that they should stop discussing about the death of his father.

Thereafter, when they were about to go home, accused-appellant and Pedrito had an altercation. Accused-appellant claimed that Pedrito
threatened him and attempted to fire his gun at him but failed. So, accused-appellant struggled with Pedrito for the possession of the gun and
consequently, the gun went off. Accused-appellant felt that Pedrito was losing his grip on the gun and so he seized it from him. Because accused-
appellant feared for his life, it was at that moment that he shot the victim.

In its decision dated November 4, 1997, the trial court rendered a judgment of conviction in the three cases, finding and disposing that

IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 1645 FOR MURDER, the Court finds the accused Arnel Bernal guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder
defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Sec. 6 of Republic Act No. 7659 with the aggravating
circumstances of evident premeditation and habitual drunkenness and sentences him to suffer the penalty of DEATH and to indemnify the family
of the late Pedrito Beralas the amount of P52,500.00 in actual expenses incurred in connection with the burial of the latter plus P50,000.00 for his
death and P500,000.00 in moral and exemplary damages;

IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 1646 FOR VIOLATION OF RESOLUTION NO. 2735 OF THE COMELEC otherwise known as the gun ban during an election
period and the Omnibus Election Code, the Court finds the accused Arnel Bernal guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of the said COMELEC
resolution and as provided by par. (q) Secs. 261 and 262 of Article XX11 of the Omnibus Election Code and sentences him to suffer an
imprisonment for a period of TWO (2) YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS and to suffer disqualification to hold public office and deprivation of the right
of suffrage; and

IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 1647 FOR SIMPLE VIOLATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1866 or ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARM AND AMMUNITION,
the Court likewise finds the accused Arnel Bernal guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of simple illegal possession of firearm defined and
penalized under Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866 and sentences him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1)
DAY of prision mayor as minimum to SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS of reclusion temporal as maximum.

In all these cases, the accused is likewise ordered to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.[5]

Hence, the instant review, with accused-appellant anchoring his plea for reversal on the following assigned errors: (1) the trial court erred in
imposing upon the accused the death penalty; (2) the trial court erred in appreciating evident premeditation and treachery; and (3) the trial court
erred in treating Criminal Case No. 1647 as a separate offense.

It appears from the record that not one of the prosecution witnesses saw the actual killing of the victim by accused-appellant. However, the
separate and detailed accounts of the event by prosecution witnesses Fernando and Felix Bernal reveal only one conclusion: that it was accused-
appellant who shot the victim.

Circumstantial as it is, conviction based thereon can be upheld, provided the circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain which leads to
one fair and reasonable conclusion that points to accused-appellant, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person.[6] Direct evidence of the
commission of the crime is not the only matrix from which the trial court may draw its conclusions and findings of guilt. Circumstantial evidence is
of a nature identical to direct evidence. It is equally direct evidence of minor facts of such a nature that the mind is led, intuitively or by a conscious
process of reasoning, to a conclusion from which some other fact may be inferred. No greater degree of certainty is required when the evidence is
circumstantial than when it is direct. In either case, what is required is that there be proof beyond reasonable doubt that a crime was committed
and that accused-appellant committed it.[7]

As noted by the Solicitor General, the evidence is replete with details to prove the fact of death of the victim and to sustain the guilt of accused-
appellant, to wit:

(1) accused-appellant, victim Pedrito, prosecution witnesses Fernando and Felix Bernal, and one Rey Bernal together went to Benedisco pub
located at Bangued, Abra;
(2) since accused-appellant, Pedrito, and Rey were already sleeping inside the pub, Fernando decided to go home, brought out Pedrito first and
seated him inside the tricycle;
(3) then Fernando took out accused-appellant who was roused from sleep and led him to the tricycle;
(4) thereafter, Fernando went inside again to fetch Rey;
(5) on their way out, Fernando heard a gunshot and he saw accused-appellant holding a gun;
(6) Fernando rushed to the tricycle where Pedrito was and it was then that he heard another gunshot;
(7) consequently, Fernando grappled with accused-appellant for the possession of the gun;
(8) Felix Bernal testified that while Fernando fetched Rey inside the pub, he turned on the engine of the tricycle;
(9) while doing so, he heard two gunshots;
(10) when he looked at Pedrito, who was supposedly sleeping inside the tricycle, he saw blood oozing from his head; and
(11) he saw accused-appellant holding a gun.

Concededly, Fernando and Felix did not see the actual shooting and killing of the victim. Nonetheless, the above-mentioned circumstances taken
together form, in our view, one unbroken chain leading to the fair and reasonable conclusion that indeed, accused-appellant, to the exclusion of all
others, was responsible for the death of the victim.
Worse, the death of the victim was accomplished with treachery.

The characteristic and unmistakable manifestation of alevosia is the deliberate, sudden and unexpected attack of the victim from behind, without
any warning and without giving him an opportunity to defend himself or repel the initial assault. If the attack is sudden, unexpected, not preceded
by any provocation and the deceased is not in a situation to defend himself, treachery must be considered as a qualifying circumstance of murder.

The circumstances obtaining in the instant case show that treachery attended the killing of the victim by accused-appellant. The attack on the
victim was sudden and unexpected, and this was evident in the manner accused-appellant shot his victim from behind and while asleep, giving his
victim no opportunity to defend himself or repel accused-appellants attack.

It has been held by this Court in a long line of cases that the qualifying circumstance of treachery exists when one takes the life of a person who is
asleep because in such a case, the victim was not in a position to put up any defense.[8]

Moreover, both prosecution witnesses Fernando and Felix Bernal are one in claiming that the victim was asleep inside the tricycle when they heard
the gunshots. They did not witness any altercation immediately preceding the actual shooting nor was there any while both the victim and
accused-appellant were inside the Benedisco pub. The fact is, after accused-appellant was brought out of the pub by Fernando, the former
positioned himself at the back of the unknowing victim and discharged his firearm twice hitting his victim on the head. Unmistakably, it indicates
the conscious and deliberate actions by accused-appellant to facilitate the killing without risk to himself. The sudden, unexpected and unprovoked
attack during which the victim was not in a position to defend himself constitutes alevosia.[9]

Accused-appellant argues that the trial court committed an error when it imposed the death penalty on him on account of the alternative
aggravating circumstance of habitual drunkenness. He claims that the prosecution was not able to prove the same at the trial, much less that he
intentionally got drunk to commit the crime. We agree.

The general rule is that intoxication may be considered either as aggravating or mitigating, depending upon the circumstances attending the
commission of the crime. Intoxication is mitigating and therefore has the effect of decreasing the penalty if the intoxication is not habitual or
attendant to the plan to commit the contemplated crime. On the other hand, when intoxication is habitual or done intentionally to embolden the
malefactor and facilitate the plan to commit the crime,[10] it is considered as an aggravating circumstance.[11]

In the instant case, accused-appellants intoxication cannot be considered aggravating because there was no showing that it was habitual or
intentional. As testified to by prosecution witness Felix Bernal, their group drink liquor only occasionally, that is, if they had visitors. His testimony
that if they had visitors everyday, they drank everyday does not suffice to prove that accused-appellant was a habitual drunkard. Nor should such
statement be taken against the accused-appellant. Undeniably, accused-appellant was a mere visitor at that time. He came to Bangued to attend a
hearing and from there went to Barangay Dangdangla, Bangued to visit his relatives.

Further, the prosecution failed to prove that accused-appellant got drunk on the day the murder occurred for the purpose of committing the same.
Neither did accused-appellant initiate the drinking spree. He merely acceded to the invitation of the victim to join his group in their drinking spree.
Thus, in the absence of clear and convincing proof that the intoxication was habitual or intentional on the part of accused-appellant, it is improper
to consider the same as an aggravating circumstance.[12]

But his intoxication cannot likewise be considered mitigating because accused-appellant failed to show that his intoxication impaired his will power
or his capacity to understand the wrongful nature of his acts. The person pleading intoxication must prove that he took such quantity of alcoholic
beverage, prior to the commission of the crime, as would blur his reason.[13] This accused-appellant failed to do. No proof was presented by
accused-appellant that the amount of liquor he had taken was of such quantity as to affect his mental faculties. The mere claim of intoxication
does not entitle him to the mitigating circumstance of intoxication.

Accused-appellant likewise reasons that the trial court erred in holding that the killing of the victim was premeditated. He denies that he had any
prior plan or preparation to kill Pedrito Beralas. He points out that the prosecution failed to establish the time when he supposedly decided to
commit the crime or prove the acts manifesting that he clung to his determination and that there was a sufficient lapse of time between
determination and execution.

We agree and the Office of the Solicitor General concurs.

Evident premeditation cannot be deduced from mere presumption or speculation. It must be proven clearly. Evident premeditation cannot be
appreciated without proof of how and when the plan to kill was hatched or how much time elapsed before it was carried out. The premeditation
must be evident and not merely suspected.[14]

We find no evidence directly showing any pre-conceived plan or devise employed by accused-appellant to kill the victim. Accused-appellant did not
go to Barangay Dangdangla, Bangued to kill the victim but to attend to some important matters. As earlier stated, accused-appellant was just
invited by his relatives, whom he had not seen for a while after he changed residence, to have a drinking spree. The probability is that the decision
to shoot the victim was made only right there and then. This should at least cast reasonable doubt on the existence of a premeditated plan to kill
the victim.[15]

The trial court thus erred in holding that evident premeditation attended the killing of the victim merely on the basis of its finding of a deep-seated
and long standing grudge felt by accused-appellant towards the victim. The mere existence of ill-feeling or grudge between the parties is not
sufficient to establish premeditated killing. Even assuming that accused-appellant felt spite towards Pedrito and harbored a desire to vindicate the
death of his father, such a sentiment does not necessarily translate into a resolution to commit a crime. There must be an outward act showing or
manifesting criminal intent.[16] Such is absent in the instant case. Hence, it would be erroneous to declare that the killing of the victim was
premeditated.

Anent accused-appellants conviction in Criminal Case No. 1647 for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 (illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition), the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) recommends that it should not be treated as a separate offense. According to the OSG, the
amendments introduced by Republic Act No. 8294 to Presidential Decree No. 1866 to the effect that the use of an unlicensed firearm in killing the
victim should be treated as an aggravating circumstance finds application in the instant case. Hence, if the offense was committed before the
effectivity of the amendments, it should be given retroactive effect as it favors accused-appellant.
We do not, however, see how such retroactive application of the amendments favors accused-appellant. The amendatory law (RA 8294), which
took effect on July 6, 1997, explicitly provides that if homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an
unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.

Accused-appellant is convicted of the crime of murder which is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Without any aggravating circumstance,
accused-appellant shall be meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua pursuant to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code. However, the presence of
even one aggravating circumstance will send accused-appellant to lethal injection. If we were to treat the use of an unlicensed firearm by accused-
appellant in killing the victim as an aggravating circumstance therefore, the maximum penalty of death would have to be imposed. This obviously
does not strengthen accused-appellants position and does not at all place him in a more favorable situation. It in fact damns him all the more. In
contrast, accused-appellants separate conviction for the offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition will spare him his life.

But if we do not consider the use of an unlicensed firearm as an aggravating circumstance in the accused-appellants prosecution for murder,
should we not instead convict him for the separate offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition under PD 1866 on the theory that this
will spare him his life and is thus favorable to him? We do not think so either.

In Criminal Case No. 1647 for illegal possession of firearms and ammunition (violation of PD 1866), we should apply the ruling enunciated in the
recent case of People vs. Walpan M. Ladjaalam[17] where we declared:

xxx if an unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of any crime, there can be no separate offense of simple illegal possession of firearms.

xxx xxx xxx

The law is clear: the accused can be convicted of simple illegal possession of firearms, provided that no other crime was committed by the person
arrested. If the intention of the law in the second paragraph were to refer only to homicide and murder, it should have expressly said so, as it did in
the third paragraph. Verily, where the law does not distinguish, neither should we.

In the above-cited case of Ladjaalam, the appellant was convicted by the trial court of (1) illegal possession of firearms, (2) direct assault with
multiple attempted homicide and (3) violation of the dangerous drugs law. We acquitted him of the first crime (illegal possession) but affirmed his
conviction of the latter two. In justifying the acquittal, we said inter alia that when the crime was committed on September 24, 1997, the original
language of PD 1866 had already been expressly superseded by RA 8294 xxx and no conviction for illegal possession of firearms separate from any
other crime was thus possible.

In the present case, the illegal possession of firearms (as a separate offense) was committed by accused-appellant before RA 8294 took effect.
Since the amendment contained in RA 8294 is favorable to him in the sense that it would mean his acquittal (from the charge of illegal possession
of firearms), then the law should be given retroactive effect.

We cannot therefore affirm the conviction of accused-appellant for illegal possession of firearm in Criminal Case No. 1647.

With respect to the awards of actual, and moral damages, the same cannot likewise be upheld by this Court. Actual damages cannot be awarded
based on the allegation of a witness without any competent document to support such claim proof is required to be adequately supported by
receipts,[18] and not merely a list as done by the prosecution. However, as the widow of the victim clearly incurred funeral expenses, P10,000.00
by way of nominal damages should be awarded. This award is adjudicated so that a right which has been violated may be recognized or vindicated,
but not for the purpose of indemnification.[19]

Furthermore, the award of P500,000.00 denominated as moral and exemplary damages by the court below is without basis. The widow of the
victim is not entitled to moral damages because she did not testify on any mental anguish or emotional distress which she suffered as a result of
her husbands death. But recent jurisprudence[20] justifies the imposition of exemplary damages in cases where treachery is proven as in this case.
For this reason, we award the amount of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.

Finally, when death occurs as a result of a crime, the heirs of the deceased are entitled to the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the
death of the victim without need for any evidence or proof of damages.[21]

WHEREFORE, finding the convictions of accused-appellant justified by the evidence on record, the Court hereby AFFIRMS said judgments, with the
following modifications: (a) in Criminal Case No. 1645 for murder, the penalty imposed is reduced to reclusion perpetua; (b) aside from the
payment of P10,000.00 as nominal damages, accused-appellant is further ordered to indemnify the heir of the victim P50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages; (c) the awards of actual and moral damages are deleted; and (d) Criminal Case No. 1647 for illegal
possession of firearm is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 111098-99. April 3, 2003]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. PIO BISO alias BISOY, EDUARDO YALONG alias BULOY, appellants.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before us, on appeal, is the decision,[1] dated June 9, 1987, of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 31, in Criminal Cases Nos. 84-24430 and
84-25774, finding Pio Biso and Eduardo Yalong guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and ordering them to pay in solidum the heirs of the victim Dario Pacaldo the amount of P50,000 as civil indemnity.

The Antecedents

At a little past 12:00 midnight on February 16, 1984, Dario Pacaldo, a black belt in karate, entered an eatery located in Masinop, Tondo, Manila,
owned by Augustina Yalong. He seated himself beside Teresita Yalong, the 14-year-old daughter of Augustina Yalong. He made sexual advances on
Teresita in the presence of her brother, Eduardo (Buloy). Dario embraced and touched Teresitas private parts. As Dario was older, bigger, taller and
huskier than Eduardo, the latter and Teresita could do nothing but to shout for help from their mother Augustina. However, before Augustina
could do anything, Dario left the eatery and proceeded to the nearby Gereli Pub House and Disco.[2]

Augustina and Teresita rushed to the house of Barangay Captain Lachica for assistance. Although he was out of the house, his wife Dolores Lachica
accompanied Augustina and Teresita to the police station where Teresita and Augustina lodged a complaint against Dario. Policemen and the three
women proceeded to the nearby Gereli Pub House and Disco where Dario was apprehended by the police officers. They brought him to the Tondo
Police Station where he tried to settle the matter with Augustina and Teresita by offering to pay them P200. However, the two rejected his offer.
An investigation ensued but Dario was released. Augustina and Teresita were told to return to the station in the morning for them to file the
appropriate criminal complaint against Dario.

At about 1:00 a.m., Eduardo contacted his cousin, Pio G. Biso (Bisoy), an ex-convict and a known toughie in the area, and related to him what Dario
had done to Teresita. Eduardo and Pio, Boy Madang and Butso decided to confront Dario. They waited in an alley near the well-lighted Masinop
Street for his arrival.

At or about 1:20 a.m., Eduardo became impatient when Dario had not yet arrived. Eduardo went to the house of Dario and knocked on the door.
When Carmen Augusto, the house helper of the Pacaldos, opened the door, she was surprised to see Eduardo at the door. The latter inquired if
Dario was at home already. When told that Dario had not yet arrived, Eduardo and Pio, Boy Madang and Butso positioned themselves in the alley
near the house of Dario. Carmen noticed that Eduardo and his companions were conversing. Momentarily, Dario arrived on board a taxicab.
Eduardo and Pio, Boy Madang and Butso assaulted Dario. Porfirio Perdigones who was on his way home from work was startled when he saw the
assault. He saw Eduardo hold, with his right hand, the wrist of Dario and cover with his left hand the mouth of Dario. He also saw Boy Madang and
Butso hold Darios right hand and hair. Pio then stabbed Dario near the breast with a fan knife. Petrified, Porfirio fled to his house. Eduardo stabbed
Dario and fled with his three companions from the scene.

Dario was able to crawl to their house and knocked at the door. His younger brother Felixberto was shocked when he opened the door and saw
Dario bloodied all over. Their father Roberto was so incensed when he saw Dario mortally wounded. When Roberto asked Dario who assaulted
him, Dario identified Eduardo with the help of three others. Roberto and Felixberto then called for help to bring Dario to the hospital. Dario
motioned that it was pointless for him to be brought to the hospital. However, Roberto and Felixberto insisted, and brought Dario to the nearby
Mary Johnston Hospital. On the way, Dario told his father that he was stabbed by Eduardo, at the same time flashing three fingers. Dario likewise
told his brother Felixberto that his assailants were Eduardo, Pio, Boy Madang and Butso. Dario died upon arrival in the hospital.

At about 5:30 a.m., Porfirio went to the house of Roberto and told the latter that earlier at about 1:00 a.m., he saw Pio and three others assaulting
Dario. He also told Roberto that he cannot recall their names but can recall their faces. He likewise told Roberto that Pio used a fan knife (balisong)
in stabbing Dario.

Roberto reported the incident to the homicide section of the Tondo Police Station. Police officers arrested Pio. However, Eduardo managed to
elude the police officers and went into hiding. After a month, Eduardo was arrested in Pampanga.

In the meantime, Darios cadaver was autopsied by Dr. Marcial G. Cenido. The doctor prepared a report on his autopsy which reads:

POSTMORTEM FINDINGS

EXTERNAL INJURIES AND EXTENSIONS INTERNALLY:

1. Penetrating stab wound, left upper anterior thorax, 122 cm, from the heel, 6.5 cm. left of anterior midline, measuring 1.5 cm. x 0.8 cm. in depth,
thru 2nd left inter-costal space, cutting upper border of the 3rd costal cartilage, directed obliquely backwards, slightly upwards and towards the
midline perforating the pericardium, incising the upper lobe of the left lung about the hilus;
2. Penetratinf (sic) stab wound, left posterior lumbar, 98 cm. from the heel, 12 cm. left of posterior midline, measuring 2 cm. x 0.9 cm. x 10.5 cm. in
depth, directed obliquely forwards, slightly upwards and towards the midline and piercing the descending colon of the large intestine; and
3. Deep abrasion, right chin and which measures 1 cm. x 0.2 cm.

INTERNAL FINDINGS:

1. Stab wounds of the internal organs and tissue indicated under the internal extensions of the external wounds items 1 & 2, with generalized
pallor;
2. Massive left hemothorax with a very small amount of blood recovered from the abdominal cavity; and
3. Recovered from the stomach a small amount of viscid/without alcoholic odor.

CAUSE OF DEATH

Penetrating stab wounds, left anterior thorax and posterior lumbar.[3]

Pio Biso was charged with murder in an Information docketed as Criminal Case No. 84-24430 which reads:

That on or about February 16, 1984, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating with three others whose true
names, identities and present whereabouts are unknown and helping one another did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously with
intent to kill, and with treachery and evident premeditation, attack, assault and use personal violence upon one Dario Pacaldo y Luega by then and
there stabbing the latter with the use of a bladed weapon thereby inflicting upon him mortal stab wounds which were the direct and immediate
cause of his death thereafter.

Contrary to law.[4]

A separate Information for murder was filed against Eduardo with the said court docketed as Criminal Case No. 84-25774 which reads:

That on or about February 16, 1984, in the city of Manila, Philippines, the said accused conspiring and confederating with Pio G. Biso who was also
charged with the Regional Trial Court of Manila docketed under Criminal Case No. 24430, and two others whose true names, real identities and
present whereabouts are still unknown and helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with premeditation,
attack, assault and use personal violence upon one, Dario Pacaldo y Luega, by there and then stabbing him with a balisong on the left chest and on
the left portion of the back, thereby inflicting upon the said Danilo Pacaldo y Luega mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of
his death.

Contrary to law.[5]

When arraigned on May 13, 1984 and January 3, 1985, respectively, Pio Biso and Edruardo Yalong, assisted by their counsel, pleaded not guilty.[6]
The proceedings in the two cases were consolidated.

The Case for the Accused

Pio denied any participation in the stabbing and the consequent death of Dario, the victim. He averred that he was in his house, sleeping with his
common-law wife Myrna when Dario was stabbed to death.

Eduardo, on the other hand, admitted stabbing Dario. However, he stressed that it was he alone who stabbed the victim. He furthered that he had
no intention of killing the victim. On March 20, 1984, Eduardo gave the same statement to the police officers admitting having stabbed the
victim.[7] He related that after having coffee at a nearby store, he saw the victim who was seemingly drunk alighting from a taxicab. Upon seeing
Eduardo, Dario shouted Nagreklamo pa kayo ay halagang dalawang daang piso lang kayo. To which Eduardo replied Kami na nga ang naagrabyado
ay kayo pa ang matapang. Dario slapped Eduardo so hard that he was pushed to the wall. Eduardo asked Dario Ano ba ang kasalanan ko? Dario
replied Matapang ka ha. Simultaneously, he took out his balisong and lunged at Eduardo. However, Eduardo was able to parry the thrust and wrest
the knife from Dario. Eduardo then swung the knife to Dario, hitting the latter on the chest. Eduardo fled from the scene of crime and went into
hiding.

On June 9, 1987, the court a quo rendered a decision, finding Pio and Eduardo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and
sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds both accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Murder qualified by treachery and evident
premeditation not offset by any mitigating circumstances and the Court hereby sentences each of them to suffer imprisonment of reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment.

Ordering both accused to indemnify the heirs of Dario Pacaldo y Luega the sum of P50,000.00.

Ordering both accused to pay litigation expenses and the costs of this proceedings.[8]

The accused appealed from the decision of the court.[9]

After filing his brief with this Court on June 12, 1999, Pio filed a motion dated January 20, 2000 praying for the withdrawal of his appeal. After
verifying the veracity and the voluntariness of the motion, the Court, in a Resolution dated October 16, 2000, granted the said motion and
declared the case closed and terminated as to Pio Biso.[10]

Appellant Eduardo filed his brief contending that:

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT TREACHERY AND EVIDENT PREMEDITATION ATTENDED THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME.

II

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER.[11]

The appellant posits that the prosecution failed to prove beyond cavil of doubt that he killed the victim with treachery and evident premeditation.
Hence, he is guilty only of homicide and not of murder. He avers that the prosecution failed to prove the essential requisites for evident
premeditation. The trial court, on the other hand, stated in its decision that evident premeditation attended the commission of the crime:

There was evident premeditation as shown by the burning hatred of accused Eduardo Yalong to avenge the dishonor of his sister Teresita Yalong
who was earlier mashed and sexually molested by the deceased in the presence of said accused Yalong. Accused Yalong had a score to settle with
the deceased Pacaldo, so he sought out the help of his ex-convict first cousin Pio Biso, who, together with two (2) others waited at the scene of the
crime for more than one (1) hour near the house of the deceased until his arrival, thereafter they were able to carry out their plan when deceased
arrived after midnight.[12]

We agree with the appellant.

Case law has it that qualifying circumstances must be proved with the same quantum of evidence as the crime itself.[13] For evident premeditation
to be appreciated, the prosecution is required to prove the following:

(a) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that the offender clung to his determination; and
(c) a sufficient interval of time between the determination and the execution of the crime to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his
act.[14]

Evident premeditation is not presumed from mere lapse of time. The prosecution is burdened to prove that the malefactors had decided to
commit a crime and performed an act manifestly indicating that the offender had clung to a previous determination to kill.[15] It must be shown
that there was a period sufficient to afford full opportunity for meditation and reflection, a time adequate to allow the conscience to overcome the
resolution of the will, as well as outward acts showing the intent to kill.[16] The premeditation to kill should be plain and notorious. In the absence
of clear and positive evidence proving this aggravating circumstance, mere presumptions and inferences thereon, no matter how logical and
probable, would not be enough.[17]

Evident premeditation must be established by clear and convincing evidence that the accused persistently and continuously clung to this resolution
despite the lapse of sufficient time for them to clear their minds and overcome their determination to commit the same.[18]

In this case, the prosecution established that the appellant, incensed at seeing the victim molesting his younger sister Teresita, went to Pio, a
notorious toughie in the area, and with two cohorts, proceeded to the house of the victim to confront him but failed to see the victim. However,
the prosecution failed to prove that the four intended to kill Dario and if they did intend to kill him, the prosecution failed to prove how the
malefactors intended to consummate the crime. Except for the fact that the appellant and his three companions waited in an alley for Dario to
return to his house, the prosecution failed to prove any overt acts on the part of the appellant and his cohorts showing that that they had clung to
any plan to kill the victim.

We do not agree with the appellants contention that treachery was not attendant in the commission of the crime.

For treachery to be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, the prosecution must establish that (a) the employment of means of execution which
gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; (b) the means of execution is deliberately or consciously adopted.[19]

The prosecution discharged its burden. Porfirio Perdigones testified how appellant Pio, and their cohorts killed Dario with treachery:

Q: When did you see that Dario Pakaldo (sic) was killed by Pio Biso and his companions?

A: February 16, 1984 about 1:00 in the morning at Masinop St., Tondo, Manila.

Q: How did Pio Biso and his companions killed (sic) Dario Pakaldo?

A: I saw how Dario was killed by Pio Biso, sir. One was holding his right hand, one was holding his left hand, one was holding his head this way, sir.
(witness demonstrating that the fellow hold (sic) Dario on his head, holding his hand at the mouth and other hand at the head and he was stabbed
by Pio Biso).[20]

Dario was powerless to defend himself or retaliate against the appellant and his cohorts.[21] By their collective and simultaneous acts, the
appellant and his cohorts deliberately and consciously insured the consummation of the crime. In sum, the appellant is guilty of murder as defined
and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.

Proper Penalty for the Crime

When the crime was committed in 1984, the penalty for murder was reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. The appellant testified
that he was 17 years old at the time of the commission of the crime. In his sworn statement to the police authorities, he also claimed that he was
17 years old.[22] The prosecution did not adduce any evidence to disprove the evidence of the appellant. Hence, the appellant is entitled to the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority under Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code.[23] Considering that the appellant was 17 years old at
the time of the commission of the felony, the imposable penalty should be reduced by one degree. Hence, the imposable penalty for the crime is
prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its medium period with a range of from ten years and one day to seventeen years
and four months. Although the crime was committed at nighttime, there is no evidence that the appellant and his companions took advantage of
nighttime or that nighttime facilitated the commission of the crime. Hence, nighttime is not aggravating in the commission of the crime.[24] The
crime was committed by a band. However, band was not alleged in the Information as mandated by Section 8, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure.[25] Although the new rule took effect on December 1, 2000 long after the crime was committed, the same shall be applied
retroactively being favorable to the appellant.[26] Taking into account the indeterminate sentence law, the appellant should be meted an
indeterminate penalty of seven years and one day of prision mayor in its medium period as minimum, to twelve years, five months and eleven
days of prision mayor in its medium period as maximum.

Civil Liabilities of the Appellant

The trial court correctly ordered the appellant to pay to the heirs of the victim Dario Pacaldo, P50,000 by way of civil indemnity.[27] The heirs of
the victim are not entitled to moral damages as none of the heirs testified for the prosecution on the factual basis for said award. The heirs are
also entitled to exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000 conformably with the ruling of the Court in People v. Catubig.[28]

The Verdict of the Court

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 31, is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. The
appellant is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and is sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of from seven years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to twelve years, five months and eleven days of prision mayor as maximum.
He is ordered to pay to the heirs of the victim Dario Pacaldo, the amount of P50,000 as civil indemnity and P25,000 as exemplary damages.

With costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-32860 September 30, 1982
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RENATO MARQUEZ, defendants, FRANCISCO FORNESTE and SAMUEL JACOBO, defendants-appellants.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

Renato Marquez, Francisco Forneste and Samuel Jacobo were charged with the crime of robbery with multiple rape before the Court of First
Instance of Quezon, Ninth Judicial District, Branch III in an amended information filed on June 3, 1964.

In the course of the proceedings in the lower court, Renato Marquez died. Pursuant to the lower court's order dated October 1, 1968, Renato
Marquez was dropped as defendant, and the case as against him, dismissed.

After trial, the lower court found Francisco Forneste and Samuel Jacobo guilty of the crime of robbery with rape as defined under Article 294,
paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code and sentenced them as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused FRANCISCO FORNESTE and SAMUEL JACOBO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery
with rape as defined and punished under Article 294, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code, and hereby sentences each of the accused to suffer
the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT, to indemnify Francisca Marquez, jointly and severally, in the amount of P1,760.00 and to pay the costs,

In their statement of facts on appeal, the appellants do not dispute the factual findings of the lower court on the commission of the crime and the
circumstances of its commission. They however, take exception to the lower court's finding that the accused were positively identified as the
perpetrators of the crime by the prosecution witnesses. Hence, their lone assignment of error is:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ACCUSED WERE IDENTIFIED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT THAT THEY WERE THE
PERPETRATORS OF THE ROBBERY.

To establish the guilt of the accused, the prosecution presented the testimonies of : 1) Francisca Marquez; 2) Leticia Tan 3) Dr. Lina C. Habito and
4) Emilio Luna with accompanying documentary evidence.

... on November 16, "1966" between seven and seven-thirty in the evening while she was in their house in barrio Dahican Catanauan, Quezon
together with her seven children and maid Rufina Marquez, somebody called in front of their window who identified themselves as PC soldier
looking for contraband. She replied that they did not have any contraband and that her husband, Angel Tan, was in the poblacion at that time. The
men ordered her to open up otherwise they will shoot up their house. Afraid, she opened the window shutter when, suddenly, a man whom he
(sic) later on recognized as Renato Marquez jumped inside. She was able to recognized Renato Marquez as the light was bright. Renato held her by
the nape and pushed her towards the door and at gunpoint ordered her to open the same. She was not able to shout as she was caught by surprise
and besides, she was afraid. When she opened the door, accused Samuel Jacobo and Francisco Forneste, both armed with guns, entered and
ordered her to put out their contraband and when she told them that they did not have any, the intruders demanded for money. She pointed at
the table which Renato Marquez pried open and took P300 therefrom. Samuel Jacobo also pried open their aparador where he got P200. Jacobo
also dispossesed her of her ring worth P15.00 and a pair of earings worth also that much. At that instant, the other accused Francisco Forneste was
upstairs guarding her children and helper. Samuel Jacobo asked her why they have only a small amount of money when they are copra-buyers and
she replied that they were just starting on their business. Whereupon, Jacobo demanded: "kuarta o buhay" so that she put out her pillow which
Jacobo grabbed and ripped open and took therefrom P820.00. Afterwards, Samuel Jacobo raped her at gunpoint while Renato Marquez ransacked
their store and took merchandise therefrom. After five minutes, Jacobo took her upstairs and tied both her arms and made her he face down on
the floor together with her children. Subsequently, her daughter Leticia and helper Rufina Martinez were taken downstairs by Francisco Forneste.
Shortly she heard Leticia shout: "Nanay" while Rufina Martinez screamed "Nanang Kikay, Nanang Kikay." Afterwards, both Leticia and Rufina were
taken upstairs by Francisco Forneste, tied and also made to lie face down on the floor. After the men had left and they did not hear any noise
anymore, Leticia was able to untie Rufina by biting the rope. Rufina, in turn, untied her and the others. After they had freed themselves, both
Leticia and Rufina cried, She asked them happened and both of them confessed that they were abused respectively by Renato Marquez and
Francisco Forneste. Aside from they lost also the following: radio worth P125.00; radio-phono worth P135.00; a ten-battery flashlight valued at
P10.00, an P85.00 wrist watch: Leticia s necklace, worth P15.00; and Rufina earings, worth P40.00 as well as her ring. (Decision, pp. 18-20, rollo)

Leticia Tan corroborated the foregoing testimony of her mother. She further testified that both she and Rufina Marquez, their housemaid, were
raped by Renato Marquez and Francisco Forneste respectively. The rapes, according to her were committed in the following manner: when her
mother, Francisco Marquez was taken upstairs, Renato Marquez brought her downstairs, to their store. Inside the store Renato Marquez to her "
to give something and if I refused I would be killed ( T.S.N., December 12, 1968, p.19). Simultaneously Renato Marquez "poked a gun and also a
balisong" at her causing her to be afraid (T.S.N. December 12, 1968, supra p. 20) She called for her mother but then she was told not to shout
because "I am going to be killed." (T.S.N. December 12, 1968, supra, p. 20) Thereafter, she was focibly made to lie down and Renato Marquez
committed the act on her. (T.S.N. December 12, 1968, supra, p. 22) Leticia related that during the time that she was with Renato Marquez, Rufina
Martinez was with Francisco Forneste and that immediate after the departure of Renato Marquez, Francisco Forneste and Samuel Jacobo, Rufina
Martinez told her that she was also raped by Francisco Forneste. (T.S.N., December 12,1968, supra, pp. 22-23).

Dr. Lina C. Habito testified regarding Leticia's allegation that she and Rufina Martinez were raped. Dr. Lina C. Habito, resident physician of the
Bondoc Peninsula General hospital at Catanauan, Quezon stated that she examined the injuries sustained by Francisca Marquez, Leticia Tan and
Rufina Martinez on 20 November 1963 and issued the corresponding medical certificates (Exhibits "A", "B" and "C"). Thus: 1) The medical
certificate issued to Francisco Marquez stated:

DIAGNOSIS:

— Linear abrasion #4, diagonal along the wrist left posterior.

— Abrasion supraclavicular area right.

— Abrasion linear #2 - anterior diagonal along the wrist right.

Refused to further examination.

DURATION: 1 to 9 days excluding complication!

(Exhibit A)

2) The medical certificate issued to Leticia Tan stated:

DIAGNOSIS:

— Abrasion with hematoma at the posters lateral side wrist right.

— Internal Examination:

Has slight bloody discharge. Contusion at 12 and 6 o'clock Vagina admits 2 fingers with difficulty.

(Exhibit C)

3) and the medical certificate issued to Rufina Martinez stated:

DIAGNOSIS:

— Abrasion antero medial side wrist left.

— Abrasion postero medial area wrist right.

— Internal Examination:

Semicircular contusion at 3, 4, and 5 o'clock

Vaginal canal admits two fingers freely.

(Exhibit B)

Dr. Habito testified that the injuries sustained by Leticia Tan and Rufina Martinez on their sex organs could have been caused by the entry of a
male organ.

Rufina Martinez was not placed on the witness stand. Atty. Uy, the private prosecutor informed the court that she could not be located because
she was only a househelp, (T.S.N., March 12, 1969, p. 12) The crime was committed in 1963 and the manifestation on her absence was made in
1969. Nevertheless, the lower court through the evidence presented, ruled:

As to the accused Francisco Forneste, the fact that Rufina Martinez had confessed to Francisca Marquez and Leticia Tan right after the commission
of the crime about her being sexually violated by the accused could be considered as a part of the res gestae and, therefore, the same is removed
from the operation of hearsay rule. Besides, the medical certificate is a telltale evidence of the commission of rape on the person of Rufina
Martinez. (Decision, p. 31, rollo)

Furthermore, the appellants admit in their brief that Rufina Martinez was raped. Their defense consists of denials that they were the culprits who
committed the crime.

The identity of Renato Marquez, Francisco Forneste and Samuel Jacobo as the perpetrators of the crime was positively established by the victims
themselves, Francisca Marquez and Leticia Tan.

Francisca Marquez testified:

Q Do you know were those persons responsible for the rape and robbery committed in your house?
A Yes, sir.
Q If you could see those persons, will you be able to point them out?
A Yes, sir.
Q Will you please look around this courtroom and see if those persons you alleged to be responsible are here?
A The two are here, sir.
Q Will you please point them out to the Court?
A That man in white polo shirt (Who, when asked for his name, responded to the name Francisco Forneste and pointed to a man who,
when asked for his name, responded to the name Samuel Jacobo).
Q You said only two are here in court. Are there other persons responsible?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who is that person or who are those persons?
A Renato Marquez, sir.
Q The Court noticed that the other person you just mentioned has the family name of Marquez. Do you have any relation with this Renato
Marquez?
A He is my distant relative, sir." (T.S.N., April 4, 1966, pp. 5-6)

ATTY. UY
Q Is this Renato Marquez the same person who jumped into your house on the same date whom you said is related to you?
A Yes, sir.

COURT:
Q You recognized him right then and there?
A Yes, Your Honor. I know him already because our light was bright, sir.

ATTY. UY:
Q What happened after he get into the house?
A He approached me and he held my nape and then he pushed me towards the door with his gun being poked at me and he told to open
the door, sir.
Q Did you open the door?
A Yes, sir.
Q When you opened the door, what happened?
A The two entered, sir.
Q Who entered
A Francisco Forneste and Samuel Jacobo, sir. (T.S.N., April 4,1966, supra, pp. 10-11)

ATTY. UY
Q After Samuel Jacobo had taken the eight hundred twenty pesos from your pillow, anything more happened?
A Because I could not do anything, 'kinuha ang aking pagkababae', sir.
Q Who?
A Samuel Jacobo, sir.
Q Where did that particular incident happen?
A In the place where I sleep near the aparador, sir.
Q And while this incident was being perpetrated, where is this Renato Marquez?
A He was there in our store ransacking the place and even our goods for sale were taken, sir. (T.S.N., April 4, 1966, supra, pp. 17-18)
Q And it was on the bed from where your pillow containing eight hundred twenty pesos was taken by Samuel Jacobo?
A Yes, sir.
A And afterwards you were made to lie on that same bed near the window?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q And the pillow was still there?
A It was already destroyed, sir.
Q And Renato Marquez was not there?
A He was ransacking the other part of the house, sir.
Q So nobody was there except you and Samuel Jacobo?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you willingly consented to the act committed by Samuel Jacobo?
A What could I do, sir, when a gun was being poked at me?
Q Why? Were they armed?
A Yes, sir, and they were armed and they had fan knife also.
Q What was Samuel Jacobo carrying with him when he was committing all these acts to you?
A He was holding a gun as short as this (Witness indicating the length of about one (1) foot).
Q What was Samuel Jacobo carrying at that time?
A gun, sir.
Q No balisong?
A He had a balisong on his left waist, sir (Witness pointing to her left waist).
Q When he entered the house after ordering you to open up, was he already carrying a gun and a knife?
A Yes, sir. They were already holding gun."(T.S.N., April 4, 1966, supra, pp. 19-20

The records sustain the following findings of the lower court:

As her husband failed to return home that evening, she went to the poblacion the following day to look for him. She found her husband and,
together, they reported the matter to the Chief of Police. Aside from the police, the PC also investigated the incident. They were made to identify
the accused Francisco Forneste and Renato Marquez at the municipal building on November 20th. During the second time that they went to the
municipal building, they were asked to Identify the accused Samuel Jacobo. On that occasion, an the three accused were present. On November
20, 1963, the PC took down her affidavit. There were many persons in the office where they confronted the accused. She pointed the accused
secretly to the PC as she was afraid that if she will do it openly, the accused might take revenge against them. In that confrontation, she pointed to
accused Francisco Forneste as one with the "bigote". Before the occurrence of the crime, she already knew Renato Marquez and Francisco
Forneste. She can recognize them anywhere, anytime and any place that she will meet them. Renato is her distant relative while Francisco
Forneste is known to her as he is also from Catanauan. She knows his parents and she used to see him in the poblacion. She recalls that Francisco
Forneste was at their house on election day, November 14. Before the incident, she saw Forneste for about five times and, she knows him for a
long time already. She knows Samuel Jacobo by face only but she frequently sees him as the jeep they used to take in going to the poblacion
passes by the house of Samuel which is near a bakery where people buy bread. The usual hangout of Samuel Jacobo is the store where "Liwayway"
is sold. Before she was called to the confrontation meeting, she already revealed the names of the culprits to the PC officers except one whom she
does not know the name. During the commission of the crime in question, their house was brightly lighted. She did not mention the fact that she
was raped in her affidavit because at that time, she was still worried as they were threatened that if ever they will report the matter to the
authorities, they will be killed. She did not submit to a medical examination because anyway she was a married woman already. (Decision, lower
court, pp. 20-21, Records)

On the other hand, Leticia Tan who was only thirteen years old when she was raped positively Identified the three accused as the persons who
robbed and abused them. During the November 12, 1968 hearing, Tan was suffering from emotional strain and the hearing had to be postponed.
In fact, during the December 12, 1968 hearing, her testimony was as follows:

ATTY. UY:
Q Will you please tell the Court or rather relate to the Court how you were abused?
A Yes, sir. When my mother was brought up the house, we were told to go down.
Q Who brought you down?
A Renato Marquez.
Q Do you know where you were brought, to where you were brought?

DEPUTY CLERK:
Q Witness at this stage is crying,

WITNESS:
A To our store,

ATTY. UY:
Q And while you were in your store what happened if anything happened?

COURT:

Answer.

WITNESS:
A I was told to give something and if I refused I would be killed.

ATTY. UY:
Q Did you understand what was that something he was asking?
A Yes, sir.
Q Will you please tell the Court what was it?

ATTY. CADAG:

Witness refused to answer,

COURT:
Q You cannot answer
A (No answer)..

ATTY. UY:
Q In short did you give that something that he was asking from you'?

ATTY. CADAG:
We will object., Your Honor, because that 'something' is vague. What is that something?

ATTY. UY:
Q Will you please answer what was that something that he was asking?

ATTY. CADAG:
Witness, Your Honor, refused to answer.

ATTY. UY:
Q Did anything happen after he asked you to give him that something?
A Yes, sir. A gun was poked at me and also a 'balisong' and so I became afraid.
Q And what happened?

ATTY. CADAG:
Witness, your Honor, refused to answer.

WITNESS:
A I was calling for my mother but I was told not to shout because I am going to be killed,

ATTY. UY:
Q And what happened?
A I was told to lie down.

COURT
Q Did you lie down?
A I was forcibly made to lie down,
Q And after you were forcibly made to lie down what did the accused do?
A (no answer).
Q You answered that and was pointed to you and a 'balisong', who, pointed to you a gun and 'balisong'. "A What did Renato Marquez point
to you?
A A gun.
Q How about the 'balisong', who pointed to you?
A He also. He was carrying two weapons.
Q Now, there were only the two of you inside the store at that time?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q All right, you were forcibly laid down by Marquez?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q After that, when you were already lying down what did he do to you? Are you ashamed to answer? Do not be ashamed, because the
persons in front of you are all married.
Q Did he do something to your person?
A Yes, sir.
Q What particular act did he do to you? Nakuha ba ang iyong pagkababae?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q After that what happened?
A I was brought upstairs and we were tied." (T.S.N., December 12, 1968, pp. 18-22)

Again, the records sustain the lower court's summary of Leticia Tan's testimony:

... They reported the incident to the police authorities who investigated her, her mother and Rufina Martinez. They were taken by the police to the
hospital where she was examined. She pointed Francisco Forneste to the PC after the PC had asked them who committed the robbery. Her mother,
Rufina and herself were together in going to the office of the Chief of Police in the company of PC soldiers. She was thirteen years old when the
incident happened, After Renato Marquez and Samuel Jacobo had taken the money from her mother, the two accused entered her room. At that
time, there was a gasera lamp in the ground floor as well as in the upper floor. Although afraid, she looked at the robbers. One of them had a
moustache, the other was short and had a slender body and the third was tall and big-bodied. It was Francisco Forneste who had a moustache. She
signed her affidavit (Exhibit D) in the municipal building. She made the Identification of the accused at the municipal building on November 20,
1963. Before they went to the municipal building, she did not know yet the names of the accused. (Decision, pp. 22-23, rollo)

The accused, in refuting the lower court's finding that they were positively identified by the complaining witnesses, stress that these witnesses
stated on three occasions that they did not know the identity of the persons who perpetrated the crime. These occasions were: (1) During the
investigation conducted by the Chief of Police of Catanauan immediately after the incident at about 9:00 in the evening of November 16, 1963, the
complaining witnesses, when asked by the former if they recognized the robbers answered in the negative; (2) On November 17, 1963 or the day
after the incident, Leticia Tan, when asked about the Identity of the robbers at the house of Goding Tan by Sgt. Lastimoso, a member of the
Catanauan Police Force, answered that she did not know them; (3) When the complaining witnesses were brought to the office of the Chief of
Police of Catanauan on November 17, 1963, to identify the suspects. among them Renato Marquez and the appellants herein, the complaining
witnesses were not able to identify the robbers, much less the accused who were directly pointed to them by Patrolman Mariano Yuson, a
member of the police force of Catanauan who took over the investigation of the incident.

These circumstances do not affect the credibility of the complaining witnesses as regards their identification of the accused as the perpetrators of
the crime. The silence of the complaining witnesses on the identity of the accused immediately after the incident was explained by the ordeal they
had just suffered at the hands of the accused. The accused were armed during the incident and the complaining witnesses were threatened with
death. Francisca Marquez expressed fear that the accused might take revenge in case she would divulge their Identity. Thus, during the first
investigation conducted by the PC authorities where there was a confrontation between Renato Marquez and Francisco Forneste on one hand and
the complaining witnesses on the other, Francisca Marquez pointed out secretly to the PC that the accused were the perpetrators of the crime ...
because I am afraid they might revenge against me, sir. I cannot do that openly." (T.S.N., April 4, 1966, p. 42) We pointed out in People v. Rendora,
G.R. No. L-14356, September 30, 1959; People v. Elizago, 73 SCRA 524, citing People v. Sanchez, G.R. No. L-13335, November 29, 1960 that:
"Experience, ... has shown that witnesses are reluctant to divulge the identity of their assailants except to the proper authorities or until they feel
the enough from any probable harm."

Moreover the complaining witnesses who were initially silent on the Identity of the accused, gave descriptions instead. According to defense
witness German Averia, then Chief of Police of Catanauan who initially investigated the incident: "I asked them if they knew the identity of the
suspects. They did not name names. They only . . . I remember they gave the description and I remember one of the suspects has been described
as very similar to my hair and weight." (T. S. N., May 5, 1970, p. 22) These descriptions given by the complaining witnesses were never questioned
as not applicable to the accused, hence it may be safely concluded that the same jibe with the descriptions of the accused.

Finally, as the lower court correctly said:

... it was not shown why the complaining witnesses would testify in the manner that they did against the accused. The accused failed to ascribe any
improper motive on the part of said complaining witnesses. Neither was it shown that said witnesses were obsessed with bias or prejudice against
the accused. (Decision, p. 30, rollo)

Since, in the commission of the crime, the following aggravating circumstances alleged in the information were proved by the prosecution: (1)
nighttime; (2) unlawful entry; (3) dwelling of the offended parties; (4) by disguise, that is by pretending to be PC officers: and (5) by utter disregard
due to victims' age and sex with no mitigating circumstances to offset the same, the lower court was correct in imposing the maximum penalty
pursuant to Article 294 paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code. However, the sentence of life imprisonment should be denominated reclusion
perpetua considering that this is the technical term of the penalty which carries with it the imposition of accessory penalties. (People v. Mobe, 51
Phil. 88: People v. Pilones, 84 SCRA 167; People v. De Jesus, 85 SCRA 686; People v. De la Cruz, 85 SCRA 285.)

We notice that the lower court did not award indemnity for the rape victims. Hence, pursuant to Articles 21, 2216, 2219, 2229 and 2230 of the Civil
Code We hereby award indemnity (People v. Amiscua, 37 SCRA 813) and fix the same in the sum of P12,000.00 (People v. Amit, 32 SCRA 95; People
v. Otto, 49 SCRA 306; People v. Gonzales, 58 SCRA 265; and People v. Abay, 70 SCRA 512) for each of the rape victims.

The evidence adduced is not sufficient to show any conspiracy among the accused in the commission of the crime of rape against the persons of
Francisca Marquez, Leticia Tan and Rufina Martinez. Therefore, the lower court was correct in concluding that the crime committed by the accused
appellants was robbery with rape not robbery with multiple rape as alleged in the information. Accordingly, the award for indemnity should be as
follows: Francisco Forneste to indemnify his rape victim Rufina Martinez and Samuel Jacobo to indemnify is rape victim Francisca Marquez.

WHEREFORE, We find the accused-appellants FRANCISCO FORNESTE and SAMUEL JACOBO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery
with rape pursuant to Article 294 paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code. The judgment appealed from is modified as follows:

1) The term life imprisonment should be changed to reclusion perpetua;

2) Accused-appellant FRANCISCO FORNESTE shall indemnify RUFINA MARTINEZ in the sum of TWELVE THOUSAND (P12,000.00) PESOS with
no subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency by reason of the penalty imposed; and
3) Accused-appellant SAMUEL JACOBO shall indemnify FRANCISCA MARQUEZ in the sum of TWELVE THOUSAND (P12,000.00) PESOS with
no subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency by reason of the penalty imposed.

In all other respects, the judgment appealed from. is hereby affirmed with costs against the appellants.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Vasquez and Relova, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 95756 May 14, 1993
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CRISOLOGO EMPACIS, accused-appellant.

NARVASA, C.J.:

In the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City,1 five men, namely: Crisologo Empacis, Romualdo Langomez, Zacarias Solis, Carlito Antiga, and Bebe Antiga,
were indicated for the crime of robbery with homicide under Article 294 (1), in relation to Article 296, of the Revised Penal Code.2 The indictment
reads as follows:

That on the 16th day of September, 1986 at 9:00 o'clock in the evening, more or less, in Barangay Kanguha, Municipality of dumanjug, Province of
Debu . . . (said) accused, all armed with carbines and bladed weapons, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with evident
premeditation and intent to kill, treacherously attack, assault and use personal violence upon FIDEL SAROMINES by stabbing him on different parts
of his body and as a result of which FIDEL SAROMINES died; that on the occassion of the said killing, in pursuance of their conspiracy, . . . (the)
accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and by means of violence, with intent to gain and against the will of FIDEL
SAROMINES, TAKE, STEAL AND CARRY AWAY the sum of TWELVE THOUSAND (P12,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, belonging to the latter.

That the crime was committed by a band, all the accused being armed with carbines and bladed weapons (Article 296, RPC).

IN VIOLATION of and contrary to ARTICLE 294 paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code.

All the accused, except Romualdo Langomez, were thereafter taken into custody. Langomez disappeared, and was never apprehended and
brought to trial.3 In due course, the other accused were arrainged and tried.

Sometime in December, 1987, during the trial, Carlito Antiga died from a gunshot wound.4

The trial eventuated in a verdict of conviction against Crisologo Empacis, and of acquittal as regards Zacarias Solis and Bebe Antiga. The Trial
Court's judgment, dated October 24, 1989, made the following final disposition:5

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Crisologo Empacis guilty of robbery with homicide as defined and penalized under Article 294 (1) of the
Revised Penal Code, and considering the attendance of the four generic aggravating circumstances of dwelling, nighttime, craft or fraud and
superior strength, not offset by any mitigating or extenuating circumstance, hereby sentences the said accused Crisologo Empacis to the supreme
penalty of death. In view of the fact, however, that the death penalty has been abolished by Section 19(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution,6 the
accused Crisologo Empacis is hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetua, to suffer the accessory penalties prescribed by law and to pay the heirs of
Fidel Saromines the amount of THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00) by way of death indemnity, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency in view of the principal penalty. He shall also pay the costs of these proceedings.

The accused Crisologo Empacis is hereby immediately ordered arrested and held in the custody of the law pending appeal or review of this
decision, should the accused wish to appeal from or take up on review this decision.

The other two accused Zacarias or Caring Solis and Bebe Antiga are hereby acquitted of the charges against them, their guilt not having been
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

Let a bench warrant issue against the fifth accused in this case, Romualdo a.k.a. Maldo Langomez so that he can be brought to court to be dealt
with accordingly.

The Trial Court accorded superior credit to the evidence of the prosecution in so far as it established Empacis' direct participation in the felony
charged, to wit: the testimony of the widow of victim, Camila Saromines; of their son, Peter Saromines; and of a neighbor, Balbino Bulak, which the
Court found to be corroborated inter alia by the Post Mortem Report dated September 17, 1986 of the Rural Health Physician at Dumanjug, Cebu
(Dr. Octavio Ortiz), and even by the testimony of accused Crisologo Empacis himself.7

Following is the story narrated to the Trail Court by the Government witnesses.

At about 9 o'clock on the night of September 16, 1986, as Fidel Saromines and his wife, Camila, were about to close to their small store, located in
their house at Kanguha, Dumanjug, Cebu, two men came and asked to buy some sardines and rice. They were Romualdo (or Maldo) Langomez and
Crisologo Empacis. Camila served them and they proceeded to make a meal of the rice and sardines.

After they finished eating, Romualdo told Fidel to sell him cigarettes. As Fidel was handing over the cigarettes, Romualdo announced a "hold-up"
and commanded Fidel to give up his money. As it happened, Fidel then had P12,000.00 in his house, wrapped in cellophane. This he started to give
to Romualdo but as the latter was taking hold of the packet, Fidel suddenly decided to fight to keep his money. A struggle followed in the course of
which Romualdo stabbed Fidel about three times. Crisologo joined in and with his own knife also stabbed Fidel. At this time, gunshots were heard
outside of the house; and a neighbor of the Saromineses, Balbino Bulak, recognized one of those doing the shooting as certain Carlito Antiga.8 A
voice was heard from below saying, "Stab him!"9 to which Langomez replied, "I already stabbed (him)."10

From his little sister's room, Fidel's thirteen-year odl son, Peter, saw his father fighting for his life with Romualdo and Crisologo Empacis. Heeding
his father's cry, "Peter, help me!" (Suportahe ko, Peter!), Peter took hold of a "pinuti" (a long bolo), and rushed to his father's defense. He struck
out at Crisologo and inflicted two wounds on him, one at the right shoulder, and the other, in the neck. Romualdo and Crisologo jumped out of the
house and fled, with the sound of Peter's defiant shout trailing them, "Come back, if you are brave!"

Peter then turned to his wounded father, but found him already dead from his injuries. The post-mortem examination conducted by Dr. Octavio
Ortiz, Rural Health Physician, disclosed four (4) stab wounds on the deceased, all in the upper back. Two of these, which penetraded the lungs and
heart, were
fatal.11

Crisologo Empacis repaired to the clinic of Dr. Eustaquio Deiparine at the poblacion of Sibonga, Cebu, for treatment of the wounds inflicted on him
by Peter, arriving there between 10 and 11 o'clock that same night. The doctor found Crisologo's wounds — described by him as a "(hacking)
wound on the right side of the neck and the right shoulder" — "so serious" as to require further treatment, even after they had been sutured. Dr.
Deiparine asked Crisologo how he had come by these wounds. Crisologo said that at around 6 to 7 o'clock that evening, near the Papan Market, he
was assaulted without warning by a young man, who injured him with a bolo.

Police officers came to Dr. Deiparine's clinic the following morning, looking for a man might have been treated for wounds from a bladed weapon.
They were directed to the public market where they came upon Crisologo, taking breakfast. They arrested him and brought him to the Dumanjug
INP Station. There, Crisologo was interrogated by the Station Commander, P/Pfc. Rogelio Abrea, and gave a sworn statement.

Crisologo was later brought to Municipal Judge Gerardo Gestopa, before whom he took oath on his affidavit. Before admnistering the oath, the
Judge had a law graduate, one Victor Esguerra, called to assist Crisologo and verify if he had voluntarily executed his sworn statement.

The three (3) accused all took the witness stand in their defense,12 and gave stories different from that of the prosecution witnesses.

Empacis confirmed the facts established by the prosecution witnesses, up to a point. He admitted that he and Romualdo Langomez had indeed
gone to the store of Fidel Saromines on the night in question, and had there partaken of a meal of sardines and rice. He also acknowledged that
after taking their supper, Romualdo Langomez had gone upstairs to buy some cigarettes from Fidel, and it was there the moments later, he saw
Romualdo and Fidel grappling with each other. He denies having joined Romualdo in attacking Fidel. He claims that when he saw Romualdo pull
out a knife, he tried to stop Romualdo from using the knife on his adversary; that nonetheless, Romualdo succeeded in stabbing Fidel twice; that a
teen-age boy came with a bolo and lashed out at Romualdo but the latter was not hit because he pulled him to one side, and instead it was he
(Empacis) who was struck at the right side of the neck; that he then ran away towards his barrio and from there he was brought by his neighbors to
the clinic of Dr. Deiparine; that he was arrested by the police the following morning; that while being investigated at the municipal hall of
Dumanjug, he told the investigator he wished to avail of the assistance of counsel but his request went unheeded; and that while being
interrogated, some policemen were inflicting pain on him by squeezing his injured back in order to force him to admit his participation in the
robbery-homicide at Kanguha, Dumanjug.13

The other two accused, Zacarias Solis and Bebe Antiga, denied any participation whatever in the crime. They were both absolved by the Trial Court,
which agreed with them that the prosecution had indeed failed to clearly and positively and their complicity in the offense.14

The Court a quo rejected (quite correctly, it may be said) the sworn statement purpotedly execute by Empacis on September 17, 1986, offered by
the prosecution, condemning it was "null and void, . . . offensive to Art. III, Section 20, of the New Constitution and the teachings of the Supreme
Court
. . . ."15 It ruled however that the other proofs of the prosecution overwhelmingly demonstrated Crisologo Empacis' guilt of the crime charged, and
accordingly entered a judgment of conviction against him. It ruled that Empacis had committed the offense in conspiracy with Romualdo Langomez
(who was then and to this day remains at large); that both of them knew Fidel to be in possession of a sizable amount of money at the time, and
their concerted acts proved their agreement to rob Fidel and if necessary, kill him. It also ruled that the crime was attended by several aggravating
circumstances, i. e., having been perpetrated (a) "in the dwelling of the offended party . . . (the latter not having) given provocation,"16 (b) "in the
nighttime;"17 (c) with employment of "craft of fraud;"18 and (d) with advantage being taken of superior strength.19

From this judgment Empacis has appealed to this Court. His basic thesis is that the evidence of the prosecution does not actually prove his guilt of
the felony of which he is accused beyond reasonable doubt.

A painstaking review of the record fails to reveal to this Court any error on the part of the Trial Court of sufficient gravity to justify reversal or
modification of its verdict. This Court is unable to perceive any reason to doubt the veracity of the testimony of the victim's widow and son
respecting the identity of Romualdo Langomez and Crisologo Empacis as the persons who attacked and killed Fidel Saromines in their effort to
make off with the latter's money amounting to P12,000.00, and the acts individually done by Romualdo and Crisologo in pursuance of their
common nefarious objective. Indeed, the narrative of the widow and son is, as already pointed out, confirmed for the most part by the testimony
of Crisologo Empacis himself. The latter's attempt to exculpate himself, by portraying himself as a frustrated protector of Fidel Saromines, cannot
be taken at face value, as against the more credible declarations of the victims widow and son, specially considering that Crisologo's credit as a
witness has been gravely enfeebled by his having obviously lied to the physician treating him, as regards the cause of his
injuries.20

The Court has been cited to no plausible cause for Fidel's widow and son to testify falsely against Crisologo if it be true, as the latter insinuates,
that either they had not seen the actual killing or, having witnessed it, had seen Crisologo actually try to stop Romualdo from stabbing Fidel. No
reason exists, therefore, to disbelieve them.21 The fact that the victim's son, Peter, had to correct his statement on direct examination that
Romualdo Langomez stabbed his father five (5) times, declaring, on cross-examination, that in truth Romualdo stabbed his father only about three
times while Crisologo Empacis stabbed the victim once — which the appellant seeks to make capital — is not sufficient warrant to reject and
discard Peter's evidence. The discrepacy is at best a minor one, not all destructive of Peter's credibility as an unrehearsed witness. This Court
agrees that the Trial Court has correctly assessed the credit that should be accorded to the evidence of the prosecution witnesses.

This Court also agrees that conspiracy is adequately proven by the evidence. Langomez and Crisologo Empacis came to Fidel's store late at night,
acting as bona fide customers. Immediately after finishing their supper, they demanded the delivery to them of Fidel's money, of which they
evidently had prior knowledge, Crisologo lending silent support to his companion's order for Fidel to turn over the money to them; they helped
each other wrest the money away from Fidel and subdue him by deadly knife thrusts; Romualdo stabbing Fidel thrice, Crisologo, once; they had
obviously arranged for shots to be fired from outside Fidel's store as a means of frightening Fidel to submit to their command; and they fled from
the scene, together. They acted in concert, helping and cooperating with one another (and others) by simultaneous acts, evidently in pursuit of a
common objective.22

The aggravating circumstance of craft or fraud23 was properly appreciated against Empacis. He and Romualdo pretended to be bona fide
customers of the victim's store and on his pretext gained entry into the latter's store and later, into another part of his dwelling. This Court has
held stratagems and ruses of this sort to constitute the aggravating circumstance of fraud or craft, e.g: where the accused —

a) pretended to be constabulary soldiers and by that ploy gained entry into the residence of their prey whom they thereafter robbed and
killed;24
b) pretended to be needful of medical treatment, and through this artifice, entered the house of the victim whom they thereupon robbed
and killed;25

c) pretended to be wayfarers who had lost their way and by this means gained entry into a house, in which they then perpetrated the crime
of robbery with homicide;26

d) pretended to be customer wanting to buy a bottle of wine;27

e) pretended to be co-passengers of the victim in a public utility vehicle;28

f) posed as customers wishing to buy cigarettes; and as being thristy, asking for drink of water.29

The Court also agrees that nighttime was properly appreciated as an aggravating circumstance against the accused. To be sure, nighttime is not per
se aggravating.30 It must be shown that nocturnity was deliberately and purposely sought to facilitate, or that it actually facilitated, the
commission of the crime.31 In the case at bar, the lateness of the hour no doubt precluded the presence of other customers who could have
deterred the felons, or come to the aid of the victim. All things considered, there is adequate showing that nocturnity was deliberately sought by
the robbers and did in reality facilitate the perpetration of the felony.

For the aggravating circumstance of superior strength to be deemed present in a case, it does not suffice to prove superiority in number on the
part of the malefactors;32 it must appear that they purposely employed excessive force, force out of proportion to the means of defense available
to the person attacked.33 In this case, the evidence shows that Empacis helped his co-accused by also stabbing the victim; he and his companion
took advantage of their combined strength and their bladed weapons to overcome their unarmed victim and assure the success of their felonious
design to make off with his money.

That the crime was "committed in the dwelling of the offended party, . . . the latter . . . not (having) given provacation," was also correctly
appreciated as an aggravating circumstance.34

This Court thus sees no cause to deviate from the established axiom that the factual findings of the Trial Court are accorded the highest respect on
appeal, if not indeed regarded as conclusive, absent any persuasive showing that material facts have been overlooked or ignored which might
otherwise dictate a different verdict.35

The Court a quo sentenced a Crisologo Empacis to pay the heirs of Fidel Saromines in the amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) "by way
of death indemnity." Pursuant to prevailing case law,36 this indemnity must be increased to Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00). On the other hand,
despite the evidence given by Fidel Saromines' widow establishing the forcible taking from her husband of the amount of P12,000.00 by Crisologo
and Romualdo,37 the Trial Court somehow omitted to require the return of said stolen money, as required by law.38

WHEREFORE, with the modification that the indemnity for death payable to the heirs of Saromines is increased to P50.000.00 and restitution of
the amount of P12,000.00 shall be made by the accused, jointly and severally, the Decision of the Trial Court subject of this appeal is hereby
AFFIRMED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Padilla, Regalado and Nocon, JJ., concur.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 127849. August 9, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. VIVENCIO LABUGUEN @ DENCIO, accused-appellant.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

For automatic review is the Decision[1] dated October 7, 1996, of the Regional Trial Court of Cauayan, Isabela, Branch 20, finding appellant
Vivencio Labuguen @ Dencio guilty of the crime of Robbery With Homicide in Criminal Case No. 20-738, and sentencing him thus:

"WHEREFORE, finding the accused VIVENCIO LABUGUEN @ DENCIO GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE as
alleged in the information and considering the presence of the aggravating circumstances of fraud and craft without any mitigating circumstance,
the Court, considering the provision of Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act 7659, hereby sentences
said accused VIVENCIO LABUGUEN the penalty of DEATH. The accused Vivencio Labuguen is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of Bonifacio Angeles
P40, 000.00 for the money taken, P55,100.00 for the expenses incurred during the wake and burial of the deceased Bonifacio Angeles and
P50,000.00 indemnification. Cost against the accused.

SO ORDERED."[2]

Filed on February 3, 1995, the information indicting appellant alleges:

"That on or about the 27th day of October, 1994, in the municipality of Angadanan, province of Isabela, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said accused, by means of force violence and intimidation against person and with intent to gain, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, take, steal and carry away cash money in the amount of P40,000.00 and belonging to Bonifacio Angeles @
Asiong, against his will and consent, to the damage and prejudice of the said Bonifacio Angeles @ Asiong, in the aforesaid amount of P40,000.00;
that on the occasion and by reason of said robbery, and for the purpose of enabling him to take, steal and bring away the said money, the accused,
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill and without any just motive, assault, attack and shoot for several times
with a firearm and stab for several times with a pointed/bladed instrument the said Bonifacio Angeles @ Asiong, inflicting upon him multiple
gunshot wounds and multiple stab wounds on the different parts of his body, which directly caused his death.

CONTRARY TO LAW."[3]

With the appellant, assisted by Atty. Dionisio E. Bala, Jr., pleading not guilty upon arraignment[4] on April 5, 1995, trial ensued with the
prosecution presenting Marilou Dabo, Tomas Pabigayan, Romeo (Romy) Bariza, Pantaleon Tagora, Elpidio Rivera, SPO2 Joselito Apalisoc, SPO1
Elmo Bungag, Edgar Valle, Geronimo Rivera, Dr. Inocencio R. Agpaoa and Federico Angeles, as its witnesses.

The defense called on Victoriano Dy, Romeo Estacio, Precila Labuguen, Lt. David Palaganas, Tranquilino Cagurangan, Jessie Cabbab and Orlando
Ramos and the appellant himself to testify.

The facts that matter are synthesized in the decision of the trial court as follows:

"xxx Bonifacio Angeles, 56, (Bonifacio) was engaged in the business of buying cows which he sold at the public market. Although he was married to
Damasa Gante with whom he had nine (9) children, he lived with another woman, Marilou Dabo, 28, at Coloma Village, San Fermin, Cauayan,
Isabela. They begot two (2) children during their ten (10) years of coverture.

Early in the morning of October 27, 1994, Tomas Pagbigayan (sic) (Tomas) went to the house of Bonifacio at San Fermin. Tomas offered two cows
to sell to Bonifacio. Bonifacio said that when he has time, he will go and see the cows. After their talk Bonifacio gave Tomas a lift on his Honda
Sports XL100 motorcycle and accompanied him to the crossing where he could take a ride home. Tomas sat on the backseat of the motorcycle.

Marilou Dabo declared that when Bonifacio returned home, the accused Vivencio (Dencio) Labuguen was with him. The accused sat behind
Bonifacio who drove the motorcycle.

The accused stayed on the porch of the house. Marilou Dabo served him coffee. The accused told Bonifacio that he knows of three big cows for
sale and that the place where they are is near. Bonifacio said that he will go and see the cows, after breakfast.

Marilou Dabo declared in her testimony that the accused had a handkerchief tied around his forehead as a headband. He was wearing dark
sunglasses, dark jacket and a faded maong pants. He wore rubber slippers. Marilou Dabo recognized him as the accused Vivencio Labuguen
because before October 27, 1994, the accused had already come to their house and offered to sell a lot to Bonifacio. After Bonifacio finished his
breakfast, he went to the porch and talked to the accused for about fifteen (15) minutes. Marilou Dabo was in the kitchen three meters away from
them.

Bonifacio entered their room and took P40,000.00 from the cabinet. Bonifacio got P40,000.00 because the accused told him the cows are big. He
counted the money and placed it inside his pocket. Marilou Dabo was beside him. She saw Bonifacio count the P40,000.00 in P1,000.00, P500.00
and P100.00 bills.

Then Bonifacio and the accused rode on the motorcycle. Bonifacio drove the motorcycle. The accused was seated behind Bonifacio. This was past
8:00 o'clock in the morning of October 27, 1994.

Bonifacio and accused Vivencio Labuguen passed by the house of Romeo Bariza, 47, farmer, who resided in San Fermin, Cauayan. His house was
120 meters away from the house of Bonifacio. Bariza was the planting 'kahoy' when he saw at a distance of 20 meters Bonifacio and the accused
pass by riding on a motorcycle color (sic) red and black, running slowly because the road was full of potholes. Bariza declared that Bonifacio and
the accused glanced at him. He recognized Bonifacio because he is his compadre and the accused because he had known him months before that
date. Accused was wearing sunglasses and a cloth on his forehead. In Court, Bariza identified the accused Vivencio Labuguen as the same person
he saw riding with Bonifacio that morning of October 27, 1994, while he was planting 'kahoy.'

Tomas declared that he was not able to get immediately a ride going home. While at the crossing waiting for a ride, he saw Bonifacio and the
accused Vivencio Labuguen. They rode on a motorcycle driven by Bonifacio. The accused sat on the backseat of the motorcycle. They glanced at
Tomas. Tomas saw the face of the accused who was wearing sunglasses with a handkerchief tied around his forehead. Tomas recognized the
accused Vivencio Labuguen because on October 22, 1994, he saw him talking to Romy Bariza on the road in front of the latter's house in San
Fermin. When the accused left, he (Tomas) asked Romy Bariza who was the person he talked with and he answered, 'Dencio.' Dencio is the
nickname of the accused Vivencio Labuguen. Accused then left driving a tricycle.

At about 10:00 o'clock that morning of October 27, 1994, Pantaleon Tagora, 55, farmer and a resident of Ramona, Angadanan, was on his way
home. He had just come from his cornfield. He was walking on top of the irrigation canal near the service drop when he met two (2) male persons.
One was younger than the other. The young one wore a jacket which was quite yellow. His face was quite round. He was not wearing sunglasses or
headband. In Court, Tagora identified the younger person as Vivencio Labuguen. (TSN p. 10, Tagora, July 5, 1995). The older one wore a faded
maong pants. His face was quite elongated. They were seated four (4) meters apart. Tagora first met the older male person. This place where
Tagora met them was one and a half kilometers from his house.

Tagora passed by the two persons without talking to them. After walking 200 meters away from them, he saw a motorcycle parked on the way.

The top of the irrigation canal was used as an exit road to the National Highway between Alicia on the South and Cauayan on the North. (TSN - Dr
Agpaoa, p. 13, October 31, 1995)

Elpidio Rivera, 31, farmer and a resident of Barangay Viga, Angadanan, one (1) kilometer West of Ramona, was sundrying (sic) his corn on the
concrete edge of the road near his house at about 10:30 o'clock that morning of October 27, 1994. This road goes to Angadanan and then to
Cauayan (TSN p. 7, Elpidio Rivera, August 16, 1995). His attention was attracted by a loud roar of a motorcycle coming towards his place. Elpidio
stopped working. At a distance he saw a person riding on a red motorcycle (sports type). He came from the West from Ramona and going towards
the East. When it was near the place where Elpidio was drying corn, the motorcycle slowed down because it was a curve. Elpidio declared in court
that he saw the face of the motorcycle rider: quite round, wearing a light yellow jacket with a handkerchief around his forehead. The handkerchief
was black with red dots. He was 6 to 7 meters from Elpidio when he passed by. In Court, Elpidio readily identified the accused Vivencio Labuguen
as the person he saw riding on the motorcycle. (TSN - Rivera, p. 8, August 16, 1995)

Between 11:00 to 12:00 o'clock noon on October 27, 1994, Geronimo Rivera, 45, was driving a Challenger, a passenger mini-bus (sic), at Barangay
Nappaccu Grande (Nappaccu), Reina Mercedes, Isabela. His conductor was Eduardo Valle, 20. They came from Santiago, Isabela, bound for
Tuguegarao, Cagayan. There were passengers in the bus.

At Nappaccu, Geromino Rivera (Rivera) saw at a distance of 200 meters, a person behind some talahibs near the National Highway. When the mini-
bus (sic) came near to a distance of 50 meters from the person, Rivera noticed that he was wiping something on his right hand and right face.
When the mini-bus (sic) was near, the person flagged it down. The bus stopped. Rivera saw a Honda XL100 motorcycle three (3) meters from the
person near the edge of the highway.

Conductor Eduardo Valle, went down the minibus (sic) to allow the person to get inside the bus. He observed that his clothes, particularly the right
side of his jacket and the right side of his pants, was soaked with blood. He was wearing a cream jacket, maong pants, sunglasses and a
handkerchief tied around his forehead. Eduardo Valle thought he met an accident but when he looked at the Honda XL100 motorcycle parked
behind the person, it was not damaged and that he had no injuries.

The person sat on the 5th row seat, a 3-seater, on the left. He was alone there. The 4th, 3rd, 2nd and 1st row of seats were vacant. He placed the
palm of his hands behind his head. He acted as if he was looking for something which he could not find. Rivera could see him clearly on the big rear
view mirror (1 foot by 1/2) above him.

Conductor Eduardo Valle went to him and asked him where he was going but the person did not answer, instead, without saying anything, he gave
a P10.00 bill to Eduardo Valle. He asked the person where he was going to alight so he could give him his change, but the person did not answer.
Eduardo Valle declared in Court that he saw the breast pocket of the jacket of the person full of money, two inches thick P100.00 bills. One bill was
falling, so Eduardo Valle told the person, 'Brod, your money is falling.'

In Court, Geronimo Rivera and Eduardo Valle positively identified the person who rode on the mini-bus (sic) with blood-soaked clothes and plenty
of money on the breast pocket of his jacket as the accused Vivencio Labuguen. They also positively identified the Honda XL100 (Exhibit 'G') as the
same motorcycle behind the accused which was left when he boarded the mini-bus (sic) at Nappaccu.

When some passengers alighted at the junction of the road in Naguillan going to San Mariano, Isabela, the accused suddenly stoop up and alighted
from the mini-bus (sic). He did not even get his change.

Going back to Pantaleon Tagora at Ramona, Angadanan. Between 1:00 to 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of October 27, 1994 while he was in his
house at Ramona, he heard that a dead person was found near the irrigation canal. He and his neighbors went to see the dead person. He was
surprised to see that the dead person was the same older person who was the companion of the younger one he met that morning. He identified
the younger person as the accused. The body of the deceased was on the middle of a ricefield (sic), 50 meters from the service drop of the
irrigation canal.

At about 5:00 o'clock that afternoon of October 27, 1994, Dr. Agpaoa in the presence of Mayor Ong and Chief of Police Redentor Garcia of
Angadanan, Isabela, conducted an examination of the body of the deceased person at the middle of a ricefield (sic) in Barangay Ramona,
Angadanan. The dead person was identified as Bonifacio Angeles by his brother Federico Angeles. Dr. Agpaoa wrote his findings while on the
ricefield (sic). Later, after examining again the body at the Funeraria, he put his findings into final form in his Autopsy Report marked Exhibit 'K'. In
his Autopsy Report, Dr. Agpaoa found the following wounds on the body of the deceased Bonifacio Angeles, thus:

'Postmortem Findings

1. Gunshot wound, entrance left, inferior margin of left clavicle, slightly outside the left midclavicular line, directed slightly downward, backward
and medially.
2. Gunshot wound, entrance, right side of the thoracic cage, along slight anterior axillary line, between 6th & 5th costal interspace, directed
medially.
3. Stab wound, left temporal area, above the left ear.
4. Stab wound, supra sternal notch (deep) penetrating chest cavity.
5. Stab wound, supra clavicular area, downwards, penetrating chest cavity.
6. Multiple superficial stab wound over anterior chest wall and abdominal wall.
7. Stab wound on both thighs, anterior surface. Cause of death - Internal Hemorrhage.'

xxx....xxx ....xxx

xxx....xxx ....xxx

The heirs of Bonifacio Angeles spent P55,000.00 for his burial (Exhibit 'L')."[5]

Appellant placed reliance on his defense of denial and alibi. Vehemently denying the charge against him, he asseverated that he could not have
committed the crime on October 27, 1994 because he left for Maconacon, Isabela on October 17, 1994, to manage the logging operation of a
certain Orlando Ramos and stayed there until December 20, 1994.[6]

On October 7, 1996, the trial court handed down its decision under review. The defense theorized that:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED ON THE BASIS OF SURMISES, SPECULATIONS, INSUFFICIENT AND INCREDIBLE
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE;

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN TOTALLY DISREGARDING THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE DEFENSE; and

III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.[7]

Circumstantial evidence is that which indirectly proves a fact in issue. The fact-finder must draw an inference from such evidence. It is at times
essential to resort to circumstantial evidence since to insist on direct testimony would, in many cases, result in setting felons free and deny proper
protection to society. An accused can be convicted on the basis of circumstantial evidence where the circumstances constitute an unbroken chain
leading to one fair reasonable conclusion and pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person.[8] Under Section 4, Rule
134 of the Rules on Evidence, circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:

a) There is more than one circumstance;

b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and

c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

In the case under consideration, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses spawn and generate the following facts which constitute an
unbroken chain of events leading to the inevitable conclusion of guilt on the part of the appellant, to wit:

1. In the early morning of October 27, 1994, appellant went to the house of the victim to convince him to purchase the cows offered for sale.

2. The victim agreed to see the cows, bringing along with him - P40,000.00. Thus, at around 8:00 in the morning of the same day, the victim and
the appellant rode on the motorcycle of the victim with the latter as the driver.

3. At past 8:00 in the morning of October 27, 1994, prosecution witness Romeo Bariza saw the victim and appellant riding on a motorcycle.

4. At about 10:00 of the same day, the victim and the appellant were seen sitting on top of an irrigation canal at Barangay Ramona, Angadanan,
Isabela.

5. Around 10:30 in the morning of October 27, 1994, appellant was seen alone on the motorcycle of the victim, speeding away from Barangay
Ramona.

6. Between 11:00 to 12:00 noon of October 27, 1994, appellant rode a minibus leaving the motorcycle of the victim on the shoulder of the road.

7. The bus conductor noticed that the right side of appellant's jacket and pants were soaked with blood, and there were two inches-thick of one
hundred peso bills tucked in the breast pocket of appellant's jacket.

8. Between 1:00 to 2:00 in the afternoon of the same day, the dead body of the victim with gunshot and stab wounds was found by the residents
of Barangay Ramona, 150 meters from the irrigation canal.

9. Around 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon also of the same day, the municipal health officer, the chief of police, the mayor, and some peace officers
of Angadanan, Isabela, proceeded to the place where the body of the unidentified victim was found (Exhibit "J", O.R., p. 156; and TSN, p. 4,
October 31, 1995, direct exam. of Dr. Agpaoa).

10. Federico Angeles identified the deceased as his brother Bonifacio Angeles (Exhibit "K", O.R., p. 157.).

After a careful study, the Court is of the ineluctable finding and conclusion that the aforementioned circumstantial evidence has established the
guilt of appellant beyond reasonable doubt. The time element of the circumstances thus proven link each chain of circumstances to another
pointing to a reasonable conclusion and no other but the guilt of appellant. From the early morning of October 27, 1994 to 10:00 o'clock in the
morning of the same day, the prosecution has sufficiently shown that the appellant was the last person seen with the victim before the latter was
killed. About thirty minutes later, appellant was seen speeding away from Barangay Ramona where he and the victim were previously spotted by
one of the prosecution witnesses. And, escaping from the consequences of his felonious act, appellant, boarded a minibus, leaving the motorcycle
of the victim on the side of the road. All the foregoing circumstances, coupled with the fact that appellant had two inches thick of one hundred
peso bills in his possession when he rode on the minibus with his jacket and pants splattered with blood, suffice to prove beyond reasonable doubt
the guilt of appellant of the crime of robo con homicido perpetrated in the morning of October 27, 1994.

In People vs. Asis,[9] the Court affirmed the conviction of the accused of the crime of homicide on the basis of circumstantial evidence, holding
thus:

"xxx We find that all these requisites have been successfully met by the prosecution. The evidence showed that appellant was one of two persons
last seen in the company of the victim before he was killed. On the morning that the victim's body was found, the appellant was observed with his
clothes smeared with blood. Witness dela Cruz saw his left shoulder with bite marks and his right hand swollen. When asked about the injuries, he
admitted engaging in a fight in Bgy. Pinakpinakan. On the same morning, some CAFGU soldiers spotted the appellant with co-accused Mendoza
while walking by the road in Bgy. Caingin. They had blood-stained clothes. The two ran away, when pursued. Their flight evinces guilt. These
circumstances taken together lead to no other conclusion but that the appellant is guilty as charged."[10]

Appellant's intention to rob the victim can be gleaned unerringly from the attendant circumstances. Obviously, robbery was the motive that
impelled appellant to convince the victim to go with him. Under the pretext of selling cows to him, appellant cajoled the victim to bring a large sum
of money and thereafter, lured him to a route where appellant could divest him of his money with the least danger of being caught. As aptly
surmised by the trial court, the two inches thick of one hundred peso bills in appellant's pocket and the blood smeared on his clothes are two vital
chains of circumstances that undoubtedly bespeak of the robbery with homicide appellant committed.

The lower court erred not in giving full weight and credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses particularly identifying appellant as
the person last seen in the company of the victim before the latter was found dead. The testimonies on record are clear and straightforward. And,
finding the witnesses for the People not ill-motivated to testify against the appellant, the Court discerns no basis for doubting their credibility.[11]
Moreover, it is a jurisprudentially-embedded rule that on the issue of credibility of witnesses, appellate courts generally do not disturb the findings
of the trial court, considering its singular opportunity to observe the deportment and manner of testifying of the witnesses.[12]

Disowning liability for the commission of the crime complained of, appellant theorized that he was in Maconacon, Isabela, from October 17, 1994
up to December 20, 1994. The Court, however, finds no credibility in the alibi theorized upon by appellant. It bears stressing that for alibi to
prosper, appellant must prove that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed and it was physically impossible for him to have been
at the scene of the crime.[13] In the present case of appellant, he failed to establish the requisite physical impossibility of his presence at the locus
criminis at the approximate time of its commission. Granting arguendo that the appellant really went to Maconacon, Isabela on October 17, 1994,
it was easy for him to go back by plane or by boat to Cauayan, Isabela, on or before October 27, 1994.

Furthermore, and more importantly, the defense of alibi of appellant cannot prevail over his positive identification by the prosecution
witnesses.[14]

Though not alleged in the Information, the generic aggravating circumstances of fraud and craft were properly appreciated by the trial court.[15]
Craft involves intellectual trickery and cunning on the part of the offender. When there is a direct inducement by insidious words or machinations,
fraud is present.[16] By saying that he would accompany the victim to see the cows which the latter intended to buy, appellant was able to lure the
victim to go with him.

Under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for Robbery with Homicide is reclusion perpetua to death. Applying Article 63 of the same
Code, the impossable penalty under the premises is death in view of the presence of the aggravating circumstances of craft and fraud and the
absence of any mitigating circumstance.

Four members of the Court are steadfast in their adherence to the separate opinion expressed in People vs. Echegaray that Republic Act No. 7659
is unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the death penalty. However, they bow to the majority opinion that the aforesaid law is constitutional
and therefore, the penalty prescribed thereunder has to be imposed.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated October 7, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Cauayan, Isabela, in Criminal Case No. 20-738, finding
appellant VIVENCIO LABUGUEN @ DENCIO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide, and imposing upon him the
penalty of DEATH, is AFFIRMED.

In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659 amending Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, upon finality of this decision, let the
records of the case be forwarded to the Office of the President for the possible exercise of the pardoning power. Costs against the appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De
Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.