HAZID TERM OF REFERENCE

WELLHEAD PRODUCTION & WATER INJECTION WELLHEAD

And
CPF & EXPORT PIPELINES

Document Reference Number

SNBL-STSI/FEED 0001/ 2018- STSI-HSE-HZD-0001

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Revision Control

Issue No. Issued By Issued Date Issued For

0 Jeff Koch 17 Jan 2018 Review and Comment

Revision Approval

Approval Name Title Date Signature

Originator Mohamed Selim HAZOP Chair 17 Jan 2018 Mohamed Selim

Reviewer Jeff Koch, PMP Project Manager 17 Jan 2018

Vice President of
Approval Lance McCarver, PE, PMP 17 Jan 2018
Engineering

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1.0 INTRODUCTION
A Hazard Identification (HAZID) study will be developed for for the North Bahariya Development - Egypt.

The study will be held at the EGYPT Office (New Maadi ,Cairo), starting on the January 23. 2019 at 9.0 am,
and is scheduled to last presumably for one day.

The scope of this document is to provide the Term of Reference (ToR) for a HAZID session to be carried out
On the design proposed for the for the North Bahariya Development Project located in the West Desert of
Egypt.

In order to ensure that a systematic approach is adopted, the NORPETCO Field Development Project was
divided into a number of stages and ‘zones’ based on layout and the process.

1. Site Clearance
2. Construction
3. Export Pipelines.
4. Production Wells & Injection Wells.
5. CPF facility

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 2.0 HAZID SCOPE SECTIONS THAT CONTAIN GLOBAL HAZARDS AND PROJECT
IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES, WHICH MAY BE COVERED ONCE FOR THE WHOLE
DEVELOPMENT, ARE:

• External Sources and Environmental Hazards,

• Hazards to the Surroundings Community and the Environment,
• Health Hazards,
• Process Hazards,
• Security hazards.

2.1.1 Plant Areas & Nodes

Once all the global issues have been discussed, the team should break down the development into a
number of clearly defined areas. These areas will then be examined in turn to identify issues that have a
specific impact on each location within the development. The definition of an area will usually be either a
geographical location, for a development consisting of many sites, or each major process group/functional
area for a single site containing an integrated plant.

For the HAZID, the team can use smaller areas or ‘nodes’. In this case they may consider each functional
block of the process. The particular hazards for each node can then be addressed

2.1.2 Areas & Node Study Methodology

Once the Team Leader has identified the ‘node’ to be studied, which could range from the whole facility to a
discrete item of plant, the function of that node will be discussed and agreed by the team and then recorded.
The Team Leader will then examine the node against the Checklist and within each Checklist section adopt
the following procedure:

• The Team Leader will nominate a category from the checklist and then ask the team to consider
each guide word.
• In each case the team will analyse each guide word (helped by the examples given in the Checklist)
to identify any hazard and its potential effects which may then be entered on the worksheet.
• The brainstorming process will then be used to identify all the potential threats or causes of the
hazard. During this process the Team Leader may suggest examples from the ‘expanders’ section of
the checklist. It is important however that these expanders are suggested as examples and not
presented as a closed list which will restrict the team’s brainstorming activity.
• The team will analyse the appropriate controls that should be put in place to prevent or control each
threat. Again the Team Leader may suggest mitigation measures.
• Finally, the team will identify the development phase(s) for which the hazard is credible and assess
the HSE risk in accordance with the attached Risk Ranking Criteria (see par. 3.5)

Note, the HAZID Checklist (reported in Annex 1) is comprehensive but not exhaustive and the use of
brainstorming to identify novel or unforeseen sources may be required.

2.1.3 Brainstorming & Analysis

The team knowledge and creativity should be used to identify credible causes and the relevant applicability
of the hazards. It is important that the list of hazards is used in a creative manner and not as a rigid checklist.
It is only in this way that new or unusual hazards will be recognised, or where specific combinations of
factors will be identified as causes of concern.

The process for the brainstorming can best be described as:

• Select plant area / node;

• From the checklist select the category;
• Against each guideword check if the hazard possible / likely;

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 • If “no”, note as such and move onto the next guideword;
• If “yes”, by means of brainstorming identify all the threats and causes;
• Assess what controls or barriers are required to prevent or control the effect and give a
recommendation;
• Rate the hazard using the Risk Ranking Matrix (see paragraph 3.5).

2.2 Risk Ranking Criteria

The level of risk obtained for each activity/operation shall be compared with the tolerability criteria defined
according to NORPETCO Standard Risk Matrix, and A Sample figure here below:

Figure 3.5.1: Risk Screening Matrix

The purpose of the risk screening matrix is to classify hazards as being low, medium or high risk.
The three different colours classify the risk as:

• TOLERABLE RISK: Hazards classified as Tolerable risk are considered to have a negligible impact
and therefore no further impact reduction measures are required. Such hazards should however be
continuously monitored and managed for continuous improvement.
• COMPULSORY REDUCTION: Hazards classified as Compulsory risk are not intolerable when
considered individually, subject to the identification and implementation of appropriate control
measures to reduce their impact. Where several hazards classified as Compulsory risk coexist the
cumulative effect of the hazards may be intolerable. Where this is the case additional impact
reduction measures may be required.
• INTOLERABLE RISK: Hazards classified as Intolerable risk do not satisfy the screening criteria and
shall be considered intolerable without a detailed justification.

2.3 Recording & Reporting

During the study, all hazards which are identified by the team are recorded on a series of worksheets using a
laptop computer and this image will be projected onto a screen for real time viewing and input by the team
members. Participating members shall ensure that this recording is appropriate at the time or that a specific
instruction for further clarification / action is noted.

Following the HAZID Session, the Chairman shall be responsible for preparing and issuing the “HAZID
Report”, to be submitted to the Company for approval. The report lists the critical issues and shall include

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references of the analysed documentation, the HAZID worksheets and the list of action sheets, i.e. actions
that will be addressed either to engineering disciplines or Company for their close-out

2.4 Close out of HAZID actions

The objective of the HAZID follow up activity is to ensure that all recommendations addressed in the ‘HAZID
Action Response Sheets’ are properly implemented by the Project.

The HSE discipline will send the ‘HAZID Action Response Sheets’ in charge to the relevant responder. The
response shall address the issue, be technically correct and fully auditable. When the response is
completed, the engineer will pass the action to the lead discipline engineer for endorsement, and then the
action is to be returned to the HSE discipline. The verification shall be addressed in a dedicated “HAZID
Close Out Report”, which shall detail the responses to each recommendation and shall contain evidence of
their implementation.

Listed below are the criteria for acceptance of the response:

• Single word answers such as “Done”, “Added”, “OK”, etc. are unacceptable;
• Any answer which makes reference to a data sheet or study must have a copy of the document
annexed;
• If the reference document is lengthy, a copy of the relevant topic plus the document cover sheet will
suffice;
• If the action requires additions to a P&ID’s, layouts etc., a copy of the drawing shall be annexed with
the addition highlighted.

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3.0 EVENT ADMINISTRATION

3.1 Reference Documentation

HAZID master of relevant documentation shall be provided for the study and displayed in the study room so
that all attendees can consult them.

As a minimum, the following documents will be made available during the review for reference:

Item Doc. N° Title

1 Basis of Design
2 HSE Philosophy
3 Overall Plot Plan
4 CPF Plot Plan
5 Production/Water injection wells Plot Plan
6 PFD (Construction Scheme)

3.2 Workshop Attendance

The HAZID team will be comparatively small, but sufficiently diverse to be able to identify all HSE issues.
The anticipated attendees should comprise the following:

Name Function Company

Eng : Mohamed Sleim HAZID session chairman Third Party
Eng : Hold HAZID Secretary HOLD
Eng : STS Project Manager
Eng : NORPETCO Process Lead Engineer
Eng : NORPETCO Process Engineer
Eng : NORPETCO Instrument & Control Engineer
Eng : NORPETCO Safety Engineer.

In addition to the core HAZID members shown above, the following personnel will be available on call to
provide input to the review:

Name Function Company

3.3 Timing and Location

The event is convened on the 23rd of January 2019 commencing at 09:00 in the morning and it is expected to
take 1 day in NORPETCO Office, Maadi. Cairo. The scheduled completion is at approximately 16.00 (to be
confirmed).

If a preparation will be required for mark-up of relevant documentation or clarification with engineering
disciplines, this will be arranged in a one-day meeting before the HAZID session.

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4.0 ANNEX A - HAZID GUIDEWORDS
The list of guidewords is indicative of the potential major hazards associated with the facilities. However, this
listing is not intended to be rigidly applied or be exhaustive and should be modified or enhanced by the
HAZID team if appropriate.

EXTERNAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS

GENERIC SPECIFIC EXPANDERS

GUIDEWORDS GUIDEWORDS (Examples of Guide Word Application, not exclusive)
Natural Climate Extremes Temperature, waves, wind, dust, flooding, sandstorms,
ice, blizzards
Lightning Ignition Source
Earthquakes Pipeline Rupture
Erosion Ground slide, coastal, river
Subsidence Ground structure, foundations, reservoir depletion.
Man Made Security Hazards Internal and external security threats
Terrorist Activity Direct attack on installation leading to loss of containment.
Social Instability Riots, civil disturbance, strikes, military action, political
unrest.
Previous Site Base line study, chemical, organic, radioactive.
Contamination
Effect of the Facility on Visual Ruin skyline view
the Surroundings
Socio-Economic Overwhelms existing social infrastructure to the detriment
of local population
Land Take Removes countryside for industrial, residential or
agricultural purposes
Site Of Special Any site that contains environmentally significant flora or
Interest fauna, historic or religious sites
Infrastructure Produce Emergency All associated activities to set up and implement an
Response Plan emergency response plan in the event of an incident
Create / Enhance Road, Rail, Air, Waterways, Utilities, Communications &
Local Infrastructure Waste Management.
Transportation for Food, Cleaning, Toiletries etc.
Consumables
Environmental Continuous Plant Flares, vents, fugitive emissions, energy efficiency
Discharges to Air
Continuous Plant Target/legislative requirements, drainage facilities,
Discharges to Water oil/water separation
Continuous Plant Drainage, chemical storage
Discharges to Land
Maintenance Blow- Flares, vents, drainage, soil or groundwater contamination,
downs / Emergency / additional waste generation, storage and treatment
Upset Discharges
Contaminated
Ground Facility Previous use, pipeline routing, environmental impact
Impact assessment
Waste Disposal Landfill, incineration, recycling
Options
Timing of Seasons, periods of environmental significance
Construction

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 EXTERNAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS

GENERIC SPECIFIC EXPANDERS

GUIDEWORDS GUIDEWORDS (Examples of Guide Word Application, not exclusive)
Other Minimisation of Land Use
Minimisation of Energy use
Impacts on flora and fauna, endangered species, if any
Nuisances – noise, odour, dust
Traffic movement
Sacred, cultural and historic significance
Visual effects
Statutory requirements
Environmental contingency plans

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 FACILITY HAZARDS

GENERIC SPECIFIC EXPANDERS

GUIDEWORDS GUIDEWORDS (Examples of Guide Word Application, not exclusive)
Control Methods/ Manning / Operations Effect on design, effect on locality (Manned,
Philosophy Philosophy unmanned, visited).
Operations Concept One train, x-trains, simplification.
Maintenance Plant/train/equipment item, heavy lifting, access,
Philosophy override, bypass, commonality of equipment, transport.
Control Philosophy Appropriate technology, (DCS/Local panels)
Manning Levels Accommodation, travel, support requirements.
Consistency with operations and maintenance, etc
philosophies.
Emergency Response Isolation, ESD philosophy, blow-down, flaring
requirements.
Concurrent Operations Production, maintenance requirements.
Start-up Shutdown Modular or plant wide.
Fire and Explosion Stored Flammables Improper storage, operator error (release), defect,
Hazards impact, fire (mitigation measures include: substitute
non flammable, minimise and separate inventory).
Sources of Ignition Electricity, flares, sparks, hot surfaces (mitigation
measures include: identify, remove, and separate).
Equipment Layout Confinement, escalation following release of explosive
or flammable fluid (operator error, defect, impact
process control failure, and corrosion), module
layout/proximity, orientation of equipment, predominant
wind direction (mitigation measures include: reduce
degree of confinement, spacing based on
consequence assessment, escalation barriers).
Fire Protection and Active / passive insulation, fire / gas detection, blow-
Response down / relief system philosophy, fire fighting facilities.
Operator Protection Means of escape, PPE, communications, emergency
response, plant evacuation.
Process Hazards Inventory Excess hazardous material (mitigation measures include:
minimise hazardous inventory, alternate processes and
utility systems)
Loss of Containment Excessive process stress, impact (penetration by foreign
object), process control failure, structural failure, erosion
or corrosion (mitigation measures include: recognise and
minimise process hazards during design, inherently safe
plant, containment and recovery measures).
Over Pressure Offsite sources, process blockage, thermal expansion,
connection of process to utility systems, chemical
reaction
Over / Under Atmospheric conditions, blow-down, fire, hot surfaces,
Temperature chemical reaction
Excess / Zero Level Overfill storage tanks, loss of function in separation
vessels, blow-by to downstream vessels
Wrong Composition / Offsite contamination, failure of separation process,
Phase build-up of wrong phase (sand, hydrates, etc), toxic
substances
Control Failure On control failure will the plant shut down / depressurise
safely
Mechanical Failure Vessel / Piping codes, fabrication procedure
Impact From lifting / vehicles

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 FACILITY HAZARDS

GENERIC SPECIFIC EXPANDERS

GUIDEWORDS GUIDEWORDS (Examples of Guide Word Application, not exclusive)
Utility Systems System Types Firewater, Fuel Gas, Heating Medium, Diesel Fuel,
Power Supply, Drains, Inert Gas, Potable Water
Waste Storage and Treatment, Chemical/fuel Storage,
Sewerage
Maintenance Hazards Considered Activities Access Requirements, Need to Override, Bypasses
Required, Commonality of Equipment, Heavy Lifting
Requirements, Transportation
Construction / Existing Considered Activities Tie-ins (shutdown requirements)
Facilities Concurrent Operations
Reuse of Materials
Common Equipment Capacity
Interface Shutdown / Blow-down ESD.
Skid Dimensions (weight / handling equipment)
Congestion
Existing Facilities
Mobilisation / Demobilisation
Soil Contamination
Welding Defects
Buckling, Free span

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 HEALTH HAZARDS

GENERIC SPECIFIC EXPANDERS

GUIDEWORDS GUIDEWORDS (Examples of Guide Word Application, not exclusive)
Health Hazards Direct Contact Plants
Insects
Land Animals
Marine Life
Disease Hazards Infectious diseases in the context of occupational health and
safety can include:

• Hepatitis A, B and C, and Human Immunodeficiency

Virus (HIV - which can lead to AIDS.
• Other infections people in close contact institutions -
for example enteric infections, ringworm, scabies,
etc.
• Brucellosis, leptospirosis and Q fever and other
animal infections caught from faecal matter, urine
and materials found in animal pests.
• Legionella infections, in a fine mist spray in the air, in
and around the cooling units of air-conditioning plant,
and in potting mixtures.
• Cytomegalovirus and rubella-causing infections,
• Tuberculosis.

Risk Control (Barrier): If there is a risk of more than one

infectious disease hazard, then control strategies, developed
according to the hierarchy of control, need to be developed
for each one. This is particularly important where food waste;
stagnant water etc may attract disease vectors. (animal,
birds, insects etc.)
Asphyxiation hazards Asphyxiating atmospheres, failure to use appropriate PPE,
vessel entry, working in confined spaces, smoke, exhaust.
Carcinogenic Chemicals in use.
Toxic Hazardous atmosphere, asphyxiating atmosphere, chemicals
in use.
Physical Noise, radiation (ionising, e.g. radioactive scale or non-
ionising, e.g. flares, UV, sunlight), ergonomics.
Mental Shift patterns.
Working Hazards Diving, working in water, working at heights, hazardous
equipment, hazardous surfaces, electricity.
Transport Excessive journeys, extreme weather, and quality of roads
(mitigation measures include: effective journey management.

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 PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION

GENERIC SPECIFIC EXPANDERS

GUIDEWORDS GUIDEWORDS (Examples of guideword application, not exclusive)
Contracting Prevailing influence Stability and contractual conditions, contractor selection
Strategy constraints
Non-Compliance with Governmental contracting requirements
Legislation
Ignorance of Standards Additional engineering and construction standards
External Environmental Governmental environmental requirements
Constraints
Logistics Material Supply Chain
Hazards Late Hazard Studies Hazard and Operability studies, Quantitative and Qualitative
Recognition and Risk Assessments, Fire Risk Analysis, Environmental Impact
Management Assessments, etc
Rejection of HSE Case Inadequate Case for Safety
Lack of Hazard
Register
Project Controls Quality assurance (change control, interdepartmental
involvement and interfaces)
Contingency Geographical Plant location, plant layout Medical support, fire fighting
Planning Infrastructure Recovery support, spill leak/clean-up support, security/military support,
Measures evacuation.
Competency Level of Indigenous Quality of local workforce and contractors
Training
Training Requirements
Level of Technology

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 REPUTATION

EXPANDERS
GENERIC SPECIFIC
(Examples of Guide Word Application, not
GUIDEWORDS GUIDEWORDS
exclusive)
Reputation Financial Loss
Shut Down Project
Collapse Share Prices
Adverse Publicity

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 5.0 ANNEX B TABLE 1.2 HAZID WORKSHEETS
Company NORPETCO
Facility/Ref. Docs XX-XX Drawings:
Process Flow Diagram: XXXXX
Plant/Zone/Stage Revision: (0) XX /XX /2019
Activity

Potential
Guide Existing Controls/ Ref Actions/Consideration
Hazard Cause/Threats Consequence L C R
Word Safeguards No. in QRA
& Effects

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ANNEX C TABLE 2.1 HAZID ACTIONS
Company: NORPETCO System:
Facility CPF Drawings: XXXXX-XXXX

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