Caro vs.

CA (1982)
Short Summary: Property was co-owned by 3 brothers, one of which predeceased the others. His estate was administered by the surviving wife
and his father. One of the co-owners sold his 1/3 undivided portion to a RP. Although the other co-owners did not want to redeem the
property, the widow of the deceased co-owner (who was also 1 of the administrators of his estate) wanted to exercise such right. Court held
that an administrator cannot exercise the right of legal redemption.

Facts:
-Sorsogon property (2 parcels of land) co-owned by:
 Alfredo Benito

 Mario Benito (+)

 Benjamin Benito
-Mario died. Surviving wife Basilia Lahorra and father Saturnino Benito appointed as joint administrators of Mario's estate
-Benjamin sold through DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE of 1/3 undivided portion to LUZ CARO, for P10k. Registered sale.
-Subdivision title issued to Luz Caro, with consent of Alfredo and Saturnino (as administrator) - both executed affidavits
-almost 6 years after, Caro filed a pleading (not sure - as claimant/creditor? ) in the SPECPRO that she bought 1/3 of the property co-owned.
Only then did Basilia found out about it.
-Basilia offered to redeem the said share but was ignored
-Basilia then intervened in case of Rosa Amador vda De Benito vs. Luz Caro for annulment of sale and mortgage and cancellation of the
annotation of the sale and mortgage involving same parcels of land - PRINCIPAL CASE dismissed for failure to prosecute and to pay docket fees
-Basilia then filed this independent case for legal redemption: no notice of the sale as required under A1620 and 1623 of NCC (no notice to
her as administrator of the estate of a co-owner)
>La Luz presented secondary evidence of service of written notice to possible redemptioners (written notice sent to Alfredo and Saturnino - the
best evidence - cannot be presented because they were already dead when the complaint for legal redemption brought):
 Affidavit of Benjamin Benito, ante lite motam, attesting to the fact that the possible redemptioners were formally notified in writing of his
intention to sell his undivided share
 Deposition of Saturnino's widow (bale mother in law ni Basilia): testified that she received and gave Saturnino the written notice of intended
sale and Saturnino expressed disinterest in buyingproperty
>>Complaint for legal redemption DISMISSED
a. Administratrix of co-owner does not have the power to exercise right of legal redemption
b. Seller co-owner substantially complied w/ written notice requirement to possible redemptioners
…MR denied, appealed to CA (with additional contention that Judge should have inhibited himself, his son being an associate/member of law
office of Caro's lawyer

CA: for Basilia

1. It is w/n the judge's discretion to disqualify himself, besides, no showing that Basilia asked for the Judge's disqualification
2. Right to redeem arose after death of Mario, so it's not part of the hereditary estate but a personal right of the heirs (which would include
Basilia)
3. The deed of sale statement of the seller saying that the other co-owners declined to buy was a unilateral statement, not a proof of notice
required by law
4. Registration of deed of sale did not erase right to redeem of other heirs who did not receive notice
5. Affidavits attesting to notice would not show that there was clear notice given. Saturnino's unilateral act as co-administrator can't bind his co-
administrator who has right to redeem personally as heir
6. Basilia can still redeem
>Caro appealed

WON RIGHT OF REDEMPTION COULD STILL BE EXERCISED WHEN THE PROPERTY SOUGHT TO BE REDEEMED IS NOT CO-OWNED ANYMORE
(on the theory that through the other co-owner and one of the administrators of the estate of the other co-owner already agreed to
subdivide the property)
1. On the theory that there is no longer co-ownership, with partition of the property:
-CARAM vs. CA - though this case refers to conveyance made after partition:Once a property is subdivided and distributed among the co-
owners, the community has terminated and there is no reason to sustain any right of legal redemption (purpose is to reduce the number of
participants until the community is done away with
-no difference w/ respect to conveyance before partition agreement. Basta may partition na, can't exercise right to redeem
-on allegation of fraud: fraud in securing the registration of titles to the land should be supported by clear and convincing evidence
-since subdivision title issued, and 1 year from date of entry of subdivision of title no claim for redemption, the Certificate of Title becomes
indivisible, cannot be indirectly attacked

2. On the assumption that there is still co-ownership and right of legal redemption still exists
-as administratrix, no personality to exercise right
…BUTTE vs. UY AND SONS: "While under Sec. 3, Rule 85, Rules of Court, the administrator has the right to the possession of the real and
personal estate of the deceased, so far as needed for the payment of the expenses of administration, and the administrator may bring and
defend action for the recovery or protection of the property or right of the deceased (Sec. 2, Rule 88), such right of possession and
administration do not include the right of legal redemption of the undivided share sold to a stranger by one of the co-owners after the death of
another, because in such case, the right of legal redemption only came into existence when the sale to the stranger was perfected and formed
no part of the estate of the deceased co-owner; hence, that right cannot be transmitted to the heir of the deceased co-owner."
-not discuss WON she could bring action as heir of a co-owner because her pleading specifically stated that she brought the action in her
capacity as administratrix

WON action for enforcement of right of redemption already expired? Moot and academic
-Caro argues that the tender of payment w/n 30 d from written notice of sale by co-owner already prescribed, and such being a condition
precedent to file action for enforcement of right, it already prescribed
-court did not rule on it, saying issue was already moot and academic

MAURO P. MANANQUIL, complainant, vs. ATTY. CRISOSTOMO C. VILLEGAS, respondent.

A.M. No. 2430; August 30, 1990
CORTES
DOCTRINE: Pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 84 of the Revised Rules of Court, a judicial executor or administrator has the right to the possession
and management of the real as well as the personal estate of the deceased so long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and the
expenses of administration. He may, therefore, exercise acts of administration without special authority from the court having jurisdiction of the
estate. For instance, it has long been settled that an administrator has the power to enter into lease contracts involving the properties of the
estate even without prior judicial authority and approval [See Ferraris v. Rodas, 65 Phil. 732 (1938); Jocson de Hilado v. Nava, 69 Phil. 1 (1939);
San Diego, Sr. v. Hombre, G.R No. L-19265, May 29, 1964, 11 SCRA 165].
FACTS:
1. This is a disbarment case against VILLEGAS.

2. It turns out that VILLEGAS was counsel of record of one Felix LEONG, the administrator for the testate estate of one Felomina Zerna.

3. In 1963, LEONG, as administrator of Zerna’s estate, entered into a lease contract with the partnership of HIJOS DE VILLEGAS over
several lots included in Zerna’s estate.

4. The said lease contract was renewed several times henceforth.

5. It is important to note at this point that VILLEGAS was both counsel of LEONG and a partner in the partnership of HIJOS DE
VILLEGAS.

6. When LEONG died, this disbarment suit was filed by MANANQUIL, the appointed administrator for LEONG’s estate. MANANQUIL
alleged that the lease contracts were made under iniquitous terms and conditions. Also, MANANQUIL alleged that VILLEGAS should
have first notified and secured the approval of the probate court in Zerna’s estate before the contracts were renewed, VILLEGAS
being counsel of that estate’s administrator.

ISSUE: Whether VILLEGAS should have first secured the probate court’s approval regarding the lease.
RULING:
NO. Pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 84 of the Revised Rules of Court, a judicial executor or administrator has the right to the possession and
management of the real as well as the personal estate of the deceased so long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and the expenses
of administration. He may, therefore, exercise acts of administration without special authority from the court having jurisdiction of the estate. For
instance, it has long been settled that an administrator has the power to enter into lease contracts involving the properties of the estate even
without prior judicial authority and approval [See Ferraris v. Rodas, 65 Phil. 732 (1938); Jocson de Hilado v. Nava, 69 Phil. 1 (1939); San Diego,
Sr. v. Hombre, G.R No. L-19265, May 29, 1964, 11 SCRA 165].
Thus, considering that administrator Felix Leong was not required under the law and prevailing jurisprudence to seek prior authority from the
probate court in order to validly lease real properties of the estate, respondent, as counsel of Felix Leong, cannot be taken to task for failing to
notify the probate court of the various lease contracts involved herein and to secure its judicial approval thereto.
Nevertheless, contrary to the opinion of the Solicitor General, the Court finds sufficient evidence to hold respondent subject to disciplinary sanction
for having, as counsel of record for the administrator in Special Proceedings No. 460, participated in the execution in 1975 and 1978 of renewals
of the lease agreement involving properties of the estate in favor of the partnership HIJOS DE JOSE VILLEGAS, of which respondent is a member
and in 1968 was appointed managing partner.
By virtue of Article 1646 of the new Civil Code, the persons referred to in Article 1491 are prohibited from leasing, either in person or through the
mediation of another, the properties or things mentioned in that article.
The disqualification imposed on public and judicial officers and lawyers is grounded on public policy considerations which disallow the transactions
entered into by them, whether directly or indirectly, in view of the fiduciary relationship involved, or the peculiar control exercised by these
individuals over the properties or rights covered [See Rubias v. Batiller, G.R. No. L-35702, May 29, 1973, 51 SCRA 120; Maharlika Publishing
Corporation v. Tagle, G.R. No. 65594, July 9, 1986, 142 SCRA 553; Fornilda v. The Branch 164, RTC Fourth Judicial Region, Pasig, G.R. No.
72306, October 5, 1988, 166 SCRA 281 and January 24, 1989, 169 SCRA 351].
Thus, even if the parties designated as lessees in the assailed lease contracts were the "Heirs of Jose Villegas" and the partnership HIJOS DE
JOSE VILLEGAS, and respondent signed merely as an agent of the latter, the Court rules that the lease contracts are covered by the prohibition
against any acquisition or lease by a lawyer of properties involved in litigation in which he takes part. To rule otherwise would be to lend a stamp
of judicial approval on an arrangement which, in effect, circumvents that which is directly prohibited by law. For, piercing through the legal fiction
of separate juridical personality, the Court cannot ignore the obvious implication that respondent as one of the heirs of Jose Villegas and partner,
later manager of, in HIJOS DE JOSE VILLEGAS stands to benefit from the contractual relationship created between his client Felix Leong and
his family partnership over properties involved in the ongoing testate proceedings.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, finding that respondent Atty. Crisostomo C. Villegas committed acts of gross misconduct, the Court
Resolved to SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law for four (4) months effective from the date of his receipt of this Resolution, with a
warning that future misconduct on respondent's part will be more severely dealt with. Let copies of this Resolution be circulated to all courts of
the country for their information and guidance, and spread in the personal record of Atty. Villegas.
SO ORDERED.

Elchico
Facts:
August 29, 1951. Pampanga Bus Company, Inc. (Pambusco) lodged its complaint against two defendants Valentin Fernando and
Encarnacion Elchico Vda. de Fernando (Civil Case 14578). The suit was to upon a contractual obligation.
January 23, 1955. Encarnacion Elchico Vda. de Fernando died. By this time, Pambusco in the foregoing civil case had already
presented its evidence and submitted its case.
March 23, 1955. Intestate proceedings were filed. Notice to the estate's creditors was given for them to file their claims within six
months from this date, the first publication of the notice.
The CFI rendered judgment in the civil case (Civil Case 14578) in favor of Pambusco.
January 25, 1961. The judgment in the civil case having reached finality, Pambusco moved in the intestate proceedings that the
heirs and/or the present joint administratrices, be ordered to pay the share of the deceased in the judgment debt.
The administratrices opposed.
Issue:
WON Pamubusco’s claim is time-barred
Held:
It matters not that Pambusco's said claim was filed with the probate court without the six-month period from March 25, 1955, set
forth in the notice to creditors. For, Section 2, Rule 86, permits acceptance of such belated claims.
The claim was filed in the probate court on February 25, 1959, while the defendants in the civil case were still perfecting their
appeal therein. The record does not show that the administrator objected thereto upon the ground that it was filed out of time. The
pendency of that case is a good excuse for tardiness in the filing of the claim. And, the order of final distribution is still to be given.
The order of the lower court of allowing payment of appellee's claim "impliedly granted said appellee an extension of time within
which to file said claim." The probate court's discretion has not been abused. It should not be disturbed.

G.R. No. 147561 June 22, 2006

STRONGHOLD INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., vs. REPUBLIC-ASAHI GLASS CORPORATION

Facts: Republic-Asahi entered with Jose Santos Jr., proprietor of JDS Construction, for the construction of
roadways and drainage system, which was supposed to be completed within a period of 240 days. In order
to guarantee the faithful and satisfactory performance of its undertakings’ JDS post a performance bond of
P795,000.00 with Petitioner Stronghold Insurance Co., Inc. (SICI). Respondent called the attention of JDS
to the alleged alarmingly slow pace of the construction, which resulted in the fear that the construction will
not be finished within the stipulated period. However, such was unheeded by JDS. Dissatisfied with the
progress of the work, Republic-Asahi extrajudicially rescinded the contract, but such rescission shall not be
construed as a waiver of respondent’s right to recover damages from JDS and latter’s sureties. Thus,
because of the failure to comply with the provisions of the contract, it had to hire another contractor to finish
the project, for which it incurred additional expenses. Thereafter, respondent sent a letter to petitioner SICI
filing its claim under the bond. Respondent then sent again another letter reiterating the same demand but
was unheeded. This prompted respondent to file a complaint against JDS and SICI for payment
representing additional expenses and damages. According to the Sheriff’s Return, summons were duly
served on SICI, however, Jose Santos Jr. died the previous year, and JDS was no longer at its address,
and such whereabouts were unknown. SICI filed its answer, alleging that the respondent’s money claims
have been extinguished by the death of Santos. Even if this were not the case, it had been released from
liability under the performance bond because there was no liquidation, with the active participation and
involvement, pursuant to procedural due process, of herein surety and Santos, hence there was no
ascertainment of the corresponding liabilities of Santos and SICI under the performance bond. Thus, such
liquidation would be impossible since Santos is already dead. The complaint against JDS and SICI was
dismissed on the ground that the claim against JDS did not survive the death of Santos. On Motion for
Reconsideration, the dismissal of the case was reconsidered and the case was reinstated, however, the
case against Santos remains undisturbed. On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled that SICI’s obligation
under the surety agreement was not extinguished by the death of Santos. Consequently Respondent could
still go after SICI for the bond. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the claims against SICI was extinguished from the death of Santos

Held: As a general rule, the death of either the creditor or the debtor does not extinguish the obligation.
Obligations are transmissible to the heirs, except when the transmission is prevented by the law, the
stipulations of the parties, or the nature of the obligation. Only obligations that are personal10 or are
identified with the persons themselves are extinguished by death.

Section 5 of Rule 8612 of the Rules of Court expressly allows the prosecution of money claims arising from
a contract against the estate of a deceased debtor. Evidently, those claims are not actually extinguished.
What is extinguished is only the obligee’s action or suit filed before the court, which is not then acting as a
probate court.

In the present case, whatever monetary liabilities or obligations Santos had under his contracts with
respondent were not intransmissible by their nature, by stipulation, or by provision of law. Hence, his death
did not result in the extinguishment of those obligations or liabilities, which merely passed on to his estate.
Death is not a defense that he or his estate can set up to wipe out the obligations under the performance
bond. Consequently, petitioner as surety cannot use his death to escape its monetary obligation under its
performance bond.

Hilado vs CA
Facts: -Roberto S. Benedicto died intestate on 15 May 2000. He was survived by his wife, private
respondent Julita Campos Benedicto, and his only daughter, Francisca.
-At the time of his death, there were two pending civil cases against him involving the petitioners.
The first, was then pending with the RTC of Bacolod City, with petitioner Alfredo Hilado as one
of the plaintiffs therein. The second, was then pending with the RTC of Bacolod City, with
petitioners Lopez Sugar Corporation and First Farmers Holding Corporation as one of the plaintiffs
therein.
-On 25 May 2000, private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto filed with the RTC of Manila a
petition for the issuance of letters of administration in her favor.
-On 2 August 2000, the Manila RTC issued an order appointing private respondent as
administrator of the estate of her deceased husband, and issuing letters of administration in her
favor.
-In January 2001, private respondent submitted an Inventory of the Estate, Lists of Personal and
Real Properties, and Liabilities of the Estate of her deceased husband. In the List of Liabilities
attached to the inventory, private respondent included as among the liabilities, the above-
mentioned two pending claims then being litigated before the Bacolod City courts.
-On 24 September 2001, petitioners filed with the Manila RTC a Manifestation/Motion Ex
Abundanti Cautela, praying that they be furnished with copies of all processes and orders
pertaining to the intestate proceedings.
-Private respondent opposed the manifestation/motion, disputing the personality of petitioners to
intervene in the intestate proceedings of her husband.
-On 2 January 2002, the Manila RTC issued an order denying the manifestation/motion, on the
ground that petitioners are not interested parties within the contemplation of the Rules of Court to
intervene in the intestate proceedings.
-After the Manila RTC had denied petitioners motion for reconsideration, a petition for certiorari
was filed with the Court of Appeals. The petition argued in general that petitioners had the right
to intervene in the intestate proceedings of Roberto Benedicto, the latter being the defendant in the
civil cases they lodged with the Bacolod RTC.
-Tha CA denied their petition. Hence, the present petition.
Issue: Whether the lower courts erred in denying them the right to intervene in the intestate
proceedings of the estate of Roberto Benedicto
Ruling: No. The merits of petitioners claims against Benedicto are to be settled in the civil cases
where they were raised, and not in the intestate proceedings. In the event the claims for damages
of petitioners are granted, they would have the right to enforce the judgment against the estate.
The Rules on Special Proceedings do not provide a creditor or any person interested in the estate,
the right to participate in every aspect of the testate or intestate proceedings, but instead provides
for specific instances when such persons may accordingly act in those proceedings, the Court
deemed that while there is no general right to intervene on the part of the petitioners, they may be
allowed to seek certain prayers or reliefs from the intestate court not explicitly provided for under
the Rules, if the prayer or relief sought is necessary to protect their interest in the estate, and there
is no other modality under the Rules by which such interests can be protected.

EVANGELISTA VS. LA PROVEEDORA

Facts:
Manuel Abad Santos died and subsequently, a writ of execution was issued and his property was levied by the sheriff. Meanwhile,
intestate proceeding for the settlement of his estate was filed and petitioner was appointed administratrix. Even prior to her
appointment, having been notified of the scheduled auction sale of the property subject of the levy, she informed the sheriff of the
death of Abad Santos and demanded that he desist from the sale. She filed a motion with the court but it was denied and the
property was sold to the highest bidder, La Proveedora.

Issue: W/N the judgment must be presented as a claim against the estate if the debtor dies before the levy of execution.

Held: Yes it must be presented.

The property levied upon in case the judgment debtor dies after the entry of judgment, as in this case, may be sold for the
satisfaction of the judgment in case death occurs “after execution is actually levied.” On the other hand, Section 5 of Rule 86
provides that a judgment for money against the decedent must be filed with the court in the proceeding for the settlement of the
estate. In other words, the cut-off date is the date of actual levy of execution. If the judgment debtor dies after such levy, the
property levied upon may be sold; if before, the money judgment must be presented as a claim against the estate, although of
course the same need no longer be proved, the judgment itself being conclusive. But the judgment creditor will share the estate
with other creditors, subject only to such preferences as are provided by law.

Since in this case the death of the deceased preceded the levy of execution on his properties, the judgment against his should be
presented as a claim against his estate, and the sale at auction carried out by the sheriff is null and void.

ATTY. GEORGE S. BRIONES vs LILIA J. HENSON-CRUZ, RUBY J. HENSON, and

ANTONIO J. HENSON
G.R. No. 159130 August 22, 2008

Facts:
Ruby J. Henson filed a petition for the allowance of the will of her late mother, Luz J.
Henson, with the RTC of Manila. Lilia Henson-Cruz, one of the deceased’s daughters and also a
respondent in this petition, opposed Ruby’s petition. She alleged that Ruby understated the value
of their late mother’s estate and acted with “unconscionable bad faith” in the management thereof.
Lilia prayed that her mother's holographic will be disallowed and that she be appointed as the
Intestate Administratrix. An Interim Special Administrator of the estate was appointed, however,
Ferro, declined the appointment. The trial court then designated petitioner Atty. George S. Briones
as Special Administrator of the estate. Atty. Briones accepted the appointment, took his oath of
office, and started the administration of the estate. The court ordered the accounting firm of Messrs.
Alba, Romeo & Co. to immediately conduct an audit of the administration, and suspends the
approval of the report of the special administrator except the payment of his commission, which
is hereby fixed at 1.8% of the value of the estate.
A Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus was filed by the respondents to CA.
The petition assailed the Order dated March 12, 2002 which appointed accounting firm Alba,
Romeo & Co. as auditors and the Order dated April 3, 2002 which reiterated the appointment.
Prior the filing of the petition for certiorari, the heirs of Luz Henzon filed a Notice of Appeal with
the RTC assailing the Order insofar as it directed the payment of Atty. Briones’ commission. They
subsequently filed their record on appeal. The trial court, however, denied the appeal and
disapproved the record on appeal on the ground of forum shopping. Respondents’ motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
WON petition for certiorari is the proper remedy in assailing the commission of executor.

Held:
No. From an estate proceeding perspective, the Special Administrator’s commission is no
less a claim against the estate than a claim that third parties may make. Section 8, Rule 86 of the
Rules recognizes this when it provides for “Claim of Executor or Administrator Against an Estate.”
Under Section 13 of the same Rule, the action of the court on a claim against the estate “is
appealable as in ordinary cases.” Hence, by the express terms of the Rules, the ruling on the extent
of the Special Administrator’s commission – effectively, a claim by the special administrator
against the estate – is the lower court’s last word on the matter and one that is appealable.

PAREDES v. MOYA

FACTS:
Petitioner Severino Paredes sued his employer, August Kuntze, for collection of separation and overtime pay in the CFI-Manila.
Paredes prevailed, and Kuntze appealed to the CA. Kuntze died pending appeal and was substituted by the administratrix of his
estate. The CA dismissed the appeal for the administratrix’s failure to file the printed record on appeal, and the record of the case
was remanded. Paredes filed a motion for execution, so the provincial Sheriff of Rizal levied on the properties of August Kuntze.
Paredes was the highest bidder at the auction sale conducted by the Sheriff. In spite of a Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution
filed by the Administratrix still pending resolution, Paredes sold the property to co-petitioner Victorio Ignacio. Respondent Court
(Judge Moya) set aside the Writ of Execution and the Sheriff's Sale and Public Auction of the property without prejudice to the filing
of the judgment as a claim in the proceedings for settlement of the estate of the deceased.

ISSUE: W/N the CFI correctly set aside the Writ of Execution and the Sheriff’s Sale and Public Auction – YES.

HELD:
In the case of a money claim where the defendant dies while appeal is pending, the appeal should not be dismissed; it should
continue, but the deceased defendant should be substituted by his legal representative—executor or administrator of the estate. If
the lower court is affirmed, the plaintiff must go to the probate court for an order directing the executor or administrator to satisfy
the judgment. The CFI that originally rendered the judgment has no power to order its execution and levy on the properties of the
deceased because the same are already in custodia legis in the probate court where administration proceedings for the settlement
of the estate of the deceased defendant are already pending (see Section 21, Rule 3)
If the defendant dies after final judgment has been rendered by the CFI, as in the case at bar, the action survives. The appeal
should proceed with the deceased defendant being substituted by his legal representative. This would prevent a useless repetition
of presenting anew before the probate court the evidence already presented in the CFI on the validity of the claim. Consequently,
contrary to respondents' claim, the judgment against the deceased Kuntze became final and executory; it was not arrested by his
death.
It was error on the part of the plaintiff Paredes, now one of the petitioners, to have the money judgment in his favor executed
against the properties of the deceased Kuntze.
The proper remedy of Paredes should have been to file his claim in the administration proceedings of the estate of the deceased
defendant Kuntze because all claims for money against the decedent, arising from contract, express or implied, whether the same
be due, not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral expenses and expenses for the last sickness of the decedent, and judgment
for money against the decedent, must be filed within the time limited in the notice to the creditors.
The respondent court correctly nullified the order of execution pursuant to the judgment, which became final and executory, and
the corresponding levy on execution and the public auction sale.
The judgment for money against the deceased stands in the same footing as all claims for money against the decedent, arising
from contract, express or implied, whether the same be due, not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral expenses and expenses
for the last sickness of the decedent, (1st sentence, Sec. 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court), Rule 86 of the Rules of Court), although
the validity of the money claim covered by a judgment against the decedent which has already become final and executory can no
longer be litigated in the court where administration proceedings for the settlement of the properties of the deceased are still
pending, unlike the other money claims whose validity may yet be challenged by the executor or administrator.
The writ of execution was not the proper procedure for the payment of debts and expenses of the administration. The proper
procedure is for the court to order the administratrix to make the payment; and if there is no sufficient cash on hand, to order the
sale of the properties and out of the proceeds to pay the debts and expenses of the administration.
The ordinary procedure by which to settle claims of indebtedness against the estate of a deceased person, as an inheritance tax,
is for the claimant to present a claim before the probate court so that said court may order the administrator to pay the amount
thereof.
To such effect is the decision of this Court in Aldamiz vs. Judge of the Court of First Instance of Mindoro, G.R. No. L-2360, Dec.
29, 1949, thus: . . . a writ of execution is not the proper procedure allowed by the Rules of Court for the payment of debts and
expenses of administration. The proper procedure is for the court to order the sale of personal estate or the sale or mortgage of
real property of the deceased and all debts or expenses of administration should be paid out of the proceeds of the sale or
mortgage. The order for the sale or mortgage should be issued upon motion of the administrator and with the written notice to all
the heirs, legatees and devisees residing in the Philippines, according to Rule 89, section 3, and Rule 90, section 2. And when
sale or mortgage of real estate is to be made, the regulations contained in Rule 90, section 7, should be complied with. Execution
may issue only where the devisees, legatees or heirs have entered into possession of their respective portions in the estate prior
to settlement and payment of the debts and expenses of administration and it is later ascertained that there are such debts and
expenses to be paid, in which case "the court having jurisdiction of the estate may, by order for that purpose, after hearing, settle
the amount of their several liabilities, and order how much and in what manner each person shall contribute, and may issue
execution if circumstances require" (Rule 39, section 6; see also Rule 74, section 4;). And this is not the instant case.

The same rule must be applied in connection with money judgments against the deceased that have already become final, such
as the money judgment in favor of Paredes. No writ of execution should issue against the properties of the deceased. The claim
for satisfaction of the money judgment should be presented in the probate court for payment by the administrator.
The legal basis for such a procedure is the fact that in the testate or intestate proceedings to settle the estate of a deceased person,
the properties belonging to the estate are under the jurisdiction of the court and such jurisdiction continues until said properties
have been distributed among the heirs entitled thereto. During the pendency of the proceedings all the estate is in custodia legis
and the proper procedure is not to allow the sheriff, in the case of court judgment, to seize the properties but to ask the court for
an order to require the administrator to pay the amount due from the estate and required to be paid. In this jurisdiction, a void
judgment or order is in legal effect no judgment or order. By it no rights are divested. From it no rights can be obtained. Being
worthless, it neither binds nor bars anyone. All acts performed under it and all claims flowing from it are void.

MELGAR V. Hon. BUENVIAJE

179 SCRA 196 (1989)

FACTS: A vehicular accident happened in Polangui, Albay, where a passenger bus owned by Felicidad Balla and driven by
Domingo Casin swerved to the left lane and collided with a Ford Fiera owned by Mateo Lim Relucio and driven by Ruben Lim
Relucio.

Felicidad’s vehicle then swerved further to the left this time colliding head-on-with a passenger bus owned by Benjamin Flores
and driven by Fabian Prades.

As a result of the accident Felicidad Balla, Domingo Casin, Ruben Lim Relucio and Fabian Prades died on the spot.

Spouses Oscar and Victoria Prades, as the only surviving forced heirs of Fabian Prades, filed a complaint against the children
of Felicidad for damages. The complaint alleged that Felicidad did not observe the required diligence in the selection her employee
and allowed her driver to drive recklessly.

The defendants moved to dismiss and averred that it is incorrect to hold the children liable for the alleged negligence of the
deceased and to consider suing the heirs of the deceased the same as suing the estate of said deceased person.

The defendants contend that the creditor should institute the proper intestate proceedings in which he may be able to interpose
his claim pursuant to Section 21 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.

Respondent court denied the motion to dismiss. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration stating that a distinction should
be made between a suit against Felicidad’s estate and a personal action against Felicidad’s children.

The private respondents amended the title of their complaint by naming as defendants the Estate of the late Felicidad Balla as
represented by the children named in the original complaint.

The lower court denied the MR and admitted the amended complaint.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court may entertain a suit for damages arising from the death of a person, filed against the estate of
another deceased person as represented by the heirs.

HELD: YES. Section 5 Rule 86 of the Rules of Court provides for the actions that are abated by death. This case is not among
those enumerated thus actions for damages caused by the tortious conduct of the defendant survive the death of the latter.

The action can therefore be properly brought under Section 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court. Hence, the inclusion of the "estate
of Felicidad Balla" in the amended complaint as defendant.

But the point of controversy is on the fact that no estate proceedings exist since Felicidad’s children had not filed any
proceedings for the settlement of her estate.

While petitioners may have correctly moved for the case’s dismissal and private respondents have corrected the deficiency by
filing an amended complaint, the action would still be futile for there are no steps taken towards the settlement of Felicidad’s estate,
nor has an executor or administrator been appointed.

From a statement made by the petitioners that insinuates that the deceased left no assets, it is reasonable to believe that the
petitioners will not take any step to expedite the early settlement of the estate if only to defeat the damage suit against the estate.

Under the circumstances the absence of an estate proceeding may be avoided by requiring the heirs to take the deceased’s
place.

In case of unreasonable delay in the appointment of an executor or administrator or in case where the heirs resort to an
extrajudicial settlement of the estate, the court may allow the heirs of the deceased to be substituted for the deceased.

BETTY CHUA, JENNIFER CHUA-LOCSIN, BENISON CHUA AND BALDWIN CHUA vs. ABSOLUTE MANAGEMENT
CORPORATION, CA
Third persons to whom the decedent’s assets had been conveyed may be cited to appear in court and examined under oath as to
how they came into possession of the decedent’s assets. In case of fraudulent conveyances, a separate action is necessary to
recover these assets.
FACTS: Betty T. Chua was appointed as administratrix of the intestate estate of the deceased Jose L. Chua. Thereafter, she
submitted to the trial court an inventory of all the real and personal properties of the deceased. Absolute Management Corporation,
one of the creditors of the deceased, filed a claim against the estate of the deceased in the amount of P63.7M. As administratrix,
Betty T. Chua tentatively accepted said amount as correct, with a statement that it shall be reduced or adjusted as evidence may
warrant.
Absolute Management Corporation noticed that the deceased’s shares of stocks with Ayala Sales Corporation and Ayala
Construction Supply, Inc. were not included in the inventory of assets. As a consequence, it filed a motion to require Betty T.
Chua to explain why she did not report these shares of stocks in the inventory. Through a reply, Betty T. Chua alleged that these
shares had already been assigned and transferred to other parties prior to the death of her husband, Jose L. Chua. She attached
to her reply the deeds of assignment which allegedly constituted proofs of transfer. Judge Dumatol accepted the explanation as
meritorious.
Absolute Management Corporation, suspecting that the documents attached to Betty T. Chua’s reply were spurious and simulated,
filed a motion for the examination of the supposed transferees based on Section 6, Rule 87.
Private respondents opposed the motion on the ground that this provision bears no application to the case. On February 7, 2000,
Judge Dumatol issued the assailed order, denying the motion of the corporation as it was seen as a mere fishing expedition on its
part. CA reversed, allowing the motion.
ISSUE: whether the Court of Appeals correctly ordered the trial court to give due course to the Motion for Examination
HELD: CA was correct.
Section 6 of Rule 87 seeks to secure evidence from persons suspected of having possession or knowledge of the properties left
by a deceased person, or of having concealed, embezzled or conveyed any of the properties of the deceased.
The court which acquires jurisdiction over the properties of a deceased person through the filing of the corresponding
proceedings has supervision and control over these properties. The trial court has the inherent duty to see to it that the inventory
of the administrator lists all the properties, rights and credits which the law requires the administrator to include in his inventory. In
compliance with this duty, the court also has the inherent power to determine what properties, rights and credits of the deceased
the administrator should include or exclude in the inventory. An heir or person interested in the properties of a deceased may call
the court’s attention that certain properties, rights or credits are left out from the inventory. In such a case, it is likewise the court’s
duty to hear the observations of such party. The court has the power to determine if such observations deserve attention and if
such properties belong prima facie to the estate.
However, in such proceedings the trial court has no authority to decide whether the properties, real or personal, belong to
the estate or to the persons examined. If after such examination there is good reason to believe that the person examined is
keeping properties belonging to the estate, then the administrator should file an ordinary action in court to recover the same.
Inclusion of certain shares of stock by the administrator in the inventory does not automatically deprive the assignees of their
shares. They have a right to be heard on the question of ownership, when that property is properly presented to the court.
In the present case, some of the transferees of the shares of stock do not appear to be heirs of the decedent. Neither do
they appear to be parties to the intestate proceedings. Third persons to whom the decedent’s assets had been conveyed may be
cited to appear in court and examined under oath as to how they came into possession of the decedent’s assets. In case of
fraudulent conveyances, a separate action is necessary to recover these assets.
Taken in this light, there is no reason why the trial court should disallow the examination of the alleged transferees of the
shares of stocks. This is only for purposes of eliciting information or securing evidence from persons suspected of concealing or
conveying some of the decedent’s properties to the prejudice of creditors. Petitioners’ admission that these persons are the
decedent’s assignees does not automatically negate concealment of the decedent’s assets on their part. The assignment might
be simulated so as to place the shares beyond the reach of creditors. In case the shares are eventually included in the estate,
this inventory is merely provisional and is not determinative of the issue of ownership. A separate action is necessary for
determination of ownership and recovery of possession.

# 8 De Bautista v. De Guzman

Facts:
Numenario Bautista, husband and father of plaintiffs-appellees, sustained physical injuries while inside a passenger jeep
driven by Medrano (convicted of homicide through reckless imprudence); and owned and operated by Rosendo de Guzman
Writ of execution was issued against the driver but remained unsatisfied. After which, De Guzman died. Plaintiff-
appellees then prayed that heirs of De Guzman pay the sums as well as the costs of suit.
The heirs of de Guzman refused. In support of this motion, they maintained that the suit was for a money claim against
the supposed debtor who was already dead and as such it should be filed in testate or intestate proceedings, or in the absence of
such proceedings, after the lapse of 30 days, the creditors should initiate such proceedings, that the heirs could not be held liable
therefore since there was no allegation that they assumed the alleged obligation.

Issue:
Whether or not the heirs of Bautista can claim from the heirs of De Guzman

Held:
Bautista heirs can no longer recover because of negligence and a failure to observe mandatory provisions of the law and
the Rules. They overlooked the fact that they were no longer suing de Guzman who died shortly after the accident but his heirs.
Section 5, Rule 86 makes it mandatory to inform the executor or administrator of the claims against it, thus enabling him to examine
each claim and determine whether it is a proper one which should be allowed.
The termination of intestate proceedings and the distribution of the estate to the heirs did not alter the fact that plaintiff-
appellees claim was a money claim which should have been presented before a probate court. The only instance wherein a creditor
can file an action against a distribute of the debtor’s asset is under Section 5, Rule 88. Even under this rule, the contingent claims
must first have been established and allowed in the probate court before the creditors can file an action directly against the
distributees.
 Opulencia v. CA
G.R. No. 125835, July 30, 1998

Aladin Simundac and Miguel Oliven alleged that Natalia Carpena Opulencia executed in
their favor a “CONTRACT TO SELL” of a lot in Sta. Rosa, Laguna at P150.00 per square
meters. Plaintiffs paid a downpayment of P300,000.00 but defendant, despite demands,
failed to comply with her obligations under the contract. Private respondents therefore
prayed that petitioner be ordered to perform her contractual obligations and to further
pay damages, attorney’s fee and litigation expenses. However the petitioner put forward
the following affirmative defenses: that the property subject of the contract formed part
of the Estate of Demetrio Carpena (petitioner’s father), in respect of which a petition for
probate was filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, Biñan, Laguna; that at the
time the contract was executed, the parties were aware of the pendency of the probate
proceeding; that the contract to sell was not approved by the probate court; that realizing
the nullity of the contract petitioner had offered to return the downpaymentreceived from
private respondents, but the latter refused to accept it.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Contract to Sell dated 03 February 1989 executed by the
petitioner and private respondents without the requisite probate court approval is valid

As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, Section 7 of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court is
not applicable, because petitioner entered into the Contract to Sell in her capacity as
an heiress, not as an executrix or administratrix of the estate. In the contract, she
represented herself as the “lawful owner” and seller of the subject parcel of land. She also
explained the reason for the sale to be “difficulties in her living” conditions and
consequent “need of cash.” These representations clearly evince that she was not acting
on behalf of the estate under probate when she entered into the Contract to Sell. The Court
emphasized that hereditary rights are vested in the heir or heirs from the moment of the
decedent’s death. Petitioner, therefore, became the owner of her hereditary share the
moment her father died. Thus, the lack of judicial approval does not invalidate the
Contract to Sell, because the petitioner has the substantive right to sell the whole or a part
of her share in the estate of her late father.

The Contract to Sell stipulates that petitioner’s offer to sell is contingent on the
“complete clearance of the court on the Last Will Testament of her father.” Consequently,
although the Contract to Sell was perfected between the petitioner and private
respondents during the pendency of the probate proceedings, the consummationof the
sale or the transfer of ownership over the parcel of land to the private respondents is
subject to the full payment of the purchase price and to the termination and outcome of
the testate proceedings. Therefore, there is no basis for petitioner’s apprehension that the
Contract to Sell may result in a premature partition and distribution of the properties of
the estate.

Acebedo v. Abesamis
217 SCRA 186

FACTS
1. Herodotus Acebedo and 7 others were left an estate consisting of real properties in Quezon City and
Caloocan City. Acebedo became the administrator pending partition. In the meantime, the property
is owned in common by the heirs.

2. The case pended for 16 years with the court. Miguel Acebedo et al (respondents) then filed a Motion
for Approval of Sale for them to sell their shares from the estate. The court approved the motion.
Respondents were able to find a buyer in the person of Yu Hwa Ping who agreed to buy the
properties for P12 Million. He paid P6 million as earnest money.

3. Acebedo assailed the approval of the sale claiming that the price is quite low. The court ordered
Miguel et al to find a higher bidder within a specified time frame which was later extended to 7 months
but still no other buyer could provide better terms.

4. Finally, it was agreed by the parties that respondents sell their share to the price already agreed
upon with Ping and that Acebedo can negotiate his price with Ping. But Acebedo still filed a
Supplemental Opposition against the approval of the conditional sale.

5. The court affirmed the approval of the sale and ordered Acebedo to sell his share at the same rate
that the other heirs sold their share to Ping.

ISSUE: Whether or not the other heirs can sell their shares of the estate prior to adjudication.

HELD: Yes. An heir can sell his share without final adjudication. An heir is a co-owner of the property (estate)
before adjudication.

Although the Rules of Court do not specifically state that the sale of an immovable property belonging to an
estate of a decedent, in a special proceeding, should be made with the approval of the court, this authority is
necessarily included in its capacity as a probate court. Therefore, it is clear that the probate court in the case
at bar, acted within its jurisdiction in issuing the Order approving the Deed of Conditional Sale.

The right of an heir to dispose of the decedent’s property, even if the same is under administration, is based
on the Civil Code provision stating that the possession of hereditary property is deemed transmitted to the
heir without interruption and from the moment of the death of the decedent, in case the inheritance is
accepted. Where there are however, two or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before its
partition, owned in common by such heirs.

THE HEIRS OF PEDRO ESCANLAR ET AL V. CA 281 SCRA 176 (1997)

FACTS: Spouses Guillermo Nombre and Victoriana Cari-an died without issue in 1924
and 1938, respectively. Nombre’s heirs include his nephews and grandnephews.
Victoriana was succeeded by her late brother’s son, Gregorio Cari-an.
1. After Gregorio’s death in 1971, his wife, Generosa Martinez and children (Rodolfo,
Carmen, Leonardo and Fredisminda) were adjudged as heirs by representation to
Victoriana’s estate. Leonardo passed away, leaving his widow, Nelly Chua vda. de Cari-
an and minor Leonell as his heirs
2. 2 parcels of land, denominated by Lot 1616 and 1617, formed part of the estate of
Guillermo Nombre and Victoriana Cari-an.
3. In 1978, Gregorio’s heirs executed a deed of sale of rights, interests and participation in
favor of Pedro Escanlar and Francisco Holgado over the ½ undivided share of Victoriana
for P275,000 to be paid to the heirs, except the share of the minor Leonell Cari-an which
shall be deposited to the Municipal Treasurer. Said contract of sale will be effective
only upon approval of CFI
4. Escanlar and Holgado, the vendees, were concurrently the lessees of the subject
property. In a deed of agreement executed by both parties confirming and affirming the
contract of sale, they stipulated the following:
a. That the balance of the purchase price (P225,000) shall be paid on or before May 1979
b. Pending complete payment thereof, the vendees shall not assign, sell, lease or mortgage
the rights, interests and participation thereof
c. In the event of nonpayment of the balance of said purchase price, the sum of P50,000
(down payment) shall be deemed as damages
5. Escanlar and Holgado were unable to pay the individual shares of the Cari-an heirs,
amounting to P55,000 each, on the due date. However, said heirs received at least 12
installment payments from Escanlar and Holgado after May 1979. Rodolfo was fully paid
by June 1979, Generosa Martinez, Carmen and Fredisminda were likewise fully
compensated for their individual shares. The minor’s share was deposited with the RTC
in September 1982.
6. Being former lessees, Escanlar and Holgado continued in possession of Lots 1616 and
Lots 1617. Interestingly, they continued to pay rent based on their lease contract.
7. Subsequently, Escanlar and Holgado sought to intervene in the probate proceedings of
Guillermo and Victoriana as buyers of Victoriana’s share. In 1982, the probate court
approved the motion filed by the heirs of Guillermo and Victoriana to sell their respective
shares in the estate. Thereafter, the Cari-ans, sold their shares in 8 parcels of land
including lots 1616 and 1617 to spouses Chua for P1.85 million.
8. The Cari-ans instituted a case for cancellation of sale against Escanlar and Holgado
alleging the latter’s failure to pay the balance of the purchase price on the stipulated date
and that they only received a total of P132,551 in cash and goods.
9. Escanlar and Holgado averred that the Cari-ans, having been paid, had no right to resell
the subject lots and that the spouses Chua were purchasers in bad faith.
10. The trial court held in favor of the heirs of Cari-an citing that the sale between the
Cari-ans and Escanlar is void as it was not approved by the probate court which
was required in the deed of sale.
11. CA affirmed the same and cited that the questioned deed of sale of rights is a contract to
sell because it shall become effective only upon approval by the probate court and upon
full payment of the purchase price.

ISSUE: WON the non-happening of a condition affects the validity of the contract itself
HELD: No, the non-happening of a condition only affects the effectivity and not the validity
of the contract.

Under Art 1318 Civil Code, the essential requisites of a contract are: consent of the
contracting parties; object certain which is the subject matter of the contract and
cause of the obligation which is established. Absent one of the above, no contract
can arise. Conversely, where all are present, the result is a valid contract.
However, some parties introduce various kinds of restrictions or modalities, the
lack of which will not, however, affect the validity of the contract.
In the instant case, the Deed of Sale, complying as it does with the essential
requisites, is a valid one. However, it did not bear the stamp of approval of the
court. The contract’s validity was not affected for in the words of the stipulation, “ …this
Contract of Sale of rights, interests and participations shall become effective only upon
the approval by the Honorable Court…” In other words, only the effectivity and not
the validity of the contract is affected.

CONTRACT TO SELL VS. CONTRACT TO SALE

In contracts to sell, ownership is retained by the seller and is not to pass until the full
payment of the price. Such payment is a positive suspensive condition, the failure of which
is not a breach of contract but simply an event that prevented the obligation of the vendor
to convey title from acquiring binding force. To illustrate, although a deed of conditional
sale is denominated as such, absent a proviso that title to the property sold is reserved in
the vendor until full payment of the purchase price nor a stipulation giving the vendor the
right to unilaterally rescind the contract the moment the vendee fails to pay within a fixed
period, by its nature, it shall be declared a deed of absolute sale.

In a contract of sale, the non-payment of the price is a resolutory condition which

extinguishes the transaction that, for a time, existed and discharges the obligations
created thereunder. The remedy of an unpaid seller in a contract of sale is to seek either
specific performance or rescission.

In the case at bar, the sale of rights, interests and participation as to ½ portion pro
indiviso of the 2 subject lots is a contract of salefor the reasons that (1) the sellers
did not reserve unto themselves the ownership of the property until full payment
of the unpaid balance of P225,000.00; (2) there is no stipulation giving the sellers
the right to unilaterally rescind the contract the moment the buyer fails to pay
within the fixed period.

NEED OF PROBATE COURT’S APPROVAL EXISTS WHERE SPECIFIC PROPERTIES

OF THE ESTATE ARE SOLD AND NOT WHEN IDEAL AND INDIVISIBLE SHARES OF
AN HEIR ARE DISPOSED OF
The need for approval by the probate court exists only where specific properties of the
estate are sold and not when only ideal and indivisible shares of an heir are disposed of.
In Dillena v. Court of Appeals, the Court declared that it is within the jurisdiction of the
probate court to approve the sale of properties of a deceased person by his prospective
heirs before final adjudication. The probate court’s approval is necessary for the validity
of any disposition of the decedent’s estate. However, reference to judicial approval cannot
adversely affect the substantive rights of the heirs to dispose of their ideal share in the
co-heirship and/or co-ownership among the heirs. It must be recalled that during the
period of indivision of a decedent’s estate, each heir, being a co-owner, has full ownership
of his part and may therefore alienate it. But the effect of the alienation with respect to the
co-owners shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon
the termination of the co-ownership.