Chapter II b) Where the lawyer undertakes to complete
THE LAWYERS AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION
CANON 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession and
support the activities of the integrated bar.
Rule 7.01 - A lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly
making a false statement or suppressing a material fact, in
connection with his application for admission to the bar.
Rule 7.02 - A lawyer shall not support the application for
admission to the bar of any person known by him to be
unqualified in respect to character, education, or other
relevant attribute.
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall
he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
CANON 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with
courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional
colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against
opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings,
use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise
improper.
Rule 8.02 - A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly,
encroach upon the professional employment of another
lawyer; however, it is the right of any lawyer, without fear
or favor, to give proper advice and assistance to those
seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful counsel.
CANON 9 - A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly,
assist in the unauthorized practice of law
Rule 9.01 - A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified
person the performance of any task which by law may only
be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.
Rule 9.02 - A lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to divide a
fee for legal services with persons not licensed to practice
law, except:
a) Where there is a pre-existing agreement with a
partner or associate that, upon the latter’s death,
money shall be paid over a reasonable period of
time to his estate or to the persons specified in the
agreement; or
unfinished legal business of a deceased lawyer; or
c) Where a lawyer or law firm includes non-lawyer
employees in a retirement plan, even if the plan is
based in whole or in part, on a profit-sharing
arrangement..
1 - Alitagtag v. Atty. Garcia (2002)
FACTS:
This is a petition for disbarment against
respondent Atty. Virgilio R. Garcia for the falsification of a
deed of donation and notarizing the same.
It appears that Atty. Garcia notarized the Deed of
Donation covering a parcel of land. When said document
was examined by the PNP Laboratory upon complaint of
Violeta Flores Alitagtag, it certified that the questioned
signature in the Deed of Donation and the standard
signatures of the deceased donor, Caesar B. Flores, “WERE
NOT WRITTEN BY ONE AND THE SAME PERSON”. Hence,
the Deed of Donation was declared falsified and thus, null
and void by the lower court.
As a result of such findings, the IBP recommended
the suspension of Atty. Garcia from the practice of law for
two (2) years.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that
Atty. Garcia be disbarred.
HELD:
YES. Article 2103, Sec.1(4) provides that a notary
public “ shall certify that the person acknowledging the
instrument or document is known to him and that he is the
same person who executed it, and acknowledged that the
Deed of Donation is authentic.” He assisted his father-in-
law, the donor, in executing the same. By notarizing the
document, he likewise acknowledged that the signature
therein is the donor’s true signature.
Where the notary public is a lawyer, a graver
responsibility is placed upon his shoulder by reason of his
solemn oath to obey the laws and to do no falsehood or
consent to the doing of any.
A notary who acknowledged a document that was a
forgery destroys the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession. He does not deserve to continue as member of
the bar.
2 - Torres v. Javier (2005)
DOCTRINE: Inclusion of derogatory statements actuated
by his giving vent to ill-feelings stated in the pleading is
not covered by the absolute immunity or privileged
communication.
FACTS:
Atty. Ireneo L. Torres and Mrs. Natividad Celestino
charged Atty. Jose Concepcion Javier for malpractice, gross
misconduct in office as an attorney and/or violation of the
lawyer’s oath for employing statements and remarks on
his pleadings which are false, unsubstantiated, with
malicious imputation, abusive, offensive and improper
with the character of an attorney as a quasi-judicial officer.
Atty. Javier professes that he was angry while he
was preparing his pleadings considering that his wife was
included to the burglary exposed in the present case. Also,
he invokes that those statements he made are privileged
communication, it forming part of a judicial proceeding.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Javier is administratively liable for
the alleged offensive statements he made in his pleadings
HELD:
It is well entrenched in Philippine jurisprudence
that for reasons of public policy, utterances made in the
course of judicial proceedings, including all kinds of
pleadings, petitions and motions, are absolutely privileged
so long as they are pertinent and relevant to the subject
inquiry, however false or malicious they may be. A matter,
however, to which the privilege does not extend must be
so palpably wanting in relation to the subject matter of the
controversy that no reasonable man can doubt its
irrelevance or impropriety. That matter alleged in a
pleading need not be in every case material to the issues
presented by the pleadings. It must, however, be
legitimately related thereto, or so pertinent to the subject
of the controversy that it may become the subject of
inquiry in the course of the trial.
Clearly, Atty. Javier’s primordial reason for the
offensive remark stated in his pleadings was his emotional
reaction in view of the fact that herein Complainant was in
a legal dispute with his wife. This excuse cannot be
sustained; that the Atty. Javier is representing his wife is
not at all an excuse.
In keeping with the dignity of the legal profession,
a lawyer’s language must be dignified and choice of
language is important in the preparation of pleadings. In
the assertion of his client’s rights, a lawyer — even one
gifted with superior intellect — is enjoined to rein up his
temper.
Thus, the inclusion of the derogatory statements
by respondent was actuated by his giving vent to his ill-
feelings towards Atty. Torres, a purpose to which the
mantle of absolute immunity does not extend.
3 - Likong v. Lim (1994)
FACTS:
Complainant Cerina B. Likong executed a deed of
assignment assigning to Geesnell L. Yap pension checks
which she regularly receives from the US government as a
widow of a US pensioner. The deed of assignment states
that the same shall be irrevocable until her loan is fully
paid. Cerina likewise executed a special power of attorney
authorizing Yap to get her pension checks from the post
office.
About three months after the execution of the SPA,
Cerina informed the post office that she was revoking the
SPA. Yap filed a complaint for injunction against Cerina.
Respondent Alexander H. Lim appeared as counsel for Yap
while Attys. Roland B. Inting and Erico B. Aumentado
appeared for Cerina.
Cerina and Yap filed a joint motion, which does
not bear the signatures of Cerina's counsel, to allow the
Yap to withdraw the pension checks. They likewise
entered into a compromise agreement without the
participation of Cerina's counsel. In the compromise
agreement, it was stated that complainant Cerina admitted
an obligation to Yap and that they agreed that the amount
would be paid in monthly installments.
Cerina filed a complaint for disbarment, alleging
that in all the motions, she was prevented from seeking
assistance, advise and signature of any of her two lawyers
as she was advised by Atty. Lim that it was not necessary
for her to consult her lawyers under the pretense that: (a)
this could only jeopardize the settlement; (b) she would
only be incurring enormous expense if she consulted a
new lawyer; (c) respondent was assisting her anyway; (d)
she had nothing to worry about the documents foisted
upon her to sign; (e) complainant need not come to court
afterwards to save her time; and in any event respondent
already took care of everything. She alleged that she was
prevented from exhibiting fully her case by means of fraud,
deception and some other form of LEGAL ETHICS| ATTY.
GUZMAN| CASE DIGESTS| CANONS 7-22| YEAR I BLOCK
2|14 mendacity practiced on her by Atty. Lim who,
fraudulently or without authority, assumed to represent
complainant and connived in her defeat.
Atty. Lim argued that Cerina‘s counsel had
abandoned her and it was upon her request that he made
the compromise agreement. Atty. Lim states that he first
instructed Cerina to notify her lawyers but was informed
that her lawyer had abandoned her since she could not pay
his attorney's fees.
The compromise agreement prepared by
respondent increased Cerina‘s debt to Yap and the terms
contained therein are grossly prejudicial to Cerina.
ISSUE:
WON Atty. Lim is guilty of misconduct under the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
HELD:
Yes. Atty. Lim was suspended from the practice of
law for 1 year for violating Rule 8.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, constituting malpractice and
grave misconduct.
RATIO:
Atty. Lim prevented Cerina from informing her
lawyers by giving her the reasons enumerated in the
complaint. There is no showing that Atty. Lim even tried to
inform opposing counsel of the compromise agreement.
Neither is there any showing that Atty. Lim informed the
trial court of the alleged abandonment of Cerina by her
counsel.Instead, even assuming that she was really
abandoned by her counsel, Atty. Lim saw an opportunity to
take advantage of the situation, and the result was the
execution of the compromise agreement which is grossly
and patently disadvantageous and prejudicial to Cerina.
Undoubtedly, Atty. Lim's conduct is unbecoming a member
of the legal profession.
The Code of Professional Responsibility states:
Rule 8.02 — A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly,
encroach upon the professional employment of another
lawyer; however, it is the right of any lawyer, without fear
or favor, to give proper advice and assistance to those
seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful counsel.
4 - Re: Letter Of The Up Law Faculty Entitled
"Restoring Integrity: A Statement By The Faculty Of
The University Of The Philippines College Of Law On
The Allegations Of Plagiarism And Misrepresentation
In The Supreme Court (2011)
FACTS:
For disposition of the Court are the various
submissions of the 37 respondent law professors in
response to the Resolution directing them to show cause
why they should not be disciplined as members of the Bar
for violation of specific provisions of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
The ponencia of Associate Justice Mariano del
Castillo in Vinuya, et al. v. Executive Secretary was
promulgated. The counsel for Vinuya, et al. (the "Malaya
Lolas"), Attys. H. Harry L. Roque, Jr. and Atty. Romel
Regalado Bagares filed a Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration where they posited their charge of
plagiarism claiming that "in this controversy, the evidence
bears out the fact not only of extensive plagiarism but also
of twisting the true intents of the plagiarized sources by
the ponencia to suit the arguments of the assailed
Judgment for denying the Petition. A statement entitled
"Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the Faculty of the
University of the Philippines College of Law on the
Allegations of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the
Supreme Court" was submitted by Dean Leonen to the
Court.
The Ethics Committee was given a copy of the
signed UP Law Faculty Statement that showed on the
signature pages the names of the full roster of the UP Law
Faculty, 81 faculty members in all. Indubitable from the
actual signed copy of the Statement was that only 37 of the
81 faculty members appeared to have signed the same.
However, the 37 actual signatories to the Statement did
not include former Supreme Court Associate Justice
Vicente V. Mendoza as represented in the previous copies
of the Statement submitted by Dean Leonen and Atty.
Roque. It also appeared that Atty. Miguel R. Armovit signed
the Statement although his name was not included among
the signatories in the previous copies submitted to the
Court.
Dean Leonen was directed to show cause why he
should not be disciplinarily dealt with for violation of
Canon 10 for submitting, for the consideration of the Court
en banc, a dummy which is not a true and faithful
reproduction of the UP Law Faculty Statement.
Dean Leonen‘s predicament is the fact that he did
not from the beginning submit the signed copy, Restoring
Integrity I, to the Court and, instead, submitted Restoring
Integrity II with its retyped or "reformatted" signature
pages. It would turn out, according to Dean Leonen‘s
account, that there were errors in the retyping of the
signature pages due to lapses of his unnamed staff.
"Restoring Integrity I" bears the entire roster of
the faculty of the UP College of Law in its signing pages,
and the actual signatures of the thirty-seven (37) faculty
members subject of the Show Cause Resolution while
"Restoring Integrity II" does not bear any actual physical
signature, but which reflects as signatories the names of
thirty-seven (37) members of the faculty with the notation
"(SGD.)".
In his Compliance, Dean Leonen essentially denies
that Restoring Integrity II was not a true and faithful
reproduction of the actual signed copy, Restoring Integrity
I, because looking at the text or the body, there were no
differences between the two. He attempts to downplay the
discrepancies in the signature pages of the two versions of
the Statement (i.e., Restoring Integrity I and Restoring
Integrity II) by claiming that it is but expected in "live"
public manifestos with dynamic and evolving pages as
more and more signatories add their imprimatur thereto.
He believes that he had not committed any violation of
Canon 10 for he did not mislead nor misrepresent to the
Court the contents of the Statement or the identities of the
UP Law faculty members who agreed with, or expressed
their desire to be signatories to, the Statement.
ISSUE:
WON Dean Leonen violated Canon 10, Rules 10.02 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
HELD:
Yes. In due consideration of Dean Leonen‘s
professed good intentions, the Court deems it sufficient to
admonish the former for failing to observe full candor and
honesty in his dealings with the Court as required under
Canon 10.
RATIO:
CANON 10 - A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith
to the court.
Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or
misrepresent the contents of paper, the language or the
argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or
authority, or knowingly cite as law a provision already
rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as
a fact that which has not been proved.
To begin with, the Court said that live public
manifesto or not, the Statement was formally submitted to
this Court at a specific point in time and it should reflect
accurately its signatories at that point. The value of the
Statement as a UP Law Faculty Statement lies precisely in
the identities of the persons who have signed it, since the
Statement‘s persuasive authority mainly depends on the
reputation and stature of the persons who have endorsed
the same.
Dean Leonen has not offered any explanation why
he deviated from this practice with his submission to the
Court of Restoring Integrity II. There was nothing to
prevent the dean from submitting Restoring Integrity I to
this Court even with its blanks and unsigned portions. Yet,
Dean Leonen deliberately chose to submit to this Court the
facsimile that did not contain the actual signatures and his
silence on the reason therefor is in itself a display of lack of
candor. Contrary to Dean Leonen‘s proposition, that is
precisely tantamount to making it appear to the Court that
a person or persons participated in an act when such
person or persons did not.
The Court is surprised that someone like Dean
Leonen, with his reputation for perfection and stringent
standards of intellectual honesty, could proffer the
explanation that there was no misrepresentation when he
allowed at least one person to be indicated as having
actually signed the Statement when all he had was a verbal
communication of an intent to sign. In the case of Justice
Mendoza, what he had was only hearsay information that
the former intended to sign the Statement. If Dean Leonen
was truly determined to observe candor and truthfulness
in his dealings with the Court, the court sees no reason
why he could not have waited until all the professors who
indicated their desire to sign the Statement had in fact
signed before transmitting the Statement to the Court as a
duly signed document. If it was truly impossible to secure
some signatures, such as that of Justice Mendoza who had
to leave for abroad, then Dean Leonen should have just
resigned himself to the signatures that he was able to
secure.
5 - Pobre v. Sen. Defensor-Santiago (2009)
FACTS:
JBC through public invitation published the soon
vacant position of Chief of Justice, hence Santiago was one
of the applicant but unfortunately informed by the JBC that
only incumbent associate justice would qualify the
position. During her privilege speech on the Congress to
wit: “x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the
mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated,
debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like
throwing up to be living my middle years in a country of
this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief
Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the
Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the position
[of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I
would rather be in another environment but not in the
Supreme Court of idiots. x x x”
Antero J. Pobre in his sworn letter/complaint
invites the attention of the court and asks that disbarment
proceedings or other disciplinary actions be taken against
the lady senator.
ISSUE: Does the disbarment proceeding and other
disciplinary actions should be taken against the senator?
HELD:
No, because the delivery of speech was conducted while
the Congress is in session and therefore she is covered
with the state immunity provided in our Constitution Art.
VI Sec.11 of the Constitution. Indeed, her privilege
speech is not actionable criminally or in a disciplinary
proceeding under the Rules of Court. The plea of Senator
Santiago for the dismissal of the complaint for disbarment
or disciplinary action is well taken. Indeed, her privilege
speech is not actionable criminally or in a disciplinary
proceeding under the Rules of Court.
The disciplinary actions falls under the Congress
provided in The Rules of the Senate contains a provision
on Unparliamentary Acts and Language that enjoins a
Senator from using, under any circumstance, offensive
or improper language against another Senator or
against any public institution. Senate President had not
apparently called her to order, let alone referred the
matter to the Senate Ethics Committee for appropriate
disciplinary action, as the Rules dictates under such
circumstance. The lady senator clearly violated the rules of
her own chamber. Therefore the disbarment case
proceeding was DISMISSED.
6 - Saladaga v. Atty. Astorga (2014)
VIOLATION: breach of the Lawyer’s Oath; unlawful,
dishonest, and deceitful conduct; and disrespect for the
Court and causing undue delay of these cases
PENALTY: SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of two (2) years, reckoned from receipt of this
Decision
FACTS:
Accused representing himself as the owner of a
parcel of land known as Lot No. 7661 of the Baybay
Cadastre, mortgaged the same to the Rural Bank of
Albuera, Albuera, Leyte, within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, knowing fully well that the possessor
and owner at that time was private complainant Florencio
Saladaga by virtue of a Pacto de Retro Sale which accused
executed in favor of private complainant on 2nd
December, 1981, without first redeeming/repurchasing
the same. [P]rivate complainant knowing of accused[’s]
unlawful act only on or about the last week of February,
1991 when the rural bank dispossessed him of the
property, the mortgage having been foreclosed, private
complainant thereby suffered damages and was prejudiced
by accused[’s] unlawful transaction and
misrepresentation.
Complainant likewise instituted the instant
administrative cases against respondent by filing before
this Court an Affidavit-Complaint dated January 28, 1997
and Supplemental Complaint dated February 27, 1997,
which were docketed as A.C. No. 4697 and A.C. No. 4728,
respectively. In both complaints, complainant sought the
disbarment of respondent.
Respondent denied that his agreement with
complainant was a pacto de retro sale. He claimed that it
was an equitable mortgage and that, if only complainant
rendered an accounting of his benefits from the produce of
the land, the total amount would have exceeded
P15,000.00.
HELD:
Regardless of whether the written contract
between respondent and complainant is actually one of
sale with pacto de retro or of equitable mortgage,
respondent’s actuations in his transaction with
complainant, as well as in the present administrative cases,
clearly show a disregard for the highest standards of legal
proficiency, morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing
required from lawyers, for which respondent should be
held administratively liable.
When respondent was admitted to the legal
profession, he took an oath where he undertook to “obey
the laws,” “do no falsehood,” and “conduct [him]self as a
lawyer according to the best of [his] knowledge and
discretion.”18 He gravely violated his oath.
The Investigating Commissioner correctly found,
and the IBP Board of Governors rightly agreed, that
respondent caused the ambiguity or vagueness in the
“Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase” as he was the
one who prepared or drafted the said instrument.
Respondent could have simply denominated the
instrument as a deed of mortgage and referred to himself
and complainant as “mortgagor” and “mortgagee,”
respectively, rather than as “vendor a retro” and “vendee a
retro.” If only respondent had been more circumspect
and careful in the drafting and preparation of the
deed, then the controversy between him and
complainant could have been avoided or, at the very
least, easily resolved. His imprecise and misleading
wording of the said deed on its face betrayed lack of
legal competence on his part. He thereby fell short of
his oath to “conduct [him]self as a lawyer according to
the best of [his] knowledge and discretion.”
Respondent dealt with complainant with bad faith,
falsehood, and deceit when he entered into the “Deed of
Sale with Right to Repurchase” dated December 2, 1981
with the latter. He made it appear that the property was
covered by TCT No. T-662 under his name, even giving
complainant the owner’s copy of the said certificate of title,
when the truth is that the said TCT had already been
cancelled some nine years earlier by TCT No. T-3211 in the
name of PNB. He did not even care to correct the wrong
statement in the deed when he was subsequently issued a
new copy of TCT No. T-7235 on January 4, 1982, or barely
a month after the execution of the said deed. All told,
respondent clearly committed an act of gross dishonesty
and deceit against complainant.
 Respondent’s infractions are aggravated by the
fact that he has already been imposed a disciplinary
sanction before. In Nuñez v. Atty. Astorga,respondent was
held liable for conduct unbecoming an attorney for which
he was fined P2,000.00.
7 - Spouses Lopez v. Atty. Limos (2016)
FACTS:
Complainants filed a disbarment case on Atty.
Limos for violation of 18.03 of the CPR, as she neglected
the legal matter entrusted to her by not filing the adoption
case - for almost a year until complainants finally
withdrew their documents from respondent and opted to
have the filing of the case handled by another lawyer.
Worse, respondent refused to return the amount of
P75,000.00 representing legal fees paid by complainants to
her.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent should be held
administratively liable for violating the Rule 18.03 of the
CPR,
HELD:
Respondent's acts constitute a flagrant violation of
Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR, to wit:
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.
Once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, he is
duty-bound to serve the latter with competence, and to
attend to such client's cause with diligence, care, and
devotion whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. He
owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of
the trust and confidence reposed upon him. Therefore, a
lawyer's neglect of a legal matter entrusted to him by his
client constitutes inexcusable negligence for which he
must be held administratively liable, as in this case.
8 - Del Mundo v. Atty. Capistrano (2012)
FACTS:
On January 8, 2005, Suzette and her friend Ricky S.
Tuparan (Tuparan) engaged the legal services of Atty.
Capistrano to handle the judicial declaration of nullity of
their respective marriages allegedly for a fee of
PhP140,000.00 each. On the same date, a Special Retainer
Agreement was entered into by and between Suzette and
Atty. Capistrano which required an acceptance fee of
PhP30,000.00, appearance fee of PhP2,500.00 per hearing
and another PhP2,500.00 per pleading. Moreover for every
payment that Suzette made, she would inquire from Atty.
Capistrano on the status of her case. In response, the latter
made her believe that the two cases were already filed
before the Regional Trial Court of Malabon City and
waiting notice of hearing. Sometime in July 2005, when she
could hardly reach Atty. Capistrano, she verified her case
from the Clerk of Court of Malabon and discovered that
while the case of Tuparan had been filed on January 27,
2005, no petition has yet been filed for her.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Arnel C. Capistrano violated the Code
of Professional Responsibility
HELD:
This court finds that Atty. Capistrano committed
acts in violation of his sworn duty as a member of the bar.
In his Manifestation and Petition for Review, he himself
admitted liability for his failure to act on Suzette’s case as
well as to account and return the funds she entrusted to
him. He only pleaded for the mitigation of his penalty
citing the lack of intention to breach his lawyer’s oath; that
this is his first offense; and that his profession is the only
means of his and his family’s livelihood. He also prayed
that the adjudged amount of PhP140,000.00 be reduced to
PhP73,500.00 representing the amount of PhP78,500.00
he received less his payment of the sum of PhP5,000.00.
Consequently, Commissioner Quisumbing and the IBP-CBD
Board of Governors correctly recommended the
appropriate penalty of one year suspension from the
practice of law for violating the pertinent provisions of the
Canons of Professional Responsibility. As stated under
Canon Law,
CANON 16 – A lawyer shall not hold in trust all moneys
and properties of his client that may come into his
possession.
RULE 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or
property collected or received for or from the client.
RULE 16.02 – A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client
separate and apart from his own and those of others kept
by him.
Canon 18- A lawyer shall serve his client with competence
and diligence.
RULE 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.
RULE 18.04 – A lawyer shall keep the client informed of
the status of his case and shall respond within a
reasonable time to the client’s request for information.
Furthermore, a lawyer is obliged to hold in trust
money of his client that may come to his possession. As
trustee of such funds, he is bound to keep them separate
and apart from his own. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a
specific purpose such as for the filing and processing of a
case if not utilized, must be returned immediately upon
demand. Failure to return gives rise to a presumption that
he has misappropriated it in violation of the trust reposed
on him. And the conversion of funds entrusted to him
constitutes gross violation of professional ethics and
betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Arnel C.
Capistrano, having clearly violated Canons 16 and 18 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, is SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for one year with a stern warning that a
repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with
more severely. He is ORDERED to return to Suzette Del
Mundo the full amount of PhP73,500.00 within 30 days
from notice hereof and DIRECTED to submit to the Court
proof of such payment.
9 - Spouses Jacinto v. Atty. Bangot, Jr. (2016)
FACTS:
Complainants Emilio and Alicia Jacinto filed an
administrative case against Atty. Emelie P. Bangot, Jr. for
the latter's unjust and dishonest treatment of them as his
clients. Atty. Bangot executed a MOA between him and the
Complainant to impress that his supposed attorney's fees
would be paid on contingent basis, however, the MOA
indicates that the payment thru real property is being
made immediately effective upon execution of the
agreement.
There is also apparent disproportion between the
amount of attorney's fees and the effort or service already
performed by him.
ISSUE:
Did the respondent violate his ethical duties as a member
of the Bar in his dealings with the complainants?
HELD:
The court held that the respondent grossly
violated his Lawyer's Oath and his ethical duties as an
attorney because he did not observe candor and fairness in
his dealings with his clients.
A lawyer shall observe candor, honesty and
fairness in dealing with his clients, and shall only charge
fair and reasonable fees for his legal services. He should
not excessively estimate the value of his professional
services. In drawing up the terms of his professional
engagement, he should not practice deceit. The clients are
entitled to rescind the written agreement on his
professional fees if the terms thereof contravened the true
agreement of the parties.
10 - Campos, Jr. v. Atty. Estebal (2016)
FACTS:
In the early part of 2006, complainants engaged the
services of Atty. Estebal to assist each of them in securing
tourist visas to the United States (U.S.). Toward this end,on
January 24, 2006, Campos and Atty. Estebal entered into a
Service Contract stipulating an acceptance/service fee of
Php200, 000.00 exclusive of out-of-pocket expenses such
as tickets, filing fees, and application fees; and that in case
no visa is issued, Campos is entitled to a refund of what has
been actually paid less 7% thereof Campos paid Atty.
Estebal the sum of Php150, 000.00. For their part, Batac
and Carpiogave Atty. Estebal the amounts of Php75,
000.00 and Phpl20, 000.00, respectively.
Complainants claimed that despite receipt of their
monies, Atty. Estebal failed to apply or secure for them the
U.S. tourist visas that he promised. Thus, they demanded
for the return of their monies. Atty. Estebal, however,
failed to return the amount despite repeated demands.
Hence, they filed this Complaint praying that Atty. Estebal
be suspended or disbarred from the practice of law, and
that he be directed to return their monies.
Atty. Estebal posited that complainants’ demand
for the return or refund of their money has no factual or
legal basis at all, especially because he had invested
considerable time, talent and energy in the processing of
complainants’ tourist visa applications with the U.S.
Embassy.
Investigating Commissioner Jose I. De la Rama, Jr.
recommended that Atty. Estebal be suspended from the
practice of law for six (6) months for violating Canons
15,16 and 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility;
moreover, it was recommended that Atty. Estebal be
directed to refund the amount of Php330,000.00 and to
retain the amount of Php15, 000.00 as his attorney’s fees.
On December 29, 2012, the IBP Board of
Governors issued Resolution affirming with modification
the Investigating Commissioner’s recommendation. In fine,
the IBP Board of Governors resolved to delete the
recommended penalty of suspension and reduce the
amount refunded from Php330,000.00 to Php300,000.00.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Estebal is guilty of professional
misconduct for violating the pertinent provisions of the
Code of Professional Responsibility?
HELD:
Respondent clearly violated Canons 15, 16 and 20
of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
CANON 15 – A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR,
FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS
AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.
CANON 16 – A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL
MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT
MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money
or property collected or received for or from the
client.
CANON 20 – A LAWYER SHALL CHARGE ONLY FAIR AND
REASONABLE FEES.
Rule 20.01 – A lawyer shall be guided by the
following factors in determining his fees.
Respondent violated Canon 15 for the reason that
he was not candid enough to tell the complainants their
chance[s] of getting [a] US visa. Instead, the respondent
made the complainants believe that they will have a good
chance of getting the US visa if they will be joined with
other groups. It turned out to be false. Complainants
waited for so long before the respondent could find other
members of the group. In the end, nothing happened.
He also violated Canon 16, Rule 16.01 because he
did not account [for] the money he received from the
complainants. It is not clear to the complainants how much
is the amount due to the respondent.
Lastly, it appears that the attorney’s fees that he
collected from the complainants are excessive and
unreasonable. Considering the degree of work and number
of hours spent, the amount he collected from the
complainants is not commensurate to the degree of
services rendered. Obviously, respondent took advantage
of the weakness of the complainants in their desire to go
the United States.
Respondent Atty. Alexander C. Estebal is found
GUILTY of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility
and SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of
one (1) year, effective upon receipt of the Decision. He is
also ORDERED to return the amounts of Php,000.00 to
William G. Campos, Jr., Php60,000.00 to Rita C. Batac;
andPhp105,000.00 to Dorina D. Carpio. Atty. Alexander C.
Estebal is WARNED that are petition of the same or similar
act will be dealt with more severely.
11 - Vda. dE Caina v. Victoriano (1959)
FACTS:
Respondent Flaviano T. Dalisay, Jr. was the
attorney of one of petitioners, Elena Peralta Vda. de Caiña,
in an action for ejectment filed before the Justice of the
Peace of Caloocan, Rizal, against Ricardo Nabong, which
was dismissed and appealed to the Court of First Instance
of Rizal. In the latter court, the case was docketed as Civil
Case No. 3875, and because of the non-appearance of
defendant, the latter was declared in default and judgment
was rendered in favor of plaintiff. This judgment became
final and executory for lack of appeal.
On June 26, 1957, respondent Dalisay filed a
motion in the same ejectment case for annotation of his
attorney’s lien on the back of Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 51585 claiming that, notwithstanding the services he
had rendered to the widow and her children who were
presented by him in said case, they have failed to pay him
his attorney’s fees which he fixed at P2,020. This motion
was set for hearing and thereafter the same was granted in
an order entered on July 10, 1957 wherein the court
ordered petitioners to surrender their duplicate copy of
said certificate in order that the annotation requested
maybe made. Upon receipt of a copy of this order,
petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that
they were never furnished with a copy of respondent’s
motion, nor notified of the date of its hearing, for which
reason they were not able to appear to contest the same.
This motion was opposed by respondent Dalisay who
averred that petitioners were furnished with a copy of his
motion by registered mail three days before the hearing as
shown by the return card attached to his written
opposition. And on August 27, 1957, the court denied the
motion. Hence the present petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
WON the attorney’s lien of respondent Dalisay for services
he had rendered in the ejectment case can be ordered
annotated on the back of Transfer Certificate of Title
No.51585.
HELD:
An attorney’s lien is of two kinds: one is called
retaining alien and the other charging lien. The retaining
lien is the right of the attorney to retain the funds,
documents, and papers of his client which have lawfully
come into his possession until his lawful fees and
disbursements have been paid and to apply such funds to
the satisfaction thereof. The charging lien is the right
which the attorney has upon all judgments for the
payment of money, and executions issued in pursuance of
said judgments, which he has secured in litigation of his
client. Under this rule, this lien, whether retaining or
charging, takes legal effect only from and after, but not
before, notice of said lien has been entered in the record
and served on the adverse party. It may therefore be seen
that the right of a lawyer to insure the payment of his
professional fee is either to retain the funds, documents,
andpapers of his client which may have lawfully come into
his possession, or to enforce it upon any judgment for the
payment of money he may secure in favor of his client. And
it has been held that the retaining lien is dependent upon
possession and does not attach to anything not in
attorney’s hands. The lien exists only so long as the
attorney’s retains possession ends.
In the instant case, the lien which respondent
attorney tried to enforce for the satisfaction of his
professional fee is charging in the sense that his purpose
is to make of record his claim in order that it may be
considered in the execution of the judgment that may be
rendered in the case, and this he has already done. Thus,
he had already caused a statement of his claim to be
entered in the record of the ejectment case and that is all
what the rule requires of him to do. Certainly, he cannot go
any further, such as what he filed the trial court to do, that
is, to have his lien annotated on the back of the title of
petitioners which is beyond the province of the court. The
lien of respondent is not of a nature which attaches to the
property in litigation but is at most a personal claim
enforceable by a writ of execution. The respondent judge
has therefore exceeded his authority in issuing the order
subject of the present petition for certiorari. Petition is
granted.
12 - Aniñon v. Sabitsana (2012)
FACTS:
Josefina M. Aniñon (complainant) related that she
previously engaged the legal services of Atty. Sabitsana in
the preparation and execution in her favor of a Deed of
Sale over a parcel of land owned by her late common-law
husband, BrigidoCaneja, Jr. Atty. Sabitsana allegedly
violated her confidence when he subsequently filed a civil
case against her for the annulment of the Deed of Sale in
behalf of Zenaida L. Cañete, the legal wife of BrigidoCaneja,
Jr. The complainant accused Atty. Sabitsana of using the
confidential information he obtained from her in filing the
civil case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Sabitsana is guilty of misconduct for
representing conflicting interests.
HELD:
Atty. Sabitsana is guilty of misconduct for
representing conflicting interests. As stated under Rule
15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
Rule 15.03. “A lawyer shall not represent conflicting
interests except by written consent of all concerned given
after a full disclosure of the facts.” “The proscription
against representation of conflicting interests applies to a
situation where the opposing parties are present clients in
the same action or in an unrelated action.
The prohibition also applies even if the “lawyer
would not be called upon to contend for one client that
which the lawyer has to oppose for the other client, or that
there would be no occasion to use the confidential
information acquired from one to the disadvantage of the
other as the two actions are wholly unrelated.”To be held
accountable under this rule, it is “enough that the opposing
parties in one case, one of whom would lose the suit, are
present clients and the nature or conditions of the lawyer’s
respective retainers with each of them would affect the
performance of the duty of undivided fidelity to both
clients.”
Based on the associated facts the courts find
evidence to support Atty. Sabitsana’s violation of the above
rule that his legal services were initially engaged by the
complainant to protect her interest over a certain
property. The records show that upon the legal advice of
Atty. Sabitsana, the Deed of Sale over the property was
prepared and executed in the complainant’s favor.
Furthermore, Atty. Sabitsana met with ZenaidaCañete to
discuss the latter’s legal interest over the property subject
of the Deed of Sale. At that point, Atty. Sabitsana already
had knowledge that ZenaidaCañete’s interest clashed with
the complainant’s interests. And despite the knowledge of
the clashing interests between his two clients, Atty.
Sabitsana accepted the engagement from ZenaidaCañete.
Lastly his actual knowledge of the conflicting interests
between his two clients was demonstrated by his own
actions: first, he filed a case against the complainant in
behalf of ZenaidaCañete; second, he impleaded the
complainant as the defendant in the case; and third, the
case he filed was for the annulment of the Deed of Sale that
he had previously prepared and executed for the
complainant.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court
resolves to ADOPT the findings and recommendations of
the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines. Atty. Clemencio C. Sabitsana, Jr. is found
GUILTY of misconduct for representing conflicting
interests in violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED for
one (1) year from the practice of law.
13 - Sesbreño v. CA (2008)
FACTS:
Mrs. Rosario Sen and other camineros hired the
petitioner to prosecute Civil Cases against Commissioner
of Public Highways and the District Engineer. The
agreement was that they will pay Atty. Raul H. Sesbreño,
thirty (30%) percent of whatever back salaries, damages,
etc. that they may recover and they shall take care of all
expenses in connection with the said cases.
 During pendency petitioner registered his
charging/retaining lien based on the Agreement.
The camineros obtained favorable judgment in
CFI. Certiorari cases filed by aggrieved party.
Gov. Gullas assumed the position of governor of
Cebu and proposed the compromise settlement of all
mandamus cases then pending against the province which
included Civil Cases handled by the petitioner.
Under the Compromise Agreement executed by
Guillas and petitioner are the following:
1. Immediately appropriate and pay full backwages
and salaries as awarded by the trial court
2. Amounts payable to the employees is subject to
said lawyer's charging and retaining liens as
registered in the trial court and in the CA
3. Agreeable to paying an advance of P5,000.00 to
each employee payable through their counsel.
Camineros, through their new counsel (who
substituted for the petitioner), moved for its execution.
The court then ordered the issuance of a partial writ of
execution directing the payment of only 45% of the
amount due them and hold 55%. However, instead of
complying with the court order directing partial payment,
the province of Cebu directly paid the camineros the full
amount of their adjudicated claims.
Petitioner filed the complaint for Damages (Thru
Breach of Contract) and Attorney's Fees against the
Province of Cebu and its officials and against the
camineros. (alleged that by directly paying the camineros
the amounts due them, the respondents induced the
camineros to violate their written contract for attorney's
fees.). He claimed that they violated the compromise
agreement approved by the Court.
Although he was not a party to the above
contracts, by virtue of the registration of his charging lien,
he was a quasi-party and thus, had legal standing to
institute the case. Dismiss case against the camineros after
they had entered into an agreement but continued against
province of Cebu
RTC: favored petitioner and ordered the province to pay
him
CA: reversed (petitioner failed to sufficiently establish his
allegation that the respondents induced the camineros to
violate the agreement for attorney's fees and the
compromise agreement, and that he suffered damage due
to respondents' act of directly paying the camineros the
amounts due them. )
SC:
-compromise agreement had been validly entered into by
the respondents and the camineros and the same became
the basis of the judgment rendered by this Court.
-evidenced by an agreement for attorney's fees voluntarily
executed by the camineros where the latter agreed to pay
the former "thirty (30%) percent no fixed amount was
specifically provided for in their contract nor was a
specified rate agreed upon on how the money claims were
to be computed. --- use of the word "whatever" shows that
the basis for the computation would be the amount that
the court would award in favor of the camineros
-Since they agreed to compromise, payment would have to
be based on the amount agreed upon by them in the
compromise agreement
-Considering that petitioner's claim of higher attorney's
fees is baseless and considering further that he had settled
his case as against his former clients, cannot sustain his
right to damages for breach of contract against the
respondents, even on the basis of Articles 1191 46 or
1311.
-cannot render a favorable judgment because there was no
breach of contract. Even if there was such a breach, he had
waived his right to claim against the respondents by
accepting payment and/or absolving from liability those
who were primarily liable to him.
-The records do not show that when they did so, they
induced the camineros to violate their contract with the
petitioner; nor do the records show that they paid their
obligation in order to cause prejudice to the petitioner. –
petition is hereby DENIED.
14 - Spouses Concepcion v. Atty. Dela Rosa (2015)
FACTS:
Complainants alleged that from 1997 until August 2008,3
respondent served as their retained lawyer and counsel.
Aware of the fact that complainants had money intact from
their failed business venture, respondent, on March 23,
2006, called Henry to borrow the amount of
P2,500,000.00, which he promised to return, with interest,
five (5) days thereafter. On March 28, 2006, or the day
respondent promised to return the money, he failed to pay
complainants. Thus, in April 2006, complainants began
demanding payment but respondent merely made
repeated promises to pay soon. On July 7, 2008, Blesilda
sent a demand letter to respondent, which the latter did
not heed.
HELD:
Under Rule 16.04, Canon 16 of the CPR, a lawyer is
prohibited from borrowing money from his client unless
the client’s interests are fully protected:
CANON 16 – A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and
properties of his clients that may come into his
possession.
Rule 16.04 – A lawyer shall not borrow money
from his client unless the client’s interests are
fully protected by the nature of the case or by
independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend
money to a client except, when in the interest of
justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a
legal matter he is handling for the client.”
The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the
relationship between a lawyer and his client is
one imbued with trust and confidence. And as true as any
natural tendency goes, this “trust and confidence” is prone
to abuse. The rule against borrowing of money by a lawyer
from his client is intended to prevent the lawyer from
taking advantage of his influence over his client. The rule
presumes that the client is disadvantaged by the lawyer’s
ability to use all the legal maneuverings to renege on his
obligation.
In the same vein, the Court finds that respondent
also violated Canon 7 of the CPR which reads:
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE
INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF
THE INTEGRATED BAR.
In unduly borrowing money from the
complainants and by blatantly refusing to pay the same,
respondent abused the trust and confidence reposed in
him by his clients, and, in so doing, failed to uphold the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession. Thus, he
should be equally held administratively liable on this
score.
Atty. Elmer A. dela Rosa is found guilty of violating
Canon 7 and Rule 16.04, Canon 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of three
(3) years.
15 - Resurreccion v. People (2014)
FACTS:
- Resurreccion, et al. were charged with violation of
Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 before the
Sandiganbayan.
- After the prosecution had rested its case, the accused
filed a Demurrerto Evidence which the Sandiganbayan
denied.
- Despite the ample opportunity given, the accused still
failed to present evidence on their behalf.
- Sandiganbayan convicted Resurreccion, et al.
- Petitioners sought, but failed, to obtain a reconsideration.
- Resurreccion, et al., contend that the Sandiganbayan
gravely erred in convicting them based only on the
evidence presented by the
prosecution. They attribute their failure to present
evidence to their former counsel's negligence and claim
that they were denied due process of law. They argue that
Atty. Corpuz's failure to inform them about the
developments affecting their case and the scheduled
hearing for the reception of evidence - resulting in the
waiver of presentation of defense evidence, as they were
not able to present evidence in their behalf -constitutes
gross negligence that warrants the application of the
exception to the general rule that "negligence and
dereliction of duty of the counsel bind the client."
- The petitioners likewise argue that the Sandiganbayan
gravely erred when it denied their motion for
reconsideration on the mere technical ground that their
motion lacked the required notice of hearing.
ISSUES:
- Was the negligence of the former counsel of the
petitioners in allegedly not informing them about the
status of their case, resulting in their failure to present
evidence and, consequently, to the waiver of their right to
present evidence, a valid ground to set aside the judgment
for conviction.
- Did the Sandiganbayan correctly deny the petitioners'
motion for reconsideration on the ground that the motion
did not contain a notice of hearing?
RULING:
- No. The negligence and mistakes of the counsel are
binding on the client. The rationale behind this rule is that
a counsel, once retained, is said to have the authority,
albeit impliedly, to do all acts necessary or, at least,
incidental to the prosecution of the case in behalf of his
client, such that any act or omission by counsel within the
scope of his authority is treated by law as the act or
omission of the client himself. It is only in cases involving
gross or palpable negligence of the counsel, or when the
application of the general rule amounts to an outright
deprivation of one's property or liberty through
technicality, or where the interests of justice so require,
when relief is accorded to a client who has suffered
thereby. As can be gleaned from the records, hearings
were scheduled by the Sandiganbayan for the parties'
presentation of evidence. However, due to the repeated
absences of the accused and the prosecution witnesses; as
well as the motions for cancellation filed both by the
prosecution and the defense counsels, the hearings had
been postponed several times. Although the
postponements were not solely attributable to the
petitioners, Atty. Corpuz cannot also be entirely faulted. In
any event, even assuming that Atty. Corpuz had indeed
been grossly negligent in not communicating with them for
three years, it cannot be said that the petitioners had been
deprived of due process of law. As shown above, the
petitioners were not denied their day in court and were, in
fact, afforded ample opportunity to present evidence in
their defense.
- Yes, it was proper. The Rules of Court require that every
written motion be set for hearing by the movant, except
those motions which the court may act upon without
prejudicing the rights of the adverse party. The notice of
hearing must be addressed and served to all parties at
least three days before the hearing. It must specify the
time and date of the hearing of the motion.39 Sections 4
and 5, Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
provide:

SECTION 4. Hearing of motion. - Except for motions which

the court may act upon without prejudicing the rights of
the adverse party, every written motion shall be set for
hearing by the applicant. Every written motion required to
be heard and the notice of the hearing thereof shall be
served in such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the
other party at least three (3) days before the date of
hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the hearing
on shorter notice.

SECTION 5. Notice of hearing. The notice of hearing shall

be addressed to all parties concerned, and shall specify the
time and date of the hearing which must not be later than
ten (10) days after the filing of the motion.
A motion which does not meet the requirements of
Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure is considered pro forma; it is nothing but a
worthless piece of paper which the clerk has no right to
receive and the court has no authority to act upon. "Service
of [a] copy of a motion containing notice of the time and
place of hearing of said motion is a mandatory
requirement and the failure of the movant to comply with
[the] said requirements renders his motion fatally
defective.