Professional Documents
Culture Documents
DIAZ
AND CO.)
Review of the decision of the CA
FACTS
LC Diaz is a professional partnership engaged in accounting.
On 14 August 1991, LC diaz, thru its cashier, instructed their messenger, Calapre, to deposit money in Solidbank.
Calapre then deposited in Solidbank.
Since the transaction took time and Calapre had to make another deposit for L.C. Diaz with Allied Bank, he left the
passbook with Solidbank.
When he came back, the teller told him that somebody else got the passbook. The next day, it was learned that 300k was
withdrawn from the account.
An information for estafa was filed against one of their messengers (Ilagan) and one Roscoe Verdazola. LC Diaz
demanded SolidBank the return of their money.
The latter refused and a case for recovery of a sum of money was filed against them
TC applied rules on savings account written on the passbook.
The rules state that “possession of this book shall raise the presumption of ownership and any payment or payments
made by the bank upon the production of the said book and entry therein of the withdrawal shall have the same effect as
if made to the depositor personally.”
Also, they applied the rule that the holder of the passport is presumed the owner.
It was also held that Solidbank did not have any participation in the custody and care of the passbook and as such, their
act was not the proximate cause of the loss. The proximate cause was LC Diaz’ negligence.
CA revered. It ruled that Solidbank’s negligence was the proximate cause.
It applied the provision on the CC on quasi delicts and found that the requisite elements were present. They
found that the teller made no inquiry upon the withdrawal of 300k.
The teller could have called up LC Diaz since the amount being drawn was significant. The appellate court ruled
that while L.C. Diaz was also negligent in entrusting its deposits to its messenger and its messenger in leaving
the passbook with the teller,
Solidbank could not escape liability because of the doctrine of “last clear chance.”
Solidbank could have averted the injury suffered by L.C. Diaz had it called up L.C. Diaz to verify the
withdrawal.
ISSUES
WON Solidbank was liable
HELD
For breach of the savings deposit agreement due to negligence, or culpa contractual, the bank is liable to its
depositor. When the passbook is in the possession of Solidbank’s tellers during withdrawals,
the law imposes on Solidbank and its tellers an even higher degree of diligence in safeguarding the passbook.
Likewise, Solidbank’s tellers must exercise a high degree of diligence in insuring that they return the passbook
only to the depositor or his authorized representative
In culpa contractual, once the plaintiff proves a breach of contract, there is a presumption that the defendant was
at fault or negligent. The burden is on the defendant to prove that he was not at fault or negligent.
Solidbank failed to discharge this burden. (they could have presented the teller to whom the passbook was left,
but they didn’t)
L.C. Diaz was not at fault that the passbook landed in the hands of the impostor. Solidbank was in possession of
the passbook while it was processing the deposit.
After completion of the transaction, Solidbank had the contractual obligation to return the passbook only to
Calapre, the authorized representative of L.C. Diaz. SolidBank’s negligence in returning the passbook was the
proximate cause.
The doctrine of last clear chance states that where both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is
appreciably later than that of the other, or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence caused
the loss, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the loss but failed to do so, is chargeable with the
loss.
Stated differently, the antecedent negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude him from recovering damages
caused by the supervening negligence of the defendant, who had the last fair chance to prevent the impending
harm by the exercise of due diligence.
We do not apply the doctrine of last clear chance to the present case.
Solidbank is liable for breach of contract due to negligence in the performance of its contractual obligation to L.C. Diaz.
This is a case of culpa contractual, where neither the contributory negligence of the plaintiff nor his last clear chance to
avoid the loss, would exonerate the defendant from liability.
Such contributory negligence or last clear chance by the plaintiff merely serves to reduce the recovery of damages by the
plaintiff but does not exculpate the defendant from his breach of contract.
DISPOSITIVE
Decision affirmed, modification only to damages
ENGADA V CA
Petition for review seeking the reversal of the decision of the CA which affirmed with modification the judgment of the
RTC of Iloilo City
FACTS
On November 29, 1989, at about 1:30 in the afternoon, Edwin Iran was driving a blue Toyota Tamaraw jeepney
bound for Iloilo City.
On board was Sheila Seyan, the registered owner of the Tamaraw.
The Tamaraw passengers allegedly saw from the opposite direction a speeding Isuzu pickup, driven by
petitioner Rogelio Engada.
When it was just a few meters away from the Tamaraw, the Isuzu pickup’s right signal light flashed, at the
same time, it swerved to its left, encroaching upon the lane of the Tamaraw and headed towards a headon
collision course with it.
Seyan shouted at Iran to avoid the pickup. Iran swerved to his left but the pickup also swerved to its right.
Thus, the pickup collided with the Tamaraw, hitting the latter at its right front passenger side.
The impact caused the head and chassis of the Tamaraw to separate from its body. Seyan was thrown out of the
Tamaraw and landed on a ricefield.
Seyan incurred P130,000 in medical expenses. The Toyota Tamaraw jeepney ended up in the junk heap. Its total
loss was computed at P80,000.
ISSUES
1. WON petitioner’s negligence was the proximate cause of the accident
HELD
1. YES. Ratio It is a settled rule that a driver abandoning his proper lane for the purpose of overtaking another
vehicle in an ordinary situation has the duty to see to it that the road is clear and he should not proceed if he
cannot do so in safety.
For failing to observe the duty of diligence and care imposed on drivers of vehicles abandoning their lane,
petitioner must be held liable.
Iran could not be faulted when in his attempt to avoid the pickup, he swerved to his left. Petitioner’s acts had
put Iran in an emergency situation which forced him to act quickly.
An individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and is required to act without much time to
consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger,
is not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a
better solution, unless the emergency was brought by his own negligence.
Reasoning The doctrine of last clear chance states that a person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of
avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent, is considered in law solely responsible
for the consequences of the accident.
But what has been shown is the presence of an emergency and the proper application of the emergency rule. There was
no clear chance to speak of.
Iran swerved to the left only to avoid petitioner’s pick up, which was already on a head to head position going against
Iran’s Tamaraw jeepney immediately before the vehicles collided. No convincing proof was adduced by petitioner that
Iran could have avoided a headon collision.
Dispositive
The appealed decision is AFFIRMED.
VESTIL V IAC (UY)
NATURE
o July 29, 1975: Theness was bitten by a dog while she was playing with a child of the petitioners in the house of
the late Vicente Miranda, the father of Purita Vestil.
o She was rushed to the Cebu General Hospital, where she was treated for "multiple lacerated wounds on the
forehead.”
o She was discharged after nine days but was readmitted one week later due to "vomiting of saliva." The
following day, on August 15, 1975, the child died.
o The cause of death was certified as broncho pneumonia.
o Theness developed hydrophobia, a symptom of rabies, as a result of the dog bites, and second, that asphyxia
bronchopneumonia, which ultimately caused her death, was a complication of rabies
Seven months later, the Uys sued for damages, alleging that the Vestils were liable to them as the possessors of
"Andoy," the dog that bit and eventually killed their daughter.
Judge Jose R. Ramolete of the CFI of Cebu sustained the defendants.
IAC found that the Vestils were in possession of the house and the dog and so should be responsible under Article 2183
of the Civil Code for the injuries caused by the dog.
On the strength of the foregoing testimony, the Court finds that the link between the dog bites and the certified cause of
death has been satisfactorily established.
Petitioners’ Claim
The Vestils are liable for the death of Theness, since they own the dog that bit her.
Respondents’ Comments
The dog belonged to the deceased Vicente Miranda, that it was a tame animal, and that in any case no one had witnessed
it bite Theness.
ISSUE
WON the Vestils are liable for the damage caused by the dog.
HELD
Ratio The obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil Code is not based on the negligence or on the presumed lack
of vigilance of the possessor or user of the animal causing the damage. It is based on natural equity and on the principle
of social interest that he who possesses animals for his utility, pleasure or service must answer for the damage which
such animal may cause.
Reasoning
ART. 2183. The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible for the damage which it
may cause, although it may escape or be lost. This responsibility shall cease only in case the damage should come from
force majeure or from the fault of the person who has suffered damage.
While it is true that she is not really the owner of the house, which was still part of Vicente Miranda's estate, there is no
doubt that she and her husband were its possessors at the time of the incident in question.
There is evidence showing that she and her family regularly went to the house, once or twice weekly.
Theness developed hydrophobia, a symptom of rabies, as a result of the dog bites, and second, that asphyxia broncho
pneumonia, which ultimately caused her death, was a complication of rabies.
The Court finds that the link between the dog bites and the certified cause of death has been satisfactorily established.
It does not matter that the dog was tame and was merely provoked by the child into biting her.
The law does not speak only of vicious animals but covers even tame ones as long as they cause injury.
As for the alleged provocation, the petitioners forget that Theness was only three years old at the time she was
attacked and can hardly be faulted for whatever she might have done to the animal.
Obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil Code is not based on the negligence or on the presumed lack of
vigilance of the possessor or user of the animal causing the damage.
It is based on natural equity and on the principle of social interest that he who possesses animals for his utility,
pleasure or service must answer for the damage which such animal may cause.
The Court approves the time.
DINGCONG vs. KANAAN
Petition for certiorari assailing the decision of the CA
FACTS
o The brothers Loreto and Jose Dingcong rented the house of Emilia Saenz (in Jose Ma. Basa Street of the City of
Iloilo) and established the Central Hotel.
o Among the hotel's guests is Francisco Echevarria, paying P30 a month, and occupying room no. 10 of said hotel.
o Kanaan, on the other hand, occupies the ground floor of the hotel and established his "American Bazaar"
dedicated to the purchase and sale of articles and merchandise.
o Around 11pm of 19 September 1933, Echevarria, when retiring to bed, carelessly left the faucet open that with
only an ordinary basin without drainage.
o That time, the pipes of the hotel were under repair;
o the water run off the pipes and spilled to the ground, wetting the articles and merchandise of the "American
Bazaar," causing a loss which the CFI sets at P1,089.61.
The Kanaans (Halim, Nasri and Michael), representing the establishment "American Bazaar," thereafter filed this
complaint for damages against Loreto Dingcong, Jose Dingcong and Francisco Echevarria.
CFI held Francisco Echevarria liable, and acquitted Jose Dingcong.
CA reversed and declared Jose Dingcong responsible, sentencing him to pay the plaintiffs damages.
ISSUE
WON Jose Dingcong and Francisco Echevarria are liable for damages
HELD
YES.
o Francisco Echevarria, the hotel guest, is liable for being the one who directly, by his negligence in leaving open
the faucet, caused the water to spill to the ground and wet the articles and merchandise of the plaintiffs.
o Jose Dingcong, being a corenter and manager of the hotel, with complete possession of the house, must also be
responsible for the damages caused.
o He failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family to prevent these damages, despite his power
and authority to cause the repair of the pipes.
o Disposition Appealed decision is affirmed, with the costs against apellant.
AFABLE V SINGER SEWING MACHINE COMPANY
o Leopoldo Madlangbayan was a collector for the Singer Sewing Machine Company in the district of San
Francisco del Monte, outside of the limits of the City of Manila,
o and he was supposed to be residing in his district according to the records of the company.
o One Sunday afternoon, Leopoldo Madlangbayan while riding a bicycle was run over and fatally injured at the
corner of O'Donnel and Zurbaran streets in the City of Manila by a truck driven by Vitaliano Sumoay.
o It appears that Madlangbayan had moved to Teodora Alonso St. in Manila without notifying the company,
o and that at the time of his death he was returning home after making some collections in San Francisco del
Monte.
o According to the practice of the company, if collectors made collections on Sunday they were required to deliver
the amount collected to the company the next morning.
o The widow and children of Leopoldo Madlangbayan brought an action to recover from the defendant
corporation under Act No. 3428, as amended by Act. No. 3812, P100 for burial expenses and P1,745.12 for
compensation.
o Plaintiffs' complaint was subsequently amended, and they sought to recover under sections 8 and 10 of Act No.
3428 fifty per cent of P16.78 for 208 weeks of P1,745.12 plus P100 for burial expenses.
Defendant as special defenses alleged that Leopoldo Madlangbayan at the time that he sustained the injuries
resulting in his death was violating an ordinance of the City of Manila which prohibits work on Sunday;
and that Act No. 3428, as amended, is unconstitutional and void because it denies the defendant the equal
protection of the law,
and impairs the obligation of the contract between the defendant and Leopoldo Madlangbayan, and deprives the
CFI of their probate jurisdiction over the estate of deceased persons and nullifies Chapters XXIX, XXX, XXXI,
XXXII, XXXIII, and XXXIV of the Civil Code Procedure and related articles of the Civil Code.
ISSUE
WON the employer is liable to pay the employee’s heirs.
RULING
NO.
As the deceased Leopoldo Madlangbayan was killed on November 16, 1930 and Act No. 3812 was not approved until
December 8, 1930, it is apparent that the law which is applicable is Act No. 3428, section 23 of which reads as follows:
When any employee receives a personal injury from any accident due to in the pursuance of the employment, or
contracts any illness directly caused by such employment or the result of the nature of such employment, his employer
shall pay compensation in the sums and to the persons hereinafter specified.
The accident which caused the death of the employee was not due to and in pursuance of his employment.
At the time that he was over by the truck Leopoldo Madlangbayan was not in the pursuance of his employment with
the defendant corporation,
but was on his way home after he had finished his work for the day and had left the territory where he was authorized to
take collections for the defendant.
The employer is not an insurer "against all accidental injuries which might happen to an employee while in the
course of the employment",
and as a general rule an employee is not entitled to recover from personal injuries resulting from an accident that
befalls him while going to or returning from his place of employment,
because such an accident does no arise out of and in the course of his employment.
The phrase "due to and in the pursuance of" used in section 2 of Act No. 3428 was changed in Act No. 3812 to
"arising out of and in the course of".
Discussing this phrase, the Supreme Court of Illinois in the case of Mueller Construction Co. vs. Industrial
Board, said:
The words "arising out of" refer to the origin or cause of the accident, and are descriptive of its character, while
the words "in the course of" refer to the time, place, and circumstances under which the accident takes place.
By the use of these words it was not the intention of the legislature to make the employer an insurer against all
accidental injuries which might happen to an employee while in the course of the employment,
but only for such injuries arising from or growing out of the risks peculiar to the nature of the work in the scope
of the workman's employment of incidental to such employment,
and accidents in which it is possible to trace the injury to some risk or hazard to which the employee is exposed
in a special degree by reason of such employment.
Risks to which all persons similarly situated are equally exposed and not traceable in some special degree to the
particular employment are excluded.
If the deceased had been killed while going from house to house in San Francisco del Monte in the pursuance of his
employment, the plaintiffs would undoubtedly have the right, prima facie, to recover.
In the case at bar the deceased was going from work in his own conveyance.
Furthermore, it appears that the deceased had never notified the defendant corporation of his removal from San
Francisco del Monte of Manila,
and that the company did not know that he was living in Manila on the day of the accident; that the defendant
company did not require its employees to work on Sunday,
or furnish or require its agents to use bicycles.
These are additional reasons for holding that the accident was not due to and pursuance of the employment of
the deceased.
If the deceased saw fit to change his residence from San Francisco del Monte to Manila and to make use a
bicycle in going back and forth,
he did so at his own risk, as the defendant company did not furnish him a bicycle or require him to use one;
and if he made collections on Sunday, he did not do so in pursuance of his employment, and his employer is not
liable for any injury sustained by him.
DISPOSITION The decision appealed from was affirmed, with the costs against the appellants.
COCACOLA BOTTLERS PHILS V CA
o Lydia Geronimo was engaged in the business of selling food and drinks to children in the Kindergarten
Wonderland Canteen located in Dagupan.
o August 12, 1989 A group of parents complained that they found fibrous material in the bottles of Coke and
Sprite that their children bought from Geronimo’s store.
o Geronimo examined her stock of softdrinks and found that there were indeed fibrous materials in the unopened
soda bottles.
o She brought the bottles to the Department of Health office in their region and was informed that the soda
samples she sent were adulterated.
o Because of this, Geronimo’s sales plummeted with her regular sales of 10 cases day dwindling to about 2 or 3
cases.
o Her losses amounted to P200 to P300 a day which later on forced her to close down her business on December
12, 1989.
o She demanded payment of damages from plaintiff CocaCola but the latter did not accede to her demands.
o The trial court ruled in favor of CocaCola, stating that the complaint was based on a contract and not a quasi
delict because of preexisting relation between the parties.
o Thus the complaint should have been filed within 6 months from the delivery of the thing sold.
The TC however annulled the questioned orders of the RTC and directed it to conduct further proceedings in the
civil case.
According to the CA: “the allegations in the complaint plainly show that it is an action for damages arising from
respondent’s act of recklessly and negligently manufacturing adulterated food items intended to be sol for public
consumption.”
It also noted that the availability of an action for breach of warranty does not bar an action for torts in a sale of
defective goods.
Petitioners’ Claim:
CocaCola moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of failure to exhaust administrative remedies and
prescription.
Since the complaint is for breach of warranty (under A1561, CC), it should have been brought within 6 months
from the delivery of the goods.
Respondents’ Comments:
Geronimo alleges that her complaint is one for damages which does not involve an administrative action.
Her cause of action is based on an injury to plaintiff’s right which can be brought within 4 years (based on
A1146, CC).
ISSUE
WON the complaint is founded on a quasidelict and pursuant to A1146(12), CC, the action prescribes in 4 years
HELD
YES
The vendee’s remedies against a vendor with respect to the warranties against hidden defects or encumbrances
upon the thing sold are not limited to those prescribed in A1567.
The vendee may also ask for the annulment of the contract upon proof of error or fraud in which case the
ordinary rule on obligations shall be applicable.
Under American law, the liabilities of the manufacturer or seller of injurycausing products may be based on
negligence, breach of warranty, tort or other grounds.
DISPOSITION The instant petition is denied for lack of merit.
GILCHRIST v CUDDY
FACTS
Cuddy was the owner of the film “Zigomar”.
Gilchrist was the owner of a theatre in Iloilo.
They entered into a contract whereby Cuddy leased to Gilchrist the Zigomar” for exhibition in his theatre for a
week for P125.
Cuddy returned the money already paid by Gilchrist days before the delivery date so that he can lease the film to
Espejo and Zaldarriaga instead and receive P350 for the film for the same period.
Gilchrist filed a case for specific performance against Cuddy, Espejo and Zaldarriaga. He also prayed for
damages against Espejo and Zaldarriaga for interfering with the contract between Gilchrist and Cuddy.
ISSUE
WON Espejo and Zaldarriaga is liable for interfering with the contract between Gilchrist and Cuddy, they not knowing
at the time the identity of the parties
HELD
YES
Appellants have the legal liability for interfering with the contract and causing its breach.
This liability arises from unlawful acts and not from contractual obligations to induce Cuddy to violate his
contract with Gilchrist.
Article 1902 of the Civil Code provides that a person who, by act or omission causes damage to another when
there is fault or negligence, shall be obliged to pay for the damage done.
There is nothing in this article which requires as a condition precedent to the liability of the tortfeasor that he
must know the identity of a person to whom he causes damage.
No such knowledge is required in order that the injured party may recover for the damages suffered.
DISPOSITION Judgment affirmed
SON PING BUN vs CA (Tek Hua)
FACTS
In 1963, Tek hua Trading, through its Managing Director So Pek Giok, entered into a lease agreement with D.C.
Chuan covering four stalls in Binondo.
The contracts were initially for one year but after expiry of the same, they continued on a month to month basis.
In 1976, Tek Hua was dissolved with the original members forming a new corporation, Tek Hua Enterprises
with Manuel Tiong as one of the incorporators.
So Ping Bun, on the death of his grandfather, So Pek Giok, occupied the same stalls under the business name,
Trendsetter Marketing.
In 1989, the lessor, DC Chuan sent a letter to Tek Hua advising it of a 25% increase in rent effective September 1,
1989.
A further rent increase of 30% effective January 1, 1990 was implemented. Enclosed in both letters were new
lease contracts for signing.
While the letters contained a statement that the leases will be terminated if the contracts were not signed, the
same were not rescinded.
In 1991, Tiong wrote a letter to So Ping Bun asking him to vacate the four stalls as the same were going to be used by
them. Instead of vacating the stalls, So was able to secure lease agreements from DC Chuan.
Tek Hua filed an injunction and an action for nullification of the contracts between Trendsetter and DC Chuan.
The lower Court ruled in favor of Tek Hua.
The CA, on appeal, upheld the trial court. Both the trial court and the CA awarded legal fees only.
ISSUE
WON So Ping Bun was guilty of tortuous interference of contract
HELD
Yes.
A duty which the law on torts is concerned with is respect for the property of others, and a cause of action ex
delicto may be predicated upon an unlawful interference by one party of the enjoyment of the other of his
private property.
In the case at bar, petitioner, Trendsetter asked DC Chuan to execute lease contracts in its favor, and as a result
petitioner deprived respondent of the latter’s property right.
Reasoning
Damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from injury, and damges are the recompense or compensation awarded
for the damage suffered. One becomes liable in an action for damages for a nontrespassory invasion of another’s interest
in the private use and enjoyment of asset if
a) the other has property rights and privileges with respect to the use or enjoyment interfered with;
b) the invasion is substantial;
c) the defendant’s conduct is a legal cause of the invasion;
d) the invasion is either intentional and unreasonable or unintentional and actionable under the general negligence rules.
On the other hand, the elemts of tort interference are
a) existence of a valid contract
b) knowledge on the part of the third party of its existence
c) interference of the third party is without legal justification or
excuse
Since there were existing lease contracts between Tek Hua and DC Chuan, Tek Hua in fact had property rights
over the leased stalls.
The action of Trendsetter in asking DC Chuan to execute the contracts in their favor was unlawful interference.
The SC handled the question of whether the interference may be justified considering that So acted solely for the
purpose of furthering his own financial or economic interest.
It stated that it is sufficient that the impetus of his conduct lies in a proper business interest rather than in wrongful
motives to conclude that So was not a malicious interferer.
Nothing on the record imputes deliberate wrongful motives or malice on the part of So.
Hence the lack of malice precludes the award of damages.
The provision in the Civil Code with regard tortuous interference is Article 1314 which states that
“ any third party who induces another to violate his contract shall be liable for damages to the other contracting
party”.
The Court ratiocinated that the recovery of legal fees is in the concept of actual or compensatory damages as
provided in Article 2208 of the Civil Code.
In this casse, due to defendant’s action of interference, plaintiff was forced to seek relief through the Court snd
thereby incur expenses to protect his interests.
The Court, however, found the award exorbitant. It was reduced to Pesos 100,000.00
Disposition –
Petition denied. CA decision affirmed subject to the modified award of attorney’s fees.
GUILATCO v CITY OF DAGUPAN
On July 25, 1978, Florentina Guilatco, a court interpreter, accidentally fell into a manhole while she was about
to board a motorized tricycle at a sidewalk at Perez Blvd.
Her right leg was fractured, due to which she was hospitalized, operated on, and confined.
She averred that she suffered mental and physical pain, and that she has difficulty in locomotion.
She has not yet reported for duty as court interpreter (at the time of filing of complaint) and thus lost income.
She also lost weight, and she is no longer her former jovial self.
Moreover, she has been unable to perform her religious, social, and other activities which she used to do prior to
the incident.
← Police confirmed existence of the manhole, which was partially covered by a concrete flower
pot by leaving a gaping hole about 2 ft long by 1 1∕2 feet wide or 42 cm wide by 75 cm long by 150 cm deep.
City Engineer of Dagupan Alfredo Tangco admitted that the manhole is owned by the National Government and
the sidewalk on which they are found along Perez Blvd. are also owned by the National Government.
He said that he supervises the maintenance of said manholes and sees to it that they are properly covered, and
the job is specifically done by his subordinates.
Trial court ordered the city to pay Guilatco actual, moral and exemplary damages, plus attorney’s fees. CA
reversed the lower court’s ruling on the ground that no evidence was presented to prove that City of Dagupan
had control or supervision over Perez Blvd.
City contends that Perez Blvd is a national road that is not under the control or supervision of the City of
Dagupan. Hence, no liability should attach to the city.
Issue : WON control or supervision over a national road by the City of Dagupan exists, in effect binding the city to
answer for damages in accordance with article 2189 CC.
Held
YES
The liability of private corporations for damages arising from injuries suffered by pedestrians from the defective
condition of roads is expressed in the Civil Code
Moral damages of P150000 is excessive and is reduced to P20000. Guilatco’s handicap was not permanent and
disabled her only during her treatment which lasted for one year.
Exemplary damages of P50000 reduced to P10000. Award of P7420 as lost income for one year, plus P450
bonus remain the same P3000 as attorney’s fees remain the same
Disposition Petition granted. CA decision reversed and set aside, decision of trial court reinstated with modification.