G.R. No.
104277 July 5, 1993
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
BOBBY DE PAZ Y GADITANO, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Teodoro C. Alegro, Jr. for accused-appellant.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
Accused Bobby de Paz was charged for violating Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as
The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, in a criminal complaint filed with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC)
of Catbalogan, Samar on 5 March 1991.1 Having failed to submit counter-affidavits despite the favorable action on
his motion for an extension of time within which to do so, the court declared him to have waived his right to a
preliminary investigation and, finding a prima facie case against him, forwarded the records of the case to the
Office of the Provincial Public Prosecutor of Samar for appropriate action.2
On 25 April 1991, the Provincial Public Prosecutor of Samar filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) therein an
Information3 charging the accused with the violation of Section 4, Article II of The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as
amended. The Information recounts:
That on or about the 4th day of March, 1991, at nighttime which was purposely sought, at
Barangay No. 9, Ubanon District, Municipality of Catbalogan, Province of Samar, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, without being
authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver and give
fifteen (15) sticks of marijuana cigarettes or "Indian Hemp", a prohibited drug, to one PO1 Leo
Letrodo who acted as poseur-buyer.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The case, docketed as Criminal Case No. 3374, was raffled off to Branch 27 of the said court.
Arraigned on 23 May 1991,4 the accused entered a plea of not guilty.
During the trial on the merits, the prosecution presented P/Lt. Vicente Armada, PO1 Leo Letrodo, SPO2 Elpidio
Digdigan and SPO2 Porferio Mañoso. The defense, on the other hand, presented Victoria Cordova and the accused
himself as its witnesses.
On 7 January 1992, the trial court promulgated its decision5 finding the accused guilty as charged. The dispositive
portion thereof reads:
WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing, the court hereby pronounces accused BOBBY DE
PAZ y GADITANO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the violation of Section 4, Article II of
Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as The Dangerous Drug Act of 1972, as amended, and
accordingly sentences him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of
TWENTY-THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000,00), as well as the costs of this action.6
The conviction is based on the evidence duly established by the prosecution and summarized by the trial court as
follows:
In the afternoon of March 4, 1991, a police team composed of PO1 Leo Letrodo of the
NARCOM, 8th Narcotics Regional District, Tacloban City, PO2 Elpidio Digdigan and PO2 Porferio
Mañoso, the latter two of the 361st PNP Company, Camp Lukban, Catbalogan, Samar, with the
participation of a female confidential informant, conducted a "buy-bust" operation in Ubanon
District, in this capital town of Catbalogan, with herein accused Bobby de Paz as the target-
suspect, and Letrodo acting as poseur-buyer. Letrodo, Digdigan and Mañoso went to Brgy. 9,
Ubanon District at around 5:30 pm. In Ubanon, Letrodo made contact with the confidential
agent and the latter in turn contacted the accused. Near an area where dried fish are sold, the
confidential agent introduced Letrodo to the accused de Paz as one from Tacloban City who
wanted to buy marijuana from said accused. Digdigan and Mañoso positioned themselves
around 10 meters away from, and in full view of Letrodo, the accused and the confidential
agent. Leonardo asked accused (sic) how much was the price of the drug and the latter
informed the former that tree (3) sticks of marijuana cigarettes cost P10.00. Letrodo then
informed the accused that if the latter had some available marijuana, the former wanted to
buy P50.00-worth of the drug. Letrodo then handed to accused de Paz a marked P50.00 bill
(Exh. "A") which accused left the place. A few minutes later, the accused came back and
handed to Letrodo Fifteen (15) rolled up sticks of marijuana cigarettes. Upon receiving the
sticks of marijuana cigarettes, Letrodo opened one of the sticks, and after determining by its
smell that it indeed contained marijuana, the lawman scrached his head as a signal to Digdigan
and Mañoso who immediately approached Letrodo. Letrodo introduced himself as a NARCOM
agent and apprehended the accused. Digdigan and Mañoso likewise introduced themselves to
the accused. Letrodo searched de Paz's pocket and got from it the marked P50.00 bill (Exh.
"A") he had earlier given said accused. Letrodo and his companions then brought the accused
to the headquarters of the 361st PNP Company for investigation. The fifteen (15) sticks of
suspected marijuana cigarettes were later submitted to the PNP Crime Laboratory Service, RUC
8, Camp September 21st Movement, PNP Hills, Palo, Leyte, where they were subjected to
qualitative examination and found positive for marijuana, a prohibited drug.7
On the other hand, the trial court's summary of the evidence for the defense is as follows:
At around 6:30 p.m. of March 4, 1991, accused Bobby de Paz was in the grocery store of
Victoria Cordova in front of the church in Ubanon District when three men whose identities
were then unknown to him but whom he now knows to be Sgt. Digdigan, SP02 Mañoso and a
certain Captain Marcelo, approached him asking where they could buy some dried fish.
Accused led the three men to another store of Victoria Cordova where dried fish were sold,
but finding there the price of dried fish to be high, the three men, together with the accused,
went to the nearby store of Fidel Gaditano, where they bought, a kilo of dried fish. Accused
1
 and the three men then went out of Gaditano's store and parted ways. Accused then
proceeded on his way to, the warehouse ("casa") where he was working, but before he could
reach the place, he was called by one Emma Alcantara who was near the gate of the church.
When accused approached Alcantara, the latter requested him to buy for her some marijuana
from a certain Frankie Dacallos. Accused begged off and asked Alcantara to go to Dacallos
herself asked she was known to him. Alcantara reiterated her request and so he got the P50.00
from the former went to the house of Dacallos nearby to buy marijuana. Accused failed to buy
marijuana from Dacallos as he had none of the stuff at the time. When accused went back to
Alcantara, the latter requested him to buy marijuana instead from one "Taba", whose real
name is Renato Albat. Accused told Alcantara that he would take a bath first, but because
Alcantara requested him to do her the favor as it would not take long anyway, accused
proceeded to the house of Taba which is very near where Alcantara was at the time. In the
house of Taba accused bought P50.00-worth of marijuana which Taba handed to him wrapped
in a newspaper. Accused then went to Alcantara and gave her the marijuana he had bought
from Taba. After the two parted ways, accused proceeded on his way to the place where he
was working, but after he had taken five steps, he heard a gun report. As accused quickened
his steps, PO2 Mañoso put his arm around the shoulders of the former, telling him not to run
so nothing would happen to him, and to go with him (Mañoso) towards the (sic) downtown.
Mañoso took the accused to a Petron gasoline station followed by the former's two
companions in buying the dried fish earlier. At the gasoline station, accused was made to board
a motor vehicle, and shortly after the vehicle's engine had started, Emma Alcantara arrived
and handed to Captain Marcelo the wrapped marijuana accused had earlier purchased for
Alcantara from Taba. The lawmen then brought the accused to the PNP, Headquarters in Camp
Lukban, Brgy. Maulong, also of this capital town. Accused was brought the office of Captain
Marcelo, and upon being asked from whom he bought the marijuana, told the officer that he
bought them from Renato Albat. Captain Marcelo then ordered Mañoso to bring the accused
to Sgt. Digdigan.8
The court a quo gave faith and credit to the prosecution's evidence as the witnesses who took part in the buy-bust
operation are police officers who are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner; moreover,
nothing in the record suggests any reason or motive as to why they would testify falsely against the accused. The
court, however, rejected the accused's version not only because his testimony was uncorroborated, but also
because he admitted possessing the fifteen sticks of marijuana cigarettes before the same were seized by the law
enforcers. Furthermore, "[T]he evidence shows that for a period before the 'buy-bust' operation was actually
conducted, the police placed the accused under surveillance, convincing the lawmen that accused was engaged in
the illicit and highly pernicious practice or business of 'drug-pushing'; specifically, of selling marijuana to interested
or willing customer or buyers."9
His motion for the reconsideration of the decision 10 having been denied by the trial court in the Order of 5
February 1992, 11 the accused filed on 10 February 1992 his Notice of Appeal. 12 This Court accepted the appeal in
the Resolution of 8 June 1992. 13
In his Appellant's Brief, the accused pleads for the reversal of the trial court's decision because it allegedly erred:
I. . . . IN NOT FINDING THAT THERE IS INSTIGATION IN THE INSTANT CASE; and
II. . . . IN FINDING THE VERSION OF THE PROSECUTION AS "DULY CORROBORATED" AND
THEREBY WANTING ANY REASON TO MOTIVATE THE POLICE OFFICERS TO TESTIFY FALSELY
AGAINST ACCUSED. 14
Anent the first error, the accused maintains that the evidence relied on to convict him clearly indicates the
presence of instigation which would entitle him to an acquittal considering that instigation is an absolutory cause
akin to an exempting circumstance in criminal law. 15 According to him, the idea to purchase marijuana did not
come from him; he claims that it originated from Emma Alcantara, the alleged confidential informant and "asset"
of the police officers. Nor could he be prosecuted for illegal possession under Section 8 of R.A. No. 6425 as he had
no intention to possess the marijuana at all; he merely ran an errand for Alcantara.
In support of the second assigned error, the accused contends that the version submitted by the prosecution "is
in fact not corroborated, full of glaring contradictions and material inconsistencies, absurd and concocted
situations." He argues that the evidence on the illegal transaction is anchored solely on the testimony of PO1
Letrodo, which was uncorroborated. Hence, the same should not be given weight and credence as doubt exists as
to whether the accused really sold the merchandise to the latter; the accused contends that the doubt should be
resolved in his favor. More importantly, he claims that the said police officer had a sinister motive for testifying
falsely against him. The accused avers that he was merely being used to flush out the drug pushers in the locality.
The primordial issue in this case is factual and involves the credibility of the witnesses.
It is doctrinally settled that when the issue of the credibility of witnesses is involved, appellate courts will generally
not disturb the findings of the trial court, considering that the latter is in a better position to decide the question,
having heard the witnesses and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during trial, unless certain
facts or circumstance of weight have been overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied which, if considered, might
affect the result of the case. 16 Having reviewed the records of this case and evaluated the evidence to both parties,
we find no compelling reason to depart from the factual findings of the trial court.
We have likewise consistently held in several drugs cases that absent any proof to the contrary, law enforcers are
presumed to have regularly performed their duty. 17 In the instant case, aside from the accused's bare allegation
of a sinister motive on the part of the law enforcers to use him "to flush out the drug pushers in Ubanon District,
Catbalogan, Samar, particularly the suspected drug dealers, Frankie Dacallos and Renato Albat," 18 no other
evidence was introduced to rebut the presumption of regularity. The allegation of a sinister motive is at once self-
serving and baseless because the fact of the matter is that the accused had been under surveillance precisely for
drug pushing. It is, therefore, unlikely that he would be used at all to flush out the drug pushers in Ubanon District.
We thus find no merit in the accused's claim that he was instigated, not entrapped and, therefore, should be
absolved since instigation "is an absolutory cause or akin to an exempting circumstance." 19 As incontrovertibly
disclosed by the evidence for the prosecution, a buy-bust operation — with PO1 Leo Letrodo as the proser-buyer
— was successfully carried out in this case. Letrodo, after contacting the accused, offered to buy sticks of marijuana
cigarettes from him; the latter then accepted. Consequently, Letrodo handed the marked P50.00 bill to the accused
who then left and returned a few minutes later to deliver the fifteen sticks of marijuana cigarettes. Letrodo opened
up one stick and, after determining that it contained marijuana, gave the pre-arranged signal to his teammates
who swooped down on the accused. Clearly, the accused was caught in flagrante. The operation, a definite
entrapment, was hatched to expose, arrest and prosecute the accused, a drug trafficker. Since he was actually
committing a crime, no one else was needed to induce him to consummate his evil intentions. In short, the criminal
2
intent did not originate from Letrodo, but from the accused himself. 20 Entrapment has consistently proven to be
an effective method of apprehending drug peddlers. 21

There is, as well, no merit in the second assigned error as Letrodo's testimony is not uncorroborated. On the
contrary, the said testimony was in fact corroborated by the testimonies of the other policemen who were present
during the buy-bust operation. Besides, even if there was no corroboration, the testimony is credible by itself and
would require no further avouchment. We have ruled that the testimony of a single witness, if credible, is sufficient
to convict. 22

While the accused has practically admitted that he was caught in possession of fifteen sticks of marijuana
cigarettes, he still argues that he was merely acting as an errand boy for the police informer. We are not persuaded.
The fact that he had the prohibited drug with him and accepted the P50.00 as payment for it clearly established a
consummated sale of the illegal drug which is punishable under Section 4, Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972, as amended. Section 4 provides:

Sec. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited Drugs. —

The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from twenty thousand to thirty
thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell,
administer, deliver, give away another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any
prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions. If the victim of the offense
is a minor, or should a prohibited drug involved in any offense under this Section be the
proximate cause of the death of a victim thereof, the maximum penalty herein provided shall
be imposed. (As amended by P.D. No. 1675, 17 February 1980.)

The law does not require the element of intent to sell or possess in order to obtain a conviction. Nor is it essential
that the ownership of the prohibited drug be established or known. The commission of the offense of illegal sale
of marijuana requires merely the consummation of the selling transaction. 23 As has been proven and established
by clear and convincing evidence, the accused committed the said unlawful act.

Thus, the challenged decision is in accordance with the facts and the law.

WHEREFORE, the decision of Branch 27 of the Regional Trial Court of Samar, 8th Judicial Region, in Criminal Case
No. 3374 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

Feliciano, Bidin, Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.

3
G.R. No. 128116 January 24, 2001 said, "NBI ka pala" and suddenly grabbed Rimando's identification card before he shot Rimando twice in the body.
Appellant went back to his taxi and left. The three (3) eyewitnesses had a clear view of appellant's face inasmuch
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, as there was a lamppost that illuminated the area.3
vs.
CIC GILBERT PERALTA Y RINGOR, accused-appellant. On cross and re-direct examination, prosecution witness Crizaldo Esguerra testified that Rimando and the
appellant had an argument that lasted for two (2) to three (3) minutes before the appellant shot Rimando. 4
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Rimando was brought to the United Doctors Medical Center but was later transferred to Santo Tomas University
Before us on appeal is the Decision1of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 106, in Criminal Case No. Hospital in Manila. On July 7, 1991, he was pronounced dead.5 Dr. Sergio Alteza, Jr., the medico legal officer of the
Q-91-23687 is convicting the appellant, Gilbert Peralta y Ringor, of the crime of murder. Santo Tomas University Hospital, conducted the autopsy on the body of the deceased, Rimando. His findings
showed that:
Gilbert Peralta was charged with the crime of murder as defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised.
Penal Code, in an Information that reads: GENERAL PHYSICAL EXAMINATION:

That on or about the 3rd day of July, 1991, in Quezon City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Conscious (sic), Stretcher- Borne
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, qualified by evident premeditation and
treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, INJURIES:
attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the person of LOUISE RIMANDO Y MEDINA, by then
and there, shooting him with a gun, hitting him twice in the body, thereby inflicting upon him serious 1. GSW of entry, 2 x 2 cm., abdomen, Rt. anterior lumbar area.
and mortal wounds which was the direct and immediate cause of his untimely death, to the damage and
prejudice of the heirs of the said offended part (sic) in such amount as may be awarded under the
2. GSW of entry , 1 x 1.5 cm., Rt. Postrio lumbar area.
provisions of the Civil Code.

3. GSW of exit, left Antero-lateral iliac area.

Upon being arraigned, appellant Gilbert R. Peralta pleaded "Not Guilty", and the trial ensued.

4. Multiple Perforating GSW (6) involving the jejunum and 2 perforations of sigmoid colon.
The evidence of the prosecution shows that prosecution witnesses Crizaldo Esguerra, Delfin Doriano, and Danilo
Gaa were schoolmates of the victim, Louise Rimando, at The Technological Institute of the Philippines and
fraternity brothers in Tau Gamma Fraternity. After watching a basketball game in Pasig City in the evening of July 5. Hemoperitoneum
2, 1991, Louise Rimando together with Crizaldo Esguerra, Delfin Soriano and Danillo Gaa, proceeded to Quezon
City "to pick up" prostitutes. When they reached the Aberdeen Court Hotel along Quezon Avenue in Quezon City, CONCLUSION:
Rimando alighted from their owner type jeep that was being driven by Esguerra and talked to a gay pimp named
Roberto Reyes. Rimando introduced himself as an agent of the National Bureau of Investigation apparently to avail Patient pronounced dead July 7, 1991.6
of a discount for the services of the prostitutes. Reyes agreed to introduce certain young girls to Rimando and
proposed to pick them up in front of the Aberdeen Court Hotel. When the jeep reached the hotel. Reyes together
with two (2) of the girls and another gay named Sandro Lim suddenly boarded the jeep. Reyes told Rimando, According to Dr. Alteza, the first gunshot wound was fatal inasmuch as it hit the intestines and other vital organs
"Mamang NBI, tulungan ninyo kami. Andiyan iyong CAPCOM na nanghihingi sa amin ng pera." Upon Rimando's of the victim. On the basis of the location of the gunshot wounds, he declared that the assailant must have been
instructions, the jeep sped away with eight (8) persons on board.2 at the right lateral side of the victim at the time of the shooting incident. He did not find any injuries on the hands
of the victim. 1âwphi1.nêt
While driving along Quezon Avenue in Quezon City, one of the pimps noticed that they were being followed by
appellant in a taxi cab. Rimando instructed Esguerra to park the jeep in front of Dunkin Donuts at the corner of For the defense, appellant testified that he was a member of the Central District Field Force, Intelligence
Quezon and West Avenues in Quezon City. Rimando ordered the two gays to alight from the jeep. Meanwhile, the Investigation Unit of the Central Police District. On July 2, 1991; pursuant to a mission order7, the appellant was
taxi parked behind the jeep. One of the ladies also got off the jeep for fear of being arrested. The appellant who dispatched to Quezon Avenue near Aberdeen Court Hotel in Quezon City concerning rampant prostitution in the
was holding a .38 caliber firearm alighted and approached Rimando who was then seated beside the driver's seat. area. He was in a civilian attire and was carrying an authorized .38 caliber gun.8
Appellant inquired if they were policemen, but Rimando replied in the negative. Rimando stated that he was an
agent of the National Bureau of Investigation and showed the appellant his NBI Identification Card. The appellant

4
While conducting police surveillance on board a taxi, at about 1:00 o'clock in the morning of July 3, 1991, he
spotted three (3) young girls sitting in front of the Aberdeen Court Hotel along Quezon Avenue in Quezon City.
Suspecting them to be prostitutes, he instructed the taxi driver to stop in front of the hotel. When a pimp named
Roberto Reyes approached him and said, "Mama, gusto mong chicks?" he identified himself as a police officer.
Reyes then shouted to warn the girls that the appellant was a police officer. Reyes together with two (2) of the
girls and another gay boarded an owner-type jeep. Appellant went back to the taxi and followed the jeep to effect
an arrest. When the jeep stopped, he alighted from the taxi and approached its passengers. After identifying
himself as a police officer, Rimando arrogantly introduced himself by saying "E, ano kung pulis ka, NBI naman
ako."9 Appellant showed his identification card to Rimando but the latter asked him what he wanted from them.
Appellant replied, "Pare, wala naman iyon," and informed Rimando that the girls inside the jeep were subject to
arrest. The hot-tempered Rimando insisted that the ladies were the girlfriends of his companions. 10 Their heated
discussion lasted for about two (2) to three (3) minutes.11 The girls jumped off the jeep after hearing that the,
appellant was going to arrest them. Appellant tried to pursue them but Rimando grabbed appellant's right forearm
and held appellant's .38 caliber gun. However, the appellant maintained his hold of the gun with both of his hands.
As the companions, of Rimando were already approaching, appellant accidentally pressed the trigger twice.12 After
the gun went off, appellant took cover behind a concrete post. After the jeep had left toward the south, appellant
proceeded to his headquarters and reported the incident to the Officer-in-Charge of the Intelligence Investigation
Unit, Dante Yan.13
The next day, Police Officer Dante Yan formed a team to conduct follow-up operations regarding the incident;
however, the team was not able to find out the identity of the victim. Police Officer Yan prepared a spot report to
inform their commanding officer, Police Chief Senior Inspector Absalon Salboro, of the accidental firing of the
appellant's firearm.14 It was only on August 23, 1991, or about one and a half months after the shooting incident,
that the appellant was identified as the assailant of the deceased, victim, Rimando.15
In his eleven (11) years in the police service, this was the first time that appellant was charged with a criminal
offense.16
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused
GILBERT PERALTA y RINGOR GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER, defined and
penalized under the provisions of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and conformably thereto, and
as its commission was prior to the effectivity of the Death Sentence Law, he is hereby sentenced to suffer
the penalty of imprisonment of RECLUSION PERPETUA; and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased victim
the sum of P50,000.00, plus P57,000.00, actual damages and P35,000.00, as moral damages and
P35,000.00 as exemplary damages and to pay the costs.
It appearing that the accused is a detention prisoner, he may be entitled to be credited of his preventive
imprisonment in the service of his sentence provided therein, pursuant to existing laws.
SO ORDERED. 18
In his appeal, the appellant raised the following assignment of errors:
I
The Court a quo erred in finding that accused-appellant CIC Gilbert Peralta who was engaged in the
performance of his official duty, did not act in self defense in shooting and killing victim Louise Rimando.
II
The Court a quo erred in finding that treachery attended the shooting of victim.
III

To corroborate the appellant's testimony, Roberto Reyes testified that in the early morning of July 3, 1991, The Court a quo erred in disregarding the testimony of Roberto Reyes who was with the group of victim
Rimando approached him looking for "pick-up" girls. To avail of a discount, he introduced himself as an agent of at the time of the shooting.
the National Bureau of Investigation. They agreed that the girls would be picked up in front of the Aberdeen Court
Hotel located along Quezon Avenue in Quezon City. Before the jeep arrived at their rendezvous, the appellant's IV
taxi arrived. Reyes approached the taxi and offered the services of a pick-up girl to the appellant. But the appellant
threatened to arrest Reyes. This prompted Reyes to warn his companions of the presence of a police officer. Reyes, The Court a quo erred in ordering accused-appellant to pay the heirs of victim the amount of P50,000.00
together with two (2) girls and a certain Sandro Lim boarded the victim's jeep which immediately sped away. The death indemnity; P57,000.00 actual damages; P35,000.00 moral damages; and P35,000.00 exemplary
taxi followed the jeep up to an outlet of the Dunkin Donuts located along West Avenue in Quezon City where they damages.19
parked. Reyes claimed that the appellant drove the taxi by himself. Reyes and Lim hid near a parked car after
alighting from the jeep. Appellant approached Rimando who stood up and confronted the appellant face to face.
That appellant killed the victim is not disputed. However, the appellant invokes the justifying circumstance of self-
Rimando and the appellant had a heated argument. Rimando even pushed the appellant. As Rimando tried to get
defense. Consequently, the burden of proof is shifted from the prosecution to the defense and it is the duty of the
something from his back pocket, the appellant pulled out his hand gun and poked it at the former. When Rimando
latter to establish self-defense by clear and convincing evidence. The defense must rely on the strength of its own
was not able to get his weapon from his waist, he grabbed the appellant's firearm. While the appellant and
evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution, for even if that were weak it cannot be disbelieved after
Rimando struggled for the possession of the gun, Reyes heard two (2) gunshots. Thereafter, Reyes and Lim left the
the appellant himself has admitted killing the victim.20
premises by boarding a taxi.17

The three (3) elements of self-defense are provided under Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code which states that:
After weighing the evidence, the trial court on November 21, 1996 rendered a Decision finding the appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
Art. 11. Justifying Circumstances. -The following do not incur any criminal liability:
5
 1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following circumstances concur:
First. Unlawful aggression;
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
xxx
There is unlawful aggression when the peril to one's life, limb or right is either actual or imminent. There must be
actual physical force or actual use of a weapon.21 It is a statutory and doctrinal requirement that for the justifying
circumstance of self-defense, the presence of unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non. There can be no
self-defense, complete or incomplete, unless the victim has committed an unlawful aggression against the person
defending himself.22
In the case at bar, the appellant's claim that his forearm was held by the victim and even attempted to grab his
gun cannot be believed. There were no signs of injuries on the hands of the victim. It was sufficiently proven by
the prosecution that appellant shot the victim while the latter was still seated beside the driver's seat inside the
jeep. The medical findings of Dr. Sergio Alteza, Jr., medico legal officer of the UST Hospital, showed that the point
of entry of one of the bullets was at the right upper quadrant of the abdomen while the point of exit was at the
lower left portion of the abdomen. This indicates that the trajectory of the bullet was downwards which reinforces
the prosecution's version that the victim was shot while he was seated inside the jeep. Moreover, the finding of
the said medico legal officer that the two (2) gunshot wounds were located at the right portion of the victim's body
bolsters the claim that the right portion of the victim's body was the part vulnerable to attack inasmuch as he was
seated at the right front seat of the jeep. The testimony of Roberto Reyes that the victim alighted from their jeep
and stood up prior to the shooting incident cannot be given credence for the reason that it runs counter to the
medical findings of Dr. Alteza who is a disinterested and credible witness. There being no unlawful aggression on
the part of the victim, the claim of self-defense by the appellant is not credible.
The plea of self-defense is also belied by the failure of the appellant to immediately report to his superior officer
on the night of the incident that he shot somebody with his service firearm in self-defense. In fact, the appellant
testified in court that he did not know he hit anyone after he allegedly fired his gun accidentally. Aside from being
inconsistent with his plea of self-defense, this feigned ignorance of the appellant is not persuasive. Firstly it was
impossible for the appellant to have overlooked the reaction of the victim who was just beside him during the
shooting incident inasmuch as the area was illuminated by a lamppost. Secondly, there was no scuffle. Thirdly, the
act of twice firing his service firearm suggests that appellant was acting deliberately when he pulled the trigger for
the second time as he had full control of the handle and the trigger of the gun.
On the other hand, this Court finds the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Crizaldo Esguerra, Delfin Soriano, and
Danilo Gaa to be credible. From their eyewitness accounts, it appears that appellant who was holding a handgun,
approached them after they parked their jeep near Dunkin Donuts at the corner of Quezon and West Avenues in
Quezon City. A heated argument ensued between the appellant and the victim. Thereafter, the appellant shot the
victim twice while the latter remained seated beside the driver's seat of the jeep.
Nevertheless, we cannot agree with the trial court's finding that the act of shooting happened suddenly and
immediately after the victim introduced himself as a National Bureau of Investigation agent to the appellant. The
trial court's reliance on the affidavits of the prosecution's three (3) eyewitnesses overlooked the testimony of
prosecution witness Crizaldo Esguerra that there was an interval of two (2) to three (3) minutes before the two (2)
shots were fired by the appellant. During that period of time, the appellant tried to arrest the two (2) women on
board the jeep whom he suspected to be prostitutes but the victim intervened by maintaining that the women
were girlfriends of his companions. The victim's adamant refusal to surrender the suspected prostitutes who later
jumped off the jeep must have earned the ire of the appellant thereby causing him to shoot the victim.
The shooting incident was a result of the heated argument between the victim and the appellant. Hence, the
qualifying circumstance of treachery may not be appreciated. The essence of treachery is the sudden and
unexpected attack by an aggressor on an unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any real chance to defend
himself, thereby ensuring its commission without risk to the aggressor and without the slightest provocation on
the part of the victim.23 The elements of treachery are: (1) the means of execution employed gives the person no
opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and (2) the means of execution were deliberately or consciously
adopted.24 It does not follow that a sudden and unexpected attack is tainted with treachery for it could have been
that the same was done on impulse, as a reaction to an actual or imagined provocation offered by the
victim.25Provocation of the appellant by the victim negates the presence of treachery even if the attack may have
been sudden and unexpected.26 The suddenness of the attack does not, of itself, suffice to support a finding
of alevosia, even if the purpose was to kill, so long as the decision was made all of a sudden and the victim's
helpless position was accidental. The qualifying circumstance of treachery may not be simply deduced from
presumption as it is necessary that the existence of this qualifying or aggravating circumstance should be proven
as fully as the crime itself in order to aggravate the liability or penalty of the culprit.27
In the case at bar, the victim provoked the appellant when the former engaged the latter in a heated argument. It
was not shown that appellant deliberately or consciously thought of shooting the victim prior to their
confrontation. The protagonists did not meet previously until they confronted each other at the corner of West
Avenue and Quezon Avenue in Quezon City. According to the three (3) prosecution witnesses, they saw appellant
holding his firearm as he approached the jeep. The victim was not therefore unaware of the danger of being shot
for the reason that appellant was already brandishing his weapon while he was approaching the jeep.
This Court also rules out the presence of evident premeditation. For the qualifying circumstance of evident
premeditation to be appreciated, the following requisites should be proved: (1) the time when the offender
determined to commit the crime, (2) an overt act manifestly indicating that the culprit has clung to his
determination, and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between the determination and execution, to allow him to reflect
upon the consequences of his act.28 In the case at bar, there was no proof of the time when appellant allegedly
determined to commit the crime against the victim. The appellant did not even know the victim and vice versa
prior to their confrontation at the place of the shooting incident. The Solicitor General correctly pointed out that
appellant's act of tailing the victim's group is not an overt act that reflects appellant's determination to kill
Rimando. Appellant followed the jeep in order to effect an arrest of women whom he suspected to be prostitutes.
Appellant attempts to impeach the credibility of prosecution witnesses Crizaldo Esguerra, Delfin Soriano and
Danilo Gaa for the reason that they were biased witnesses. Appellant pointed out that Esguerra testified that as a
fraternity brother he would do anything and everything for the victim.29 A witness may be said to be biased when
his relation to the cause or to the parties is such that he has an incentive to exaggerate or give false color or pervert
the truth, or to state what is false.30 To impeach a biased witness, the counsel must lay the proper foundation of
6
the bias by asking the witness the fact constituting the bias. In the case at bar, there was no proper impeachment
by bias of the three (3) prosecution witnesses. Esguerra's testimony that he would do anything for his fellow
brothers was too broad and general so as to constitute a motive to lie before the trial court. Counsel for the defense
failed to propound questions regarding the tenets of the fraternity that espouse absolute fealty of the members
to each other. The question was phrased so as to ask only for Esguerra's personal conviction. And even if Esguerra's
credibility were impeached, it does not follow that the testimonies of Soriano and Gaa should also be undermined
as they were not asked the same question on cross examination.
Appellant claims that he shot the victim while he was in the performance of his police duties. Article 11 of the
Revised Penal Code provides that a person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty does not incur any criminal liability.
Two (2) requisites must concur before this defense can prosper: (1) the accused must have acted in the
performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office, (2) the injury caused or the offense committed
should be the necessary consequence of the due performance of duty.31 We find the requisites absent in the case
at bar. Appellant was not in the performance of his duties at the time of the shooting for the reason that the girls
he was attempting to arrest were not committing any act of prostitution in his presence. If at all, the only person
he was authorized to arrest during that time was Roberto Reyes, who offered him the services of a prostitute, for
acts of vagrancy. Even then, the fatal injuries that the appellant caused the victim were not a necessary
consequence of appellant's performance of his duty as a police officer. The record shows that appellant shot the
victim not once but twice after a heated confrontation ensued between them. His duty to arrest the female
suspects did not include any right to shoot the victim to death.
Appellant faults the trial court for disregarding the testimony of Roberto Reyes. The matter of appreciating the
credibility of this witness was best left to trial Judge Tabiolo who was the presiding judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 106, when Roberto Reyes took the witness stand, and, hence, the said trial judge was
able to observe his demeanor.32 As pointed out by the Solicitor General, the issues as to who of the witnesses and
whose testimonies are to be believed are best addressed by the trial judge who had the unique opportunity to
observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct and attitude on the witness stand.33 In fact,
.the testimony of Reyes is full of material inconsistencies that militate against his credibility. First, he testified that
prior to the shooting incident he was already arrested by the appellant. However, despite knowing the appellant
was a police officer, Reyes still offered to him the services of a prostitute. 34 Second, he told the trial court that
appellant drove the taxi that followed the jeep, but appellant testified that he had a driver with him while tailing
the jeep.35Third, he claimed that the taxi was parked in front of the jeep but appellant testified that the taxi was
parked behind the jeep.36 Lastly, Reyes testified that he heard gunshots and yet he did not see anyone get hit as a
result thereof. It was unbelievable for Reyes not to have seen the victim hit by the gunshots inasmuch as he
testified having seen the appellant while in the act of shooting the victim in that illuminated place. 37
Kuwait, through a recruitment agency called EEl, where he was about to earn One Thousand Two Hundred Dollars
($1,200.00) per month were it not for his untimely death. She incurred hospitalization expenses in the amount of
(P16,000.00) and engaged the services of a funeral parlor which cost her Eighteen Thousand Five Hundred Pesos
(P18,500.00).38 She also had to buy a funeral lot worth Eight Thousand Pesos (P8,000.00) and spent Four Hundred
Pesos (P400.00) 39 for the funeral mass. She felt terrible when she lost her only son who was the eldest among the
siblings.40
The Court notes that the funeral expenses in the total amount of Twenty Six Thousand Nine Hundred Pesos
(P26,900.00) are properly supported by official receipts. However, we cannot consider the alleged hospitalization
expenses inasmuch as the same were not evidenced by any receipt. Likewise, we cannot award alleged loss of
earning capacity of the victim inasmuch as the documents showing that he was allegedly bound to work in Kuwait
were not presented in evidence. We affirm the trial court's award of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as civil
indemnity ex delicto, and Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages. However, the award of exemplary
damages is deleted for the reason that the crime was not committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances.1âwphi1.nêt
In the case at bar, there was neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstance.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 106 is hereby MODIFIED in
that the appellant is GUILTY only, beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime of HOMICIDE as defined under Article
249 of the Revised Penal Code; and the sentence imposed on the appellant is hereby reduced to an indeterminate
sentence of imprisonment for a period of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen
(14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, with accessory penalties provided
by law; and the appellant is also ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased victim., Louise Rimando, the sum of
P26,900.00 as actual damages, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto, and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
Inasmuch as the appellant is a detention prisoner, the period of his preventive imprisonment shall be credited to
the service of his sentence.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Mendoza, Quisumbing, Buena. JJ:., concur.

As there is reasonable doubt on the alleged attendance of treachery and evident premeditation in the case at bar,
the crime committed by the appellant was only homicide. Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code provides that:

Art. 249. Homicide. Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another
without the attendance of any other circumstances enumerated in the next preceding article, shall be
deemed guilty of homicide and be punished by reclusion temporal.

With respect to appellant's civil liabilities, Zenaida Obias Rimando, mother of the victim, testified that his son was
a 3rd year mechanical engineering student at the Technological Institute of the Philippines and a civilian agent of
the National Bureau of Investigation; that at the time of his death, he had an approved application for work in

7
G.R. Nos. 103501-03 February 17, 1997
LUIS A. TABUENA, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
G.R. No. 103507 February 17, 1997
ADOLFO M. PERALTA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division), and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the OFFICE OF THE
SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, respondents.
FRANCISCO, J.:
Through their separate petitions for review,1 Luis A. Tabuena and Adolfo M. Peralta (Tabuena and Peralta, for
short) appeal the Sandiganbayan decision dated October 12, 1990,2 as well as the Resolution dated December 20.
19913denying reconsideration, convicting them of malversation under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code.
Tabuena and Peralta were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt Of having malversed the total amount of P55
Million of the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) funds during their incumbency as General Manager
and Acting Finance Services Manager, respectively, of MIAA, and were thus meted the following sentence:
(1) In Criminal Case No. 11758, accused Luis A. Tabuena is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of seventeen (17) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as minimum to
twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to pay a fine of TWENTY-FIVE
MILLION PESOS (P25,000,000.00), the amount malversed. He shall also reimburse the Manila
International Airport Authority the sum of TWENTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS (P25,000,000.00).
In addition, he shall suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification from public office,
(2) In Criminal Case No. 11759, accused Luis A. Tabuena is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of seventeen (17) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as minimum, and
twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to pay a fine of TWENTY-FIVE
MILLION PESOS (P25,000,000.00), the amount malversed. He shall also reimburse the Manila
International Airport Authority the sum of TWENTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS (P25,000,000.00).
In addition, he shall suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification from public office.
(3) In Criminal Case No. 11760, accused Luis A. Tabuena and Adolfo M. Peralta are each
sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of seventeen (17) years and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal as minimum and twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum
and for each of them to pay separately a fine of FIVE MILLION PESOS (P5,000,000.00) the
amount malversed. They shall also reimburse jointly and severally the Manila International
Airport Authority the sum of FIVE MILLION PESOS (P5,000,000.00).
In addition, they shall both suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification from public
office.
A co-accused of Tabuena and Peralta was Gerardo G. Dabao, then Assistant General Manager of MIAA,
has remained at large.
There were three (3) criminal cases filed (nos. 11758, 11759 and 11760) since the total amount of P55 Million was
taken on three (3) separate dates of January, 1986. Tabuena appears as the principal accused — he being charged
in all three (3) cases. The amended informations in criminal case nos. 11758, 11759 and 11760 respectively read:
That on or about the 16th day of January, 1986, and for sometime subsequent thereto, in the
City of Pasay, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Luis A.
Tabuena and Gerardo G. Dabao, both public officers, being then the General Manager and
Assistant General Manager, respectively, of the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA),
and accountable for public funds belonging to the MIAA, they being the only ones authorized
to make withdrawals against the cash accounts of MIAA pursuant to its board resolutions,
conspiring, confederating and confabulating with each other, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, feloniously, and with intent to defraud the government, take and misappropriate
the amount of TWENTY FIVE MILLION PESOS (P25,000,000.00) from MIAA funds by applying
for the issuance of a manager's check for said amount in the name of accused Luis A. Tabuena
chargeable against MIAA's Savings Account No. 274-500-354-3 in the PNB Extension Office at
the Manila International Airport in Pasay City, purportedly as partial payment to the Philippine
National Construction Corporation (PNCC), the mechanics of which said accused Tabuena
would personally take care of, when both accused well knew that there was no outstanding
obligation of MIAA in favor of PNCC, and after the issuance of the above-mentioned manager's
check, accused Luis A. Tabuena encashed the same and thereafter both accused
misappropriated and converted the proceeds thereof to their personal use and benefit, to the
damage and prejudice of the government in the aforesaid amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
xxx xxx xxx
That on or about the 16th day of January, 1986, and for sometime subsequent thereto, in the
City of Pasay. Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Luis A.
Tabuena and Gerardo G. Dabao, both public officers, being then the General Manager and
Assistant General Manager, respectively, of the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA),
and accountable for public funds belonging to the MIAA, they being the only ones authorized
to make withdrawals against the cash accounts of MIAA pursuant to its board resolutions,
conspiring, confederating and confabulating with each other, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, feloniously, and with intent to defraud the government, take and misappropriate
the amount of TWENTY FIVE MILLION PESOS (P25,000,000.00) from MIAA funds by applying
8
 for the issuance of a manager.s check for said amount in the name of accused Luis A. Tabuena Office of the President
chargeable against MIAA's Savings Account No. 274-500-354-3 in the PNB Extension Office at of the Philippines
the Manila International Airport in Pasay City, purportedly as partial payment to the Philippine Malacanang
National Construction Corporation (PNCC), the mechanics of which said accused Tabuena
would personally take care of, when both accused well knew that there was no outstanding
obligation of MIAA in favor of PNCC, and after the issuance of the above-mentioned manager's
check, accused Luis A. Tabuena encashed the same and thereafter both accused
misappropriated and converted the proceeds thereof to their personal use and benefit, to the
damage and prejudice of the government in the aforesaid amount.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

xxx xxx xxx

That on or about the 29th day of January, 1986, and for sometime subsequent thereto, in the
City of Pasay, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Luis A.
Tabuena and Adolfo M. Peralta, both public officers, being then the General Manager and
Acting Manager, Financial Services Department, respectively, of the Manila International
Airport Authority (MIAA), and accountable for public funds belonging to the MIAA, they being MEMO TO: The General Manager
the only ones authorized to make withdrawals against the cash accounts of MIAA pursuant to Manila International Airport Authority
its board resolutions, conspiring, confederating and confabulating with each other, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously, and with intent to defraud the government, take You are hereby directed to pay immediately the Philippine National Construction Corporation,
and misappropriate the amount of FIVE MILLION PESOS (P5,000,000.00) from MIAA funds by thru this Office, the sum of FIFTY FIVE MILLION (P55,000,000.00) PESOS in cash as partial
applying for the issuance of a manager's check for said amount in the name of accused Luis A. payment of MIAA's account with said Company mentioned in a Memorandum of Minister
Tabuena chargeable against MIAA's Savings Account No. 274-500- 354-3 in the PNB Extension Roberto Ongpin to this Office dated January 7, 1985 and duly approved by this Office on
Office at the Manila International Airport in Pasay City, purportedly as partial payment to the February 4, 1985.
Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC), the mechanics of which said accused
Tabuena would personally take care of, when both accused well knew that there was no Your immediate compliance is appreciated.
outstanding obligation of MIAA in favor of PNCC, and after the issuance of the above-
mentioned manager's check, accused Luis A. Tabuena encashed the same and thereafter both
(Sgd.)
accused misappropriated and converted the proceeds thereof to their personal use and
FERDINAND
benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the government in the aforesaid amount.
MARCOS.4

CONTRARY TO LAW.
The January 7, 1985 memorandum of then Minister of Trade and Industry Roberto Ongpin referred to in
the MARCOS Memorandum, reads in full:
Gathered from the documentary and testimonial evidence are the following essential antecedents:
MEMORANDUM
Then President Marcos instructed Tabuena over the phone to pay directly to the president's office and in cash
what the MIAA owes the Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC), to which Tabuena replied, "Yes, sir,
For: The President
I will do it." About a week later, Tabuena received from Mrs. Fe Roa-Gimenez, then private secretary of Marcos, a
Presidential Memorandum dated January 8, 1986 (hereinafter referred to as MARCOS Memorandum) reiterating
in black and white such verbal instruction, to wit: From: Minister Roberto V. Ongpin

Date: 7 January 1985

9
 Subject: Approval of Supplemental Contracts and — Approved by Price Escalation Committee
Request for Partial Deferment of Repayment of PNCC's (PEC) but pended for lack of funds P1.9 million
Advances for MIA Development Project
— Endorsed by project consultants and
May I request your approval of the attached recommendations of Minister Jesus S. Hipolito for currently being evaluated by PEC 30.7 million
eight (8) supplemental contracts pertaining to the MIA Development Project (MIADP) between
the Bureau of Air Transport (BAT) and Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC), — Submitted by PNCC directly to PEC
formerly CDCP, as follows: and currently under evaluation 66.5 million
——————
1. Supplemental Contract No. 12 Total P99.1 million
Package Contract No. 2 P11,106,600.95
There has been no funding allocation for any of the above escalation claims due to budgetary
2. Supplemental Contract No. 13 constraints.
5,758,961.52
The MIA Project has been completed and operational as far back as 1982 and yet residual
3. Supplemental Contract No. 14 amounts due to PNCC have not been paid, resulting in undue burden to PNCC due to additional
Package Contract No. 2 4,586,610.80 cost of money to service its obligations for this contract.

4. Supplemental Contract No. 15 To allow PNCC to collect partially its billings, and in consideration of its pending escalation
1,699,862.69 billings, may we request for His Excellency's approval for a deferment of the repayment of
PNCC's advances to the extent of P30 million corresponding to about 30% of P99.1 million in
5. Supplemental Contract No. 16 escalation claims of PNCC, of which P32.5 million has been officially recognized by MIADP
Package Contract No. 2 233,561.22 consultants but could not be paid due to lack of funding.

6. Supplemental Contract No. 17 Our proposal will allow BAT to pay PNCC the amount of P34.5 million out of existing MIA
Package Contract No. 2 8,821,731.08 Project funds. This amount represents the excess of the gross billings of PNCC of P98.4 million
over the undeferred portion of the repayment of advances of P63.9 million.
7. Supplemental Contract No. 18
Package Contract No. 2 6,110,115.75 In obedience to President Marcos' verbal instruction and memorandum, Tabuena, with the help of Dabao and
Peralta, caused the release of P55 Million of MIAA funds by means of three (3) withdrawals.
8. Supplemental Contract No. 3
Package Contract No. II 16,617,655.49 The first withdrawal was made on January 10, 1986 for P25 Million, following a letter of even date signed by
Tabuena and Dabao requesting the PNB extension office at the MIAA — the depository branch of MIAA funds, to
issue a manager's check for said amount payable to Tabuena. The check was encashed, however, at the PNB
(xerox copies only; original memo was submitted to the Office of the
Villamor Branch. Dabao and the cashier of the PNB Villamor branch counted the money after which, Tabuena took
President on May 28, 1984)
delivery thereof. The P25 Million in cash were then placed in peerless boxes and duffle bags, loaded on a PNB
armored car and delivered on the same day to the office of Mrs. Gimenez located at Aguado Street fronting
In this connection, please be informed that Philippine National Construction Corporation Malacanang. Mrs. Gimenez did not issue any receipt for the money received
(PNCC), formerly CDCP, has accomplishment billings on the MIA Development Project
aggregating P98.4 million, inclusive of accomplishments for the aforecited contracts. In
Similar circumstances surrounded the second withdrawal/encashment and delivery of another P25 Million, made
accordance with contract provisions, outstanding advances totalling P93.9 million are to be
on January 16, 1986.
deducted from said billings which will leave a net amount due to PNCC of only P4.5 million.

The third and last withdrawal was made on January 31, 1986 for P5 Million. Peralta was Tabuena's co-signatory to
At the same time, PNCC has potential escalation claims amounting to P99 million in the
the letter- request for a manager's check for this amount. Peralta accompanied Tabuena to the PNB Villamor
following stages of approval/evaluation:
branch as Tabuena requested him to do the counting of the P5 Million. After the counting, the money was placed
10
in two (2) peerless boxes which were loaded in the trunk of Tabuena's car. Peralta did not go with Tabuena to
deliver the money to Mrs. Gimenez' office at Aguado Street. It was only upon delivery of the P5 Million that Mrs.
Gimenez issued a receipt for all the amounts she received from Tabuena. The receipt, dated January 30, 1986,
reads:
The disbursement of the P55 Million was, as described by Tabuena and Peralta themselves, "out of the ordinary"
Malacanang and "not based on the normal procedure". Not only were there no vouchers prepared to support the
Manila disbursement, the P55 Million was paid in cold cash. Also, no PNCC receipt for the P55 Million was presented.
Defense witness Francis Monera, then Senior Assistant Vice President and Corporate Comptroller of PNCC, even
affirmed in court that there were no
J payments made to PNCC by MIAA for the months of January to June of 1986.
a
The position of the prosecution wasn that there were no outstanding obligations in favor of PNCC at the time of the
disbursement of the P55 Million. Onu the other hand, the defense of Tabuena and Peralta, in short, was that they
acted in good faith. Tabuena claimed
a that he was merely complying with the MARCOS Memorandum which
ordered him to forward immediately r to the Office of the President P55 Million in cash as partial payment of MIAA's
obligations to PNCC, and that he (Tabuena)
y was of the belief that MIAA indeed had liabilities to PNCC. Peralta for
his part shared the same belief and3so he heeded the request of Tabuena, his superior, for him (Peralta) to help in
the release of P5 Million. 0
,
1
With the rejection by the Sandiganbayan of their claim of good faith which ultimately led to their conviction,
Tabuena and Peralta now set forth9 a total of ten (10) errors6 committed by the Sandiganbayan for this Court's
consideration. It appears, however,8 that at the core of their plea that we acquit them are the following:
6
1) the Sandiganbayan convicted them of a crime not charged in the amended informations, and
RECEIVED FROM LOUIE TABUENA THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF FIFTY FIVE MILLION PESOS (P55,000,000.00) as of the
following dates:
2) they acted in good faith.

Jan. 10 — P 25,000,000.00
Anent the first proposition, Tabuena and Peralta stress that they were being charged with intentional
Jan. 16 — 25,000,000.00
malversation, as the amended informations commonly allege that:
Jan. 30 — 5,000,000.00

. . . accused . . . conspiring, confederating and other, then and there wilfully, unlawfully,
(
feloniously, and with intent to defraud the government, take and misappropriated the amount
S
of . . . .
g
d
But it. would appear that they were convicted of malversation by negligence. In this connection, the
Court's
) attention is directed to p. 17 of the December 20, 1991 Resolution (denying Tabuena's and
Peralta's
F motion for reconsideration) wherein the Sandiganbayan said:
e
R xxx xxx xxx
o
a On the contrary, what the evidence shows is that accused Tabuena delivered the P55 Million
- to people who were not entitled thereto, either as representatives of MIAA or of the PNCC.
G
i
m It proves that Tabuena had deliberately consented or permitted through negligence or
e abandonment, some other person to take such public funds. Having done so, Tabuena, by his

11
 own narration, has categorically demonstrated that he is guilty of the misappropriation or
malversation of P55 Million of public funds. (Emphasis supplied.)
To support their theory that such variance is a reversible flaw, Tabuena and Peralta argue that:
1) While malversation may be committed intentionally or by negligence, both modes cannot be committed at the
same time.
2) The Sandiganbayan was without jurisdiction to convict them of malversation of negligence where the amended
informations charged them with intentional malversation.7
3) Their conviction of a crime different from that charged violated their constitutional right to be informed of the
accusation.8
We do not agree with Tabuena and Peralta on this point. Illuminative and controlling is "Cabello v.
Sandiganbayan" 9where the Court passed upon similar protestations raised by therein accused-petitioner Cabello
whose conviction for the same crime of malversation was affirmed, in this wise:
. . . even on the putative assumption that the evidence against petitioner yielded a case of
malversation by negligence but the information was for intentional malversation, under the
circumstances of this case his conviction under the first mode of misappropriation would still
be in order. Malversation is committed either intentionally or by negligence. The dolo or
the culpa present in the offense is only a modality in the perpetration of the felony. Even if the
mode charged differs from the mode proved, the same offense of malversation is involved and
conviction thereof is proper. . . .
In Samson vs. Court of Appeals, et. al., we held that an accused charged with willful or
intentional falsification can validly be convicted of falsification through negligence, thus:
While a criminal negligent act is not a simple modality of a willful crime, as we held in Quizon
vs. Justice of the Peace of Bacolor. G.R. No. L-6641, July 28, 1995, but a distinct crime in our
Penal Code, designated as a quasi offense in our Penal Code, it may however be said that a
conviction for the former can be had under an information exclusively charging the
commission of a willful offense, upon the theory that the greater includes the lesser offense.
This is the situation that obtains in the present case. Appellant was charged with willful
falsification but from the evidence submitted by the parties, the Court of Appeals found that
in effecting the falsification which made possible the cashing of the checks in question,
appellant did not act with criminal intent but merely failed to take proper and adequate means
to assure himself of the identity of the real claimants as an ordinary prudent man would do. In
other words, the information alleges acts which charge willful falsification but which turned
out to be not willful but negligent. This is a case covered by the rule when there is a variance
between the allegation and proof, and is similar to some of the cases decided by this Tribunal.
xxx xxx xxx
Moreover; Section 5, Rule 116, of the Rules of Court does not require that all the essential
elements of the offense charged in the information be proved, it being sufficient that some of
said essential elements or ingredients thereof be established to constitute the crime proved. .
..
The fact that the information does not allege that the falsification was committed with
imprudence is of no moment for here this deficiency appears supplied by the evidence
submitted by appellant himself and the result has proven beneficial to him. Certainly, having
alleged that the falsification has been willful, it would be incongruous to allege at the same
time that it was committed with imprudence for a charge of criminal intent is incompatible
with the concept of negligence.
Subsequently, we ruled in People vs. Consigna, et. al., that the aforestated rationale and
arguments also apply to the felony of malversation, that is, that an accused charged with willful
malversation, in an information containing allegations similar to those involved in the present
case, can be validly convicted of the same offense of malversation through negligence where
the evidence sustains the latter mode of perpetrating the offense.
Going now to the defense of good faith, it is settled that this is a valid defense in a prosecution for malversation
for it would negate criminal intent on the part of the accused. Thus, in the two (2) vintage, but
significantmalversation cases of "US v. Catolico" 10 and "US v. Elvina," 11 the Court stressed that:
To constitute a crime, the act must, except in certain crimes made such by statute, be
accompanied by a criminal intent, or by such negligence or indifference to duty or to
consequences as, in law, is equivalent to criminal intent. The maxim is actus non facit reum,
nisi mens sit rea — a crime is not committed if the mind of the person performing the act
complained of is innocent.
The rule was reiterated in "People v. Pacana," 12 although this case involved falsification of public
documents and estafa:
Ordinarily, evil intent must unite with an unlawful act for there to be a crime. Actus non facit
reum, nisi mens sit rea. There can be no crime when the criminal mind is wanting.
American jurisprudence echoes the same principle. It adheres to the view that criminal intent in
embezzlement is not based on technical mistakes as to the legal effect of a transaction honestly entered
into, and there can be no embezzlement if the mind of the person doing the act is innocent or if there is
no wrongful purpose.13 The accused may thus always introduce evidence to show he acted in good faith
and that he had no intention to convert.14 And this, to our mind, Tabuena and Peralta had meritoriously
shown.
In so far as Tabuena is concerned, with the due presentation in evidence of the MARCOS Memorandum we are
swayed to give credit to his claim of having caused the disbursement of the P55 Million solely by reason of such
memorandum. From this premise flows the following reasons and/or considerations that would buttress his
innocence of the crime of malversation.
12
First. Tabuena had no other choice but to make the withdrawals, for that was what the MARCOS Memorandum
required him to do. He could not be faulted if he had to obey and strictly comply with the presidential directive,
and to argue otherwise is something easier said than done. Marcos was undeniably Tabuena's superior — the
former being then the President of the Republic who unquestionably exercised control over government agencies
such as the MIAA and PNCC.15 In other words, Marcos had a say in matters involving inter-government agency
affairs and transactions, such as for instance, directing payment of liability of one entity to another and the manner
in which it should be carried out. And as a recipient of such kind of a directive coming from the highest official of
the land no less, good faith should be read on Tabuena's compliance, without hesitation nor any question, with
the MARCOS Memorandum. Tabuena therefore is entitled to the justifying circumstance of "Any person who acts
in obedience to an order issued by a superior for some lawful purpose."16 The subordinate-superior relationship
between Tabuena and Marcos is clear. And so too, is the lawfulness of the order contained in the MARCOS
Memorandum, as it has for its purpose partial payment of the liability of one government agency (MIAA) to
another (PNCC). However, the unlawfulness of the MARCOS Memorandum was being argued, on the observation,
for instance, that the Ongpin Memo referred to in the presidential directive reveals a liability of only about P34.5
Million. The Sandiganbayan in this connection said:
Exhibits "2" and "2-a" (pages 1 and 2 of the memorandum of Min. Ongpin to the President
dated January 7, 1985) were mainly:
a.) for the approval of eight Supplemental Contracts; and
b.) a request for partial deferment of payment by PNCC for advances made for the MIAA
Development Project, while at the same time recognizing some of the PNCC's escalation
billings which would result in making payable to PNCC the amount of P34.5 million out of
existing MIAA Project funds.
Thus:
"xxx xxx xxx
To allow PNCC to collect partially its billings, and in consideration of ifs
pending escalation billings, may we request for His Excellency's approval
for a deferment of repayment of PNCC's advances to the extent of P30
million corresponding to about 30% of P99.1 million in escalation claims of
PNCC, of which P32.6 million has been officially recognized by MIADP
consultants but could not be paid due to lack of funding.
Our proposal will allow BAT to pay PNCC the amount of P34.5 million out
of existing MIA Project funds. This amount represents the excess of the
gross billings of PNCC of P98.4 million over the undeferred portion of the
repayment of advances of P63.9 million."
While Min. Ongpin may have, therefore recognized the escalation claims of the PNCC to MIAA
to the extent of P99.1 million (Exhibit 2a), a substantial portion thereof was still in the stages
of evaluation and approval, with only P32.6 million having been officially recognized by the
MIADP consultants.
If any payments were, therefore, due under this memo for Min. Ongpin (upon which President
Marcos' Memo was based) they would only be for a sum of up to P34.5 million. 17
xxx xxx xxx
V. Pres. Marcos' order to Tabuena dated January 8, 1986 baseless.
Not only was Pres. Marcos' Memo (Exhibit "1") for Tabuena to pay P55
million irrelevant, but it was actually baseless.
This is easy to see.
Exhibit "1" purports to refer itself to the Ongpin Memorandum (Exhibit "2",
"2-a"); Exhibit "1", however, speaks of P55 million to be paid to the PNCC
while Exhibit "2" authorized only P34.5 million. The order to withdraw the
amount of P55 million exceeded the approved payment of P34.5 million by
P20.5 million. Min. Ongpin's Memo of January 7, 1985 could not therefore
serve as a basis for the President's order to withdraw P55 million. 18
Granting this to be true, it will not nevertheless affect Tabuena's goad faith so as to make him criminally
liable. What is more significant to consider is that the MARCOS Memorandum is patently legal (for on its
face it directs payment of an outstanding liability) and that Tabuena acted under the honest belief that
the P55 million was a due and demandable debt and that it was just a portion of a bigger liability to
PNCC. This belief is supported by defense witness Francis Monera who, on direct examination, testified
that:
ATTY ANDRES
Q Can you please show us in this Exhibit "7" and "7-a" where it is indicated
the receivables from MIA as of December 31, 1985?
A As of December 31, 1985, the receivables from MIA is shown on page 2,
marked as Exhibit "7-a", sir, P102,475.392.35
xxx xxx xxx 19
ATTY. ANDRES
Q Can you tell us, Mr. Witness, what these obligations represent?
WITNESS
13
 A These obligations represent receivables on the basis of our billings to
MIA as contract-owner of the project that the Philippine National
Construction Corporation constructed. These are billings for escalation
mostly, sir.
Q What do you mean by escalation?
A Escalation is the component of our revenue billings to the contract-
owner that are supposed to take care of price increases, sir.
xxx xxx xxx 20
ATTY ANDRES
Q When you said these are accounts receivable, do I understand from you
that these are due and demandable?
A Yes, sir. 21
Thus, even if the order is illegal if it is patently legal and the subordinate is not aware of its illegality, the
subordinate is not liable, for then there would only be a mistake of fact committed in good faith.22 Such
is the ruling in "Nassif v. People"23 the facts of which, in brief, are as follows:
Accused was charged with falsification of commercial document. A mere employee of R.J.
Campos, he inserted in the commercial document alleged to have been falsified the word
"sold" by order of his principal. Had he known or suspected that his principal was committing
an improper act of falsification, he would be liable either as a co-principal or as an accomplice.
However, there being no malice on his part, he was exempted from criminal liability as he was
a mere employee following the orders of his principal. 24
Second. There is no denying that the disbursement, which Tabuena admitted as "out of the ordinary", did not
comply with certain auditing rules and regulations such as those pointed out by the Sandiganbayan, to wit:
a) [except for salaries and wages and for commutation of leaves] all disbursements above P1,000.00 should be
made by check (Basic Guidelines for Internal Control dated January 31, 1977 issued by COA)
b) payment of all claims against the government had to be supported with complete documentation (Sec. 4, P.D.
1445, "State Auditing Code of the Philippines). In this connection, the Sandiganbayan observed that:
There were no vouchers to authorize the disbursements in question. There were no bills to
support the disbursement. There were no certifications as to the availability of funds for an
unquestionably staggering sum of P55 Million. 25
c) failure to protest (Sec. 106, P.D. 1445)
But this deviation was inevitable under the circumstances Tabuena was in. He did not have the luxury of
time to observe all auditing procedures of disbursement considering the fact that the MARCOS
Memorandum enjoined his "immediate compliance" with the directive that he forward to the President's
Office the P55 Million in cash. Be that as it may, Tabuena surely cannot escape responsibility for such
omission. But since he was acting in good faith, his liability should only be administrative or civil in nature,
and not criminal. This follows the decision in "Villacorta v. People"26 where the Court, in acquitting
therein accused municipal treasurer of Pandan, Catanduanes of malversation after finding that he
incurred a shortage in his cash accountability by reason of his payment in good faith to certain
government personnel of their legitimate wages leave allowances, etc., held that:
Nor can negligence approximating malice or fraud be attributed to petitioner. If he made
wrong payments, they were in Good faith mainly to government personnel, some of them
working at the provincial auditor's and the provincial treasurer's offices And if those payments
ran counter to auditing rules and regulations, they did not amount to a criminal offense and
he should only be held administratively or civilly liable.
Likewise controlling is "US v. Elvina" 27 where it was held that payments in good faith do not amount to
criminal appropriation, although they were made with insufficient vouchers or improper evidence. In
fact, the Dissenting Opinion's reference to certain provisions in the revised Manual on Certificate of
Settlement and Balances — apparently made to underscore Tabuena's personal accountability, as
agency head, for MIAA funds — would all the more support the view that Tabuena is vulnerable to civil
sanctions only Sections 29.2 and 295 expressly and solely speak of "civilly liable," describe the kind of
sanction imposable on a superior officer who performs his duties with "bad faith, malice or gross
negligence"' and on a subordinate officer or employee who commits "willful or negligent acts . . . which
are contrary to law, morals, public policy and good customs even if he acted under order or instructions
of his superiors."
Third. The Sandiganbayan made the finding that Tabuena had already converted and misappropriated the P55
Million when he delivered the same to Mrs. Gimenez and not to the PNCC, proceeding from the following
definitions/concepts of "conversion":
"Conversion", as necessary element of offense of embezzlement, being the fraudulent
"appropriation to one's own use' of another's property which does not necessarily mean to
one's personal advantage but every attempt by one person to dispose of the goods of another
without right as if they were his own is conversion to his own use." (Terry v. Water
Improvement Dist. No. 5 of Tulsa County, 64 p, 2d 904, 906, 179 Okl. 106)
— At p. 207,
Words and
Phrases,
Permanent
Edition 9A.
Conversion is any interference subversive of the right of the owner of personal property to
enjoy and control it. The gist of conversion is the usurpation of the owner 's right of property,
14
 and not the actual damages inflicted. Honesty of purpose is not a defense. (Ferrera v. Parks, Such delivery, no doubt, is in effect delivery to the Office of the President inasmuch as Mrs. Gimenez
23 p. 883, 885 19 Or. 141) was Marcos' secretary then. Furthermore, Tabuena had reasonable ground to believe that the President
was entitled to receive the P55 Million since he was certainly aware that Marcos, as Chief Executive,
— exercised supervision and control over government agencies. And the good faith of Tabuena in having
A delivered the money to the President's office (thru Mrs. Gimenez), in strict compliance with the MARCOS
t Memorandum, was not at all affected even if it later turned out that PNCC never received the money.
p Thus, it has been said that:
a
g Good faith in the payment of public funds relieves a public officer from the crime of
e malversation.
1
6 xxx xxx xxx
8
,
Not every unauthorized payment of public funds is malversation. There is malversation only if
the public officer who has custody of public funds should appropriate the same, or shall take
i
or misappropriate or shall consent, or through abandonment or negligence shall permit any
d
other person to take such public funds. Where the payment of public funds has been made in
.
good faith, and there is reasonable ground to believe that the public officer to whom the fund
had been paid was entitled thereto, he is deemed to have acted in good faith, there is no
xxx xxx xxx criminal intent, and the payment, if it turns out that it is unauthorized, renders him only civilly
but not criminally liable.29
The words "convert" and "misappropriate" connote an act of using or disposing of another's
property as if it were one's own. They presuppose that the thing has been devoted to a purpose Fourth. Even assuming that the real and sole purpose behind the MARCOS Memorandum was to siphon-out public
or use different from that agreed upon. To appropriate to one's own use includes not only money for the personal benefit of those then in power, still, no criminal liability can be imputed to Tabuena. There
conversion to one's personal advantage but every attempt to dispose of the property of is no showing that Tabuena had anything to do whatsoever with the execution of the MARCOS Memorandum. Nor
another without right. is there proof that he profited from the felonious scheme. In short, no conspiracy was established between
Tabuena and the real embezzler/s of the P5 Million. In the cases of "US v. Acebedo" 30 and "Ang v.
— People vs. Sandiganbayan",31 both also involving the crime of malversation, the accused therein were acquitted after the
Webber, 57 Court arrived at a similar finding of non-proof of conspiracy. In "Acebedo", therein accused, as municipal president
O.G. of Palo, Leyte, was prosecuted for and found guilty by the lower court of malversation after being unable to turn
p. 2933, 2937 over certain amounts to the then justice of the peace. It appeared, however, that said amounts were actually
collected by his secretary Crisanto Urbina. The Court reversed Acebedo's conviction after finding that the sums
By placing them at the disposal of private persons without due authorization or legal were converted by his secretary Urbina without the knowledge and participation of Acebedo. The Court said, which
justification, he became as guilty of malversation as if he had personally taken them and we herein adopt:
converted them to his own use.
No conspiracy between the appellant and his secretary has been shown in this case, nor did
— People vs. such conspiracy appear in the case against Urbina. No guilty knowledge of the theft committed
Luntao, 50 by the secretary was shown on the part of the appellant in this case, nor does it appear that
O.G. he in any way participated in the fruits of the crime. If the secretary stole the money in question
p. 1182, without the knowledge or consent of the appellant and without negligence on his part, then
1183 28 certainly the latter can not be convicted of embezzling the same money or any part thereof.32

We do not agree. It must be stressed that the MARCOS Memorandum directed Tabuena "to pay In "Ang", accused-petitioner, as MWSS bill collector, allowed part of his collection to be converted into
immediately the Philippine National Construction Corporation, thru this office the sum of FIFTY FIVE checks drawn in the name of one Marshall Lu, a non-customer of MWSS, but the checks were
MILLION. . .", and that was what Tabuena precisely did when he delivered the money to Mrs. Gimenez. subsequently dishonored. Ang was acquitted by this Court after giving credence to his assertion that the

15
 conversion of his collections into checks were thru the machinations of one Lazaro Guinto, another
MWSS collector more senior to him. And we also adopt the Court's observation therein, that:
The petitioner's alleged negligence in allowing the senior collector to convert cash collections
into checks may be proof of poor judgment or too trusting a nature insofar as a superior officer
is concerned but there must be stronger evidence to show fraud, malice, or other indicia of
deliberateness in the conspiracy cooked up with Marshall Lu. The prosecution failed to show
that the petitioner was privy to the conspirational scheme. Much less is there any proof that
he profited from the questioned acts. Any suspicions of conspiracy, no matter how sincerely
and strongly felt by the MWSS, must be converted into evidence before conviction beyond
reasonable doubt may be imposed. 33
The principles underlying all that has been said above in exculpation of Tabuena equally apply to Peralta
in relation to the P5 Million for which he is being held accountable, i.e., he acted in good faith when he,
upon the directive of Tabuena, helped facilitate the withdrawal of P5 Million of the P55 Million of the
MIAA funds.
This is not a sheer case of blind and misguided obedience, but obedience in good faith of a duly executed order.
Indeed, compliance to a patently lawful order is rectitude far better than contumacious disobedience. In the case
at bench, the order emanated from the Office of the President and bears the signature of the President himself,
the highest official of the land. It carries with it the presumption that it was regularly issued. And on its face, the
memorandum is patently lawful for no law makes the payment of an obligation illegal. This fact, coupled with the
urgent tenor for its execution constrains one to act swiftly without question. Obedientia est legis essentia. Besides,
the case could not be detached from the realities then prevailing As aptly observed by Mr Justice Cruz in his
dissenting opinion:
We reject history in arbitrarily assuming that the people were free during the era and that the
Judiciary was independent and fearless. We know it was not: even the Supreme Court at that
time was not free. This is an undeniable fact that we can not just blink away. Insisting on the
contrary would only make our sincerity suspect and even provoke scorn for what can only be
described as our incredible credulity. 34
But what appears to be a more compelling reason for their acquittal is the violation of the accused's basic
constitutional right to due process. "Respect for the Constitution", to borrow once again Mr. Justice Cruz's words,
"is more important than securing a conviction based on a violation of the rights of the accused."35 While going over
the records, we were struck by the way the Sandiganbayan actively took part in the questioning of a defense
witness and of the accused themselves. Tabuena and Peralta may not have raised this as an error, there is
nevertheless no impediment for us to consider such matter as additional basis for a reversal since the settled
doctrine is that an appeal throws the whole case open to review, and it becomes the duty of the appellate court
to correct such errors as may be found in the judgment appealed from whether they are made the subject of
assignments of error or not. 36
Simply consider the volume of questions hurled by the Sandiganbayan. At the taking of the testimony of Francis
Monera. then Senior Assistant Vice President and Corporate Comptroller of PNCC, Atty. Andres asked sixteen (16)
questions on direct examination. Prosecutor Viernes only asked six (6) questions on cross-examination in the
course of which the court interjected a total of twenty-seven (27) questions (more than four times Prosecutor
Viernes' questions and even more than the combined total of direct and cross-examination questions asked by the
counsels) After the defense opted not to conduct any re-direct examination, the court further asked a total of ten
(10) questions.37 The trend intensified during Tabuena's turn on the witness stand. Questions from the court after
Tabuena's cross-examination totalled sixty-seven (67). 38 This is more than five times Prosecutor Viernes' questions
on cross-examination (14), and more than double the total of direct examination and cross-examination questions
which is thirty-one (31) [17 direct examination questions by Atty. Andres plus 14 cross-examination questions by
Prosecutor Viernes]. In Peralta's case, the Justices, after his cross-examination, propounded a total of forty-one
(41) questions. 39
But more importantly, we note that the questions of the court were in the nature of cross examinations
characteristic of confrontation, probing and insinuation. 40 (The insinuating type was best exemplified in one
question addressed to Peralta, which will be underscored.) Thus we beg to quote in length from the transcripts
pertaining to witness Monera, Tabuena and Peralta. (Questions from the Court are marked with asterisks and
italicized for emphasis.)
(MONERA)
(As a background, what was elicited from his direct examination is that the PNCC had receivables from MIAA
totalling P102,475,392.35, and although such receivables were largely billings for escalation, they were
nonetheless all due and demandable. What follows are the cross-examination of Prosecutor Viernes and the court
questions).
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY PROS. VIERNES
Q You admit that as shown by these Exhibits "7" and "7- a", the items here
represent mostly escalation billings. Were those escalation billings
properly transmitted to MIA authorities?
A I don't have the documents right now to show that they were
transmitted, but I have a letter by our President, Mr. Olaguer, dated July 6,
1988, following up for payment of the balance of our receivables from MIA,
sir.
*AJ AMORES
*Q This matter of escalation costs, is it not a matter for a conference
between the MIA and the PNCC for the determination as to the correct
amount?
A I agree, your Honor. As far as we are concerned, our billings are what we
deemed are valid receivables And, in fact, we have been following up for
payment.
*Q This determination of the escalation costs was it accepted as the
correct figure by MIA ?
16
A I don't have any document as to the acceptance by MIA your Honor, but about P2.6 million and there was a payment for application on withholding
our company was able to get a document or a letter by Minister Ongpin to and contractual stock of about P1 million; that summed up to P44.4 million
President Marcos, dated January 7, 1985, with a marginal note or approval all in all. And you deduct that from the P102 million, the remaining balance
by former President Marcos. would be about P57 million.

*PJ GARCHITORENA *PJ GARCHITORENA

*Q Basically, the letter of Mr. Ongpin is to what effect?
A The subject matter is approval of the supplementary contract and
request for partial deferment of payment for MIA Development Project,
your Honor.
*Q It has nothing to do with the implementation of the escalation costs?
*Q What you are saying is that, for all the payments made on this P102
million, only P2 million had been payments in cash ?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q The rest had been adjustments of accounts, assignments of accounts,
or offsetting of accounts?

A The details show that most of the accounts refer to our escalations, your
Honor.
*Q Does that indicate the computation for escalations were already billed
or you do not have any proof of that
A Our subsidiary ledger was based on billings to MIA and this letter of
Minister Ongpin appears to have confirmed our billings to MIA, your
Honor.
*AJ AMORES
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q This is as of December 31, 1985?
A The P102 million was as of December 31, 1985, your Honor, but the
balances is as of August 1987.
*Q We are talking now about the P44 million, more or less, by which the
basic account has been reduced. These reductions, whether by adjustment
or assignment or actual delivery of cash, were made after December 31,
1985?

*Q Were there partial payments made by MIA an these escalation billings? WITNESS

A Based on records available as of today, the P102 million was reduced to A Yes, your Honor.
about P56.7 million, if my recollection is correct, your Honor.
*Q And your records indicate when these adjustments and payments were
*PJ GARCHITORENA made?

*Q Were the payments made before or after February 1986, since Mr. A Yes, your Honor.
Olaguer is a new entrant to your company?
*AJ AMORES
WITNESS
*Q You said there were partial payments before of these escalation
A The payments were made after December 31, 1985 but I think the billings. Do we get it from you that there was an admission of these
payments were made before the entry of our President, your Honor. escalation costs as computed by you by MIA, since there was already
Actually, the payment was in the form of: assignments to State Investment partial payments?
of about P23 million; and then there was P17.8 million application against
advances made or formerly given; and there were payments to PNCC of
17
A Yes, your Honor. A Yes, your Honor.

*Q How were these payments made before February 1986, in case or *PJ GARCHITORENA
check, if there were payments made?
*Q Subsequent thereto, we are talking merely of about P44 million?
A The P44 million payments was in the form of assignments, your Honor.
A Yes, your Honor, as subsequent settlements.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q After December 31, 1985?
*Q The question of the Court is, before December 31, 1985, were there
any liquidations made by MIA against these escalation billings? A Yes, your Honor.

A I have not reviewed the details of the record, your Honor. But the ledger
card indicates that there were collections on page 2 of the Exhibit earlier
presented. It will indicate that there were collections shown by credits
indicated on the credit side of the ledger.
*Q And they have liquidated that, as you described it, by way of
assignments, adjustments, by offsets and by P2 million of cash payment?
A Yes, your Honor.

*AJ AMORES
*AJ AMORES

*Q Your ledger does not indicate the manner of giving credit to the MIA
*Q Your standard operating procedure before December 31, 1985 in
with respect to the escalation billings. Was the payment in cash or just
connection with or in case of cash payment, was the payment in cash or
credit of some sort before December 31, 1985?
check?

A Before December 31, 1985, the reference of the ledger are official
A I would venture to say it was by check, your Honor.
receipts and I suppose these were payments in cash, your Honor.

*Q Which is the safest way to do it?

*Q Do you know how the manner of this payment in cash was made by
MIA?
A Yes, your Honor.
A I do not know, your Honor.
"PJ GARCHITORENA
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q And the business way?
*Q But your records will indicate that?
A Yes, your Honor.
A The records will indicate that, your Honor.
PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q Except that you were not asked to bring them?
Continue.
A Yes, your Honor.
PROS VIERNES
*Q At all events, we are talking of settlement or partial liquidation prior to
December 31, 1985?

18
 Q You mentioned earlier about the letter of former Minister Ongpin to the A Yes, sir.
former President Marcos, did you say that letter concurs with the
escalation billings reflected in Exhibits "7" and "7-a"? Q In 1986. from your records as appearing in Exhibit "7-a", there were no
payments made to PNCC by MIA for the months of January to June 1986?
WITNESS
A Yes, sir.
A The Company or the management is of the opinion that this letter, a copy
of which we were able to get, is a confirmation of the acceptance of our Q And neither was the amount of P22 million remitted to PNCC by MIA?
billings, sir.
A Yes, sir.
Q This letter of Minister Ongpin is dated January 7, 1985, whereas the
entries of escalation billings as appearing in Exhibit "7" are dated June 30,
PROS VIERNES
1985, would you still insist that the letter of January 1985 confirms the
escalation billings as of June 1985?
That will be all, your Honor.
A The entries started June 30 in the ledger card. And as of December 31,
1985, it stood at P102 million after payments were made as shown on the PJ GARCHITORENA
credit side of the ledger. I suppose hat the earlier amount, before the
payment was made, was bigger and therefore I would venture to say that Redirect?
the letter of January 7, 1985 contains an amount that is part of the original
contract account. What are indicated in the ledger are escalation billings. ATTY ANDRES

*PJ GARCHITORENA No redirect, your Honor.

*Q We are talking about the letter of Minister Ongpin? *PJ GARCHITORENA

A The letter of Minister Ongpin refers to escalation billings, sir. Questions from the Court.

*Q As of what date? *AJ AMORES

A The letter is dated January 7, 1985, your Honor. *Q From your records, for the month of January 1986, there was no
payment of this escalation account by MIA?
PJ GARCHITORENA
WITNESS
Continue.
A Yes, your Honor. But on page 2 of Exhibit "7" there appears an
PROS. VIERNES assignment of P23 million, that was on September 25, 1986.

Q In accordance with this letter marked Exhibit "7" and "7-a", there were *Q But that is already under the present administration?
credits made in favor of MIA in July and November until December 1985.
These were properly credited to the account of MIA? A After February 1986, your Honor.

WITNESS

19
*Q But before February, in January 1986, there was no payment A There is still a balance of receivables from MIA as evidenced by a
whatsoever by MIA to PNCC? collection letter by our President dated July 6, 1988, your Honor. The
amount indicated in the letter is P55 million.
A Per record there is none appearing, your Honor.
PJ GARCHITORENA
*PJ GARCHITORENA
Any clarifications you would like to make Mr. Estebal?
*Q The earliest payment, whether by delivery of cash equivalent or of
adjustment of account, or by assignment, or by offsets, when did these ATTY ESTEBAL
payments begin?
None, your Honor.
A Per ledger card, there were payments in 1985, prior to December 31,
1985, your Honor. PJ GARCHITORENA

*Q After December 31, 1985? Mr. Viernes?

A There appears also P23 million as credit, that is a form of settlement, PROS VIERNES
your Honor.
No more, your Honor.
*Q This is as of September 25?
PJ GARCHITORENA
A Yes, your Honor. There were subsequent settlements P23 million is just
part of the P44 million.
The witness is excused. Thank you very much Mr. Monera. . . .41

*Q And what you are saying is that, PNCC passed the account to State
(TABUENA)
Investment. In other words, State Investment bought the credit of MIA?

(In his direct examination, he testified that he caused the preparation of the checks totalling P55 Million pursuant
A Yes, your Honor.
to the MARCOS Memorandum and that he thereafter delivered said amount in cash on the three (3) dates as
alleged in the information to Marcos' private secretary Mrs. Jimenez at her office at Aguado Street, who thereafter
*Q And the amount of credit or receivables sold by PNCC to State issued a receipt. Tabuena also denied having used the money for his own personal use.)
Investment is P23 million?
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY PROS. VIERNES
A Yes, your Honor.
Q The amount of P55 million as covered by the three (3) checks Mr.
*Q Is there a payback agreement? Tabuena, were delivered on how many occasions?

A I have a copy of the assignment to State Investment but I have not yet A Three times, sir.
reviewed the same, your Honor.
Q And so, on the first two deliveries, you did not ask for a receipt from Mrs.
*AJ AMORES Gimenez?

*Q As of now, is this obligation of MIA, now NAIA, paid to PNCC? A Yes, sir.

20
Q It was only on January 30, 1986 that this receipt Exhibit "3" was issued Q Did you see this Exhibit "3" prepared in the Office of Mrs. Gimenez?
by Mrs. Gimenez?
A Yes, sir.
A Yes, sir.
Q This receipt was typewritten in Malacañang stationery. Did you see who
*PJ GARCHITORENA typed this receipt?

*Q So January 30 is the date of the last delivery? A No, sir. What happened is that, she went to her room and when she came
out she gave me that receipt.
A I remember it was on the 31st of January, your Honor What happened is
that, I did not notice the date placed by Mrs. Gimenez. *PJ GARCHITORENA

Q Are you telling us that this Exhibit "3" was incorrectly dated Q What you are saying is, you do not know who typed that receipt?

A Yes, your Honor. WITNESS

*Q Because the third delivery was on January 31st and yet the receipt was A Yes, your Honor.
dated January 30?
*Q Are you making an assumption that she typed that receipt?
A Yes, your Honor.
A Yes, your Honor, because she knows how to type.
*Q When was Exhibit "3" delivered actually by Mrs. Gimenez?
*Q Your assumption is that she typed it herself?
A January 31st, your Honor.
A Yes, your Honor.
PJ GARCHITORENA
PJ GARCHITORENA
Continue.
Proceed.
PROS VIERNES
PROS. VIERNES
Q You did not go to Malacañang on January 30, 1986?
Q This receipt was prepared on January 31, although it is dated January
A Yes, sir, I did not. 30?

Q Do you know at whose instance this Exhibit "3" was prepared? A Yes, sir, because I was there on January 31st.

A I asked for it, sir. Q In what particular place did Mrs. Gimenez sign this Exhibit "3"?

Q You asked for it on January 31, 1986 when you made the last delivery? A In her office at Aguado, sir.

A Yes, sir. Q Did you actually see Mrs. Gimenez signing this receipt Exhibit "3"?

21
A No, sir, I did not. She was inside her room. A Nobody, sir.

Q So, she was in her room and when she came out of the room, she handed Q I noticed in this receipt that the last delivery of the sum of P55 million
this receipt to you already typed and signed? was made on January 30. Do we understand from you that this date
January 30 is erroneous?
A Yes, sir.
A Yes, sir, that January 30 is erroneous. I noticed it only afterwards. This
*AJ HERMOSISIMA should be January 31st, sir.

*Q So, how did you know this was the signature of Mrs. Gimenez? PROS VIERNES

WITNESS That will be all, your Honor.

A Because I know her signature, your Honor. I have been receiving letters PJ GARCHITORENA
from her also and when she requests for something from me. Her writing
is familiar to me. Redirect?

So, when the Presiding Justice asked you as to how you knew that this was ATTY. ANDRES
the signature of Mrs. Gimenez and you answered that you saw Mrs.
Gimenez signed it, you were not exactly truthful? No redirect, your Honor.

A What I mean is, I did not see her sign because she went to her room and *PJ GARCHITORENA
when she came out, she gave me that receipt, your Honor.
Questions from the Court.
PJ GARCHITORENA
*AJ HERMOSISIMA
That is why you have to wait for the question to be finished and listen to it
carefully. Because when I asked you, you said you saw her signed it. Be
*Q Why did you not ask for a receipt on the first and second deliveries?
careful Mr. Tabuena.

A Because I know that the delivery was not complete yet, your Honor.
WITNESS

*PJ GARCHITORENA
Yes, your Honor.

*Q So you know that the total amount to be delivered was P55 million')
PJ GARCHITORENA

A Yes, your Honor.

Continue.

PJ GARCHITORENA
PROS VIERNES

Response by Mr. Peralta to the testimony of Mr. Tabuena.

Was there another person inside the office of Mrs. Gimenez when she gave
you this receipt Exhibit "3"?
ATTY. ESTEBAL

22
We are adopting the testimony of Mr. Tabuena and we will also present A Yes, your Honor.
the accused, your Honor.
*AJ DEL ROSARIO
*AJ DEL ROSARIO
Did you file any written protest with the manner with which such payment
"Q From whom did you receive the President's memorandum marked was being ordered?
Exhibit "1"? Or more precisely, who handed you this memorandum?
A No, your Honor.
A Mrs. Fe Roa Gimenez, your Honor.
*Q Why not?
Q Did you ask Mrs, Fe Gimenez for what purpose the money was being
asked? A Because with that instruction of the President to me, I followed, your
Honor.
A The money was in payment for the debt of the MIA Authority to PNCC,
your Honor. *Q Before receiving this memorandum Exhibit "1", did the former
President Marcos discuss this maitter with you?
*Q If it was for the payment of such obligation why was there no voucher
prepared to cover such payment? In other words, why was the delivery of A Yes, your Honor.
the money not covered by any voucher?
*Q When was that?
A The instruction to me was to give it to the Office of the President, your
Honor.
A He called me up earlier, a week before that, that he wants to me pay
what I owe the PNCC directly to his office in cash, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q Be that as it may, why was there no voucher to cover this particular
disbursement?
*Q By "I OWE ", you mean the MIAA?

A I was just told to bring it to the Office of the President, your Honor.
WITNESS

*AJ DEL ROSARIO

A Yes, your Honor.

*Q Was that normal procedure for you to pay in cash to the Office of the
*AJ DEL ROSARIO
President for obligations of the MIAA in payment of its obligation to
another entity?
*Q And what did you say in this discussion you had with him?
WITNESS
A I just said, "Yes, sir, I will do it/"
A No, your Honor, I was just following the Order to me of the President.
*Q Were you the one who asked for a memorandum to be signed by him?
*PJ GARCHITORENA
A No, your Honor.
*Q So the Order was out of the ordinary?

23
*Q After receiving that verbal instruction for you to pay MIAA's obligation
with PNCC, did you not on your own accord already prepare the necessary
papers and documents for the payment of that obligation?
A He told me verbally in the telephone that the Order for the payment of
that obligation is forthcoming, your Honor. I will receive it.
*Q So the obligation of MIAA to PNCC was not, for the record, cancelled by
virtue of that payment?
A Based on the order to me by the former President Marcos ordering me
to pay that amount to his office and then the mechanics will come after,
your Honor.

*Q Is this the first time you received such a memorandum from the *Q Is the PNCC a private corporation or government entity?
President?
A I think it is partly government, your Honor.
A Yes, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q And was that the last time also that you received such a memorandum?
*Q That is the former CDCP?
A Yes, your Honor.
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q Did you not inquire, if not from the President, at least from Mrs.
Gimenez why this procedure has to be followed instead of the regular *AJ HERMOSISIMA
procedure?
*Q Why were you not made to pay directly, to the PNCC considering that
A No, sir. you are the Manager of MIA at that time and the PNCC is a separate
corporation, not an adjunct of Malacañang?
*AJ DEL ROSARIO
WITNESS
*Q Why did you not ask?
A I was just basing it from the Order of Malacanang to pay PNCC through
A I was just ordered to do this thing, your Honor. the Office of the President, your Honor.

*AJ HERMOSISIMA *Q Do you know the President or Chairman of the Board of PNCC?

*Q You said there was an "I OWE YOU"? A Yes, your Honor.

A Yes, your Honor. "Q How was the obligation of MIAA to PNCC incurred. Was it through the
President or Chairman of the Board?
*Q Where is that "I OWE YOU" now?
A PNCC was the one that constructed the MIA, your Honor.
A All I know is that we owe PNCC the amount of P99.1 million, your Honor.
MIAA owes PNCC that amount. *Q Was the obligation incurred through the President or Chairman of the
Board or President of the PNCC? In other words, who signed the contract
*Q Was this payment covered by receipt from the PNCC? between PNCC and MIAA?

A It was not covered, your Honor. A Actually, we inherited this obligation, your Honor. The one who signed
for this was the former Director of BAT which is General Singzon. Then

24
when the MIA Authority was formed, all the obligations of BAT were WITNESS
transferred to MIAA. So the accountabilities of BAT were transferred to
MIAA and we are the ones that are going to pay, your Honor. A Yes, your Honor.

*Q Why did you agree to pay to Malacañang when your obligation was *Q And prior to your Joining the MIA, did you ever work for the
with the PNCC? government?

A I was ordered by the President to do that, your Honor. A No, your Honor.

*Q You agreed to the order of the President notwithstanding the fact that *Q So, is it correct for us to say that your joining the MIA in 1968 as its
this was not the regular course or Malacañang was not the creditor? Manager was your first employment ,with the government?

A I saw nothing wrong with that because that is coming, from the
President, your Honor.
*Q The amount was not a joke, amounting to P55 million, and you agreed
to deliver money in this amount through a mere receipt from the private
secretary?
A I was ordered by the President, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q While you were Manager of MIA, did you have other subsequent
concurrent positions in the government also?
A I was also the Chairman of the Games and Amusement Board, your
Honor.
*Q But you were not the executive or operating officer of the Games and
Amusement Board?

*Q There is no question and it can be a matter of judicial knowledge that A I was, your Honor.
you have been with the MIA for sometime?
*Q As Chairman you were running the Games and Amusement Board?
A Yes, your Honor.
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q Prior to 1986?
*Q What else, what other government positions did you occupy that time?
A Yes, your Honor.
A I was also Commissioner of the Game Fowl Commission, your Honor.
*Q Can you tell us when you became the Manager of MIA?
*PJ GARCHITORENA
A I became Manager of MIA way back, late 1968, your Honor.
*Q That is the cockfighting?
*Q Long before the MIA was constituted as an independent authority?
WITNESS
A Yes, your Honor.
A Yes, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q Here, you were just a member of the Board?
*Q And by 1986, you have been running the MIA for 18 years?
25
A Yes, your Honor. A Yes, your Honor.

*Q So you were not running the commission?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q Any other entity?
A No more, your Honor.
*Q As far as you can recall, besides being the Manager of the MIA and later
the MIAA for approximately 18 years, you also ran the Games and
Amusement Board as its executive officer?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q And you were a commissioner only of the Came Fowl Commission?
*Q And more than anything else the COA is ever anxious for proper
documentation and proper supporting papers?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q Sometimes, regardless of the amount?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q Now, you have P55 million which you were ordered to deliver in cash,
not to the creditor of the particular credit, and to be delivered in armored
cars to be acknowledged only by a receipt of a personal secretary. After
almost 18 years in the government service and having had that much time
in dealing with COA people, did it not occur to you to call a COA
representative and say, "What will I do here?"

A I did not, your Honor.

A Yes, your Honor.

*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q Who was running the commission at that time?

*Q Did you not think that at least out of prudence, you should have asked
A I forgot his name, but he retired already, your Honor.
the COA for some guidance on this matter so that you will do it properly?

*Q All of us who joined the government, sooner or later, meet with our
WITNESS
Resident COA representative?

A What I was going to do is, after those things I was going to tell that
A Yes, your Honor.
delivery ordered by the President to the COA, your Honor.

*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q And one of our unfortunate experience (sic) is when the COA
Representative comes to us and says: "Chairman or Manager, this cannot
be". And we learn later on that COA has reasons for its procedure and we
learn to adopt to them?
*Q That is true, but what happened here is that you and Mr. Dabao or you
and Mr. Peralta signed requests for issuance of Manager's checks and you
were accommodated by the PNB Office at Nichols without any internal
documentation to justify your request for Manager's checks?
A Yes, your Honor.

WITNESS
*Q Of course we had no intimation at that time that Mr. Marcos will win
the elections but even then, the Daily Express, which was considered to be
A Yes, your Honor. a newspaper friendly to the Marcoses at that time, would occasionally
come with so-called expose, is that not so?
*Q As a matter of fact, sometimes we consider it inefficient, sometimes we
consider it foolish, but we know there is reason in this apparent madness A Yes, your Honor.
of the COA and so we comply?
26
*Q And worst, you had the so-called mosquito press that would always
come out with the real or imagined scandal in the government and place
it in the headline, do you recall that?
A Yes, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
Under these circumstances, did you not entertain some apprehension that
some disloyal employees might leak you out and banner headline it in
some mosquito publications like the Malaya at that time?
WITNESS
A No, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
I bring this up because we are trying to find out different areas of fear. We
are in the government and we in the government fear the COA and we also
fear the press. We might get dragged into press releases on the most
innocent thing. You believe that?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q And usually our best defense is that these activities are properly
documented?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q In this particular instance, your witnesses have told us about three (3)
different trips from Nichols to Aguado usually late in the day almost in
movie style fashion. I mean, the money being loaded in the trunk of your
official car and then you had a back-up truck following your car?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q Is that not quite a fearful experience to you ?
A I did not think of that at that time, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
"Q You did not think it fearful to be driving along Roxas Boulevard with P25
million in the trunk of your car?
WITNESS
A We have security at that time your Honor.
ATTY. ANDRES
Your Honor, the P25 million was in the armored car; only P5 million was in
the trunk of his car.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
Thank you for the correction. Even P1 million only. How much more with
P5 million inside the trunk of your car, was that not a nervous experience?
A As I have said, your Honor, I never thought of that.
PJ GARCHITORENA
Thank you very much, Mr. Tabuena. You are excused. . . . 42
(PERALTA)
(He testified on direct examination that he co-signed with Tabuena a memorandum request for the issuance of
the Manager's Check for P5 Million upon order of Tabuena and that he [Peralta] was aware that MIAA had an
existing obligation with PNCC in the amount of around P27 Million. He affirmed having accompanied Tabuena at
the PNB Villamor Branch to withdraw the P5 Million, but denied having misappropriated for his own benefit said
amount or any portion thereof.)
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY PROS VIERNES
Q Will you please tell the Honorable Court why was it necessary for you to
co-sign with Mr. Tabuena the request for issuance of Manager's check in
the amount of P5 million?
A At that time I was the Acting Financial Services Manager of MIAA, sir, and
all withdrawals of funds should have my signature because I was one of
the signatories at that time.
27
Q As Acting Financial Services Manager of MIAA, you always co-sign with
Mr. Tabuena in similar requests for the issuance of Manager's checks by
the PNB?
A That is the only occasion I signed, sir.
Q Did you say you were ordered by Mr. Tabuena to sign the request?
Q How did you know there was an existing liability of MIAA in favor of PNCC
at that time?
A Because prior to this memorandum of Mr. Tabuena, we prepared the
financial statement of MIAA as of December 31, 1985 and it came to my
attention that there was an existing liability of around P27,999,000.00,
your Honor.

A Yes, sir, and I think the order is part of the exhibits and based on that Q When was that Financial Statement prepared?
order, I co-signed in the request for the issuance of Manager's check in
favor of Mr. Luis Tabuena. A I prepared it around January 22 or 24, something like that, of 1986, sir.

PROS VIERNES Q Is it your usual practice to prepare the Financial Statement after the end
of the year within three (3) weeks after the end of the year?
Q Was there a separate written order for you to co-sign with Mr. Tabuena?
A Yes, sir, it was a normal procedure for the MIAA to prepare the Financial
WITNESS Statement on or before the 4th Friday of the month because there will be
a Board of Directors Meeting and the Financial Statement of the prior
month will be presented and discussed during the meeting.
A Yes, sir, an order was given to me by Mr. Tabuena.

*PJ GARCHITORENA
*PJ GARCHITORENA

*Q This matter of preparing Financial Statement was not an annual activity

Was that marked in evidence?
but a monthly activity?

WITNESS
A Yes, your Honor.

Yes, your Honor.

*Q This Financial Statement you prepared in January of 1986 recapitulated
the financial condition as of the end of the year?
*PJ GARCHITORENA
A Yes, your Honor.
What exhibit?
PJ GARCHITORENA
WITNESS
Continue.
I have here a copy, your Honor. This was the order and it was marked as
exhibit "N".
PROS VIERNES

PROS VIERNES
Q You made mention of a request for Escalation Clause by former Minister
Ongpin. Did you personally see that request?
It was marked as Exhibit "M", your Honor.
A When this order coming from Mr. Tabuena was shown to me, I was
shown a copy, sir. I have no file because I just read it.

28
Q It was Mr. Tabuena who showed you the letter of Minister Ongpin? PROS VIERNES

A Yes, sir. Q In how many boxes were those bills placed?

*PJ GARCHITORENA A The P5 million were placed in two (2) peerless boxes,

And that will be Exhibit? Q And you also went with Mr. Tabuena to Aguado?

ATTY. ANDRES A No, sir, I was left behind at Nichols. After it was placed at the trunk of the
car of Mr. Tabuena, I was left behind and I went back to my office at MIA.
Exhibit "2" and "2-A", your Honor.
Q But the fact is that, this P5 million was withdrawn at passed 5:00 o'clock
PROS VIERNES in the afternoon?

Q You also stated that you were with Mr. Tabuena when you withdrew the
amount of P5 million from the PNB Extension Office at Villamor?
A Yes, sir.
A I started counting it I think at around 4:30, sir. It was after office hours.
But then I was there at around 4:00 o'clock and we started counting at
around 4:30 p.m. because they have to place it in a room, which is the
office of the Manager at that time.

Q And Mr. Tabuena left for Malacañang after 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon
Q Why was it necessary for you to go with him on that occasion?
of that date?

A Mr. Tabuena requested me to do the counting by million, sir. So what I

A Yes, sir. After we have counted the money, it was placed in the peerless
did was to bundle count the P5 million and it was placed in two (2) peerless
boxes and Mr. Tabuena left for Malacanang.
boxes.

PROS VIERNES
Q Did you actually participate in the counting of the money by bundles?

Q And you yourself, returned to your office at MIA?

A Yes, sir.

WITNESS
Q Bundles of how much per bundle?

A Yes, sir.
A If I remember right, the bundles consisted of P100s and P50s, sir.

Q Until what time do you hold office at the MIA?

Q No P20s and P10s?

A Usually I over-stayed for one (1) or two (2) hours just to finish the paper
A Yes, sir, I think it was only P100s and P50s.
works in the office, sir.

*PJ GARCHITORENA
Q So, even if it was already after 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, you still
went back to your office at MIA?
*Q If there were other denominations, you can not recall?
A Yes, sir.
A Yes, your Honor.

29
PROS VIERNES *Q Do you have a copy or an excerpt of that Journal Voucher presented in
Court to show that payment?
That will be all, your Honor.
A We have a copy of the Journal Voucher, your Honor.
PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q Was this payment of P5 million ever recorded in a cashbook or other
Redirect? accounting books of MIAA ?

ATTY. ESTEBAL A The payment of P5 million was recorded in a Journal Voucher, your
Honor.
No redirect, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q In other words, the recording was made directly to the Journal?
Questions from the Court.
WITNESS
*AJ DEL ROSARIO
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q Did you not consider it as odd that your obligation with the PNCC had
to be paid in cash? *Q There are no other separate documents as part of the application for
Manager's Check?
WITNESS
A Yes, your Honor, there was none.
A Based on the order of President Marcos that we should pay in cash, it
was not based on the normal procedure, your Honor. *AJ DEL ROSARIO

*Q And, as Acting Financial Services Manager, you were aware that all *Q After the payment was made, did your office receive any receipt from
disbursements should be covered by vouchers? PNCC?

A Yes, your Honor, the payments should be covered by vouchers. But then,
inasmuch as what we did was to prepare a request to the PNB, then this
can be covered by Journal Voucher also.
*Q Was such payment of P5 million covered by a Journal Voucher?
A Yes, your Honor.
A I was shown a receipt by Mr. Tabuena, the receipt given by Mrs. Fe Roa
Gimenez, your Honor. Inasmuch as the payment should be made through
the Office of the president, I accepted the receipt given by Mrs. Fe Gimenez
to Mr. Tabuena.
*Q After receiving that receipt, did you prepare the necessary supporting
documents, vouchers, and use that receipt as a supporting document to
the voucher?

*Q Did you present that Journal Voucher here in Court?

A Your Honor, a Journal Voucher was prepared for that.

A We have a copy, your Honor.

*Q How about a disbursement voucher?

30
A Inasmuch as this was a request for Manager's check, no disbursement
voucher was prepared, your Honor.
*AJ DEL ROSARIO
*Q Since the payment was made on January 31, I986, and that was very
close to the election held in that year, did you not entertain any doubt that
the amounts were being used for some other purpose?
ATTY. ESTEBAL
With due respect to the Honorable Justice, we are objecting to the
question on the ground that it is improper.
*AJ DEL ROSARIO
I will withdraw the question.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
What is the ground for impropriety?
ATTY. ESTEBAL
This is not covered in the direct examination, and secondly, I don't think
there was any basis, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
Considering the withdrawal of the question, just make the objection on
record.
*AJ HERMOSISIMA
*Q As a Certified Public Accountant and Financial Manager of the MIAA,
did you not consider it proper that a check be issued only after it is covered
by a disbursement voucher duly approved by the proper authorities ?
A Your Honor, what we did was to send a request for a Manager's check to
the PNB based on the request of Mr. Tabuena and the order of Mr.
Tabuena was based on the Order of President Marcos.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q In your capacity as Financial Services Manager of the MIAA, did you not
think it proper to have this transaction covered by a disbursement
voucher?
WITNESS
A Based on my experience, payments out of cash can be made through
cash vouchers, or even though Journal Vouchers, or even through credit
memo, your Honor.
*AJ HERMOSISIMA
*Q This was an obligation of the MIAA to the PNCC. Why did you allow a
disbursement by means of check in favor of Mr. Luis Tabuena, your own
manager?
A We based the payment on the order of Mr. Tabuena because that was
the order of President Marcos to pay PNCC through the Office of the
President and it should be paid in cash, your Honor.
*Q You are supposed to pay only on legal orders. Did you consider that
legal?
ATTY. ESTEBAL
With due respect to the Honorable Justice, the question calls for a
conclusion of the witness.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
Considering that tire witness is an expert, witness may answer.
WITNESS
A The order of president Marcos was legal at that time because the order
was to pay PNCC the amount of P5 million through the Office of the
President and it should be paid in cash, your Honor. And at that time, I
know for a fact also that there was an existing P.D. wherein the President
of the Republic of the Philippines can transfer funds from one office to
another and the PNCC is a quasi government entity at that time.
*AJ HERMOSISIMA
31
*Q Are you saying that this transaction was made on the basis of that P.D.
which you referred to?
A I am not aware of the motive of the President, but then since he is the
President of the Philippines, his order was to pay the PNCC through the
Office of the President, your Honor.
*Q As Financial Manager, why did you allow a payment in cash when
ordinarily payment of an obligation of MIAA is supposed to be paid in
check?
A I caused the payment through the name of Mr. Tabuena because that
was the order of Mr. Tabuena and also he received an order coming from
the President of the Philippines at that time, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q Mr. Peralta, are not Journal Vouchers merely entries in the Journals to
correct certain statements of accounts earlier made in the same journal?
In other words, really what you are telling us is that, a Journal Voucher is
to explain a transaction was otherwise not recorded.
WITNESS
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q Therefore, when you said that a Journal Voucher here is proper, you
are saying it is proper only because of the exceptional nature of the
transactions?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q In other words, as an Accountant, you would not normally authorize
such a movement of money unless it is properly documented?
ATTY. ESTEBAL
With due respect to the Honorable Presiding Justice, I think the question is
misleading because what the witness stated is. . .
*PJ GARCHITORENA
Be careful in your objection because the witness understands the language
you are speaking, and therefore, you might be coaching him.
ATTY. ESTEBAL
No, your Honor. I am also an accountant that is why I could say that. . .
*PJ GARCHITORENA
Please be simple in your objection.
ATTY. ESTEBAL
The question is misleading on the ground that what the witness stated
earlier is that the Journal Voucher in this particular case was supported,
your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
Overruled, may answer.
WITNESS
A The transaction was fully documented since we have the order of the
General Manager at that time and the order of President Marcos, your
Honor.
*Q Are you saying the Order of the General Manager is an adequate basis
for the movement of money?
A Yes, your Honor, because at that time we have also a recorded liability
of P27 million.
*Q we are not talking of whether or not there was a liability. What we are
saying is, is the order of the General Manager by itself adequate with no
other supporting papers, to justify the movement of funds?
A Yes, your Honor. The order of Mr. Luis Tabuena was based on our existing
liability of P27,931,000.00, inasmuch as we have that liability and I was
shown the order of President Marcos to pay P5 million through the Office
of the President, I considered the order of Mr. Luis Tabuena, the order of
President Marcos and also the existing liability of P27 million sufficient to
pay the amount of P5 million. Inasmuch as there is also an escalation clause
32
of P99.1 million, the payment of P5 million is fully covered by those existing
documents.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
You keep flooding us with details we are not asking for. We are not asking
you whether or not there was valid obligation. We are not asking you about
the escalation clause. We are asking you whether or not this particular
order of Mr. Tabuena is an adequate basis to justify the movement of
funds?
WITNESS
When we pay, your Honor, we always look for the necessary documents
and at that time I know for a fact that there was this existing liability.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
A Because at that time, your Honor, I have knowledge that the President is
authorized through a Presidential Decree to transfer government funds
from one office to another.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q Under the Appropriation Act. Are payments of debts of the MIAA
covered by the Appropriation Act?
A I think the liability was duly recorded and appropriations to pay the
amount is. . . . (interrupted)
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q Tell me honestly, is your answer responsive to the question or are you
just throwing words at us in the hope that we will forget what the question
is?

When we ask questions and when we answer them, we must listen to the A No, your Honor.
question being asked and not to whatever you wanted to say. I know you
are trying to protect yourself. We are aware of your statement that there *Q Are you telling us that the debts incurred by MIAA ate covered by the
are all of these memoranda. Appropriations Act so that the payment of this debt would be in the same
level as the realignment of funds authorized the President? Or are you
*Q By your disbursement of such amount, you are saying that the order of telling as you did not read the Decree?
Mr. Tabuena by itself is adequate?
A I was aware of that Decree, your Honor.
WITNESS
*PJ GARCHITORENA
A As far as I am concerned, your Honor, inasmuch as we have a liability and
I was shown the Order of President Marcos to pay PNCC through his office, Mr. Estebal, will you include in your memorandum what are the Decrees
I feel that the order of the General Manager, the order of President authorizing this movement of funds?
Marcos, and also the memorandum of Minister Ongpin are sufficient to
cause the payment of P5 million.
ATTY. ESTEBAL

*PJ GARCHITORENA
Yes, your Honor.

*Q This Presidential Decree which authorizes the President to transfer

*PJ GARCHITORENA
funds from one department to another, is this not the one that refers to
the realignment of funds insofar as the Appropriation Act is concerned?
*Q It is true that President Marcos was the President, but he was not an
officer of the MIAA, was he?
WITNESS

A No, your Honor.

33
*Q In fact, for purposes of internal control, you have different officers and
different officials in any company either government or private, which are
supposed to check and balance each other, is it not?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q So that when disbursements of funds are made, they are made by
authority of not only one person alone so that nobody will restrain him?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q These checks and balances exist in an entity so that no one person can
dispose of funds in any way he likes?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q And in fact, the purpose for having two (2) signatories to documents
and negotiable documents is for the same purpose?
A Yes, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q In other words, the co-signatories counter check each other?
WITNESS
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q In your case, you would be the counter check for Mr. Tabuena?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q In the other words, even if Mr. Tabuena is the Manager, you as Financial
Services Manager and as counter signatory are in a position to tell Mr.
Tabuena, "I am sorry, you are my superior but this disbursement is not
proper and, therefore, I will not sign it"., if in your opinion the
disbursement is not proper?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q Therefore, as a co-signatory, you expected to exercise your judgment
as to the propriety of a particular transactions?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q And this is something you know by the nature of your position and
because you are a Certified Public Accountant?
A Yes, your Honor.
*AJ DEL ROSARIO
*Q You admit that the payment of P5 million and P50 million were unusual
in the manner with which they were disposed?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q Did you submit a written protest to the manner in which such amount
was being disposed of?
A A written protest was not made, your Honor, but I called the attention
of Mr. Tabuena that since this payment was upon the order of President
Marcos, then I think as President he can do things which are not ordinary.
*Q If you did not prepare a written protest, did you at least prepare a
memorandum for the record that this was an extra-ordinary transaction?
A I called the attention of Mr. Tabuena that this was an extra-ordinary
transaction and no written note, your Honor.
PJ GARCHITORENA
Thank you very much Mr. Peralta, you are excused. . . . 43
This Court has acknowledged the right of a trial judge to question witnesses with a view to satisfying his mind upon
any material point which presents itself during the trial of a case over which he presides. 44 But not only should his
examination be limited to asking "clarificatory" questions, 45 the right should be sparingly and judiciously used; for
the rule is that the court should stay out of it as much as possible, neither interfering nor intervening in the conduct
of the trial.46 Here, these limitations were not observed. Hardly in fact can one avoid the impression that the
Sandiganbayan had allied itself with, or to be more precise, had taken the cudgels for the prosecution in proving
the case against Tabuena and Peralta when the Justices cross-examined the witnesses, their cross- examinations
supplementing those made by Prosecutor Viernes and far exceeding the latter's questions in length. The "cold
neutrality of an impartial judge" requirement of due process was certainly denied Tabuena and Peralta when the
court, with its overzealousness, assumed the dual role of magistrate and advocate. In this connection, the
observation made in the Dissenting Opinion to the effect that the majority of this Court was "unduly disturbed"
with the number of court questions alone, is quite inaccurate. A substantial portion of the TSN was incorporated
in the majority opinion not to focus on "numbers" alone, but more importantly to show that the court questions
34
were in the interest of the prosecution and which thus depart from that common standard of fairness and ATTY. ESTEBAL
impartiality. In fact, it is very difficult to be, upon review of the records, confronted with "numbers" without
necessarily realizing the partiality of the Court. In "US v. De Sisto" (2 Cir., 1961, 289 F 2d 833), for example, a new This is not covered in the direct examination, and secondly, I don't think
trial was required because the trial judge, as in this case, indulged in extensive questioning of defendant and his there was any basis, Your Honor.
witnesses, and the reviewing court also had to amplify on "numbers" to bolster this. It was pointed out in the "De
Sisto" case that the judge asked 3,115 questions of all witnesses, the prosecutor asked but 1,381, defense counsel
PJ GARCHITORENA
3,330. The judge's questions to the defendant De Sisto totalled 306, the prosecutor's 347, and the defense
counsel's, 201. After referring to these figures, the court stated:
Considering the withdrawal of the question, just make the objection on
record.
. . . It is indeed an impressive proportion, but no such mathematical computation is of itself
determinative. However, taking all this in conjunction with the long and vigorous examination
of the defendant himself by the judge, and the repeated belittling by the judge of defendant's Nothing from the preceding questions of counsels or of the court would serve as basis for this question.
efforts to establish the time that Fine left the pier, we fear that in its zeal for arriving at the How then, can this be considered even relevant? What is the connection between the payment made to
facts the court here conveyed to the jury too strong an impression of the court's belief in the the President's office and the then forthcoming presidential "snap election"? In another instance,
defendant's probable guilt to permit the jury freely to perform its own function of independent consider the following questions of Presiding Justice Garchitorena:
determination of the facts. . . .
*PJ GARCHITORENA
The majority believes that the interference by the Sandiganbayan Justices was just too excessive that it
cannot be justified under the norm applied to a jury trial, or even under the standard employed in a non- *Q Mr. Peralta, are not Journal Vouchers merely entries in the Journals to
jury trial where the judge is admittedly given more leeway in propounding questions to clarify points and correct certain statements of accounts earlier made in the same journal?
to elicit additional relevant evidence. At the risk of being repetitious, we will amplify on this via some
specific examples. Based on the evidence on record, and on the admission of Tabuena himself, the P55 xxx xxx xxx
million was delivered to the President's Office thru Mrs. Gimenez, in obedience to the Presidential
directive. One Sandiganbayan Justice, however, hurled the following questions to Peralta:
*Q In other words, really what you are telling us is that, a Journal Voucher
is to explain a transaction was otherwise not recorded.
AJ DEL ROSARIO

xxx xxx xxx

Q: Since the payment was made on January 31, 1986, and that was very
close to the election held in that year, did you not entertain any doubt that
the amounts were being used for some other purposes? *Q Therefore, when you said that a Journal Voucher here is proper, you
are saying it is proper only because of the exceptional nature of the
transactions?
ATTY. ESTEBAL

xxx xxx xxx

With due respect to the Honorable Justice, We are objecting to the
question on the ground that it is improper.
*Q In other words, as an Accountant, you would not normally authorize
such a movement of money unless it is properly documented?
AJ DEL ROSARIO

ATTY. ESTEBAL
I will withdraw the question.

With due respect to the Honorable Presiding Justice, I think the question is
PJ GARCHITORENA misleading because what the witness stated is . . .

What is the ground for impropriety? *PJ GARCHITORENA

35
Be careful in your objection because the witness understands the language When we ask questions and when we answer them, we must listen to the
you are speaking, and therefore, you might be coaching him. question being asked and not to whatever you wanted to say. I know you
are trying to protect yourself. We are aware of your statement that there
ATTY. ESTEBAL are all of these memoranda.

No, your Honor. I am also an accountant that is why I could say that . . . *Q By your disbursement of such amount, you are saying that the order of
Mr. Tabuena by itself is adequate?
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*PJ GARCHITORENA
Please be simple in your objection.
*Q This Presidential Decree which authorizes the President to transfer
funds from one department to another, is this not the one that refers to
ATTY. ESTEBAL
the realignment of funds insofar as the Appropriation Act is concerned?

The question is misleading on the ground that what the witness stated
*PJ GARCHITORENA
earlier is that the Journal Voucher in this particular case was supported,
your Honor.
*Q Under the Appropriation Act. Are payments of debts of the MIAA
covered by the Appropriation Act?
*PJ GARCHITORENA

*PJ GARCHITORENA
Overruled may answer.

*Q Tell me honestly, is your answer responsive to the question or are you

WITNESS
just throwing words at us in the hope that we will forget what the question
is?
A The transaction was fully documented since we have the order of the
General Manager at that time and the order of President Marcos, your
xxx xxx xxx
Honor.

*Q Are you telling us that the debts incurred by MIAA are covered by the
*Q Are you saying the Order of the General Manager is an adequate basis
Appropriations Act so that the payment of this debt would be in the same
for the movement of money?
level as the realignment of funds authorized the President? Or are you
telling as you did not read the Decree?
*Q We are not talking of whether or not there was a liability. What we are
saying is, is the order of the General Manager by itself adequate with no
*PJ GARCHITORENA
other supporting papers, to justify the movement of funds?

Mr. Estebal, will you include in your memorandum what are the Decrees
*PJ GARCHITORENA
authorizing this movement of funds?

You keep flooding us with details we are not asking for. We are not asking
ATTY. ESTEBAL
you whether or not there was valid obligation. We are not asking you about
the escalation clause. We are asking you whether or not this particular
order of Mr. Tabuena is an adequate basis to justify the movement of Yes, your Honor.
funds?
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*PJ GARCHITORENA

36
 *Q It is true that President Marcos was the President, but he was not an
officer of the MIAA, was he?
*Q In fact, for purposes of internal control, you have different in officers
and different officials in any company either government or private, which
are supposed to check and balance each other, is it not?
*Q So that when disbursements of funds are made, they are made by
authority of not only one person alone so that nobody will restrain him?
*Q These checks and balances exist in an entity so that no one person can
dispose of funds in any way he likes?
*Q And in fact, the purpose for having two (2) signatories to documents
and negotiable documents is for the same purpose?
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q In other words, the co-signatories counter check each other?
*Q In your case, you would be the counter check for Mr. Tabuena?
*Q In other words, even if Mr. Tabuena is the Manager, you as Financial
Services Manager and as counter signatory are in a position to tell Mr.
Tabuena, "I am sorry, you are my superior but this disbursement is not
proper and, therefore, I will not sign it.", if in your opinion the
disbursement is not proper?
*Q Therefore, as co-signatory, you are expected to exercise your judgment
as to the propriety of a particular transaction ?
*Q And this is something you know by the nature of your position and
because you are a Certified Public Accountant? 47
How can these questions be considered clarificatory when they clearly border more on cross-
examination questions? Thus, the Dissenting Opinion's focus on the distinction between the two kinds
of trial to justify the Sandiganbayan's active participation in the examination of petitioners Tabuena and
Peralta and witness Monera, with due respect, appears insignificant to this case. Let it, therefore, be
emphasized anew that:
A trial judge should not participate in the examination of witnesses as to create the impression
that he is allied with the prosecution.48
We doubt not that the sole motive of the learned judge was to ascertain the truth of the
transaction, but it is never proper for a judge to discharge the duties of a prosecuting attorney.
However anxious a judge may be for the enforcement of the law, he should always remember
that he is as much judge in behalf of the defendant accused of crime, and whose liberty is in
jeopardy, as he is judge in behalf of the state, for the purpose of safeguarding the interests of
society. 49
Ordinarily it is not good practice for the presiding judge himself to examine witnesses at length.
The circumstances may be such in a given case as to justify the court in so doing. . . . This court,
however, has more than once said that the examination of witnesses is the more appropriate
function of counsel, and the instances are rare and the conditions exceptional which will justify
the presiding judge in conducting an extensive examination. It is always embarrassing for
counsel to object to what he may deem improper questions by the court. Then, in conducting
a lengthy examination, it would be almost impossible for the judge to preserve a judicial
attitude. While he is not a mere figurehead or umpire in a trial, and it is his duty to see that
justice is done, he will usually not find it necessary to conduct such examinations. The extent
to which this shall be done must largely be a matter of discretion, to be determined by the
circumstances of each particular case, but in so doing he must not forget the function of the
judge and assume that of an advocate. . . 50
While it is true that the manner in which a witness shall be examined is largely in the discretion
of the trial judge, it must be understood that we have not adopted in this country the practice
of making the presiding judge the chief inquisitor. It is better to observe our time-honored
custom of orderly judicial procedure, even at the expense of occasional delays. . . . The judge
is an important figure in the trial of a cause, and while he has the right, and it is often his duty,
to question witnesses to the end that justice shall prevail, we can conceive of no other reason,
for him to take the trial of the cause out of the hands of counsel. 51
The examination of witnesses is the more appropriate function of counsel, and it is believed
the instances are rare and the conditions exceptional in a high degree which will justify the
presiding judge in entering upon and conducting an extended examination of a witness, and
that the exercise of a sound discretion will seldom deem such action necessary or advisable. 52
He [the judge] may properly intervene in a trial of a case to promote expedition, and prevent
unnecessary waste of time, or to clear up some obscurity, but he should bear in mind that his
undue interference, impatience, or participation in, the examination of witnesses, or a severe
attitude on his part toward witnesses, especially those who are excited or terrified by the
unusual circumstances of a trial, may tend to prevent the proper presentation of the cause, or
the ascertainment of the truth in respect thereto. 53
The impartiality of the judge — his avoidance of the appearance of becoming the advocate of
either one side or the other of the pending controversy is a fundamental and essential rule of
special importance in criminal cases. . . 54
Our courts, while never unmindful of their primary duty to administer justice, without fear or
favor, and to dispose of these cases speedily and in as inexpensive a manner as is possible for
37
 the court and the parties, should refrain from showing any semblance of one-sided or more or
less partial attitude in order not to create any false impression in the minds of the litigants. For
obvious reasons, it is the bounden duty of all to strive for the preservation of the people's faith
in our courts.55

Time and again this Court has declared that due process requires no less than the cold
neutrality of an impartial judge. Bolstering this requirement, we have added that the judge
must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial, to give added assurance to
the parties that his decision will be just. The parties are entitled to no less than this, as a
minimum guaranty of due process. 56

We are well aware of the fear entertained by some that this decision may set a dangerous precedent in that those
guilty of enriching themselves at the expense of the public would be able to escape criminal liability by the mere
expedient of invoking "good faith". It must never be forgotten, however, that we render justice on a case to case
basis, always in consideration of the evidence that is presented. Thus, where the evidence warrants an acquittal,
as in this case, we are mandated not only by the dictates of law but likewise of conscience to grant the same. On
the other hand, it does not follow that all those similarly accused will necessarily be acquitted upon reliance on
this case as a precedent. For the decision in this case to be a precedent, the peculiar circumstances and the
evidence that led to the petitioner's acquittal must also be present in subsequent cases.

Furthermore, as between a mere apprehension of a "dangerous precedent" and an actual violation of

constitutionally enshrined rights, it is definitely the latter that merits our immediate attention. For the most
dangerous precedent arises when we allow ourselves to be carried away by such fears so that it becomes lawful
to sacrifice the rights of an accused to calm the fearful. In our eagerness to bring to justice the malefactors of the
Marcos regime, we must not succumb to the temptation to commit the greatest injustice of visiting the sins of the
wrongdoers upon an innocent.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, herein petitioners Luis A. Tabuena and Adolfo M. Peralta are hereby
ACQUITTED of the crime of malversation as defined and penalized under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code.
The Sandiganbayan Decision of October 12, 1990 and the Resolution dated December 20, 1991 are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

38
G.R. No. 151085 August 20, 2008 On February 27, 1990, AAA was born to spouses FFF and MMM. 10 Among her siblings CCC, BBB, DDD, EEE and
GGG, AAA is the only girl in the family. Before these disturbing events, AAA's family members were close friends
JOEMAR ORTEGA, petitioner, of petitioner's family, aside from the fact that they were good neighbors. However, BBB caught petitioner raping
vs. his younger sister AAA inside their own home. BBB then informed their mother MMM who in turn asked
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. AAA.11 There, AAA confessed that petitioner raped her three (3) times on three (3) different occasions.

DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition1 for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking the
reversal of the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision2 dated October 26, 2000 which affirmed in toto the Decision3 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, Branch 50, dated May 13, 1999, convicting petitioner Joemar
Ortega4 (petitioner) of the crime of Rape.
The first occasion happened sometime in August 1996. MMM left her daughter AAA, then 6 years old and son BBB,
then 10 years old, in the care of Luzviminda Ortega12 (Luzviminda), mother of petitioner, for two (2) nights because
MMM had to stay in a hospital to attend to her other son who was sick. 13 During the first night at petitioner's
residence, petitioner entered the room where AAA slept together with Luzviminda and her daughter. Petitioner
woke AAA up and led her to the sala. There petitioner raped AAA. The second occasion occurred the following day,
again at the petitioner's residence. Observing that nobody was around, petitioner brought AAA to their comfort
room and raped her there. AAA testified that petitioner inserted his penis into her vagina and she felt pain. In all
of these instances, petitioner warned AAA not to tell her parents, otherwise, he would spank her. 14 AAA did not
tell her parents about her ordeal.

The Facts The third and last occasion happened in the evening of December 1, 1996. Petitioner went to the house of AAA
and joined her and her siblings in watching a battery-powered television. At that time, Luzviminda was conversing
Petitioner, then about 14 years old,5 was charged with the crime of Rape in two separate informations both dated with MMM. While AAA's siblings were busy watching, petitioner called AAA to come to the room of CCC and BBB.
April 20, 1998, for allegedly raping AAA,6 then about eight (8) years of age. The accusatory portions thereof AAA obeyed. While inside the said room which was lighted by a kerosene lamp, petitioner pulled AAA behind the
respectively state: door, removed his pants and brief, removed AAA's shorts and panty, and in a standing position inserted his penis
into the vagina of AAA.15 AAA described petitioner's penis as about five (5) inches long and the size of two (2)
Criminal Case No. 98-19083 ballpens. She, likewise, narrated that she saw pubic hair on the base of his penis.16

That sometime in August, 1996, in the Municipality of XXX, Province of YYY, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force, violence and
intimidation, did then and there, (sic) willfully, unlawfully and feloniously (sic) had carnal knowledge of
and/or sexual intercourse with the said AAA, a minor, then about 6 years old, against her will.
This last incident was corroborated by BBB in his testimony. When BBB was about to drink water in their kitchen,
as he was passing by his room, BBB was shocked to see petitioner and AAA both naked from their waist down in
the act of sexual intercourse. BBB saw petitioner holding AAA and making a pumping motion. Immediately, BBB
told petitioner to stop; the latter, in turn, hurriedly left. Thereafter, BBB reported the incident to his mother,
MMM.17

CONTRARY TO LAW.7
Criminal Case No. 98-19084
That on or about the 1st day of December, 1996, in the Municipality of XXX, Province of YYY, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force,
violence and intimidation, did then and there, (sic) willfully, unlawfully and feloniously (sic) had carnal
knowledge of and/or sexual intercourse with the said AAA, a minor, then about 6 years old, against her
will.
MMM testified that when she asked AAA about what BBB saw, AAA told her that petitioner inserted his fingers
and his penis into her vagina. MMM learned that this was not the only incident that petitioner molested AAA as
there were two previous occasions. MMM also learned that AAA did not report her ordeal to them out of fear that
petitioner would spank her. MMM testified that when BBB reported the matter to her, petitioner and Luzviminda
already left her house. After waiting for AAA's brothers to go to sleep, MMM, with a heavy heart, examined AAA's
vagina and she noticed that the same was reddish and a whitish fluid was coming out from it. Spouses FFF and
MMM were not able to sleep that night. The following morning, at about four o'clock, MMM called Luzviminda
and petitioner to come to their house. MMM confronted Luzviminda about what petitioner did to her daughter,
and consequently, she demanded that AAA should be brought to a doctor for examination.18

CONTRARY TO LAW.8 MMM, together with Luzviminda, brought AAA to Dr. Lucifree Katalbas19 (Dr. Katalbas), the Rural Health Officer of
the locality who examined AAA and found no indication that she was molested.20 Refusing to accept such findings,
Upon arraignment on September 10, 1998, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.9 Thus, trial on the on December 12, 1996, MMM went to Dr. Joy Ann Jocson (Dr. Jocson), Medical Officer IV of the Bacolod City Health
merits ensued. In the course of the trial, two varying versions arose. Office. Dr. Jocson made an unofficial written report21 showing that there were "abrasions on both right and left of
the labia minora and a small laceration at the posterior fourchette." She also found that the minor injuries she saw
on AAA's genitals were relatively fresh; and that such abrasions were superficial and could disappear after a period
Version of the Prosecution
39
of 3 to 4 days. Dr. Jocson, however, indicated in her certification that her findings required the confirmation of the
Municipal Health Officer of the locality.
Subsequently, an amicable settlement22 was reached between the two families through the DAWN Foundation,
an organization that helps abused women and children. Part of the settlement required petitioner to depart from
their house to avoid contact with AAA.23 As such, petitioner stayed with a certain priest in the locality. However, a
few months later, petitioner went home for brief visits and in order to bring his dirty clothes for laundry. At the
sight of petitioner, AAA's father FFF was infuriated and confrontations occurred. At this instance, AAA's parents
went to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which assisted them in filing the three (3) counts of rape.
However, the prosecutor's office only filed the two (2) instant cases.
Version of the Defense
Petitioner was born on August 8, 1983 to spouses Loreto (Loreto) and Luzviminda Ortega. 24 He is the second child
of three siblings ― an elder brother and a younger sister. Petitioner denied the accusations made against him. He
testified that: his parents and AAA's parents were good friends; when MMM left AAA and her brothers to the care
of his mother, petitioner slept in a separate room together with BBB and CCC while AAA slept together with
Luzviminda and his younger sister; he never touched or raped AAA or showed his private parts to her; petitioner
did not threaten AAA in any instance; he did not rape AAA in the former's comfort room, but he merely
accompanied and helped AAA clean up as she defecated and feared the toilet bowl; in the process of washing, he
may have accidentally touched AAA's anus; on December 1, 1996, petitioner together with his parents, went to
AAA's house;25 they were dancing and playing together with all the other children at the time; while they were
dancing, petitioner hugged and lifted AAA up in a playful act, at the instance of which BBB ran and reported the
matter to MMM, who at the time was with Luzviminda, saying that petitioner and AAA were having sexual
intercourse;26petitioner explained to MMM that they were only playing, and that he could not have done to AAA
what he was accused of doing, as they were together with her brothers, and he treated AAA like a younger
sister;27 BBB was lying; AAA's parents and his parents did not get angry at him nor did they quarrel with each other;
petitioner and his parents peacefully left AAA's house at about nine o'clock in the evening; however, at about four
o'clock in the morning, petitioner and his parents were summoned by MMM to go to the latter's house; upon
arriving there they saw BBB being maltreated by his father as AAA pointed to BBB as the one who molested her;
and MMM and Luzviminda agreed to bring AAA to a doctor for examination.28
Luzviminda corroborated the testimony of her son. She testified that: her son was a minor at the time of the
incident; CCC and BBB were the children of MMM in her first marriage, while AAA and the rest of her siblings were
of the second marriage; CCC and BBB are half-brothers of AAA; when MMM entrusted AAA and her brothers to
her sometime in August of 1996, she slept with AAA and her youngest daughter in a separate room from petitioner;
on December 1, 1996, she was at AAA's house watching television and conversing with MMM, while FFF and Loreto
were having a drinking spree in the kitchen; from where they were seated, she could clearly see all the children,
including petitioner and AAA, playing and dancing in the dining area; she did not hear any unusual cry or noise at
the time; while they were conversing, BBB came to MMM saying that petitioner and AAA were having sexual
intercourse; upon hearing such statement, Luzviminda and MMM immediately stood up and looked for them, but
both mothers did not find anything unusual as all the children were playing and dancing in the dining area;
Luzviminda and MMM just laughed at BBB's statement; the parents of AAA, at that time, did not examine her in
order to verify BBB's statement nor did they get angry at petitioner or at them; and they peacefully left AAA's
house. However, the following day, MMM woke Luzviminda up, saying that FFF was spanking BBB with a belt as
AAA was pointing to BBB nor to petitioner as the one who molested her. At this instance, Luzviminda intervened,
telling FFF not to spank BBB but instead, to bring AAA to a doctor for examination. Luzviminda accompanied MMM
to Dr. Katalbas who found no indication that AAA was molested. She also accompanied her to Dr. Jocson. After
getting the results of the examination conducted by Dr. Jocson, they went to the police and at this instance only
did Luzviminda learn that MMM accused petitioner of raping AAA. Petitioner vehemently denied to Luzviminda
that he raped AAA. Thereafter, MMM and Luzviminda went to their employer who recommended that they should
seek advice from the Women's Center. At the said Center, both agreed on an amicable settlement wherein
petitioner would stay away from AAA. Thus, petitioner stayed with a certain priest in the locality for almost two
(2) years. But almost every Saturday, petitioner would come home to visit his parents and to bring his dirty clothes
for laundry. Every time petitioner came home, FFF bad-mouthed petitioner, calling him a rapist. Confrontations
occurred until an altercation erupted wherein FFF allegedly slapped Luzviminda. Subsequently, AAA's parents filed
the instant cases.29
The RTC's Ruling
On May 13, 1999, the RTC held that petitioner's defenses of denial cannot prevail over the positive identification
of petitioner as the perpetrator of the crime by AAA and BBB, who testified with honesty and credibility. Moreover,
the RTC opined that it could not perceive any motive for AAA's family to impute a serious crime of Rape to
petitioner, considering the close relations of both families. Thus, the RTC disposed of this case in this wise:
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused Joemar Ortega Y Felisario GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt as Principal by Direct Participation of the crime of RAPE as charged in Criminal Cases
Nos. 98-19083 and 98-19084 and there being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance, he is sentenced
to suffer the penalty of Two (2) Reclusion Temporal in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the accused shall be imprisoned for each case for a period of Six (6) years and One (1) day
of Prision Mayor, as minimum, to Fifteen (15) years of Reclusion Temporal, as maximum. The accused is
condemned to pay the offended party AAA, the sum of P100,000.00 as indemnification for the two (2)
rapes (sic).
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed the RTC Decision to the CA.30
Taking into consideration the age of petitioner and upon posting of the corresponding bail bond for his provisional
liberty in the amount of P40,000.00, the RTC ordered the petitioner's release pending appeal.31
The CA's Ruling
On October 26, 2000, the CA affirmed in toto the ruling of the RTC, holding that the petitioner's defense of denial
could not prevail over the positive identification of the petitioner by the victim AAA and her brother BBB, which
were categorical, consistent and without any showing of ill motive. The CA also held that the respective medical
examinations conducted by the two doctors were irrelevant, as it is established that the slightest penetration of
the lips of the female organ consummates rape; thus, hymenal laceration is not an element of rape. Moreover, the
CA opined that petitioner acted with discernment as shown by his covert acts. Finally, the CA accorded great weight
and respect to the factual findings of the RTC, particularly in the evaluation of the testimonies of witnesses.
Petitioner filed his Motion for Reconsideration32 of the assailed Decision which the CA denied in its
Resolution33 dated November 7, 2001.
40
Hence, this Petition based on the following grounds:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS OVERLOOKED CERTAIN FACTS OF SUBSTANCE AND VALUE
WHICH IF CONSIDERED MIGHT AFFECT THE RESULT OF THE CASE.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR WHEN IT FAILED TO APPRECIATE THE
MEDICAL FINDINGS OF DR. LUCIFREE KATALBAS.
III.
THE FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT, AFFIRMED BY THE APPELLATE COURT, THAT PETITIONER-
APPELLANT IN FACT COMMITTED AND IS CAPABLE OF COMMITTING THE ALLEGED RAPE WITHIN THE
RESIDENCE OF THE VICTIM WHERE SEVERAL OF THE ALLEGED VICTIM'S FAMILY MEMBERS AND THEIR
RESPECTIVE MOTHERS WERE PRESENT IS IMPROBABLE AND CONTRARY TO HUMAN EXPERIENCE.
IV.
THE HONORABLE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE FACTS SET FORTH BY THE ALLEGED
VICTIM REGARDING THE CIRCUMSTANCES ATTENDING THE COMMISSION OF RAPE SOMETIME IN
AUGUST 1996.34
Petitioner argues that, while it is true that the factual findings of the CA are conclusive on this Court, we are not
prevented from overturning such findings if the CA had manifestly overlooked certain facts of substance and value
which if considered might affect the result of the case. Petitioner stresses that from the testimonies of AAA and
BBB, it can be deduced that penetration was achieved; thus, AAA felt pain. Petitioner contends that assuming the
allegations of AAA are true that petitioner inserted his fingers and his penis into her vagina, certainly such acts
would leave certain abrasions, wounds and/or lacerations on the genitalia of AAA, taking into consideration her
age at the time and the alleged size of petitioner's penis. However, such allegation is completely belied by the
medical report of Dr. Katalbas who, one day after the alleged rape, conducted a medical examination on AAA and
found that there were no signs or indications that AAA was raped or molested. Petitioner submits that the CA
committed a grave error when it disregarded such medical report since it disproves the allegation of the existence
of rape and, consequently, the prosecution failed to prove its case; thus, the presumption of innocence in favor of
the petitioner subsists. Moreover, petitioner opines that like AAA, petitioner is also a child of the barrio who is
innocent, unsophisticated and lacks sexual experience. As such, it is incredible and contrary to human reason that
a 13- year-old boy would commit such act in the very dwelling of AAA, whose reaction to pain, at the age of six,
could not be controlled or subdued. Petitioner claims that poverty was MMM's motive in filing the instant case, as
she wanted to extort money from the parents of the petitioner. Petitioner points out that the medical report of
Dr. Jocson indicated that the abrasions that were inflicted on the genitalia of AAA were relatively fresh and the
same could disappear within a period of 3 to 4 days. Considering that Dr. Jocson conducted the medical
examination on December 12, 1996, or after the lapse of eleven (11) days after the alleged incident of rape, and
that AAA's parents only filed the instant case after almost a year, in order to deter Luzviminda from filing a case of
slander by deed against FFF, it is not inconceivable that MMM inflicted said abrasions on AAA to prove their case
and to depart from the initial confession of AAA that it was actually BBB who raped her. Finally, petitioner submits
that AAA and BBB were merely coached by MMM to fabricate these stories.35
On the other hand, respondent People of the Philippines through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends
that: the arguments raised by the petitioner are mere reiterations of his disquisitions before the CA; the RTC, as
affirmed by the CA, did not rely on the testimonies of both doctors since despite the absence of abrasions, rape is
consummated even with the slightest penetration of the lips of the female organ; what is relevant in this case is
the reliable testimony of AAA that petitioner raped her in August and December of 1996; even in the absence of
force, rape was committed considering AAA's age at that time; as such, AAA did not have any ill motive in accusing
petitioner; and it is established that the crime of rape could be committed even in the presence of other people
nearby. Moreover, the OSG relies on the doctrine that the evaluation made by a trial court is accorded the highest
respect as it had the opportunity to observe directly the demeanor of a witness and to determine whether said
witness was telling the truth or not. Lastly, the OSG claims that petitioner acted with discernment when he
committed the said crime, as manifested in his covert acts.36
However, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9344,37 or the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006, was enacted into law on
April 28, 2006 and it took effect on May 20, 2006.38 The law establishes a comprehensive system to manage
children in conflict with the law39 (CICL) and children at risk40 with child-appropriate procedures and
comprehensive programs and services such as prevention, intervention, diversion, rehabilitation, re-integration
and after-care programs geared towards their development. In order to ensure its implementation, the law,
particularly Section 841 thereof, has created the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Council (JJWC) and vested it with
certain duties and functions42 such as the formulation of policies and strategies to prevent juvenile delinquency
and to enhance the administration of juvenile justice as well as the treatment and rehabilitation of the CICL. The
law also
provides for the immediate dismissal of cases of CICL, specifically Sections 64, 65, 66, 67 and 68 of R.A. No. 9344's
Transitory Provisions.43
The said Transitory Provisions expressly provide:
Title VIII
Transitory Provisions
SECTION 64. Children in Conflict with the Law Fifteen (15) Years Old and Below. — Upon effectivity of this
Act, cases of children fifteen (15) years old and below at the time of the commission of the crime shall
immediately be dismissed and the child shall be referred to the appropriate local social welfare and
development officer. Such officer, upon thorough assessment of the child, shall determine whether to
release the child to the custody of his/her parents, or refer the child to prevention programs, as provided
under this Act. Those with suspended sentences and undergoing rehabilitation at the youth
rehabilitation center shall likewise be released, unless it is contrary to the best interest of the child.
SECTION 65. Children Detained Pending Trial. — If the child is detained pending trial, the Family Court
shall also determine whether or not continued detention is necessary and, if not, determine appropriate
41
 alternatives for detention. If detention is necessary and he/she is detained with adults, the court shall
immediately order the transfer of the child to a youth detention home.
SECTION 66. Inventory of "Locked-up" and Detained Children in Conflict with the Law. — The PNP, the
BJMP and the BUCOR are hereby directed to submit to the JJWC, within ninety (90) days from the
effectivity of this Act, an inventory of all children in conflict with the law under their custody.
SECTION 67. Children Who Reach the Age of Eighteen (18) Years Pending Diversion and Court
Proceedings. — If a child reaches the age of eighteen (18) years pending diversion and court proceedings,
the appropriate diversion authority in consultation with the local social welfare and development officer
or the Family Court in consultation with the Social Services and Counseling Division (SSCD) of the
Supreme Court, as the case may be, shall determine the appropriate disposition. In case the appropriate
court executes the judgment of conviction, and unless the child in conflict with the law has already
availed of probation under Presidential Decree No. 603 or other similar laws, the child may apply for
probation if qualified under the provisions of the Probation Law.
SECTION 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving Sentences. — Persons who have been
convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this Act, and who were below the age
of eighteen (18) years at the time of the commission of the offense for which they were convicted and
are serving sentence, shall likewise benefit from the retroactive application of this Act. They shall be
entitled to appropriate dispositions provided under this Act and their sentences shall be adjusted
accordingly. They shall be immediately released if they are so qualified under this Act or other applicable
laws.
Ostensibly, the only issue that requires resolution in this case is whether or not petitioner is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape as found by both the RTC and the CA. However, with the advent of R.A. No.
9344 while petitioner's case is pending before this Court, a new issue arises, namely, whether the pertinent
provisions of R.A. No. 9344 apply to petitioner's case, considering that at the time he committed the alleged rape,
he was merely 13 years old.
In sum, we are convinced that petitioner committed the crime of rape against AAA. In a prosecution for rape, the
complainant's candor is the single most important factor. If the complainant's testimony meets the test of
credibility, the accused can be convicted solely on that basis.44 The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, did not doubt AAA's
credibility, and found no ill motive for her to charge petitioner of the heinous crime of rape and to positively
identify him as the malefactor. Both courts also accorded respect to BBB's testimony that he saw petitioner having
sexual intercourse with his younger sister. While petitioner asserts that AAA's poverty is enough motive for the
imputation of the crime, we discard such assertion for no mother or father like MMM and FFF would stoop so low
as to subject their daughter to the tribulations and the embarrassment of a public trial knowing that such a
traumatic experience would damage their daughter's psyche and mar her life if the charge is not true.45 We find
petitioner's claim that MMM inflicted the abrasions found by Dr. Jocson in the genitalia of AAA, in order to extort
money from petitioner’s parents, highly incredible. Lastly, it must be noted that in most cases of rape committed
against young girls like AAA who was only 6 years old then, total penetration of the victim's organ is improbable
due to the small vaginal opening. Thus, it has been held that actual penetration of the victim's organ or rupture of
the hymen is not required.46 Therefore, it is not necessary for conviction that the petitioner succeeded in having
full penetration, because the slightest touching of the lips of the female organ or of the labia of the pudendum
constitutes rape.47
However, for one who acts by virtue of any of the exempting circumstances, although he commits a crime, by the
complete absence of any of the conditions which constitute free will or voluntariness of the act, no criminal liability
arises.48 Therefore, while there is a crime committed, no criminal liability attaches. Thus, in Guevarra v.
Almodovar,49 we held:
[I]t is worthy to note the basic reason behind the enactment of the exempting circumstances embodied
in Article 12 of the RPC; the complete absence of intelligence, freedom of action, or intent, or on the
absence of negligence on the part of the accused. In expounding on intelligence as the second element
of dolus, Albert has stated:
"The second element of dolus is intelligence; without this power, necessary to determine the
morality of human acts to distinguish a licit from an illicit act, no crime can exist, and because
. . . the infant (has) no intelligence, the law exempts (him) from criminal liability."
It is for this reason, therefore, why minors nine years of age and below are not capable of performing a
criminal act.
In its Comment50 dated April 24, 2008, the OSG posited that petitioner is no longer covered by the provisions of
Section 64 of R.A. No. 9344 since as early as 1999, petitioner was convicted by the RTC and the conviction was
affirmed by the CA in 2001. R.A. No. 9344 was passed into law in 2006, and with the petitioner now approximately
25 years old, he no longer qualifies as a child as defined by R.A. No. 9344. Moreover, the OSG claimed that the
retroactive effect of Section 64 of R.A. No. 9344 is applicable only if the child-accused is still below 18 years old as
explained under Sections 67 and 68 thereof. The OSG also asserted that petitioner may avail himself of the
provisions of Section 3851 of R.A. No. 9344 providing for automatic suspension of sentence if finally found guilty.
Lastly, the OSG argued that while it is a recognized principle that laws favorable to the accused may be given
retroactive application, such principle does not apply if the law itself provides for conditions for its application.
We are not persuaded.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344 clearly and explicitly provides:
SECTION 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. — A child fifteen (15) years of age or under at the
time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability. However, the child shall be
subjected to an intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of this Act.
A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise be exempt from
criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention program, unless he/she has acted with discernment,
in which case, such child shall be subjected to the appropriate proceedings in accordance with this Act.
The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include exemption from civil liability,
which shall be enforced in accordance with existing laws.
Likewise, Section 64 of the law categorically provides that cases of children 15 years old and below, at the time of
the commission of the crime, shall immediately be dismissed and the child shall be referred to the appropriate
local social welfare and development officer (LSWDO). What is controlling, therefore, with respect to the
42
exemption from criminal liability of the CICL, is not the CICL's age at the time of the promulgation of judgment but
the CICL's age at the time of the commission of the offense. In short, by virtue of R.A. No. 9344, the age of criminal
irresponsibility has been raised from 9 to 15 years old.52
Given this precise statutory declaration, it is imperative that this Court accord retroactive application to the
aforequoted provisions of R.A. No. 9344 pursuant to the well-entrenched principle in criminal law - favorabilia sunt
amplianda adiosa restrigenda. Penal laws which are favorable to the accused are given retroactive effect.53 This
principle is embodied in Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides:
Art. 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws. — Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor
the persons guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article
62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws, a final sentence has been
pronounced and the convict is serving the same.
We also have extant jurisprudence that the principle has been given expanded application in certain instances
involving special laws.54 R.A. No. 9344 should be no exception.
In fact, the legislative intent for R.A. No. 9344's retroactivity is even patent from the deliberations on the bill in the
Senate, quoted as follows:
Sections 67-69 On Transitory Provisions
Senator Santiago. In Sections 67 to 69 on Transitory Provisions, pages 34 to 35, may I humbly propose
that we should insert, after Sections 67 to 69, the following provision:
ALL CHILDREN WHO DO NOT HAVE CRIMINAL LIABILITY UNDER THIS LAW PENDING THE CREATION OF
THE OFFICE OF JUVENILE WELFARE AND RESTORATION (OJWR) AND THE LOCAL COUNCIL FOR THE
PROTECTION OF CHILDREN (LCPC) WITHIN A YEAR, SHALL BE IMMEDIATELY TRANSFERRED TO DSWD
INSTITUTIONS, AND DSWD SHALL UNDERTAKE DIVERSION PROGRAMS FOR THEM, PRIORITIZING THE
YOUNGER CHILDREN BELOW 15 YEARS OF AGE AND THE LIGHTER OFFENSES.
The only question will be: Will the DSWD have enough facilities for these adult offenders?
Senator Pangilinan, Mr. President, according to the CWC, the DSWD does not have the capability at the
moment. It will take time to develop the capacity.
Senator Santiago. Well, we can say that they shall be transferred whenever the facilities are ready.
Senator Pangilinan. Yes. Mr. President, just a clarification. When we speak here of children who do not
have criminal liability under this law, we are referring here to those who currently have criminal
liability, but because of the retroactive effect of this measure, will now be exempt. It is quite confusing.
Senator Santiago. That is correct.
Senator Pangilinan. In other words, they should be released either to their parents or through a diversion
program, Mr. President. That is my understanding.
Senator Santiago. Yes, that is correct. But there will have to be a process of sifting before that. That is
why I was proposing that they should be given to the DSWD, which will conduct the sifting process,
except that apparently, the DSWD does not have the physical facilities.
Senator Pangilinan. Mr. President, conceptually, we have no argument. We will now have to just craft it
to ensure that the input raised earlier by the good Senator is included and the capacity of the DSWD to
be able to absorb these individuals. Likewise, the issue should also be incorporated in the amendment.
The President. Just a question from the Chair. The moment this law becomes effective, all those
children in conflict with the law, who were convicted in the present Penal Code, for example, who will
now not be subject to incarceration under this law, will be immediately released. Is that the
understanding?
Senator Pangilinan. Yes, Mr. President.
Senator Santiago. They would immediately fall under . . . .
Senator Pangilinan. The diversion requirements, Mr. President.
Senator Santiago. Yes.
The President. But since the facilities are not yet available, what will happen to them?
Senator Santiago. Well, depending on their age, which has not yet been settled . . . . . provides, for
example, for conferencing family mediation, negotiation, apologies, censure, et cetera. These
methodologies will apply. They do not necessarily have to remain in detention.
Senator Pangilinan. Yes, that is correct, Mr. President. But it will still require some sort of infrastructure,
meaning, manpower. The personnel from the DSWD will have to address the counseling. So, there must
be a transition in terms of building the capacity and absorbing those who will benefit from this measure.
The President. Therefore, that should be specifically provided for as an amendment.
Senator Pangilinan. That is correct, Mr. President.
The President. All right. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the Santiago amendment is
accepted.55
xxxx
43
PIMENTEL AMENDMENTS
xxxx
Senator Pimentel.
xxxx
Now, considering that laws are normally prospective, Mr. President, in their application, I would like to
suggest to the Sponsor if he could incorporate some kind of a transitory provision that would make
this law apply also to those who might already have been convicted but are awaiting, let us say,
execution of their penalties as adults when, in fact, they are juveniles.
Senator Pangilinan. Yes, Mr. President. We do have a provision under the Transitory Provisions wherein
we address the issue raised by the good Senator, specifically, Section 67. For example, "Upon
effectivity of this Act, cases of children fifteen (15) years old and below at the time of the commission
of the crime shall immediately be dismissed and the child shall be referred to the appropriate local
social welfare and development officer." So that would be giving retroactive effect.
Senator Pimentel. Of cases that are still to be prosecuted.
Senator Pangilinan. Yes.
Senator Pimentel. What about those that have already been prosecuted? I was trying to cite the instance
of juvenile offenders erroneously convicted as adults awaiting execution.
Senator Pangilinan. Mr. President, we are willing to include that as an additional amendment, subject to
style.
Senator Pimentel. I would certainly appreciate that because that is a reality that we have to address,
otherwise injustice will really be . . .
Senator Pangilinan. Yes, Mr. President, we would also include that as a separate provision.
The President. In other words, even after final conviction if, in fact, the offender is able to prove that at
the time of the commission of the offense he is a minor under this law, he should be given the benefit
of the law.
Senator Pimentel. Yes, Mr. President. That is correct.
Senator Pangilinan. Yes, Mr. President. We accept that proposed amendment.56
The Court is bound to enforce this legislative intent, which is the dominant factor in interpreting a statute.
Significantly, this Court has declared in a number of cases, that intent is the soul of the law, viz.:
The intent of a statute is the law. If a statute is valid it is to have effect according to the purpose and
intent of the lawmaker. The intent is the vital part, the essence of the law, and the primary rule of
construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent. The intention of the legislature in enacting a
law is the law itself, and must be enforced when ascertained, although it may not be consistent with the
strict letter of the statute. Courts will not follow the letter of a statute when it leads away from the true
intent and purpose of the legislature and to conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the
act. Intent is the spirit which gives life to
a legislative enactment. In construing statutes the proper course is to start out and follow the true intent of the
legislature and to adopt that sense which harmonizes best with the context and promotes in the fullest manner
the apparent policy and objects of the legislature.57
Moreover, penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the accused.58 In this case, the plain meaning of R.A. No.
9344's unambiguous language, coupled with clear lawmakers' intent, is most favorable to herein petitioner. No
other interpretation is justified, for the simple language of the new law itself demonstrates the legislative intent
to favor the CICL.
It bears stressing that the petitioner was only 13 years old at the time of the commission of the alleged rape. This
was duly proven by the certificate of live birth, by petitioner's own testimony, and by the testimony of his mother.
Furthermore, petitioner’s age was never assailed in any of the proceedings before the RTC and the CA. Indubitably,
petitioner, at the time of the commission of the crime, was below 15 years of age. Under R.A. No. 9344, he is
exempted from criminal liability.
However, while the law exempts petitioner from criminal liability for the two (2) counts of rape committed against
AAA, Section 6 thereof expressly provides that there is no concomitant exemption from civil liability. Accordingly,
this Court sustains the ruling of the RTC, duly affirmed by the CA, that petitioner and/or his parents are liable to
pay AAA P100,000.00 as civil indemnity. This award is in the nature of actual or compensatory damages, and is
mandatory upon a conviction for rape.
The RTC, however, erred in not separately awarding moral damages, distinct from the civil indemnity awarded to
the rape victim. AAA is entitled to moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 for each count of rape, pursuant
to Article 2219 of the Civil Code, without the necessity of additional pleading or proof other than the fact of rape.
Moral damages are granted in recognition of the victim's injury necessarily resulting from the odious crime of
rape.59
A final note. While we regret the delay, we take consolation in the fact that a law intended to protect our children
from the harshness of life and to alleviate, if not cure, the ills of the growing number of CICL and children at risk in
our country, has been enacted by Congress. However, it has not escaped us that major concerns have been raised
on the effects of the law. It is worth mentioning that in the Rationale for the Proposed Rule on Children Charged
under R.A. No. 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, it was found that:
44
 The passage of Republic Act No. 9344 or the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 raising the age of
criminal irresponsibility from 9 years old to 15 years old has compounded the problem of employment
of children in the drug trade several times over. Law enforcement authorities, Barangay Kagawads and
the police, most particularly, complain that drug syndicates have become more aggressive in using
children 15 years old or below as couriers or foot soldiers in the drug trade. They claim that Republic Act
No. 9344 has rendered them ineffective in the faithful discharge of their duties in that they are
proscribed from taking into custody children 15 years old or below who openly flaunt possession, use
and delivery or distribution of illicit drugs, simply because their age exempts them from criminal liability
under the new law. 60

The Court is fully cognizant that our decision in the instant case effectively exonerates petitioner of rape, a heinous
crime committed against AAA who was only a child at the tender age of six (6) when she was raped by the
petitioner, and one who deserves the law’s greater protection. However, this consequence is inevitable because
of the language of R.A. No. 9344, the wisdom of which is not subject to review by this Court.61 Any perception that
the result reached herein appears unjust or unwise should be addressed to Congress. Indeed, the Court has no
discretion to give statutes a meaning detached from the manifest intendment and language of the law. Our task is
constitutionally confined only to applying the law and jurisprudence to the proven facts, and we have done so in
this case.62

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Criminal Case Nos. 98-19083 and 98-19084 filed against petitioner Joemar
F. Ortega are hereby DISMISSED. Petitioner is hereby referred to the local social welfare and development officer
of the locality for the appropriate intervention program. Nevertheless, the petitioner is hereby ordered to pay
private complainant AAA, civil indemnity in the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) and moral
damages in the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00). No costs.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the two Houses of Congress and the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Council
(JJWC).

SO ORDERED.

45
 deep thought and claimed of seeing a devil. He was brought to UST hospital on March, 1986
for psychiatric treatment. Impression then was Paranoid Disorder with Reactive Psychosis. He
G.R. No. 96832 November 19, 1992 was given Tranquilizers and was managed as an out patient. However, he did not come back
for check-up as he was noted at home to be asymptomatic.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. On October 26, 1988, he allegedly stabbed his wife to death with a knife due to his jealousy.
TEOTIMO DANAO @ "TIMO", accused-appellant. He was apprehended by police authorities and was put to jail charge with Parricide. While in
jail, oddities in behavior recurred. Because of these, he was brought here per commitment
order coming from the court for physical and mental examination.

The recommendation of the National Center for Mental health was treat and confine appellant, as they found him
NOCON, J.:
to be "still psychotic or insane" and as such incompetent to stand the rigors of a court trial. 5

Forever to be etched in Teotimo Danao's mind and soul is the gruesome killing of his wife, upon whom he himself
However, five months later, specifically on August 24, 1989, a petition for release was filed by the National Center
inflicted no less than thirty two (32) stab wounds on her lifeless body.
for Mental health as the accused had shown considerable improvement and is now competent to stand trial. Its
findings are as follows:
It was about 9 to 10 o'clock in the morning of October 26, 1988, when Victorio Sunga, brother-in-law of Ruby
Guintu Danao (now deceased) arrived in his house and received the unexpected news about the death of his sister-
In view of the foregoing mental and physical examinations and observations, patient Teotimo
in-law, Ruby. He proceeded to the house of accused-appellant which was located about fifty (50) meters away
Danao y Manansala, he was found suffering from a mental disorder called Schizophrenia or
from his residence and saw appellant by the window holding a bolo. Victorio Sunga asked herein appellant what
insanity, manifestation of which have been mentioned in the previous report rendered to the
happened and the latter replied that he killed his wife, Ruby and by reason of which he considers himself a
Honorable Court.
criminal.1

At present, he showed considerable improvement and the Forensic Medical Staff believes the
At about the same time, Vicente Guintu, Sr., father of the deceased was informed by one of his grandsons, that
patient is now competent to stand trial.
their mother was killed by their father. He immediately proceeded to the house of herein appellant and the latter
said to him, "Come here, I will not call you father anymore only Enteng. 2
It is respectfully prayed for the Honorable Court to grant us the authority to transfer patient
to his court of origin for proper disposition of his case.
Victorio Sunga pleaded to the appellant to surrender himself, which the latter did, throwing two kitchen knives
made of stainless steel. Subsequently, appellant came down from the house and surrendered himself to the
barangay officials." 3 Likewise, it is recommended that patient should undergo regular monthly follow-up at the
Patient Service of this hospital to prevent recurrence of his mental illness. 6
The National Center for mental health gave a brief background history 4 on the mental health of the accused in its
report dated March 30, 1989, after the latter has killed his wife, to wit: The third of the ten (10) children of appellant, by the name of Maritess Danao testified that on the morning of
October 26, 1988, she got up at 5 o'clock in the morning and was asked by her mother to buy a box of matches.
When Maritess returned with the box of matches, she noticed her father holding her second youngest sister. A
xxx xxx xxx
few hours later, she went to her grandparents house which is five (5) houses away from their residence to fetch
water. 7It was at the moment when one of her brothers, Ricky Danao, who was on the first floor of their house,
Sometime in 1981 he went to Saudi Arabia to work in a construction firm for two years. When noticed that his father got hold of a bolo and went straight upstairs. Though Ricky was downstairs, he witnessed
he came home in 1983 he became disappointed when he found out that much of the money his father stab his mother because the flooring of their house is made of bamboo slats of one (1) inch apart. 8
he was sending to his family have gone up in smoke due to wife and brother-in-law's spending
spree. He confronted his wife but she told him that the money was used for the payment of
When Maritess Danao was about to return to their house, she was met by Ricky Danao who told her that their
hospital bills when their youngest child got sick. He felt bad about this but kept it to himself.
father killed their mother. On their way out of their grandparents' house, they were met by their other brother
and sister who were all bloodied.
Behavioral changes were noted sometime in 1986 after he had a misunderstanding with his
cousin when the latter threatened to harm him with a gun. He became frightened and went
As a result of this incident, appellant Teotimo Danao was charged with the crime of Parricide before the Regional
into hiding for two days. Upon returning home, he was observed to be sleepless, anxious, in
Trial Court of Macabebe, Pampanga under an Information 9 which reads:
46
 That on or about the 26th day of October, 1988 in Barangay Esteban, municipality of
Macabebe, Province of Pampanga, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused Teotimo Danao y Manansala @ "Timo", with intent to kill and
armed with two (2) kitchen knives, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
assault, attack and stab Ruby Guintu-Danao, his legitimate wife, thereby inflicting upon her
mortal and fatal injuries which directly caused her death shortly thereafter.
All contrary to law.
After a trial on the merits, the lower court rendered a decision 10 finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime charged, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty as above stated, the Court hereby renders judgment
sentencing the accused as follows:
1. To suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and the accessories of the law;
2. To indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P17,000.00 as compensatory and actual
damages;
3. To pay likewise the heirs of the victim the amount of P30,000.00 as moral damages; and
4. To pay the amount of P10,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
Accused-appellant interposes as his defense the exempting circumstance of insanity.
We are not convinced.
The nature of insanity may be gleaned from the definition of insane persons in Section 1039 of the Revised
Administrative Code which provides:
Insanity is a manifestation in language or conduct of disease or defect of the brain, or more or
less permanently diseased or disordered condition of the mentality, functional or organic, and
characterized by perversion, inhibition, or disordered function of the sensory or of the
intellective faculties, or by impaired or disordered volition.
Article 800 of the Civil Code provides:
The law presumes that every person is of sound mind, in the absence of proof to the contrary.
The allegation of insanity must be clearly proved. The law presumes all acts to be voluntary. Not every aberration
of the mind or exhibition of mental deficiency is insanity.
As held in People vs. Puno: 11
Insanity under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code means that the accused must be deprived
completely of reason or discernment and freedom of the will at the time of committing the
crime (People vs. Formigones, 87 Phil. 658, 660).
Insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that
is, the accused is deprived of reason, he acts without the least discernment because there is
complete absence of the power to discern, or there is a total deprivation of freedom of the
will. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability. (People vs. Ambal,
G.R. No. 52688, October 17, 1980; People vs. Renegado, L-27031, May 31, 1974, 57 SCRA 275,
286; People vs. Cruz, 109 Phil. 288, 292).
When insanity is alleged as a ground for exemption from criminal responsibility, the evidence on this point must
refer to the time preceding the act under prosecution or to the very moment of its execution. 12 If the evidence
pointed to insanity subsequent to the commission of the crime, the accused cannot be acquitted. he is presumed
to be sane when he committed it.
The quantum of evidence required to overthrow the presumption of sanity is proof beyond reasonable
doubt. 13Insanity is a defense in the nature of a confession and avoidance, and as such must be proved beyond
reasonable doubt.
Appellant contends that Dra. Santiago's declaration as to his insanity was also corroborated by the testimony of
Dr. Johnvert R. Jimenez, resident physician of the Center. As further contended, the testimonies of Dra. Santiago
and Dr. Jimenez were supported by the antecedent fact that appellant was examined for mental disorder at the
University of Sto. Tomas, Manila, prior to the commission of the crime charged as testified to by his children,
Maritess and Rick Danao. In short, appellant submits that he was insane, with complete absence of power to
discern, and totally deprived of the freedom of will when he committed the crime.
The foregoing contentions do not deserve merit.
As the records will show, Dr. Jimenez just made an initial examination on the mental condition of the appellant
after he was admitted at the Center. He testified:
Atty. Silvestre:
Q Now, Mr. Witness, in your residency at the National Center for Mental
health, do you recall whether you treated a person by the name of Teotimo
Danao?
Dr. Johnevert Jimenez:
47
 A Yes, sir, I was the initial attending physician of that patient.
Q When did you first attend to this patient by the name of Teotimo Danao?
A From the time he was admitted sometime in November 1988 until March
when I submitted my initial court report.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Mr. witness, you said that you examined the patient while he was
confined at the National Center for Mental Health, after this first
endorsement which is dated March 30, 1989 recommending for further
treatment, did you further examine the patient?
A. No, sir, Dr. Avelina (sic) Medrano-Medina was the next attending
physician of Teotimo Danao. 14
The participation of Dra. Sylvia B. Santiago, Chief Forensic Psychiatry Service of the Center, was merely to indorse
the "Report on the mental and physical condition of patient Teotimo Danao y Manansala" dated March 30, 1989
(Exhibit "1-A", "1-B" and "1-C") jointly signed by Dr. Johnevert R. Jimenez and Dr. Nicanor L. Echavez as shown in
her 1st Indorsement (Exhibit "1") which contained the following:
Respectfully forwarded to the honorable Judge, Municipal Trial Court, Masantol-Macabebe,
Masantol, Pampanga the enclosed clinical case report on the mental and physical condition of
patient TEOTIMO DANAO Y MANANSALA accused in Criminal Case No. 88-133, in compliance
with the order of this Court. 15
Dra. Santiago merely indorsed the "Follow-up report on the present mental and physical condition of patient
TEOTIMO Y MANANSALA, etc." dated August 24, 1989 (Exhibit "2", "3-A", "3-B", "3-C" and "3-D") jointly signed by
Dra. Adelita Medrano-Medina and Dr. Isagani S. Gonzales as can be shown in her 1st Indorsement of even date
which also contained the following:
Respectfully forwarded to the Honorable Judge, Municipal Trial Court Masantol-Macabebe,
Masantol, Pampanga the enlisted clinical case report on the mental and physical condition of
patient TEOTIMO DANAO Y MANANSALA accused in Criminal Case No. 88-133, in compliance
with order of this court. 16
Clearly, Dra. Santiago did not actually examine the mental condition of the appellant during his confinement for
alleged insanity at the Center.
The testimonies of the two doctors, Dra. Sylvia Santiago and Dr. Johnevert Jimenez seemingly were influenced by
the disclosure of the appellant of his previous consultation at the UST Hospital sometime in 1986. They did not
examine the accused before October 26, 1988, the date when he killed his wife, but after the killing. At the UST
Hospital on March. 1986, appellant was merely given tranquilizers and was treated as an out patient. Thus, DR.
Jimenez testified as follows:
Atty. Silvestre:
Q Now, Mr. Witness, the alleged crime took place sometime on October
26, 1988 and based on your examination of the patient, did you find out
from the patient whether prior to that he was already sick of that ailment
which is mental disorder?
Dr. Johnevert Jimenez:
A Yes, sir. Upon interviews, the patient relates that was sometime in 1986
wherein admissive behavior were observed that he was brought to the UST
Hospital for psychotic examination or consultation and he was given
psychosis medication but he did not come back for follow-up treatment.
Then sometime in October 1988, he allegedly stabbed his wife. So based
on our findings we believed that the patient was suffering from psychosis
before, during and after the commission of the crime. 17
During cross-examination, Dr. Jimenez testified that appellant was found to have no record of any previous
admission at the National Center for Mental Health. He further testified:
Court:
Q Doctor, you will agree with the Court that Teotimo Danao was first
admitted at the hospital, you had no record that he was previously
confined there for examination.
Dr. Jimenez:
A Yes, your honor.
Q You will also agree with the Court that in accordance with your
examination his control of his impulse is weak?
A Yes, your honor.
Q And he could easily overwhelm by emotions?
A Based on the mental status, yes, your honor.
Q With the agreement with the Court you will also agree that a person
overwhelm by emotions maybe sane but is only overwhelm by emotions?
48
 A It could be a part of the symptoms, your honor. 18 Q You answered the question with respect to matters you know?

It is the impression of this Court that the appellant is purporting insanity to exculpate himself from his criminal
liability.
Fiscal Agpawa.
Q Mr. Witness, it was only after the death of your wife that you were
treated at the National Mental Hospital. Is that it?
A Yes, sir. 19
In the case at bar, there is no clear and convincing evidence that appellant was insane during the commission of
the crime. The fact is, prior to the commission of the crime, appellant was engaged in fishing and was a "jueteng"
collector for the last two years. Victorio Sunga testified:
Fiscal Pangilinan:

Teotimo Danao: Q What is the name of the husband of Ruby Danao?

A What I remember I was already being checked up at the UST Hospital Victorio Sunga:
before the death of my wife, sir.
A Teotimo Danao, sir.
Q But you were only committed at the national Mental Hospital after the
death of your wife? xxx xxx xxx

A I do not know, sir. Q Do you know that occupation of vocation of the accused Teotimo
Danao?
Fiscal Agpawa:
A Yes, sir.
That is all, your Honor.
Q What was his work?
Court:
A He is a fisherman "mamalakaya".
Q You know that you were admitted to the National Mental Hospital?
Q Where does he exercise is (sic) profession or vocation?
A I do not know why I was brought there, sir.
A In the sea, sir.
Q You will admit that you were brought there?
Q For how long have you know the accused engaged in fishing at the sea?
Q When I woke up I just discovered that I was at the National Mental
Hospital. A Since he got married.

A. Were you interviewed there? Q Aside from fishing do you know if ever the accused is engaged in any
occupation?
A Yes, sir.
A Yes, sir.
Q And you answered questions?
Q What kind of was he engaged aside from fishing?
A Yes, sir.

49
 xxx xxx xxx The trial court had the privilege of examining the deportment and demeanor of the witnesses and therefore, it can
discern if such witnesses were telling the truth or not.24
A He is a collector in "weteng" sir.
Moreover, the state should guard against sane murderers escaping punishment through a general plea of
Q Where does he exercise that "weteng" collector? insanity. 25

A In San Esteban, Macabebe, Pampanga, sir. The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender however, should be considered in favor of the appellant. His
surrender to the barangay officials 26 was spontaneous in such manner that it shows the intent of the accused to
surrender unconditionally to the authorities, either because he acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to save them
xxx xxx xxx
the trouble and expense necessarily incurred in his search and capture.

Q For how long have you known him engaged in weteng collector?
A Maybe, sir, for two years already. sir. 20
Maritess Danao likewise testified:
Under Article 63, par. 2 (3) of the Revised Penal Code, it provides that in all cases in which the law prescribes a
penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, like reclusion perpetua to death, the penalty of parricide (Article
246), and there is present one (1) mitigating circumstance with no aggravating circumstance to affect the same,
the lesser penalty shall be applied, which in this case is reclusion perpetua. The penalty imposed by the trial court
is correct except that the indemnity be P50,000.00. 27

Fiscal Pangilinan: WHEREFORE, the guilt of the accused-appellant Teotimo Danao having been proved beyond reasonable doubt and
there being no reversible error in the decision appealed herefrom, the same is hereby AFFIRMED with the
Q What was the occupation or vocation of your father before October 26, modification that the indemnity to be paid by the appellant is hereby increased to P50,000.
1988?
SO ORDERED.
Maritess Danao:
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Regalado and Campos, Jr., JJ., concur.
A He was a jueteng bet collector, sir.

Q Of your own personal knowledge when was the last date that your father
engaged in jueteng be Collecting?

A A few days before the incident my father has stopped collecting jueteng
bet and mother was the one who collected jueteng bet then.

Q How long was your father was collecting jueteng before he stopped?

A For quite a time already, sir. 21

The evidence before Us says that appellant was not insane during the commission of the crime. Insanity must be
clearly and satisfactorily proved in order to acquit an accused on the ground of insanity. 22 In the absence of such
proof, it will be presumed that the offender committed the crime when he was sane. The presumption is in favor
of sanity. The defense must prove insanity beyond reasonable doubt. 23

It has been repeatedly held that conclusions and findings of fact by the trial court are entitled to great weight on
appeal and should not be disturbed unless for strong and congent reasons because the trial court is in a better
position to examine real evidence, as well as to observe the demeanor of witnesses while testifying in the case.
50
G.R. Nos. 99259-60 March 29, 1996
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EMILIO SANTOS Y DELGADO, accused-appellant.
FRANCISCO, J.:p
The rationale behind the whole concept of mitigating circumstances is to show mercy and some extent of leniency
in favor of an accused who has nevertheless shown lesser perversity in the commission of an offense. 1 Thus, where
the evidence on record bespeaks vileness and depravity, no mercy nor leniency should be accorded an accused
who should be made to suffer in full for acts perpetrated with complete voluntariness and intent for their tragic
consequences.
This is an appeal from the decision of Branch XLIX of the Regional Trial Court of Manila convicting appellant of the
crimes of murder and frustrated murder as follows:
1. In "People versus Emilio Santos". Criminal Case No. 90-80422, the Court finds the accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as principal for (sic) the crime of "Murder" defined in and
penalized by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and there being no other modifying
circumstances attendant thereto, hereby metes on the said Accused the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA, with all the accessory penalties of the law and hereby condemns him to pay to the
heirs of the deceased Valentino Guevarra the amount of P7,500.00 as actual damages and the
amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity or moral damages.
2. In "People versus Emilio Santos". Criminal Case No. 90-80423, the Court finds the accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of "Frustrated Murder" and there being no other
modifying circumstances attendant thereto, hereby imposes on said Accused an indeterminate
penalty of from Eight (8) Years and Twenty (20) Days of Prision Mayor, to Twelve (12) Years,
Five (5) Months and Eleven (11) Days of Reclusion Temporal and to pay to Francisco Lacsa the
total amount of P22,000.00 as actual damages and P25,000.00 as indemnity and moral
damages. 2
Appellant does not assail his conviction of the crimes aforementioned but assigns as errors in the instant
appeal, the failure of the trial court to consider in his favor the ordinary mitigating circumstance of
immediate vindication of a grave offense committed against an ascendant and the privileged mitigating
circumstance of incomplete defense of a relative. 3
As may be culled from the testimony of prosecution witness Francisco Lacsa, the antecedent facts are as follows:
At around 6:00 o'clock in the evening of October 22, 1989, Francisco Lacsa was suddenly awakened from his sleep
by the arrival of his close friend and compadre, Valentino Guevarra. Surprised to see Valentino in a torn and
bloodstained shirt, Francisco asked him what happened, and the latter replied that earlier, he had a
misunderstanding with appellant's father, Emmanuel Santos. Valentino requested Francisco to intervene in
settling his dispute with Emmanuel, and Francisco, being a Barangay Tanod and knowing Emmanuel personally,
readily acceded. Both Francisco and Valentino proceeded to the house of Emmanuel for the sole purpose of talking
to him but were greeted by the latter with a bow and arrow pointed at them. Fearing for their lives, Francisco and
Valentine retreated and ran towards the corner of Laong-Laan and Dela Fuente Streets with Emmanuel and his
daughter; Elizabeth, in close pursuit. After running a distance of some fifty (50) meters, a tricycle carrying
appellant, his brother, Dionisio and two unidentified men overtook them. The said persons alighted from the
tricycle and approached Francisco and Valentino. Dionisio who was armed with a jungle bolo attacked Valentino
hacking him on the thigh and causing him to fall face down. Thereupon, appellant who was wielding a samurai,
lifted the wounded body of Valentino, turned him ower and repeatedly stabbed and hacked the latter. The two
unidentified men who were armed with ordinary knives also took turns in stabbing Valentino. Meanwhile,
Emmanuel had arrived at the scene of the crime and pointed his bow and arrow at Francisco, rendering the latter
immobile and unable to stave off the attack on the fallen Valentino. Obviously insatiated with their bloody deed,
appellant, Dionisio and their cohorts turned their fury on Francisco. Appellant stabbed and hacked Francisco
thereby cutting-off four fingers of the latter's left hand while Dionisio stabbed him on his right shoulder. At this
point, Francisco ceased to be fully aware of the attack on him save for the fact that he managed to run towards
the nearby Fariñas Transportation Compound where a security guard fired a shot in the air to scare off his
assailants. Francisco then proceeded to the house of the Barangay Chairman, Benjie Ranola who brought him to
the University of Sto. Tomas (UST) Hospital. While Francisco was fortunate enough to have survived, Valentino
died as a consequence of the multiple wounds inflicted upon him.
Two informations were filed against the appellant, one for the murder of Valentino Guevarra and another for the
frustrated murder of Francisco Lacsa. The two cases were consolidated and during trial, appellant pleaded not
guilty to both charges. He admitted having stabbed. Francisco but averred that he acted in self-defense and in
order to avenge the earlier assault by Francisco and Valentino on his father. 4 With respect to the injuries inflicted
on Valentino and his consequent death, appellant, however, chose to remain silent. 5
To support his defense and claim that the stabbing of Francisco was attended by the mitigating circumstance of
immediate vindication of a grave offense against his ascendant, appellant presents the following version of the
facts of this case. Appellant claims that early in the evening of October 22, 1989, he learned from his Uncle Indo
that a fist fight had taken place between Valentino and Francisco on the one hand and appellant's father,
Emmanuel on the other. His Uncle Indo informed him that the fight ensued as a result of the fact that Francisco
and Valentino had molested and made fun of Emmanuel who was then engaged in selling balut. Neither Emmanuel
nor appellant reported the matter to the Barangay or police authorities, instead, feeling certain that Valentine and
Francisco would be going to their house looking for a fight, appellant armed himself with a samurai in anticipation
of the duo's attack.
Appellant testified that later at around 7:00 o'clock in the evening, Francisco and Valentino armed with a bladed
cane and a knife, respectively, arrived and positioned themselves in front of their house. When Emmanuel stepped
out of the door, Valentine immediately stabbed him grazing the right side of his jaw. Francisco likewise assaulted
Emmanuel causing him to fall to the ground unconscious. Whereupon appellant, who was in the kitchen of their
house, rushed outside to aid his father. He grappled with Francisco for possession of the latter's bladed cane and
succeeded. Thereafter, Francisco and Valentino fled towards the corner of Laong-Laan Street with appellant in
pursuit.
After a careful and judicious scrutiny of the evidence presented before it, the trial court found more plausible the
prosecution's story, and gave full faith and credence to Francisco's testimony. In debunking appellant's theory of
51
self-defense, the lower court ruled that the facts as established by the prosecution completely negated the I hacked him, sir.
existence of the elements of self-defense namely, (1) that the accused is not the unlawful aggressor; (2) that there
was lack of sufficient provocation on his part; and (3) that he employed reasonable means to prevent or repel the ATTY. LACHICA:
aggression. 6
Why did you do that?
Perhaps realizing the futility of his efforts at exculpating himself from criminal liability, appellant now comes to
this court abandoning the theory of self-defense albeit invoking the privileged mitigating circumstance of
WITNESS:.
incomplete defense of a relative.

Because when they returned back in the evening, he boxed my father, sir.
The law provides that, defense of a relative is one of the circumstances that justify the commission of a crime and
exculpate the accused from criminal liability provided that the following requisites concur: (1) unlawful aggression;
(2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel or prevent it; and (3) in case the provocation was given ATTY. LACHICA:
by the person attacked, the one making the defense had no part therein. 7 In the event that not all of the
aforementioned requisites are attendant, the accused shall be entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance Was Laxa (sic) alone when he returned?
of incomplete defense of a relative pursuant to Article 13 (1) of the Revised Penal Code. 8 However, this Court has
consistently held that for the claim of incomplete defense of a relative to prosper, it is essential to prove the WITNESS:
primordial element of unlawful aggression. If there is no unlawful aggression there would be nothing to prevent
or repel. In that event, there could be no defense, complete or incomplete. 9
They were two, sir.
The defense miserably failed to prove unlawful aggression on the part of Francisco and Valentine against
appellant's father thereby prompting appellant to act in his defense. Thus, as correctly observed by the trial court: xxx xxx xxx

The Court found incredible and chimerical the claim of the Accused that Francisco Lacsa armed ATTY. LACHICA:
with a bladed cane (baston) and Valentino Guevarra, armed with a "29 fan knife", assaulted
and attacked Emmanuel Santos as a consequence of which the right side of the jaw of When you say retunred (sic), where did they return?
Emmanuel Santos was grazed and the latter fell on the ground unconscious. Indeed when the
Accused testified before the Court, the Accused, at the time of the arrival of Francisco Lacsa WITNESS:
and Valentino Guevarra, was in the kitchen, in (sic) the second floor of their house. From where
he was, the Accused could not see the incident involving his father on one hand, and Francisco
In front of our house, sir.
Lacsa and Valentino Guevarra on the other. 10(Emphasis supplied).

ATTY. LACHICA:
Furthermore, the testimony of the appellant himself belies the claim that he merely acted to prevent or repel the
unlawful aggression that was being committed by Francisco and Valentino against his father. His unequivocal
statements in open court lead to the conclusion that assuming arguendo that Francisco and Valentino had indeed Where were you at that time when they returned in front of your house?
attacked appellant's father, this attack had ceased completely by the time the appellant confronted the duo.
Otherwise stated, when appellant stabbed and hacked Francisco, there no longer was any unlawful aggression to WITNESS:
prevent or repel. Thus:
I was inside the house, sir.
ATTY. LACHICA:
ATTY. LACHICA (sic):
Mr. Laxa (sic) further testified that you inflicted upon his person by hacking
with a "samurai" sword his left hand, what could you say to that? When my father went down, he was stabbed and then he fell down face
up on the ground, sir.
WITNESS:
ATTY. LACHICA:

52
 After noticing of what happened to your father, what did you do? Were you alone in your fight against the two, Guevarra and Laxa (sic)?

WITNESS: WITNESS:

I defended himself (sic), sir. Yes, sir.

ATTY. LACHICA: ATTY. LACHICA:

And by what did you defend him? Both the police officer and Laxa (sic) testified that the fight ended or
stopped near the Fariñas Transportation garage at Laong-Laan and Dela
WITNESS: Fuente Streets, what could you say to that?

I was able to get a cane (pamalo), po. WITNESS:

ATTY. LACHICA: It started from Pepin Street and then they ran towards the corner of Laong-
Laan Street, sir.
What did you do with that "pamalo"?
xxx xxx xxx 11
WITNESS:
Hence, as correctly pointed out by the trial court,
Laxa (sic) and I had a rumble until such time that I was able to get hold of
what he was holding, sir. . . . there is no evidence in the record that Francisco Lacsa persisted in his aggression from the
time the Accused wrested the cane from him. On the contrary, the evidence of the Accused
shows that Francisco Lacsa and Valentino Guevarra ran towards the corner of Laong-Laan
ATTY. LACHICA:
Street . . . from the clutches of the Accused. From the time Francisco Lacsa sped away from the
scene, his alleged initial unlawful aggression already ceased. . . . 12
What was that, that he was holding that you were able to get hold (sic)?
And this Court has consistently held that when the unlawful aggression which has begun no longer exists,
WITNESS: the one making the defense has no more right to kill or even wound the former aggressor. 13

A "baston", sir, which has a content. Another factor which militates against the appellant's claim of incomplete defense of a relative is the physical
evidence on record. Francisco suffered no less than ten (10) stab wounds on different parts of his body and a
ATTY. LACHICA: decapitation of four (4) fingers on (his left hand, while Valentino suffered ten (10) stab and hack wounds, two of
which were fatal enough to have caused his death. Just as the presence and severity of a large number of wounds
What was the content of that "baston"? on the part of the victim disprove self-defense, 14 so do they belie the claim of incomplete defense of a relative
and indicate not the desire to defend one's relative but a determined effort to kill.

WITNESS:.
We now go to the other mitigating circumstance which the appellant claims in his favor, that of immediate
vindication of a grave offense against an ascendant. Appellant contends that his act in stabbing and hacking
A bladed instrument, sir. Francisco was done in vindication of the earlier assault committed by the latter and Valentine on his father.

xxx xxx xxx FISCAL PIZARRO:

ATTY. LACHICA:

53
 You said that there was an incident involving your father and Guevarro (sic) All over his body, Your Honor.
and Laxa (sic) where did this incident happen?
COURT:
WITNESS:.
Proceed.
At the corner of Maria Clara and Miguelin Streets, sir.
F1SCAL PIZARRO:
xxx xxx xxx
Who were present when the incident happened?
FISCAL PIZARRO:
WITNESS:
You said that there was a fistfight between your father, Guevarra and Laxa
(sic). do you mean to say that your father hit Guevarra and Laxa (sic). My uncle, sir.

WITNESS: FISCAL PIZARRO:

They hit my father ahead, sir. His name please?

FISCAL PIZARRO: WITNESS:

Do you know of any reason why Guevarra and Laxa (sic) hit your father? Indo, sir.

WITNESS: FISCAL PIZARRO:

None, sir. How about you, were you also present?

xxx xxx xxx WITNESS:

COURT: No, sir.

Was your father hit by the fist blows of Valentino Guevarra and Francisco FISCAL PIZARRO:
Laxa (sic)?
And therefore, you do not have personal knowledge of what happened in
WITNESS: that incident, is it not?

Yes, Your Honor. WITNESS:

COURT: I came to know from my uncle, sir.

What part of his body was hit by the two? FISCAL PIZARRO:

WITNESS: What did you (sic) uncle tell you about the incident?

54
 WITNESS:

He pacified them, sir.

FISCAL PIZARRO:

How did he pacify them?

WITNESS:

Both of them were approached by my uncle, sir.

xxx xxx xxx 15

From the foregoing, it is clear that the defense failed to adduce sufficient evidence to prove that a grave offense
had in fact been committed by Francisco and Valentine against his father. By appellant's own admission, he was
not present when the alleged skirmish took place. His testimony is hearsay, deserving no weight whatsoever and
is in fact inadmissible in evidence. Further, proof exists that from the time appellant learned of the alleged fight
up to the time Francisco and Valentino arrived at appellant's house, sufficient time had lapsed within which
appellant could have recovered his composure and assuaged his vindictive sentiments. This may be inferred from
appellant's testimony that upon knowing of the ill-treatment that his father suffered in the hands of Francisco and
Valentino, he proceeded to prepare a weapon in the form of a samurai, after which, he anxiously awaited the
arrival of Francisco and Valentino. Thus, the benefit of the said mitigating circumstance cannot be considered in
favor of the appellant pursuant to the established rule that there can be no immediate vindication of a grave
offense when the accused had sufficient time to recover his serenity. 16

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and the assailed decision is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

55
G.R. No. L-32040 October 25, 1977 Your lawyer here has manifested your desire to enter a plea of guilty to the
offense charged, robbery with homicide. Do you know that by agreeing to
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, that manifestation of your lawyer, you will be admitting the commission of
vs. the crime charged?
PEDRO PAGAL y MARCELINO and JOSE TORCELINO y TORAZO, defendants-appellants.
Accused:
Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor General Crispin V. Bautista and Solicitor Leonardo L. Cruz for
appellee. We agree, your honor, to what our lawyer said, but we would like to
explain something.
Ciriaco Lopez, Jr. for appellants.
Court:

Your lawyer here has stated that you will still prove mitigating
CONCEPCION, JR. J.:têñ.£îhqw⣠circumstances. Is that what you like to explain?

In Criminal Case No. CCC-VI-5 (70) of the Circuit Criminal Court of Manila, the accused, Pedro Pagal y Marcelino Accused:
and Jose Torcelino y Torazo were charged with the crime of robbery with homicide, committed as
follows: ñé+.£ªwph!1 Yes, your honor.

That on or about December 26, 1969, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, Court:
conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping each other, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to gain, and by means of violence, take away If that is the case, I will give you a chance.
from the person of one Gau Guan, cash amounting Pl,281.00. Philippine currency, to the
damage and prejudice of the said Gau Guan in the said sum of Pl,281.00; that on the occasion
Accused:
of the said robbery and for the purpose of enabling them to take, steal and carry away the said
amount of P1,281.00, the herein accused, in pursuance of their conspiracy, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill and taking advantage of their superior Yes, your honor.
strength, treacherously attack, assault and use personal violence upon the said Gau Guan, by
then and there stabbing him with an icepick and clubbing him with an iron pipe on different Court:
parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon him mortal wounds which were the direct and
immediate cause of his death thereafter. Do you know that by agreeing to that manifestation, you will be admitting
the commission of the crime charged, robbery wit,. homicide?
Contrary to law, and with the generic aggravating circumstances of (1) nightime purposely
sought to better accomplish their criminal design; (2) evident premeditation; (3) in disregard Accused:
of the respect due the offended party; and (4) with abuse of confidence, the accused being
then employees of the offended party. 1
Yes, your honor.
When the case was called for affaigmnent, counsel de oficio for the accused infomred said court of their intention
to enter a plea of guilty provided that they be allowed afterwards to prove the mitigating circumstances of Court:
sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the offended party immediately preceding the act, and that of having
acted upon an impulse so powerful as to produce passion and obfuscation. 2 Therafter, the trial judge propounded And for which this court might sentence you to death or life
to them the questions and the accused gave the answers quoted hereunder: ñé+.£ªwph!1 imprisonment?

Court: Accused:

56
 Yes, your honor.
Court:
And notwithstanding what is explained to you, you still insist in your desire
to enter a plea of guilty to the offense charged?
Accused:
Yes, your honor.
Court:
Q Notwithstanding again the warning of the court that the maximum
penalty impossable is death?
A Yes, your honor.
Court:
Arraign the accused.
(At this stage, both accused were arraigned and both pleaded guilty to the offense charged). 3
Thereafter, the accused presented evidence to prove the mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation on the
part of the victim immediately preceding the act and acting upon an impulse so powerful as to produce passion
and obfuscation. After the accused had rested their case, the prosecution presented the statements 4 of the
accused, and other pertinent documents regarding the investigation of the case. 5
After the trial, the court a quo rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: ñé+.£ªwph!1
WHEREFORE, both accused are hereby found guilty beyond reasaonable doubt as principals of
the crime of robbery with homicide and there being proven the aggravating circumstances of
nighttime, evident premeditation and disregard of respect due the offended party offset only
by the mitigating circumstance of their plea of guilty, sentences each one of them to DEATH,
jointly and severally indemnify the heirs of the deceased Gau Guan; P15,000.00 for moral
damages; P15,000.00 for exemplary damages, all amounts to bear interest until they shall have
been fully paid; the sum of P1,281.00 represnting the amount taken from the victim; and to
pay proportionately the costs. 6
The case is now before this Court for mandatory review on account of the death penalty imposed upon the
accused.
The appellant Pedro Pagal contends that the trial court erred in convicting him of the crime of robbery with
homicide instead of declaring him liable only for his individual acts, claiming that the record is bereft of any proof
or evidence that he and his co-appellant Jose Torcelino conspired to commit the crime of robbery with homicide.
The appellant's position is not well-taken. His denial of conspiracy with his co-appellant Jose Torcelino cannot be
given credence in view of the clear and convincing confession of his guilt in his statement 7 signed by him before
the police investigators several hours after the commission of the crime. Besides, when he pleaded guilty to the
charge, he is deemed to have admitted all the material facts alleged in the information. 8 By his plea, the appellant
admitted not only the commission of the crime but also the circumstances surrounding its commission, including
the allegations of conspiracy. A plea of guilty when formally entered on arraignment, is sufficient to sustain a
conviction even for a capital offense without the introduction of further evidence, 9 the requisite proofs having
been supplied by the accused himself. 10 We find, therefore, that the trial court did not commit any error in
convicting the appellant Pedro pagal of the crime of robbery with homicide.
The appellants further assail the trial court in not appreciating in their favor the mitigating circumstances of
sufficient provocation, and passion or obfuscation.
Again, the appeflants'contention is devoid of merit. Firstly, since the alleged provocation which caused the
obfuscation of the appellants arose from the same incident, that is, the alleged maltreatment and/or ill-treatment
of the appellants by the deceased, these two mitigating circumstances cannot be considered as two distinct and
separate circumstances but should be treated as one. 11 Secondly, the circumstance of passion and obfuscation
cannot be mitigating in a crime which — as in the case at bar — is planned and calmly meditated before its
execution. Thus, in People vs. Daos, 12 a case of robbery with homicide, this Court rejected the claim of the
appellants therein that passion and obfuscation should have been estimated in their favor, because the death of
the victim therein took place on the occasion of a robbery, which, before its execut,.on, had been planned and
calmly meditated by the appellants. Thirdly, the maltreatment that appellants claim the victim to have committed
against them occurred much earlier than the date of the commission of the crime. Provocation in order to be a
mitigating circumstance must be sufficient and immediately proceeding the act. We hold that the trial court did
not commit any error in not appreciating the said mitigating circumstances in favor of the appellants.
Finally, the appellants claim that the trial court erred in considering the aggravating circumstances of nighttime,
evident premeditation, and disregard of the respect due the offended party on account of his rank and age.
Although the trial court correctly considered the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity because the same was
purposely and deliberately sought by the a,)pellants to facilitate the commission of the crime, nevertheless, We
disagree with its conclusion that evident premeditation and disregard of the respect due the offended party were
present in the commission of the crime.
Evident premeditation is inherent in the crime of robbery. 13 However, in the crime of robbery with homicide, if
there is evident premeditation to kill besides stealing, it is considered as an aggravating circumstance. 14 In other
words, evident premeditation will only be aggravating in a complex crime of robbery with homicide if it is proved
that the plan is not only to rob, but also to kill. 15 In the case at bar, a perusal of the written statements 16 of the
appellants before the police investigators show that their original plan was only to rob, and that, they killed the
deceased only when the latter refused to open the "kaha de yero", and fought with them. The trial court, therefore,
erred in taking into consideration the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation.
57
The aggravating circumstance that the crime was committed with insult or in disregard of the respect due the
offended party on account of his rank, age or sex may be taken into account only in crimes against persons or
honor, when in the commission of the crime there is some insult or disrespect shown to rank, age, or sex. 17 lt is
not proper to consider this aggravating circumstance in crimes against property. 18 Robbery with homicide is
primarily a crime against property and not against persons. Homicide is a mere incident of the robbery, the latter
being the main purpose and object of the criminal. 19 The trial court erred in taking into account this aggravating
circumstance.

It results that in the commission of the crime, there is only generic aggravating circumstance, i.e., nighttime or
nocturnity.

Robbery with homicide is punished by reclusion perpetua to death. 20 Since the aggravating circumstance of
nighttime is offset by the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty, the lesser penalty, which is reclusion perpetua,
should be imposed upon the appellants. 21

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment of the trial court is modified and the appellnts Pedro Pagal y Marcelino and Jose
Torcefino y Torazo are hereby sentenced to suffer each the penalty of reclusion perpetua. In all other respects, the
judgment of the trial court is affirmed. With costs against the appellants.

SO ORDERED.

Castro, C.J., Fernando, Aquino, Martin, Santos, Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.1äwphï1.ñët

Teehankee and Makasiar, JJ., concur in the result.

Antonio, J., took no part.

58
G.R. No. L-45100 October 26, 1936 went there. Upon arriving near the house, they saw Yu Hiong coming down the stairs. When Yu Hiong saw them,
he ran upstairs and they pursued him. As the Chinese found the door of the house locked, he shouted that it be
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, opened for him. At that moment, he was overtaken by the accused who carried knives locally known as balisong,
vs. of different sizes. Yu Hiong fell on his knees and implored pardon. In that situation Roman Diokno stabbed him
EPIFANIO DIOKNO and ROMAN DIOKNO, defendants-appellants. with the knife in the back and later in the left side. Epifanio Diokno also stabbed him once. Yu Hiong fell on the
landing of the stairs in the balcony, and there he was again stabbed repeatedly. Then Roman Diokno said: "Enough,
father." Yu Hiong lost consciousness. Juan Alcantara, who lived on the same street, Hermanos Belen, in front of
Ramon Diokno and Gabriel N. Trinidad for appellants.
Antonio Layco's house, saw the accused pursue Yu Hiong and fired shots for the police to come. Upon hearing the
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.
shots, municipal policeman Francisco Curabo appeared and found Yu Hiong pale and lying on the landing of the
stairs. He then asked who had wounded the Chinese and the accused Epifanio Diokno answered that it was he.
The policeman took the knife (Exhibit C) which Epifanio Diokno carried in his right hand and brought him to police
headquarters. Roman Diokno had left before the policeman arrived and he was not located until after three days.
The municipal president of San Pablo, Laguna, also went to the scene of the crime, found the Chinese almost
VILLA-REAL, J.: unconscious and questioned him, putting down his answers in Exhibit E. The Chinese was brought to the provincial
hospital of San Pablo where he was examined by Drs. David Evangelista and Manuel Quisumbing, who found that
Epifanio Diokno and Roman Diokno appeal to this court from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, he had five incised wounds in different parts of the body, one of them at the back and about three and a half inches
the dispositive part of which reads as follows: long, piercing the pleura and penetrating the lower lobe of the right lung about an inch, which wound was
necessarily mortal and which caused the death of the victim. On January 8, 1935, while the said Chinese was in a
serious condition in the hospital, he made a statement telling how he was attacked by the accused (Exhibit K).
In view of the foregoing considerations, the court finds the accused Epifanio Diokno and Roman Diokno
guilty of the crime of murder, beyond a reasonable doubt, and sentences each of them to reclusion
perpetua, to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000 and to pay The accused, testifying as witnesses in their own behalf, stated that they had not gone to San Pablo together on
the costs of the suit. It is so ordered. the day in question; that when Roman Diokno arrived, his father Epifanio Diokno was coming down the stairs of
Antonio Layco's house with a knife in his hand; that Epifanio Diokno told his son Roman to go home and tell their
relatives what had happened; that when Epifanio Diokno overtook Yu Hiong on the landing of the stairs of Antonio
In support of their appeal, the appellants assign the following alleged errors as committed by the court a quo in its Layco's house, he asked Yu Hiong whether he was willing to marry his daughter; that the Chinese answered him in
judgment in question, to wit: the negative and at the same time tried to take something from his pocket; that as Epifanio knew that Yu Hiong
carried a revolver, he feared the Chinese might harm him; he became obfuscated, drew his knife and knew not
1. The lower court erred in accepting Exhibit E as evidence. what happened afterwards.

2. The lower court erred in admitting Exhibit K as evidence.
3. The lower court erred in not acquitting the appellant Roman.
4. The lower court erred in sentencing the appellant Epifanio to reclusion perpetua.
The first question to be decided in the present appeal is whether or not the court a quo erred in admitting as
evidence Exhibit E, consisting in the investigation conducted by the municipal president of San Pablo in the same
place where Yu Hiong had fallen a few minutes before, at about 1.30 p. m. on January 7, 1935, and wherein Yu
Hiong, answering the questions asked by said municipal president, stated that it was Ramon Diokno and Epifanio
Diokno who had wounded him.

It is argued by the defense that said document Exhibit E should not be admitted on the ground that some words
The following facts have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt during the trial:
had been altered and because it has not been proven that declarant had a sense of impending death.

The deceased Yu Hiong was a vendor of sundry goods in Lucena, Tayabas. At about 7 o'clock in the morning of
It does not appear that said document was altered after it had been signed, but on the contrary, municipal
January 4, 1935, Salome Diokno, to whom Yu Hiong was engaged for about a year, invited the latter to go with her.
president Jacinto Peñaflor, upon being cross-examined by the defense, declared that he neither erased any word
Yu Hiong accepted the invitation but he told Salome that her father was angry with him. Salome answered him:
nor put another in its place after said document had been finished.
"No matter, I will be responsible." At about 6 o'clock in the afternoon of said day, Yu Hiong and Salome Diokno
took an automobile and went to the house of Vicente Verina, Salome's cousin, in Pagbilao. As they found nobody
in the house, they went on their way up to San Pablo, Laguna. On January 5th or 6th of said year, Roman Diokno The fact that Yu Hiong failed to state that he had given up all hope of life, in answering the municipal president's
telegraphed his father Epifanio Diokno, who was in Manila, informing him that Salome had eloped with the Chinese questions, does not make his declaration inadmissible. It is enough if, from the circumstances of the case, it can
Yu Hiong. On the morning of January 7, 1935, Epifanio Diokno and Roman Diokno went to San Pablo, Laguna, in be inferred with certainty that such must have been his state of mind (People vs. Chan Lin Wat, 50 Phil., 182). In
search of the elopers. Having been informed that the latter were stopping at the house of Antonio Layco, they the present case, Yu Hiong was semiconscious as a result of the wounds received by him and, consequently, he

59
could not have the hope to live when he made his declaration immediately after he was mortally wounded. But
even if the document Exhibit E were not admissible as an ante mortem declaration, it is admissible as a part of
the res gestæbecause it was made under circumstances so proximate to the incident that it may be considered as
a part thereof. (People vs. Portento and Portento, 48 Phil., 971; People vs. Palamos, 49 Phil., 601.)
The first assignment of alleged error is, therefore, untenable.
With respect to the second assignment of alleged error consisting in that the court a quo erred in admitting Exhibit
K as an ante mortem declaration of Yu Hiong, because it does not appear that when the declarant made it he was
aware of impending death and that he did not die until three days after making it, all that has been said relative to
Exhibit E, which is the subject matter of the first assignment of alleged error, may be repeated in connection with
said Exhibit K, in the sense that it is admissible as an ante mortem declaration. Furthermore, when the deceased
made the declaration Exhibit K, he complained of great difficulty in breathing and of being very ill. The fact that he
did not die until three days later neither implies that he had no sense of impending death when he made his
declaration because he did not improve thereafter but became worse until he died; nor detracts from its character
of an ante mortem declaration because what gives the declaration such character is the declarant's conviction,
upon making it, that he is not going to live (U. S. vs. Mallari, 29 Phil., 14).
The third assignment of alleged error consists in the failure of the court a quo to acquit the appellant, Roman
Diokno.
The testimony of the eyewitnesses Juan Alcantara and Antonio Layco corroborated by the different dimensions of
the wounds which, according to Dr. Manuel Quisumbing, were caused by two instruments of different sizes, and
the ante mortem declarations (Exhibits E and K) of the deceased, leave no room for doubt that Roman Diokno
cooperated with his father and stabbed the deceased Yu Hiong with a knife in different parts of the body.
Furthermore, the deceased stated in his ante mortem declaration (Exhibit K) that it was Roman Diokno who
inflicted the necessarily mortal wound in his back, which caused his death.
We find the fourth assignment of alleged error well founded. The circumstance of abuse of superior strength,
qualifying the crime of murder, which the trial court found to have been proven, has not been established beyond
a reasonable doubt. In the case of United States vs. Devela (3 Phil., 625), this court said that "the mere fact that
the number of the assailants is superior to that of those attacked by them is not sufficient to constitute the
aggravating circumstance of abuse of superiority." In this case we have the photographs of the body of the
deceased (Exhibits D and D-1) showing that he had a strong constitution: but there is no evidence of the physical
constitution of the accused Epifanio Diokno and Roman Diokno. Therefore, we cannot determine whether or not
said accused were physically stronger than the deceased and whether or not they abused such superiority.
Neither does this court find the existence of the other circumstance qualifying murder, that is, evident
premeditation, proven beyond a reasonable doubt because, even assuming that both the accused went to San
Pablo, Laguna, each carrying the knife used by him in attacking Yu Hiong, it being customary for the people of said
province to carry it, it cannot be inferred with certainty from the mere fact that they carried knives that their
intention in going to San Pablo was to look for the deceased in order to kill him. In order that premeditation may
be considered either as an aggravating circumstance or as a qualifying circumstance, it must be evident, that is,
the intention to kill must be manifest and it must have been planned in the mind of the offender and carefully
meditated. It is not enough that it arose at the moment of the aggression.
Therefore, there having been neither abuse of superior strength nor evident premeditation, the crime committed
by the accused is simple homicide.lâwphi1.nêt
The presence of the fifth mitigating circumstance of article 13 of the Revised Penal Code, that is, immediate
vindication of a grave offense to said accused, may be taken into consideration in favor of the two accused, because
although the elopement took place on January 4, 1935, and the aggression on the 7th of said month and year, the
offense did not cease while Salome's whereabouts remained unknown and her marriage to the deceased
unlegalized. Therefore, there was no interruption from the time the offense was committed to the vindication
thereof. Our opinion on this point is based on the fact that the herein accused belong to a family of old customs
to whom the elopement of a daughter with a man constitutes a grave offense to their honor and causes
disturbance of the peace and tranquility of the home and at the same time spreads uneasiness and anxiety in the
minds of the members thereof.
The presence of the sixth mitigating circumstance of said article 13, consisting in having acted upon an impulse so
powerful as naturally to have produced passion or ofuscation, may also be taken into consideration in favor of the
accused. The fact that the accused saw the deceased run upstairs when he became aware of their presence, as if
he refused to deal with them after having gravely offended them, was certainly a stimulus strong enough to
produce in their mind a fit of passion which blinded them and led them to commit the crime with which they are
charged, as held by the Supreme Court of Spain in similar cases in its decisions of February 3, 1888, July 9, 1898,
February 8, 1908, May 25, 1910, July 3, 1909, and in other more recent ones.
The seventh circumstance of article 13 of the Revised Penal Code, consisting in having surrendered himself
immediately to the agents of persons in authority, should also be taken into consideration in favor of the accused
Epifanio Diokno.
In view of the foregoing considerations, this court concludes that the accused are guilty beyond a reasonable doubt
of the crime of homicide defined and punished in article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty prescribed
therein being reclusion temporal in its full extent. Three mitigating circumstances must be taken into consideration
in favor of the accused Epifanio Diokno and two in favor of the accused Roman Diokno, with no aggravating
circumstance, thus authorizing the imposition of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by law (reclusion
temporalin its full extent), or prision mayor in its full extent, in the period that this court deems applicable, which
is the medium period in this case, in accordance with the provisions of article 64, rule 5, that is eight years and one
day of prision mayor.
Both accused should be granted the benefits of the indeterminate sentence provided in Act No. 4103, as amended
by Act No. 4225, which prescribes a penalty the minimum of which shall be taken from that next lower to prision
mayor, or prision correccional of from six months and one day to six years. Taking into account the circumstances
of the case, the indeterminate penalty to which each of said accused must be sentenced is fixed at from two years
and one day of prision correccional to eight years and one day of prision mayor, crediting each with one-half of the
time during which they have undergone preventive imprisonment (art. 29, Revised Penal Code).
Wherefore, this court declares the accused Epifanio Diokno and Roman Diokno guilty of the crime of homicide and
sentences each of them to an indeterminate penalty from two years and one day of prision correccional to eight
years and one day of prision mayor, crediting them with one-half of the time during which they have undergone
preventive imprisonment, and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000, with the costs of both
instances. So ordered.
60
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JUNE IGNAS y SANGGINO, accused-appellant.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
In the amended decision[1] dated June 2, 1999, in Criminal Case No. 96-CR-2522, the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of La Trinidad, Benguet, Branch 8, found appellant June Ignas y Sanggino guilty of murder aggravated
especially by the use of an unlicensed firearm. Appellant was initially sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua,[2] but on motion for reconsideration by the prosecution, the penalty was upgraded to death by lethal
injection.[3] Hence, the case is now before us for automatic review.
Appellant is an elementary school graduate. He resided at Cruz, La Trinidad, Benguet, where he operated a
bakery.[4] He is married to Wilma Grace Ignas, by whom he has a son of minor age.[5]Wilma Grace used to be the
cashier of Windfield Enterprise, which is owned by Pauline Gumpic.[6] Pauline had a brother, Nemesio Lopate. It
was he whom appellant fatally shot.
In the amended Information,[7] pursuant to Section 14, Rule 110[8] of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure,
the Provincial Prosecutor of Benguet charged appellant as follows:
That on or about the 10th day of March 1996 at Trading Post, Km. 5, Municipality of La Trinidad, Province of
Benguet, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, without any authority of law or without
any lawful permit did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession, control and custody
a Cal. .38 hand gun and two (2) ammunitions, (sic) which firearm and ammunitions were used by the accused in
unlawfully killing NEMESIO LOPATE at the above-mentioned place and date in violation of the said law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[9]
Appellant was arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the foregoing amended information. The case then
proceeded to be heard on the merits.
Gleaned from the records, the facts of this case are as follows:
Sometime in September 1995, appellants wife, Wilma Grace Ignas, confided to her close friend,
Romenda[10] Foyagao, that she was having an affair with Nemesio Lopate.[11]
On the evening of October 16, 1995, Wilma Grace, Romenda, and Nemesio went to Manila. Romenda and
Nemesio were sending off Wilma Grace at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport as she was leaving for Taiwan to
work as a domestic helper. Upon arrival in Manila, the trio checked at Dangwa Inn, with Nemesio and Wilma Grace
sharing a room.[12] All three of them stayed at the inn until October 18, 1995, when Wilma Grace left for Taiwan.[13]
Thereafter, Romenda received from Taiwan four letters written by Wilma Grace on various dates. Although
all the letters were addressed to Romenda, two of them were meant by Wilma Grace to be read by her paramour,
Nemesio.[14] In the other two letters, Wilma Grace instructed Romenda to reveal to appellant her affair with
Nemesio.
It was only sometime late in February 1996 that Romenda, following her bosom friends written instructions,
informed appellant about the extramarital affair between Wilma Grace and Nemesio. Romenda informed him that
the two had spent a day and a night together in a room at Dangwa Inn in Manila.[15] Appellant became furious. He
declared Addan to aldaw na dayta nga Nemesio, patayek dayta nga Nemesio (There will be a day for that Nemesio.
I will kill that Nemesio).[16] Appellant then got all the letters of Wilma Grace from Romenda.[17]
That same week Alfred Mayamnes, appellants neighbor who was presented at the trial as a prosecution
witness, had a talk with appellant. Mayamnes was an elder of the Kankanaey tribe to which appellant belonged. He
wanted to confirm whether Nemesio Lopate, who was likewise from the same tribe, [18] was having an affair with
appellants spouse. Talk apparently had reached the tribal elders and they wanted the problem resolved as soon
as possible.[19] A visibly angry appellant confirmed the gossip.[20] Mayamnes also testified that he advised Nemesio
to stay at the Mountain Trail Kankanaey community until things had cooled down.[21]
Shortly after their talk, appellant closed down his bakeshop and offered his equipment for sale. Among the
potential buyers he approached was Mayamnes, but the latter declined the offer.[22]
Sometime during the first week of March, Mayamnes saw appellant load his bakery equipment on board a
hired truck and depart for Nueva Vizcaya.[23]
At around 10:00 p.m. of March 10, 1996, according to another prosecution witness, Annie Bayanes, a trader
in vegetables, she was at the Trading Post, La Trinidad, Benguet.[24] The Trading Post is a popular depot where
vegetable growers in the Cordilleras bring their produce late in the evenings for sale to wholesalers and retailers.
Witness Bayanes said she was at the unloading area (bagsakan), conversing with another dealer at the latters
booth, when suddenly two gunshots shattered the quiet evening.[25]
Bayanes turned towards the place where the sound of the gunshots came from. She testified that she saw a
person falling to the ground.[26] Standing behind the fallen individual, some 16 inches away,[27] was another person
who tucked a handgun into his waistband and casually walked away.[28]
Initially, she only saw the gunmans profile, but when he turned, she caught a glimpse of his face. [29] She
immediately recognized him as the appellant June Ignas. She said she was familiar with him as he was her
townmate and had known him for several years. Witness Bayanes was five or six meters away from the scene, and
the taillight of a parked jeepney, which was being loaded with vegetables, plus the lights from the roof of
the bagsakan, aided her recognition of appellant.[30]
Also at the bagsakan area that night was prosecution witness Marlon Manis. He testified that on hearing
gunshots from the Trading Post entrance, he immediately looked at the place where the gunfire came from. He
saw people converging on a spot where a bloodied figure was lying on the ground.[31] Witness Manis saw that the
fallen victim was Nemesio Lopate, whom he said he had known since Grade 2 in elementary school.[32] Manis then
saw another person, some 25 meters away, hastily walking away from the scene. He could not see the persons
face very well, but from his gait and build, he identified the latter as his close friend and neighbor, June
Ignas.[33] Manis said that the scene was very dimly lit and the only illumination was from the lights of passing
vehicles, but he was familiar with appellants build, hairstyle, and manner of walking. [34]
Prosecution witness Mona Barredo, a bakery worker, testified that she knew appellant. She said they were
co-workers formerly at the Annaliza Bakery at Km. 10, Shilan, La Trinidad, Benguet.[35]Barredo declared that at
around 10:30 p.m. of March 10, 1996, appellant came to her residence at Pico, La Trinidad. After being served
refreshments, appellant took out a handgun from his jacket and removed the empty shells from the
chamber.[36] Appellant then told her to throw the empty cartridges out of the window. Because of nervousness
she complied.[37] Barredo also said that appellant disclosed to her that he had just shot his wifes
paramour.[38] Appellant then stayed at her house for 8 or 9 hours; he left only in the morning of March 11,
1996,[39] according to her. Police investigators later recovered the spent gun shells from witness Barredos sweet
potato garden.[40]
61
 According to witness on the scene, responding policemen immediately brought the victim, Nemesio Lopate,
to the Benguet General Hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival.[41]
Dr. Doris C. Jovellanos, Municipal Health Officer of La Trinidad, Benguet, testified during that trial that she
conducted the post-mortem examination of the victims cadaver. Among her findings were:
1. Ovaloid hole, 2.0 x 5.0 cm. dms., with blackened edges (1.8 x 1.3 cms. span), on the right side of the mouth,
above the edge of the upper lip
xxx
3. Exit hole on the left side of the mouth, 5.0 x 1.3 cm. dms., with avulsion of the upper lip on the left side
xxx
9. Circular hole, penetrating, on the back, right side, 0.7 cm. x 0.7 cm. diam., with blackened edges (0.9 x 0.9 cm.
span), at the level of the fifth intercostal space, subscapular area, 13 cm. from the midline, directed to the left side
of the chest, 38.0 cm. from the embedded bullet slug of the left shoulder. [42]
Dr. Jovellanos determined the cause of death to be Hypovolemia due to gunshot wound, back, right, (Point
of Entry fifth intercostal space subscapular area).[43] She further stated on the witness stand that she recovered a
bullet from the victims left shoulder, which she turned over to the police investigators. [44] According to her, given
the blackened edges of the gunshot wound at the victims back, Nemesio was shot from a distance of less than
three (3) feet.[45]
On March 14, 1996, police investigators accompanied by one of appellants brother as well as prosecution
witness Julio Bayacsan, a friend of appellant, went to Kayapa, Nueva Vizcaya, to invite appellant to shed light on
the slaying of Nemesio. The law enforcers found appellant selling bread at Kayapa and brought him back to La
Trinidad, Benguet.[46]
Witness Bayacsan testified that shortly after they arrived from Kayapa, he had an opportunity to talk with
appellant at the La Trinidad Police Station. There, appellant disclosed to this witness that he shot and killed
Nemesio.[47] Bayacsan, however, did not inform the police about appellants revelation as he considered appellant
his good friend.[48]
Prosecution witness Pauline Gumpic, the victims sister, testified that she and appellant had a private talk,
while the latter was in police custody, and appellant admitted to her that he killed her brother. [49] Gumpic declared
that appellant revealed to her that he shot Nemesio for having illicit relations with appellants wife and failing to
ask for his forgiveness.[50]
SPO4 Arthur Bomagao[51] of the La Trinidad police, who headed the team that investigated the fatal shooting
of Nemesio, declared on the stand that appellant voluntarily admitted to him that he shot the victim with a .38
caliber handgun.[52] Bomagao further testified that appellant surrendered to him the letters of Wilma Grace,
wherein the latter admitted her affair with Nemesio.[53]
Appellant interposed the defense of alibi. Sometime during the last week of February 1996, he said, he
entered into a partnership with a friend and fellow baker, Ben Anoma, to operate a bakery in Kayapa, Nueva
Vizcaya.[54] Appellant claimed that he was having a hard time operating his bakeshop in La Trinidad as he had no
helpers. When Anoma proposed a business arrangement, he added, he immediately seized the opportunity.[55] On
March 8, 1996, he and Anoma then transferred his equipment to Anomas bakery in Kayapa,[56] which is some four
(4) to five (5) hours away from La Trinidad, according to appellant. He averred that he was baking bread with
Anoma in Kayapa on the night Nemesio was killed.[57] Under oath, appellant said that he never left Kayapa since
his arrival on March 8, 1996. He and Anoma were engrossed in baking and marketing their produce, he testified,
until the policemen from La Trinidad brought him back to Benguet for questioning on March 14, 1996.[58]
Defense witness Ben Anoma corroborated appellants alibi. Anoma declared that during the last week of
February 1996, he met with appellant in La Trinidad. There, the witness said, he proposed a partnership with
appellant in the baking business to be based in Kayapa.[59] Appellant agreed and on March 8, 1996, they transferred
appellants equipment to Kayapa.[60] They immediately commenced their operations and on the evening of March
10, 1996, he and appellant baked bread at his bakery in Kayapa until 11:00 p.m., when they rested for the night. [61]
The trial court disbelieved appellants defense and sustained the prosecutions version. Its initial judgment
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the accused June Ignas is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of MURDER as defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and considering the
aggravating circumstances of treachery, nighttime and the special aggravating circumstance of the use of an
unlicensed firearm, without any mitigating circumstance, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua. He is further sentenced to pay the heirs of the VICTIM the following sums:
1. P150,000.00 for funeral expenses and those incurred for and during the wake;
2. P1,800,000.00 for unearned income;
3. P50,000.00 as death compensation established by jurisprudence; and
4. P50,000.00 as and for moral damages; and
5. P20,000.00 as attorneys fees.
Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED in Chambers this 18th day of February 1999 at La Trinidad, Benguet, Philippines.[62]
Both the prosecution and the defense filed their respective motions for reconsideration. The prosecution
sought the imposition of the death penalty.[63] The defense prayed for acquittal on the ground of reasonable doubt.
On June 2, 1999, the trial court granted the prosecutions motion. It amended its judgment to read as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the accused June Ignas is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of MURDER as defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and considering the
aggravating circumstances of treachery, nighttime and the special aggravating circumstance of the use of an
unlicensed firearm, without any mitigating circumstance, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of death by
lethal injection. He is further sentenced to pay the heirs of the victim the following sums:
62
1. P150,000.00 for funeral expenses and those incurred for and during the wake; VI

2. P2,040,000.00 for unearned income; THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT DID NOT APPRECIATE IN FAVOR OF THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES OF IMMEDIATE VINDICATION OF A GRAVE OFFENSE, PASSION AND
3. P50,000.00 as death compensation established by jurisprudence; and OBFUSCATION AND VOLUNTARY SURRENDER.

4. P50,000.00 as and for moral damages; and VII

5. P20,000.00 as attorneys fees. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT AWARDED EXCESSIVE DAMAGES IN THE FORM OF
FUNERAL EXPENSES AND UNEARNED INCOME OF THE DECEASED WHICH WERE NOT SUFFICIENTLY PROVEN. [65]
Costs against the accused.
Appellants assigned errors may be reduced to the following pertinent issues: (1) the nature of the crime
committed, if any; (2) the sufficiency of the prosecutions evidence to prove appellants guilt; (3) the correctness of
SO ORDERED in Chambers.[64]
the penalty; and (4) the propriety of the damages awarded.

Hence, this automatic review, with appellant imputing the following errors to the court a quo:

I 1. Murder or Homicide

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
OF THE CRIME OF MURDER DESPITE THE WEAKNESS OF THE CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING EVIDENTIARY WEIGHT TO THE ALLEGED EXTRA-JUDICIAL
ADMISSIONS MADE BY ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE ITS BEING HEARSAY IN NATURE AND IN VIOLATION OF HIS
RIGHTS UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION.
III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING PROBATIVE VALUE TO THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI INTERPOSED BY
ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
IV
Assuming arguendo that the evidence on record suffices to sustain the appellants conviction for the unlawful
killing of Nemesio Lopate, the question arises: Was the killing murder as found by the trial court or mere homicide?
Note that the amended information under which the appellant stands charged does not, unlike the original
information, charge appellant with murder but with mere unlawful killing albeit through the use of an unlicensed
firearm. Note further that the amended information does not definitely and categorically state that the unlawful
killing was attended by the aggravating or qualifying circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation, and
nocturnity.
The 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that the qualifying and aggravating circumstances
must be specifically alleged in the information.[66] Although the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure took effect
only on December 1, 2000 or long after the fatal shooting of Nemesio Lopate, as a procedural rule favorable to the
accused, it should be given retrospective application.Hence, absent specific allegations of the attendant
circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation, and nocturnity in the amended information, it was error for
the trial court to consider the same in adjudging appellant guilty of murder. As worded, we find that the amended
information under which appellant was charged and arraigned, at best indicts him only for the crime of homicide.
Any conviction should, thus, fall under the scope and coverage of Article 249[67] of the Revised Penal Code.

ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS GUILTY, THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT
RULED THAT THE KILLING OF THE DECEASED WAS ATTENDED BY EVIDENT PREMEDITATION, TREACHERY AND
NIGHTTIME.
V conviction of the crime of illegal possession of firearm where another crime, as indicated by R.A. No. 8294, is
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT APPRECIATED THE ALLEGED USE OF AN UNLICENSED
.38 CALIBER FIREARM AS AN AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE IN THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME OF MURDER
WITHOUT ANY FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS.
As for the separate case for illegal possession of firearm, we agree with the trial courts order to dismiss the
information for illegal possession of firearm and ammunition in Criminal Case No. 97-CR-2753.[68] Under R.A. No.
8294,[69] which took effect on July 8, 1997, where murder or homicide is committed with the use of an unlicensed
firearm, the separate penalty for illegal possession of firearm shall no longer be imposed since it becomes merely
a special aggravating circumstance.[70] This Court has held in a number of cases[71] that there can be no separate
committed. Although R.A. No. 8294 took effect over a year after the alleged offense was committed, it is
advantageous to the appellant insofar as it spares him from a separate conviction for illegal possession of firearms
and thus should be given retroactive application.[72]

63
2. Sufficiency of the Prosecutions Evidence
But is the prosecutions evidence sufficient to sustain a conviction for homicide?
Appellant primarily contests the accuracy of the identification made by the prosecution witnesses who
testified that they saw him at the locus criminis, tucking a gun in his pants and casually walking away. For one, he
contends that the prosecution witnesses who were present at the scene did not in fact see appellant as the person
who allegedly shot the victim. Witness Marlon Manis was not certain that the person he saw walking away from
the fallen victim was appellant. As per Manis own admission, he merely presumed that it was appellant. As to
witness Annie Bayanes, her identification of appellant as the assailant was equally doubtful. The fact is she did not
see the alleged gunmans face, considering that the only illumination on the scene was a vehicles taillight. Appellant
stresses that both Bayanes and Manis were in a state of excitement and nervousness as a result of the incident,
hence the resultant commotion and fear distracted their powers of observation. Appellant insists that given these
considerations, the testimonies of Bayanes and Manis failed to show that he was at the scene of the crime, much
less prove that he was the gunman.
For the appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that the failure of Manis to see the actual
shooting is irrelevant, as such was not the purpose for which his testimony was offered in evidence. Rather, Manis
testimony was meant to provide circumstantial evidence tending to show the physical description of Nemesios
attacker, and not as an eyewitness testimony to positively identify said assailant. Neither was Bayanes presented
to testify as an eyewitness to the shooting, but to declare that she got a clear look at the face of the
suspected gunman.
We note that at the heart of the prosecutions case is the familiarity of Annie Bayanes and Marlon Manis with
appellant. Absent this familiarity, the prosecutions theory that circumstantial evidence shows that appellant killed
Nemesio would collapse like a house of cards. It was precisely this familiarity with appellant, which enabled said
witnesses to recognize him as the person tucking a gun in his waistband and walking away from the fallen victim.
Bayanes had known appellant for some ten (10) years before the incident and even described him as a good
man.[73] She was only five or six meters away from the scene of the crime and was able to fully look at the face of
the person tucking a gun in his pants and walking away. Familiarity with the physical features, particularly those
of the face, is actually the best way to identify the person.[74] That the only illumination in the area came from the
taillight of a parked vehicle and the lights on the roof of the bagsakan does not discredit her account. We have
held that moonlight,[75] starlight,[76] kerosene lamps,[77] a flashlight,[78] and lights of passing vehicles[79] may be
adequate to provide illumination sufficient for purposes of recognition and identification. Under the circumstances
of these cases, this Court believes that Bayanes was in the position and had a fair opportunity to identify appellant
as the person leaving the crime scene with a gun tucked in his waist.
Her testimony was buttressed by that of witness Marlon Manis. A former neighbor of appellant, he had
known appellant since 1993. He was a frequent customer at appellants bakery. In the rural areas, people tend to
be more familiar with their neighbors. This familiarity may extend to body movements, which cannot easily be
effaced from memory. Hence, Manis testimony that he could recognize appellant even just from his build and
manner of walking is not improbable. His declaration that he was some twenty-five (25) meters away from the
person walking away from the victim does not make recognition far-fetched. Once a person has gained familiarity
with another, identification is an easy task, even from that distance.[80]
Evidence should only be considered for the purpose it was formally offered.[81] As the Solicitor General points
out, the statements of Bayanes and Manis were not offered to positively identify appellant as the assailant, but to
provide circumstantial evidence concerning Nemesios assailant, tending to prove that appellant did shoot the
victim. Thus, the court a quo committed no reversible error in giving weight and credence to the testimonies of
Bayanes and Manis for the stated purposes therefor.
Appellant next assails the testimonies of the following prosecution witnesses: (1) Pauline Gumpic for being
inconsistent and flawed with contradictions; (2) Annie Bayanes and Julio Bayacsan for their unexplained delay in
giving their respective sworn statements to the police; and (3) Mona Barredo for flip-flopping with respect to the
alleged admission to her by appellant and how the police investigators knew about said admission, after she
claimed that she did not tell anyone about his revelation. Appellant submits that the trial court erred in giving
weight to the aforementioned testimonies.
For appellee, the OSG argues that with respect to Gumpics alleged contradictions, they refer only to
unimportant and collateral matters; they do not affect her credibility. With respect to the delay or vacillation by
Bayacsan and Bayanes in giving their statements to the authorities, the OSG points out that a reading of their
declarations in court will show that the alleged delay was adequately explained. As to Barredos testimony, a closer
reading of her supposed flip-flopping shows that the alleged contradictions were due to an honest
misapprehension of fact on her part.
When the issue boils down to the credibility of witnesses, the appellate court will not generally disturb the
findings of the trial court because the latter is in the vantage position of observing witnesses through the
various indicia of truthfulness or falsehood.[82] However, this rule is not absolute. One exception is where the judge
who wrote the decision did not personally hear the prosecutions evidence. [83] In this case, the records show that
Judge Angel V. Colet, who authored the assailed decision, took over from Judge Benigno M. Galacgac only on April
29, 1997 or after the witnesses for the prosecution had testified. It does not follow, however, that a judge who
was not present at the trial cannot render a just and valid judgment. The records and the transcripts of
stenographic notes are available to him as basis for his decision.
After going over the transcripts of the witnesses testimonies, we find no reason to disturb the findings of the
trial court. With respect to the statements of Gumpic, we agree with the Solicitor General that alleged
inconsistencies refer only to irrelevant and collateral matters, which have nothing to do with the elements of the
crime. It is axiomatic that slight variations in the testimony of a witness as to minor details or collateral matters do
not affect his or her credibility as these variations are in fact indicative of truth and show that the witness was not
coached to fabricate or dissemble.[84] An inconsistency, which has nothing to do with the elements of a crime, is
not a ground to reverse a conviction.[85]
We likewise find no basis for appellants contention that Bayanes and Bayacsan failed to give a satisfactory
explanation for the delay or vacillation in disclosing to the authorities what they knew.Bayanes gave a satisfactory
reason for her delay in reporting to the authorities what she knew. She had simply gone about her normal business
activities for some months, unaware that a case had been filed concerning the killing of Nemesio. It was only nine
(9) months after the incident that she read a notice for help posted by the victims relatives at the Trading Post,
appealing to possible witnesses to the killing to come forth and assist them in their quest for justice. It was only
then that she decided to reveal to the authorities what she knew.
As to Bayacsan, he candidly admitted in court that he considered appellant his friend and he wanted to
protect him and hence, he only disclosed appellants admission to him when the police started questioning him.
There is no rule that the suspect in a crime should immediately be named by a witness. [86] Different people react
differently to a given situation and there is no standard form of human behavior when one is confronted with a
strange, startling, or frightful experience.[87] The Court understands the natural reluctance or aversion of some
people to get involved in a criminal case.[88] More so where, as in these cases, a townmate of Bayanes and Bayacsan
is involved. We have taken notice that when their townmates are involved in a criminal case, most people turn
64
reticent.[89]Hence, the failure of Bayanes and Bayacsan to immediately volunteer information to the police
investigators will not lessen the probative value of their respective testimonies. The delay, having been
satisfactorily explained, has no effect on their credibility.[90]
We have likewise closely scrutinized the testimony of Mona Barredo regarding the alleged admission by
appellant to her that he killed the victim. We find nothing flip-flopping about her testimony. Instead, we find a
witness who admitted she was nervous that she might not be able to answer all the questions. [91] Said nervousness
was engendered by her erroneous belief that to be a credible witness, she must have personal knowledge of the
crime.[92] Even the most candid witnesses make mistakes and may give some contradictory or inconsistent
statements, but such honest lapses need not necessarily affect their credibility. Ample margin should be accorded
a witness who is tension-filled with the novelty of testifying before a court.[93]
Appellant further contends that the trial court erred in giving credence to the verbal admissions of guilt he
made to Gumpic and SPO4 Bomagao inside the police station since said admissions are inadmissible in evidence
as uncounseled confessions.
The OSG submits that said verbal admissions of complicity, as well as those made to appellant to Bayacsan
and Barredo, are admissible as statements forming part of the res gestae. We agree on this point with the OSG.
The requisites of res gestae are: (1) the principal act or res gestae must be a startling occurrence; (2) the
statement is spontaneous or was made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise a false statement, and
the statement was made during the occurrence or immediately prior or subsequent to thereto; and (3) the
statement made must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances.[94] All
these elements are present in appellants verbal admission to Barredo that he killed the victim when he went to
the latters house half an hour after the fatal shooting of Nemesio.
The verbal admission by appellant to Barredo was made before appellant had the time and opportunity to
contrive a falsehood. Similar statements have been held to be part of the res gestae: (1) a childs declaration made
an hour after an alleged assault;[95] (2) the testimony of a police officer as to what the victim revealed to him some
30 minutes after the commission of an alleged crime;[96]and (3) a victims declaration made some 5 to 10 minutes
after an alleged felony took place.[97] Note that since appellants admission was not solicited by police officers in
the course of a custodial investigation, but was made to a private person, the provisions of the Bill of Rights on
custodial investigation do not apply. The Rules of Court[98] provides that an admission made to a private person is
admissible in evidence against the declarant.[99]
Prosecutions evidence here is admittedly circumstantial. But in the absence of an eyewitness, reliance on
circumstantial evidence is inevitable.[100] Resort thereto is essential when the lack of direct evidence would result
in setting a felon free.[101]
Circumstantial evidence suffices to convict if the following requisites are met: (1) there is more than one
circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. [102] In our mind, the following pieces
of circumstantial evidence show with moral certainty that appellant was responsible for the death of Nemesio:
1. Appellant had the motive to kill Nemesio Lopate for having an affair with his wife, and appellant had openly
expressed his desire and intention to do so;
2. At around 10:00 p.m. of March 10, 1996, Annie Bayanes and Marlon Manis heard two gun shots at the Trading
Post, La Trinidad, Benguet and saw Nemesio Lopate fall to the ground;
3. Bayanes saw appellant behind the victim, tucking a gun into his waistband, and walking away;
4. From another angle, Manis also saw a person whose gait and built resembled that of appellant walking away
from the crime scene;
5. At around 10:30 p.m. of March 10, 1996, appellant went to the house of Mona Barredo, brought out a handgun,
emptied it of two spent .38 caliber shells and instructed Barredo to throw the shells out of the window, which she
did;
6. Appellant then told Barredo that he had shot and killed his wifes paramour, after which he stayed at Barredos
house for the night;
7. On March 11, 1996, Dr. Doris C. Jovellanos, Municipal Health Officer of La Trinidad, Benguet recovered a .38
caliber slug from Nemesios corpse and found two (2) bullet entry wounds on the said cadaver;
8. On March 18, 1996, police investigators, assisted by Barredo, recovered two (2) spent .38 caliber shells from
Barredos sweet potato patch, immediately outside her residence wherein appellant had slept a week before.
The foregoing circumstances clearly show that appellant had the motive, the opportunity, and the means to
commit the crime at the place and time in question. Simply put, the circumstantial evidence adduced by the
prosecution has successfully overcome the claim of innocence by appellant. Under the proved circumstances,
appellants defense of alibi is untenable. More so, in this situation where prosecution witness Bayanes unflinchingly
declared that she saw appellant standing behind the victim, tucking a gun in his pants, moments after the latter
was shot. As we held in People v. Salveron,[103] and reiterated in People v. Sesbreo,[104] where an eyewitness saw
the accused with a gun, seconds after the gunshot and after the victim fell to the ground, the reasonable conclusion
is that said accused killed the victim.
Appellants alibi cannot prevail over the positive testimony of Bayanes concerning appellants identification
and presence at the crime scene. Basic is the rule that for alibi to prosper, the accused must prove that he was
somewhere else when the crime was committed and that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the
scene of the crime.[105] Physical impossibility refers to the distance between the place where the appellant was
when the crime transpired and the place where it was committed, as well as the facility of access between the two
places.[106] In these cases, the defense admitted that the distance between La Trinidad, Benguet and Kayapa, Nueva
Vizcaya is 79 kilometers, which can be negotiated in 4 or 5 hours. [107] Clearly, it was not physically impossible for
appellant to be at the locus criminis at the time of the killing. Hence, the defense of alibi must fail.
In sum, we find that the prosecutions evidence suffices to sustain the appellants conviction for homicide.
3. Crime and its Punishment
As appellant can only be convicted of homicide, it follows that he cannot, under the provisions of RA No.
7659, be sentenced to suffer the death penalty. The penalty for homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal
Code is reclusion temporal. Our task now is to determine whether there are aggravating or mitigating
circumstances which could modify the penalty.
65
 More specifically, may the special aggravating circumstance of use of an unlicensed firearm be taken against
the appellant?
Appellant argues that the trial court erred in appreciating the special aggravating circumstance of use of
unlicensed firearm in the present case. Like the killing, said aggravating circumstance must likewise be proved
beyond reasonable doubt, says the appellant. On this point, he adds, the prosecution failed to adduce the
necessary quantum of proof.
We find merit in the appellants contentions. It is not enough that the special aggravating circumstance of
use of unlicensed firearm be alleged in the information, the matter must be proven with the same quantum of
proof as the killing itself. Thus, the prosecution must prove: (1) the existence of the subject firearm; and (2) the
fact that the accused who owned or possessed it does not have the corresponding license or permit to own or
possess the same.[108] The records do not show that the prosecution presented any evidence to prove that
appellant is not a duly licensed holder of a caliber .38 firearm. The prosecution failed to offer in evidence a
certification from the Philippine National Police Firearms and Explosives Division to show that appellant had no
permit or license to own or possess a .38 caliber handgun. Nor did it present the responsible police officer on the
matter of licensing as a prosecution witness. Absent the proper evidentiary proof, this Court cannot validly declare
that the special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm was satisfactorily established by the
prosecution. Hence such special circumstance cannot be considered for purposes of imposing the penalty in its
maximum period.
Coming now to the obverse side of the case, is the appellant entitled to benefit from any mitigating
circumstance?
Appellant, firstly contends that assuming without admitting that he is guilty, the lower court should have
considered at least the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave offense as well as that of
passion and obfuscation. Appellant points out that the victims act of maintaining an adulterous relationship with
appellants wife constituted a grave offense to his honor, not to mention the shame, anguish, and anxiety he was
subjected to. Even the mere sight of the victim must have triggered an uncontrollable emotional outburst on
appellants part, so that even a chance meeting caused in him an irresistible impulse powerful enough to overcome
all reason and restraint. Secondly, appellant points out that the trial court failed to consider his voluntary surrender
as a mitigating circumstance.
The Solicitor General counters that there was literally no immediate vindication to speak of in this
case. Appellant had sufficient time to recover his serenity following the discovery of his wifes infidelity. Nor could
passion and obfuscation be appreciated in appellants favor because the killing was not proximate to the time of
the offense. Appellant became aware of the treatment offensive to his dignity as a husband and to the peace and
tranquility of his home two weeks earlier. This interval between the revelation of his wifes adultery and the fatal
shooting was ample and sufficient for reason and self-control to reassert themselves in appellants mind. As to the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, the OSG stresses that his supposed surrender at Kayapa, Nueva
Vizcaya was actually due to the efforts of law enforcers who came looking for him. There he did not resist, but lack
of resistance alone is not tantamount to voluntary surrender, which denotes a positive act and not merely passive
conduct.
According to the OSG, for the mitigating circumstance of vindication of a grave offense to apply, the
vindication must be immediate. This view is not entirely accurate. The word immediate in the English text is not
the correct translation of the controlling Spanish text of the Revised Penal Code, which uses the
word proxima.[109] The Spanish text, on this point, allows a lapse of time between the grave offense and the actual
vindication.[110] Thus, in an earlier case involving the infidelity of a wife, the killing of her paramour prompted
proximately though not immediately by the desire to avenge the wrong done, was considered an extenuating
circumstance in favor of the accused.[111] The time elapsed between the offense and the suspected cause for
vindication, however, involved only hours and minutes, not days. Hence, we agree with the Solicitor General that
the lapse of two (2) weeks between his discovery of his wifes infidelity and the killing of her supposed paramour
could no longer be considered proximate. The passage of a fortnight is more than sufficient time for appellant to
have recovered his composure and assuaged the unease in his mind. The established rule is that there can be no
immediate vindication of a grave offense when the accused had sufficient time to recover his serenity. [112] Thus, in
this case, we hold that the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave offense cannot be
considered in appellants favor.
We likewise find the alleged mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation inexistent. The rule is that
the mitigating circumstances of vindication of a grave offense and passion and obfuscation cannot be claimed at
the same time, if they arise from the same facts or motive.[113] In other words, if appellant attacked his victim in
proximate vindication of a grave offense, he could no longer claim in the same breath that passion and obfuscation
also blinded him. Moreover, for passion and obfuscation to be well founded, the following requisites must concur:
(1) there should be an act both unlawful and sufficient to produce such condition of mind; and (2) the act which
produced the obfuscation was not far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time,
during which the perpetrator might recover his moral equanimity.[114] To repeat, the period of two (2) weeks which
spanned the discovery of his wifes extramarital dalliance and the killing of her lover was sufficient time for
appellant to reflect and cool off.
Appellant further argues that the lower court erred in failing to consider voluntary surrender as a mitigating
circumstance. On this point, the following requirements must be satisfied: (1) the offender has not actually been
arrested; (2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority; and (3) the surrender was
voluntary.[115] Records show, however, that leaflets and posters were circulated for information to bring the killer
of Nemesio to justice. A team of police investigators from La Trinidad, Benguet then went to Kayapa, Nueva Vizcaya
to invite appellant for questioning. Only then did he return to Benguet. But he denied the charge of killing the
victim. Clearly, appellants claimed surrender was neither spontaneous nor voluntary.
Absent any aggravating or mitigating circumstance for the offense of homicide the penalty imposable under
Art. 64 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the penalty which could actually be imposed on appellant is an indeterminate prison term consisting of eight
(8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal as maximum.
4. Proper Award of Damages
Appellant and the Solicitor General are one in contending that the trial court awarded excessive actual
damages without adequate legal basis. Thus, the amount of P150,000.00 was awarded for funeral and burial
expenses without any supporting evidence on record.[116] This cannot be sustained in this review. In order for
actual damages to be recovered, the amount of loss must not only be capable of proof but must actually be proven
with reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof or best evidence obtainable of the actual
amount thereof, such as receipts or other documents to support the claim.[117] The records clearly show in this
case that only the amount of P7,000 as funeral expenses was duly supported by a receipt.[118] Hence, the award of
actual damages should be limited to P7,000 only.
66
 Appellant further contests the award of P2,040,000 for loss of earning capacity as unconscionable. Since the Appellant June Ignas y Sanggino is ORDERED TO PAY the heirs of the victim, Nemesio Lopate, the following
victims widow could not present any income tax return of her husband to substantiate her claim that his net sums: a) P7,000 as actual damages; b) P1,020,000 for loss of earning capacity; c) P50,000 as civil indemnity;
income was P60,000 annually, then according to appellant, there is no basis for this award at all. At best, appellant d) P25,000 as temperate damages; and e) P20,000 as attorneys fees. Costs de oficio.
says, only temperate or nominal damages may be awarded.
SO ORDERED.
The OSG responds that the award for loss of earning capacity has adequate basis as the prosecution
presented sufficient evidence on the productivity of the landholdings being tilled by the deceased and the
investments made by the Lopate family from their income. Hence, said the OSG, it was not a product of sheer
conjecture or speculation. Nonetheless, the OSG submits that the original amount of P1,800,000 for loss of earning
capacity should be restored as it is this amount which takes into account only a reasonable portion of annual net
income which would have been received as support by the heirs.

In setting said award at P2,040,000, amended from P1,800,000, for lost earnings, the trial court took note of
the following factors in its computations:

The Death Certificate of Nemesio Lopate shows that he died at the age of 29. [119] His widows detailed
testimony shows that their average annual net income from vegetable farming was P60,000.[120] The victims share
of the annual net income from the couples farm is half thereof, or P30,000. Using the American Expectancy Table
of Mortality, the life expectancy of the victim at age 29 is set at 34 years.

Therefore, total loss of Earning Capacity (X) should be computed as follows:

X = 2/3 (80-29) x P30,000

X = 2/3 (51) x P30,000

X = 34 x P30,000

X = P1,020,000

This amount should form part of the damages awarded to the heirs.

We sustain the award of P50,000 as indemnity ex delicto. But there being no testimony or other proof
thereon, the award of P50,000 as moral damages cannot now be sustained. Instead, temperate damages in the
amount of P25,000 should be awarded.

The award of P20,000 in attorneys fees should be maintained. Records show that the victims widow had to
hire the services of a private prosecutor to actively prosecute the civil aspect of this case,[121] and in line with Article
2208 of the Civil Code,[122] reasonable attorney fees may be duly recovered.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, Benguet, Branch 8, in Criminal Case
No. 96-CR-2522 is MODIFIED as follows:

Appellant June Ignas y Sanggino is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of HOMICIDE as
defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.There being neither aggravating
nor mitigating circumstance, he is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one
(1) day of prision mayor as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal as maximum.

67
G.R. Nos. 54344-45 January 10, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
WILLIE AMAGUIN, GILDO AMAGUIN AND CELSO AMAGUIN, accused.
WILLIE AMAGUIN AND GILDO AMAGUIN, accused-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Sixto P. Demaisip for accused-appellants.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
The coup de main on the Oro brood sent two brothers to the mortuary and a third to medical care. The bloodbath
resulted in the brothers Willie, Gildo and Celso, all surnamed Amaguin, being charged with the murder of the Oro
brothers Pacifico and Diosdado. Willie and Gildo went through trial while Celso to this date remains a fugitive.
The culpability of the Amaguin brothers was recounted by Hernando Oro, a younger brother of Pacifico and
Diosdado. Hernando narrated that in the afternoon of 24 May 1977, he and his brothers Diosdado and Danilo,
brother-in-law Rafael Candelaria, an first cousin Sergio Argonzola were invited by their eldest brother Pacifico to
the latter's house in the interior of Divinagracia Street, La Paz, Iloilo City, for a small gathering to celebrate the
town fiesta.1 At about five o'clock in the afternoon, after partaking of the meager preparations put together by
Pacifico, he (Hernando) and his companions decided to leave. They were accompanied by their host to the plaza
where they could get a ride.
On their way, while traversing Divinagracia Street, Pacifico was called by accused Celso Amaguin : "Pare, come
here." But Pacifico answered : "Pare, not yet because I have to conduct my guests first." Immediately, Celso, with
a butcher's knife in hand, rushed towards Pacifico. Gildo, Celso's younger brother, with a knife tucked to his waist,
followed with a slingshot known as "Indian pana" or "Indian target". While Gildo aimed the dart from his slingshot
at Danilo, which hit the latter on the chest, Celso hacked Pacifico. Gildo then stabbed Diosdado with a knife.
Thereafter, Willie, the eldest of the Amaguin brothers, appeared with a handgun and successively shot the brothers
Pacifico, Diosdado and the fleeing Danilo. Diosdado, own kneeling, gasping for breath and pleading for his life, was
again shot by Willie who next fired anew at Pacifico. Meanwhile, Gildo and Celso repeatedly stabbed Pacifico who
already lying prostrate and defenseless.2
Danilo Oro, the youngest of the Oros, likewise testified. He said that at around five o'clock in the afternoon of 24
May 1977, while walking along Divinagracia Street on their way to the plaza for ride home with his three brothers
and two others, they were waylaid by Celso, Willie and Gildo, their cousin Danny, all surnamed Amaguin, and
several others. Celso placed an arm on the shoulder of Pacifico and stabbed him with a knife. 3 Then there was a
clash between the two groups. In a split second, he (Danilo) was hit on the left chest by a dart from the slingshot
of Gildo whom he saw aiming at him. He (Danilo) pulled the dart from his chest and ran away but was hit on the
lips by a bullet. Then he was pushed by Hernando to seek cover.4
Rafael Candelaria, a brother-in-law of the Oros, also took the witness stand. His version was that while he, his
brothers-in-law and one Sergio Argonzola were walking along Divinagracia Street that afternoon, two men
approached them. Without any provocation, one suddenly stabbed him. After being hit on the left arm, he
immediately fled to the plaza where he flagged down a passing cab to take him to the hospital. He did not see
what happened next to his companions.5
The defense however maintains that it was the Oro brothers who started the fight. Accused Gildo Amaguin
recounted that on 24 May 1977, at about five o'clock in the afternoon, Pacifico with five others went to their house
in Divinagracia Street, La Paz, Iloilo City, and approached his brother Celso, who was waiting for his wife at the foot
of the stairs. While Pacifico was talking to Celso, a companion of Pacifico came forward, held Celso by the shoulder
and said : "This is the bravest man in Divinagracia Street, the Amaguin." Meanwhile, another companion of Pacifico
gave Celso a flying kick that sent him reeling. Gildo then went down the house shouting : "Don't fight." However,
the attackers drew their knives and slingshots. In return, Celso pulled out his knife. Since one of the companions
of Pacifico lunged at him, Gildo retreated to the other side of the road and threw stones at his attackers.
Meanwhile, he saw his cousin Danny hit Danilo Oro with a dart from a slingshot. But later Danny himself was
stabbed from behind by one of Pacifico's companions. Then Ernie Ortigas, a guest of Celso, emerged from the
Amaguin residence holding a revolver. Ernie initially fired three warning shots, after which he successively shot
Pacifico and a person who tried to stab the former as well as an identified companion of Pacifico. Later, both Ernie
Ortigas and Celso Amaguin escaped towards the railway tracks.6 The following day, he was brought by his uncle to
the PC authorities in Fort San Pedro for "safe-keeping" and turned over to the local police after a week.
The story of Gildo was confirmed by Vicente Belicano7 and Nilda Tagnong,8 long-time residents of Divinagracia
Street, and Nenita Amaguin, mother of the accused brothers, who even affirmed that her son Celso was indeed
troublesome,9 but added that Willie "never had any brush with the
law." 10
On his part, Willie related that he was in the house of his uncle along Divinagracia Street that afternoon drinking
with some friends. He left the group after hearing some explosions coming from the direction of his mother's
house and then seeing his cousin Danny, with a stab wound at the back, being taken by two policemen, and his
wounded brother Gildo running towards the plaza. Thus, he went to his mother's residence to find out what
happened. But when he got there, the incident had already ended. As a consequence, he was told by his mother
to look for his two brothers who were wounded in the fight and to take them to the hospital.11 He turned himself
in after five days, upon learning that law enforcers were looking for him.
Ulpiano Vencer, Rogelio de la Paz and Pat Jereos all confirmed that accused Willie only left their gathering after
the explosions were heard, and only after seeing his wounded brother Gildo and his cousin Danny, who was in the
company of two policemen, pass by.
Perla Belleza, a vegetable vendor in the La Paz Public Market, also testified that after hearing six explosions, she
saw an unidentified man with a revolver running away from the scene of the crime, followed by accused Celso who
was holding a knife. She was certain that the unidentified man was not accused Willie as the latter was very well
known to her, she being a former neighbor of the Amaguins. 12
68
Dr. Tito Doromal, Asst. Medico-Legal Officer, Iloilo Metropolitan District Command, INP, conducted an autopsy on
Pacifico and Diosdado. He declared that out of the 15 stab wounds and one gunshot wound Pacifico sustained, five
of the stab wounds were fatal. With regard to Diosdado, four (4) stab wounds, out of the ten (10), and the lone
bullet he had sustained were considered fatal. 13
After a joint trial, and finding the version of the prosecution to be more credible, the then Court of First Instance
of Iloilo, Br. II, 14 found the accused Gildo Amaguin, also known as "Tigib," guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Murder, and . . . sentenced (him) to Reclusion Perpetua, both in Criminal Cases Nos. 8041 and 8042,
together with all the accessory penalties, and to pay the costs."
As regards Willie Amaguin alias "Tikboy," the trial court found him guilty "as accomplice in both Criminal Cases
8041 and 8042, and . . . sentenced (him) to an indeterminate penalty of Seventeen (17) Years, Four (4) Months,
and One (1) Day to Twenty (20) Years each in said cases together with all the accessory penalties, and to pay the
costs."
Both accused were "further sentenced to indemnify the heirs of the late Pacifico Oro and Diosdado Oro, jointly
and severally in the total sum of P24,000.00 as death compensation; P20,000.00 (as) moral damages; P10,000.00
(as) exemplary damages; and P5,000.00 for burial expenses, in both Criminal cases nos. 8041 and 8042."
In this appeal, accused Willie Amaguin and Gildo Amaguin claim that the court a quo erred: (a) in categorizing the
offense/s as murder; (b) in finding Willie Amaguin to be the person involved in the incident; (c) in holding that
there was conspiracy between the brothers Gildo and Celso Amaguin (the latter is at large); (d) in finding Gildo
Amaguin to be armed with a knife and an Indian target when he was only armed with stones; and, (e) even
assuming the accused to be guilty, in not holding them responsible for their individual acts, and in not appreciating
the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. 15
Before disposing of the other issues raised by appellants, we resolve the second and fourth assigned errors first to
determine which of the two conflicting versions of the incident deserves credence. Their resolution rests upon the
credibility of the witnesses who have come forward, a matter addressed to the sound judgment of the trial court
which is in a better position to decide them, it having heard the witnesses and observed their deportment and
manner of testifying during the trial. Consequently, the assessment of the trial judge is usually received with
respect, if not conclusiveness, on appeal unless there is a showing of arbitrariness. Always, this has been the
familiar rule. 16
In the instant case, the trial court has accepted as credible the testimonies of Hernando and Danilo Oro who
positively identified accused Celso and Gildo Amaguin as having started the assault on the Oro brothers with the
use of a knife and an "Indian pana," and accused Willie Amaguin as the gunwielder who shot the brothers Pacifico,
Diosdado and Danilo during the fray. We see no reason to disregard the assessment. We simply cannot set aside
the factual findings of the trial court absent any showing of capriciousness on its part.
The defense belittles the testimony of Hernando Oro pointing to accused Willie Amaguin as the gunman as it stands
"singly and alone," in contrast to the declaration of the defense witnesses exonerating Willie and Gildo. While the
defense may have presented a number of witnesses who, as the trial court puts it, "virtually 'sang' in a chorus that
the killers (Celso and Danny Amaguin and a certain Ernie Ortigas) not the two accused herein (Willie and Gildo
Amaguin)," 17 still the trial judge had the opportunity, as well as the right and responsibility, to assess their
credibility — just like all other witnesses. After all, there is no law which requires that the testimony of a single
witness needs corroboration except when the law so expressly requires. As it is often said, witnesses are to be
weighed, not numbered. If credible and positive, the testimony of a single witness is sufficient to convict. 18 Indeed
the determination of the credibility of witnesses is the trial court's domain, hence, we respect its factual findings.
For, even the respective defenses of the accused, i.e., accused Willie Amaguin's alibi that he did not participate in
the fray and that he was in the nearby house of his uncle drinking with his friends, and accused Gildo Amaguin's
denial that he was unarmed but later forced to hurl stones to defend himself, are without sound basis. Alibi is one
of the weakest defenses that can be resorted to especially where there is direct testimony of an eyewitness, not
only because it is inherently weak and unreliable but also because of the ease of its fabrication and the difficulty
of checking and rebutting it.19 Besides, alibi to be believed must be supported by the physical impossibility of the
accused to have been at the scene of the crime. 20 And as in an alibi, a denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and
convincing evidence, is a negative and self-serving evidence which deserves no weight in law and cannot be given
greater evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.21 Thus, as
between a mere denial of the accused and the positive identification and detailed declarations of the prosecution
witnesses, the trial court committed no error in according heavier weight to the latter. 22
Hence, this version of the prosecution prevails: Celso and Gildo, together with others, attacked the Oros. During
the fray, Gildo was armed with a knife and an "Indian target." And just as they were about to finish off the Oro
brothers, Willie, the eldest of the Amaguins, appeared with a revolver and delivered the coup de grace.
The factual setting having been settled, we now go to the first assigned error , i.e., thwt the lower court erred in
categorizing the offense as murder there being no treachery since "the combatants were face to face" and
"[c]onfronting each other frontally . . . that each will know each other's next move." 23 Except for appellants'
premise, the argument has merit. The killing of Pacifico and Diosdado cannot be qualified by treachery.
While we have already ruled that even a frontal attack can be treacherous, as when it is sudden and unexpected
and the victim is unarmed, 24 here, it appears that the aggressors did not employ means tending directly and
specially to ensure the execution of the crime without risk to themselves arising from the defense which the
offended parties might take.
It must be noted that the assailants attacked a group of six (6) individuals who could have been armed.
It is highly probable that at least one of those attacked could offer resistance and could put the lives of the
aggressors in danger, as what indeed happened when accused-appellant Gildo Amaguin and his cousin Danny
suffered injuries as a result of the fight which, from all indications, ended in a free-for-all. That Pacifico sustained
15 stab wounds and a gunshot wound, and Diosdado, ten stab wounds and a bullet wound, does not necessarily
mean that treachery attended the killings. As already adverted to, for treachery to be appreciated, the offender
must employ means, methods, or forms in the commission of the crime which tend directly and specially to insure
its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might take. 25 Here, there
is serious doubt.
On the third assigned error, i.e., that there was conspiracy between Gildo and Celso, who remains at large, the
evidence shows how Celso and Gildo simultanously assaulted the Oro brothers. While Celso lunged at Pacifico,
Gildo aimed his slingshot at Danilo who was hit by its dart, and immediately
69
attacked Pacifico with a knife. Under the circumstances, it is evident that Gildo and Celso acted in unison and
cooperated with each other toward the accomplishment of a common felonious objective. Certainly, there was
conspiracy between the brothers Gildo and Celso, and it was not necessary to prove a previous agreement to
commit the crime since from their overt acts, it was clear that they acted in concert in the pursuit of their unlawful
design.
However, it was error to rule that accused Willie was an accomplice to his brothers. There being no sufficient
evidence to link him to the conspiracy, he should be liable for the natural and logical consequence of his own
felonious acts. Hence, we take exception to the conclusion of the trial court that Pacifico and Diosdado did not die
due to the gunshot wounds inflicted by Willie.
Dr. Tito Doromal, the medico-legal officer who autopsied the bodies of Pacifico and Diosdado, testified that while
the gunshot wound sustained by Pacifico was not fatal, that suffered by Diosdado was fatal.26
Consequently, in Crim. Case No. 8041, where Willie mortally shot Diosdado, he should be liable for homicide. And,
since Diosdado was already on bended knees and pleading for his life when fatally shot, the aggravating
circumstance of the abuse of superior strength, although not alleged in the information but proven during the trial,
may be considered as a generic aggravating circumstance. 27
In Crim. Case No. 8042, where Willie shot Pacifico while lying prostrate already with numerous fatal stab wounds,
Willie should be liable for frustrated homicide it appearing that the gunshot wound was not fatal although his
intent to kill was evident. Likewise, the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength may be appreciated
as a generic aggravating circumstance.
Finally, we agree with accused-appellants' view that voluntary surrender should be appreciated in their favor.
While it may have taken both Willie and Gildo a week before turning themselves in, the fact is, they voluntarily
surrendered to the police authorities before arrest could be effected. For voluntary surrender to be appreciated
as a mitigating circumstance, the following elements must be present: (a) the offender has not been actually
arrested; (b) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority; and (c) the surrender must be
voluntary. 28 All these requisites appear to have attended their surrender.
Now, we turn to the penalties.
In Crim. Cases Nos. 8041 and 8042, Gildo Amaguin is guilty of two (2) separate crimes of homicide for the death of
Diosdado and Pacifico, respectively. The penalty prescribed by law for homicide is reclusion
temporal. 29 Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and appreciating the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender with no aggravating circumstance, the maximum penalty to be imposed on accused Gildo Amaguin for
each of the homicide he has committed, which he must serve successively, should be taken from the minimum of
the imposable penalty, which is reclusion temporal the range of the minimum period of which is twelve (12) years
and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months, while the minimum should be taken from the penalty
next lower in degree, which is prision mayor the full range of which is six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12)
years, in any of its periods.
In Crim. case No. 8041, Willie Amaguin is guilty of homicide aggravated by abuse of superior strength but offset by
the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, and in Crim. Case No. 8042, he is guilty of frustrated homicide
likewise aggravated by abuse of superior strength but offset by voluntary surrender. For the homicide, applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law and taking into account the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender
which, as earlier mentioned, offsets the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength, the maximum
penalty should be taken from the medium of the imposable penalty, which is reclusion temporal the range of the
medium period of which is fourteen (14) years eight (8) months and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four
(4) months, while the minimum should be taken from the penalty next lower in degree which is prision mayor in
any of its periods.
For the frustrated homicide, the imposable penalty is one degree lower than the penalty prescribed by law for the
consummated offense, and one degree lower than reclusion temporal is prision mayor. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law and the attending circumstances which offset each other, the maximum penalty to
be imposed should be taken from the medium of the imposable penalty, which is prision mayor the range of the
medium period of which is eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years, while the minimum should be taken
from the penalty next lower in degree, which is prision correccional the full range of which is six (6) months and
one (1) day to six (6) years, in any of its periods.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo finding the accused-appellants WILLIE AMAGUIN and GILDO
AMAGUIN guilty in Crim. Cases Nos. 8041 and 8042 is MODIFIED as follows:
(a) accused-appellant WILLIE AMAGUIN is found guilty of HOMICIDE in Crim. Case No. 8041 and is sentenced to six
(6) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision mayor minimum as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8)
months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal medium as maximum, and of FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE in Crim.
Case No. 8042 and is sentenced to six (6) months and twenty (20) days of prision correccional minimum as
minimum, to eight (8) years, four (4) months and ten (10) days of prision mayor as maximum, to be served
successively;.
(b) accused-appellant GILDO AMAGUIN is found guilty of two (2) separate crimes of HOMICIDE in Crim. Cases Nos.
8041 and 8042 and is sentenced to six (6) years two (2) months and one (1) day of prision mayor minimum as
minimum, to twelve (12) years, six (6) months and ten (10) days of reclusion temporal minimum as maximum, for
each homicide, to be served successively;
(c) in Crim. Case No. 8041, accused-appellants WILLIE AMAGUIN and GILDO AMAGUIN are declared jointly and
severally liable to the heirs of Diosdado Oro for P50,000.00 as civil indemnity consistent with prevailing
jurisprudence; and,
(d) in Crim. case No. 8042, accused-appellant GILDO AMAGUIN is liable to the heirs of Pacifico Oro for P50,000.00
as civil indemnity.
Costs against accused-appellants WILLIE AMAGUIN and GILDO AMAGUIN in both cases.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Davide, Jr. and Quiason, JJ., concur.
70
G.R. No. L-80845 March 14, 1994 This is a case where three accused were allegedly responsible for forcibly taking things from
the storeroom of the Bukidnon National School of Home Industries.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs. It was established by the prosecution that the storeroom of the Bukidnon National School of
HON. ERNESTO M. MENDOZA, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Malaybalay, Bukidnon, Branch 10, and Home Industries at Maramag, Bukidnon, on January 20, 1987 was ransacked as shown by the
JUAN MAGALOP y SALVACION, respondents. testimonies of the policemen and by the keepers of the storeroom. After on the spot
investigation, the policemen were at a loss to identify the person or persons responsible
The Solicitor General for petitioner. thereof.

Public Attorney's Office for private respondent. Except for the accused Juan Magalop who pleaded guilty, the identity of the perpetrators
remained a problem. Accused Ricarte Dahilan is mentally deranged; hence the trial was
separate for accused Petronilo Fernandez and Juan Magalop.

As shown by the evidence of the prosecution, some of the stolen things were in the possession
BELLOSILLO, J.:
of a certain Babie Tan, consisting of two pliers and a saw, and these were all allegedly sold to
said Babie Tan who refused to testify on the matter.
This is a petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal (now Provincial Prosecutor)
of Malaybalay, Bukidnon, in behalf of the People of the Philippines, assailing the judgment of respondent Judge
The evidence of the prosecution failed to prove that the three accused were responsible for
Ernesto M. Mendoza in Crim. Case No. 4264 acquitting accused Juan Magalop y Salvacion, private respondent
stealing these three articles or tools.
herein, of the crime of robbery with force upon things notwithstanding his plea of guilt. Petitioner prays that
respondent Judge be ordered to reverse his judgment exonerating Magalop and, instead, to impose upon him the
proper penalty for the offense to which he pleaded guilty. Although Juan Magalop pleaded guilty, it was not shown who (how?) they conspired and
helped each other in the commission of the crime charged. To the Court, the plea of Juan
Magalop was not intelligently done. In the course of the proceedings, it was not established
The evidence discloses that on 20 January 1987, the storeroom of the Bukidnon National School of Home Industries
how Juan Magalop and Petronilo Fernandez participated in the looting. No evidence was
(BNSHI) in Maramag, Bukidnon, was ransacked. After an on-the-spot investigation, the police found themselves at
introduced to show that the accused sold the stolen things to Babie Tan, which the prosecution
a loss as to the identity of the culprit or culprits. The value of the missing articles was estimated at P15,298.15.
could have proved to show that the possessors of the stolen things could have been identified
as the thief or thieves; hence, the prosecution utterly failed to prove the guilt of the accused
Eventually, responsibility for the robbery with force upon things was laid on accused Juan Magalop y Salvacion, beyond doubt (emphasis supplied).
Petronilo Fernandez y Cano and Ricarte Dahilan alias Ricky. All three (3) were represented by District Citizens
Attorney Isidro L. Caracol. At the arraignment on 23 June 1987, Magalop pleaded "guilty" while Fernandez pleaded
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the accused Petronilo Fernandez and Juan Magalop are hereby
"not guilty." The arraignment of Dahilan was deferred as he was "not mentally well."
ACQUITTED. With respect to Ricarte Dahilan, let this case be held in abeyance until he is
mentally well.1
Instead of pronouncing judgment on Magalop, the court a quo conducted trial. The prosecution presented Pat.
Jakosalem, INP, who investigated the break-in, as well as a clerk and a storekeeper of the BNSHI. The prosecution
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner is now before us contending that the decision of 8
likewise offered in evidence colored pictures of the ransacked storeroom, a pair of ordinary pliers colored blue, a
October 1987 and the order of 4 November 1987 denying reconsideration are "purely capricious and arbitrary,
pair of long-nose pliers colored red, and a coping saw. The last three items were said to have been recovered by
made for no proper reason at all and rendered without legal authority whatsoever, thereby amounting to lack of
the police.
jurisdiction and/or grave abuse of discretion, and curtailed the power of the state to punish criminals."2

The defense having opted to waive its right to present evidence, the case was submitted for decision.
Petitioner submits that the accused Magalop, who was assisted by counsel, had voluntarily, spontaneously and
intelligently pleaded guilty to the crime of robbery with force upon things. Thus, the trial court had no alternative
On 8 October 1987, respondent Judge acquitted accused Fernandez as well as Magalop who earlier pleaded guilty but to pronounce judgment and impose the proper penalty.
to the charge. The two-paged, single-spaced judgment is quoted hereunder for careful scrutiny and better
appreciation. Thus —
Parenthetically, petitioner interposed no objection to the acquittal of accused Fernandez.

71
It may be stressed that the petition is defective since it was filed by the Provincial Fiscal and Assistant Provincial
Fiscal of Malaybalay, Bukidnon, and not by the Solicitor General. We have already ruled in a number of cases that
only the Solicitor General may bring or defend actions on behalf of the People of the Philippines once such actions
are brought before the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court.3 As a matter of fact, in his Manifestation filed with
this Court on 8 June 1989, the Solicitor General steered away from the case, explaining that the petition was filed
directly by the Provincial Fiscal of Malaybalay, Bukidnon, "without coursing it through the OSG," as a consequence
of which it should be the fiscal who should submit the required pleadings.
Nonetheless, even if we overlook this procedural lapse and treat the case on the merits, the petition should, just
the same, be dismissed.
Petitioner would have this Court set aside the acquittal of Magalop, insisting that with his voluntary plea of guilt,
the trial court had no other recourse but to pronounce judgment and impose the proper penalty.
The essence of a plea of guilty is that the accused admits his guilt freely, voluntarily and with full knowledge and
understanding of the precise nature of the crime charged in the information as well as the consequences of his
plea.4 It is an unconditional admission of guilt with respect to the offense charged. It forecloses the right to defend
oneself from said charge and leaves the court with no alternative but to impose the penalty fixed by law under the
circumstances.5 Thus, under the 1985 New Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, when the accused pleads
guilty to a non-capital offense, the court may receive evidence from the parties to determine the penalty to be
imposed.6
plea of Magalop was not intelligently made, Judge Mendoza proceeded to pass judgment without requiring
Magalop to plead anew to the charge. Applying the principle laid down in the Padernal case, it can fairly be
concluded that there was no standing plea at the time the court rendered its judgment of acquittal hence said
acquittal was a nullity.
Be that as it may, however, in the interest of substantial justice, we cannot allow such procedural error to prevail
over the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. In fairness to
Magalop, outside of his improvident plea of guilt, there is absolutely no evidence against him — presented or
forthcoming. From the evidence of the prosecution, there is no way by which accused Magalop could have been
implicated. It is for this fundamental reason that, even pro hac vice, his acquittal must be sustained. Interdum even
it ut exceptio quae prima facie justa videtur, tamen inique noceat. It may sometime happen that a plea which on
its face seem just, nevertheless is injurious and inequitable. It is so in this instance.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the acquittal of the accused-
respondent JUAN MAGALOP Y SALVACION is sustained.
SO ORDERED.

This rule is at most directory. It will certainly be a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the judge to persist in
holding the accused bound to his admission of guilt and sentencing him accordingly when the totality of the
evidence points to his acquittal. There is no rule which provides that simply because the accused pleaded guilty to
the charge that his conviction automatically follows. Additional evidence independent of the plea may be
considered to convince the judge that it was intelligently made.

Here it is evident, even from the start, that the case of the prosecution against the three (3) accused was virtually
non-existent as the asported articles were found in the possession of a certain Babie Tan and yet, quite
inexplicably, the prosecution did not summon him to the witness stand. Babie Tan could have positively identified
those who sold him the stolen articles if called to testify. Or, he could very well have been the perpetrator of the
crime himself. In the absence of an explanation of how one has come into possession of stolen effects, the
possessor is presumed to be the author of the crime of robbery.7

Indeed, not even the testimonies and the mute exhibits introduced during the trial could breathe life into the
moribund state of the case for the prosecution. While the loss of articles in the storeroom of the BNSHI was
established, there was nothing, independent of the acknowledgment of guilt, which could link accused Magalop
to the robbery. As the trial court succinctly put it, "the plea of Juan Magalop was not intelligently done."

Admittedly, the procedure followed by respondent judge was not the normal course, as the better procedure
would have been that set forth in People v. Padernal, 8 where the court sustained the exoneration of the accused
notwithstanding his plea of guilt. In that case, in view of the exculpatory testimony of the accused who had earlier
pleaded guilty to the charge of homicide, the trial court correctly considered the plea as withdrawn and, in its
place, ordered a plea of not guilty entered. This was not done by respondent judge. For even after finding that the

72
G.R. No. 95259 October 26, 1992
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
BERNARDO PERAN, FELIX PIQUERO, accused-appellants.
CAMPOS, JR., J.:
On February 8, 1990, the Honorable Celso P. Lagro, presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, Cagayan
de Oro rendered judgment in Criminal Case No. 89-051 entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Bernardo Peran, et
al.", convicting the three accused for murder as follows:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds Bernardo Peran, Fortunato Narido, Jr., and Felix Piquero all guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder. There being no mitigating or aggravating
circumstance attendant to the commission of the offense and pursuant to the ruling laid by
the Supreme Court in the cases of People vs. Almario, G.R. No. 38968-70, 9 February 1989,
where our Supreme Court held:
The penalty for the crime of Murder is Reclusion Temporal to Death. If the
crime has not been attended by any aggravating or mitigating
circumstances, the penalty shall be applied in its medium period which
is Reclusion Perpetua.
Consequently, this Court hereby sentences all and each of the accused to suffer the penalty of
Life Imprisonment and to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of the late Jose Namoc in
the amount of P30,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay
the coasts.
The accused being detention prisoners, they are entitled to four fifth (4/5) credit only of the
preventive imprisonment that they have undergone, it appearing that they have not agreed in
writing to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed on convicted prisoners.
SO ORDERED. 1
The accused-appellants appealed from this decision assigning the following errors:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE TESTIMONY OF ROBERTO CAWASAN CREDIBLE;
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE TESTIMONY OF BERNARDO PERAN AND HIS
CORROBORATIVE WITNESSES CREDIBLE;
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE THREE (3) ACCUSED FOR FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO PROVE THE GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT;
IV
IF EVER THE ACCUSED ARE GUILTY OF A CRIME IT IS ONLY HOMICIDE AND NOT MURDER;
V
ASSUMING THE ACCUSED ARE GUILTY OF MURDER THE PENALTY IMPOSABLE IS FROM 18
YEARS TO 20 YEARS AND NOT LIFE SENTENCE.
The facts of the case as may be gathered from the evidence presented at the trial may be summarized as follows:
In the morning of May 10, 1988 at about 7: o' clock , in the presence of prosecution witness Roberto Cawasan,
Jose Namoc, the deceased, and Bernardo Peran, one of the accused-appellants, engaged in an altercation
regarding the ownership of a puppy wherein the latter ended up fuming mad. When Bernardo left, witness Roberto
and Jose agreed to go to the house of Castro Namoc, but Jose asked Roberto to go ahead of him because he still
had to feed the chickens.
Roberto left immediately. While he was barely 25 meters from Jose's house, he looked back and saw the three
accused-appellants heading towards Jose's house. Worried about what may happen, he decided to stay and
watched the trio. He saw Bernardo Peran and Junior Narido take Jose, holding both of his arms, and lead him
towards the creek, with Felix Piquero following from behind.
Eyewitness Roberto Cawasan hid behind the tall grass and observed what the three would do with Jose. Upon
reaching the creek, Bernardo got hold of a piece of wood, about two feet long and as thick as an arm, and hit the
victim on the forehead. The victim instantly fell. Wherefore, Junior Narido gave the victim second blow, again
hitting him in the forehead, with a stone. The third accused, Felix Piquero, gave the last blow with his fist, hitting
the victim on his mouth while holding him on his head.
Roberto immediately ran away and went towards his house after this incident. He kept silent concerning the crime
he witnesses, for fear of his life.
Several days later, Castor Namoc, a cousin of the deceased went to the latter's house and was surprised to find his
house in disarray. Worried of what may have caused the disappearance of Jose, he formed a search team
composed of his neighbors and Bernardo Peran. After forty seven (47) days of searching, on June 25, 1988 they
finally found his cadaver in an advanced state of decomposition, near the Calabasa Waterfalls. A close examination
of the victim's remains revealed a broken forehead and three missing teeth.
73
The next day, June 26, 1988, Castor in company with the Barangay Captain and several other persons, one of whom
was Roberto, went back to the Calabasa Waterfalls to retrieve the remains of Jose and give it a decent burial.
On June 27, 1988, eyewitnesses Roberto broke his silence. He went to the Barangay Captain, Redemptor Salvallon
and narrated the entire story, pointing to the three accused as the perpetrators of said crime. On the very same
day, Bernardo Peran was invited by the Barangay Captain for questioning. Bernardo was picked up and brought to
the house of a certain Fuentes where he admitted killing Jose and executed a confession, implicating his two other
co-accused, Junior Narido and Felix Piquero. He also revealed to Salvallon where these two other accused may be
found. This disclosure by Bernardo led to the arrest of his two co-accused.
Upon arraignment, on March 30, 1989, all three accused entered a plea of not guilty. At the trial, Bernardo
repudiated the alleged confession saying that it was signed under duress, and presented another version of how
the victim died.
According to him, Jose's death, which was on May 13, 1988 (not May 10, 1988, as alleged by the prosecution), was
caused by an unfortunate accident. While he and the victim were out on said Calabasa Waterfalls for the purpose
of catching frogs, the latter fell from the top of the falls, hit his head and died instantly. He never told anybody of
the freak accident because he was afraid he would be blamed for Jose's death.
The Trial Court gave credence to the version of the prosecution, rejected the version of the accused as incredible,
and convicted the three accused of murder qualified by conspiracy, treachery and superior strength. 2
The first three assigned errors concerns the reliability of the findings of fact of the trial court and these may be
treated jointly.
The general rule is that findings of the judge who tried the case and heard the witnesses are not to be disturbed
on appeal, unless there are substantial facts and circumstances which have been overlooked and which, if properly
considered, might affect the result of the case. 3 Such findings, except for good cause, are generally not disturbed
on appeal. 4
Where the issue concerns the credibility of witnesses, the trial court's findings gains greatest significance, because
it had seen the witness face to face at the witness stand and observed their demeanor closely. The trial courts are
found to be in better position than the appellate courts, who rely entirely on the inanimate transcript of
stenographic notes of the case. Thus, the findings will generally be upheld on appeal save for exceptional cases.
We find no such exceptions in the case at bar, which may warrant the reversal of its verdict.
Eyewitness Roberto Cawasan, at the time of the incident, was a boy of sixteen years of age and had not had an
opportunity for education above the second grade. As the trial court did, we find it most natural for him to be
overcome by the fear for his life should he divulge the crime to the authorities. It would be too demanding for us
to expect a barrio boy of such age and level of education to know that he should report to the authorities this kind
of crime at the earliest opportunity, lest his testimony may be discredited for such a delay. Thus, we reiterate this
court's rulings that fear of reprisal is a valid excuse for the momentary silence of a prosecution witness. 5
The appellants next contend that Roberto's testimony had statements inconsistent with those of the other
witnesses. According to him, the victim's corpse was left in the same creek as that where he saw the victim killed
by the three appellants, whereas the members of the search team actually found the corpse at the Calabasa
Waterfalls. This matter is not of such significance as compared to the circumstances and the very act of killing
which constitute the elements of the crime. We take note of the fact that Roberto testified that after Felix Piquero
gave the third blow, he fled from the scene of the crime for fear of being discovered by the appellants. He did not
see what transpired thereafter. This explains the apparent inconsistency as to the location of the victim's body
after the victim was killed. We are not discounting the possibility that the victim's body was transferred to another
place after he was killed to hide the body. This is not the first time for us to rule that inconsistencies in minor
details do not impair a witness' credibility but rather strengthen it. 6
In a last attempt to discredit the eyewitness, the appellants pointed to the possibility of Roberto testifying falsely
against appellants to counter-act suspicion against himself (Roberto) and his family because, for some reason or
another, the Cawasan family and the victim Jose Namoc previously had dome feud concerning a piece of
agricultural land. This claim is an afterthought for nowhere in the records did we find evidence to this effect. We
find no proof on record that witness Roberto had ill motive to testify adversely against the defendants nor did he
serve as witness for the prosecution to draw any suspicion away from him. This Court cannot sustain such theory
even if the appellants claim that the witness harbored a grudge or hatred against them, to such extent as to
implicate them for a crime so grave as murder. 7
We find no circumstances whatsoever to discredit eyewitness Roberto Cawasan and we afford full faith and credit
to his version. Once the prosecution witness is afforded full faith and credit, the defense version necessarily stands
totally unworthy of belief. 8
In disregarding the version of accused-appellant Bernardo, we find further support in the fact of his silence despite
allegedly having knowledge of the circumstance surrounding the death of Jose. His invocation of the doctrine laid
down in People vs. Cunanan, 9 which incidentally the lawyer for the appellant misquoted and even took out of
context, from which he intends to draw an excuse for his silence even constitutes an implied admission of his guilt.
A guilty conscience makes a man such a coward as to bring himself out in the open, whereas a strong conviction
of being innocent makes him fearless. The accused-appellant's situation differs from that of eyewitness Roberto
Cawasan in that the latter came out to testify in open court out of his own volition while defendant was only forced
to present a version different from that of the latter, as a matter of self preservation for his own defense.
With regards to the other two accused-appellants, Junior Narido and Felix Piquero, there was no evidence that
they could not have possibly been at the scene of the crime at the time and date of its commission. Thus, their
defense of alibi necessarily fails. 10 Besides, their alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification by eyewitness
Roberto Cawasan and for an alibi to be given full faith and credit it must be clearly established and must not leave
any doubt as to its plausibility and verity. 11
It has been established beyond reasonable doubt that Jose Namoc, was killed by accused-appellants Bernardo
Peran, Fortunato Narido, alias Junior Narido and Felix Piquero. What remains to be determined, however, is
whether or not the Trial Court erred in convicting them for murder under the information which reads:
On or about 7:00 o'clock in the morning of May 10, 1988 at Sitio Calabasa, Barangay Molugan,
Municipality of Claveria, Misamis Oriental, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused/s with deliberate intent to kill, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously conspire, confederate an help one another in attacking,
assaulting and killing the victim Jose T. Namoc, by first striking a piece of wood on the forehead
74
 of the victims and afterwards, when enfeebled and unable to defend himself as the victim lay
on the ground, one of the other accused smash a big stone also on his forehead and thereafter
box the other accused which concerted action caused the direct and immediate death of said
victim. With intent to conceal the corpus delicti of the crime, the dead body of the victim was
hidden in a small cave near the Calabasa waterfall.
CONTRARY TO and in violation of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. 12
The trial court erroneously appreciated conspiracy as a qualifying circumstances. Although there was conspiracy
in the case at bar, as evident from concert of action and unity of purpose, it could not elevate the motive of the
crime to a more serious offense.
The only qualifying circumstance alleged in the information, which was employing means to weaken the defense
of the victim was not present in the case at bar.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision is SET ASIDE and a new one entered finding the accused-
appellants Bernardo Peran, Fortunato Narido alias Junior and Felix Piquero, guilty of homicide with the aggravating
circumstance of abuse of superior strength and hereby sentences the accused-appellants to an indeterminate
penalty of 10 years one (1) day of prision mayor to 17 years and four months and one (1) day of Reclusion
Temporal and to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of the late Jose Namco in the amount of P50,000.00. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Conspiracy is neither aggravating nor qualifying but rather a manner in incurring collective criminal liability among
every co-conspirator in an equal degree, whereby the effect is that the act of one becomes the act of all. The
presence of conspiracy cannot per se qualify a killing to murder.

The trial court likewise erred in holding that the killing was qualified by treachery. Treachery has neither been
alleged nor has it been proved by the evidence. Treachery cannot be presumed, it must be proved by clear and
convincing evidence or as conclusively as the killing itself. 13

Bernardo Peran and Junior Narido held the victim while Felix Piquero followed them on their way from Jose's house
in the direction of the creek. When they reached the place, Bernardo Peran, hit the victim with a piece of wood
while facing the victim. There was no other description offered by the witness on how the attack was carried out.
We cannot presume the presence of treachery in the manner the criminal act was committed.

In order that alevosia may be considered as a qualifying circumstance to raise the classification of the crime, or as
an aggravating circumstance to augment the penalty, it must be shown that the treacherous acts were present
and preceded the commencement of the act which caused the injury complained of. After the commencement of
such an attack, and before its termination, an accused person may have employed means or methods which were
of a treacherous character, and yet such means or methods would not constitute the circumstance of alevosia.
One continuous attack cannot be broken up into two or more parts and made to constitute separate, distinct, and
independent attacks so that treachery may be injected therein, and considered as qualifying or aggravating
circumstance. 14 The second blow delivered on the victim when he was in such a position where he could not have
defended himself cannot constitute treachery. The established rule is that treachery must be present from the
commencement of the attack.

The trial court correctly appreciated the circumstances of abuse of superior strength. This was evident from the
injury sustained by the victim. The accused-appellant could not have broken the victim's skull had it not exerted
excessive force out of proportion to the means of the defense available to the person attacked. The force used on
the victim in hitting his head again with a stone after he had already fallen to the ground after being hit on the
forehead with a piece of wood was clearly excessive. There was abuse of superior strength but it could not qualify
the killing to murder because it has not been sufficiently alleged in the information. 15 It may only be considered
as a generic aggravating circumstance.

75
G.R. No. 88300 July 6, 1992
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ERNIE LAPAN y CABRAL, defendant-appellant.
ROMERO, J.:
In an Information dated October 6, 1987, the accused-appellant Ernie Lapan alias Erning Bulag, Florentino
Bracamonte, and Manuel Reginaldo, were accused of Robbery with Double Homicide ** allegedly committed as
follows:
That on or about September 23, 1987, in the City of Cavite, Republic of the Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating together and mutually helping each other, with intent to gain, did, then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter the house of one Violeta Sayaman Parnala, and
once inside, by means of violence and intimidation, rob, take and carry away a necklace worth
P660.00 and ring worth P440.00 belonging to one Jay Vee Parnala Custodio, son of Violeta
Sayaman Parnala without the consent of the said owner and to his damage and prejudice in
the total amount of P1,100.00, Philippine Currency and that on the occasion of the said
robbery, and in pursuance of their conspiracy, the above-named accused, with intent to kill,
did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack, scald and stab Jay Vee
Parnala Custodio and Teresita Minorca Rosalinas, hitting and inflicting upon Jay Vee Parnala
Custodio 3 incised and 14 stab wounds and upon Teresita Minorca Rosalinas 1 incised and 6
stab wounds on the different parts of their body, which ultimately caused their death.
Contrary to law. 1
Florentino Bracamonte and Manuel Reginaldo remain at large and cannot be located.
Upon arraignment, Ernie Lapan pleaded "not guilty" and trial commenced.
In due course, a decision was rendered convicting the appellant of the crime charged. The dispositive portion
reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds the accused Ernie Lapan alias Erning
Bulag guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Robbery with Double Homicide and he is hereby
sentenced to undergo imprisonment of reclusion perpetua to indemnify the heirs of Jay Vee
Parnala and Teresita Rosalinas the amount of P30,000.00 each, to pay unto Violeta Sayaman
Parnala, the amount of P1,100.00 corresponding to the total value of the necklace and ring
stolen, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED. 2
The accused-appellant interposed the present appeal from the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XVII,
Cavite City finding him guilty as charged.
We adopt the following statement of facts of the Solicitor General as we find it to be accurate and supported by
the records of the case.
Around 8:30 o'clock on the evening of September 23, 1987, while coming from the Kingdom
Hall of the Jehovah's Witnesses at Cavite City, Violeta Parnala and her common-law husband,
Clark Din, knocked on the main door of their two-storey house at 8790 Bautista St., Dalahican,
Cavite City, but got no response (March 16, 1988, tsn, pp. 5-6). Clark Din then went to the back
of the house and stoned the window of the room occupied by Violeta's son, six-year old Jay
Vee Parnala Custodio, and the housemaid, Teresita Rosalinas (Ibid.).
As Violeta continued knocking on the front door, Manley Reginaldo suddenly opened it and
hurriedly went out, followed by two others, namely Nonoy Bracamonte and appellant (Ibid.).
Caught by surprise, Violeta started shouting, prompting the intruders to run away (Ibid.). She
then called her husband who immediately ran in pursuit (Ibid., pp. 7-9; March 21, 1988, tsn,
pp. 7-8). Failing to catch up with the three, Clark Din returned to the house. He saw Pat.
Sahagun and Pat. Punzal standing at the gate, and both accompanied him to the house (March
21, 1988, tsn, pp. 9-10). Inside, the lights were off but the television set was on. They opened
the lights as they searched for the housemaid Teresita and Jay Vee (Ibid., p. 11). They
discovered that the bathroom door upstairs was locked when they tried to open it, so Clark
Din went down to his wife to get the key.
When the door was opened and the light turned on, they saw Teresita, feet and hands tied and
mouth gagged, lying dead on the floor, bathed in blood. Jay Vee was found in the washroom,
his dead body immersed in a water container (Ibid., pp. 11-14). Per autopsy report, Teresita
suffered one (1) incised and six (6) stab wounds, and Jay Vee sustained three (3) incised and
fourteen (14) stab wounds (Exhibits "J" and "K") 3 .
Before us, the appellant assails his conviction by alleging that the trial court gravely erred in giving more weight
and credence to the version of the prosecution and in disregarding the version of the defense, thus finding
accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide as charged in the information. 4
Accused-appellant Ernie Lapan denied his alleged participation in the case and interposed alibi as his defense. He
averred that on September 23, 1987, at about 8:20 p.m. he was at the birthday party of Leopoldo Pareja held in
the house of his sister-in-law at 777 Dalahican St., Caridad, Cavite City; that he and Guillermo Papa went there at
7:00 p.m.; that he was wearing a muscle shirt stamped Banzai Beach Club; that Leopoldo Pareja, Roberto Mendoza,
Eduardo Sagpao, and a certain Junior were also in the party; that drinks were served and he drank beer and
lambanog; that he and Guillermo Papa left the party for about five minutes to buy more lambanog; that he knew
Florentino Bracamonte and Manley Reginaldo both from Dalahican Street, Cavite City; that they were not in the
party and did not belong to his group; that when he left the party at 9:00 p.m. nothing unusual happened; that he
proceeded to Aguinaldo monument where he indulged in idle talk with some friends; that thereafter he went
76
home, slept and woke up at 7:00 the following morning; that he went to work but his manager advised him to go
home instead because there was no available material; that at about 10:00 a.m. Captain Rebullar came and
brought him to the station for interrogation about his alleged participation in the crime where he was pinpointed
by witnesses as one of the assailants; and that he reluctantly gave his statement. 5
The crux of this appeal is the determination as to which should be given more weight: the positive identification
of the accused-appellant by two prosecution witnesses or his alibi.
While it is true that "prosecution has the onus probandi of establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt and the weakness of the defense does not relieve it of its duty . . ., 6 in the instant case, we are convinced
that the prosecution has proven beyond moral certainty the guilt of accused-appellant. As underscored at the
outset, prosecution witness Violeta Parnala, 40 years old, married, businesswoman, and formerly a resident of
Dalahican St., Cavite City, 7 positively identified accused-appellant Ernie Lapan as one of the killers of her six-year
old sons, Jay Vee Parnala Custodio and household helper, Teresita Minorca Rosalinas. She said that upon arriving
home from the Kingdom Hall of Jehovah's Witnesses at around 8:30 o'clock in the evening of September 23, 1987,
she and her common-law husband Clark Din knocked on the door. Not getting any response, Clark Din went around
the house and stoned the window of the housemaid's room. 8 Meanwhile, she continued knocking on the door
and pushing the doorbell when suddenly the front door opened and out rushed three men all of whom she
identified as Florentino Bracamonte, Manuel Reginaldo and accused-appellant Ernie Lapan. 9Caught by surprise
and fear, she began shouting, "Magnanakaw," "magnanakaw," 10 causing her husband and their neighbors
Celodonio Furtona and Roger Tupaz to pursue the three men. In her distraught state, Violeta was certainly in no
position to falsely accuse Ernie Lapan with an atrocious offense. For in the words of the Court, "the identification
of an accused while in a state of shock is worthy of full faith and credence. 11
Violeta Parnala was able to clearly identify the assailants, namely: Florentino Bracamonte because he is a jeepney
driver and she used to take a ride in his jeep in going to market; Manuel "Manley" Reginaldo because he used to
buy gold from her; and accused-appellant Ernie Lapan because he is a resident of their place. 12 Besides, the locus
delicti was well-lighted by a MERALCO electric post about eight to ten meters away from her house. 13
Prosecution witness Rosita Ordoñez, 32 years old, married, laundrywoman and a resident of Dalahican Street,
Cavite City, 14 corroborated the testimony of Violeta. She narrated that on September 23, 1987, at around 8:30 in
the evening while she was washing clothes outside her house, she noticed somebody running behind her. So she
turned around but accused-appellant Ernie Lapan who was trying to evade the pursuing Clark Din shoved her
against the wall. 15
Another prosecution witness, Clark Din, 42 years old, married, and jobless, 16 testified that after the chase proved
futile, he hurriedly went back home where Patrolmen Sahagun and Punzal, his neighbors, met him at the gate and
together, they entered the house. 17 Noticing that the T.V. was on, he turned it off. Nothing was touched in the
master's bedroom. Finding the bathroom locked, he unlocked the same and was petrified upon seeing his
housemaid bathed in her own blood with her body sprawled on the floor of the bathroom, mouth gagged, and
feet and hands tied. 18 Worse, he was shocked to see Jay Vee's head and body immersed in a pail of water. 19
Promptly, Clark Din asked his neighbor to call a policeman to investigate the gruesome killing. His prompt action
which led to the immediate arrest of one of the killers manifests spontaneity of reaction, not one dictated by an
ulterior motive but of his earnest desire for the vindication of the deaths of his son and helper. 20
In addition, the gruesome pictures that were taken hours after the killing eloquently speak for themselves. 21
We hold that the defense of alibi is devoid of merit.
Alibi is one of the weakest defenses that can be resorted to by an accused, 22 not only because it is inherently weak
and unreliable but also because of its easy fabrication without need of much checking or rebuttal. 23
Times without number, we have consistently stated that for the defense of alibi to prosper, it must be established
by clear and convincing evidence that the accused was at some other place for such period of time as to negate
his presence at the time and place of the crime committed. 24
Interestingly, the accused-appellant, 35 years old, single, laborer, and a resident of Dalahican Street, Cavite
City, 25admitted during the cross-examination that the distance between the victims' house where the crime was
committed and Leo Pareja's residence where he claimed to be at the time of the macabre killing was "just a walking
distance." 26
In fact, according to accused-appellant's own witnesses, Guillermo Papa and Leopoldo Pareja, Parnala's house is
only 200 meters away and can be easily reached by foot in five minutes. 27
Likewise, the accused-appellant bared in his Sinumpaang Salaysay dated September 24, 1987, 28 that while the
drinking spree went on, he and Guillermo Papa left the party for five minutes to buy bottles of lambanog.
On the contrary, Guillermo Papa and Leopoldo Pareja were one in declaring in their Sinumpaang Salaysay both
dated October 30, 1987 29 that the accused-appellant left alone to buy more drinks.
Since the situs of the offense is only 200 meters away from Pareja's house and located on the same Dalahican
Street, the accused-appellant could conceivably be at the place of the heinous killing at the time it occurred.
Clearly, therefore, the denial and alibi of the accused-appellant cannot prevail over the positive and unwavering
testimonies of Violeta and Rosita pinpointing him as having run away from the scene of the crime.
The aforecited facts of the case yield to the inescapable conclusion that the prosecution's evidence, albeit
circumstantial, is sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused-appellant. 29
The requisites of a valid conviction on the basis of circumstantial evidence are set out in Section 4, Rule 133 of the
Rules of Courts, thus: "(a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived
are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable
doubt." 30
Applying the above requisites and, at the risk of being repetitious, the testimony of Violeta Parnala that she actually
saw the accused-appellant together with Manley Reginaldo and Florentino Bracamonte rushing out of her house
before the dead bodies of Jay Vee Parnala and Teresita Rosalinas were discovered inside the bathroom; the
declaration of Rosita Ordoñez that as the accused-appellant ran from the scene of the crime, he shoved her against
the wall; the fact that the blue and white baseball cap of Manley Reginaldo was found at the site of the crime; and
77
the pursuit by Clark Din of the three killers indubitably strengthen the bases for conviction, they being consistent (20) Years of Reclusion Temporal for the death of Jay Vee Parnala and another indeterminate penalty of Twelve
with the hypothesis that the accused-appellant is guilty. (12) Years of Prision Mayor to Twenty (20) Years of Reclusion Temporal for the death of Teresita Rosalinas and to
indemnify the heirs of deceased Jay Vee Parnala and Teresita Rosalinas in the amount of P50,000.00 each in line
With respect to the charge of robbery, however, we are constrained to agree with the accused-appellant and the with recent jurisprudence.
Solicitor General that the same has not been independently and adequately proved. While the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses deserve credit as regards the fleeing of the accused-appellant together with Manley With costs.
Reginaldo and Florentino Bracamonte from
the victims' house, no conclusive evidence proving the physical act of asportation thereof by the accused-appellant SO ORDERED.
himself has been presented by the prosecution. 31

As succinctly stated by the Solicitor General, both Violeta Parnala and Clark Din came to know of the loss of the
ring and necklace only after the interment of Jay Vee Custodio. At the time Jay Vee was discovered in the
bathroom, Clark Din failed to notice if the ring and necklace were still on his person. While there is testimony that
Jay Vee was last seen wearing a ring and necklace at around 6:00 o'clock that fateful evening, the time lag between
this time and the discovery of its loss is such that it could well be possible that somebody other than the accused-
appellant could have taken them from the body of the deceased. 32

In the case of People v. Moro Ambahang, 33 we held that the testimony of the witness that he found his personal
belongings gone when he returned to the scene of the killing, but he did not see who stole said items, the crime
of robbery cannot be imputed to the accused since it is not based on substantial evidence but on mere conjecture.

Similarly, we ruled in People v. Pacala, 34 that to sustain a conviction for the crime of robbery 'with homicide, it is
necessary that the robbery itself be proven conclusively as any other essential element of a crime. Thus, where
there is no conclusive proof that robbery has actually taken place, there can be no evidence for the composite
crime of robbery with homicide, but only for homicide which was duly proved. 35

In the case at bar, we cannot discount the fact that from the time of the discovery of Jay Vee's death up to the
time of his interment, several people had already touched his body, not to mention the policemen who took his
dead body from the pail and the employees of the funeral parlor. The strong possibility that they had taken the
lost jewelry of the boy enhances the element of doubt in favor of the accused-appellant. On this score, the penal
laws should be strictly construed against the Government and liberally in favor of the accused-appellant. 36 Hence,
the doubt should be resolved in favor of the accused-appellant Ernie Lapan.

The lower court, however, erred in not considering the age of the deceased as an aggravating circumstance. 37 Jay
Vee Parnala was barely six years old when ruthlessly stabbed fourteen times before his body was submerged in
the pail.

Likewise, the trial court erred in disregarding morada which aggravated the offense inasmuch as the crime took
place and was committed by the accused-appellant in the house of the victims. The accused-appellant showed
greater perversity in his deliberate invasion of the tranquility and privacy of the Parnala's domicile. 38

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the lower court is hereby MODIFIED, finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide as defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code,
and considering the presence of two aggravating circumstances, morada and disregard of age, the accused-
appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of Twelve (12) Years of Prision Mayor to Twenty

78
G.R. No. 123102 February 29, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MADELO ESPINA Y CAÑASARES, accused-appellant.
QUISUMBING, J.:
On appeal is the decision dated September 4, 1995, of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, Branch 14 1 convicting
appellant of the crime of murder, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordering him to
pay the heirs of the victim the amounts of P100,000.00, as indemnity, P15,000.00 as funeral expenses, and
P50,000.00 as damages.
Appellant, a 17 year-old jeepney conductor, was charged with murder for the killing of Ma. Nympha Belen y
Melano, a 21 year-old mental retardate.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On July 1, 1993, at about 12:00 in the evening, prosecution witness Tolentino A. Colo was sleeping inside a jeepney
parked at a garage in Francisco Homes, San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan. Suddenly, he was awakened when a woman
cried out "Aruy!". Colo stood up and saw appellant coming out of a hut located some eight (8) meters away from
the garage. Appellant was holding a curved knife in his hand. His t-shirt, hands, and knife were drenched with
blood. Colo saw a woman inside the hut fall down on her face. Although it was nighttime, there was a light inside
the hut and a mercury lamp some three (3) meters away which cast enough illumination for Colo to recognize
appellant and the woman as Ma. Nympha Belen. When appellant saw Colo, he shouted "panglima ire" referring to
the victim, and "panganim ka! referring to Colo. Scared out of his wits, Colo immediately jumped out of the window
of the jeepney and hid in the roof of a nearby house. Appellant gave chase but when he could not find Colo, he
finally gave up and left. Colo remained on the roof for five (5) long hours. At around 6:00 the following morning,
he gingerly went down and drove the jeepney in his usual route. On July 2, 1993, at around 7:00 in the evening,
Colo was arrested by the police and brought to the station for investigation. The following day, Colo told Mrs.
Precila Melanio-Belen, mother of the victim, that it was appellant who killed her daughter.2
On August 3, 1993, appellant was charged with the crime of murder under the following Information:3
INFORMATION
The undersigned Asst. Provincial Prosecutor accuses Madelo Espina y Cañasares of the crime
of murder, penalized under the provisions of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, committed
as follows:
That on or about the 1st day of July, 1993, in the municipality of San Jose del Monte, province
of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused
Madelo Espina y Cañasares, armed with a bladed weapon and with intent to kill one Maria
Nympha Belen, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with evident
premeditation, abuse of superior strength and treachery, attack, assault and stab with the said
bladed weapon he was then provided the said Maria Nympha Belen, a mentally retarded
woman, hitting the latter on the different parts of her body, thereby causing her serious
physical injuries which directly caused her death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Malolos, Bulacan, August 3, 1993.
Upon arraignment on October 29, 1993, appellant entered a plea of not guilty.4 At the pre-trial conference,5 the
sworn statements of Mrs. Precila Melanio-Belen6 and Tolentino Colo,7 the post-mortem examination8 and death
certificate of Ma. Nympha Belen9 were marked in evidence.
During trial, the prosecution presented the following witnesses: (1) Mrs. Precila Melanio-Belen, mother of the
victim, who testified that her daughter was a mental retardate, and that their family paid more than P15,000.00
for the funeral of the victim;10 (2) Tolentino A. Colo, a jeepney driver, who narrated the events he witnessed in
connection with the stabbing incident; (3) SPO3 Rogelio Encina, a member of the Philippine National Police (PNP),
San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan, who was tasked to bring to court the knife used in the killing from the Municipal Trial
Court of San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan;11 (4) Dr. Juan V. Zaldariaga, Jr., Medico-Legal Officer of the National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI), who conducted the post-mortem examination and testified that the victim sustained six (6)
stab wounds, five (5) of which were fatal.12
For the defense, appellant himself testified. He stated that in the evening of July 1, 1993, he was having a drinking
spree with Jun, Gusing, Panis, Colo, and some others, at the garage in San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan. At around
10:00 P.M., he left the group and being drunk, he decided to sleep inside the parked jeepney in the garage instead
of going home. At around 12:10 in the morning, he was awakened by policemen and brought to the police
detachment where he was questioned regarding the killing. He told the police that he did not know who killed the
victim.13
On September 4, 1995, the trial court rendered a decision 14 finding appellant guilty of murder, the dispositive
portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Madelo Espina y Cañasares guilty of the crime of Murder, the
court hereby imposes upon the accused the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.
To indemnify the heirs of the victim P100,000.00.
To pay Precila Belen P15,000.00 expenses for wake & burial.
To pay P50,000.00 moral damage.
The accused a detention prisoner, the Provincial Warden of Malolos, Bulacan is ordered to commit the
accused to the National Penitentiary immediately upon receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.15
79
Hence, the present appeal. Appellant contends that the trial court gravely erred in —
I. . . . GIVING FULL FAITH AND CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF ALLEGED EYEWITNESS, AND IN NOT
ACQUITTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT ON GROUND OF REASONABLE DOUBT.
II. . . . ORDERING ACCUSED-APPELLANT TO INDEMNIFY THE HEIRS OF THE VICTIM IN THE AMOUNT OF
P100,000.00; TO PAY THE AMOUNT OF P15,000.00 AS REIMBURSEMENT FOR THE WAKE AND THE
BURIAL EXPENSES; AND P50,000.00 AS MORAL DAMAGES.
The fact that a witness may have been investigated in connection with the commission of the crime and that he
had a previous quarrel with appellant are not grounds for disqualification of a witness under Section 20 of Rule
130 of the Rules of Court. By itself, prejudice against an accused cannot warrant the disqualification of witnesses
or the total disregard of their testimonies.20 Under the same rule, in general, any person can testify in court,
regardless of personal interest in a case. At any rate, these circumstances may affect the credibility of the witness,
the assessment of which is within the province of the trial court. Anent his motive in testifying, Colo repeatedly
insisted that he offered to testify because he pitied the mother of the victim who could find no witnesses willing
to shed light on the death of her daughter.21 The foregoing factors considered, we find no cogent reason to
overturn the factual findings of the trial court.

In his brief,16 appellant assails the credibility of prosecution witness Colo considering that the latter was also a
As to the sufficiency of evidence to convict appellant, we have likewise held that direct evidence of the commission
suspect in the killing, and was under detention at the time he gave his statement pointing to appellant as the killer.
of a crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. 22 Under
Further, appellant claims, Colo had a motive in pointing to appellant as the assailant since they had a previous
Section 4 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, conviction may be had even on circumstantial evidence provided three
quarrel over money. Appellant also, contends that Colo's behavior after witnessing the incident is not in
requisites concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are
consonance with normal human behavior, for instead of reporting the matter to the police, he merely went ahead
proven: and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
plying his usual jeepney route. Appellant also avers that the murder weapon was not positively identified in court.
doubt.
Lastly, appellant insists that he was convicted on the basis of insufficient circumstantial evidence. And even
assuming that appellant committed the crime, the lower court failed to take into consideration the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority, appellant being only seventeen (17) years old at the time of the commission The following circumstances, when pieced together, lead to the ineluctable conclusion that appellant stabbed the
of the crime. victim: (1) Appellant, by his own admission, was at the locus criminis at around the time of stabbing incident.23 (2)
He was seen leaving the hut, barely seconds after the killing, by witness Colo.24 (3) He was seen leaving the hut
holding a bloodied knife, and his t-shirt and hands drenched with blood.25 (4) The knife, which had one blunt
For the State, the Office of the Solicitor General17 contends that Colo was released after investigation, suggesting
extremity and one sharp extremity, was presented in evidence, was akin to the knife used to inflict the wounds
the insufficiency of evidence to implicate him. Further, the OSG belies the imputation of ill-motive on the part of
sustained by the victim.26 (5) He was heard exclaiming "pang lima ire" referring to the victim and "pang-anim ka"
Colo to testify against appellant considering that the alleged quarrel over money was brought up to explain why
referring to Colo.27 (6) Appellant, still holding the knife, even chased Colo, but eventually left when he could not
appellant was no longer living with Colo, not why Colo would implicate appellant. The OSG also contends that
find Colo.28
there is also no standard form of behavior when one is confronted with a shocking incident. Hence, the OSG prays
for the affirmance of the conviction for murder since the killing is qualified by abuse of superior strength. But, it
recommends that indemnity be reduced to P50,000.00 pursuant to existing jurisprudence. The most incriminating piece of evidence against appellant is Colo's testimony that he saw appellant holding a
bloodied curved knife, with his t-shirt and hands drenched with blood, leaving the locus criminis. Thus, in People
v. Malimit,29 one of the circumstantial evidence considered in convicting appellant of the crime of Robbery with
In sum, the issues center on the credibility of the prosecution witness Colo and the sufficiency of the circumstantial
Homicide is the testimony of two witnesses that they saw appellant holding a blood-stained bolo in his right hand,
evidence to convict appellant of the crime charged.
rushing out of the victim's store mere seconds prior to their discovery of the crime.

Anent the issue of credibility of witnesses, the elementary rule is that appellate courts will generally not disturb
For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all circumstances must be consistent with each
the findings of the trial court. The latter is in a better position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses
other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the
themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial, unless it has plainly
hypothesis that he is innocent and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt. 30 Thus, conviction
overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if considered, might affect the result of the case.18 The rule
based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld, provided the circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain
admits of certain exceptions, namely: (1) when patent inconsistencies in the statements of witnesses are ignored
which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion that points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the
by the trial court, or (2) when the conclusions arrived at are clearly unsupported by the evidence.19 No
guilty person,31 a conclusion adequately proven in this case.
inconsistencies in Colo's testimony were pointed out by appellant. Neither does appellant contend that the trial
court erred in relying on the evidence on record.
Appellant's defense of denial is unavailing. For the defense of denial and alibi to prosper, it must be clearly
established by positive, clear and satisfactory proof that (1) the accused was somewhere else when the offense
Appellant attempts to impeach the testimony at this late stage of the proceeding. The records show that appellant
was committed, and (2) it was physically impossible for the accused to have been physically present at the scene
was afforded ample opportunity to cross examine Colo and to demonstrate any falsity or error in his allegedly
of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission.32 Appellant was right smack in the midst of
biased testimony. Appellant failed, however, to undermine Colo's credibility.
the locus criminis at the time of the commission of the crime. Hence, his defense of denial and alibi miserably failed
to comply with the strict requirements of time and place.33

80
As to the crime committed, the Information alleged three qualifying circumstances — abuse of superior strength,
evident premeditation, and treachery. The trial court appreciated abuse of superior strength and evident
premeditation without specifying which one qualified the crime to murder. We find, however, that only abuse of
superior strength qualified the killing to murder.
In several cases,34 we have held that an attack made by a man with a deadly weapon upon an unarmed and
defenseless woman constitutes the circumstance of abuse of that superiority which his sex and the weapon used
in the act afforded him, and from which the woman was unable to defend herself. This is the exact scenario in this
case.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court finding appellant Madelo Espina y Cañasares guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of murder is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION regarding the penalty imposed so that
appellant is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of four (4) years, ten (10) months and twenty (20)
days of prision correccional maximum as minimum, to twelve (12) years, four (4) months and ten (10) days
of reclusion temporal minimum as maximum, to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of P50.000.00 as death
indemnity, and to pay the costs.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.

Evident premeditation, however, was not sufficiently proven by the prosecution. The following requisites must be
established before evident premeditation may be considered in imposing the proper penalty: (a) the time when
the accused determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that the accused clung to his
determination; and (c) a sufficient lapse of time between such determination and execution to allow him to reflect
upon the consequences of his act.35 Given the attendant factual circumstances in this case, we find them
insufficient to establish evident premeditation.

Treachery likewise did not attend the commission of the crime. The qualifying circumstance of treachery can not
be taken into consideration in the absence of evidence showing the manner of attack and what ensued inside the
hut. Nobody witnessed the actual killing, only its immediate aftermath. Where treachery is alleged, the manner of
attack must be proven.36 It cannot be presumed or concluded merely on the basis of the resulting crime. 37 When
no particulars are known regarding the manner in which the aggression was made or how the act which resulted
in the death of the victim began and developed, it cannot be established from mere supposition that the accused
perpetrated the killing with treachery38.

The trial court erred ill appreciating nighttime as a generic aggravating circumstance. Nighttime only becomes an
aggravating circumstance when (1) it is especially sought by the offender; (2) it is taken advantage of by him; or
(3) it facilitates the commission of the crime by ensuring the offender's immunity from capture. 39 Here, other than
the time of the crime, there is nothing else to suggest that appellant deliberately availed himself or took advantage
of the circumstances of nighttime. Further, when the place of the crime is illuminated by light, as in this case,
nighttime is not aggravating.40

In sum, we find the crime committed by appellant to be murder because killing was qualified by abuse of superior
strength. At the time of the commission of the crime, the penalty for murder was reclusion temporal maximum to
death.41 Appellant having been born on May 16, 1976,42 he was 17 years, 1 month and 15 days old, at the time of
the commission of the crime. The existence of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority requires the
imposition of the penalty next lower in degree43 which is prision mayor maximum to reclusion temporal medium.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum penalty to be imposed upon appellant shall be taken
from the medium period of the imposable penalty, which is reclusion temporal minimum, while the minimum shall
be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, which is prision correccional maximum to prision mayor medium.

As to the amount of damages, the death indemnity should be lowered to P50,000.00 pursuant to existing
jurisprudence.44 As to actual damages, the records do not contain any receipts for the funeral expenses incurred
by the family of the victim. The mother of the victim likewise did not testify as to the moral damages sustained as
a result of the death of her daughter. Hence, for lack of competent proof, we cannot award either actual or moral
damages.45
81
G.R. No. 116600 July 3, 1996
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
M/SGT. REYNALDO LANDICHO, PAT. JOHNNY BUNYI, C1C ERIC MANLUSOC, and C2C LEOVINO CANUEL, accused.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:p
As Juvenal once asked, "But who is to guard the guards themselves?"1 This case deals not with a mere appeal from
a conviction in a murder case. It is a tale, rather, an expose, of the warped sense of camaraderie which binds
certain members of the law enforcement and penal systems in our country. This account of betrayal of the public
trust stands as yet another stain on the honor of the Philippine National Police (PNP), at a time when its reputation
and integrity are already in serious question.
On 8 January 1991, at 9:30 p.m., in Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, four members of the PNP gunned down Isagani
Mazon in cold blood. Mazon died instantly, having suffered twenty-one (21) gunshot wounds, a number of which
were at his back. As a result, the accused were charged with murder, 2 but in the interim, the trial court endowed
them the privilege of being detained by their superiors, instead of customary incarceration at the provincial jail.
And if only to exacerbate matters, the accused then escaped through the connivance or inexcusable negligence of
their guardians. Of the accused, only the appellant was subsequently arrested.
On 30 August 1991, the accused were charged with murder in an information filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 39, Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, in Criminal Case No. C-3496, the accusatory portion reading:
That on or about January 8, 1991, at the Municipality of Calapan, Province of Mindoro Oriental,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, all
public officers, being members of the Philippine National Police (PNP), conspiring with each
other, with deliberate intent to kill and with the use of firearms, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully, feloniously and treacherously attack and shoot Isagani Mazon, a private person,
hitting him at the vital parts of his body and inflicting upon him mortal wounds, thereby causing
his instantaneous death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
No bail was recommended for their temporary liberty.
On 17 October 1991, the trial court, through Judge Marciano T. Virola, issued a warrant for the arrest of the
accused.4 On 24 October 1991, the accused allegedly surrendered at the PNP office in Oriental Mindoro. Then, in
a first indorsement dated 25 October 1991, Superintendent Jaime L. Lasar, PNP Provincial Director of Oriental
Mindoro, committed the accused to the trial court, but requested that they be detained at the PNP Stockade as
they were members of the PNP Mindoro Oriental Command. 5
On 29 October 1991, the accused filed a petition for bail and motion to transfer their detention from the Provincial
Jail to the PNP Headquarters pending hearing of their petition. 6 Judge Virola immediately granted the motion for
transfer to the PNP Stockade at the PNP Mindoro Oriental Command Headquarters, on the condition that the
accused would not be allowed to leave the stockade or "be placed in the custody of any person without order from
[the] Court."7 The trial court, however, denied the application for bail as the motion did not set the application for
hearing. Branch Clerk of Court Rolando Caguete then committed the accused to Supt. Lasar for detention at the
PNP Stockade.8 Meanwhile, First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Emmanuel S. Panaligan opposed the petition for
bail and prayed that it be denied for lack of merit.9 On 30 October 1991, the accused filed a notice to set for hearing
the petition for bail.10
Upon arraignment on 5 November 1991, each of the accused entered a plea of not guilty.11 The trial court then set
the hearing on the petition for bail on 11, 18, and 19 November 1991, and the pre-trial on 18 November 1991. 12 On
even date, the private prosecutor, Atty. Alvin T. Sarita, moved to suspend the accused from the service pursuant
to Section 4713 Of R.A. No. 6975 (Department of Interior and Local Government Act), which the trial court granted
on 6 November 1991.14
The 11 November 1991 hearing on the petition for bail was cancelled but reset to 18, 19, and 20 November 1991.
In a letter dated 13 November 1991, Pedro Mazon, father of the victim, sought Judge Virola's assistance regarding
information that all the accused were seen aboard the boat M.B. San Miguel bound for Batangas.15 Judge Virola
ordered the Calapan RTC Clerk of Court as ex-officio sheriff and his Branch Clerk of Court to investigate the
matter16 and directed Supt. Lasar to comment on Pedro Mazon's letter.17
In their report,18 the aforementioned Clerks of Court informed Judge Virola that they went to the Oriental Mindoro
PNP Command on 13 November 1991 at around 12:00 p.m., only to discover that accused Landicho and Bunyi
were not there. According to the guard on duty, SPO3 Fortunato Mendoza, the said accused, escorted by SPO3
Julian Bilog, left the Mindoro Oriental PNP Command at about 11:50 a.m. and ate lunch outside the PNP Command.
Later, at around 1:10 p.m., Landicho and Bunyi returned with their escort SPO3 Bilog. Bilog then informed the
Clerks of Court that on 12 November 1991, at around 11:30 a.m., while he was the guard on duty, the four accused
left the stockade for lunch and talked to someone about their case, with Landicho and Bunyi escorted by PO2
Edilberto Santos, and accused Manlusoc and Canuel by SPO2 Ernesto Javier. An hour later, only Bunyi returned;
further, when the Clerks of Court left at about 2:00 p.m., Manlusoc and Canuel had not yet returned.
In his comment, Supt. Lasar confirmed that the four accused "were present at the place as they were seen [but]
were guarded by escort."19
In his report20 to the trial court, Senior Inspector Jesus T. Gatchalian, Commanding Officer of the 269th PNP Mobile
Force Company, declared that at 11:20 a.m. of 12 November 1991, all the accused left for lunch with escorts. While
Landicho and Bunyi returned to the PNP Stockade at 1:00 p.m. that day, Manlusoc and Canuel proceeded to
Batangas, with escorts, to get financial support for their case. However, they returned to the PNP Stockade at 3:00
p.m. on 14 November 1991.
At the scheduled pre-trial on 18 November 1991, the trial court granted the motion of the accused to terminate
the pre-trial and reset the hearing of the petition for bail on 23, 24, 27, and 30 January 1992.21
82
In his letter of 16 December 1991, Pedro Mazon informed Judge Virola that on 13 December 1991, he saw the four
accused watching a cockfight in Barangay Sta. Isabel, Calapan.22 Judge Virola referred the matter to Supt.
Lasar,23who replied that on 13 December 1991, the accused were at the PNP Stockade, as evidenced by the
certification issued by the Sgt of the Guard and Guards on Duty at the time." 24
The petition for bail was initially heard on 23 January 1992, with the prosecution presenting eyewitness Lilian
Francisco. The hearing continued the following day with the prosecution ready to present Dr. Arturo Alberto;
however, the defense and the prosecution agreed to dispense with Dr. Alberto's testimony and mark the following
exhibits:
Exhs. "B" — Necropsy Report "B-2"
— Dorsal Side of Exh. "B"
"B-2" — Signature of Dr. Alberto
On Exh. "B-1"
"C" — Rough Illustration report
"C-1" — Signature of Dr. Alberto on Exh. "C"
"D" — Certificate of Death
"D-1" — Signature of Dr. Alberto on Exh. "D".25
Consequently, the trial court issued an order, the pertinent portions providing:
After the prosecutor announced that the next witness that he is presenting is Dr. Arturo
Alberto as medico legal expert, whose qualification as such was admitted by counsel for the
accused, for the purposes to wit:
(a) to identify the Necropsy Report issued by him in connection with the
Post Mortem examination conducted on the body of Isagani Mason;
(b) to testify on the character and nature of the wounds sustained by
Isagani Mason as well as the cause of the wounds sustained by the victim
which according to his opinion as stated in the Necropsy Report were all
sustained by gunshot wound;
(c) to testify as to the number of wounds sustained which is 21 gunshot
wounds;
(d) to testify to the effect that the victim sustained 7 gunshot wounds at
the back;
(e) to testify that the victim sustained 14 gunshot wounds in front of his
body, two of which were inflicted on the head;
(f) to identify the rough sketch showing the anterior and posterior position
of a human body and to testify that the wounds sustained by the deceased
as indicated were in front and at the back of the body;
(g) to identify the certificate of death of Isagani Mason;
(h) to testify as to the cause of death which is multiple internal injuries,
secondary to gunshot wounds;
Counsel for the accused manifested that he is admitting that if presented on the witness stand
said witness will testify according to the tenor and for the purposes as stated by the prosecutor
in open court.
Forthwith, the prosecutor caused the marking of the Necropsy Report as Exhibits "B", "B-1",
and "B-2", the Sketch showing the anterior view and posterior view and the location of the
wounds indicated therein as Exhibits "C" and "C-1", the Certificate of Death of Isagani Mason
as Exhibits "D" and "D-1" and thereafter dispensed with the presentation of Dr. Arturo Alberto
in view of the stipulation between the parties.26
On 16 March 1992, the prosecution presented Herman Mejico, Jr. as its third witness on the petition for bail and,
thereafter, rested its case for the purpose.27
At the hearing on 17 March 1992, as their evidence in connection with the petition for bail, the accused only caused
to be marked some documents and then rested their case. The documents marked were:
Exh. "1" — Alias Warrant of Arrest for Isagani Mazon
in
Criminal Case No. 3201, for violation of RA
6539 — Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972 —
dated 2 January 1990;
Exh. "2" — Warrant of Arrest for Herman Mejico in
Crim. Case No. C-2675 for attempted murder
dated 28 January 1988;
Exh. "3" — Order of 28 August 1988 in Crim. Case No.
C-2675 archiving the case since Mejico has
not been arrested;
83
 Exh. "4" — Warrant of Arrest for Isagani Mazon dated
27 August 1990 in Crim. Case No. C-3201;
Exh. "5" — Order of 18 December 1990 in Crim. Case
No. C-3201 archiving the case.28
The trial court then considered the petition for bail submitted for resolution and set the reception of the
prosecution's evidence on the merits of the case on 23 April and 24 April 1992. 29
On the same date, 17 March 1992, the court granted Atty. Edgardo Aceron's withdrawal as defense counsel on the
ground that he would seek election as Governor of Mindoro Oriental. 30 Likewise, the private prosecutor moved
to transfer the detention of the accused to the Provincial Jail and cite the accused and the PNP Provincial Director
in contempt of court because of persistent violations of the court's order not to allow the accused to leave the
PNP Stockade nor to place them in the custody of any person without a court order. 31 The court deferred action
on the motion for transfer until the petition for bail was resolved and required Supt. Lasar to comment on the
motion to cite him in contempt.32 Supt. Lasar responded that he had not received any information that the accused
left the stockade without escorts and the accused were never moved to any detention cell other than the PNP
Stockade.33
On 24 March 1992, the trial court issued an order34 denying the petition for bail on the ground that evidence of
guilt was strong, directing the transfer of the accused from the PNP Stockade to the Calapan Jail Center, and
reiterating its previous order that the accused would not be allowed to leave the jail nor be placed in the custody
of any person, unless otherwise ordered by the court.
On 27 March 1992, the trial court denied the prosecution's motion to cite the accused and the PNP Provincial
Director in contempt of court due to "humanitarian reasons"; moreover, the prosecution failed to substantiate its
allegations in the said motion.35
The hearing on the merits of 23 April and 24 April 1992 were reset to 20 May and 21 May 1992.36
In a letter dated 5 May 1992, Pedro Mazon complained once more to Judge Virola that he saw the four accused
roaming the town of San Vicente, Calapan, and often staying in a house in Libis, another town in Calapan. 3 7 Judge
Virola asked the Provincial Jail Warden to comment 38 and the latter replied that the accused "are at present inside
the jail," although at one time "they requested to be escorted by Mr. Saure, Prison Guard, to consult their legal
counsel, hence it may have been possible that they were seen outside." 39
On 10 May 1992, the prosecution moved for the issuance of a bench warrant for the arrest of the accused who
had been roaming around Calapan without police escorts.40 Thus the trial court ordered the PNP Provincial Director
to cause the immediate arrest of all the accused and place them inside the Provincial Jail, and the Provincial Jail
Warden to show cause why he should not be cited for contempt of court for allowing the accused to roam
around.41
On oral order of Judge Virola, Clerk of Court Armando E. Fortus went to the Provincial Jail on 12 May and 13 May
1992 to verify the private prosecutor's allegations that all the accused were seen "roaming around without any
escorts and carrying firearms." Fortus reported that on the said dates Bunyi, Manlusoc, and Canuel "were all out
of the Provincial Jail Center for the reasons that they were in the custody of the Provincial Governor, however,
M/Sgt. Reynaldo Landicho was there . . ."42
Since Supt. Lasar did not comply with the above order, the court issued on 14 May 1992 another bench warrant
for the arrest of all the accused, except Landicho, and redirected the Provincial Jail Warden not to allow the
accused to be placed in the custody of any person, including the Governor.43
Then, on 15 May 1992, the trial court received information from Provincial Jail Warden Menandro S. Abac that:
[T]he four (4) . . . accused were reported in the Logbook as escaped prisoners as of May 9, 1992
while Guard-on-Duty was busy attending in serving meals for lunch to our inmates. The four
accused left unnoticed and might have used the exit way going to the Provincial Capitol
Compound.44
At the scheduled hearing on 20 May 1992, none of the accused appeared despite notice. Upon request of Atty.
Ligorio Turiano of the Public Attorney's Office (PAO), who was appointed by the court as de oficio counsel for the
accused, the hearing on that day was adjourned until the following day, as scheduled.
The accused did not appear on 21 May 1992. The prosecution rested its case by adopting as its evidence on the
merits the evidence it had presented on the petition for bail. The trial court then set the reception of the evidence
for the defense on 1, 4, 8, 9, and 10 June 1992.45
At the scheduled hearing on 1 June 1992, counsel for the accused asked for a postponement on the ground that
he had not been able to contact the accused who, according to the Provincial Jail Warden, had escaped. The court
granted the motion but directed the hearing to proceed on the succeeding scheduled dates of 4, 8, 9, and 10 June
1992.46
The hearing on 4 June 1992 was also postponed on motion of counsel for the accused. 4 7 At the hearing on 8 June
1992, the defense presented
Sgt. Rogelio M. Rogelio48 who merely identified photocopies of certain documents.49 The defense then moved to
reset the next scheduled hearings because the wife of accused Landicho was still trying to convince the latter to
return to the folds of the law.50 The trial court, for humanitarian reasons, but over the vehement objections of the
prosecution, granted the motion and reset the trial on 16 June and 17 June 1992.51
On 16 June 1992, the accused, through their new counsel, Atty. Renato G. dela Cruz, moved to quash the
information on the ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. They claimed
that under P.D. No. 1486, crimes committed by public officers were within the original and exclusive jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan, and although Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975 provided that "criminal cases involving PNP
members shall be within the jurisdiction of the regular courts," the term "courts" referred to the
Sandiganbayan.52The trial court denied the motion to quash53 and considered Atty. dela Cruz' verbal motion for a
grant of five days within which to file a motion for reconsideration as dilatory.54
Since Atty. dela Cruz manifested that he was not ready to present evidence, the trial court issued on 16 June 1992
an order declaring the accused as having waived the presentation of evidence since they had not been re-arrested
84
and repeatedly failed to present evidence despite the several occasions afforded them. Thus, the trial court set
the promulgation of judgment on 1 July 1992.55
On 29 June 1992, however, Atty. dela Cruz filed a motion praying that the scheduled promulgation be cancelled
and further proceedings suspended, citing Eternal Gardens Memorial Park vs. Court of Appeals,56 because the
accused had filed a "25-page Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition With Writ of Preliminary Injunction & Prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order" before the Cour0t of Appeals, docketed therein as CA-G.R. SP No. 28210. On 1 July
1992, the trial court denied the motion and promulgated its decision57 as scheduled. The dispositive portion reads:
ACCORDINGLY, the Court finds all the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as principals,
of the crime of Murder, defined under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code and penalized therein
by reclusion temporal in its maximum period, to death, with the qualifying circumstance of
treachery and with the ordinary aggravating circumstance of the crime having been committed
by a band and advantage having been taken of superior strength. Considering that there are
two ordinary aggravating circumstances and no mitigating circumstance present, the penalty
that accused must suffer should be the maximum period of the penalty provided by law.
Considering, however, the abolition of the death penalty under the Constitution of 1987, the
hands of the Court are tied in imposing the supreme penalty of death.
Consequently, all the accused are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, together with all the accessory penalties provided by law and to pay the costs.
Accused are likewise ordered to pay jointly and severally the legal heirs of the victim Isagani
Mazon the amount of P50,000.00 by way of actual and compensatory damages without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Let warrants of arrest be issued for the arrest of the accused and the different police agencies
be furnished with copies thereof to effect the recapture of all the accused who had escaped
from confinement during the progress of the trial.58
The following disquisitions of the trial court support its judgment:
To substantiate the allegation of the Information, the prosecution presented Lilian Francisco
and German Mejico, Jr. The presentation of Dr. Arturo Alberto whose qualification as medico
legal expert was admitted by counsel for the accused, was dispensed with in view of the
stipulation that, should said witness be presented on the witness stand, he would testify,
among others, that he was the one who conducted the post mortem examination on the body
of deceased Isagani Mazon; that the victim sustained 21 gunshot wounds, 7 of which were
sustained at the back, 14 of which were in front, and 2 of which were on the head; and that
the cause of the death of the victim is multiple internal injuries secondary to gunshot wounds.
From the evidence adduced by the prosecution, it has been sufficiently established that
sometime on January 8, 1991, at around 9:30 in the evening, while the victim Isagani Mazon
was walking together with German Mejico, Jr. on J.P. Rizal St., Calapan, Oriental Mindoro near
the Main Deck which is opposite the building where the Pizza Galera Restaurant and Hotel
Domini are housed, accused Johnny Bunyi and Eric Manlusoc approached them. Isagani Mazon
told German Mejico, Jr. to go away and after German Mejico, Jr. had moved away around 10
arms length from Isagani Mazon, accused Johnny Bunyi and Eric Manlusoc fired their short
firearms at Isagani Mazon while accused Sgt. Reynaldo Landicho and Leovino Canuel rushed
towards Isagani Mazon and likewise fired their guns at Isagani Mazon. The shooting incident
was also witnessed by Lilian Francisco who was then ascending the stairs of the building where
the Domini Hotel and Pizza Galera Restaurant are housed. Lilian Francisco recognized all the
accused because she knew all of them prior to the incident in question. She knew Johnny Bunyi
for around one month prior to the incident in question; Eric Manlusoc around a year prior to
the incident in question; Leovino Canuel also around a year prior to the incioent in question;
and Reynaldo Landicho even before the COSAC organized by the military was disbanded. She
recalled that accused Reynaldo Landicho formerly resided at the back of the Mindoro College
and accused Johnny Bunyi, Eric Manlusoc and Leovino Canuel used to visit and drink in the
Mariwasa Restaurant where she formerly worked as floor manager of the ladies working
thereat.
xxx xxx xxx
After the cancellation of the scheduled dates of trial on June 1 and 4 at the instance of counsel
for the accused, counsel for the accused presented SPO3 Rogelio Rogelio on June 8, 1992 who
identified certain documents namely, xerox copy of the statement of M/Sgt. Landicho, xerox
copy of the statement of Johnny Bunyi, xerox copies of the joint statements of Leovino Canuel
and Eric Manlusoc, xerox copy of the Investigation Report of SPO3 Rogelio, xerox copy
of alias warrant of arrest against Isagani Mazon in Criminal Case No. C-3201 of this Court.
Thereafter, counsel for the accused asked for continuance and for the cancellation of the trial
on June 9 and 10 and prayed that accused be given another opportunity to present further
evidence on June 16 and 17, 1992, all starting at 8:30 in the morning and the same was granted
by the Court in view of the manifestation of the counsel for the accused that the wife of one
of the accused is trying her best to convince the accused to return to the fold of the law in
order to testify in this case.
xxx xxx xxx
For repeated failure of the accused to present their evidence despite the fact that they were
given several opportunities to do so although they had escaped from the Provincial Jail, the
Court considered the accused to have waived the presentation of their evidence and the case
was considered submitted for decision.
Even admitting that there was a warrant issued by the Court for the arrest of Isagani Mazon in
Crim. Case No. 3201 the accused were ordered by their Commanding Officer to serve the same,
the accused were not by that fact alone justified to shoot and kill Isagani Mazon. They have to
establish by clear and convincing evidence that they were justified in killing Isagani Mazon.
Instead of testifying in their favor to prove justifying or exempting circumstance accused
escaped from the provincial jail after the prosecution has rested its case.
85
 The act of the accused in escaping from the custody of the law during the progress of the trial
of the case against them is indicative of their guilt (citations omitted).
Considering that in killing Isagani Mazon accused employed means, methods and forms in the
execution thereof which tended directly and especially to ensure its execution without risk to
themselves arising from the defense which said Isagani Mazon might make, the commission of
the crime is attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery. The commission of the crime
is likewise attended by the ordinary aggravating circumstance of the crime having been
committed by a band considering that all the four accused were all armed with firearms and
acted together in the commission of the offense. The commission of the offense is also
attended by the ordinary aggravating circumstance of advantage having been taken of superior
strength considering that the victim Isagani Mazon was unarmed while the four accused were
armed with firearms.59
At the promulgation of judgment, the trial court was informed by the PNP Criminal Investigation Service Command
(PNP-CISC), Fourth Regional Office, that accused Manlusoc was arrested on 26 June 1992 at Barangay Mendez
Crossing, Tagaytay City.60 With this information, the trial court, pursuant to its judgment, caused warrants of arrest
to issue against Landicho, Canuel, and Bunyi.61
On 3 July 1992, accused Manlusoc was surrendered to the court pursuant to its order for the purpose of
committing him to the National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa.62 Manlusoc was then turned over to the custody of
the Provincial Jail Warden of Calapan.63
On 8 July 1992, accused Landicho, Bunyi, and Canuel, who remained at large, through Atty. dela Cruz, filed a motion
to quash the warrant of arrest issued against them on the ground that the Court of Appeals had given due course
to their petition questioning the trial court's jurisdiction.64 In a supplemental manifestation filed the following day,
Atty. dela Cruz called the attention of the trial court to the resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
28210 directing the trial court to answer the petition and to show cause why injunction should not
issue.65 Agreeing with the prosecutor's opposition that the motion to quash was premature as giving due course
to the accused's petition did not automatically render void the proceedings before it, 66 the trial court denied the
motion.67
On 15 July 1992, the trial court denied the Provincial Jail Warden's request to allow him to escort Manlusoc to
Tagaytay City for a hearing in a case of illegal possession of firearms filed against Manlusoc. Further, the trial court
directed the Provincial Jail Warden to commit Manlusoc to the National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa "under tight
security."68
On 16 July 1992, Atty. dela Cruz filed a Notice of Appeal Ad
Cautelam69 which the trial court denied due course to as it was remotely contingent upon the Court of Appeals
finding that the trial court had jurisdiction over the case.70
Later, on 30 September 1992, the four accused filed a Supplemental Petition before the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 28210 asking the said court to declare the trial court to be without jurisdiction over Criminal Case No.
C-3496 and as null and void the subsequent orders of the trial court, including its denial of their notice of Appeal Ad
Cautelam.71 This supplemental petition was verified by the four accused who subscribed and swore to such
verification before their counsel, Atty. dela Cruz, in his capacity as a notary public and who entered such fact in his
notarial register as Proc. No. 320; Page No. 65; Book No. III, Series of 1992.72
In its decision of 22 September 1993 in CA-G.R. SP No. 28210, the Court of Appeals dismissed the accused's petition
for certiorari and prohibition, but partially granted the supplemental petition in favor of Eric Manlusoc, by ordering
the trial court to give due course to Manlusoc's appeal to this Court.73
Unsatisfied, the accused filed in this Court a petition for review, G.R. No. 110792, which we denied in our resolution
of 22 November 1993 as the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error. We also denied the motion to
reconsider the resolution.74 Meanwhile, the trial court gave due course to the appeal of Manlusoc as directed by
the Court of Appeals.75
The only valid appeal then is that of accused C1C Eric Manlusoc who was re-arrested five days before the
promulgation. 76 On 29 May 1995, this Court accepted Manlusoc's appeal.77
In his Appellant's Brief, Manlusoc imputes to the trial court seventeen "errors." He contends that:
I. THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT WAS A NULLITY IN THAT IT FAILED TO CONTAIN
SUFFICIENT FINDINGS OF FACT TO PRONOUNCE A JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION AS MANDATED
UNDER THE CONSTITUTION;
and that the trial court erred:
II. . . . IN HAVING CONVICTED APPELLANT WITH MURDER DESPITE THE LACK OF PROOF OF THE
ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION;
III. . . . IN HAVING FOUND APPELLANT GUILTY OF MURDER DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE
MEDICO-LEGAL OFFICER TO TESTIFY ON THE FACT OF DEATH OF THE VICTIM; THE NATURE OF
THE INJURIES SUSTAINED AND THE CAUSE OF DEATH;
IV. . . . IN HAVING FOUND THAT THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY WAS
PRESENT NOTWITHSTANDING THAT NO LESS THAN PROSECUTION'S OWN EVIDENCE HAD
ESTABLISHED ITS ABSENCE;
V. . . . IN NOT WAVING MADE ANY FINDING IN ITS DECISION THAT THE BULLET WHICH CAME
FROM THE GUN OF APPELLANT HIT THE VICTIM;
VI. . . . IN HAVING MADE [THE] ASSUMPTION AND CONCLUSION THAT BECAUSE THE
APPELLANT AND HIS CO- ACCUSED FIRED THEIR GUNS, THE VICTIM'S DEATH RESULTED
THEREFROM;
VII. . . . IN HAVING MADE A GENERALIZED CONCLUSION OF THE DEATH OF THE VICTIM SIMPLY
BECAUSE HE WAS SHOT BY THE APPELLANT AND HIS CO-ACCUSED;
86
 VIII. . . . IN FINDING APPELLANT GUILTY OF MURDER DESPITE LACK OF PROOF THAT THE
GUNSHOT COMING FROM APPELLANT'S FIREARM HIT THE VICTIM;
IX. . . . IN FINDING APPELLANT GUILTY OF MURDER DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE AS TO
WHO'S GUNSHOT WOUND WAS FATAL;
X. . . . IN FINDING APPELLANT GUILTY OF MURDER DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF PROOF OF
CONSPIRACY BETWEEN AND AMONG THE APPELLANT AND HIS CO-ACCUSED;
XI. . . . IN HAVING FOUND THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF BAND TO BE ATTENDANT IN
THE COMMISSION OF THE ALLEGED CRIME OF MURDER;
XII. . . . IN HOLDING THAT THE APPELLANT AND HIS CO- ACCUSED IN FACT ESCAPED;
XIII. . . . IN HAVING RULED THAT THE ALLEGED ESCAPE OF THE APPELLANT AND HIS CO-
ACCUSED DURING THE TRIAL INDICATED AN ADMISSION OF GUILT;
XIV. . . . IN NOT HAVING MADE A FINDING IN ITS DECISION AS TO THAT PART OF THE
TESTIMONY OF THE WITNESSES WHICH IT CONSIDERED BELIEVABLE;
XV. . . . IN NOT HAVING RULED THAT THE TESTIMONY OF BOTH PROSECUTION WITNESSES
LILIAN FRANCISCO AND HERMAN MEJICO, JR. WAS REPLETE WITH MATERIAL INCONSISTENCY
AFFECTING THEIR CREDIBILITY;
XVI. . . . IN HAVING GIVEN CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF LILIAN FRANCISCO AND HERMAN
MEJICO, JR. NOTWITHSTANDING PRESENCE OF CIRCUMSTANCES INDUBITABLY SHOWING
THAT THEIR TALE OF THE ALLEGED SHOOTING WAS UNBELIEVABLE AND CONTRARY TO
HUMAN EXPERIENCE; and
XVII. . . . IN NOT HAVING ACQUITTED APPELLANT CONSIDERING THAT THE PROSECUTION HAD
FAILED TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.78
In its Brief for the Appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General refutes all errors assigned by the appellant, but
recommends, however, that the appellant should only be convicted of the crime of homicide because:
[I]t cannot be said that the killing of Mazon was attended by treachery. No evidence was
presented to show that prior to the killing, appellant and his co-accused had determined to
commit the crime and consciously adopted the mode of attack.79
xxx xxx xxx
[W]here there is no evidence that the accused had, prior to the moment of the killing, resolved
to commit the crime or there is no proof that the death of the victim was the result of
meditation, calculation, or reflection, treachery cannot be considered.80
If the decision to kill was sudden, there is no treachery, even if the position of the victim was
vulnerable, because it was not deliberately sought by the accused, but was purely accidental.81
It asserts, further, that the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength was duly proven by the
prosecution; nevertheless, since it was not alleged in the Information, it may only be considered as a generic
aggravating circumstance.
We cannot proceed to resolve the assigned errors without first commenting on certain lapses of the trial court,
which only heighten a suspicion that the accused initially obtained generous concessions from it. It immediately
granted, ex-parte, their request to be detained at the PNP stockade but, at the same time, denied the
accompanying motion for bail solely on the ground that it did not set it for hearing, although both motions were
contained in one petition. It took no positive action against the accused, the PNP Provincial Director, and the
Provincial Jail Warden, despite admissions that the accused had been allowed to roam around unescorted and
even go to Batangas without leave of court in all instances. Then strangely, it rejected the motion for contempt on
the flimsy ground of "humanitarian" considerations. Worse, it did not pursue any disciplinary action against the
Provincial Jail Warden despite the latter's failure to comply with the "show cause" order of 10 May 1992.
Compounding the matter, although the trial court had been belatedly informed by the Provincial Jail Warden on
15 May 1992 that the accused had escaped from the Provincial Jail on 9 May 1992, and by Clerk of Court Fortus
that on 12 May and 13 May 1992 accused Bunyi, Manlusoc, and Canuel were in the custody of the Provincial
Governor, the trial court did not either order the Provincial Jail Warden to formally investigate the escape nor
direct the Provincial Governor to show cause why he kept the "escaped" prisoners.
What is more appalling is that although it validly tried the accused in absentia82 because they escaped, it
conveniently forgot that by their escape, the accused waived their right to present evidence and cross-examine
the witnesses against them. 83 Accordingly, the testimony of Sgt. Rogelio M. Rogelio on 8 June 1992 and all
documents identified by him (Exhibits "1" to "5-A", inclusive) must be rejected.
Needless to say, the conduct of the trial court leaves much to be desired.
We now turn to the assigned errors.
The first assigned error is patently without merit. The challenged decision substantially complied with the
requirements of both Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution 84 and Section 2, Rule 120 of the Rules of
Court.85The pertinent disquisitions therein, as well as its dispositive portion earlier quoted, readily show such
compliance. It sets out the facts which it believed were proved and the law upon which the judgment was based,
and states the legal qualifications of the offense constituted by the facts proved, the modifying circumstances, the
participation of the accused, the penalty imposed, and the civil liability.
The remaining assigned errors are interrelated and may be classified as follows:
That the trial court erred:
I. In holding that the crime of murder was committed despite absence of proof of its essential
elements (First and Fourth assigned errors);
87
 II. In holding the appellant guilty despite lack of evidence against him (Third, Fifth, Sixth,
Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, Fifteenth, Sixteenth, and Seventeenth assigned errors);
III. In appreciating the aggravating circumstance of band (Eleventh assigned error);
IV. In holding that the appellant and his co-accused had escaped and such escape indicated an
admission of guilt (Twelfth and Thirteenth assigned errors);
V. In not making a finding as to what part of the testimony of the witnesses it considered
believable (Fourteenth assigned error);
We resolve them in seriatim.
I. The qualifying circumstance alleged in the Information was treachery and the trial court appreciated it as:
[I]n killing Isagani Mazon accused employed means, methods and forms in the execution
thereof which tended directly and especially to ensure its execution without risk to themselves
arising from the defense which said Mazon might make . . .86
While the above was a mere conclusion without an accompanying explanation, such a lamentable inadequacy does
not, per se, justify a reversal of the decision. Since the appellant's appeal opens the whole case for review,87 we
shall, on the basis of the evidence, determine for ourselves if the killing of Isagani Mazon was attended with
treachery.
For treachery to be present, two conditions must concur: (1) the means, method, and form of execution employed
giving the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) that such means, methods, or
form of execution were deliberately and consciously adopted by the
accused.88
In the case at bench, the victim seemed to have expected trouble, considering that upon seeing Manlusoc and
Bunyi approaching him, he told his companion, Mejico, to move away. Nevertheless, treachery may still be
appreciated for even when the victim was warned of danger to his person, what is decisive is that the execution
of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate.89 The evidence clearly bears this
out. The victim was unarmed and the accused gave no warning. The victim was then totally unprepared to even
guess that the appellant and his co-accused Canuel — who were the first two who appeared — would pepper him
with bullets. It was for this reason that the appellant asserted in his Brief:
[I]nstead of running away when he had the opportunity to do so, the victim went straight,
continued to walk towards the appellant and Canuel and faced them.90
This reaction only showed that the victim had no inkling whatever that he would be fired upon. The
assault was indisputably sudden and the victim's premonition of peril did not negate the treacherous
nature of the attack.
That it was impossible for the victim to defend himself or retaliate is obvious from other circumstances of this case.
While the accused each had a gun, there is no proof that the victim was armed. The appellant's allegation that
"[t]ruly, after the shootout, the victim yielded a gun and a dagger," 91 does not even point to the source of such a
conclusion. If it were the testimony or report of defense witness Rogelio, the same, as already noted above, must
be rejected. If, indeed, the victim had a gun and dagger, the accused should have presented them at the hearing
on the application for bail.
A sudden attack against an unarmed victim shows treachery.92 Furthermore, it was shown that the first shot,
towards the victim's head, came from behind the victim.93 While it has been said that a dorsal attack alone does
not indicate treachery, 94 the assault in this case was also sudden, unexpected, and without warning, thus
suggesting treachery.95
As to the method of execution, we find that the accused, including the appellant, adopted it deliberately. We
disagree with the submission of the Office of the Solicitor General that treachery was absent because of lack of
evidence that "prior to the killing, appellant and his co-accused had determined to commit the crime and
consciously adopted the mode of attack." 96 The number and location of the gunshot wounds, two in the head,
and at both the anterior and posterior portions of the body as shown in Exhibit "C," are enough to banish any
motive of an accidental shooting.97 The severity of the accused's acts indicate a calculated pursuit of a decision to
kill.
Treachery being present, it was then error for the trial court to consider the generic aggravating circumstance of
abuse of superior strength as an independent aggravating circumstance. It is settled that treachery absorbs abuse
of superior strength.98
II. Under the second classification of his assigned errors, the appellant contends that the trial court erred in holding
him guilty of murder: (a) despite the failures of the medico-legal officer to testify to the fact of death of the victim
(Third assigned error) and of the trial court to make a finding that the bullet which came from his (appellant's) gun
hit the victim (Fifth assigned error); (b) despite absence of proof that the gunshot coming from his (appellant's)
firearm hit the victim (Eight assigned error) and as to who caused the fatal gunshot wound (Ninth assigned error)
and of conspiracy (Tenth assigned error); (c) in having assumed that because he and his co-accused fired their
guns, the victim's death resulted therefrom (Sixth assigned error) and made a generalized conclusion of the death
of the victim simply because he was shot by him (appellant) and his co-accused (Seventh assigned error); and (d)
in giving credit to the testimony of prosecution witnesses Lilian Francisco and Herman Mejico although the same
was replete with material inconsistencies affecting their credibility (Fifteenth assigned error) and notwithstanding
the presence of circumstances indubitably showing that their tale of the alleged shooting was unbelievable and
contrary to human experience (Sixteenth assigned error).
These errors fail to impress.
It is untrue that the medico-legal officer failed to testify to the fact of death of the victim. As earlier shown, the
said officer, Dr. Arturo Alberto, was ready to testify on 24 January 1992 in connection with the petition for bail,
but the defense and the prosecution dispensed with his testimony on the basis of the stipulation as to the nature,
tenor, and extent of his testimony and admission by the former of the qualifications of Dr. Alberto. Further, the
defense chose not to cross-examine him. It probably intended to subject him to more searching questions during
trial on the merits. But they escaped before such time. Thus, when the prosecution rested its case for the trial on
the merits by adopting the evidence it introduced at the hearing of the petition for bail, which included that of Dr.
88
Alberto and the documents prepared by him, the appellant lost his opportunity to cross-examine Dr. Alberto,
through no fault of the prosecution or any other, but solely his own. The appellant cannot now be heard to
complain.
There is equally no basis for the sixth and seventh assigned errors. The appellant admitted in his Brief that he,
Canuel, and Bunyi shot Isagani Mazon.99 Dr. Alberto attributed the victim's death to multiple internal injuries
secondary to gunshot wounds, 100 which was undisputed. The victim suffered no other injury aside from those
inflicted by the accused. The unbroken chain of events from the accused's wounding of the victim to the latter's
death induces no other conclusion than that the accused's acts led to the victim's death.
As to conspiracy among the four accused (Tenth assigned error), the challenged decision does not, indeed, mention
conspiracy. Nevertheless, one cannot infer the absence of conspiracy from such silence. Direct proof is not
essential to prove such a scheme, and its existence may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the
offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused themselves when such acts point to a joint
purpose and design, concerted action, and community of intent. 101 It is sufficient that the malefactors acted in
concert pursuant to the same objective. 102
But inconsistency, not consistency, as to material facts is the mark of lack of credibility. Thus, among the
tests of integrity of evidence are whether the testimonies agree on the essential facts and whether the
respective versions corroborate and substantially coincide with each other to make a consistent and
coherent whole. 111The appellant, however, points out the consistency of the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses and, in effect, endorses their honesty.
The appellant also calls our attention to Francisco's former job as a procurer of flesh 112 to discourage this Court
from believing her testimony. Francisco revealed her trade through the following exchange:
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ATTY. ACERON:
Q You stated on direct examination that you are the floor manager of the
ladies in the Mariwasa Restaurant on or about January 8, 1991. Do you
affirm that?
A Yes. sir.

There was conspiracy in this case considering that the accused's synchronous presence at the crime scene was not
Q So, do I understand . . . that you are an employee and receiving salary
a mere coincidence. The appellant admitted that he and his co-accused belonged to the same intelligence team
from the proprietor or owner of the Mariwasa Restaurant?
which was then purposely searching for Mazon. 103 Additionally, the evidence on record shows that Bunyi shot the
victim from behind, 104 after which Manlusoc, positioned in front of the victim, also shot the latter. 105 Canuel and
Landicho then rushed to the scene and shot the victim again while he was lying on the ground. 106 Afterwards, the A No, sir.
four accused dumped the victim in a Philippine Constabulary service vehicle and drove away in the said
vehicle. 107The accused's simultaneous movement towards and concerted attack on the victim, and their Q Why? What is the nature of your work as floor manager of the ladies of
coordinated escape from the crime scene clearly evince the existence of conspiracy. the Mariwasa Restaurant on or about that date?

There being conspiracy and it being proven that the victim died by the hands of the conspirators, the fifth, eighth, A I only receive commissions from the ladies thereat.
and ninth errors need not detain us long. Manlusoc claims it was never proven that he shot the fatal bullet, thus,
he cannot be held liable for the victim's death. However, where conspiracy is proven, the act of one is the act of Q What for is that commission?
all. 108Consequently, it does not matter if Manlusoc did not fire the fatal shot, for all the accused are equally
responsible for the killing of the victim. 109
A I receive a commission of P1.00 for every lady's drink.
The fifteenth and sixteenth assigned errors concern the credibility of the two prosecution witnesses, Lilian
Francisco and Herman Mejico. Often emphasized is the rule that when the issue is one of credibility of witnesses, Q And that is the source of your income as floor manager of the ladies?
appellate courts will generally not disturb the finding of the trial court, considering that the latter is in a better
position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and A There is an additional amount I receive like for instance when ladies are
manner of testifying during the trial, unless it plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if brought out by customers and whatever they receive they give me a
considered, might affect the result of the case. 110 certain percentage.

The appellant gives this Court no reason to overturn the trial court's assessment of the prosecution witnesses' xxx xxx xxx
credibility, even though he claims the two witnesses:
Q And these ladies are prostitutes?
[a]lmost jibed in their declarations in claiming that they both saw all the four (4) appellant and
the co-accused shot the victim, just to be sure they got convicted. A That is it, sir.

89
 Q So you are the procurer or pimp, not the floor manager of the ladies?
PROSECUTOR PANALIGAN:
Objection, Your Honor, misleading and assumes a fact.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT:
All right, inform the witness that the question tends to incriminate her
because the question tends to insinuate that she is a pimp or procurer and
said act is penalized by law. Inform her that it is her right not to answer the
question if she so desires, but if she wants to answer the question she is at
liberty to do so, but she cannot be forced to answer the question.
A I may answer or I may not.
COURT:
Q Precisely, you are being asked. It is your right not to answer. Do you want
to answer the question?
A I am willing to answer the question.
COURT:
All right, then answer the question.
A Yes, sir. 113
Such admission given openly and after the witness was informed of her right not to disclose her line of
work emphasized her trustworthiness. The revelation enhanced, not impaired, Francisco's credibility. 114
Still doubting her honesty, the appellant claims Francisco's varied reactions to the events she witnessed are
contrary to human experience. For instance, Francisco testified:
Q Now, from the time that you heard the first shot when you were then
ascending the Domini Hotel, how many minutes elapsed, more or less, up
to the time that you heard again the bully of the second shot?
A A split while because the shot I heard is like a super lolo. 115
The appellant then inquires, "If what she heard was a super lolo cracked, why did she have a peculiar
interest to find out what it was?" Obviously, the appellant misinterpreted Francisco; if he had read the
rest of the testimony he would not have missed the following explanation:
Q And when you heard the shot you thought it was [a] super lolo and not
a report from a gun?
PROSECUTOR PANALIGAN:
Misleading, Your Honor.
ATTY. ACERON:
I am on cross-examination, Your Honor.
COURT:
Witness may answer.
A The sounds of the shot were like the super lolo because the shots were
successive. 116
As early on as the direct examination, Francisco made it clear that her attention was drawn to the
incident because she heard a shot, not an exploding firecracker:
Q Now, while you were ascending the stairs of the Domini Hotel towards
the direction of Pizza Galera upstairs, do you know of anything unusual
which occurred?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was that incident?
A While I was ascending and was on the third step I heard a shot. 117
The appellant cites other incidents testified to by Francisco which he claims is contrary to human experience.
However, as with the super lolo example, each alleged contradiction was adequately clarified in Francisco's
testimony. Besides, among witnesses there can be no standard reaction to a crime. 118
Persistent in his attempts to cast doubt on Francisco's credibility, the appellant argues then queries:
Incidentally, her testimony that she heard the victim dared the four (4) lawmen and said: "sige
patayin ninyo ako," is this credible? No sane person would utter such statement especially by
90
 the victim who was a former Marine soldier. More incredibly, why should Landicho and Canuel
under mission to serve a warrant of arrest call the challenge and shoot simultaneously? 119
This Court cannot be expected to delve into the state of mind of persons, especially deceased victims
and escaped detainees, hence, these queries have no bearing on Francisco's credibility.
120
The appellant also cites omissions in Francisco's sworn statement taken at the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) office in Batangas City. Particularly, in relating the killing, Francisco failed to give the names of Manlusoc and
Bunyi. On the witness stand, she explained that the omission
was due to the investigating officer's failure to ask for the names of the said accused. 121 However, Francisco
mentioned in her sworn statement the names Landicho and "Bunso" without being asked for the same. Still, the
omission is too trivial to dent Francisco's credibility, especially since affidavits are almost always incomplete and
often inaccurate, 122 as they are usually not "prepared by the affiant himself but by another who uses his own
language in writing the affiant's statements." 123 Moreover, affidavits are generally considered to be inferior to
testimonies given in open court, 124 hence, an omission in the affidavit can not automatically discredit a witness.
At any rate, the decisive factor is that the witness in fact identified the accused, 125 which Francisco did, not only
in her testimony but also in the later portion of her sworn statement where she named one of the assassins as
"Tenyente," an alias used by the appellant. 126
The appellant then assaults Francisco's report to the NBI on 21 January 1991, when the killing occurred on 8
January 1991. We, however, take judicial notice of the actuality that witnesses in this country are usually reluctant
to volunteer information about a criminal case or are unwilling to be involved in or dragged into criminal
investigations. 127
Since the transcript of her testimony consumed 102 pages, Francisco's examination must have taken hours to
complete, interrupted only by a short recess 128 and a break at noon. 129 Yet, this witness weathered a grueling
cross-examination bordering on harassment and remained coherent and unfeigned throughout. This Court can,
therefore, only lend credence to Francisco's testimony.
As regards Mejico, the appellant questions his "bravery" when he opted to witness what would happen to his
friend, Mazon, and did not move away as the victim ordered him to do. Bravery is not a cause for disbelieving a
witness, and his concern for the well-being of a friend was certainly understandable.
To discredit Mejico, the appellant cites this witness's admission that he had never seen any of the accused, except
Landicho, until the incident complained of. 130 The appellant's observation is of no moment, for a witness'
statement that he does not know the perpetrators does not mean he cannot identify them. 131
Still hoping to dilute the witnesses' credibility, the appellant contends that they are under the protection of
Barangay Captain "Pae" Roxas, a relative of the victim. 132 This fact is immaterial since Roxas was never shown to
have influenced the witnesses. On the contrary, that the witnesses needed Roxas's protection only highlighted the
banefulness of the accused.
Yet, there is one point of discrepancy between the prosecution witnesses' testimony: the position of the victim
when Landicho and Canuel shot him. Francisco claimed the victim was lying face downward 133 while Mejico said
he was lying on his back. 134 However, this disparity may be attributed to the different vantage points from which
the witnesses observed the event. Francisco observed the killing at an oblique angle 135 and about four or five arms
length away, 136 while Mejico viewed the crime some ten meters away and, it seems, not at an angle. 137 At any
rate, the discrepancy is not sufficient to cast doubt on the testimonies since the witnesses agree on the material
point that while the victim was lying on the ground, Canuel and Landicho shot him.
III. The trial court correctly appreciated the generic aggravating circumstance of band. There is band whenever
more than three armed malefactors shall have acted together in the commission of the offense. 138 In the present
case, the four accused, each armed with a gun, conspired in the killing of Isagani Mazon, hence this aggravating
circumstance was present.
However, the trial court erred in appreciating against the accused the generic aggravating circumstance of abuse
of superior strength. As correctly observed by the Office of the Solicitor General in the Appellee's Brief, this
circumstance is absorbed by treachery.
IV. We do not think that the appellant and his counsel are serious in the twelfth and thirteenth assigned errors. As
shown earlier, their escape on 9 May 1992 was registered in the logbook of the Provincial Jail and reported to the
court by the Provincial Jail Warden. Their own counsel de oficio asked for the postponement of the 1 June 1992
hearing because he was unable to contact the accused who had escaped, and after the testimony of Rogelio on 8
June 1992, the counsel asked for the cancellation of the next scheduled hearings because Landicho's wife was still
trying to convince the former to return to the folds of the law. And on 16 June 1592, their new counsel, Atty. dela
Cruz, could not produce them in court. It is also a fact that the appellant was re-arrested only on 26 June 1992 in
Tagaytay City.
Finally, the appellant and his counsel are fully aware that the fact of such escape was confirmed by the Court of
Appeals in its 22 April 1993 decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 28210, and by this Court in our 22 November 1993 resolution
in G.R. No. 110792, to which the Brief for the Appellant makes express reference. 139
The confirmed escape of the accused is flight from justice. It is doctrinally settled that flight of an accused is an
indication of his guilt or of a guilty mind. 140 Indeed, the wicked man flees though no man pursueth, but the
righteous are as bold as a lion. 141
V. The fourteenth assigned error is an exercise in futility, assigned more to annoy this Court than to see justice
done. A trial court is not bound to disclose which part of a witness' testimony it deems believable. Generally, a
witness' testimony is considered in its entirety, 142 partial credence being an exception as when the testimony of a
witness can be reasonably believed as to some facts but disbelieved as to others. 143 Further, it is presumed that a
person is innocent of a crime or wrong, 144 including giving false testimony. Hence, unless a court, for some reason,
finds a witnesses' testimony unworthy of belief, the court must lend it credence. Moreover, the defense failed to
prove that the prosecution witnesses had any ill motive to testify against the accused, and the rule on this matter
is that absent proof of ill motive, the testimonies are worthy of belief. 145
Affirmance then of the appealed judgment is inevitable, which, however, does not write finis to this case. We are
compelled, in light of our preface to this decision, to decry the questionable conduct of the trial court, certain law
enforcement authorities, and the counsel for the accused-appellant.
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We earlier detailed the procedural lapses committed by the trial judge, Honorable Marciano T. Virola, which
heighten a suspicion that the accused initially obtained generous concessions from his court. He should be
admonished to be more circumspect in the performance of his duty.
We are likewise convinced that PNP Provincial Director of Oriental Mindoro Superintendent Jaime L. Lasar showed
manifest bias by tolerating or allowing the accused to leave the PNP stockade without the permission of the court
and treating its orders in a cavalier fashion, which ultimately resulted in the highly suspicious "escape" of the
accused. The PNP leadership must perforce conduct a thorough investigation to determine his administrative
liability.
The Jail Warden of the Provincial Jail of Oriental Mindoro, on his part, displayed gross negligence in the
performance of his duty. Worse, he even attempted to deceive the trial court. When asked to show cause why he
should not be held in contempt for allowing the accused to roam around, especially on 12 May and 13 May 1992,
he lamely explained that the said accused "were reported in the Logbook as escaped prisoners as of May 9, 1992."
(c) DIRECT the Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), through the Director General
of the Philippine National Police, to (1) use the full force of the law to effect the re-arrest of accused M/Sgt.
Reynaldo Landicho, Pat. Johnny Bunyi, and C2C Leovino Canuel and thereafter commit them to the New Bilibid
Prison in Muntinglupa, Metro Manila, and (2) conduct appropriate administrative proceedings against
Superintendent JAIME L. LASAR for gross misconduct or conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and
to SUBMIT to this Court, within sixty (60) days from notice of this Decision, status reports on such re-arrest and
administrative proceedings;
(d) REQUIRE Provincial Jail Warden MENANDRO S. ABAC to SHOW CAUSE, within ten (10) days from notice of this
Decision, why he should not be held in contempt of court for the escape of the four accused on 9 May 1992; and
(e) DIRECT Atty. RENATO DELA CRUZ to SHOW CAUSE, within ten (10) days from notice of this Decision, why no
disciplinary action should be taken against him for violation of Rule 1.02, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

Turning to the Provincial Governor of Oriental Mindoro, as of 12 May and 13 May 1992, he had yet to explain why Let the Office of the President, Judge Marciano T. Virola, the Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local
he had in his custody all of the accused, except Landicho, who, by then, were already fugitives from justice. Government, Superintendent Jaime L. Lasar, Provincial Jail Warden Menandro S. Abac, and Atty. Renato dela Cruz
be furnished with copies of this Decision.
Finally, we note that while the accused were already fugitives from justice, Atty. Renato dela Cruz nevertheless
was in constant touch with them as he was able to procure their signatures for their supplemental petition before Costs against the accused-appellant.
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 28210, and in their Magkaanib na Sinumpaang Salaysay. 146 In the latter,
the four accused subscribed to it and swore before Atty. dela Cruz as notary public in Makati, Metro Manila, on 20
August 1992, and he entered such act in his notarial register as Doc. No. 263; Page No. 54; Book No. III; Series of
1992. Yet, despite full knowledge that his clients were fugitives from justice and that bench warrants of
arrest 147and warrants of arrest 148 had been issued against his clients, Atty. dela Cruz made no effort to persuade
them to surrender. A lawyer is absolutely prohibited from counselling or abetting activities aimed at defiance of
the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system. 149 Hence, lest the general public venture the thought that
lawyers approve of their clients' degeneration into outlaws, Atty. dela Cruz must explain his action, or rather,
inaction which, in effect, aided the accused in making a mockery of our judicial and penal systems.

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED and the challenged decision of Branch 39 of the Regional Trial Court
of Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, in Criminal Case No. C-3496 finding accused-appellant ERIC MANLUSOC guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and sentencing him and each of his co-accused to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay jointly and severally the heirs of the victim Isagani Mason the sum of
P50,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

The Court further resolved to:

(a) ADMONISH Honorable Judge MARCIANO T. VIROLA to be more circumspect in his actuations in criminal cases
to strengthen the public's trust and confidence in the criminal justice system;

(b) FURNISH the Office of the President with a copy of this Decision that it be informed and take the appropriate
action regarding the alleged harboring by the Provincial Governor of Oriental Mindoro of the accused who were
then fugitives from justice as of 12 May and 13 May 1992;

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G.R. No. 97227 October 20, 1992
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CECILIO BINONDO, accused-appellant.
CAMPOS, JR., J.:
On May 25, 1990, the Honorable Godardo A. Jacinto, Presiding Judge of Branch 16, Regional Trial Court, Cebu City
rendered a decision in Criminal Case No. CBU-9795, entitled" People of the Philippines vs. Cecilio Binondo, Rosendo
Binondo, Valentina Binondo, Nicolasa Binondo, Severino Binondo, and Damian Soriano". finding Cecilio Binondo
guilty of murder and acquitting the rest of his co-accused as follows:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court finds the accused Cecilio
Binondo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, for which he is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to further indemnify the Heirs of
Domiciano Dinopol in the sum of P30,000.
On the ground of reasonable doubt, a verdict of acquittal is hereby entered for the accused
Rosendo Binondo, Valentina Binondo, Nicolasa Binondo, Damian Soriano, and Severino
Dinopol, and their bail bonds are therefore cancelled.
Costs against Cecilio Binondo.
SO ORDERED. 1
On appeal, the accused-appellant raised the following errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S PLEA OF SELF-
DEFENSE AND FINDING HIM GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES IN FAVOR
OF THE ACCUSED APPELLANT.
The facts as may be gathered from the records of the case are as follows:
At about 10:00 or 11:00 o'clock in the evening of February 23, 1986, prosecution witnesses
Maximo Dinopol and his wife Pablita, who were neighbors of the accused-appellant Cecilio,
saw accused-appellant with seven other persons carrying a naked body of a dead person into
his (Cecilio) yard. The aforesaid witnesses alleged having heard accused-appellant tell his
companions that they should have nothing to worry about because he will take sole
responsibility for the death of the victim.
On that same evening, accused-appellant brought the head of the decapitated victim to the police station at the
municipal building. This was received by Pat. Esmeraldo dela Peña who was at the station during that time although
his tour of duty would yet start at 8:00 o'clock in the morning of the following day. He asked preliminary questions
to the accused-appellant. When the Station Commander arrived, the latter took over the investigation. After a
brief interview with the accused-appellant, he sent Pat. Franklin Aniñon and CHDF Boy Padilla to retrieve the body
of the victim from the house of the accused-appellant. The Station Commander ordered Rosendo and Valentina,
companions of the accused-appellant to bring the air rifle (escopita) and bolo used by accused-appellant to the
Municipal building.
Dr. Ferraren, Municipal Health Officer of Ginatilan, Cebu, conducted the autopsy examination and issued the
Medical Certificate which reads as follows:
This certificates that at about 1:45 o'clock p.m. of February 24, 1986, a human head, severed
from its body, identified by Pfc. Rotillo Siñeres of the Simboan Police Force as that of Pat.
Domiciano Dinopol of same force, had been examined by the undersigned at the Municipal
building, Simboan, Cebu, and findings were as follows:
a) eyes half closed:
b) wound incised, about 4 inches long, lower jaw, with underlying bone cracked;
c) wound, lacerated about 1/2 inch parietal, left;
d) wound, lacerated about 1/2 inch parietal, right.
On the same day, at about 2:20 in the afternoon, a beheaded human body had also been
examined at the residence of the parents of Pat. Domiciano Dinopol in Samboan and the
significant findings are as follows:
a) Wound, incised, 4 1/2" x 1" anterior, thorax, right;
b) wound, incised about 4" x 1" at the level of the Xphoid, right;
c) wound, incised about 4 1/2" x 1/2", left lateral side of the body;
d) wound, incised about 4" x 1/2" deltoid, left;
93
 e) wound, incised about 4 inches supraeliac, left;
f) wound, incised about 6 inches, abdomen, some intestines exposed and some portions
severed.
Sgd. TRIFANA
M. FERRAREN,
M. D.
March 6,
1986. 2
The accused-appellant Cecilio Binondo declared that he killed Pat. Domiciano Dinopol in self-defense and
presented his version of what transpired, as follows:
At about 8:00 o'clock in the evening of February 23, 1986, he, together with his wife, Valentina Binondo, his son,
Rosendo, and Brgy. Councilman Severino Dinopol went to the house of the spouses Bilanghilot to drink tuba
thereat. They left the house at about 11:00 o'clock in the evening. When they were near the Barangay Health
Center of Basak, the victim, carrying a gun with the left hand and a bolo in his right hand, suddenly emerged from
under the mango tree and approached him in an angry mood at the same time brandishing his bolo as if in an act
of charging him, saying: "Why are you looking for me? What is your purpose? 3 Valentina interceded and tried to
pacify Domiciano. To avoid getting into trouble with the enraged victim, he opted to walk away from him and
proceeded home with his son Rosendo. Severino also went home ahead of Valentina.
About five minutes after he and Rosendo arrived at their house, Valentina came gasping for breath telling him to
close all windows and doors because Domiciano was following her and he said he would kill Cecilio and Rosendo.
Right away he secured the front door, shut off all the lights and got his air gun and bolo to defend himself and his
companions should Domiciano carry out his threat. He also asked Rosendo to go upstairs to take care of his
(Rosendo) wife and children on the second storey.
Pat. Domiciano Dinopol finally arrived and he tried to force open the main door but failed. He asked Cecilio to
come out: shouting "Cilio, come out I will break your head. 4 Domiciano went towards the kitchen door, awaiting
the attack by Domiciano.
Domiciano forced open the kitchen door. When he was about to enter with his head protruding inside the kitchen,
Cecilio aimed his rifle at the head of Domiciano. From a distance of about one and one half (1-1/2) feet, he fired
the rifle. When this happened, Domiciano was still holding his firearm and his bolo.
After a single shot from the air gun, Domiciano turned his head towards him and aimed his gun at him. Before
Domiciano could fire his gun, Cecilio attacked him with his bolo, his purpose to let the latter loosen his hold on his
weapons. This was followed by five or six more strokes on the neck and body to be sure that Domiciano would
drop his weapons. Domiciano finally dropped his weapons and fell to the floor. Except on the skin of the nape, the
head was almost severed from the body. Knowing of Domiciano having an amulet which could revive him if his
body is doused with water, he finally decided to cut off his head completely. Immediately thereafter, he carried
the victim's body to the municipal building and surrendered to the police authorities.
The trial court refused to give credit to his plea of self-defense and convicted him of murder on the basis of his
admission of killing Domiciano Dinopol.
We find this appeal to be without merit and find the defendant's plea of self-defense as completely incredible.
Well entrenched in this jurisdiction is the doctrine that when the accused admits having killed the victim, but
invokes self-defense, the burden of proving the elements of that defense by clear and convincing evidence lies
with the accused. To do that, he must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the weakness of the
prosecution were weak, it may not be disbelieved after the accused admitted responsibility for the killing. 5
Whether or not appellant acted in self-defense is essentially a question of fact. Being so and in the abscence of
any showing that the court a quo failed to appreciate facts and circumstances of weight and substance that would
have altered its conclusion, the court below, having seen and heard the witness during the trial, was in a better
position to evaluate their testimonies. No compelling reason, therefore, existed for this court to disturb the trial's
court findings that appellant did not act in self-defense. 6
The accused-appellant did not present clear and convincing evidence for the court to sustain the claim of self-
defense. The trial court refused to give credence to accused-appellant's story that the deceased went to his house
purposely to kill him. There were no findings that the victim was guilty of unlawful aggression or unjust
provocation.
Even assuming that his story were true, the oral threat made by Domiciano to kill him unaccompanied by any other
unequivocal act clearly showing his intent to carry out his threat does not constitute unlawful aggression. Mere
shouting threats and poundings on the door of the accused-appellant's house were not held by this Court to
constitute unlawful aggression. 7 Furthermore, as the accused-appellant himself testified that he extinguished all
sources of light inside the house, there could not have possibly been any form of attack which may be said to be
immediate and imminent from the victim upon the person of the accused-appellant. Putting out the lights inside
the house threw the house in total darkness that the victim could not be in a position to locate him physically.
Not only was there an abscence of unlawful aggression in the case at bar, but the claim of self-defense is likewise
negated by the physical evidence. The accused-appellant suffered no harm or injury physically. The number and
nature of the wounds inflicted on the victim proved that if at all, the attack came from the accused-appellant. The
victim had no chance to defend himself even if armed. The medico-legal certificate issued by the municipal health
officer attests to a total of severe wounds all of which were located on the vital parts of the body. The means
employed becomes unreasonable and unnecessary when after the aggression head ceased and the victim no
longer posed any threat of further attack, the accused-appellant continued inflicting injuries on the victim who fell
to the ground helpless. From his testimony it was evident that when he delivered the blows with his bolo, he was
aiming at his victim's body and not simply on the victim's had hand which he claimed was aiming the gun at him. 8 It
was also clear that he was aware that his blows were hitting the victim; 9 that his victim was profusely
bleeding; 10 and that even before his victim fell to his kitchen floor, the victim's weapons had already dropped and
he was
defenseless. 11 What absolutely negated the existence of a "reasonable necessity of the means employed in
repelling the attack" was the fact that the appellant decapitated the victim. The claim that the victim possessed
an amulet which could revive him did not justify that last and final act of cutting off the victim's head. A dead man
could not have possibly posed any further resistance or launch an attack, be it imminent or remote.
94
Having found the absence of self-defense, what is incumbent upon us is to determine whether or not there was
any attending circumstance which will qualify the killing to murder.

We hold that the crime committed was murder.

The presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery was evidence from the testimony of the accused-
appellant himself. According to him, his wife arrived ahead of the victim of he was apprised of the fact that the
victim was on his way to their house and was threatening to kill him and his son. He had enough time to prepare
himself, his weapons and surroundings in a way that he would have the advantage of position and could deliver
the first blow without risk to himself from his unwary victim. This he accomplished by putting off all the lights
inside the house and by positioning himself near the kitchen door where he could not be seen at once. The accused-
appellant employed means, methods or forms in the execution of the offense which tend directly and specially to
insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. These
facts established by evidence on record clearly constitute treachery, which raised the crime to murder.

Furthermore, when the killing was done with cruelty, by deliberately or inhumanly augmenting the suffering of
the victim or outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse, 12 it was likewise qualified to murder. (Emphasis
supplied). No greater outrage, insult or abuse can a person commit upon a corpse than to server the head
therefrom. The head represents the dignity of the person and any violence directed towards it cannot be
interpreted in any other manner than an outrage to his corpse.

As regards the mitigating circumstances claimed by the accused-appellant, We hold that the trial court erred in
not appreciating voluntary surrender in favor of the accused. This may be off-set by the aggravating circumstances
of treachery under Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code. The accused-appellant could, not however, claim
incomplete self-defense as there was no unlawful aggression on the part of the victim.

However, the killing was accompanied by the qualifying circumstance of outraging at the corpse of the victim, thus
constituting the crime into murder. Treachery may be considered as a mere aggravating circumstance which may
be set off by the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.

For reasons indicated, and in the light of the applicable law and jurisprudence on the matter, We hold that the
evidence was sufficient to sustain the verdict finding the defendant guilty of the crime of murder as charged. The
judgment of conviction is affirmed subject to the modification that the defendant is ordered to indemnify the heirs
of the victim the amount of P50,000.00, with costs against the accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

95