REGIE REY N.

AGUSTIN LEGAL TECHNIQUE & LOGIC

JD – 1 ATTY. LEO MALAGAR

G.R. NO. 237428

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

DISSENTING OPINION:

This quo warranto petition seeks to nullify the appointment of herein respondent Maria
Lourdes P.A. Sereno as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court for lack of proven integrity which is
a requirement under Section 7 (3), Article VIII of the Constitution for a person to be a member
of the Supreme Court. The Solicitor General maintains that respondent’s constant failure to file
her Statement of Assets Liabilities, and Networth (SALN) as required by law proves lack of
integrity.

“Section 7, Article VIII of the Constitution provides for the qualifications

for a person to be a member of the Supreme Court, to wit:

Sec. 7 (1) No person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme Court or

any lower collegiate court unless he is a natural born citizen of the Philippines. A
member of the Supreme Court must be at least forty years of age, and must have
been for fifteen years or more a judge of a lower court or engaged in the practice
of law in the Philippines;

xxx

(3) A member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven competence,

integrity, probity, and independence.”

RESPONDENT VIOLATED THE

CONSTITUTION FOR NON-FILING OF

HER SALN.

Section 17, Article XI of the Constitution mandates the filing of the SALN by all public
officers and employees upon assumption of office. Republic Act No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, likewise requires the filing of the SALN by every government employee
not only upon assumption of office and every year thereafter, but also upon the expiration of
one’s term of office or upon his resignation or separation from office. Also, it is mandated under
R.A. 6713 or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, the
latest law on the matter which provides more detailed guidelines for the SALN compliance.

Based on respondent’s letter dated July 23, 2012 to the JBC, she averred that she
submitted her SALNs with the UP HRDO during her employment as a Law Professor but she
could no longer find her personal copies of said SALNs. She should have secured a certification
from the UP HRDO that she had filed her SALNS if indeed she had religiously filed her SALNs.
Respondent’s failure to secure such certification wanes her claim that she could not find her
SALNs. Clearly, respondent failed to provide adequate evidence to invalidate the OSG’s
evidence of her failure to file her SALNs for several years while she was teaching. Thus,
respondent can be held liable for her repeated non-filing of SALNs.

At the time respondent assumed her position as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court,
she was required to file under oath her SALN within thirty (30) days after assumption of office,
and the statements must be reckoned as of her first day of service pursuant to the provisions of
the SALN law. However, respondent failed to file a SALN containing sworn statements
reckoned as of her first day of service within thirty (30) days after assumption of office after
assuming office. While she claims to have submitted the required SALN on September 16, 2010,
the same was unsubscribe and her SALN were reckoned not on her first day of service. In other
words, respondent failed to file the required SALN upon her assumption to office, which is a
clear violation of Section 17, Article XI of the Constitution. In view thereof, her failure to
submitted the required SALN upon assumption in 2010 as Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court amounts to culpable violation of the Constitution, a violation committed while she was
already serving as an impeachable officer.

CONGRESS IS THE PROPER VENUE

TO REMOVE IMPEACHABLE OFFICERS

FROM OFFICE.

As stated in the Constitution, impeachable officers may only be removed from office
through an impeachment and not through a quo warranto proceeding. Section 2, Article XI of the
Constitution expressly provides:

“Section 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the

Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the
Ombudsman, may be removed from office, or impeachment for, and conviction
of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft, and corruption,
other high crimes or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and
employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by
impeachment.”

It is within the view of the ponente that the interpretation of Section 2, Article XI of the
Constitution does not exclude an action for a quo warranto against impeachable officers. The
ponente emphasized that "while impeachment concerns actions that make the officer unfit to
continue exercising his or her office, quo warranto involves matters that render him or her
ineligible to hold the position to begin with”. Such pronouncement is an erroneous interpretation
of the law. Applying logical principles, the position of the ponente in this issue constitute a
fallacy of ambiguity which is under the fallacies as reasoning errors, it is when an unclear phrase
with multiple definitions is used within the argument in which does not support its conclusion.
In this case the ponente posited his own interpretation of the law that quo warranto is likewise a
remedy of removing from office of an impeachable officer under Section 2 other than an
impeachment. However, the law is clear on its face; it is evident that the law intended to exclude
all other manners of removal of a public officers or employees, following the principle of
expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Moreover, there should be no room for interpretation rather
the Court should have applied the law.

In conclusion, the only method allowed under the Constitution to remove a member of
this Court is to bring such matter to the Congress. To employ any other means which is not
written in the law is to re-write the Constitution and to allow this quo warranto petition to
remove an incumbent member of this Court is to violate the Constitution.

Hence, the court should have referred this matter to the jurisdiction of the Congress, in
order for the Congress to exercise its authority and evaluate the merits of respondent’s case with
the appropriate action provided and mandated by law.