ARTICLE III - BILL OF RIGHTS

Primacy of Human Rights and Enforcement

Republic v. Sandiganbayan, GR 104768, July 21, 2003
*Mijares v. Ranada, GR 139325, April 12, 2005
Facts: Ten Filipino citizens who each alleged having suffered
human rights abuses during the Marcos regime, filed a case
in the US against the Estate of Marcos. They won with an
award of over 1 Billion. When filed in the RTC for enforcement,
respondent judge dismissed the case for failure to pay the
correct filing fees (472 million instead of 410 pesos).
Held: The current action is not a claim against the estate nor
an action capable of pecuniary estimation, but rather an action
based on a judgment (an action not involving property). The
Rules did not distinguish if it is a local or foreign judgment.
Thus, the docket fee is correctly paid.

SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without

due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of
the laws.

Hierarchy of Rights
*Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Org. v.
Philippine Blooming Mills Co. Inc., 51 SCRA 189, June 5,
1973
Facts: PBMEO is a labor union who decided to stage a mass
demonstration at Malacanang in protest against the alleged
abuses of Pasig Police (not against the company). Despite the
pleas of the company that the first shift workers and the
regular employees should not absent themselves to
participate, the rally took place and the employees were
terminated.
Held: The primacy of human rights over property rights is
recognized. In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights to
freedom of expression and of assembly occupy a preferred
position as they are essential to the preservation and vitality
of our civil and political institutions. The contention of the
company that they would suffer loss due to the rally is only a
property rights that can never overshadow the alleged abuse
of the peace office that will threaten the peace, life, and liberty
of the people in the society.

Due Process: In General

*Tupas v. CA - 193 SCRA 597, 1991
Facts: Petition of review is filed out of time. Instead of filing
the petition for review with the Court of Appeals within the
 remainder of the 15-day reglementary period, that is, on May
10, 1989, the petitioner did so only on May 23, 1989, or 14
days later.
Held: It is a mistake to suppose that enforcement of
procedural rules should never be permitted if it will result in
prejudice to the substantive rights of the litigants. Observance
of both substantive and procedural rights is equally
guaranteed by due process, whatever the source of such
rights, be it the Constitution itself or only a statute or a rule of
court.
Asilo v. People – 645 SCRA 41

I. Procedural Due Process

A. Judicial Proceedings

1. In General
a. *Banco Espanol 37 P 921
Facts: Engracio Palanca was indebted to El Banco and he had his
parcel of land as security. He was unable to pay and El Banco
executed an instrument to mortgage Engracio‟s property. Engracio
however left for China and he never returned till he died. Since
Engracio is a non-resident El Banco has to notify Engracio about
their intent to sue him by means of publication using a newspaper.
Vicente averred that there had been no due process as Engracio
never received the summons.
Held: The essential of procedural fairness in judicial proceedings are:
1. There must be a COURT or TRIBUNAL clothed with judicial power
to hear and determine the matter before it; 2. JURISDICTION must
be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the
property which is the subject of the proceeding; 3. The defendant
must be given the OPPORTUNITY to be heard; and 4. Judgment
must be rendered upon lawful HEARING. Conclusions stated by the
court indicated that the judgment appealed from is without error, and
the same is accordingly affirmed.

2. Aspects of the Proceedings

a. Galvez v. CA 237 SCRA 685
b. State Prosecutors v. Muros 236 SCRA 505
c. Martinez v. CA 237 SCRA 575
d. Espeleta v. Avelino 62 SCRA 395
e. Rabino v. Cruz 222 SCRA 493
f. Ysmael v. CA 273 SCRA 165
g. Carvajal v. CA 280 SCRA 351
h. People v. Castillo 289 SCRA 213
i. Cosep v. Peo. 290 SCRA 378
j. People v. Galleno 291 SCRA 761
k. Oil v. CA 293 SCRA 26
l. Rodrigo v. Sandiganbayan GR 125498 Feb. 18, 1999
m. People v. Hui 338 SCRA 2000
n. People v. Cabiles 341 SCRA 2000
o. Gozum v. Liangco 339 SCRA 253
p. Soriano v. Angeles 339 SCRA 253
q. Villanueva v. Malaya 330 SCRA 278
r. Almendras v. Asis 330 SCRA 69
s. Dayot v. Garcia 353 SCRA 280
t. People v. Hapa GR 125698 July 19, 2001
u. Aguirre v. People GR 144142 August 23, 2001
v. Puyat v. Zabarte 352 SCRA 738
w. Baritua v. Mercader 350 SCRA 86
x. Barbers v. Laguio 351 SCRA 606
y. People v. Herida 353 SCRA 650
z. People v. Medenilla GR 1311638 Mar. 26, 2001
aa. People v. Rivera GR 139180 July 31, 2001
bb. People v. Basquez GR 144035 Sept. 27, 2001
cc. Cooperative Development v. DOLEFIL GR 137489 May 29, 2002
dd. Garcia v. Pajaro GR 141149 July 5, 2002
ee. Briaso v. Mariano, GR 137265, Jan. 31, 2003
ff. Macias v. Macias, GR 1461617, Sept. 3, 2003
gg. Albior v. Auguis, AM P-01- 1472, June 6, 2003
hh. Republic v. Sandiganbayan, GR 152154, Nov. 18, 2003
ii. Ty v. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank, 422 SCRA 649
jj. People v. Larranaga, 421 SCRA 530
kk. R. Transport v. Philhino 494 SCRA 630
ll. Trans Middle East v. Sandiganbayan 499 SCRA 308
mm. Uy v. First Metro 503 SCRA 704
nn. Deutsche Bank v. Chua 481 SCRA 672
oo. People v. Santos 501 SCRA 325
pp. Victoriano v. People 509 SCRA 483
qq. Santos v. DOJ 543 SCRA 70
rr. DBP v. Feston 545 SCRA 422
ss. Ruivivar v. OMB 565 SCRA 324
tt. Borromeo v. Garcia 546 SCRA 543
uu. Cesa v. OMB 553 SCRA 357
vv. DAR v. Samson 554 SCRA 500
ww. Hilario v. People 551 SCRA 191
xx. Pastona v. CA 559 SCRA 137
yy. Bibas v. OMB 559 SCRA 591
zz. Espina v. Cerujano 550 SCRA 107
aaa. Geronga v. Varela 546 SCRA 429
bbb. OMB v. Magno GR 178923, Nov. 27, 2008
ccc. Avenido v. CSC 553 SCRA 711
ddd. Romuladez v. COMELEC 553 SCRA 370
 eee. Multi-Trans Agency v. Oriental 590 SCRA 675
fff. Siochi v. BPI, GR 193872, October 18, 2011
ggg. Catacutan v. People 656 SCRA 524
hhh. Mortel v. Kerr 685 SCRA 1
iii. Gravides v. COMELEC 685 SCRA 382
jjj. Tua v. Mangrobang 714 SCRA 248

3. Publicity and T.V. Coverage

a. Webb v. de Leon 247 SCRA 652
b. People v. Teehankee 249 SCRA 54
c. People v. Sanchez GR 121039-45 Jan. 25, 1999
d. People v. Sanchez GR 121039 Oct. 18, 2001
e. Perez v. Estrada A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC June 29, 2001
f. Perez v. Estrada A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC Sept. 13, 2001
g. People v. Roxas – 628 SCRA 378

B. Administrative; Quasi-Judicial Proceedings; Arbitration

1. In General; administrative due process

a. *Ang Tibay v. CIR 69 P 635
Facts: Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay, a leather
company which supplies the Philippine Army. Due to alleged
shortage of leather, Toribio caused the layoff of members of
National Labor Union (NLU). NLU averred that Toribio’s act is not
valid. The CIR, decided the case and elevated it to the SC, but a
motion for new trial was raised by the NLU. But Ang Tibay filed a
motion for opposing the said motion.
Held: The SC ruled that all administrative bodies cannot ignore
or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due
process. There are cardinal primary rights which must be
respected even in proceedings of this character: (1) the right to a
hearing, which includes the right to present one’s cause and
submit evidence in support thereof; (2) The tribunal must
consider the evidence presented; (3) The decision must have
something to support itself; (4) The evidence must be substantial;
(5) The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the
hearing; or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the
parties affected; (6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must
act on its own independent consideration of the law and facts of
the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a
subordinate; (7) The Board or body should, in all controversial
questions, render its decision in such manner that the parties to
the proceeding can know the various Issue involved, and the
reason for the decision rendered.
b. Dazon v. Yap – 610 SCRA 19
c. *Shu v. Dee 723 SCRA 512
 Facts: Forgery and falsification of public documents. The
respondents argued in their counter-affidavits that they were
denied their right to due process during the NBI investigation
because the agency never required them and Metrobank to
submit the standard sample signatures of the petitioner for
comparison.
Held: The Court held that the functions of this agency are merely
investigatory and informational in nature. It has no judicial or
quasi-judicial powers and is incapable of granting any relief to
any party. It cannot even determine probable cause. The NBI is
an investigative agency whose findings are merely
recommendatory. It undertakes investigation of crimes upon its
own initiative or as public welfare may require in accordance with
its mandate. There was no denial of the respondents’ due
process right could have taken place as the NBI’s findings were
still subject to the prosecutor’s and the Secretary of Justice’s
actions for purposes of finding the existence of probable cause.

2. Judges and Disciplinary Process

a. OCA v. Pascual 259 SCRA 604
b. Valenzuela v. Bellosillo 322 SCRA 536

3. Aspects of the Proceedings

a. Lumiqued v. Exevea 282 SCRA 125
c. Fabella v. CA 282 SCRA 256
d. Joson v. Exec. Sec. 290 SCRA 279
e. Busuego v. CA GR 95325 Mar. 11, 1999
f. CSC v. Lucas GR 127838 Jan. 21, 1999
g. NPC v. Bernabe 332 SCRA 74
h. Summary Dismissal v. Torcita 330 SCRA 153
i. Velayo v. Comelec 327 SCRA 713
j. Ramoran v. Jardine 326 SCRA 208
k. Immam v. Comelec 322 SCRA 866
l. Villarosa v. Comelec GR 133927 Nov. 29, 1999
m. Go v. Comelec GR 147741 May 10, 2001
n. Mollaneda v. Umacob GR 140128 June 6, 2001
o. Cruz v. CSC GR 144469 Nov. 27, 2001
p. Codilla v. De Venecia GR 150605 Dec. 10, 2002
q. Associated Communications v. Dumlao GR 136762 Nov. 21,
2002
r. Villarosa v. Pomperada, AdminCase No. 5310, Jan. 28, 2003
s. Alauya v. Comelec, GR 152151-52, Jan. 22, 2003
t. Spouses Casimiro v. CA, 136911, Feb. 11, 2003
u. Sy v. CA, GR 147572, Feb. 27, 2003
v. Namil v. Comelec, GR 15040, Oct. 28, 2003
w. Bautista v. Comelec, GR 154796- 97, Oct. 23, 2003
 x. Office of OMB v. Coronel 493 SCRA 392
y. Erece v. Macalingay 552 SCRA 320
z. Marcelo v. Bungubung 552 SCRA 589
aa. SEC v. Interport 567 SCRA 354
bb. Calinisan v. Roaquin 630 SCRA 456
cc. IBP v. Atienza 613 SCRA 518
dd. Domingo v. OMB 577 SCRA 476
ee. Zambales v. Castillejos 581 SCRA 320
ff. OMB v. Evangelista 581 SCRA 350
gg. Phil Export v. Pearl City 608 SCRA 280
hh. OMB v. Reyes 658 SCRA 626
ii. Pichay v. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary 677 SCRA
408
jj. Arroyo v. DOJ 681 SCRA 181
kk. Jalosjos v. COMELEC, GR 205033, June 18, 2013
ll. Posadas v. Sandiganbayan, GR 168951 and 169000, July 17,
2013
mm. Gundayao v. COMELEC, GR 205233, Feb 18, 2014
nn. Coalition v. COMELEC, 701 SCRA 786
oo. Miro v. Mendoza, 710 SCRA 371
pp. DOH v. Phil. Pharmawealth, 691 SCRA 421
qq. *GMA v. COMELEC 734 SCRA 88
Facts: Resolution 9615 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
changed the airtime limitations for political campaign from “per
station” basis, as used during the 2007 and 2010 elections, to a “total
aggregate” basis for the 2013. Various broadcast networks
questioned the interpretation of the COMELEC on the ground that
the provisions are oppressive and violative of the constitutional
guarantees of freedom of expression and of the press. Respondent
claims that certiorari and prohibition are not the proper remedies that
petitioners have taken to question the assailed Resolutions of the
COMELEC. They also claim the legal standing of the petitioners.
Held: Technically, respondent may have a point. However,
considering the very important and pivotal issues raised, and the
limited time, such technicality should not deter the Court from having
to make the final and definitive pronouncement that everyone else
depends for enlightenment and guidance. For petitioner-intervenor
Senator Cayetano, he undoubtedly has standing since he is a
candidate whose ability to reach out to the electorate is impacted by
the assailed Resolutions. For the broadcast companies, they
similarly have the standing in view of the direct injury they may suffer
relative to their ability to carry out their tasks of disseminating
information
* because of the burdens imposed on them.
rr. Apo Cement Corporation v. Mingson 740 SCRA 383

4. Extradition Proceedings
 a. Sec. of Justice v. Lantion 343 SCRA 377
b. Cuevas v. Munoz GR 140520 Dec. 18, 2000
c. Gov’t. of U.S.A v. Purganan GR 148571 Sept. 24, 2002
d. Rodriguez v. Presiding Judge, 483 SCRA 290
e. *Gov’t of Hong Kong v. Olalia, GR 153675 April 19, 2007
Facts: Respondent Muñoz was charged of 3 counts of offences of
“accepting an advantage as agent”, and 7 counts of conspiracy to
defraud, punishable by the common law of Hong Kong. Hong Kong
Administrative Region then filed in the RTC petition for extradition
and arrest of respondent. Meanwhile, respondent filed a petition for
bail, which was opposed by the petitioner, initially the RTC denied
the petition holding that there is no Philippine Law granting bail in
extradition cases and that private responded is a “flight risk”.
Held: The extradited may be subject to detention as may be
necessary step in the process of extradition, but the length of time in
the detention should be reasonable. In the case at bar, the record
show that the respondent, Muñoz has been detained for 2 years. The
Philippines has the obligation of ensuring the individual his right to
liberty and due process and should not therefor deprive the
extraditee of his right to bail PROVIDED that certain standards for
the grant is satisfactorily met. In other words there should be “CLEAR
AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE”. However in the case at bar, the
respondent was not able to show and clear and convincing evidence
that he be entitled to bail.

5. Arbitration
a. *RCBC v. Banco de Oro 687 SCRA 583
Facts: RCBC entered into a Share Purchase Agreement (SPA) with
Equitable-PCI Bank, Inc. (EPCIB), George L. Go and the individual
shareholders of Bankard, Inc. (Bankard) for the sale to RCBC of
226,460,000 shares (Subject Shares) of Bankard. RCBC
commenced arbitration proceedings with the ICC-ICA in accordance
with Section 10 of the SPA.
Doctrine: Due process dictates the cold neutrality of impartiality. This
means that "it is not enough that cases be decided without bias and
favouritism. Nor is it sufficient that prepossessions be rid of.
Actuations should moreover inspire that belief." Evident partiality in
its common definition thus implies "the existence of signs and
indications that must lead to an identification or inference" of
partiality.

C. Academic Discipline

1. In General
a. Angeles v. Sison 112 SCRA 26
b. Malabanan v. Ramento 129 SCRA 359
c. Guzman v. NU 142 SCRA 699
d. Alcuaz v. PSBA 161 SCRA 7
e. Non v. Judge Dames 185 SCRA 523
f. *ADMU v. Capulong 222 SCRA 644
Facts: The initiation rites of Aquila Legis, a fraternity in the Ateneo
Law School resulted in the death of 2 freshman students. During
the investigation of the school, respondent students failed to file
their reply and after hearing the testimonies of the witnesses,
found a prima facie case against the respondents. They also failed
to file their answer with the Disciplinary Board and they only asked
for postponement and for the copies of the evidence against them.
The respondents were dismissed. They now alleged that they
were denied due process.
Held: In an academic institution, the following are the minimum
standards to be satisfied in the imposition of disciplinary
sanctions:
1. The students must be informed in writing of the nature and
cause of any accusation against them – The respondent were
given ample notice regarding the nature and cause of the
accusation against them. Various notices dated Feb 14 and Feb
20 were given and were addressed individually to the respondent
students.
2. They shall have the right to answer the charges against them
with the assistance of counsel, if desired – The law firm of
Gonzales Batiler and Bilog and Associates put in its appearances
and filed pleadings on behalf of respondent students.
3. They shall be informed of the evidence against them –
Respondents cannot argue that since they did not have the
opportunity to see and examine the statements that became the
basis of the case against them, they were denied of due process.
For disciplinary actions or cases involving students, it is not
necessary that right to cross examination is included. Here, it is
clear that the investigation is summary in nature with no right of
cross examination.
4. They shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf
5. The evidence must be duly considered by the investigating
committee or official designated to hear and decide the case –
The decision of the Board were only reached after the hearing
wherein respondent students were summoned to answer
clarificatory questions and after considering the written
statements and testimonies of the witnesses.
g. U.P. v. Ligot-Telan 227 SCRA 342
h. *Go v. Colegio de San Juan de Letran 683 SCRA 358
Facts: Upon receiving information of fraternity recruitment on
Letran’s High School, an investigation was conducted. Four
students admitted that they were neophytes of Tau Gamma
 Fraternity who identified a certain Kim Go, a 4 th year HS student
in Letran as a senior member of the fraternity. The parents of Kim
was informed and Kim was also questioned although he denied
the allegation. Based on the testimonies of the neophytes, the
school found substantial basis to suspend Kim. However, the
parents of Kim refused to sign the agreement alleging that they
had been denied of due process.
Held: (see requisites for due process in academic institutions in
ADMU vs. Capulong)
1. Right to cross-examine is not necessarily included. Respondent
may not argue that they were not accorded the opportunity to see
and examine the written statements which became the basis of
the order.
2. Parents were well informed and were asked to assist Kim but
they were the one who failed to attend the hearing conducted.
3. They were properly notified of the charge (fraternity
membership).
4. They were informed about the nature of evidence (testimonies).
5. They were given the time and opportunity to answer.

D. Deportation Proceedings

1. In General
a. *Lao Gi v. CA 180 SCRA 756
Facts: Herein petitioner faces a charge for deportation when a
judgment was rendered cancelling his citizenship (obtained from
a prior judgment) on the ground that it was founded on fraud and
misrepresentation. Petitioners were required to register as aliens
but refused.
Held: Note that deportation proceeding is not judicial in nature,
but rather administrative to remove undesirable aliens.
Although a deportation proceeding does not partake of the nature
of a criminal action, considering that it is a harsh and
extraordinary administrative proceeding affecting the freedom
and liberty of a person, the constitutional right of such person to
due process should not be denied.
b. Domingo v. Scheer, 421 SCRA 468

E. Regulations: Fixing of Rates and Regulation of Profession

1. Rates
a. Philcomsat v. Alcuaz 180 SCRA 218
b. Radiocom v. NTC 184 SCRA 517
c. *Maceda v. ERB 199 SCRA 454
Facts: Caltex and Petron proffered separate application with the
ERB for permission to increase the wholesale posted prices of
 petroleum products. The Board in a joint Order granted said
provisional relief authoring said applicants a weighted average
provisional increase on 1.42 pesos per liter in the wholesale
posted prices of their various petroleum products. Petitioner
Maceda also submit that the same was issued without proper
notice and hearing.
Held: In the broad interest of justice, the administrative body
may, in any particular manner, except itself from technical
rules and apply such suitable procedure as shall promote its
objectives. While EO 172 stressed that a hearing is
indispensable, it does not preclude the Board from ordering a
provisional increase, as it did in this case, subject to its final
disposition.
d. Globe Telecom v. NTC, 435 SCRA 110

2. Profession
a. *Corona v. UHPAP 283 SCRA 31
Facts: PPA General Manager issued PPA-AO No. 04-92
providing therein that “all existing regular appointments which
have been previously issued either by the Bureau of Customs or
the PPA shall remain valid up to 31 December 1992 only” and
that “all appointments to harbour pilot positions in all pilotage
districts shall, henceforth, be only for a term of one (1) year from
the date of effectivity subject to yearly renewal or cancellation by
the authority after conduct of rigid evaluation of performance.”
Respondents argued that due process was not observed
because no hearing was conducted.
Held: In the present case, there is a deprivation and that such
deprivation is done without proper observance of due process.
While notice and hearing are essential only when an
administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial function, there is
no dispute that Pilotage as a profession has taken on the nature
of a property right. Therefore, PPA-AO No. 04-92 unduly restricts
the right of harbor pilots to enjoy their profession before their
compulsory retirement.

F. Dismissals, Suspensions, Reinstatements, etc. …

1. Dismissal in Government Boards and Commissions

a. Abalos v. CSC -196 SCRA 81
b. GSIS v. CSC - 201 SCRA 661
c. Macayayong v. Ople - 204 SCRA 372
d. Gonzales v. CSC - 226 SCRA 66
e. Go. v. NPC - 271 SCRA 447
f. CHR v. CSC - 227 SCRA 42
g. Uy v. COA - 328 SCRA 607
 h. Lameyra v. Pangilinan - 322 SCRA 117
i. NPC v. Zozobrado - 487 SCRA 16
j. PAGCOR v. CA, GR 185668, December 13, 2011

2. Dismissal in Private Sector

a. Hellenic v. Siete - 195 SCRA 179
b. *Salaw v. NLRC - 202 SCRA 7
Facts: Salaw and a fellow employee were alleged to have
conspired in selling twenty (20) sewing machines and electric
generators which had been foreclosed by the respondent
bank. The Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) of the
Philippine Constabulary extracted Sworn Statement from
them without the assistance of a counsel. Petitioner was
requested to appear before the bank's Personnel Discipline
and Investigation Committee (PDIC) which petitioner
attended and 3 months after, his termination became effective
for alleged serious misconduct or willful disobedience and
fraud or willful breach of the trust reposed on him by the
private respondents.
Held: In labor cases the rudimentary requirements of due
process — notice and hearing — must also be observed
before an employee may be dismissed. Those twin
requirements constitute essential elements of due process in
cases employee dismissal. The petitioner was terminated
without the benefit of due process of law. Complainant was
not given the opportunity to present his own defense and
confront the witnesses, if any, and examine the evidence
against him. Hearing was also set "without counsel or
representative. It is true that administrative and quasi-judicial
bodies are not bound by the technical rules of procedure in
the adjudication cases. However, the right to counsel, a very
basic requirement of substantive due process, has to be
observed. Significantly, the dismissal of the petitioner from his
employment was characterized by undue haste.
c. Conti v. NLRC, GR 119253 April 10, 1997
d. Aparente v. NLRC, GR 117652
e. Lopez v. Alturas - 647 SCRA 566

3. Preventive Suspension
a. Alonzo v. Capulong - 244 SCRA 80
b. Castillo – Co v. Barbers 290 SCRA 717
c. Bacsasar v. CSC - 576 SCRA 787
d. Carabeo v. CA 607 - SCRA 394
G. Ordinance/Statute/Memo Cir./Rules
a. *People v. Nazario 165 SCRA 136
Facts: Any owner or manager of fishponds in places within the
territorial limits of Pagbilao shall pay a municipal tax. Nazario
argued that the ordinance is ambigious and uncertain since
he is only a mere lessee while the ordinance speaks of “owner
or manager.
Held: It is Valid. As a rule, a statute or act may be said to be
vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men "of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning
and differ as to its application." It is repugnant to the
Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for
failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it,
fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law
enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions
and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.
It is unmistakable from their very provisions that the appellant
falls within its coverage. As the actual operator of the
fishponds, he comes within the term "manager."
b. Francisco v. CA - 199 SCRA 595
c. Misamis Or. v. DOF - 238 SCRA 63
d. *Estrada v. Sandiganbayan GR 148560 Nov. 19, 2001
Facts: Joseph Ejercito Estrada, then the President of the
Philippines was prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act Defining
and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder). The petitioner
contended that RA 7080 was unconstitutional, on the ground,
among others, that it was vague; said law allegedly suffers
from vagueness on the terms it uses, particularly:
‘combination’, ‘series’, and ‘unwarranted’. Based on this, the
petitioner used the facial challenge to question the validity of
RA 7080.
Held: A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely
because of the employment of general terms or the failure to
define the terms used therein. The validity of a law is
sustained, so long as that law provides some comprehensible
guide as to what would render those subject to the said law
liable to its penalties. The petitioner cannot rely on the void-
for-vagueness doctrine, since this doctrine does not apply to
laws that merely consist of imprecise language. *The over-
breadth doctrine states that a governmental purpose may not
be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly
and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. *A facial
challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one
which is overbroad because of a possible “chilling effect” upon
protected speech.
e. People v. de la Piedra - 350 SCRA 163
H. Motion for Reconsideration
a. Medenilla v. CSC - 194 SCRA 278
b. Mendiola v. CSC - 221 SCRA 295
c. Rodriguez v. Proj. 6 - 247 SCRA 528
d. Lazo v. CSC - 236 SCRA 469
e. Salonga v. CA - 269 SCRA 534
f. Bernardo v. CA - 275 SCRA 413
g. Casuela v. Ombudsman - 276 SCRA 635
h. Cordenillo v. Executive Secretary - 276 SCRA 652
i. Chua v. CA - 287 SCRA 33
j. De la Cruz v. Abelle - 352 SCRA 691
k. Rodriguez v. CA, GR 134275 August 7, 2002
l. Gonzales v. CSC - 490 SCRA 741
m. Berboso v. CA - 494 SCRA 583
n. Pontejos v. Desierto - 592 SCRA 64
o. NAECOR v. ERC - 653 SCRA 642
p. Imperial v. GSIS - 658 SCRA 497
q. Arroyo v. Rosal Homeowners - 684 SCRA 297
r. Ylaya v. Gacott - 689 SCRA 452
s. Moldex v. Villabona - 675 SCRA 615

I. Suretyship
a. Stronghold Insurance v. CA - 205 SCRA 605

J. Tariff and Customs Code

a. *Feeder v. CA - 197 SCRA 842
Facts: Company owned foreign vessel M/T ‘ULU WAI’ from
Singapore carried oil and gas bound for Zamboanga. It
however illegally anchored in Iloilo without notifying the
Customs authorities. The gas and oil were immediately
seized and forfeited due to illegal importation. The
testimonies of the owner’s representative were also made
without counsel.
Held: No violation of due process. Seizure and forfeiture
proceedings under the tariff and customs laws are not criminal
in nature as they do not result in the conviction of the offender
nor in the imposition of the penalty. They are purely civil and
administrative in character. In this case, the degree of proof
required is merely substantial evidence. The right to the
assistance of counsel is not indispensable to due process
unless required by the Constitution or a law. There is nothing
in the Constitution that says a party in a non-criminal
proceeding is entitled to be represented by counsel and that
without such representation he will not be bound by such
proceedings.
K. Appeal
a. Alba v. Deputy Ombudsman - 254 SCRA 753
b. Telan v. CA - 202 SCRA 534
c. Aris v. NLRC - 200 SCRA 246
d. Rivera v. CSC - 240 SCRA 43
e. Singson v. NLRC - 274 SCRA 358
f. Building Care v. Macaraeg - 687 SCRA 643
g. Diona v. Balergue - 688 SCRA 22

L. Closure Proceedings
a. *CB v. CA 220 SCRA 536 (relative constitutionality)
Facts: Pursuant to Monetary Board Resolution No. 596, the
Central Bank was authorized to take over and close
operations of Triumph Savings Bank (TSB) due to insolvency
even without notice and hearing. TSB argued it was denied
due process.
Held: This "close now and hear later" scheme is grounded on
practical and legal considerations to prevent unwarranted
dissipation of the bank's assets and as a valid exercise of
police power to protect the depositors, creditors, stockholders
and the general public. Due process does not necessarily
require a prior hearing; a hearing or an opportunity to be heard
may be subsequent to the closure. The banking business is
properly subject to reasonable regulation under the police
power of the state because of banks are affected with public
interest because they receive funds from the general public in
the form of deposits.
b. Rural Bank v. CA 162 SCRA 288
c. Phil. Merchants v. CA GR 112844 June 2, 1995

M. Biddings
a. Concerned Officials v. Vasquez, 240 SCRA 502

N. UDHA – R.A. 7279; Squatting; Procedure for relocation;

summary abatement
a. *Perez v. v. Madrona 668 SCRA 696
Facts: The Demolition Office of Marikina wanted to demolish the
fence and gate of Madrona’s house because it encroached the
sidewalk. Madrona filed a TRO arguing that his rights to due process
will be violated due to the summary demolition. The Demolition
Office argues that the clearing of the sidewalk is an infrastructure
project of Marikina and cannot be restrained.
Held: There is a right to be protected, that is, respondents’ right over
their concrete fence which cannot be removed without due process.
If petitioner indeed found respondents fence to have encroached on
 the sidewalk, his remedy is not to demolish the same summarily after
respondents failed to heed his request to remove it. Instead, he
should go to court and prove respondents supposed violations in the
construction of the concrete fence. Indeed, unless a thing is a
nuisance per se, it may not be abated summarily without judicial
intervention.

O. Cancellation of Property Rights/Privileges

a. *American Inter-Fashion v. OP 197 SCRA 409
Facts: In 1984, the Garments and Textile Export Board
(GTEB) found Glorious Sun Fashion Garments Corp.
(Glorious) guilty of dollar-salting (occurs when dollars are
removed from the Philippines without approval from the
Central Bank and transferred to an account outside the
county) and misdeclaration of importations. Glorious filed a
petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court but later on
withdrew the same. It argued that its right to due process was
violated when it was prevented to present evidence to the
GTEB.
Held: The glaring fact is that Glorious was denied due
process when GTEB failed to disclose evidence used by it in
rendering a resolution against Glorious. Moreover, the
documents disclosed to Glorious by GTEB in 1987 enhanced
the charge that the former was denied due process. Attention
was also brought to the Puno affidavit, wherein Puno, the
Chairman of the Investigating Panel created by the Ministry of
Trade and Industry admitted that he was pressured by
Minister Ongpin to look for ways and means to remove the
quotas from Glorious.
b. Alliance of DFLO v. Laguesma 254 SCRA 565
c. ABAKADA v. Ermita 469 SCRA 1
d. *British American Tobacco v. Camacho 562 SCRA 511
and (MR) 585 SCRA 36
Facts: British American Tobacco filed a TRO to enjoin the
implementing rules of Sec. 145 of the NIRC on the ground that
they discriminate against new brands of cigarettes, in violation
of the equal protection and uniformity provisions of the
Constitution. The said Section provides a classification freeze
provision where it taxed new brands of cigarettes according
to their current net retail price while existing or "old" brands
shall be taxed based on their net retail price.
Held: The classification freeze provision was in the main the
result of Congress’s earnest efforts to improve the efficiency
and effectivity of the tax administration over sin products while
trying to balance the same with other State interests. In
particular, the questioned provision addressed Congress’s
 administrative concerns regarding delegating too much
authority to the DOF and BIR as this will open the tax system
to potential areas for abuse and corruption. Congress may
have reasonably conceived that a tax system which would
give the least amount of discretion to the tax implementers
would address the problems of tax avoidance and tax
evasion.
e. DPWH v. Spouses Tecson, GR 179334, July 1, 2013

P. Administrative and Preliminary Investigation - Ombudsman

a. Roxas v. Vasquez GR 114944 June 19, 2001
b. Ocampo v. Ombudsman 322 SCRA 17
c. Serapio v. Sandiganbayan, GR 148468, Jan. 28, 2003
d. Estrada v. ombudsman, GR 212140, January 21, 2015

II. Substantive Due Process

*United States v. Toribio - 15 PHIL. 85 (prohibit or penalize

slaughter of large cattle without permit of the municipal
treasurer) – in a municipal slaughterhouse without permit
Facts: No permit to slaughter has been carabaos shall be
granted by the municipal treasurer unless such animals are
unfit for agricultural work or for draft purposes. It appears
however that in the town of Carmen, in the Province of Bohol,
wherein the animal was slaughtered there is no municipal
slaughterhouse. It appears that the defendant did in fact apply
for a permit to slaughter his carabao, and that it was denied
him on the ground that the animal was not unfit "for
agricultural work or for draft purposes."
Held: Mere restriction s over property is not taking under
eminent domain
Prohibition of the slaughter of carabaos for human
consumption, so long as these animals are fit for agricultural
work or draft purposes was a "reasonably necessary"
limitation on private ownership, to protect the community from
the loss of the services of such animals by their slaughter
*Churchill v. Rafferty - 32 PHIL. 580 ( involved in the advertising
business, particularly in billboard advertising. Their billboards located upon
private lands in the Province of Rizal were removed upon complaints and
by the orders of the defendant Collector of Internal Revenue by virtue of
the provisions of subsection (b) of section 100 of Act No. 2339, hallenge
the power of the of the Collector of Internal Revenue to remove any sign,
signboard, or billboard upon the ground that the same is offensive to the
sight or is otherwise a nuisance and maintain that the billboards in
question “in no sense constitute a nuisance and are not deleterious to the
health, morals, or general welfare of the community, or of any persons.
Held: Legitimate exercise of police power. Things offensive to the senses, such as sight,
smell or hearing, may be suppressed by the State especially those situated in thickly populated districts.
Aesthetics may be regulated by the police power of the state, as long as it is justified by public interest
and safety. Moreover, if the police power may be exercised to encourage a healthy social and economic
condition in the country, and if the comfort and convenience of the people are included within those
subjects, everything which encroaches upon such territory is amenable to the police power of the State.

*People v. Fajardo - 104 PHIL. 443

Facts: The municipal council of baao, camarines sur stating among
others that construction of a building, which will destroy the view of
the plaza, shall not be allowed and therefore be destroyed at the
expense of the owner, enacted an ordinance. Herein appellant filed
a written request with the incumbent municipal mayor for
a permit to construct a building adjacent to their gasoline station on
a parcel of land registered in Fajardo's name, located along the
national highway and separated from the public plaza by a creek.
The request was denied, for the reason among others that
the proposed building would destroy the view or beauty of the
public plaza. Defendants reiterated their request for a
building permit, but again the mayor turned down the request.
Whereupon, appellants proceeded with the construction of the
building without a permit, because they needed a place of residence
very badly, their former house having been destroyed by a typhoon
and hitherto they had been living on leased property.
Thereafter, defendants were charged in violation of the ordinance
and subsequently convicted. Hence this appeal.

Held: It is not a valid exercise of police power. The ordinance is

unreasonable and oppressive, in that it operates to permanently
deprive appellants of the right to use their own property; hence, it
oversteps the bounds of police power, and amounts to a taking of
appellant’s property without just compensation.The ordinance fails to
state any policy, or to set up any standard to guide or limit the mayor's
action. The ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive, in that it operates
to permanently deprive appellants of the right to use their own property;
hence, it oversteps the bounds of police power, and amounts to a taking of
appellants’ property without just compensation. The ordinance is not a
mere regulation.

*Ermita-Malate Hotel & Motel Operator v. City of Manila - 20 SCRA 849

Facts: Ordinanance 4670 would impose P6,000.00 license fee per annum for first
class motels and P4,500.00 for second class motels; there was also the requirement
that the guests would fill up a form specifying their personal information.
There was also a provision that the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and
lodging houses would be open for inspection from city authorites. They claimed this to
be violative of due process for being vague.
The law also classified motels into two classes and required the maintenance
of certain minimum facilities in first class motels such as a telephone in each room, a
dining room or, restaurant and laundry. The petitioners also invoked the lack of due
process on this for being arbitrary.
It was also unlawful for the owner to lease any room or portion thereof more than
twice every 24 hours.
There was also a prohibition for persons below 18 in the hotel.
The challenged ordinance also caused the automatic cancellation of the license of the
hotels that violated the ordinance.
The lower court declared the ordinance unconstitutional.
Hence, this appeal by the city of Manila.

Held: here is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to
minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals, particularly fornication and
prostitution. Moreover, the increase in the licensed fees was intended to discourage
"establishments of the kind from operating for purpose other than legal" and at the
same time, to increase "the income of the city government." There is a presumption that
the laws enacted by Congress (in this case Mun Board) is valid. W/o a showing or a strong
foundation of invalidity, the presumption stays. As in this case, there was only a stipulation of
facts and such cannot prevail over the presumption. Further, the ordinance is a valid exercise of
Police Power. There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to
minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals. This is to minimize prostitution. The
increase in taxes not only discourages hotels/motels in doing any business other than legal but
also increases the revenue of the LGU concerned. And taxation is a valid exercise of police power
as well. The due process contention is likewise untenable, There is no controlling and precise
definition of due process. It has a standard to which the governmental action should conform in
order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid. What then is
the standard of due process which must exist both as a procedural and a substantive requisite to
free the challenged ordinance from legal infirmity? It is responsiveness to the supremacy of
reason, obedience to the dictates of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and
unfairness avoided. Nothing in the petition is sufficient to prove the ordinance’s nullity for an
alleged failure to meet the due process requirement.

Constitutionality of the ordinance upheld for lack of evidence to rebut such.

It was enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals –
alarming increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery and fornication in
Manila traceable in great part to the existence of motels, which "provide a
necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit" and thus
become the "ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill-seekers.” No showing that
the respondent acted unreasonableness and arbitrariness.

*Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court - 148 SCRA 659

Facts:
In 1980 President Marcos amended Executive Order No. 626-A which
orders that no carabao and carabeef shall be transported from one
province to another; such violation shall be subject to confiscation and
forfeiture by the government, to be distributed to charitable institutions
and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat
Inspection Commission may see fit for the carabeef and to deserving
farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit
in the case of the carabaos.

On January 13, 1984, Petitioner’s 6 carabaos were confiscated by the

police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for having been
transported from Masbate to Iloilo in violation of EO 626-A. He issued a
writ for replevin, challenging the constitutionality of said EO. The trial
court sustained the confiscation of the animals and declined to rule on
the validity of the law on the ground that it lacked authority to do so. Its
decision was affirmed by the IAC.Hence, this petition for review filed by
Petitioner.

Issue:
Whether or not the said Executive Order is unconstitutional.

Held:
SC ruled that while there is a lawful subject, there was no lawful method.
The EO imposes on the absolute ban not on the slaughter of carabaos but
on their movement, providing that no carabao and carabeef should be
transported from one province to another the purpose of which is to
protect the community from the loss of the services of such animals by
their slaughter. SC said that the reasonable connection between the
means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the
questioned measure is missing. They cannot see how the prohibition of
the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their
indiscriminate slaughter considering that they can be killed anywhere.

The EO is also unconstitutional as there was outright confiscation of

carabaos without according the owner the right to be heard before a
competent and impartial court. There certainly was no reason why the
offense prohibited by the EO should not have been proved first in a court
of justice, with the accused being accorded all the rights safeguarded to
him under the Constitution. The EO is penal in nature, the violation
should have been pronounced not by the police only but by a court of
justice, which alone would have had the authority to impose the
prescribed penalty, and only after trial and conviction of the accused.

Wherefore, the EO is unconstitutional.

*Balacuit v. CFI - 163 SCRA 182

Facts: Facts:
Petitioners, theater owners, assailed the constitutionality of
Ordinance No. 640 passed by the Municipal Board of the City
of Butuan on April 21, 1969. This called for a reduction to ½
of the ticket price given to minors from 7-12 years old. There
was a fine from 200-600 pesos or a 2-6 month imprisonment

The complaint was issued in the trial court. A TRO was then
issued to prevent the law from being enforced. The
respondent court entered its decision declaring the law valid.

Petitioners attack the validity and constitutionality of

Ordinance No. 640 on the grounds that it is ultra vires and an
invalid exercise of police power. Petitioners contend that
Ordinance No. 640 is not within the power of’ the Municipal
Board to enact as provided for in Section 15(n) of Republic
Act No. 523 where it states that the Muncipal board can only
fix license fees for theaters and not admission rates.

The respondent attempts to justify the enactment of the

ordinance by invoking the general welfare clause embodied
in Section 15 (nn) of the cited law.

Issue:

W/N Ordinance 640 – prohibiting payment on theater tickets

for children below seven (7) is constitutional?

Ruling:

NO, because it infringes theater owners’ right to property.

There is nothing pernicious in demanding equal price for both

children and adults. The petitioners are merely conducting
their legitimate businesses. The object of every business
entrepreneur is to make a profit out of his venture. There is
nothing immoral or injurious in charging the same price for
both children and adults. In fact, no person is under
compulsion to purchase a ticket. It is a totally voluntary act on
the part of the purchaser if he buys a ticket to such
performances.

Such ticket represents a right, Positive or conditional, as the

case may be, according to the terms of the original contract
of sale. This right is clearly a right of property.The ticket
which represents that right is also, necessarily, a species of
property. As such, the owner thereof, in the absence of any
condition to the contrary in the contract by which he obtained
it, has the clear right to dispose of it, to sell it to whom he
pleases and at such price as he can obtain. So that an act
prohibiting the sale of tickets to theaters or other places
of amusement at more than the regular price was held
invalid as conflicting with the state constitution securing
the right of property.

Children shall not pay full price of ticket of any movie or other
public exhibitions, games, contests, or other performances.
Held: The ordinance is not justified by any necessity of public
interest. The purpose which is to help ease the burden to
parents will only shift the burden to the owners of the
establishments. The burden to ensure that the children are
below 12 years old is also unreasonable and unduly
oppressive. There is no national policy for the state to interfere
with prices of admission tickets for entertainment
performances.

*Magtajas v. Pryce Properties – 234 SCRA 255

Facts: The Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) is a
corporation created directly by P.D. 1869 to help centralize and regulate all games
of chance, including casinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of
the Philippines. PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro
City by leasing a portion of a building belonging to Pryce Properties Corporation
Inc. for its casino. Sangguniang Panlungsod of CDO enacted ordinance 3353,
prohibiting the issuance of business permit and cancelling existing business
permit to any establishment for the using and allowing to be used its premises or
portion thereof for the operation of a casino. It enacted Ordinance 3375-93,
prohibiting the operation of casino and providing penalty for violation therefore.
Pryce assailed the ordinances before the CA, where it was joined by PAGCOR as
intervenor.
The Court found the ordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed for to prohibit
their enforcement. CDO City and its mayor filed a petition for review under Rules
of Court with the Supreme Court.
Issue: WON the Sangguniang Panlungsod can prohibit the establishment of
casino operated by PAGCOR through an ordinance or resolution.
Held: No. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is generally considered inimical
to the interests of the people, there is nothing in the Constitution categorically
proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even mentioning it at all. In
the exercise of its own discretion, the Congress may prohibit gambling altogether
or allow it without limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and
allow others for whatever reasons it may consider sufficient.
Under Sec. 458 of the Local Government Code, local government units are
authorized to prevent or suppress, among others, “gambling and other prohibited
games of chance.” Ordinances should not contravene a statue as municipal
governments are only agents of the national government. Local councils exercise
only delegated powers conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmaking
body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher
than those of the latter.
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has
held that to be valid, an ordinance must conform to the following substantive
requirements:
1) It must not contravene the constitution or any statute.
2) It must not be unfair or oppressive.
3) It must not be partial or discriminatory.
4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade.
5) It must be general and consistent with public policy.
6) It must not be unreasonable.

*Bennis v. Michigan - No. 94-8729 March 4, 1996

Facts: Petitioner, was a joint owner, with her husband of a car in
which her husband engaged in sexual activity with a prostitute.
Petitioner’s husband was convicted of gross indecency and the car
was abated under 600.3801 and 600.3825 of Michigan’s Compiled
Laws. A Michigan court, Wayne County Circuit Court (probably like
RTC in Philippines) ordered the car forfeited as a public nuisance,
notwithstanding her lack of knowledge of her husband’s activity. 

The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the decision of WCCC and
held that the car cannot be abated in absent of proof that she knew
to what end the car would be used. The Michigan Supreme Court
reversed the ruling of the Michigan Court of Appeals and reinstated
the abatement, ordered by WCCC, completely. 


Michigan Compiled Laws 600.3801 “Any building, vehicle, boat,

aircraft, or place used for the purpose of lewdness, assignation or
prostitution or gambling, or used by, or kept for the use of prostitutes
or other disorderly persons, ... is declared a nui- sance, ... and all ...
nuisances shall be enjoined and abated as provided in this act and
as provided in the court rules. Any person or his or her servant,
agent, or employee who owns, leases, conducts, or maintains any
building, vehicle, or place used for any of the purposes or acts set
forth in this section is guilty of a nuisance.”

Position of Petitioners: Petitioner’s defense was that she did not know
that her husband would use the car to violate Michigan’s indecency
law.

Position of Respondents: According to jurisprudence, Michigan does

not need to prove that the owner knew or agreed that her vehicle
would be used in a manner prescribed by 600.3801 when she
entrusted it to another user.

ISSUE: W/N Michigan’s abatement scheme has deprived petitioner

of her interest in the forfeited car without due process, in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment?

HELD/RATIO: NO. Wayne County Circuit Court took into

consideration the fact that the petitioners had another car to
use in case the car in question is declared a public nuisance.
According to jurisprudence, owner’s interest in a property may
be forfeited even though the owner did not know that it was
used as such and this is not a violation of the due process
clause. Forfeiture of property serves as a deterrent purpose. It
prevents illegal use both by preventing further illicit use of
property and imposing economic penalty. Also, the car taken
away from the petitioner was by virtue of this case and not by
virtue of State’s exercise of eminent domain. Thus there is no
just compensation needed. 

  

*Cruzan v. Dir. Missouri - No. 88-1503 June 25, 1990

Facts: Petitioner Nancy Cruzan is incompetent, having sustained
severe injuries in an automobile accident, and now lies in a
Missouri state hospital in what is referred to as a persistent
vegetative state: generally, a condition in which a person
exhibits motor reflexes but evinces no indications of significant
cognitive function. The State is bearing the cost of her care.
Hospital employees refused, without court approval, to honor the
request of Cruzan's parents, copetitioners here, to terminate her
artificial nutrition and hydration, since that would result in death.
A state trial court authorized the termination, finding that a
person in Cruzan's condition has a fundamental right under the
State and Federal Constitutions to direct or refuse the
withdrawal of death-prolonging procedures, and that Cruzan's
expression to a former housemate that she would not wish to
continue her life if sick or injured unless she could live at least
halfway normally suggested that she would not wish to continue
on with her nutrition and hydration. The State Supreme Court
reversed. While recognizing a right to refuse treatment
embodied in the common-law doctrine of informed consent, the
court questioned its applicability in this case. It also declined to
read into the State Constitution a broad right to privacy that
would support an unrestricted right to refuse treatment and
expressed doubt that the Federal Constitution embodied such a
right. The court then decided that the State Living Will statute
embodied a state policy strongly favoring the preservation of
life, and that Cruzan's statements to her housemate were
unreliable for the purpose of determining her intent. It rejected
the argument that her parents were entitled to order the
termination of her medical treatment, concluding that no person
can assume that choice for an incompetent in the absence of the
formalities required by the Living Will statute or clear and
convincing evidence of the patient's wishes.
Held: The Due Process Clause does not require a State to accept
the "substituted judgment" of close family members in the
absence of substantial proof that their views reflect the patient's.
This Court's decision upholding a State's favored treatment of
traditional family relationships may not be turned into a
constitutional requirement that a State must recognize the
primacy of these relationships in a situation like this. Nor may a
decision upholding a State's right to permit family decision
making be turned into a constitutional requirement that the
State recognize such decision making. Nancy Cruzan's parents
would surely be qualified to exercise such a right of "substituted
judgment" were it required by the Constitution. However, for the
same reasons that Missouri may require clear and convincing
evidence of a patient's wishes, it may also choose to defer only
to those wishes, rather than confide the decision to close family
members.

*Chavez v. Romulo, 431 SCRA 534

Facts: President Gloria Arroyo delivered a speech before the members of
the PNP stressing the need for a nationwide gun ban in all public places,
hence ordering PNP Chief Ebdane to suspend the issuance of permits to
carry firearms outside of residence (PTCFOR). The Memorandum released
by Ebdane states among others that all PTCFOR are revoked except those
covered with mission/letter orders. Chavez, as a licensed gun owner,
alleged that the PNP guidelines violate due process clause because the
right to own and carry a firearm is necessarily intertwined with right to life.
Held: A license authorizing a person to enjoy a certain privilege is neither a
property nor property right nor does it create a vested right. Consequently,
a PTCFOR, just like ordinary licenses in other regulated fields, may be
revoked any time. It does not confer an absolute right, but only a personal
privilege to be exercised under existing restrictions, and such as may
thereafter be reasonably imposed.

*GSIS v. Montescarlos, 434 SCRA 441

Facts: Nicolas Montesclaros, 72 years old widower, married Milagors
Orbiso, 43 years old. He then filed with the GSIS an application for
retirement benefits under PD 1146, designating Milagros as his sole
beneficiary. GSIS approved the application and later on, he died. Milagros
now claims for a survivorship pension, which the GSIS denied, stating that
under the law, a surviving spouse has no right to the survivorship pension
unless she contracted with the pensioner within 3 years before the
deceased spouse is qualified for pension. The marriage was only less than
a year before the date of retirement of Nicolas.
Held: he sole proviso Sec. 18 of PD 1146 is unconstitutional. Under Section 18 of PD 1146, it
prohibits the dependent spouse from receiving survivorship pension if such dependent spouse
married the pensioner within three years before the pensioner qualified for the pension. The Court
holds that such proviso is discriminatory and denies equal protection of the law. The proviso is
unduly oppressive in outrightly denying a dependent spouses claim for survivorship pension if the
dependent spouse contracted marriage to the pensioner within the three-year prohibited period.
There is outright confiscation of benefits due the surviving spouse without giving the surviving
spouse an opportunity to be heard.
A statute based on reasonable classification does not violate the constitutional guaranty of
the equal protection of the law. The requirements for a valid and reasonable classification are:
(1) it must rest on substantial distinctions;
(2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) it must apply equally to all members of the same class. Thus, the law may treat and regulate
one class differently from another class provided there are real and substantial differences to
distinguish one class from another.
The proviso in question does not satisfy these requirements. The proviso discriminates against the
dependent spouse who contracts marriage to the pensioner within three years before the
pensioner qualified for the pension. Under the proviso, even if the dependent spouse married the
pensioner more than three years before the pensioners death, the dependent spouse would still
not receive survivorship pension if the marriage took place within three years before the pensioner
qualified for pension. The object of the prohibition is vague. There is no reasonable connection
between the means employed and the purpose intended. The law itself does not provide any
reason or purpose for such a prohibition. If the purpose of the proviso is to prevent deathbed
marriages, then we do not see why the proviso reckons the three-year prohibition from the date
the pensioner qualified for pension and not from the date the pensioner died. The classification
does not rest on substantial distinctions. Worse, the classification lumps all those marriages
contracted within three years before the pensioner qualified for pension as having been
contracted primarily for financial convenience to avail of pension benefits.

*Chavez v. COMELEC, 437 SCRA 415

Facts: Francisco Chavez, as a taxpayer and citizen, sought to enjoin
COMELEC from enforcing Section 32 of its Resolution No. 6520 which
reads: All propaganda materials … shall be presumed to have conducted
premature campaigning in violation of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election
Code. Chavez have formal agreements with some establishments to
endorse products, thus, his name and face was shown in 3 billboards. He
now asked to be exempted from the provision, considering that the
billboards are for product endorsement and cannot be considered as
paraphernalia for premature campaigning
Issue: Section 32 of COMELEC Resolution No. 6520 an invalid
exercise of police power?
Held: Petitioner argues that the billboards, while they exhibit his
name and image, do not at all announce his candidacy for any
public office nor solicit support for such candidacy from the
electorate. They are, he claims, mere product endorsements and
not election propaganda. Prohibiting, therefore, their exhibition to
the public is not within the scope of the powers of the COMELEC,
he concludes.
Police power, as an inherent attribute of sovereignty, is the power
to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace,
education, good order, or safety, and the general welfare of the
people. To determine the validity of a police measure, two
questions must be asked: (1) Does the interest of the public in
general, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require
the exercise of police power? and (2) Are the means employed
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and
not unduly oppressive upon individuals?
A close examination of the assailed provision reveals that its
primary objectives are to prohibit premature campaigning and to
level the playing field for candidates of public office, to equalize the
situation between popular or rich candidates, on one hand, and
lesser-known or poorer candidates, on the other, by preventing the
former from enjoying undue advantage in exposure and publicity
on account of their resources and popularity. The latter is a valid
reason for the exercise of police power. Moreover, petitioner cannot
claim that the subject billboards are purely product endorsements
and do not announce nor solicit any support for his candidacy
It is true that when petitioner entered into the contracts or
agreements to endorse certain products, he acted as a private
individual and had all the right to lend his name and image to these
products. However, when he filed his certificate of candidacy for
Senator, the billboards featuring his name and image assumed
partisan political character because the same indirectly promoted
his candidacy. Therefore, the COMELEC was acting well within its
scope of powers when it required petitioner to discontinue the
display of the subject billboards. If the subject billboards were to be
allowed, candidates for public office whose name and image are
used to advertise commercial products would have more
opportunity to make themselves known to the electorate, to the
disadvantage of other candidates who do not have the same
chance of lending their faces and names to endorse popular
commercial products as image models. Similarly, an individual
intending to run for public office within the next few months, could
pay private corporations to use him as their image model with the
intention of familiarizing the public with his name and image even
before the start of the campaign period. This, without a doubt,
would be a circumvention of the rule against premature
campaigning:
Under the abovementioned Constitutional provision, the
COMELEC is expressly authorized to supervise or regulate the
enjoyment or utilization of all media communication or information
to ensure equal opportunity, time, and space. All these are aimed
at the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible
elections.

*Lucena Grand Terminal v. JAC Liner, 452 SCRA 174

Facts: Ordinances were passed by the City of Lucena
granting the Lucena Grand Central Terminal a franchise to
construct and maintain a common bus-jeepney terminal
facility, and regulating the entrance of buses, mini buses and
jeepneys in the said City to alleviate traffic congestion in the
city. JAC liner was one of those affected by the ordinances,
hence they assailed the ordinances.
Held: There must be a concurrence of a lawful
subject and lawful method. That traffic congestion is a public,
not merely a private, concern, cannot be gainsaid. The
ordinances however are characterized by overbreadth. They
go beyond what is reasonably necessary to solve the traffic
problem. Additionally, since the compulsory use of the
terminal operated by petitioner would subject the users
thereof to fees, rentals and charges, such measure is unduly
oppressive. In the subject ordinances, the scope of the
proscription against the maintenance of terminals is so broad
that even entities which might be able to provide facilities
better than the franchised terminal are barred from operating
at all.
*City of Manila v. Laguio, 455 SCRA 308
Facts: Malate Tourist Development Corp. (MTDC), which
operates Victoria Court in Malate, filed a case for declaratory
relief, assailing that the ordinance issued by the City of Manila
with regard to operating certain businesses are
unconstitutional. They assail that Victoria Court was
improperly included in the enumeration, considering that the
establishment is not for amusement or entertainment and they
were not services for entertainment, nor did they use women
as tools for entertainment. Petitioners then asserted that the
ordinance was passed to protect the social and moral welfare
of the community.
Held: A reasonable relation must exist between the purposes
of the police measure and the means employed for its
accomplishment. The prohibition of the enumerated
establishments will not per se protect and promote the social
and moral welfare of the community; it will not in itself
eradicate the alluded social ills of prostitution, adultery,
fornication nor will it arrest the spread of sexual disease in
Manila. It is readily apparent that the means employed by
the Ordinance for the achievement of its purposes, the
governmental interference itself, infringes on the
constitutional guarantees of a person’s fundamental right to
liberty and property.
*Bayan v. Ermita, GR 169848, April 25, 2006
Facts: Petitioners argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit
before one can stage a public assembly regardless of the
presence or absence of a clear and present danger. It also
curtails the choice of venue and is thus repugnant to the
freedom of expression clause as the time and place of a public
assembly form part of the message for which the expression
is sought. They further argue that B.P. No. 880 is
unconstitutional as it is a curtailment of the right to peacefully
assemble and petition for redress of grievances because it
puts a condition for the valid exercise of that right. Thus, its
provisions are not mere regulations but are actually
prohibitions.
Held: The permit can only be denied on the ground of clear
and present danger to public order, public safety, public
convenience, public morals or public health. Neither is the law
overbroad. It regulates the exercise of the right to peaceful
assembly and petition only to the extent needed to avoid a
clear and present danger. There is, likewise, no prior restraint,
since the content of the speech is not relevant to the
regulation. It also does not curtail or unduly restrict freedoms;
it merely regulates the use of public places as to the time,
place and manner of assemblies. The delegation to the
mayors of the power to issue rally "permits" is valid because
it is subject to the constitutionally-sound "clear and present
danger" standard.
*KMU v. Dir. Gen. 487 SCRA 623
Facts: Under EO 420, the President directs all government
agencies and government-owned and controlled corporations
to adopt a uniform data collection and format for their existing
identification (ID) systems. Petitioners allege that EO 420 is
unconstitutional: 1) EO 420 is vague and without adequate
safeguards or penalties for any violation of its provisions; and
2) there are no compelling reasons that will legitimize the
necessity of EO 420.
Held: EO 420 shows no constitutional infirmity. EO 420 further
provides strict safeguards to protect the confidentiality of the
data collected, in contrast to the prior ID systems which are
bereft of strict administrative safeguards. The right to privacy
does not bar the adoption of reasonable ID systems by
government entities. Without a reliable ID system,
government entities like GSIS, SSS, Philhealth, and LTO
cannot perform effectively and efficiently their mandated
functions under existing laws. Without a reliable ID system,
GSIS, SSS, Philhealth and similar government entities stand
to suffer substantial losses arising from false names and
identities. The integrity of the LTOs licensing system will
suffer in the absence of a reliable ID system.
*Mirasol v. DPWH 490 SCRA 318
Facts: Pursuant to its mandate under R.A. 2000, DPWH
issued on June 25, 1998 Department Order (DO) No. 215
declaring the Manila-Cavite (Coastal Road) Toll Expressway
as limited access facilities. The DPWH acting thru the TRB,
issued Department Order No. 123 (and AO 1) only allowing
motorcycles with engine displacement of 400 cubic
centimeters inside limited access facilities (toll ways).
Held: The use of public highways by motor vehicles is subject
to regulation as an exercise of the police power of the state.
AO 1 does not impose unreasonable restrictions. It merely
outlines several precautionary measures designed to ensure
public safety and the uninhibited flow of traffic within limited
access facilities. A toll way is not an ordinary road. Inevitably,
such rules will restrict certain rights. But the mere fact that
certain rights are restricted does not invalidate the rules. The
exercise of police power involves restriction, but such must
reasonable. AO 1 is not oppressive. Petitioners are not being
deprived of their right to use the limited access facility. They
are merely being required, just like the rest of the public, to
adhere to the rules on how to use the facility. Further
classification by itself is not prohibited. Not all motorized
vehicles are created equal. There is real and substantial
differences exist between a motorcycle and other forms of
transport sufficient to justify its classification among those
prohibited from plying the toll ways.
*Parreno v. COA 523 SCRA 390
Facts: Petitioner retired, migrated to Hawaii and became a
naturalized American citizen. The AFP stopped petitioner’s
monthly pension in accordance with Section 27 of PD 1638,
which provides that a retiree who loses his Filipino citizenship
shall be removed from the retired list and his retirement
benefits terminated upon loss of Filipino citizenship. Petitioner
requested for reconsideration but the Judge Advocate
General of the AFP denied the request.
Held: PD 1638, as amended, does not impair any vested right
or interest of petitioner. Where the employee retires and
meets the eligibility requirements, he acquires a vested right
to the benefits that is protected by the due process clause. At
the time of the approval of PD 1638 and at the time of its
amendment, petitioner was still in active service. Hence,
petitioner’s retirement benefits were only future benefits and
did not constitute a vested right. Before a right to retirement
benefits or pension vests in an employee, he must have met
the stated conditions of eligibility with respect to the nature of
employment, age, and length of service. It is only upon
retirement that military personnel acquire a vested right to
retirement benefits. Retirees enjoy a protected property
interest whenever they acquire a right to immediate payment
under pre-existing law.
Esponcilla v. Bagong Tanyag 529 SCRA 654
BF v. City Mayor 515 SCRA 1
*St. Luke’s v. NLRC 517 SCRA 677
Facts: Santos was hired as X-Ray Technician in the
Radiology department of private respondent St. Luke's
Medical Center, Inc. In 1992, Congress passed and enacted
Republic Act No. It requires that no person shall practice or
offer to practice as a radiology and/or x-ray technologist in the
Philippines without having obtained the proper certificate of
registration from the Board of Radiologic Technology. Upon
Santos’ failure to comply, a notice was issued informing her
that the management of SLMC has approved her retirement
in lieu of separation pay.
Held: While the right of workers to security of tenure is
guaranteed by the Constitution, its exercise may be
reasonably regulated pursuant to the police power of the State
to safeguard health, morals, peace, education, order, safety,
and the general welfare of the people. Consequently, persons
who desire to engage in the learned professions requiring
scientific or technical knowledge may be required to take an
examination as a prerequisite to engaging in their chosen
careers.
Carlos v. DSWD 526 SCRA 130
Perez v. LPG 531 SCRA 431
*MMDA v. Viron 530 SCRA 341
Facts: Respondent Viron filed a petition for declaratory relief
before the RTC of Manila alleging that the MMDA was "poised
to issue a Circular, Memorandum or Order closing, or
tantamount to closing, all provincial bus terminals along EDSA
and in the whole of the Metropolis under the pretext of traffic
regulation." This impending move, it stressed, would mean the
closure of its bus terminal in Sampaloc and two others in
Quezon City.
Held: Notably, the parties herein concede that traffic
congestion is a public concern that needs to be addressed
immediately. Indeed, the E.O. was issued due to the felt need
to address the worsening traffic congestion in Metro Manila
which. The means employed cannot be considered as
reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem. On the
contrary, the elimination of respondents’ bus terminals brings
forth the distinct possibility and the equally harrowing reality
of traffic congestion in the common parking areas, a case of
transference from one site to another.
*Sec. of DND v. Manalo 568 SCRA 42
Facts: Brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo were
abducted by military men belonging to the CAFGU on the
suspicion that they were members and supporters of the NPA.
After 18 months of detention and torture, the brothers
escaped. Thereafter, they filed a Petition for Prohibition,
Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order to stop the
military officers and agents from depriving them of their right
to liberty and other basic rights. While the said case was
pending, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo took effect. The
Manalos subsequently filed a manifestation and omnibus
motion to treat their existing petition as amparo petition.
Held: In upholding the CA decision, the Supreme Court ruled
that there is a continuing violation of the Manalos right to
security. The Writ of Amparo is the most potent remedy
available to any person whose right to life, liberty, and security
has been violated or is threatened with violation by an
unlawful act or omission by public officials or employees and
by private individuals or entities. Understandably, since their
escape, the Manalos have been under concealment and
protection by private citizens because of the threat to their life,
liberty, and security. The circumstances of respondents’
abduction, detention, torture and escape reasonably support
a conclusion that there is an apparent threat that they will
again be abducted, tortured, and this time, even executed.
These constitute threats to their liberty, security, and life,
actionable through a petition for a writ of amparo,
SJS v. DDB 570 SCRA 410
SJS v. Atienza 545 SCRA 92
SEC v. Interport 567 SCRA 354
BANAT v. COMELEC 595 SCRA 477
People v. Siton 600 SCRA 476
*White Light v. City of Manila 576 SCRA 416
Facts: City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed into law the
Ordinance prohibiting short time admission in hotels, motels,
lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments
in the City of Manila. The Ordinance, it is argued, is also a
valid exercise of the power of the City. Petitioners argued that
the Ordinance an invalid exercise of police power; and it is an
unreasonable and oppressive interference in their business.
Held: It cannot be denied that the primary animus behind the
ordinance is the curtailment of sexual behaviour. The City
asserts that the subject establishments "have gained notoriety
as venue of ‘prostitution, adultery and fornications’ in Manila.
However, it must appear that the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
require an interference with private rights (lawful subject) and
the means must be reasonably necessary (not arbitrary) for
the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive
of private rights (lawful means). It must also be evident that
no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose.
Here, the Ordinance makes no distinction between places
frequented by patrons engaged in illicit activities and patrons
engaged in legitimate actions. Further, the behaviour which
the Ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already prohibited and
could in fact be diminished simply by applying existing laws.
Less intrusive measures such as curbing the proliferation of
prostitutes and drug dealers through active police work would
be more effective in easing the situation. So would the strict
enforcement of existing laws and regulations penalizing
prostitution and drug use. These measures would have
minimal intrusion on the businesses of the petitioners and
other legitimate merchants. Further, it is apparent that the
Ordinance can easily be circumvented by merely paying the
whole day rate without any hindrance to those engaged in
illicit activities. Moreover, drug dealers and prostitutes can in
fact collect "wash rates" from their clientele by charging their
customers a portion of the rent for motel rooms and even
apartments.
Note: Standards of judicial review: strict scrutiny for laws
dealing with freedom of the mind or restricting the political
process, the rational basis standard of review for economic
legislation, and the heightened or immediate scrutiny for
evaluating classifications based on gender and
legitimacy. Using the rational basis examination, laws or
ordinances are upheld if they rationally further a legitimate
governmental interest. Under intermediate review,
governmental interest is extensively examined and the
availability of less restrictive measures is considered.
Applying strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence of
compelling, rather than substantial, governmental interest and
on the absence of less restrictive means for achieving that
interest.

CREBA v. Romulo 614 SCRA 605

Southern Hemisphere v. ATC 632 SCRA 146
*Roxas v. Macapagal-Arroyo 630 SCRA 211
Facts: Melissa Roxas was a Filipino-American activist. On
May 19, 2009, she was abducted by alleged soldiers under
the presumption that she was an NPA member. She was a
member of Bayan and was in Tarlac for a survey work. She
alleged that she was tortured for 5 days. She was eventually
released. However her abductors still did surveillance on her.
She was given a cellular phone with a SIM card where she
received calls.
Held: Writ of amparo cannot be used to protect property
rights. The Amparo rule does not allow a fishing expedition of
evidenceThe place must be reasonably determinable from the
party’s allegations. An inspection order cannot issue on the
bases of allegations that unreliable and doubtful. The writ of
habeas data was conceptualized as a judicial remedy
enforcing the right to privacy, most especially the right to
informational privacy of individuals. It protects a person’s right
to control information regarding himself, especially when the
info is being collected through unlawful means for unlawful
ends. To issue the writ there must be showing of an actual or
threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or
security of the victim, which she failed to do.
*Meralco v. Lim 632 SCRA 195
Facts: Respondent is a clerk of Meralco. An anonymous letter
was posted at the door in the building where respondent is
assigned, denouncing respondent. She was ordered to be
transferred to Alabang due to concerns over her safety. She
complained under the premise that the transfer was a denial
of her due process. To her, this constituted a violation of her
liberty and security. She asked for disclosure of the data and
measures for keeping the confidentiality of the data.
Held: The writs of amparo and habeas data will NOT issue to
protect purely property or commercial concerns nor when the
grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor are vague
or doubtful. Employment constitutes a property right under the
context of the due process clause of the Constitution. It is
evident that respondent’s reservations on the real reasons for
her transfer - a legitimate concern respecting the terms and
conditions of one’s employment - are what prompted her to
adopt the extraordinary remedy of habeas data. Jurisdiction
over such concerns is inarguably lodged by law with the
NLRC and the Labor Arbiters. In another vein, there is no
showing from the facts presented that petitioners committed
any unjustifiable or unlawful violation of respondent’s right to
privacy vis-a-vis the right to life, liberty or security.
Pollo v. Karina Constantino, GR 181881, October 8, 2011
Sto. Tomas v. Paneda 685 SCRA 245
De Lima v. Gatdula, GR 204528, Feb 19, 2013
Fernando v. St. Scholastica’s Collage, GR 161107, March 12,
2013
Ligot v. Republic, GR 176944, March 6, 2013
Republic v. Roque, GR 204603, Sep. 24, 2013
Bankers Association of the PH v. COMELEC, GR 206794,
November 26, 2013 - Manila Memorial Park v. DSWD, GR
175356, December 3, 2013
Legaspi v. City of Cebu, GR 159110, December 10, 2013
*Remman Enterprises v. Professional Regulatory Board,
GR 197676, Feb 4 , 2014
Facts: RA 9646 was enacted which aims to professionalize
and regulate the real estate sector by licensing, registration,
and supervision of real estate service practitioners.
Petitioners are real estate developers alleging that the RA
violates due process since it will negatively impact the real
estate developers’ most basic ownership rights, the right to
use and dispose property, and thus void and unconstitutional.
Held: Real property transactions are susceptible to
manipulation and corruption that may affect the economy,
thus there is a need for interference by the State. While the
petitioners may be burdened by requiring them to employ
licensed real estate professional, but such is unavoidable
consequence of a reasonable regulatory measure within the
State’s exercise of police power. Further, proper regulation of
a profession has always been upheld as a legitimate subject
of exercise of police power as it will affect the execution of
legitimate governmental function, preservation of the state,
and to some extent public health, welfare, and public morals.
*Disini v. Secretary of Justice, GR 203335, Feb 18, 2014
Facts: Petitioner alleged that Section 12 and 15 of the
Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 as unconstitutional for
violation of due process.
Held: Is Section 12 on Real-Time collection of traffic data valid
and constitutional? Void and unconstitutional. Sec 12
empowers law enforcement authorities to collect or record
data upon determination of due cause without giving the
extent of what due cause is, giving them too much discretion.
Thus, the authority that Section 12 gives law enforcement
agencies is too sweeping and lacks restraint. It may amount
to a fishing expedition.
Is Section 15 on search, seizure and examination of computer
data valid and constitutional? Valid and constitutional,
because Section 15 merely enumerates the duties of law
enforcement authorities that would ensure proper collection,
preservation, and use of computer system or data that have
been seized by virtue of a court warrant.
*Imbong v. Ochoa, GR 204819, April 8, 2014
Facts: Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the
Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of
2012 (RH Law), was enacted. Challengers from various
sectors of society are questioning the constitutionality of the
said Act.
Held: Due Process: Definition of certain terms are not vague.
The definition of “private health care service provider” must be
seen in relation to Section 4(n) of the RH Law which defines
a “public health service provider”. The “private health care
institution” cited under Section 7 should be seen as
synonymous to “private health care service provider.” The
terms “service” and “methods” are also broad enough to
include providing of information and rendering of medical
procedures. Thus, hospitals operated by religious groups are
exempted from rendering RH service and modern family
planning methods (as provided for by Section 7 of the RH
Law) as well as from giving RH information and procedures.
The RH Law also defines “incorrect information”. Used
together in relation to Section 23 (a)(1), the terms “incorrect”
and “knowingly” connote a sense of malice and ill motive to
mislead or misrepresent the public as to the nature and effect
of programs and services on reproductive health.
Equal Protection: To provide that the poor are to be given
priority in the government’s RH program is not a violation of
the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section
11, Article XIII of the Constitution, which states that the State
shall prioritize the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly,
disabled, women, and children and that it shall endeavor to
provide medical care to paupers.
U.E. v. Pepanio – 689 SCRA 250
*Garcia v. Drilon – 699 SCRA 352
Facts: Private respondent Rosalie Garcia filed a petition
before the RTC of Bacolod City a Temporary Protection Order
against her husband, Jesus Garcia, pursuant to R.A. 9262,
entitled “An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their
Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims,
Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes.” She
claimed to be a victim of physical, emotional, psychological
and economic violence, being threatened of deprivation of
custody of her children and of financial support and also a
victim of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner. Petitioner
hence, challenged the constitutionality of RA 9262 on making
a gender-based classification.
Held: Equal Protection: The equal protection clause in our
Constitution does not guarantee an absolute prohibition
against classification. The non-identical treatment of women
and men under RA 9262 is justified to put them on equal
footing and to give substance to the policy and aim of the state
to ensure the equality of women and men.
Due Process: RA 9262 is not violative of the due process
clause of the Constitution. The essence of due process is in
the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any
evidence one may have in support of one’s defense. A victim
of VAWC may already have suffered harrowing experiences
in the hands of her tormentor, and possibly even death, if
notice and hearing were required before such acts could be
prevented. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary
requirements of procedural due process must yield to the
necessities of protecting vital public interests, among which is
protection of women and children from violence and threats to
their personal safety and security.
Nagkakaisang Maralita v. Sitio – 697 SCRA 359
Burgos v. Esperon – 715 SCRA 208
*Caram v. Segui – 732 SCRA 86
Facts: Petitioner Christina and Marcelino had a baby without
the benefit of marriage. Christina voluntarily surrendered
Baby Julian to the DSWD. Baby Julian was then declared as
“Legally Available for Adoption” and was then “matched” with
Spouses Medina and supervised trial custody commenced.
Upon the death of Marcelino, his family offered to help
Petitioner. However, since the declaration that Baby Julian is
legally available for adoption had attained finality, Petitioner
filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo to obtain
custody of the baby.
Held: Christina argues that the life, liberty and security of Baby
Julian is being violated or threatened by the respondent
DSWD officers’ enforcement of an illegal Deed of Voluntary
Commitment. The Amparo Rule was intended to address the
intractable problem of "extralegal killings" and "enforced
disappearances:” Here, there is no "enforced disappearance"
as used in the context of the Amparo rule. Clearly, Christina
is not searching for a lost child but asserting her parental
authority over the child and contesting custody over him.
Hermano Oil Manufacturing v. TRB – 742 SCRA 397
*Mison v. Gallegos – 760 SCRA 363
Facts: The Embassy of the Republic of Korea wrote a Letter-
Request to petitioner Chairperson of the Bureau of
Immigration (BI) for the immediate arrest and deportation of
respondent Ja Hoon Ku (Ku) to Korea for being an
undesirable alien. Pursuant to Summary Deportation Order,
Ku was arrested and detained at the BI detention center. Ku
filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo with
Interim Remedies which was granted by Judge Gallegos.
Held: The Amparo rule was intended to address the
intractable problem of the “extralegal killings” and “enforced
disappearances,” Guided by the parameters of RA 9851, we
can readily discern that Ku’s circumstance does not come
under the statutory definition of an enforced disappearance.
Indeed, Ku was arrested by agents of the BI, but there was no
refusal on the part of the BI to acknowledge such arrest nor
was there any refusal to give information to remove Ku from
the protection of the law for a prolonged time. More
importantly, there was no attempt on the part of the BI to
conceal Ku or his whereabouts.
*Zarate v. Aquino III, GR 220028, November 10, 2015
Facts: The Government commenced intensified military
offensives in Talaingod, Davao del Norte under the rubric of
counterinsurgency. About 1,300 Manobos allegedly
evacuated to Davao City to escape the effects of said military
operations. Certain Manobos claimed, on the other hand, that
they were deceived into going to Davao City; that, upon
reaching UCCP Haran, they were deprived of their freedom of
locomotion and were held there against their will; that they
were forced to listen to lectures and join rallies; that their
repeated pleas to go home fell on deaf ears until a fellow tribe
member was found dead, hanging lifeless on a tree, inside the
UCCP Haran compound; and that it was only then that they
were allowed to go home with the body of the deceased.
Held: The writ of amparo is an extraordinary remedy as it is
available not only for violations of life, liberty, and security, but
also against threatened violations of such. But not all threats
are protected by the Amparo Rule. As previously elucidated
by this Court, "only actual threats, as may be established from
all the facts and circumstances of the case, can qualify as a
violation that may be addressed under the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo." Having these guidelines in mind, we hold that
petitioners failed to substantially prove that their life, liberty
and security are threatened with violation. Mere membership
in these organizations or sectors cannot equate to an actual
threat that would warrant the issuance of the writ.

7. Equal Protection of Law

People v. Cayat - 68 PHIL. 12, 18
Requisites for a valid qualification:
a. It must rest on substantial distinction.
b. It must be germane to the purpose of the law.
c. It must not be limited to existing conditions only.
d. It shall be applicable to all subjects of the same class.
Ichong v. Hernandez - 101 PHIL. 1155
*Villegas v. Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho - 86 SCRA 270
Facts: An ordinance as promulgated by the petitioner
prohibiting aliens from being employed of engaged in any kind
of trade or business or occupation without first securing an
employment permit and paying a fee.
Held: The ordinance violates equal protection. While
classification under the law is not prohibited, such should be
based on real and substantial differences having a reasonable
relation to the subject of the particular legislation. The permit
fee is not only unreasonable and excessive, but the law fails
to consider valid substantial differences among individual
aliens: whether he is casual, permanent, and part-time or full
time, they are all similarly situated. Further, the ordinance will
unduly deprive the aliens of their basic right to engage in
livelihood, livelihood is a part of life protected by due process.
Dumlao v. COMELEC - 96 SCRA 392
Goesart v. Cleary - 335 US 464
*Ormoc Sugar Central v. Ormoc City - L-23794 February
17, 1968
Facts: An ordinance was passed imposing a 1% municipality
tax to all productions of centrifugal sugar milled by petitioner
Ormoc Sugar Company (OSC).
Held: Violation of equal protection since the imposition applies
only to OSC. Granted that it is the only sugar central in Ormoc
at the time of the enactment of the ordinance, but when
another company similar to OSC is established, they will not
be subjected to the municipal tax imposed by the ordinance.
Thus, requisites no. 3 and 4 are not present in this case for a
valid classification.
Basco v. PAGCOR - May 14, 1991
Republic v. Sandiganbayan – 230 SCRA 711
Binay v. Domingo - 201 SCRA 508
NPC v. De Guzman – 229 SCRA 801
Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance –249 SCRA 628
Himagan v. People - 237 SCRA 538
Almonte v. Vasquez – 244 SCRA 286
Lim v. Pacquing - 240 SCRA 649
Conference of Maritime Manning v. POEA - 243 SCRA 666
Regala v. Sandiganbayan – 262 SCRA 122
Sison v. Ancheta – 130 SCRA 654
Marcos v. CA – 278 SCRA 843
Nolasco v. COMELEC – 275 SCRA 762
Phil. Judges v. Prado – 227 SCRA 703
Olivarez v. Sandiganbayan – 248 SCRA 700
GMC v. Torres – 196 SCRA 216
Segovia v. Sandiganbayan - 288 SCRA 328
Chavez v. PCGG – GR 130716 December 9, 1998
Telebap v. COMELEC – 289 SCRA 337
Tiu v. CA – GR 127410 January 20, 1999
Lacson v. Executive Secretary – GR 128096 January 20,
1999
Soriano v. CA – GR 123936 March 4, 1999
Aguinaldo v. COMELEC – GR 132774 June 21, 1999
Loong v. COMELEC, 305 SCRA 832
International School v. Quisumbing – GR 128845 June 1,
2000
De Guzman v. COMELEC, GR 129118, July 19, 2000
Bayan v. Zamora, GR 138570, October 10, 2000
People v. Mercado, GR 116239, November 29, 2000
People v. Jalosjos, 324 SCRA 689
Lopez v. CA, GR 144573, Sept. 24, 2002
Philreca v. Sec. of DILG, GR 140376, June 10, 2003
Farinas v. Executive Secretary, GR 147387, Dec. 10, 2003
Dimaporo v. HRET, GR 158359, Mar. 23, 2004
GSIS v. Montescarlos, 434 SCRA 441
In re Request of Assistant Court Administrators, 440 SCRA
16
*Central Bank Employees Ass’n v. Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas, 446 SCRA 299
Facts: Petitioner Central Bank (now BSP) Employees
Association, Inc., filed a petition for prohibition to restrain
respondents from further implementing the last proviso in
Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, on the ground that it
is unconstitutional – “Provided, however, That compensation
and wage structure of employees whose positions fall under
salary grade 19 and below shall be in accordance with the
rates prescribed under Republic Act No. 6758.” The thrust of
petitioner's challenge is that the above proviso makes an
unconstitutional cut between two classes of employees in the
BSP: (1) the BSP officers or those exempted from the
coverage of the Salary Standardization Law; and (2) the rank-
and-file (Salary Grade 19 and below), or those not exempted
from the coverage of the SSL (non-exempt class). It is
contended that this classification is not based on substantial
distinctions.
Held: Violation of Equal Protection: In the case at bar, it is
precisely the fact that as regards the exemption from the SSL,
there are no characteristics peculiar only to the seven GFIs or
their rank-and-file so as to justify the exemption which BSP
rank-and-file employees were denied (not to mention the
anomaly of the SEC getting one). The distinction made by the
law is not only superficial, but also arbitrary. It is not based on
substantial distinctions that make real differences between
the BSP rank-and-file and the seven other GFIs.
Mirasol v. DPWH
In re Request of ACA 495 SCRA 432
Dimayuga v. OMB 495 SCRA 461
*Ycasuegi v. PAL 569 SCRA 467
Facts: In 1984, petitioner’s weight problem started, which
prompted PAL to send him to an extended vacation until
November 1985. He was allowed to return to work once he
lost all the excess weight. But the problem recurred. PAL
finally served petitioner a Notice of Administrative Charge for
violation of company standards on weight requirements.
Petitioner insists that he is being discriminated as those
similarly situated were not treated the same. Thereafter,
petitioner was formally informed by PAL that due to his
inability to attain his ideal weight his services were considered
terminated “effective immediately.”
Held: No violation of Equal Protection. No interference from
the State. In the absence of governmental interference, the
liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked.
Put differently, the Bill of Rights is not meant to be invoked
against acts of private individuals. Indeed, the United States
Supreme Court, in interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment,
which is the source of our equal protection guarantee, is
consistent in saying that the equal protection erects no shield
against private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful.
Private actions, no matter how egregious, cannot violate the
equal protection guarantee.
SJS v. Atienza 545 SCRA 92
Gobenciong v. CA 550 SCRA 302
MIAA v. Olongapo 543 SCRA 269
Nicolas v. Romulo – 578 SCRA 438
Serrano v. Gallant – 582 SCRA 254
*People v. Siton – 600 SCRA 476
Facts: Respondents Evangeline Siton and Krystel Kate
Sagarano were charged with vagrancy pursuant to Art. 202
(2) of the RPC in two separate Informations. Accused were
found wandering and loitering around San Pedro and Legaspi
Streets of Davao City, without any visible means to support
herself nor lawful and justifiable purpose.
Held: Article 202 (2) of the RPC does not violate the equal
protection clause; neither does it discriminate against the poor
and the unemployed. Offenders of public order laws are
punished not for their status, as for being poor or unemployed,
but for conducting themselves under such circumstances as
to endanger the public peace or cause alarm and
apprehension in the community. Being poor or unemployed is
not a license or a justification to act indecently or to engage in
immoral conduct.
*League of Cities v. COMELEC – 608 SCRA 636
Facts: During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law
RA 9009 amending Section 450 of the Local Government
Code by increasing the annual income requirement for
conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million
to P100 million. During the 13th Congress, 16 of the 24
municipalities mentioned in the unapproved Joint Resolution
No. 29 filed between November and December of 2006,
through their respective sponsors in Congress, individual
cityhood bills containing a common provision, as follows:
Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009. - The City of x x x
shall be exempted from the income requirement prescribed
under Republic Act No. 9009.
Held: Limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities
violates the requirement that the classification must apply to
all similarly situated. Municipalities with the same income as
the 16 respondent municipalities cannot convert into cities,
while the 16 respondent municipalities can. Clearly, as
worded the exemption provision found in the Cityhood Laws,
even if it were written in Section 450 of the Local Government
Code, would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal
protection clause.
*Quinto v. COMELEC – 613 SCRA 385
Facts: Petitioner assails the constitutionality of Sec 4(a) of
Resolution 8678, 3rd paragraph of Sec 13of RA 9369, and Sec
66 of the Omnibus Election Code for violating equal protection
due to the different treatment for persons holding appointive
offices and elective position. Under the questioned laws, an
appointive official is considered resigned from office upon
filing of his certificate of candidacy. The same is not applicable
to incumbent elected officials.
Held: No violation of equal protection. First, there is
substantial distinction. An elected official occupy their office
by virtue of the mandate of the electorate (sovereign will) for
a definite period of time and the same shall be respected.
They may only be removed by stringent condition. On the
other hand, appointed officials are only designated.
Appointive official are non-partisan while elective officials are
allowed to take part in political and electoral activities.
Second, while the evil sough to be prevented (use of
government funds for campaigning) still remains (for example,
if the VP and a cabinet secretary decided to run for President,
only the latter needs to forfeit his position), the same will not
nullify the laws. To remedy an injustice, the legislature need
not address every manifestation of evil at once, nor is there
any constitutional requirement that a regulation must reach
each and every class to which it may be applied.
CREBA v. Romulo – 614 SCRA 605
NPC v. Pinatubo – 616 SCRA 611
Biraogo v. PTC – 637 SCRA 78
League v. COMELEC – 643 SCRA 149
PAGCOR v. BIR – 645 SCRA 338
Gancayco v. Quezon City – 658 SCRA 853
Mendoza v. People, GR 183891, October 19, 2011
Bureau of Customs v. Teves, GR 181704, December 6, 2011
Pichay v. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary (supra.)
Alvarez v. People 677 SCRA 673
Garcia v. People 677 SCRA 750
Arroyo v. DOJ (supra.,)
Sto. Tomas v. Paneda 685 SCRA 245
In the matter of the brewing controversies in the elections of
the IBP, AM 09-5-2-Sc, April 11, 2013 (supra Art 3, Sec 1)
Aquino v. Philippine Ports Authority, GR 181973, April 17,
2013
Garcia v. Drilon, GR 179267, June 25, 2013
National Artist for literature Almario, GR 189028, July 16,
2013
Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board v.
Stronghold Insurance, Gr 200740, October 2, 2013
Imbong v. Ochoa, GR 204819, April 8, 2014 (supra Art III, Sec
1)
Spouses Dacudao v. DOJ, GR 188056, Jan 8, 2013
Goldenway v. Equitable – 693 SCRA 439
Remman v. PRBRES (supra.)
Espinas v. COA - 720 SCRA 302
Disini v. Secretary of Justice (supra.)
*People v. Jumanan - 722 SCRA 108
Facts: Accused-appellant and his wife, KKK, were married
and have four children. On February 19, 1999, KKK executed
a Complaint-Affidavit, alleging that her husband, the accused-
appellant, raped her at 3 :00 a.m. of December 3, 1998 at their
residence in Cagayan de Oro City, and that on December 12,
1998, the accused-appellant boxed her shoulder for refusing
to have sex with him.
Held: The Supreme Court held that husbands do not have
property rights over their wives’ bodies. Sexual intercourse,
albeit within the realm of marriage, if not consensual, is rape.
The Court ruled that to treat marital rape cases differently from
non-marital rape cases in terms of the elements that
constitute the crime and in the rules for their proof, infringes
on the equal protection clause. The Court found that there is
no rational basis for distinguishing between marital rape and
non-marital rape. The various rationales which have been
asserted in defense of the exemption are either based
upon archaic notions about the consent and property rights
incident to marriage or are simply unable to withstand even
the slightest scrutiny.
Bartolome v. SSS - 740 SCRA 78
*Villanueva, v. JBC – 755 SCRA 182
Facts: After about a year from being appointed as a MCTC
judge, Judge Villanueva applied for the vacant position of
presiding judge in some RTC branches. The JBC however
informed him that he was not included in the list of candidates
for such position because the JBC’s long-standing policy
requires 5 years of service as judge of first-level courts before
one can apply as judge for second-level courts.
Held: The equal protection clause is not violated because the
classification created by the challenged policy satisfies the
rational basis test. Substantial distinctions do exist between
lower court judges with five year experience and those with
less than five years of experience, like the petitioner, and the
classification enshrined in the assailed policy is reasonable
and relevant to its legitimate purpose. The assailed criterion
or consideration for promotion to a second-level court, which
is five years’ experience as judge of a first-level court, is a
direct adherence to the qualities prescribed by the
Constitution. Placing a premium on many years of judicial
experience, the JBC is merely applying one of the stringent
constitutional standards requiring that a member of the
judiciary be of “proven competence.” In determining
competence, the JBC considers, among other qualifications,
experience and performance.
*Ferrer v. Bautista – 760 SCRA 692
Facts: The City of Quezon passed an ordinance on Garbage
Collection Fees imposing fees depending on the amount of
the land or floor area. Jose Ferrer, as a property owner and
taxpayer in Quezon City questioned the validity of the city
ordinances for it violates the rule on equality.
Held: For the purpose of garbage collection, there is, in fact,
no substantial distinction between an occupant of a lot, on one
hand, and an occupant of a unit in a condominium, socialized
housing project or apartment, on the other hand. Most likely,
garbage output produced by these types of occupants is
uniform and does not vary to a large degree; thus, a similar
schedule of fee is both just and equitable. Further, the
classifications are not germane to its declared purpose of
“promoting shared responsibility with the residents to attack
their common mindless attitude in over-consuming the
present resources and in generating waste.” Instead of
simplistically categorizing the payee into land or floor
occupant of a lot or unit, respondent City Council should have
considered factors that could truly measure the amount of
wastes generated and the appropriate fee for its collection
*1-United v. COMELEC – 755 SCRA 441
Facts: COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 9615, which
provides prohibited forms of election propaganda on public
places which includes: Public utility vehicles such as buses,
jeepneys, trains, taxi cabs, ferries, pedicabs and tricycles,
whether motorized or not; and within the premises of public
transport terminals, such as bus terminals, airports, seaports,
docks, piers, train stations, and the like. The violation of such
shall be a cause for the revocation of the public utility
franchise and will make the owner and/or operator of the
transportation service and/or terminal liable for an election
offense.
Held: Prohibiting owners of PUVs and transport terminals
from posting election campaign materials violates the equal
protection clause. The questioned provisions are not only
repugnant to the free speech clause, but are also violative of
the equal protection clause, as there is no substantial
distinction between owners of PUV s and transport terminals
and owners of private vehicles and other properties.