RULE 102 OF THE RULES OF COURT – HABEAS CORPUS
CASE NUMBER/TITLE/G.R NO/PONENTE
(1) JOSE ORDA and IMELDA LOZADA,
Petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS and GIL GALANG Respondents,
G.R. No. 92625 : December 26, 1990, 192
SCRA 768, GANCAYCO, J.:
(2) IN RE: THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
FOR REYNALDO DE VILLA (detained at the
New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa City)
REYNALDO DE VILLA, petitioner, JUNE DE
VILLA, petitioner-relator, vs. THE DIRECTOR,
NEW BILIBID PRISONS, G.R. No. 158802.
November 17, 2004
PONENTE: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
CASE RULING
THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD NOT REMAND A PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS TO THE TRIAL COURT – IT IS
AUTHORIZED TO CONDUCT TRIAL OR HEARING ON MERITS
The ASSAILED DECISION AND THE TWO RESOLUTIONS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS are not supported by law and the Rules of
Court. THE PROVISIONS OF THE JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION ACT (B.P. Blg. 129) cited by the respondent Court of Appeals in its
resolution dated 13 March 1990 are not in point. SECTIONS 9(1) AND 21 thereof merely provide that the ***COURT OF APPEALS
AND REGIONAL TRIAL COURTs, respectively, exercise original jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus, among others. While
recognizing the CONCURRENT ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OF BOTH COURTS OVER HABEAS CORPUS CASES AS SPECIAL
PROCEEDINGS, these provisions are not authority for remanding or referring to the latter original actions filed with the former.
***On the contrary, the COURT OF APPEALS is specifically given the power to receive evidence and perform any and all acts
necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original jurisdiction . Furthermore, under the SUPREME
COURT RESOLUTION DATED 11 FEBRUARY 1983 IMPLEMENTING B.P. BLG. 129 pending the corresponding thorough revision of
the Rules of Court, the COURT OF APPEALS is authorized to conduct a trial or hearing to receive evidence and for the purpose
shall observe the procedure prescribed for the trial courts. Clearly, the COURT OF APPEALS should not have remanded or
referred the petition for a writ of habeas corpus to the trial court.
MOST BASIC CRITERION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS / WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS HAS LIMITED
AVAILABILITY AS A POST-CONVICTION REMEDY
***The EXTRAORDINARY WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS has long been a haven of relief for those seeking liberty from any
unwarranted denial of freedom of movement. Very broadly, the WRIT APPLIES to all cases of illegal confinement or detention
by which a person has been deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person has been withheld from the
person entitled thereto. ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT necessitates that a person be illegally deprived of his liberty.
In the celebrated case of Villavicencio v. Lukban, we stated that any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient.
The ***MOST BASIC CRITERION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT, therefore, is that the individual seeking such relief be
illegally deprived of his freedom of movement or placed under some form of illegal restraint. If an INDIVIDUALS LIBERTY IS
RESTRAINED VIA SOME LEGAL PROCESS, the writ of habeas corpus is unavailing. Concomitant to this principle, the WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS CANNOT BE USED to directly assail a judgment rendered by a competent court or tribunal which, having duly
acquired jurisdiction, was not deprived or ousted of this jurisdiction through some anomaly in the conduct of the proceedings.
***Thus, notwithstanding its historic function as the great writ of liberty, the WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS has very limited
 availability as a post-conviction remedy. In the recent case of FERIA V. COURT OF APPEALS, we ruled that REVIEW OF A
JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION IS ALLOWED in a PETITION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS only in very
specific instances, such as when, as a consequence of a judicial proceeding, (a) there has been a deprivation of a constitutional
right resulting in the restraint of a person; (b) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or (c) an excessive penalty
has been imposed, as such sentence is void as to such excess.

A survey of our decisions in habeas corpus cases demonstrates that, in GENERAL, the WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS is a high
prerogative writ which furnishes an extraordinary remedy; it may thus be invoked only under extraordinary circumstances. We
have been categorical in our pronouncements that the WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS IS NOT TO BE USED as a substitute for
another, more proper remedy. RESORT TO THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS IS AVAILABLE only in the limited instances when a
judgment is rendered by a court or tribunal devoid of jurisdiction.

(3) EDWIN N. TRIBIANA, petitioner, vs.
LOURDES M. TRIBIANA, G.R. No. 137359.
September 13, 2004
PONENTE: CARPIO, J.:
BARANGAY CONCILIATION REQUIREMENT IN SECTION 412 OF THE LGC DOES NOT APPLY TO HABEAS CORPUS PROCEEDINGS
Moreover, in a HABEAS CORPUS PROCEEDING INVOLVING THE WELFARE AND CUSTODY OF A CHILD OF TENDER AGE, the
paramount concern is to resolve immediately the issue of who has legal custody of the child . TECHNICALITIES should not stand
in the way of giving such child of tender age full protection. This rule has sound statutory basis in ARTICLE 213 OF THE FAMILY
CODE, which states, NO CHILD UNDER SEVEN YEARS OF AGE shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds
compelling reasons to order otherwise. In this case, the CHILD (KHRIZA) was only one year and four months when taken away
from the mother.

***Under RULE 102 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, a PARTY MAY RESORT TO A HABEAS CORPUS PROCEEDING IN
TWO INSTANCES. The FIRST is when any person is deprived of liberty either through illegal confinement or through detention.
The SECOND instance is when custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled to such custody . The MOST
COMMON CASE FALLING UNDER THE SECOND INSTANCE involves children who are taken away from a parent by another parent
or by a relative. The CASE FILED BY LOURDES falls under this category.

***The COURT OF APPEALS dismissed Edwins contentions by citing as an ADDITIONAL GROUND THE EXCEPTION IN SECTION
412 (B) (2) OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE (LGC) ON BARANGAY CONCILIATION, which states: (b) WHERE THE PARTIES MAY
GO DIRECTLY TO COURT. The PARTIES MAY GO DIRECTLY TO COURT IN THE FOLLOWING INSTANCES: xxx 2) Where a person has
otherwise been deprived of personal liberty calling for habeas corpus proceedings . The BARANGAY CONCILIATION
REQUIREMENT IN SECTION 412 OF THE LGC does not apply to habeas corpus proceedings where a person is deprived of
personal liberty. In such a case, SECTION 412 expressly authorizes the parties to go directly to court without need of any
conciliation proceedings. There is DEPRIVATION OF PERSONAL LIBERTY WARRANTING A PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS where
the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.

(4) LUIS MALALUAN, petitioner, vs. WHAT IS A JUDICIAL PROCESS?

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSEPH
EVANGELISTA, G.R. No. 120193. March 6,
1996
PONENTE: HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:
(5) IN THE MATTER OF PETITION FOR THE
PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS: AZUCENA L. GARCIA, G.R. No.
141443. August 30, 2000
PONENTE: DE LEON, JR., J.:
Invariably, a JUDICIAL PROCESS is defined as a writ, warrant, subpoena, or other formal writing issued by authority of law; also
the means of accomplishing an end, including judicial proceedings, or all writs, warrants, summonses, and orders of courts of
justice or judicial officers. It is likewise held to include a writ, summons, or order issued in a judicial proceeding to acquire
jurisdiction of a person or his property, to expedite the cause or enforce the judgment, or a writ, warrant, mandate, or other
process issuing from a court of justice.
Under the JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION ACT, the ENFORCEMENT OF SUCH WRITS AND PROCESSES no longer needs the
approval of the regional trial court. On the other hand, while, formerly, writs and processes of the then courts of first instance
were enforceable throughout the Philippines, ***under the INTERIM OR TRANSITIONAL RULES AND GUIDELINES, certain
specified writs issued by a regional trial court are now enforceable only within its judicial region. In the interest of clarity and
contrast, it is necessary that said provision be set out in full: 3. WRITS AND PROCESSES. — (a) Writs of certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction ISSUED BY A REGIONAL TRIAL COURT may be enforced in any part of
the region. (b) ALL OTHER PROCESSES, whether issued by a regional trial court or a metropolitan trial court, municipal trial
court or municipal circuit trial court may be SERVED anywhere in the Philippines, and, in the last three cases, without a
certification by the judge of the regional trial court. (Emphasis ours.)
We feel that the foregoing provision is too clear to be further belabored or enmeshed in unwarranted polemics. The RULE
ENUMERATES THE WRITS AND PROCESSES which, even IF ISSUED BY A REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, are enforceable only within its
judicial region. In contrast, it unqualifiedly provides that ALL OTHER WRITS AND PROCESSES, regardless of which court issued
the same, shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. As earlier demonstrated, a SEARCH WARRANT is but a judicial
process, not a criminal action. No legal provision, statutory or reglementary, expressly or impliedly provides a jurisdictional or
territorial limit on its area of enforceability. On the contrary, the ABOVE-QUOTED PROVISION OF THE INTERIM RULES expressly
authorizes its enforcement anywhere in the country, since it is not among the processes specified in paragraph (a) and there is no
distinction or exception made regarding the processes contemplated in paragraph (b).
THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS WILL NOT ISSUE WHERE THE PERSON IN WHOSE BEHALF IT IS SOUGHT IS OUT ON BAIL
***The HIGH PREROGATIVE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve
persons from unlawful restraint. Its OBJECT is to inquire into the legality of ones detention, and if FOUND ILLEGAL, to order the
release of the detainee. However, it is equally well-settled that the WRIT WILL NOT ISSUE where the person in whose behalf the
writ is sought is out on bail, or is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment
or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make
the order.
Even if we disregard the fact that petitioner is out on bail, the WRIT PRAYED FOR SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED. Indeed, we have
held that ONCE A DEPRIVATION OF A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT IS SHOWN TO EXIST, the court that rendered the judgment is
deemed ousted of jurisdiction and habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy to assail the legality of his detention . PETITIONER,

(6) EFREN C. MONCUPA vs. JUAN PONCE
ENRILE, FABIAN C. VER, GALILEO KINTANAR,
FERNANDO GOROSPE, AND JOSE CASTRO,
G.R. No. L-63345, January 30, 1986
PONENTE: GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
(7) ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL. vs.
JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL., G.R. No. L-14639,
March 25, 1919
PONENTE: MALCOLM, J.:
(8) FELIPE N. MADRIAN vs FRANCISCA R.
however, has failed to persuade this Court that the proceedings before the trial court were attended by violations of her right to
due process, or for that matter, other constitutional rights.
CONCEPT OF RESTRAINT (INCLUDES NOT ONLY ACTUAL PHYSCICAL RESTRAINT) / CONCEPT OF DISCHARGE OR RELEASE
As early as 1919, in the leading case of VILLAVICENCIO V. LUKBAN (39 Phil. 778, 790), this Court ruled: A prime specification of al
APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS is restraint of liberty. The ESSENTIAL OBJECT AND PURPOSE OF THE WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person
therefrom if such restraint is illegal. ANY RESTRAINT which will preclude freedom of action is SUFFICIENT.
***The RESERVATION OF THE MILITARY IN THE FORM OF RESTRICTIONS ATTACHED TO THE TEMPORARY RELEASE OF THE
PETITIONER constitute restraints on the liberty of Mr. Moncupa. SUCH RESTRICTIONS limit the freedom of movement of the
petitioner. It is NOT PHYSICAL RESTRAINT ALONE which is inquired into by the writ of habeas corpus. In the light of the above
ruling, the PRESENT PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS has not become moot and academic. Other precedents for such a
conclusion are not wanting.
***In effect the principle is clear. A RELEASE THAT RENDERS A PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS MOOT AND
ACADEMIC must be one which is free from involuntary restraints. Where a person continues to be unlawfully denied one or
more of his constitutional freedoms, where there is present a denial of due process, where the restraints are not merely
involuntary but appear to be unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has, in the light of subsequent
developments, become arbitrary, the person concerned or those applying in his behalf may still AVAIL THEMSELVES OF THE
PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT. (CITED IN THE BOOK OF FESTIN, PAGE 225)
ANY RESTRAINT WHICH WILL PRECLUDE FREEDOM OF ACTION IS SUFFICIENT
***A PRIME SPECIFICATION OF AN APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS is restraint of liberty. The ESSENTIAL OBJECT
AND PURPOSE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from
voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is
SUFFICIENT. The forcible taking of these women from Manila by officials of that city, who handed them over to other parties,
who deposited them in a distant region, DEPRIVED THESE WOMEN OF FREEDOM OF LOCOMOTION just as effectively as if they
had been imprisoned. PLACED IN DAVAO WITHOUT EITHER MONEY OR PERSONAL BELONGINGS, they were prevented from
exercising the liberty of going when and where they pleased. The RESTRAINT OF LIBERTY which began in Manila continued until
the aggrieved parties were returned to Manila and released or until they freely and truly waived his right.
RA 8369 DID NOT DIVEST THE CA AND SC OF THEIR JURISDICTION OVER HABEAS CORPUS CASES
MADRIAN, G.R. No. 159374, July 12, 2007
PONENTE: CORONA, J.:
(9) LEE YICK HON vs. THE INSULAR
COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, G.R. No. L-16779,
March 30, 1921
PONENTE: STREET, J.:
The COURT OF APPEALS should take cognizance of the case since there is NOTHING IN RA 8369 that revoked its jurisdiction to
issue writs of habeas corpus involving the custody of minors. ***We rule therefore that RA 8369 did not divest the Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Court of their JURISDICTION OVER HABEAS CORPUS CASES INVOLVING THE CUSTODY OF MINORS.
From the foregoing, there is no doubt that the COURT OF APPEALS AND SUPREME COURT have concurrent jurisdiction with
family courts in habeas corpus cases where the custody of minors is involved. (emphases supplied)
We note that AFTER PETITIONER MOVED OUT OF THEIR PARANAQUE RESIDENCE ON MAY 18, 2002, he twice transferred his
sons to provinces covered by different judicial regions. This situation is what the Thornton interpretation of RA 8369s provision
on jurisdiction precisely addressed: The reasoning that by GIVING FAMILY COURTS EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OVER HABEAS
CORPUS CASES, the lawmakers intended them to be the sole courts which can issue writs of habeas corpus] will result in an
iniquitous situation, leaving INDIVIDUALS LIKE RESPONDENT without legal recourse in obtaining custody of their children.
INDIVIDUALS WHO DO NOT KNOW THE WHEREABOUTS OF MINORS THEY ARE LOOKING FOR would be helpless since they
cannot seek redress from family courts whose writs are enforceable only in their respective territorial jurisdictions . Thus, if a
minor is being transferred from one place to another, which seems to be the case here , the PETITIONER IN A HABEAS CORPUS
CASE will be left without legal remedy. This lack of recourse could not have been the intention of the lawmakers when they
passed [RA 8369].
Moreover, a CAREFUL READING OF SECTION 5(B) OF RA 8369 reveals that FAMILY COURTS are vested with original exclusive
jurisdiction in custody cases, NOT in habeas corpus cases. WRITS OF HABEAS CORPUS which may be issued exclusively by
family courts under Section 5(b) of RA 8369 pertain to the ancillary remedy that may be availed of in conjunction with a petition
for custody of minors under RULE 99 OF THE RULES OF COURT. In other words, the ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT is merely ancillary to
the custody case pending before the family court. The WRIT must be issued by the same court to avoid splitting of jurisdiction,
conflicting decisions, interference by a co-equal court and judicial instability.
PRELIMINARY CITATION VIS-À-VIS PRELIMINARY CITATION
***Where the PERSON is detained under governmental authority and the illegality of detention is not patent from the petition
for the writ, the COURT may issue a citation to the government officer having the person in his custody to show cause why the
writ of habeas corpus should not issue. This is known as a PRELIMINARY CITATION, as distinguished from the PEREMPTORY
WRIT. The LATTER IS ISSUED when the cause of the detention appears to be patently illegal, and the non-compliance wherewith
is punishable.
At this point attention should be directed to the fact that the ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE, a copy of which was served on the Insular
Collector of Customs on July 23, 1920, is NOT THE PEREMPTORY WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS, unconditionally commanding the
respondent to have the body of the detained person before the court at a time and place therein specified. The REQUISITES OF
THE PEREMPTORY WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS are stated in section 533 of the Code of Civil Procedure; and appropriate forms are
supplied in section 534 of said Code and in section 82 of General Orders, No. 58. The ORDER SERVED IN THE CASE before us was
MERELY A PRELIMINARY CITATION requiring the respondent to appear and show cause why the peremptory writ should not be

(10) TUNG CHIN HUI, petitioner, vs. RUFUS
B. RODRIGUEZ, Commissioner of
Immigration; and the BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS, Bureau of Immigration
and Deportation, G.R. No. 137571,
September 21, 2000
PONENTE: PANGANIBAN, J.:
(11) CARLOS T. GO, SR., vs LUIS T. RAMOS,
G.R. No. 167569, September 4, 2009
PONENTE: QUISUMBING, J.:
(12) MA. HAZELINA A. TUJANMILITANTE IN
BEHALF OF THE MINOR CRISELDA M. CADA
vs. RAQUEL M. CADA-DEAPERA, G.R. No.
210636, July 28, 2014
granted. The PRACTICE OF ISSUING A PRELIMINARY CITATION OF THIS CHARACTER, UPON APPLICATIONS FOR THE WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS, has, as all legal practitioners are aware, become common in our courts; and upon considerations of practical
convenience, the usage has must be commend it, in cases where the necessity for the immediate issuance of the peremptory
writ is not manifest. (CITED IN THE BOOK OF FESTIN, PAGE 222)
REGLEMENTARY PERIOD FOR FILING AN APPEAL IN A HABEAS CORPUS CASE
Clearly then, the REGLEMENTARY PERIOD FOR FILING AN APPEAL IN A HABEAS CORPUS CASE is now similar to that in ordinary
civil actions and is GOVERNED BY SECTION 3, RULE 41 OF THE 1997 RULES OF COURT, which provides: SEC. 3. PERIOD OF
ORDINARY APPEAL - The APPEAL SHALL BE TAKEN within FIFTEEN (15) DAYS from notice of the judgment or final order
appealed from. Where a RECORD ON APPEAL IS REQUIRED, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal
within THIRTY (30) DAYS from notice of the judgment or final order.
***The PERIOD OF APPEAL SHALL BE INTERRUPTED by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion for
extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed.
A PERSON DULY CHARGED IN COURT MAY NO LONGER QUESTION HIS DETENTION THROUGH A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS /
WHAT IS MEANING OF THE TERM “COURT”?
***ONCE A PERSON DETAINED IS DULY CHARGED IN COURT, he may no longer question his detention through a petition for
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus . HIS REMEDY would be to quash the information and/or the warrant of arrest duly issued.
The WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED after the party sought to be released had been charged before any
court.
***The term COURT in this context includes quasi-judicial bodies of governmental agencies authorized to order the persons
confinement, like the Deportation Board of the Bureau of Immigration. Likewise, the CANCELLATION OF HIS BAIL cannot be
assailed via a petition for habeas corpus. When an ALIEN IS DETAINED BY THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION FOR DEPORTATION
PURSUANT TO AN ORDER OF DEPORTATION BY THE DEPORTATION BOARD, the Regional Trial Courts have no power to release
such alien on bail even in habeas corpus proceedings because there is no law authorizing it. (CITED IN THE BOOK OF FESTIN,
PAGE 222)
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS ISSUED BY THE RTC IS MADE ENFORCEABLE WITHIN A JUDICIAL REGION
In the case at bar, WHAT RESPONDENT FILED was a PETITION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS under Section
20 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC and Rule 102 of the Rules of Court. As provided: SECTION 20. PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS - A VERIFIED PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS INVOLVING CUSTODY OF MINORS shall be filed with the
PONENTE: VELASCO, JR., J.:
(13) IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR
HABEAS CORPUS OF DATUKAN MALANG
SALIBO, DATUKAN MALANG SALIBO,
Petitioner, v. WARDEN, QUEZON CITY JAIL
ANNEX, BJMP BUILDING, CAMP BAGONG
DIWA, TAGUIG CITY AND ALL OTHER
PERSONS ACTING ON HIS BEHALF AND/OR
HAVING CUSTODY OF DATUKAN MALANG
SALIBO, G.R. No. 197597, April 08, 2015
PONENTE: LEONEN, J.:
Family Court. The WRIT SHALL BE ENFORCEABLE within its judicial region to which the Family Court belongs.
Considering that the WRIT IS MADE ENFORCEABLE WITHIN A JUDICIAL REGION, PETITIONS FOR THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS, whether they be filed under Rule 102 of the Rules of Court or pursuant to Section 20 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC ,
may therefore be filed with any of the proper RTCs within the judicial region where enforcement thereof is sought. In the case
at bar, RESPONDENT FILED THE PETITION before the family court of Caloocan City. SINCE CALOOCAN CITY AND QUEZON CITY
both belong to the same judicial region, the WRIT ISSUED BY THE RTC-CALOOCAN can still be implemented in Quezon City.
Whether petitioner resides in the former or the latter is immaterial in view of the above rule.
Lastly, as regards petitioner’s assertion that the SUMMONS WAS IMPROPERLY SERVED, suffice it to state that SERVICE OF
SUMMONS, to begin with, is not required in a habeas corpus petition, be it under Rule 102 of the Rules of Court or A.M. No. 03-
04-04-SC. As held in SAULO V. CRUZ, a WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS plays a role somewhat comparable to a summons, in ordinary
civil actions, in that, by SERVICE OF SAID WRIT, the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the respondent.
THE RETURN OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS MAYBE HEARD BY A COURT APART FROM THAT WHICH ISSUED THE WRIT /
DECISION ON THE PETITION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT IS APPEALABLE
***The RETURN OF THE WRIT may be heard by a court apart from that which issued the writ. Should the COURT ISSUING THE
WRIT DESIGNATE A LOWER COURT TO WHICH THE WRIT IS MADE RETURNABLE, the lower court shall proceed to decide the
petition of habeas corpus. By virtue of the designation, the LOWER COURT "acquires the power and authority to determine the
merits of the petition for habeas corpus. ***Therefore, the DECISION ON THE PETITION is a decision appealable to the court
that has appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the lower court.
In this case, PETITIONER SALIBO filed his PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS before the Court of Appeals. The COURT OF APPEALS
issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus, making it returnable to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 153, Pasig City. The TRIAL COURT then
heard respondent Warden on his Return and decided the Petition on the merits. We rule that the TRIAL COURT "acquired the
power and authority to determine the merits" of petitioner Salibo's Petition. The DECISION ON THE PETITION FOR HABEAS
CORPUS, therefore, was the decision of the trial court, not of the Court of Appeals. SINCE THE COURT OF APPEALS is the court
with appellate jurisdiction over decisions of trial courts, RESPONDENT WARDEN correctly filed the appeal before the Court of
Appeals.
***The WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS is different from the FINAL DECISION ON THE PETITION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT. It is
the writ that commands the production of the body of the person allegedly restrained of his or her liberty. On the other hand, it
is in the FINAL DECISION where a court determines the legality of the restraint.
***BETWEEN THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT AND THE FINAL DECISION ON THE PETITION FOR ITS ISSUANCE, it is the issuance of
the writ that is essential. The ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT sets in motion the speedy judicial inquiry on the legality of any deprivation
of liberty. Courts shall liberally issue writs of habeas corpus even if the petition for its issuance "on its face is devoid of merit.”

(14) RUBEN E. TIU v. HON. NATIVIDAD G.
DIZON, ACTING CHAIRPERSON OF THE
BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLE, HON.
FRANKLIN JESUS BUCAYU, DIRECTOR OF
THE BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, HON.
SECRETARY LEILA M. DE LIMA OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, HON. PAQUITO
N. OCHOA JR., THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
G.R. No. 211269, June 15, 2016
PONENTE: PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Although the PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS MAY BE SUSPENDED in cases of invasion, rebellion, or when the
public safety requires it, the WRIT ITSELF may not be suspended.
WRIT IS DENIED IF THE PETITIONER FAILS TO SHOW FACTS THAT HE IS ENTITLED THERETO EX MERITO JUSTICIAS
The OBJECT OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS is to inquire into the legality of the detention, and, if the DETENTION IS FOUND
TO BE ILLEGAL, to require the release of the detainee. Well-settled is the rule that the WRIT WILL NOT ISSUE where the person
in whose behalf the writ is sought is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge with jurisdiction or by
virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record. The WRIT IS DENIED if the petitioner fails to show facts that he is entitled
thereto ex merito justicias.
In this case, PETITIONER is serving sentence by virtue of a final judgment convicting him of the offense of selling and delivering
prohibited drugs defined and penalized under Section 15, Article III of RA 6425,36 as amended by RA 7659. He failed to show,
however, that his further incarceration is no longer lawful and that he is entitled to relief under a writ of habeas corpus. In sum,
there being NO UNLAWFUL RESTRAINT ON PETITIONER'S LIBERTY, no relief under a writ of habeas corpus can be granted to
him.