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Alabama Great Southern Railroad v. Carroll
Brief Fact Summary.
Carroll (Plaintiff) worked as a railroad
brakeman, and was injured in Mississippi due to
the failure of other employees’ to inspect the
brakes in Alabama.
Synopsis of Rule of Law.
Where a negligent act is committed in one
state, but causes injury in a different state, an
action seeking damages for injuries resulting
from the act may be brought only in the state
where the result occurred, and not where the
act was committed.
Facts.
Carroll (Plaintiff), a resident of Alabama, was
injured in Mississippi due to a break in a
defective railroad car link. The Railroad’s
(Defendant) employees had been negligent in
their duty to inspect the links in Alabama.
Plaintiff sued the Defendant in Alabama under a
state statute that authorized recovery.
Mississippi would have denied recovery as it
had no similar statute.
Issue.
May recovery be obtained for a tortious act in
the state where the breach of duty occurred,
but not the injury?
Held.
(McClellan, J.) No. The general rule is that
recovery cannot be made in one state for the
injuries to the person sustained in a different
state unless the infliction of the injuries is
actionable under the law of the state where the
injuries were received. In this case, up to the
time the train passed from Alabama, no injury
had resulted. The Alabama statute has no
efficiency beyond state lines. Only Mississippi
could apply proper jurisdiction over the claim.
There may have been a different result if Carroll
had been injured in Alabama but suffered in
Mississippi. As for an argument that the
Railroad (Defendant) was under a contractual
duty to Carroll (Plaintiff), which arose in
Alabama, the Alabama law will govern only
occurrences of the employment relationship
and not with any specific contractual
obligations. Reversed and remanded.
Dissent.
Under the First Restatement, where a tort is
involved the choice of law focuses on the situs
of the wrong””that is, where the last incidence
required to make the defendant liable took
place. This will usually be the place of plaintiff’s
injury.
Auten v Auten (1922) – Fuld, J.
Plaintiff: Margarite Auten
Defendant: Harold Auten
Concept:
Brief facts: Margarite Auten sues Harold Auten
in New York to recover support for her and her
children that Harold owed by virtue of a
separation agreement. The Autens were
married in England. Harold deserted her, went
to America, obtained a Mexican divorce, then
married another woman. Margarite went to
New York, where she and Harold came to a
separation agreement which provided that
Harold was to pay to a trustee, for Margarite’s
account, 50 pounds sterling (British currency) a
month for her support and that of their 2
children. The agreement also provided that they
were not to sue each other in any action
relating to their separation, and Margarite
would not cause any complaint against Harold
in any jurisdiction because of his alleged divorce
and remarriage. Harold made a few payments
only, so Margarite filed a petition for separation
in England, charging Harold with adultery.
Harold was served in New York with process in
that suit and he was ordered to pay alimony
pendent lite. This English case never proceeded
to trial. Margarite instituted the instant suit to
recover support due under the agreement.
Doctrine: Center of Gravity/Grouping of
Contacts Theory: The courts, instead of
regarding as conclusive the parties’ intention or
the place of making or performance, lay
emphasis rather upon the law of the place
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which has the most significant contacts with the
matter in dispute.
FACTS:
1. 1917: Harold and Margarite Auten were
married in England, living there with their 2
children until 1931.
2. 1931: According to Margarite, Harold
deserted her, came to America, obtained a
Mexican divorce, then married another woman.
3. 1933: They came to a separation
agreement, which provided that:
o Harold was to pay to a trustee, for the
account of Margarite, £50 (50 pounds sterling) a
month for the support of Margarite and her 2
children.
o They were to live separate and apart.
o They were not to sue each other in any
action relating to their separation.
o Margarite would not cause any
complaint to be lodged against Harold in any
jurisdiction because of the alleged divorce or
remarriage.
4. Harold made a few payments only,
leaving Margarite and her children destitute.
5. August 1934: Margarite filed a petition
for separation in an English court, charging
Harold with adultery
6. December 4, 1936: Harold was served
in New York with process in that suit.
7. July 1938: Harold was ordered to pay
alimony pendente lite.
8. This English case never proceeded to
trial.
9. 1947: Margarite brought the instant
suit to recover $26,564 representing support
due under the agreement, from January 1, 1935
to September 1, 1947.
CFI dismissed the complaint.
The Appellate Division affirmed the lower
court’s decision
ISSUES:
Which law applied as to the issue of whether
Margarite’s commencement of the English case
(petition for separation with charge of adultery)
constituted a rescission and repudiation of the
separation agreement? English
RATIO:
Based on the “center of gravity” or “grouping of
contacts” theory of the conflict of laws, English
law governs.
The decisions in New York jurisprudence as to
which law applies to contracts with elements in
different jurisdictions show several approaches.
o Most of the cases rely on these general
rules, which were thought to be conclusive:
• "All matters bearing upon the
execution, the interpretation and the validity of
contracts are determined by the law of the
place where the contract is made"
• "All matters connected with
performance are regulated by the law of the
place where the contract, by its terms, is to be
performed."
• What constitutes a breach of the
contract and what circumstances excuse a
breach are considered matters of performance,
governable, within this rule, by the law of the
place of performance.
o However, recent decisions have
innovated by employing a method that
rationalizes the choice of law. This method has
been called the “center of gravity” or “grouping
of contracts” theory.
• “The courts, instead of regarding as
conclusive the parties’ intention or the place of
making or performance, lay emphasis rather
upon the law of the place which has the most
significant contacts with the matter in dispute.”
• This method may seem less predictable
but it gives to the jurisdiction having the most
interest in the problem, control over the legal
issues arising from a specific set of
circumstances, allowing the forum to apply the
rules of the jurisdiction most intimately
connected with the outcome of the particular
case.
• This has been thought to effect the
probable intention of the parties when making
their contract.
In the instant case:
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o England has the most significant
contacts with the case.
• The agreement was between British
subjects.
• They were married in England.
• They lived there as a family for 14
years.
• Harold abandoned his family and was in
the US on a temporary visa.
• Margarite’s sole purpose was to get
Harold to agree to support their family.
• The money was to be paid to a trustee
in New York but those who stood to benefit live
in England.
• The agreement refers to British
currency (pounds sterling.)
o New York’s only connection to the case
is where the agreement was made , and where
the trustee to whom the money was to be paid
held office.
o It is unlikely that Margarite intended to
subject herself to the law of another state
which she was not familiar with.
• English law must be applied.
o It is for the courts of that state to
determine whether Margarite’s institution of a
case constituted a breach of their agreement.
o The Court noted that based on English
law, there was no breach of the agreement by
Margarite.
DISPOSITIVE: The judgment of the Appellate
Division and that of Special Term insofar as they
dismiss the complaint should be reversed, with
costs in all courts, and the matter remitted for
further proceedings in accordance with this
opinion.
Haag v. Barnes
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: The more modern view
is that "the courts, instead of regarding as
conclusive the parties' intention or the place of
making or performance, lay emphasis rather
upon the law of the place `which has the most
significant contacts with the matter in dispute'".
Emergency Recitation: Haag met Barnes in New
York while Barnes was in a business trip. They
became friends since Barnes hired Haag as a
law secretary. Eventually, Haag became
pregnant. As a result, they had an agreement
executed in Illinois, since Illinois was the
principal place of work of Barnes, wherein it
provided the terms of support, that Haag
releases Barnes from any action, and that their
agreement will be govern by the laws of Illinois.
Eventually, Haag instituted a complaint in New
York for the alleged violation of Sec. 64 of the
New York City Criminal Courts Act. In dismissing
the complaint and ruling in favor of Barnes, the
court said that the Illinois laws would apply
since it has the most significant contacts with
the matter in dispute because: (1) both parties
are designated as being “of Chicago, Illinois”; (2)
the child was born in Illinois; (3) the agents to
act in behalf of the parties are all Illinois
residents; and (4) support were always made
from Chicago, Illinois.
FACTS:
• The complainant Dorothy Haag alleges
that in 1947 she moved from Minnesota and
took up residence in New York City and that
since then she has been a resident of New York.
• The defendant Norman Barnes, on the
other hand, is a resident of Illinois.
• According to the statements contained
in the complainant's affidavits:
o She met Barnes in the spring of 1954 in
New York.
o She was a law secretary and had been
hired by Barnes to work for him while he was in
New York.
o The relationship between them
"ripened into friendship" and, on the basis of
representations that he loved her and planned
to divorce his wife and marry her, she was
"importuned" into having sexual relations with
him.
o That she became pregnant and that,
upon being informed of this, Barnes asked her
to move to Illinois to be near him.
o She refused and, instead, went to live in
California with her sister to await the birth of
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her child. Fearing that Barnes was losing
interest in her, she returned to Chicago before
the child was born and, upon attempting to
communicate with Barnes, she was referred to
his attorney. The attorney told Haag to choose a
hospital in Chicago, which she did, and the baby
was born there with Barnes paying the
expenses.
• Shortly after the birth of the child, Haag
attempts to see Barnes in New York failed and
she was advised by Barnes’ attorney to return
to Chicago in order that an agreement might be
made for the support of her and her child.
• Returning to that city, Haag procured an
attorney and signed an agreement which
provides:
o For the child’s support;
o That Haag releases Barnes from all
manner of actions; and
o That their agreement "shall in all
respects be interpreted, construed and
governed by the laws of the State of Illinois".
• Shortly after the agreement was signed,
Haag lived in California for 2 years. She then
returned to New York where she and her child
have ever since been supported by Barnes in
full compliance with the terms of the
agreement. In fact, Barnes has provided sums in
excess of their agreement.
• The present proceeding was instituted
in 1959 and Barnes was thereafter arrested
pursuant to section 64 of the New York City
Criminal Courts Act.
• A motion, made by Barnes, to dismiss
the proceeding was granted by the Court of
Special Sessions and the resulting order was
affirmed by the Appellate Division.
o The ground urged for dismissal was that
the parties had entered into an agreement
providing for the support of the child which has
been fully performed;
o That in this agreement the Haag
relinquished the right to bring any action for the
support of the child; and
o That, in any event, the action is
precluded by the laws of the State of Illinois
which, the parties expressly agreed, would
govern their rights under the agreement.
• In opposition, Haag contended:
o That New York, not Illinois, law applies;
o That the agreement in question is not a
sufficient basis for a motion to dismiss under
either section 63 of the New York City Criminal
Courts Act or section 121 of the Domestic
Relations Law, since both of these provisions
provide that "An agreement or compromise
made by the mother * * * shall be binding only
when the court shall have determined that
adequate provision has been made"; and
o That, even were the Illinois law to
apply, it does not bar the present proceeding.
ISSUE(S): Whether the law of New York or of
Illinois applies
HELD: The law of Illinois applies. The motion to
dismiss was properly granted.
RATIO:
• Haag may not upset a support
agreement which is itself perfectly consistent
with the public policy of New York, which was
entered into in Illinois with the understanding
that it would be governed by the laws of Illinois
and which constitutes a bar to a suit for further
support under Illinois law.
• The traditional view was that the law
governing a contract is to be determined by the
intention of the parties. However, The more
modern view is that "the courts, instead of
regarding as conclusive the parties' intention or
the place of making or performance, lay
emphasis rather upon the law of the place
`which has the most significant contacts with
the matter in dispute'". Whichever of these
views one applies in this case, however, the
answer is the same, namely, that Illinois law
applies.
• The agreement, in so many words,
recites that it "shall in all respects be
interpreted, construed and governed by the
laws of the State of Illinois" and, since it was
also drawn and signed by Haag in Illinois, the
traditional conflicts rule would, without doubt,
treat these factors as conclusive and result in
applying Illinois law.
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• But, even if the parties' intention and
the place of the making of the contract are not
given decisive effect, they are nevertheless to
be given heavy weight in determining which
jurisdiction "`has the most significant contacts
with the matter in dispute'".
• And, when these important factors are
taken together with other of the "significant
contacts" in the case, they likewise point to
Illinois law. Among these other Illinois contacts
are the following:
o both parties are designated in the
agreement as being "of Chicago, Illinois", and
Barnes’ place of business is and always has
been in Illinois;
o the child was born in Illinois;
o the persons designated to act as agents
for the principals (except for a third alternate)
are Illinois residents, as are the attorneys for
both parties who drew the agreement; and
o all contributions for support always
have been, and still are being, made from
Chicago.
Contrasted with these Illinois contacts, the New
York contacts are of far less weight and
significance. Chief among these is the fact that
child and mother presently live in New York and
that part of the "liaison" took place in New
York.
Bobcock v. Jackson
A husband and wife from New York went on a
car trip with a friend Babcock to Ontario. While
in Ontario they had a motor vehicle accident.
Babcock sued Jackson, the driver, claiming his
negligence caused the car crash.
This case brought up a question of ‘choice of
law’; if the law of the place of residence of the
accident victims (New York) be applied, or,
should the law of the place of the tort (Ontario)
be applied. Under the old conflict rules, the law
of the place of the accident should apply.
However, Ontario had a law that prohibited
passengers from suing the driver.
The court rejected a traditional fixed method of
determining which law should apply, and
instead, a process of weighing factors such as
relationship between the party, decision to take
the trip, connections to the locality. Thus, the
Court held that the parties did not have
substantial connection with Ontario and so it
would be unfair to apply the law as the location
was largely fortuitous. The Court found that the
jurisdiction with the most connections was New
York and so New York law should apply.
GIBBS vs. GOVT. OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
G.R. No. L-35694December 23, 1933
FACTS:Allison D. Gibbs and his wife Eva Johnson
Gibbs are both citizens ofCalifornia and
domiciled therein since their marriage in July
1906. There was no antenuptial marriage
contract between the parties and during
theexistence their marriage the spouses
acquired lands in the Philippine Islands,as
conjugal property. On November 28, 1929, Mrs.
Gibbs died and that in accordance with the law
of California, the community property of
spouses who are citizens of California, upon the
death of the wife previous to that ofthe
husband, belongs absolutely to the
surviving husband without administration. In
intestate proceedings, Allison D. Gibbs, on
September 22,1930, filed an ex parte petition.
The court granted said petition and entered a
decree adjudicating the said Allison D. Gibbs to
be the sole and absolute owner of said lands,
applying section 1401 of the Civil Code of
California.When this decree presented to
the Register of Deeds of Manila and
demanded for the issuance of a Transfer
Certificate of Title, it declined to accept as
binding said decree of court and refused to
register the transfer oftitle of the said conjugal
property to Allison D. Gibbs, on the ground that
thecorresponding inheritance tax had not been
paid. Thereupon, Allison filed inthe said court a
petition for an order requiring the said register
of deeds "to issue the corresponding titles" to
the petitioner without requiring
previouspayment of any inheritance tax.
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ISSUE: Whether or not Eva Johnson Gibbs at the
time of her death is theowner of a descendible
interest in the Philippine lands.
RULING: Thesecond paragraph Article 10 of the
Civil Code provides:Nevertheless, legal and
testamentary successions, in respect to
theorder of succession as well as to the amount
of the successional rights and the intrinsic
validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by
thenational law of the person whose succession
is in question, whatevermay be the nature of
the property or the country in which it may
besituated.The second paragraph of article 10
applies only when a legal ortestamentary
succession has taken place in the
Philippines and inaccordance with the law of
the Philippine Islands; and the foreign law is
consulted only in regard to the order of
succession or the extent of the successional
rights; in other words, the second paragraphof
article 10 can be invoked only when the
deceased was vested with a descendible
interest inproperty within the jurisdiction
of the PhilippineIslands. This fundamental
principle is stated in the first paragraph of
article 10of our Civil Code as follows: "Personal
property is subject to the laws of thenation of
the owner thereof; real property to the laws of
the country in whichit is situated.”Under this
broad principle, the nature and extent of the
title whichvested in Mrs. Gibbs at the time of
the acquisition of the community landshere in
question must be determined in accordance
with thelex rei sitae. Itis admitted that the
Philippine lands here in question were acquired
ascommunity property of the conjugal
partnership of the appellee and his wife.Under
the law of the Philippine Islands, she was vested
of a title equal to thatof her husband. It results
that the wife of the appellee was, by the lawof
the Philippine Islands, vested of a descendible
interest, equal tothat of her husband, in the
Philippine lands covered by certificatesof title
Nos. 20880, 28336 and 28331, from the
date of theiracquisition to the date of her
death.The descendible interest of Eva Johnson
Gibbs in the lands aforesaidwas transmitted to
her heirs by virtue of inheritance and this
transmissionplainly falls within the language of
section 1536 of Article XI of Chapter 40 ofthe
Administrative Code which levies a tax on
inheritances. It is unnecessaryin this proceeding
to determine the "order of succession" or the
"extent ofthe successional rights" (article
10, Civil Code,supra) which would
beregulated by section 1386 of the Civil Code of
California which was in effectat the time of the
death of Mrs. Gibbs.
Grant v. Mcauliffe
Brief Fact Summary
Two California residents driving separate cars in
Arizona crashed into one another and one died
as a result. Under Arizona law, a tort action did
not survive the death of the plaintiff, while
under California law it did.
Synopsis of Rule of Law
Statutes providing for the survival of a tort
action if the plaintiff dies are procedural, not
substantive, and may be applied to a suit that
arises from an injury sustained in a different
jurisdiction.
Facts: Pullen was a resident of California and
the driver of an automobile who died as result
of an auto accident in which he was allegedly
the negligent party. The accident took place in
Arizona. Grant (Plaintiff), also a resident of
California, was injured in the accident and
sought damages from McAuliffe (Defendant),
Pullen’s administrator. Under California law,
tort actions survive the tortfeasor’s death,
however, under Arizona law they do not. The
California trial court found that Arizona law
applied sine it was a substantive rather than
procedural nature and, therefore, granted
McAuliffe’s (Defendant) motion to abate
Plaintiff’s suit. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that
the law was in fact procedural and therefore
the law of the forum, California, should apply.
Issue
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Is a survival statute as to tort actions
substantive law that would govern litigation
over injuries sustained wherever the case is
tried?
Held
(Traynor, J.) No. A survival statute as to tort
actions is not substantive law that would govern
litigation over injuries sustained wherever the
case is tried. This court recognizes the doctrine
that the substantive law of the place of the
wrong must govern litigation wherever it is
tried. However, the forum state may always
follow its own procedural rules of law. Since
the authorities are split on whether a survival
statute is procedural or substantive, this court
will determine which argument has the most
merit. Because a survival statute does not
create a new cause of action but simply allows
the continuation of an existing action, it is
procedural. All the relevant contacts are with
California and the survival statute does not
relate to liability but is a procedural rule to
enforce claims for damages. Since a court may
always follow its own procedural rules, this case
may properly be tried under California law.
Reversed and remanded.
Cadalin v. POEA
G.R. No. L-104776, Dec. 5, 1994
GENERAL RULE: A foreign procedural law will
not be applied in the forum.
EXCEPTION: When the country of the forum has
a "borrowing statute," the country of the forum
will apply the foreign statute of limitations.
EXCEPTION TO THE EXCEPTION: The court of
the forum will not enforce any foreign claim
obnoxious to the forum's public policy.
FACTS: Cadalin et al. are overseas contract
workers recruited by respondent-appellant AIBC
for its accredited foreign principal, Brown &
Root, on various dates from 1975 to 1983. As
such, they were all deployed at various projects
in several countries in the Middle East as well as
in Southeast Asia, in Indonesia and Malaysia.
The case arose when their overseas
employment contracts were terminated even
before their expiration. Under Bahrain law,
where some of the complainants were
deployed, the prescriptive period for claims
arising out of a contract of employment is one
year.
ISSUE: Whether it is the Bahrain law on
prescription of action based on the Amiri
Decree No. 23 of 1976 or a Philippine law on
prescription that shall be the governing law
HELD: As a general rule, a foreign procedural
law will not be applied in the forum. Procedural
matters, such as service of process, joinder of
actions, period and requisites for appeal, and so
forth, are governed by teh laws of the forum.
This is true even if the action is based upon a
foreign substantive law.
A law on prescription of actions is sui generis in
Conflict of Laws in the sense that it may be
viewed either as procedural or substantive,
depending on the characterization given such a
law.
However, the characterization of a statute into
a procedural or substantive law becomes
irrelevant when the country of the forum has a
“borrowing statute.” Said statute has the
practical effect of treating the foreign statute of
limitation as one of substance. A “borrowing
statute” directs the state of the forum to apply
the foreign statute of limitations to the pending
claims based on a foreign law. While there are
several kinds of “borrowing statutes,” one form
provides that an action barred by the laws of
the place where it accrued, will not be enforced
in the forum even though the local statute has
not run against it. Section 48 of our Code of Civil
Procedure is of this kind. Said Section provides:
“If by the laws of the state or country where the
cause of action arose, the action is barred, it is
also barred in the Philippine Islands.”
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In the light of the 1987 Constitution, however,
Section 48 cannot be enforced ex propio vigore
insofar as it ordains the application in this
jurisdiction of Section 156 of the Amiri Decree
No. 23 of 1976.
The courts of the forum will not enforce any
foreign claims obnoxious to the forum’s public
policy. To enforce the one-year prescriptive
period of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 as
regards the claims in question would
contravene the public policy on the protection
to labor.
Haumschild v. Cont’l Casualty Co., 7 Wis. 2d
130, 95 N.W.2d 814, 1959 Wisc. LEXIS 402 (Wis.
1959)
Brief Fact Summary
Mrs. Haumschild (Plaintiff) was injured as a
result of her husband’s negligence while they
were traveling in California. She brought suit in
Wisconsin where they lived.
Synopsis of Rule of Law
Interspousal immunity for tort actions is a rule
of family law and not tort law and the law of the
spouses’ domicile governs, not the law of the
place where the wrong occurred.
Facts
Mrs. Haumschild (Plaintiff) and her husband
(Defendant) were residents of Wisconsin
travelling in California. While in California,
Plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident
as a result of her husband’s negligence.
California law prohibited a husband or wife
from bringing suit against a spouse for
negligence, however, the law of Wisconsin did
not. Mrs. Haumschild (Plaintiff) sued her
husband (Defendant) in Wisconsin.
Issue
Where the place of the wrong prohibits
husbands and wives from suing each other for
negligence, may the court of the spouses’
domicile apply its own law which would allow
such suits?
Held
(Currie, J.) Yes. Where the place of the wrong
prohibits husbands and wives from suing each
other for negligence, the court of the spouses’
domicile may apply its own law that would
allow such suits. This case presents the issue of
capacity to sue due to marital status. This
relates to substantive family law and not to
substantive tort law. While the majority of the
states recognize the place of the wrong as
governing capacity, we feel that the state of the
domicile has a greater interest in such cases
than the state where the wrong took place.
While California’s conflict of laws rule would
refer to our law to determine the wife’s
capacity, we do not feel it proper to resort to
the awkward principles of renvoi to accomplish
what we feel to be the desired result. The law
of the place of the wrong will govern as to
substantive tort law, but the law of the domicile
will govern as to capacity to sue. Mrs.
Haumschild (Plaintiff) should be allowed to
recover. Reversed and remanded.
Discussion
If the state of domicile will govern on the issue
of interspousal immunity, then a California wife
injured by her husband would be denied
recovery in a Wisconsin court. But if the state
of domicile views the immunity question as
procedural tort law, the court’s decision would
appear unsatisfactory. Wisconsin would then
be imposing its substantive family law in
substitution for the other state’s procedural
tort law. However, on balance, the Wisconsin
court’s approach would appear to be well-
reasoned, since the marital partners’
expectations (one could suppose) would appear
to be grounded in their domicile’s family law.
Aznar v. Garcia
7 SCRA 95 – Civil Law – Application of Laws –
Foreign Law – Nationality Principle – Internal
and Conflict Rule
Application of the Renvoi Doctrine
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Edward Christensen was born in New York but
he migrated to California where he resided for a
period of 9 years. In 1913, he came to the
Philippines where he became a domiciliary until
his death. In his will, he instituted an
acknowledged natural daughter, Maria Lucy
Christensen (legitimate), as his only heir, but
left a legacy sum of money in favor of Helen
Christensen Garcia (illegitimate). Adolfo Aznar
was the executor of the estate. Counsel for
Helen claims that under Article 16, paragraph 2
of the Civil Code, California law should be
applied; that under California law, the matter is
referred back to the law of the domicile. On the
other hand, counsel for Maria, averred that the
national law of the deceased must apply,
illegitimate children not being entitled to
anything under California law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the national law of the
deceased should be applied in determining the
successional rights of his heirs.
HELD: The Supreme Court deciding to grant
more successional rights to Helen said in effect
that there are two rules in California on the
matter; the internal law which applies to
Californians domiciled in California and the
conflict rule for Californians domiciled outside
of California. Christensen being domiciled in the
Philippines, the law of his domicile must be
followed. The case was remanded to the lower
court for further proceedings – the
determination of the successional rights under
Philippine law only.
Annesley, Davidson v. Annesley
Facts: Sybil Annesley ("Annesley"), a British
subject, was married to a British domiciliary.
The spouses resided in France until the death of
the husband. Annesley remained in France
without taking the steps set forth under French
law for the formal acquisition of domicile in that
country and seldom returned to Britain until her
death. She left a will executed in France but in
British form bequeathing her estate to her
daughter. By French law, Annesley is not a
domiciliary of France, but by British law,
Annesley is a domiciliary of France. By the laws
of France, the estate of Annesley is governed by
the laws of her nationality, but by the laws of
Britain, the estate of Annesley is governed by
the laws of the domicile. French law only allows
the testator to freely dispose of one-third of her
estate.
Issue
Whether or not the succession is governed by
French law.
Held
Yes. French law governs.
Ratio
Notwithstanding the lack of a formal French
domicile, Annesley is a French domiciliary by
British law given the concurrence of actual
residence in a foreign jurisdiction coupled with
the intent to remain there. Thus, French law
refers the matter to English law which, in turn,
will refer the matter back to French law.
Consequently, in these circumstances, French
law dictates that French courts will apply the
domestic law. Hence, French law governs the
succession and Annesley may only dispose of
one-third of her estate.
UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO V. DATER
-GEORGE Dater (and his wife, Nellie Dater) and
JOHN Price (and his wife, CLARA Price) obtained
a loan for $75k in CHICAGO
-the loan is secured by a property in CHICAGO
owned by George and John Price.
-the checks for the loan were payable and was
cashed in Chicago
-the debtor couples signed the trust mortgage
and notes in Michigan (they were residents of
Michigan), then delivered the documents back
at Illinois, Chicago
-upon death of Mr. Price, Mrs. Clara Price
became the actual and record owner of at least
1/2 of the mortgaged property.
 10
-Loan was not paid. So property was sought to
be foreclosed by University of Chicago? In
Chicago…
-George Dater was held liable while Clara Price
(the widow) was absolved, no COA
-UNIVERSITY of CHICAGO appeals
ISSUE: WON Mrs. Price has the capacity to enter
into an obligation in the state of Michigan (so as
to make her liable)?
RATIO : NO.
-dispute does not involve
construction/force/effect of instruments BUT
OF MRS. PRICE'S CAPACITY.
-(not sure): apply law of the place of
performance (here it's Michigan)
Michigan law
Illinois law
Mrs. Price has no personal liability on the note,
recoverable from her separate estate
The case is governed by Michigan law…Burr
Case
Burr v. Beckler: the wife, who was in Florida,
executed a note and trust deed in Florida to her
husband who was in Chicago. As the note was
complete when delivered from Florida (thus,
already completed in Florida), Florida law would
apply, and since Florida law holds that she is not
competent to enter into a contract, her note
and trust deed were void.
-Burr case and this case:
*manual delivery complete: already signed
when delivered to the mortgagee
*no engagement to make the loan prior to
delivery (money cashed after execution of
mortgage)
*no advance payment of money
HELD: MICHIGAN LAW applies. MRS. PRiCE NOT
LIABLE. A married woman cannot bind her
separate estate through personal engagement
for the benefit of others.
PFAU v. TRENT ALUMINUM CO.
Pfau
-domiciled in Connecticut
-Student of Iowa (Parsons College, Iowa)
Trent
-domiciled in NJ
-also a student of Iowa (Parsons College)
-Trent agreed to drive Pfau to Missouri using a
car registered in NJ, insured in NJ, and insured
by a carrier in NJ
-car collision (NJ registered car driven by Trent
collided with Joseph Davis car when Trent failed
to negotiate a curve) occurred in IOWA. Pfau
incurred injuries.
-Pfau sues before an NJ court
IOWA Guest Statute
A host-driver is not liable to his passenger-guest
for ordinary negligence
TRENT'S DEFENSE: he would not be liable
NJ and Connecticut Guest Statute
guest-passengers can recover from their host-
divers for ordinary negligence
PFAU's argument: Trent is liable
>as Pfau is a domiciliary of Connecticut, it
appears that Connecticut would have a
significant interest in applying it's substantive
law
>TRENT RAISES IOWA LAW AS A DEFENSE: Iowa
law should apply. If apply Connecticut law,
should apply conflict of law rules. As
Connecticut adheres to LEX LOCI DELICTI, the
law of the place where the incident happened
should govern, i.e. Iowa law.
HELD: For PFAU!
Not definite that Pfau would be unable to
recover in either Connecticut or Iowa
No reason for applying Connecticut's choice of
law, as Connecticut's choice-of-law does not
identify Connecticut's interest in the matter;
does not relate to a state's interest in having its
law applied to given issues in a tort case.
"since Iowa has no interest in this litigation, and
since the substantive laws of Connecticut and
NJ are the same, this case presents a false
conflict and the Connecticut plaintiff should
 11

have the right to maintain an action for ordinary >>>but no proof that Texas has conflict-of-law
negligence. situs theory
-defense 1 of oppositors: Art17, Par3 (which
BELLIS V. BELLIS provides that Prohibitive laws in the Philippines
shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or
Amos Bellis judgments of foreign countries) is an exception
-born in Texas to Art 16, par2 and A1039, which on the other
-citizen of Texas hand provides that the national law of the
-executed a will in RP: all his property... decedent applies with regard 4 items:
-had 2 marriages and some illegitimate children (1) order of succession
Mary Mallen (1st wife) (2) amount of successional rights (thus,
-5 legit children in 1st marriage, 1 pre-deceased legitimes)
dad (3) intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will
Violet Kennedy (2nd wife) (4) capacity to suceed
-3 legit children >SC: Congress deleted in what supposedly is
3 illegit children Art17 the phrase "notwithstanding the
-Oppositors-appellants provisions of this and the next preceding
-Amos executed a will in the Philippines: estate article" which means that their purpose was to
to be divided as follows: make the 2nd paragraph of Article 16 a specific
$40k to 1st wife provision in itself to be applied to testate and
$120 to 3 illegit children ($40k each) intestate successions
Remainder goes to 7 surviving children (it must *whatever public policy or good customs may
be big!) be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress
-will admitted for Probate in MANILA has no intention to extend the same to the
-illegitimate children opposed project of succession of FOREIGN NATIONALS. Specific
partition: deprived of legitime as compulsory provisions should prevail over general ones
heirs -defense 2 of oppositors: decedent made 2
CFI: applied law of the nationality of the person wills, supposedly 1 would govern Texas
whose succession is in question - Texas law property and the other Philippine property.
Thus, he intended Philippine law to apply to his
Texas law Philippine estate
Did not provide for legitimes >SC: as was held in Miciano v. Brimo, a
provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that
Philippine law his properties shall be distributed in accordance
Provided for legitimes with Philippine law (and not the law of his
nationality) is illegal and void, for his national
ISSUE: WON Texas law should apply? YES law cannot be ignored in regard to those
matters that Art10 and Art16 provides.

HELD: -No renvoi in this case: same nationality,
same domicile (both in Texas); besides, the
opponents do not even rely on renvoi
-assuming there's a conflict-of-law rule in Texas
providing that
...the law of the domicile should apply, still
apply Texas law
…situs theory: properties are in RP so apply RP
law
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL
BANK (PCIB) V. ESCOLIN
*this is a case discussed in Succession under
Fideicommisary Substitution (which Sir Danicon
said to have been ruled correctly, i.e. no
fideicommisary substitution)
Facts:
 12
-Charles and Linnie Jane Hodges (husband and
wife) provided mutually in their respective will a
provision wherein they would give all their
estate to the surviving spouse, and upon the
death of the surviving spouse, the remainder of
what has been inherited by the surviving spouse
from the earlier deceased spouse would be
bequeathed to the brothers and sisters of the
later deceased.
-Mrs. Hodges died first. Mr. Hodges was
appointed special administrator and later
executor of the will. No liquidation was made.
-Upon death of Mr. Hodges, Magno was
appointed Administratix of Mrs. Hodges estate
and was initially also Mr. Hodges' estate but
PCIB took over. Probate proceedings for both
estate initiated, the two administrators (PCIB
and Magno) differed in the alleged share of
Mrs. Hodges in their conjugal partnership
property that she could have bequeathed to her
heirs.
PCIB
The estate left by Mrs. Hodges < 1/2 of her
share in the conjugal estate (Apply Philippine
law), notwithstanding Art16 of our Civil code
which mandates the application of Texas law,
Mr.Hodges being a citizen of Texas
Magno
Texas law applicable, wherein no system of
legitime provided so estate of Mrs. Hodges
could not be less than her share or (?) >1/2
-there was also an allegation on the part of
Magno (for the brothers and sisters of Mrs.
Hodges) that Mr. Hodges made a renunciation
of the inheritance in a manifestation to the US
inheritance tax authorities (probably to escape
inheritance tax liabilities), which was allegedly
ratified by the heirs in the Philippines.
(court, though, did not rule on alleged
renunciation. For purposes of the discussion,
Court assumed that renunciation was not
upheld)
ISSUE: WON Philippine Law, as alleged by PCIB,
should be applied and not Texas law?
HELD: Texas law applies, but because of
estoppel (?) and it is yet to be proven…
*note: in Succession, it was held in this case
that there was no fideicommissary substitution
so the 1st heir instituted (Mr. Magno) had no
obligation to preserve the properties inherited
from his wife for the benefit of the latter's other
heirs (the siblings)
*no proof yet of what Texas law is, but PCIB
allegedly averred that under the laws of Texas
(although it was arguing that RP laws apply),
there is such legitime of 1/4 of the said conjgal
estate
>>>so PCIB would be estopped to claim that the
estate of Mrs. Hodges should be less than as
contended by it (which is initially at least 1/2 of
the estate), for admissions by a party related to
the effects of foreign laws, which have to be
proven in our courts like any other controverted
fact, create estoppel.
ISSUES THAT CAN BE DECIDED BY THE COURT:
Regardless what law is applicable and WON Mr.
Hodges did renounce his share, it is clear from
the inventory submitted by Mr. Hodges himself
as executor of his wife's estate that there are
properties which constitute the estate of Mrs.
Hodges which should be distributed among her
heirs pursuant to her will
It is now beyond controversy that whatever be
the provisions of Texas Law applicable, the
estate of Mrs. Hodges is AT LEAST 1/4 OF THE
CONJUGAL ESTATE OF THE SPOUSES
-Existence and effects of foreign laws being
questions of fact, and it being the position now
of PCIB that the estate of Mrs. Hodges,
pursuant to the law of Texas, should only be 1/3
of the conjugal estate, such contention
constitutes and admission of fact, and
consequently, it would be in estoppel in any
further proceedings in these cases to claim that
said estate could be less, irrespective of what
might be proven later to be the actual
provisions of Texas law...
Special Proceeding for the settlement of testate
estate of Mrs. Hodges cannot be closed, should
proceed, there having no proper and legal
adjudication or distribution yet of the estate
 13
Magno remains to be the Administratrix of Mrs.
Hodges's estate
WHAT CANNOT BE DECIDED:
WON Mr. Hodges renounced his share
WON estate of Mrs. Hodges is more than 1/4 of
the conjugal property
>>>case is remanded to trial court to allow the
parties to present evidence in relation to these
issues
RULING THAT MRS. HODGES'S ESTATE CANNOT
BE LESS THAN 1/4 OF THE CPP VS. FINDING
THAT NO EVIDENCE YET OF TEXAS LAWS? Court
said that evidence should still be presented re:
what Texas law contains but PCIB now cannot
allege that the estate is less than 1/4…
*Elementary is the rule that foreign laws may
not be taken judicial notice of and have to be
proven like any other fact in dispute between
the parties in any proceeding, with the rare
exceptional n instances when the said laws are
already within the actual knowledge of the
court, such as when they are well and generally
known, or they have been actually ruled upon in
other cases before it and none of the parties
concerned claim otherwise.
IN RE ESTATE OF JOHNSON
Emil Johnson (decedent)
-native of Sweden
-Citizen of US (Illinois)
-resident of RP at time of death
-made a WILL
>holographic
>signed and written by him
>only 2 witnesses signed (so did not conform
with Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure
of the Philippines, which required 3 witnesses)
-probate of his will initiated, arguing the will
was executed in accordance with the laws of
Illinois (he was a citizen of Illinois)
TC: declared the will to be legal and admitted it
to probate
--after will probated, her alleged daugher, Ebba
Ingeborg, moved for the annulment of the
decree, saying that the will was not executed in
accordance with Illinois law, and that the
decedent was not a resident of the state of
Illinois
ISSUE: WON Decedent a national of Illinois (to
warrant the application of Illinois law)
HELD: YES. Proof adduced before TC showed he
was indeed a national of Illinois. Petition merely
contests the residence of the decedent to be in
the Philippines, but not the nationality
ISSUE: WON will executed in conformity with
the State of Illinois
HELD: NOT REALLY SURE, BUT THE PETITIONER
CANNOT DO ANYTHING ABOUT IT.
-Courts cannot take JN of Foreign laws: TC
merely relied on the presentation of Section
1874 of the Revised Statutes of Illinois as
exhibited in a volume of an annotation and
assumed that he could take JN of the laws of
Illinois. But it was WRONG!!!
-proper rule is to require proof of the statutes
of the States of the American Union whenever
their provisions are determinative of the issues
in any action litigated in the Philippine courts.
-still,
(1) petition does not state any fact from which
it would appear that the law of Illinois is
different from what the court found
(2)petition did not raise any assignment of error
to question the supposed taking of JN of the
court
***
EFFECTS OF FAILURE TO PLEAD AND PROVE
FOREIGN LAW
3 alternatives to the forum courts:
Dismiss the case for inability to establish a COA
Assume that the foreign law is the same as the
law of the forum
Apply the law of the forum
DISMISS THE CASE FOR INABILITY TO ESTABLISH
COA
-court rests on the party relying on the foreign
law the burden of introducing proof of the
contents of such law.
-forum court would, upon proof of law, enforce
a right existing under that foreign law. Hence,
 14
failure to prove its content results in failure to
establish a prima face case.
WALTON V. ARABIAN AMERICAN OIL CO.
Walton
-citizen and resident of Arkansas
-seriously injured while temporarily in Saudi
Arabia by a truck owned by Saudi ARAMCO
Saudi ARAMCO
-incorporated in Delaware
-licensed to do business in NY
-engaged in extensve business activities in Saudi
Arabia
-Walton sued Saudi Aramco in NY.
-no evidence of Saudi Arabian law alleged by
plaintiff, nor did the defendant offered to prove
it.
NY TC: no JN of Saudi Arabian law, directed
verdict in favor of defendant
(so labo, di ba NY law ang basis nya or
something? Is Walton claiming under Saudi
Arabian law???)
HELD: Affirm. Absolve defendant Saudi Aramco
Apply NY Conflict of law rules
-substantive law applicable to alleged tort is the
LAW OF THE PLACE WHERE THE ALLEGED TORT
OCCURRED - so should apply Saudi Arabian
law… BUT Saudi Arabian law was not proved.
-A federal court must receive evidence if it is
admissible according to the rules of evidence of
the state in which the court sits.
-Siegelman v. Cunard White Star: in this case,
Court took JN of foreign law but this is an
exception because US Court can easily
comprehend of ENGLISH decisions, which are
like those of any state in US
-IN THIS CASE HOWEVER, it involved Saudi
Arabian Law: Comprehension of foreign "law"
is, to say the least, not easy, then, according to
the somewhat narrow interpretation of the NY
Statute by NY courts, a court "abuses" its
discretion under that statute perhaps if it takes
judicial notice of foreign "law" when it is not
pleaded, and surely does so unless the party,
who would otherwise have had the burden of
proving that "law", has in some way adequately
assisted the court in judicially learning it
NO PROCESSUAL PRESUMPTION: In countries
where the common law does not prevail, our
doctrines relative to negligence, and to a
master's liability for his servant's acts, may will
not exist or be vastly different. So Walton can't
argue that the rudimentary tort principles
should have been presumed to be recognized in
Saudi Arabia.
May hugas kamay paragraph from the court:
though it deemed unjust, as this involves both
US citizens, the court said it should strictly
enforce its laws
APPLY FORUM LAW
-parties who fail to introduce proof as to the
content of a foreign law acquiesce to the
application of the forum law
-theory: basic law is forum law; when foreign
law not proved, then apply forum law.
LEARY V. GLEDHILL
-both parties were acquainted in the military
service
-in the past, they had corresponded, resulting
to Leary purchasing $1,000 worth of stock
-Gledhill invited Leary to France, wherein
Gledhill told him that he needed $4,000 and he
could already raise $2,000, but needed Leary's
help to raise the $4,000. No mention of selling
plaintiff shares of stock
-Leary returned to Germany. From there, he
sent Gledhill $1,500 w/o indicating on the check
or in the accompanying letter what the money
was for.
-Later, Leary sued Gledhill for recovery of the
$1,500 before NJ courts, which was allegedly a
loan to Gledhill
-Gledhill's defense: he didn't borrow money
from Leary
>Moved to dismiss:
(1) no promise to repay
(2) no demand for repayment
(3) no pleading or proof of the law of France
where the transaction occured
 15
HELD: Apply NJ law
-transaction occurred in France
-France is not a common law jurisdiction (Court
took JN): so inappropriate to presume that the
principles of common law prevail there.
*BUT HERE (cf. Walton v. Saudi Aramco): even if
did not present French law, not deemed to have
lost COA and the court could presume any the
ff:
(1) French law same as law of forum
(2) French law recognizes certain fundamental
principles, e.g. that the taking of a loan creates
an obligation upon the borrower to make
repayment
(3) parties by failing to prove the law of France
have acquiesced in having their dispute
determined by the law of the forum
-so TC presumed that the law of France in
common with that of other civilized countries
recognizes a liability to make repayment under
the facts here present, and its decision is not
w/o substantial merit
-CON: difficult to determine WON the question
presented was of such a fundamental nature as
reasonably to warrant the assumption that it
would be similarly treated by the laws of all
civilized countries
-here: the presumption # 2 (that forum law
applies when parties fail to prove foreign law) is
universally applied regardless of the nature of
controversy
***
ZALAMEA V. CA. Court rigorously applied the
rule requiring proof of foreign law, held that
since foreign law pleaded but not proven,
private respondent's conduct was excused.
ZALAMEA V. CA
(case of bumping off, WON overbooking is
allowed in US)
-Zalamea spouses and their daughter purchased
3 airline tickets from Manila agent of Tans
World Airlines Inc. - 2 on 75% discount, and one
full-fare. All tickets confirmed in Manila and re-
confirmed in NY
-Probably in NY, the 3 were wait-listed as their
seats were already taken. As Mr. Zalamea was
holding the full-fare ticket, he was allowed to
board the plane and Mrs. Zalamea and their
daughter were compelled to buy tickets back to
Manila from other airlines
-Zalameas filed ACTION FOR DAMAGES based
on breach of contract of carriage before RTC
Makati
-RTC: for Zalameas, refund ticket price + MD +
Atty's fees
-CA: MD cannot be recovered, overbooking
being an accepted practice in US Airlines so no
fraud nor bad faith on the part of TransWorld
Airlines
Issue: WON MD should have been awarded for
BF on part of TransWorld Airlines?
Held: YES. Overbooking = BF
US law allowing overbooking never proved. Just
presented statement of Ms. Gwendolyn Lather
(customer service agent) in her deposition
wherein she said that OVERBOOKING WAS
ALLOWED based on the Code of Federal
Regulations fo the Civil Aeronautics Board.
-what is required to be able to prove foreign
law:
*official publication
*copy of the written law attested by the officers
having the legal custody of the record, or his
deputy + certificate that such officer has
custody + seal of the office of the officer who
made the certification
>who can make the certification:
…secretary of an embassy or legation
…consul general
…consul
…vice consul
…consular agent
…any officer in the foreign service of the
Philippines
-here, none presented to prove contents of the
Code of Federal Regulations for the Civil
Aeronautics Board
-so CA erred in finding that overbooking is
allowed under US laws
Even if there is such US law existing allowing
overbooking, it's irrelevant!
-lex loci contractus applies: tickets sold, issued
in RP so RP law applicable
Overbooking = BF
 16
-where an airline had deliberately overbooked,
it took the risk of having to deprive some
passengers of their seats in case all of them
would show up for check in. For the indignity
and inconvenience of being refused a confirmed
seat on the last minute, said passenger is
entitled to an award of moral damages
-even if overbooking allowed, TWA still guilty
for not informing its passengers beforehand
***
PROCESSUAL PRESUMPTION/ PRESUMED-
IDENTITY APPROACH
-forum presumes that the foreign law is the
same as forum law.
MICIANO V. BRIMO
*this is also a case in succession where
decedent wants RP law, instead of Turkish law,
to apply, and one of brothers was threatened to
be disinherited
Joseph Brimo
-Turkish National
-but had properties in the Philippines
-and executed will in the Philippines, which
contained a provision which provided that the
disposition of his properties should be done in
accordance with Philippine laws, and that an
heir who opposes such will would be deprived
of his share.
-Andre Brimo, his brother, opposed the scheme
of partition submitted by the judicial
administrator of Joseph's estate on the ground
that the will was not in accordance with the
laws of Turkey, thus void for violating Art. 10,
NCC:
"Nevertheless, legal a testamentary successions,
in respect to the order of succession as well as
to the amount of the successional rights and the
intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person
whose succession is in question, whatever may
be the nature of the property or the country in
which it may be situated."
-no proof presented
…that the will was not executed in accordance
with Turkish laws
…of the Turkish laws applicable
HELD: Turkish law should be applied so
provision in the will void. Brimo would not be
disinherited, because of the impossibility of the
condition imposed upon him.
1. Court presumed that Turkish laws were
the same as RP laws (processual
presumption)
2. Since under our law, the project
partition was valid, it should be upheld.
3. However, provision of the will with
regards application of RP law instead of
Turkish laws is void (but still used RP
laws in distributing the estate of the
decedent, but with the excuse that the
Court was just presuming Turkish laws
to be the same as RP laws…)
Xxx
*use of most significant relationship
theory/disingenuous characterization: same
conclusion w/o flouting testator's intention (to
use RP law)
COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE V. FISHER
WATLTER STEVENSON
-born in RP
-but parents both Brit
-married to Beatrice Mauricia Stevenson (also
British) in 1909
-instituted his wife as sole heiress
-initially field inheritance and estate tax returns
covering the whole estate but later filed an
amended return (made it smaller)
-CIR: assessed taxable net deduction: used
Article 124, NCC: property relation of spouses
determined by national law (law of England)
And English law does not recognize legal
partnerships between husband and wife, all
properties acquired during marriage belong to
husband exclusively
BOTTOMLINE: assess estate tax based on the
whole property of Walter (which would have
been just 1/2 if based on RP law)
CTA: apply RP Law - no proof of English law, no
prenuptual agreement: so applying laws of RP,
contracting parties presumed to have adopted
 17
the system f conjugal partnership as to
properties acquired during the marriage
WON RP law should be applied? Presume that
English law is the same as RP laws = only asses
estate and inheritance tax on 1/2 of the estate.
1.When stevensons married during 1909, old
civil code still applies.
Old civil code
Nationality theory of determining property
relation of spouses where one is a foreigner, no
prenuptual agreement: follow husband's
nationality.
Limited to marriages contracted in a foreign
land
New civil code
Same
Includes marriages celebrated in RP and aborad
…but both only applies to mixed marriages.
Here, both spouses are Brits!
Manresa said English law (the law of the
husband's nationality) should be used.
But no proof of English law presented by CIR. So
apply processual presumption, presume English
law = RP laws
SUNTAY V. SUNTAY
*again, a succession case…but I cannot find the
digest…maybe it's under another
subject…hmmm…
Jose Suntay
-Filipino Citizen
-resident of the Philippines
-died in Amoy, Fookien, China
-left properties in RP, and a house in China
-survived by children of 1st marriage and 2nd
wife and child of 2nd marriage
-2 proceedings:
*intestate proceedings, one of the children of
the 1st marriage appointed as administrator of
the estate
*Testate proceedings, by the widow showing a
will allegedly executed in 1929 in RP
>denied: loss of will before hearing
>appealed: further proceedings, deposition of
witnesses to a will taken : still dismissed
-Pacific war ensued
-after war: child of 2nd marriage (Silvino)
presented the alleged will of his father in
Chinese Characters executed and signed by him
in 1931 and that the same was filed, recorded
and probated in Amoy, China
-presented petition for probate of either the
1929 will (executed in RP) or the 1931 will -
both DISALLOWED
Issue: WON EITHER OF THE WILL COULD BE
PROBATED?
Held: NO…NONE COULD BE PROBATED
AS TO THE 1929 PHILIPPINE WILL: not proved by
Credible witnesses
-Silvino failed to present 2 credible witnesses to
prove the provisions of the lost 1929 will
-CREDIBLE Witnesses: competent witnesses, not
rely on hearsay
AS TO THE ALLEGED PROBATED 1931 WILL: was
not established
-Rule 78.1: if will probated in another country, if
could be allowed, filed and recorded by proper
CFI
-Rule 78.2: copy of will + allowance is filed
before CFI, court shall fix time and place for
hearing, and cause notice to be given as in case
of original will
-Rule 78.3: if will allowed in RP, court shall issue
certificate of allowance, signed by Judge,
attested by the seal of the court, filed and
recorded by clerk, and will would have same
effect as if originally proved and allowed in such
court
-in this case: failed to prove…
…Municipal district court of Amoy, China is a
probate court
…law of China on procedure in probate or
allowance of wills in 1931
…here, just presented the unverified answers of
Consul General of RC (depositions) which are
INADMISSIBLE:
 18
>Consul General does not qualify and make the
person who holds the Chinese law an expert of
Chinese law on procedure in probate matters
>if admitted, adverse party would be deprived
of his right to confront and cross-examine
witnesses
-plus: proceeding in Amoy, China court were
not probate proceedings, but was conducted
for the taking of the testimony of 2 attesting
witnesses to the will
PROCESSUAL PRESUMPTION: in the absence of
proof that the municipal district court of Amoy
is a probate court, it may be presumed that the
proceedings in the probating or allowing a will
in the Chinese courts are the same as those in
RP Courts
-probate: proceeding in rem: can send notices
through personal service or service by
publication
-so since no notice of the proceedings before
Amoy, China that it was a probate proceeding, it
cannot be deemed as a probate proceeding and
is deemed as merely a deposition or
perpetuation of testimony
BOARD OF COMMISIONERS (CID) V. DELA
ROSA
-deportation proceedings where initiated
against WILLIAM GATCHALIAN, with CID alleging
that he failed to prove the legality of the
marriages of his Filipino grandfather (Santiago)
to his grandma as well as the marriage of his
Father (Francisco) to his mom, both of which
were celebrated in China (his grandma and
mom were Chinese citizens).
-no evidence to prove that under Chinese law
(which was not also proved), the marriages
were valid.
-as no evidence that William Gatchalian was
born in a valid marriage(ie born outside
marriage), he is deemed to have followed the
citizenship of his mom (CHINESE) - same thing
with his dad!
WON William Gatchalian is a Chinese citizen?
NO.
Apply processual presumption: in the absence
of evidence to the contrary, foreign laws on
particular subject are presumed to be the same
as RP laws
-here, no proof of Chinese laws applicable, so
use RP laws
Why no evidence presented:
*granddad's marriage certificate was allegedly
destroyed or lost during the Japanese
occupation, and Citizenship Investigation
Bureau just listened to his testimony.
*Francisco was also just required to give
testimonies before Philippine consular and
immigration authorities regarding their
marriages, birth, and relationship to each other
-the said testimonies are ADMISSIBLE as
statements or declarations regarding family
tradition or reputation in matters of pedigree
(in accordance with the NCC, FC and ROC)
Philippine law: Lex loci celebrationis
-all marriages performed outside RP in
accordance with the laws in force in the country
were performed and valid there shall also be
valid in this country
-all presumptions favor the solidarity of the
family
-he who asserts that the marriage is not valid
under our laws bear the burden of proof to
present the foreign law
MARRIAGE OF GRANDPA AND PAPA VALID: CID
failed to prove that it was invalid in accordance
with Chinese laws
-since the rule is that a legitimate child follows
the citizenship of is father, his father is a Filipino
citizen as the marriage of his grandpa with
grandma is valid. As his father's marriage to his
mother is also valid, William Gatchalian is also a
legitimate child, thus would follow citizenship of
dad, thus Filipino
****
(note: at first, it was Gatchalian who was
required to prove the existence of Chinese law
to prove that the marriages of his grandpa and
papa were valid. But with the presumption in
favor of the solidarity of families, the burden of
proving that the marriages were not valid, thus,
of proving the Chinese law which says so, was
transferred to CID)
FACTORS TO CONSIDER IN DECIDING EITHER TO
APPLY DOMESTIC LAW OR TO DECIDE CASE
 19
AGAINST PARTY WHO FAILED TO PROVE
FOREIGN LAW FROM WHICH HIS CLAIM ARISES:
Degree of public interest involved in the dispute
Accessibility of foreign law materials to the
parties
Possibility that plaintiff is merely forum
shopping
Similarities between forum laws and foreign law
on the issue in point
(usually forum law only applied when issue
involves marriage and family relations)
EXCEPTIONS TO THE APPLICATION OF FOREIGN
LAW
GR: look into application of foreign law and
apply it
Basis: comity and reciprocity
X: 3 MAIN CATEGORIES (look at previous notes)
(1) local law expressly provides
Civil Code
Article 16: makes real and personal proerty
subject to the law of the country where they
are situated
Intestate and testamentary succession:
governed by lex nationale of the person whose
succession is under consideration
Article 829: makes revocation done outside the
Philippines valid according to the law of the
place where the will was made or lex domicilli
Article 819: prohibits Filipinos from making joint
wills even if valid in the country where they
were executed
(2) failure to plead and prove foreign law or
judgments
-as seen above
(3) case falls under exceptions to rule of comity
-Art17, Par3: PROHIBITIVE LAWS concerning
*persons
*their acts
*or property0
*and those which have for their object
…public order
…public policy
…and good customs
…shall not be rendered inefffective by laws or
judgments promulgated,
or by determinations or conventions agreed
upon
In a foreign country
UNDER EXCEPTIONS:
FOREIGN LAW IS CONTRARY TO IMPORTANT
PUBLIC POLICY OF THE FORUM
Public policy:
-principle of law
...which holds that no subject or citizen
...can lawfully commit any act
...which has a tendency to be
>injurious to the public or
>against public good.
Public Policy Technique
-situation in which the court declines to give
due course to a claim existing under a foreign
law
..because it considers the nature of the claim
unconscionable
or its enforcement would "violate a
>fundamental principle of justice,
>some prevalent concept of good morals,
>some deep-rooted tradition of the
commonwealth.
-dismissal through this method is technically not
dismissal on the merits BUT in reality, plaintiff
cannot get jurisdiction in any other court
PAKISTAN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES
CORPORATION (PIA) V. OPLE
PIA
-foreign corporation licensed to do business in
RP
-hired IN THE PHILIPPINES 2 FILIPINAs as
stewardess, the contract containing provisions
...that they have a right to terminate the
services of the Filipinas upon notice and
...that the agreements shall be construed under
and by laws of Pakistan and ONLY THE COURT
OF KARACHI, PAKISTAN shall have jurisdiction to
consider any matter arising out of or under the
agreement
-instead of the 3year contract, the 2 stewardess
were terminated 1y4m before the expiration of
their contract
-2 Filipina employees filed a COMPLAINT FOR
ILLEGAL DISMISSAL AND NONPAYMENT OF
COMPANY BENEFITS AND BONUSES vs. PIA
before Ministry of Labor and Employment
 20
-as defense, PIA invoked the provisions of its
contract (that Pakistani law should apply, and
that the case should have been filed before
Karachi courts)
WON the contract provisions should be
followed (i.e. WON Pakistani law should apply
and the case brought before Pakistani Courts)?
NO
PIA cannot invoke Par10 (venue and applicable
law) of its contract to prevent application of
labor laws and regulations of the Philippines
because
*the EER is a relationship affected w/ public
interest
*In accordance with Art17.3: RP Labor laws
cannot be rendered illusory by parties agreeing
upon some other law to govern their
relationship
PIA cannot invoke that Karachi court is the sole
venue for the dispute: court used place of
significant contacts approach
*contract executed in RP
*contract was between Philippine citizens and a
corporation licensed to do business in the
Philippines (therefore a Resident Company)
*though the Filipina stewardesses were
assigned in the Middle East and Europe, they
were based in the Philippines in between
assignments
-Par10 cannot be given effect so as to oust
Philippine agencies and courts of the
jurisdiction vested upon them by Philippine law
PIA did not invoke the Pakistani law applicable:
so presume as same as Philippine law (applied
Processual Presumption)
Xxx
CRITIQUES TO THE PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION
*ulitimate escape device: Court can disregard
the applicable law to arrive at its desired result
without having to provide the rigorous level of
analysis required to explain the shift
*intolerable affectation of superior virtue
*court of the forum sits in judgment over the
wisdom and soundness of the applicable foreign
law
Test when the public policy exception is
properly invoked: WHEN THE FOREIGN COURT
IS ABSOLUTELY CONVINCED THAT THE FOREIGN
LAW IS
*BARBAROIUS IN ITS PROVISIONS OR
*FRIGHTFULLY UNJUST IN THE PARTICULAR
CASE
XXX
THE FOREIGN LAW IS PROCEDURAL IN NATURE
Why: Judicial convenience
-impractical for the court of the forum to adopt
the procedural machinery of another state
Problems: characterization of the foreign law
into procedural or substantive
e.g. Statute of Frauds and Statute of
Limitaitions
ISSUES ARE RELATED TO PROPERTY (LEX SITUS)
*IMMOVABLE PROPERTY ARE GOVERNED BY
THE LAW OF THE PLACE WHERE IT IS LOCATED
-in the NCC: we included Personal property in
the Lex Situs rule (Art17)
When Lex situs applicable:
*sale
*exchange
*barter
*mortgage
*any form of alienation of property (SEBMA)
3 reasons why lex situs governs property:
Land and everything attached to it are w/n the
exclusive control of the state: only State officials
can lawfully deal with them physically - their
consent necessary
Immovables are of greatest concern to state
Demands of certainty and convenience
Exceptions to lex situs rule: to follow
THE ISSUES INVOLVED IN THE ENFORCEMENT
OF FOREIGN CLAIM IS FISCAL OR
ADMINISTRATIVE
GR: state is not obliged to enforce the revenue
law of another
e.g. BANCO DE BRAZIL V. AC ISRAEL
COMMUNITY CO: court deny enforcement of
tax claims by foreign countries on local
residents
View that Fiscal laws = Penal laws (JUDGE
LEARNED HAND)
MOORE V. MITCHELL: Revenue laws fall within
the same reasoning (as penal laws); they affect
a state in matters as vital to its existence as its
criminal laws. No court ought to undertake an
 21

inquiry which it cannot prosecute w/o What is a penalty? Restatement of Conflicts of

determining whether these laws are consonant laws: a sum of money exacted as punishment
w/ its own notions of what is proper for a civil wrong (there's a claim or right)
View that Fiscal law ≠ Penal laws: (PROFESSOR Vs. compensation: for loss suffered by injured
LEFLAR) party
Tax laws are not passed to punish people. Its an Penal laws and Revenue laws: deemed as
obligation of the citizen who enjoys the different, but there are views holding Revenue
protection of government to share the expense laws as penal in character
of maintaining the government. EXTRADITION
FOREIGN LAW OR JUDGMENT IS CONTRARY TO Basis: jurisdictional cooperation + assistance
GOOD MORALS (CONTRA BONOS MORES) among States in the enforcement of their
-the determination of what is contrary to good criminal laws
morals is left to the forum court trying a Scope: all offenses except Political or religious
particular case What happens: when a person indicted for a
Contra Bonos Mores (American definition): acts penal offense or a convict serving sentence
*having mischievous or pernicious ESCAPES to another country, the receiving
consequences country has legal obligation to surrender
*against true principles of morality escapee to the State from which he escaped
e.g. APPLICATION OF FOREIGN LAW MIGHT
>hiring for killing ENDANGER THE VITAL INTERESTS OF THE STATE
>bribery of public officers
>marriage between ascendants and
descendants (incest!)
CRITIQUE: inherent subjectivity
APPLICATION OF FOREIGN LAW WILL WORK
UNDENIABLE INJUSTICE TO THE CITIZENS OF
THE FORUM
THE FOREIGN LAW IS PENAL IN CHARACTER
Chief Justice Marshall: Courts of no country
execute penal laws of another.
What is penal? HUNTINGTON V. ATTRILL:
whether it appears to the tribunal which is
called upon to enforece it to be, in its essential
character and effect, a pubishment of an
offense against the public
LOZADA V. POSADAS: when it imposes
punishment for an offense committed against
the state which under the Constitution, the
Executive has the power to pardon
>>>this definition however was broadened in
common use as penal statutes were understood
to include
>"all statutes which command or prohibit
certain acts, and establish penalties for their
violation"
> impose a penalty for their commission