THE JOURNAL OF ENERGY

AND DEVELOPMENT

Linda E. Doman,

“What Happens to the Long-Term Outlook

for Liquid Fuels When Near-Term Prices Collapse?,”
Volume 40, Number 2

Copyright 2015
WHAT HAPPENS TO THE LONG-TERM OUTLOOK
FOR LIQUID FUELS WHEN NEAR-TERM
PRICES COLLAPSE?

Linda E. Doman*

Introduction

I n September 2014, the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) released

its long-term assessment of world petroleum and other liquid fuels in the In-
ternational Energy Outlook 2014 (IEO2014).1 The projections that appear in this
report were actually constructed in March 2014 and the large downward move-
ment in global crude oil prices that began in mid-2014 was not anticipated. Crude
oil prices are a major driver within EIA’s energy models, so it is appropriate to
consider the uncertainties associated with long-term projections, particularly in
light of the recent price movements.
This paper begins with a look at the IEO2014 Reference case, EIA’s business-
as-usual trend estimate that generally assumes current laws and regulations are

*Linda E. Doman serves as Senior International Energy Analyst in the Office of Energy Analysis
of the U.S. Department of Energy’s Energy Information Administration (EIA). Currently, she is the
lead analyst and author for the International Energy Outlook, the agency’s report on the long-term
assessment of world energy markets. Most recently, she coauthored the agency’s assessment of
world petroleum and other liquid fuels markets through 2040, published as the International Energy
Outlook 2014. Ms. Doman has worked on international energy analysis at EIA since 1993, focusing
mainly on world trends in energy consumption. The author of numerous professional papers and
presentations on long-term international energy analysis, Ms. Doman earned her B.A. in
mathematics and anthropology (double major) from Franklin and Marshall College (Lancaster,
Pennsylvania) and her M.S. in statistical computing from American University (Washington, D.C.).
This article is drawn from the author’s presentation to the 42nd annual international energy
conference of the International Research Center for Energy and Development, “Energy Prices
Recovery—Why, How Much, and Why?” Boulder, Colorado, April 13–15, 2015.

The Journal of Energy and Development, Vol. 40, Nos. 1 and 2

Copyright Ó 2015 by the International Research Center for Energy and Economic Development
(ICEED). All rights reserved.
229
230 THE JOURNAL OF ENERGY AND DEVELOPMENT

unchanged. The additional High and Low World Oil Price scenarios are also
discussed to demonstrate the differences in supply and demand outlooks in al-
ternative price scenarios. Next, short-term oil price forecasts—before and after the
release of the IEO2014 report—are reviewed to demonstrate how much changed
in the year since IEO2014 projections were computed. Finally, the potential im-
pact of the short-term price changes on long-term projections is presented.

Long-Term Outlook for Petroleum and Other Liquids

In the IEO2014 Reference case, world liquid fuels consumption increases by 38

percent, from 87 million barrels per day (b/d) in 2010 to 119 million b/d in 2040.
Rising prices for liquid fuels improve the cost competiveness of other fuels,
leading many consumers of liquids outside the transportation and industrial sectors
to switch to alternative sources of energy whenever possible. In fact, the trans-
portation and industrial sectors account for 92 percent of world demand for liquid
fuels in 2040, whereas in every other end-use sector the consumption of liquids
decreases on a global basis throughout the projection period.
Virtually all of the growth in long-term liquids demand will occur in the de-
veloping economies outside of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development2 (non-OECD) according to the IEO2014 Reference case (figure 1). In
particular, the nations of developing Asia (including China and India) and the Middle
East account for 85 percent of the total increase in liquids consumption between
2010 and 2040. Fast-paced economic expansion among the non-OECD regions
drives the increase in demand for liquid fuels; as strong growth in per-capita income
raises demand for personal transportation and freight transport as well as demand for
energy in the industrial sector. [Editor’s note: All figures follow the text.]
In contrast to the non-OECD regions, the more mature energy-consuming
nations of the OECD are projected to experience a 0.1 percent per year decrease in
liquids fuel consumption from 2010 to 2040 as the economies react to long-term
high fuel prices. Strong efficiency gains (especially for personal transportation)
and conservation reduce OECD demand for liquids. While technology improve-
ments and fuel-switching opportunities are also available to non-OECD con-
sumers, the strong growth in demand for transportation services in relatively
underdeveloped transportation networks outpaces these improvements.
To underscore how liquids consumption patterns are changing, consider that in
1990 OECD nations accounted for 62 percent of the world’s total liquid fuel use with
non-OECD countries accounting for 38 percent (figure 2). By 2010, the differences
between OECD and non-OECD shares of total liquids consumption had narrowed
considerably with the OECD accounting for 53 percent of total consumption and the
non-OECD for 47 percent. The strong growth in non-OECD liquids demand over the
next 30 years results in a complete reversal of the 1990 OECD and non-OECD
 LONG-TERM LIQUID FUELS OUTLOOK 231

shares. By 2040, non-OECD regions are anticipated to consume 63 percent of the

world’s liquid fuels with only 37 percent by the OECD nations.
The potential for growth in demand for liquid fuels is focused on the emerging
economies of China, India, other non-OECD Asia, and the Middle East (figure 3).
In comparison, large OECD petroleum-consuming regions—the United States,
OECD Europe, and Japan—all experience declining demand for liquid fuels over
the IEO2014 projection.
Non-OECD Asia as a whole accounts for 72 percent of the world increase in
liquid fuel consumption. Middle East nations account for another 13 percent of the
world increase. Non-OECD Asia shows the largest increase in liquid fuels con-
sumption worldwide in the IEO2014 Reference case at 23.4 million b/d from 2010
to 2040. China alone accounts for 10.7 million b/d of that increase.
As China’s economy moves from dependence on energy-intensive industrial
manufacturing to services, the transportation sector becomes the most sgnificant source
of growth in liquids fuel use, and the country’s liquid fuels consumption more than
doubles compared to its 2010 level. In the IEO2014 Reference case, China replaces the
United States as the world’s largest liquids-consuming nation by 2035 (figure 4).
There is considerable uncertainty associated with this projection for China, mostly
on the upside. It is also possible that the United States may—through efficiency gains
and conservation—have a lower trajectory in future liquids demand than projected
here. As a result, it is certainly possible that China’s liquid fuels consumption could
exceed that of the United States earlier than anticipated in IEO2014. In general, EIA’s
projections for China’s liquids demand have trended upward over time. In IEO2010,
EIA projected that China would consume 16.9 million b/d of liquids in 2035; in
IEO2014, China’s consumption reaches 18.8 million b/d in that year.

Three Oil Price Scenarios

EIA offers three oil price scenarios. In addition to the business-as-usual, Ref-
erence case, a Low Oil Price case and a High Oil Price case have been developed
(figure 5). World oil price trends are a key influence on liquid fuels consumption
and production, as are the reactions of consumers and producers to those trends,
which in turn influence future prices. The three price scenarios were developed in
order to examine a range of potential interactions of supply, demand, and prices in
world liquids market, and they provide an assessment of alternative views on the
future courses of both production and consumption of liquids.
All three of the price cases have global supply/demand quantities in 2040 that
are very similar, ranging from 119 million b/d in the Reference case to 122 million
b/d in the High Oil Price case, and 123 million b/d in the Low Oil price case.
There are four main factors that, in combination, are used to construct the three
price cases: (1) energy demand growth, (2) Organization of the Petroleum
232 THE JOURNAL OF ENERGY AND DEVELOPMENT

Exporting Countries (OPEC) investment and production decisions, (3) non-OPEC

petroleum liquid fuels supply, and (4) other liquid fuels supply.
In the Reference Case: World oil prices rise to $141 per barrel (real 2012
dollars) in 2040. Supplies of both crude oil and lease condensate (including tight
oil shale oil, extra-heavy crude oil, field condensate, and bitumen) and other liquid
fuels [natural gas plant liquids (NGPL), biofuels, coal-to-liquids (CTL), gas-to-
liquids (GTL), and refinery gain] increase over the projection. The increase in
world liquids demand requires new supplies of liquid fuels from both members of
the OPEC and non-OPEC producers. Increased demand requires 33 million b/d of
additional liquid fuels supplies to reach the 119 million b/d of total petroleum and
other liquids demanded by 2040. OPEC crude and lease condensate increases by
14 million b/d between 2010 and 2040; non-OPEC crude and lease condensate
increases by 10 million b/d. Other liquid supplies grow in importance over the
projection period. In 2010, other liquids accounted for 14 percent of total petro-
leum and other liquids supplies, but by 2040 that share increases to 17 percent.
In the Low Oil Price Case: World oil prices fall to $70 per barrel (2012 dollars)
in 2016, remain below $70 per barrel through 2023, and do not rise above $75 per
barrel through 2040. The low price results not only from an assumption of lower
marginal production costs but also from assumed lower demand for liquid fuels in the
non-OECD nations, especially China and India, relative to the Reference case. OPEC
production of crude oil and lease condensate increases throughout the projection,
displacing more expensive petroleum and other liquid fuels production. Resources that
are more costly to produce are not economically viable in the Low Oil Price case.
The IEO2014 Low Oil Price case assumes slower economic growth in the non-
OECD countries than in the Reference case. Lower economic growth translates to
lower demand for liquids, but the resulting lower oil prices temper that impact. Non-
OECD consumption of liquid fuels rises to 74 million b/d, which is only 1 million
b/d below the level in the Reference case. In contrast to the non-OECD, economic
growth in the OECD is about the same as it is in the Reference case, and the lower
prices encourage consumers to use more liquid fuels. In the Low Oil Price case,
OECD liquid fuels consumption rises to 50 million b/d in 2040, 5 million b/d higher
than in the Reference case.
On the supply side, OPEC’s market share of crude and lease condensate pro-
duction remains around 42 percent through 2016, then rises to 57 percent in 2040.
OPEC is assumed to be less successful in restricting production to try to keep prices
high in the Low Oil Price case relative to the Reference case and, as a result, OPEC
crude and lease condensate production increases by 28 million b/d, from 32 million
b/d in 2010 to 60 million b/d in 2040. In contrast, because world oil prices are lower
than in the Reference case, non-OPEC crude and lease condensate production levels
increase by only about 2 million b/d, to 45 million b/d in 2040, or 8 million b/d lower
than 2040 production in the Reference case. With higher average costs for resource
 LONG-TERM LIQUID FUELS OUTLOOK 233

development in the non-OPEC countries, the North Sea Brent crude oil price in the
Low Oil Price case is not sufficient to make undeveloped fields economically viable.
Production of other liquid fuels that are typically more expensive to produce also
grows more slowly than in the Reference case. Total other liquid fuels production
increases from 12 million b/d in 2010 to 18 million b/d in 2040, or about 2 million
b/d lower than projected in the Reference case.
In the High Oil Price Case: The assumed higher costs of crude and lease
condensate production result in lower production than in the Reference case. In
addition, the higher prices result in increased development of liquid supplies from
emerging sources, including tight oil and bitumen, which have higher production
costs. World oil prices (in 2012 dollars) are $204 per barrel in 2040.
Stronger economic growth in non-OECD countries compared with the Refer-
ence case leads to higher demand for liquid fuels in those countries. Non-OECD
consumption of petroleum and other liquid fuels totals 80 million b/d or about
5 million b/d higher than in the Reference case. The increase in non-OECD de-
mand for liquid fuels is only partially offset by a decline in OECD demand as
consumers improve efficiency or switch to less-expensive fuels when possible
in response to the high prices. OECD consumption of liquid fuels declines by
4 million b/d, from 46 million b/d in 2010 to 42 million b/d in 2040.
On the supply side, the high oil prices allow non-OPEC countries to increase
production from more costly resources. Non-OPEC crude and lease condensate
production increases initially in the High Oil Price case at about the same rate as in
the Reference case, because access to existing resources is limited and discovery
rates are lower. Eventually, however, non-OPEC crude and lease condensate pro-
duction grows to 61 million b/d in 2040, or 8 million b/d higher than in the Reference
case. The economics of other liquids also benefit from higher prices. Non-OPEC
production of other liquid fuels increases to 17 million b/d in 2040 in the High Oil
Price case, nearly 3 million b/d higher than in the Reference case.

Liquids Supplies in the IEO2014 Reference Case

The remainder of this discussion concentrates on the IEO2014 Reference case.3 The
Reference case assumes that OPEC will maintain a cohesive policy of limiting supply
growth, rather than maximizing total annual revenues. It also assumes that no geo-
political events will cause prolonged supply shocks in the OPEC countries that could
further limit production growth. Accordingly—and in a projection that was prepared in
early 2014—world oil prices trend downward in this outlook from $113 per barrel in
2011 to $92 per barrel in 2017, and then increase steadily to $141 per barrel in 2040.
The IEO2014 assumes that OPEC producers will invest in incremental pro-
duction capacity that enables them to increase crude and lease condensate pro-
duction by 14.2 million b/d from 2010 to 2040 (figure 6). Further, the OPEC share
234 THE JOURNAL OF ENERGY AND DEVELOPMENT

of the world’s crude and lease condensate production ranges from 41 percent to
47 percent over the course of the projection.
Among the OPEC supply regions, it is the Middle East members of the organi-
zation that provide the largest increase in OPEC petroleum supplies in the IEO2014
Reference case (figure 7). Middle East OPEC member countries, which accounted for
68 percent of total OPEC production in 2010, are projected to increase their crude and
lease condensate production by 12.8 million b/d, accounting for 90 percent of the total
growth in OPEC crude and lease condensate production from 2010 to 2040.
Regardless of the uncertainties associated with oil supply projections, producers in
the OPEC Middle East are likely to continue to play a key role in balancing global
petroleum and other liquids demand and supply. Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Iraq com-
bined have a large share of the world’s oil reserves and resources that are relatively
inexpensive to produce. Saudi Arabia, which has for some time been the only holder of
substantial spare oil production capacity, has played a critical role as the major swing
supplier in response to disruptions of other supply sources and when economic fluc-
tuations have affected oil demand. Both Iraq and Iran have the oil reserves needed to
raise capacity and production well above current levels, were they to successfully
address some of the internal and external above-ground constraints that have kept their
respective oil sectors from realizing their production potential for more than 30 years.
The most significant non-OPEC contributors to liquids production growth are
Canada, Brazil, the United States, Russia, and Kazakhstan (figure 8). Together
these countries account for virtually all of the total net increase in non-OPEC
crude and lease condensate supply in the IEO2014 Reference case. Non-OPEC
crude and lease condensate production grows by 10 million b/d between 2010 and
2040. The growth is led by production gains in Canada (where oil supplies in-
crease by 3.0 million b/d), followed by Brazil (2.4 million b/d), the United States
(2.2 million b/d), Kazakhstan (1.6 million b/d), and Russia (1.4 million b/d).
In a shift from recent international long-term reports, the IEO2014 projections
for Mexico included an increase of 0.8 million b/d in liquids supplied from 2010 to
2040. This reassessment of Mexican production prospects was based on both
substantial near-term investments being made by the state-owned Petróleos
Mexicanos (PEMEX) and also, in the longer term, reflecting the potential impact
of the changes liberalizing Mexico’s energy laws.
Outside of crude and lease condensate production, other liquids resources—
including NGPL and biofuels—currently supply a relatively small portion of total
world petroleum and other liquid supplies (figure 9). In 2010, they accounted for
about 14 percent of total liquids supplied. These other sources of supply are,
however, expected to grow in importance. In the IEO2014 Reference case, the
other liquids share of the world’s total liquids supply rises to 17 percent by 2040,
reaching 20.3 million b/d from 12.3 million b/d in 2010.
NGPL account for the largest portion of other liquid fuels and that remains true
throughout the projection. NGPL production accounts for 4.3 million b/d of the
 LONG-TERM LIQUID FUELS OUTLOOK 235

nearly 8 million b/d increase in other liquids supplied over the 2010 to 2040 pe-
riod, reaching 12.7 million b/d in 2040. The next largest portion of other liquid fuels
is biofuels, which account for 1.6 million b/d of the total increase in other fuels.
Non-OPEC production of other liquids grows from 9.0 million b/d in 2010 to
14.4 million b/d in 2040, accounting for two-thirds of the growth in world other
liquid fuels. Non-OPEC producers add 2.1 million b/d of NGPL over the
projection—70 percent of which come from the United States and Russia alone.
Other important alternative non-OPEC liquids supply increases include an additional
0.5 million b/d of biofuels from Brazil and an additional 0.3 million b/d of biofuels
and 0.6 million b/d of CTL from China.
NGPL is also the principal constituent of OPEC other liquid fuels supplies,
accounting for more than 90 percent of the total even in 2040. NGPL production in
OPEC member countries rises by 2.2 million b/d from 3.3 million b/d in 2010 to
5.4 million b/d in 2040. The only other form of OPEC alternative supplies is GTL,
primarily from Qatar. OPEC GTL production increases to 0.4 million b/d in 2040.

Uncertainty in the Long-Term Liquid Fuels Markets

There is always uncertainty in long-term world energy projections. The growth in

U.S. tight oil over the last few years demonstrates that global oil markets can change
fairly quickly. EIA has been putting considerable time and resources into understanding
the potential for growth in U.S. tight oil, but also in trying to assess how tight oil
production may or may not develop outside of North America. Thus, tight oil potential
is a good example of how technological advances can change the long-term outlook,
also adding considerable uncertainty to the long-term supply outlook (figure 10).
In the IEO2014, U.S. tight oil production peaks at about 4.8 million b/d in 2020
before slowly declining to 3.2 million b/d in 2040. This projection does not in-
corporate the sharp decline in crude oil prices that occurred in the second half of
2014, but it also does not incorporate increased prospects for productivity and
technological improvements that analysts have been looking at since IEO2014 was
developed. While prices may remain lower for a longer period of time than an-
ticipated in the IEO2014 Reference case, it is not altogether clear what the im-
plications of a lower price environment may ultimately have on global tight oil
production. EIA continues to assess these markets.
IEO2014 anticipated that tight oil production would increase outside of North
America (figure 11). Although the largest new supplies of tight oil do come from
the United States, substantial new volumes of tight oil are expected to be produced
in Russia, Argentina, and China, among other areas in the long term. EIA’s as-
sessment of markets outside the United States and Canada is relatively new and, as
with the U.S. tight oil profile, there is a considerable range of uncertainty asso-
ciated with production in these potential new areas of development. Consider that
in 2013, U.S. tight oil production was estimated at 2.9 million b/d but, by the time
236 THE JOURNAL OF ENERGY AND DEVELOPMENT

the August 2014 edition of the Short-Term Energy Outlook was released, EIA was
estimating that production would reach 5.0 million b/d in 2015.
The evolving assessment of the tight oil resource base could also have a sub-
stantial impact on production in the future. The Annual Energy Outlook 2014
included a High Resource case for the United States. In that case, U.S. tight oil
production reached 7.7 million b/d in 2025 and 8.1 million b/d in 2040.
This compares to the Reference case projection of 4.5 million b/d in 2025 and
3.2 million b/d in 2040. Extending that high resource assumption to the entire
world would likewise widen the range of uncertainty.

Uncertainty in Times of Falling Prices

World oil prices are a major driver of the model EIA uses to generate projections
of long-term global liquids markets (figure 12). While the prices are long-term as-
sumptions, near-term price movements—especially those that are significant and
relatively sustained—will have an impact on the long-term prospects for oil pro-
duction and consumption. One year after the IEO2014 projections were formulated,
forecasts of North Sea Brent crude oil spot prices from EIA’s Short-Term Energy
Outlook had been reduced by 50 percent (figure 13). So, the modest decline in prices
that was assumed in the IEO2014 from 2012 through about 2018, was in fact a much
sharper downward movement and one that, according to EIA’s June 2015 short-term
forecast, is expected to remain below $65 per barrel (nominal dollars) through 2016.
The lower oil prices observed in the second half of 2014 and into the present
(spring 2015), introduces a variety of uncertainties into the short- and long-term
projections. Considering the U.S. oil production markets, for instance according to
Baker Hughes, oil rig counts fell by 60 percent between their peak in October 2014
and June 2015. Although U.S. oil production continued to grow, the June 2015
edition of EIA’s Short-Term Energy Outlook anticipated a general decline in U.S.
production from June 2015 through early 2016 before growth resumes. Thus, the fall
in oil prices has introduced uncertainty into the outlook for U.S. tight oil production.
OPEC oil production decision making over the course of the next year or more will
also have to be watched. Thus far, OPEC has been steadfast in their decision (largely
in Saudi Arabia) to not cut production in favor of maintaining their market share of
world oil supply. Whether or not this decision will result in removing producers of
more expensive production from the market and how long it might take them to return
when prices strengthen also add considerable uncertainty to the mid-term. There are
also many questions about the potential return of Iranian oil exports (and its timing),
the difficult geopolitical circumstances in Iraq, and the economic troubles in
Venezuela. With all three countries key oil resource holders, their ability to supply
global oil markets is of concern in assessments of mid- to long-term production.
In Russia, lower oil prices combined with limited access to financing because
of Western sanctions did not seem to have much of an impact on Russian oil
 LONG-TERM LIQUID FUELS OUTLOOK 237

production through the first quarter of 2014, with production reaching record post-
Soviet levels. However, the inability to attract foreign investment into the Russian
oil-producing sector may lower the long-term prospects for production.
Sustained low oil prices may also mean that the impact of Mexican legislative
changes in the energy sector will have to be reassessed in the next International
Energy Outlook. IEO2014 incorporated new optimism about the potential for
Mexican production to rise in the long term as a result of the ratified constitutional
amendments passed in 2013 (figure 14). In what EIA viewed as “cautious opti-
mism” on the potential for successful reform, IEO2014 included a projection of
total liquids output in Mexico that remained steady, rather than declining in the
short term. Mexican production stabilized at 2.9 million b/d through 2020 and then
rose to 3.7 million b/d in 2040. This made Mexican oil production in 2040 1.7
million b/d higher than in the previous IEO2013 report.
In addition to the supply-side uncertainties, the lower price environment in-
troduces uncertainties on the demand-side projections. Low prices can encourage
demand growth where prices are not controlled by subsidies or tax regimes, notably in
the United States. Alternatively, in developing countries that do have subsidies, the
current low price environment can be an opportunity to remove subsidies, strength-
ening government accounts. When higher oil prices return, consumers will likely
react to the higher prices with lower demand for oil. For example, China, India,
Malaysia, and other countries have already taken steps to reduce their fuel subsidies.

Conclusions

World oil prices are a major driver in EIA’s projections of global energy mar-
kets. But prices can also be volatile and strong near-term price trajectory changes
can add considerable uncertainty to long-term outlooks. That said, general trends in
global energy markets will likely remain similar in future revisions of the outlook
for petroleum and other liquid fuels. For instance, most of the growth in demand for
liquid fuels will likely occur in the fast-growing economies of the non-OECD, like
China and India, and large resource-holding producers within OPEC will remain
a key source of global crude oil and lease condensate supplies in the future.
The current low oil price environment may delay investment that producers might
otherwise make in order to bring mid-term oil supplies to market. Mexican reform
may not proceed as quickly as expected when prices were at $100 per barrel. On the
demand side, low oil prices may increase liquids consumption in countries without
subsidized or heavily taxed liquid fuels and discourage consumers from opting for
energy-efficient technology in the short run. Alternatively, opportunities to remove
liquid fuel subsidies in a low price environment may result in slower demand growth
when higher oil prices return. All of these factors will bear watching as new as-
sessments of global petroleum and other liquid fuels markets are developed and
should be recognized as sources of uncertainty in the long-term projection.
238 THE JOURNAL OF ENERGY AND DEVELOPMENT

Figure 1
a
NON-OECD PETROLEUM AND OTHER LIQUIDS FUELS CONSUMPTION, 1990–2040
(in million barrels per day)

Figure 2
a
WORLD PETROLEUM AND OTHER LIQUID FUELS CONSUMPTION, 1990-2040
(in million barrels per day)

a
OECD = The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Source: U.S. Energy
Information Administration (EIA), International Energy Outlook 2014 (Washington, D.C.: EIA, 2014).
 LONG-TERM LIQUID FUELS OUTLOOK 239

Figure 3
LIQUID FUELS CONSUMPTION IN SELECTED COUNTRIES AND REGIONS, 2010, 2025,
a
AND 2040
(in million barrels per day)

Figure 4
a
LIQUID FUELS CONSUMPTION IN CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES, 1990–2040
(in million barrels per day)

a
OECD = The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Source: U.S. Energy
Information Administration (EIA), International Energy Outlook 2014 (Washington, D.C.: EIA, 2014).
240 THE JOURNAL OF ENERGY AND DEVELOPMENT

Figure 5
a
LIQUIDS CONSUMPTION AND PRODUCTION IN THREE PRICE CASES, 2040
(in million barrels per day)

Figure 6
a
WORLD PETROLEUM AND OTHER LIQUIDS PRODUCTION, 2000–2040
(in million barrels per day)

a
OECD = The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; OPEC = Organization
of the Petroleum Exporting Countries. Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA),
International Energy Outlook 2014 (Washington, D.C.: EIA, 2014).
 LONG-TERM LIQUID FUELS OUTLOOK 241

Figure 7
OPEC CRUDE AND LEASE CONDENSATE PRODUCTION BY REGION, 2010, 2025, AND
a
2040
(in million barrels per day)

Figure 8
NON-OPEC CRUDE AND LEASE CONDENSATE PRODUCTION BY REGION, 2010, 2025,
a
AND 2040
(in million barrels per day)

a
OPEC = Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries. Source: U.S. Energy Information
Administration (EIA), International Energy Outlook 2014 (Washington, D.C.: EIA, 2014).
242 THE JOURNAL OF ENERGY AND DEVELOPMENT

Figure 9
WORLD PRODUCTION OF SELECTED OTHER LIQUID FUELS, 2010, 2025, AND 2040
(in million barrels per day)

Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), International Energy Outlook 2014
(Washington, D.C.: EIA, 2014).

Figure 10
WORLD TIGHT OIL PRODUCTION, 2005–2040
(in million barrels per day)

Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), Annual Energy Outlook 2014
(AEO2014) and International Energy Outlook 2014 (IEO2014) (Washington, D.C.: EIA, 2014).
 LONG-TERM LIQUID FUELS OUTLOOK 243

Figure 11
a
WORLD TIGHT OIL PRODUCTION BY SELECTED COUNTRY, 2010, 2025, AND 2040
(in million barrels per day)

Figure 12
a
WORLD OIL PRICE ASSUMPTIONS IN THE INTERNATIONAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2014
(in 2012 dollars per barrel)

a
STEO = EIA’s Short-Term Energy Outlook August 2014; AEO2014 = EIA’s Annual Energy
Outlook 2014. Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), International Energy
Outlook 2014 (Washington, D.C.: EIA, 2014).
244 THE JOURNAL OF ENERGY AND DEVELOPMENT

Figure 13
NORTH SEA BRENT CRUDE OIL SPOT PRICES, JANUARY 2012–MARCH 2015
(in 2012 dollars per barrel)

Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), Short-Term Energy Outlook March
2014 and Short-Term Energy Outlook March 2015 (Washington, D.C.: EIA, 2014 and 2015).

Figure 14
MEXICAN LIQUID FUELS PRODUCTION IN INTERNATIONAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2013
AND INTERNATIONAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2014, 2010-2040
(in million barrels per day)

Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), International Energy Outlook 2013 and
International Energy Outlook 2014 (Washington, D.C.: EIA, 2013 and 2014).
 LONG-TERM LIQUID FUELS OUTLOOK 245

NOTES
1
U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), International Energy Outlook 2014 (Washington,
D.C.: EIA, 2014), available at http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/ieo.
2
For consistency, the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in-
cludes all members of the organization as of January 1, 2014, throughout all time series. For
statistical purposes, Israel was reported as part of OECD Europe in IEO2014.
3
Readers may read full descriptions of the low and high oil price scenarios in EIA’s
International Energy Outlook 2014, which may be found at http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/ieo.