ARTICLE III - BILL OF RIGHTS

Primacy of Human Rights and Enforcement

Republic v. Sandiganbayan, GR 104768, July 21, 2003
*Mijares v. Ranada, GR 139325, April 12, 2005
Facts: Ten Filipino citizens who each alleged having suffered
human rights abuses during the Marcos regime, filed a case
in the US against the Estate of Marcos. They won with an
award of over 1 Billion. When filed in the RTC for enforcement,
respondent judge dismissed the case for failure to pay the
correct filing fees (472 million instead of 410 pesos).
Held: The current action is not a claim against the estate nor
an action capable of pecuniary estimation, but rather an action
based on a judgment (an action not involving property). The
Rules did not distinguish if it is a local or foreign judgment.
Thus, the docket fee is correctly paid.

SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without

due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of
the laws.

Hierarchy of Rights
*Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Org. v.
Philippine Blooming Mills Co. Inc., 51 SCRA 189, June 5,
1973
Facts: PBMEO is a labor union who decided to stage a mass
demonstration at Malacanang in protest against the alleged
abuses of Pasig Police (not against the company). Despite the
pleas of the company that the first shift workers and the
regular employees should not absent themselves to
participate, the rally took place and the employees were
terminated.
Held: The primacy of human rights over property rights is
recognized. In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights to
freedom of expression and of assembly occupy a preferred
position as they are essential to the preservation and vitality
of our civil and political institutions. The contention of the
company that they would suffer loss due to the rally is only a
property rights that can never overshadow the alleged abuse
of the peace office that will threaten the peace, life, and liberty
of the people in the society.

Due Process: In General

*Tupas v. CA - 193 SCRA 597, 1991
Facts: Petition of review is filed out of time. Instead of filing
the petition for review with the Court of Appeals within the
 remainder of the 15-day reglementary period, that is, on May
10, 1989, the petitioner did so only on May 23, 1989, or 14
days later.
Held: It is a mistake to suppose that enforcement of
procedural rules should never be permitted if it will result in
prejudice to the substantive rights of the litigants. Observance
of both substantive and procedural rights is equally
guaranteed by due process, whatever the source of such
rights, be it the Constitution itself or only a statute or a rule of
court.
Asilo v. People – 645 SCRA 41

I. Procedural Due Process

A. Judicial Proceedings

1. In General
a. *Banco Espanol 37 P 921
Facts: Engracio Palanca was indebted to El Banco and he had his
parcel of land as security. He was unable to pay and El Banco
executed an instrument to mortgage Engracio‟s property. Engracio
however left for China and he never returned till he died. Since
Engracio is a non-resident El Banco has to notify Engracio about
their intent to sue him by means of publication using a newspaper.
Vicente averred that there had been no due process as Engracio
never received the summons.
Held: The essential of procedural fairness in judicial proceedings are:
1. There must be a COURT or TRIBUNAL clothed with judicial power
to hear and determine the matter before it; 2. JURISDICTION must
be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the
property which is the subject of the proceeding; 3. The defendant
must be given the OPPORTUNITY to be heard; and 4. Judgment
must be rendered upon lawful HEARING. Conclusions stated by the
court indicated that the judgment appealed from is without error, and
the same is accordingly affirmed.

2. Aspects of the Proceedings

a. Galvez v. CA 237 SCRA 685
b. State Prosecutors v. Muros 236 SCRA 505
c. Martinez v. CA 237 SCRA 575
d. Espeleta v. Avelino 62 SCRA 395
e. Rabino v. Cruz 222 SCRA 493
f. Ysmael v. CA 273 SCRA 165
g. Carvajal v. CA 280 SCRA 351
h. People v. Castillo 289 SCRA 213
i. Cosep v. Peo. 290 SCRA 378
j. People v. Galleno 291 SCRA 761
k. Oil v. CA 293 SCRA 26
l. Rodrigo v. Sandiganbayan GR 125498 Feb. 18, 1999
m. People v. Hui 338 SCRA 2000
n. People v. Cabiles 341 SCRA 2000
o. Gozum v. Liangco 339 SCRA 253
p. Soriano v. Angeles 339 SCRA 253
q. Villanueva v. Malaya 330 SCRA 278
r. Almendras v. Asis 330 SCRA 69
s. Dayot v. Garcia 353 SCRA 280
t. People v. Hapa GR 125698 July 19, 2001
u. Aguirre v. People GR 144142 August 23, 2001
v. Puyat v. Zabarte 352 SCRA 738
w. Baritua v. Mercader 350 SCRA 86
x. Barbers v. Laguio 351 SCRA 606
y. People v. Herida 353 SCRA 650
z. People v. Medenilla GR 1311638 Mar. 26, 2001
aa. People v. Rivera GR 139180 July 31, 2001
bb. People v. Basquez GR 144035 Sept. 27, 2001
cc. Cooperative Development v. DOLEFIL GR 137489 May 29, 2002
dd. Garcia v. Pajaro GR 141149 July 5, 2002
ee. Briaso v. Mariano, GR 137265, Jan. 31, 2003
ff. Macias v. Macias, GR 1461617, Sept. 3, 2003
gg. Albior v. Auguis, AM P-01- 1472, June 6, 2003
hh. Republic v. Sandiganbayan, GR 152154, Nov. 18, 2003
ii. Ty v. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank, 422 SCRA 649
jj. People v. Larranaga, 421 SCRA 530
kk. R. Transport v. Philhino 494 SCRA 630
ll. Trans Middle East v. Sandiganbayan 499 SCRA 308
mm. Uy v. First Metro 503 SCRA 704
nn. Deutsche Bank v. Chua 481 SCRA 672
oo. People v. Santos 501 SCRA 325
pp. Victoriano v. People 509 SCRA 483
qq. Santos v. DOJ 543 SCRA 70
rr. DBP v. Feston 545 SCRA 422
ss. Ruivivar v. OMB 565 SCRA 324
tt. Borromeo v. Garcia 546 SCRA 543
uu. Cesa v. OMB 553 SCRA 357
vv. DAR v. Samson 554 SCRA 500
ww. Hilario v. People 551 SCRA 191
xx. Pastona v. CA 559 SCRA 137
yy. Bibas v. OMB 559 SCRA 591
zz. Espina v. Cerujano 550 SCRA 107
aaa. Geronga v. Varela 546 SCRA 429
bbb. OMB v. Magno GR 178923, Nov. 27, 2008
ccc. Avenido v. CSC 553 SCRA 711
ddd. Romuladez v. COMELEC 553 SCRA 370
 eee. Multi-Trans Agency v. Oriental 590 SCRA 675
fff. Siochi v. BPI, GR 193872, October 18, 2011
ggg. Catacutan v. People 656 SCRA 524
hhh. Mortel v. Kerr 685 SCRA 1
iii. Gravides v. COMELEC 685 SCRA 382
jjj. Tua v. Mangrobang 714 SCRA 248

3. Publicity and T.V. Coverage

a. Webb v. de Leon 247 SCRA 652
b. People v. Teehankee 249 SCRA 54
c. People v. Sanchez GR 121039-45 Jan. 25, 1999
d. People v. Sanchez GR 121039 Oct. 18, 2001
e. Perez v. Estrada A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC June 29, 2001
f. Perez v. Estrada A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC Sept. 13, 2001
g. People v. Roxas – 628 SCRA 378

B. Administrative; Quasi-Judicial Proceedings; Arbitration

1. In General; administrative due process

a. *Ang Tibay v. CIR 69 P 635
Facts: Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay, a leather
company which supplies the Philippine Army. Due to alleged
shortage of leather, Toribio caused the layoff of members of
National Labor Union (NLU). NLU averred that Toribio’s act is not
valid. The CIR, decided the case and elevated it to the SC, but a
motion for new trial was raised by the NLU. But Ang Tibay filed a
motion for opposing the said motion.
Held: The SC ruled that all administrative bodies cannot ignore
or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due
process. There are cardinal primary rights which must be
respected even in proceedings of this character: (1) the right to a
hearing, which includes the right to present one’s cause and
submit evidence in support thereof; (2) The tribunal must
consider the evidence presented; (3) The decision must have
something to support itself; (4) The evidence must be substantial;
(5) The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the
hearing; or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the
parties affected; (6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must
act on its own independent consideration of the law and facts of
the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a
subordinate; (7) The Board or body should, in all controversial
questions, render its decision in such manner that the parties to
the proceeding can know the various Issue involved, and the
reason for the decision rendered.
b. Dazon v. Yap – 610 SCRA 19
c. *Shu v. Dee 723 SCRA 512
 Facts: Forgery and falsification of public documents. The
respondents argued in their counter-affidavits that they were
denied their right to due process during the NBI investigation
because the agency never required them and Metrobank to
submit the standard sample signatures of the petitioner for
comparison.
Held: The Court held that the functions of this agency are merely
investigatory and informational in nature. It has no judicial or
quasi-judicial powers and is incapable of granting any relief to
any party. It cannot even determine probable cause. The NBI is
an investigative agency whose findings are merely
recommendatory. It undertakes investigation of crimes upon its
own initiative or as public welfare may require in accordance with
its mandate. There was no denial of the respondents’ due
process right could have taken place as the NBI’s findings were
still subject to the prosecutor’s and the Secretary of Justice’s
actions for purposes of finding the existence of probable cause.

2. Judges and Disciplinary Process

a. OCA v. Pascual 259 SCRA 604
b. Valenzuela v. Bellosillo 322 SCRA 536

3. Aspects of the Proceedings

a. Lumiqued v. Exevea 282 SCRA 125
c. Fabella v. CA 282 SCRA 256
d. Joson v. Exec. Sec. 290 SCRA 279
e. Busuego v. CA GR 95325 Mar. 11, 1999
f. CSC v. Lucas GR 127838 Jan. 21, 1999
g. NPC v. Bernabe 332 SCRA 74
h. Summary Dismissal v. Torcita 330 SCRA 153
i. Velayo v. Comelec 327 SCRA 713
j. Ramoran v. Jardine 326 SCRA 208
k. Immam v. Comelec 322 SCRA 866
l. Villarosa v. Comelec GR 133927 Nov. 29, 1999
m. Go v. Comelec GR 147741 May 10, 2001
n. Mollaneda v. Umacob GR 140128 June 6, 2001
o. Cruz v. CSC GR 144469 Nov. 27, 2001
p. Codilla v. De Venecia GR 150605 Dec. 10, 2002
q. Associated Communications v. Dumlao GR 136762 Nov. 21,
2002
r. Villarosa v. Pomperada, AdminCase No. 5310, Jan. 28, 2003
s. Alauya v. Comelec, GR 152151-52, Jan. 22, 2003
t. Spouses Casimiro v. CA, 136911, Feb. 11, 2003
u. Sy v. CA, GR 147572, Feb. 27, 2003
v. Namil v. Comelec, GR 15040, Oct. 28, 2003
w. Bautista v. Comelec, GR 154796- 97, Oct. 23, 2003
 x. Office of OMB v. Coronel 493 SCRA 392
y. Erece v. Macalingay 552 SCRA 320
z. Marcelo v. Bungubung 552 SCRA 589
aa. SEC v. Interport 567 SCRA 354
bb. Calinisan v. Roaquin 630 SCRA 456
cc. IBP v. Atienza 613 SCRA 518
dd. Domingo v. OMB 577 SCRA 476
ee. Zambales v. Castillejos 581 SCRA 320
ff. OMB v. Evangelista 581 SCRA 350
gg. Phil Export v. Pearl City 608 SCRA 280
hh. OMB v. Reyes 658 SCRA 626
ii. Pichay v. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary 677 SCRA
408
jj. Arroyo v. DOJ 681 SCRA 181
kk. Jalosjos v. COMELEC, GR 205033, June 18, 2013
ll. Posadas v. Sandiganbayan, GR 168951 and 169000, July 17,
2013
mm. Gundayao v. COMELEC, GR 205233, Feb 18, 2014
nn. Coalition v. COMELEC, 701 SCRA 786
oo. Miro v. Mendoza, 710 SCRA 371
pp. DOH v. Phil. Pharmawealth, 691 SCRA 421
qq. *GMA v. COMELEC 734 SCRA 88
Facts: Resolution 9615 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
changed the airtime limitations for political campaign from “per
station” basis, as used during the 2007 and 2010 elections, to a “total
aggregate” basis for the 2013. Various broadcast networks
questioned the interpretation of the COMELEC on the ground that
the provisions are oppressive and violative of the constitutional
guarantees of freedom of expression and of the press. Respondent
claims that certiorari and prohibition are not the proper remedies that
petitioners have taken to question the assailed Resolutions of the
COMELEC. They also claim the legal standing of the petitioners.
Held: Technically, respondent may have a point. However,
considering the very important and pivotal issues raised, and the
limited time, such technicality should not deter the Court from having
to make the final and definitive pronouncement that everyone else
depends for enlightenment and guidance. For petitioner-intervenor
Senator Cayetano, he undoubtedly has standing since he is a
candidate whose ability to reach out to the electorate is impacted by
the assailed Resolutions. For the broadcast companies, they
similarly have the standing in view of the direct injury they may suffer
relative to their ability to carry out their tasks of disseminating
information
* because of the burdens imposed on them.
rr. Apo Cement Corporation v. Mingson 740 SCRA 383

4. Extradition Proceedings
 a. Sec. of Justice v. Lantion 343 SCRA 377
b. Cuevas v. Munoz GR 140520 Dec. 18, 2000
c. Gov’t. of U.S.A v. Purganan GR 148571 Sept. 24, 2002
d. Rodriguez v. Presiding Judge, 483 SCRA 290
e. *Gov’t of Hong Kong v. Olalia, GR 153675 April 19, 2007
Facts: Respondent Muñoz was charged of 3 counts of offences of
“accepting an advantage as agent”, and 7 counts of conspiracy to
defraud, punishable by the common law of Hong Kong. Hong Kong
Administrative Region then filed in the RTC petition for extradition
and arrest of respondent. Meanwhile, respondent filed a petition for
bail, which was opposed by the petitioner, initially the RTC denied
the petition holding that there is no Philippine Law granting bail in
extradition cases and that private responded is a “flight risk”.
Held: The extradited may be subject to detention as may be
necessary step in the process of extradition, but the length of time in
the detention should be reasonable. In the case at bar, the record
show that the respondent, Muñoz has been detained for 2 years. The
Philippines has the obligation of ensuring the individual his right to
liberty and due process and should not therefor deprive the
extraditee of his right to bail PROVIDED that certain standards for
the grant is satisfactorily met. In other words there should be “CLEAR
AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE”. However in the case at bar, the
respondent was not able to show and clear and convincing evidence
that he be entitled to bail.

5. Arbitration
a. *RCBC v. Banco de Oro 687 SCRA 583
Facts: RCBC entered into a Share Purchase Agreement (SPA) with
Equitable-PCI Bank, Inc. (EPCIB), George L. Go and the individual
shareholders of Bankard, Inc. (Bankard) for the sale to RCBC of
226,460,000 shares (Subject Shares) of Bankard. RCBC
commenced arbitration proceedings with the ICC-ICA in accordance
with Section 10 of the SPA.
Doctrine: Due process dictates the cold neutrality of impartiality. This
means that "it is not enough that cases be decided without bias and
favouritism. Nor is it sufficient that prepossessions be rid of.
Actuations should moreover inspire that belief." Evident partiality in
its common definition thus implies "the existence of signs and
indications that must lead to an identification or inference" of
partiality.

C. Academic Discipline

1. In General
a. Angeles v. Sison 112 SCRA 26
b. Malabanan v. Ramento 129 SCRA 359
c. Guzman v. NU 142 SCRA 699
d. Alcuaz v. PSBA 161 SCRA 7
e. Non v. Judge Dames 185 SCRA 523
f. *ADMU v. Capulong 222 SCRA 644
Facts: The initiation rites of Aquila Legis, a fraternity in the Ateneo
Law School resulted in the death of 2 freshman students. During
the investigation of the school, respondent students failed to file
their reply and after hearing the testimonies of the witnesses,
found a prima facie case against the respondents. They also failed
to file their answer with the Disciplinary Board and they only asked
for postponement and for the copies of the evidence against them.
The respondents were dismissed. They now alleged that they
were denied due process.
Held: In an academic institution, the following are the minimum
standards to be satisfied in the imposition of disciplinary
sanctions:
1. The students must be informed in writing of the nature and
cause of any accusation against them – The respondent were
given ample notice regarding the nature and cause of the
accusation against them. Various notices dated Feb 14 and Feb
20 were given and were addressed individually to the respondent
students.
2. They shall have the right to answer the charges against them
with the assistance of counsel, if desired – The law firm of
Gonzales Batiler and Bilog and Associates put in its appearances
and filed pleadings on behalf of respondent students.
3. They shall be informed of the evidence against them –
Respondents cannot argue that since they did not have the
opportunity to see and examine the statements that became the
basis of the case against them, they were denied of due process.
For disciplinary actions or cases involving students, it is not
necessary that right to cross examination is included. Here, it is
clear that the investigation is summary in nature with no right of
cross examination.
4. They shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf
5. The evidence must be duly considered by the investigating
committee or official designated to hear and decide the case –
The decision of the Board were only reached after the hearing
wherein respondent students were summoned to answer
clarificatory questions and after considering the written
statements and testimonies of the witnesses.
g. U.P. v. Ligot-Telan 227 SCRA 342
h. *Go v. Colegio de San Juan de Letran 683 SCRA 358
Facts: Upon receiving information of fraternity recruitment on
Letran’s High School, an investigation was conducted. Four
students admitted that they were neophytes of Tau Gamma
 Fraternity who identified a certain Kim Go, a 4 th year HS student
in Letran as a senior member of the fraternity. The parents of Kim
was informed and Kim was also questioned although he denied
the allegation. Based on the testimonies of the neophytes, the
school found substantial basis to suspend Kim. However, the
parents of Kim refused to sign the agreement alleging that they
had been denied of due process.
Held: (see requisites for due process in academic institutions in
ADMU vs. Capulong)
1. Right to cross-examine is not necessarily included. Respondent
may not argue that they were not accorded the opportunity to see
and examine the written statements which became the basis of
the order.
2. Parents were well informed and were asked to assist Kim but
they were the one who failed to attend the hearing conducted.
3. They were properly notified of the charge (fraternity
membership).
4. They were informed about the nature of evidence (testimonies).
5. They were given the time and opportunity to answer.

D. Deportation Proceedings

1. In General
a. *Lao Gi v. CA 180 SCRA 756
Facts: Herein petitioner faces a charge for deportation when a
judgment was rendered cancelling his citizenship (obtained from
a prior judgment) on the ground that it was founded on fraud and
misrepresentation. Petitioners were required to register as aliens
but refused.
Held: Note that deportation proceeding is not judicial in nature,
but rather administrative to remove undesirable aliens.
Although a deportation proceeding does not partake of the nature
of a criminal action, considering that it is a harsh and
extraordinary administrative proceeding affecting the freedom
and liberty of a person, the constitutional right of such person to
due process should not be denied.
b. Domingo v. Scheer, 421 SCRA 468

E. Regulations: Fixing of Rates and Regulation of Profession

1. Rates
a. Philcomsat v. Alcuaz 180 SCRA 218
b. Radiocom v. NTC 184 SCRA 517
c. *Maceda v. ERB 199 SCRA 454
Facts: Caltex and Petron proffered separate application with the
ERB for permission to increase the wholesale posted prices of
 petroleum products. The Board in a joint Order granted said
provisional relief authoring said applicants a weighted average
provisional increase on 1.42 pesos per liter in the wholesale
posted prices of their various petroleum products. Petitioner
Maceda also submit that the same was issued without proper
notice and hearing.
Held: In the broad interest of justice, the administrative body
may, in any particular manner, except itself from technical
rules and apply such suitable procedure as shall promote its
objectives. While EO 172 stressed that a hearing is
indispensable, it does not preclude the Board from ordering a
provisional increase, as it did in this case, subject to its final
disposition.
d. Globe Telecom v. NTC, 435 SCRA 110

2. Profession
a. *Corona v. UHPAP 283 SCRA 31
Facts: PPA General Manager issued PPA-AO No. 04-92
providing therein that “all existing regular appointments which
have been previously issued either by the Bureau of Customs or
the PPA shall remain valid up to 31 December 1992 only” and
that “all appointments to harbour pilot positions in all pilotage
districts shall, henceforth, be only for a term of one (1) year from
the date of effectivity subject to yearly renewal or cancellation by
the authority after conduct of rigid evaluation of performance.”
Respondents argued that due process was not observed
because no hearing was conducted.
Held: In the present case, there is a deprivation and that such
deprivation is done without proper observance of due process.
While notice and hearing are essential only when an
administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial function, there is
no dispute that Pilotage as a profession has taken on the nature
of a property right. Therefore, PPA-AO No. 04-92 unduly restricts
the right of harbor pilots to enjoy their profession before their
compulsory retirement.

F. Dismissals, Suspensions, Reinstatements, etc. …

1. Dismissal in Government Boards and Commissions

a. Abalos v. CSC -196 SCRA 81
b. GSIS v. CSC - 201 SCRA 661
c. Macayayong v. Ople - 204 SCRA 372
d. Gonzales v. CSC - 226 SCRA 66
e. Go. v. NPC - 271 SCRA 447
f. CHR v. CSC - 227 SCRA 42
g. Uy v. COA - 328 SCRA 607
 h. Lameyra v. Pangilinan - 322 SCRA 117
i. NPC v. Zozobrado - 487 SCRA 16
j. PAGCOR v. CA, GR 185668, December 13, 2011

2. Dismissal in Private Sector

a. Hellenic v. Siete - 195 SCRA 179
b. *Salaw v. NLRC - 202 SCRA 7
Facts: Salaw and a fellow employee were alleged to have
conspired in selling twenty (20) sewing machines and electric
generators which had been foreclosed by the respondent
bank. The Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) of the
Philippine Constabulary extracted Sworn Statement from
them without the assistance of a counsel. Petitioner was
requested to appear before the bank's Personnel Discipline
and Investigation Committee (PDIC) which petitioner
attended and 3 months after, his termination became effective
for alleged serious misconduct or willful disobedience and
fraud or willful breach of the trust reposed on him by the
private respondents.
Held: In labor cases the rudimentary requirements of due
process — notice and hearing — must also be observed
before an employee may be dismissed. Those twin
requirements constitute essential elements of due process in
cases employee dismissal. The petitioner was terminated
without the benefit of due process of law. Complainant was
not given the opportunity to present his own defense and
confront the witnesses, if any, and examine the evidence
against him. Hearing was also set "without counsel or
representative. It is true that administrative and quasi-judicial
bodies are not bound by the technical rules of procedure in
the adjudication cases. However, the right to counsel, a very
basic requirement of substantive due process, has to be
observed. Significantly, the dismissal of the petitioner from his
employment was characterized by undue haste.
c. Conti v. NLRC, GR 119253 April 10, 1997
d. Aparente v. NLRC, GR 117652
e. Lopez v. Alturas - 647 SCRA 566

3. Preventive Suspension
a. Alonzo v. Capulong - 244 SCRA 80
b. Castillo – Co v. Barbers 290 SCRA 717
c. Bacsasar v. CSC - 576 SCRA 787
d. Carabeo v. CA 607 - SCRA 394
G. Ordinance/Statute/Memo Cir./Rules
a. *People v. Nazario 165 SCRA 136
Facts: Any owner or manager of fishponds in places within the
territorial limits of Pagbilao shall pay a municipal tax. Nazario
argued that the ordinance is ambigious and uncertain since
he is only a mere lessee while the ordinance speaks of “owner
or manager.
Held: It is Valid. As a rule, a statute or act may be said to be
vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men "of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning
and differ as to its application." It is repugnant to the
Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for
failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it,
fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law
enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions
and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.
It is unmistakable from their very provisions that the appellant
falls within its coverage. As the actual operator of the
fishponds, he comes within the term "manager."
b. Francisco v. CA - 199 SCRA 595
c. Misamis Or. v. DOF - 238 SCRA 63
d. *Estrada v. Sandiganbayan GR 148560 Nov. 19, 2001
Facts: Joseph Ejercito Estrada, then the President of the
Philippines was prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act Defining
and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder). The petitioner
contended that RA 7080 was unconstitutional, on the ground,
among others, that it was vague; said law allegedly suffers
from vagueness on the terms it uses, particularly:
‘combination’, ‘series’, and ‘unwarranted’. Based on this, the
petitioner used the facial challenge to question the validity of
RA 7080.
Held: A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely
because of the employment of general terms or the failure to
define the terms used therein. The validity of a law is
sustained, so long as that law provides some comprehensible
guide as to what would render those subject to the said law
liable to its penalties. The petitioner cannot rely on the void-
for-vagueness doctrine, since this doctrine does not apply to
laws that merely consist of imprecise language. *The over-
breadth doctrine states that a governmental purpose may not
be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly
and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. *A facial
challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one
which is overbroad because of a possible “chilling effect” upon
protected speech.
e. People v. de la Piedra - 350 SCRA 163
H. Motion for Reconsideration
a. Medenilla v. CSC - 194 SCRA 278
b. Mendiola v. CSC - 221 SCRA 295
c. Rodriguez v. Proj. 6 - 247 SCRA 528
d. Lazo v. CSC - 236 SCRA 469
e. Salonga v. CA - 269 SCRA 534
f. Bernardo v. CA - 275 SCRA 413
g. Casuela v. Ombudsman - 276 SCRA 635
h. Cordenillo v. Executive Secretary - 276 SCRA 652
i. Chua v. CA - 287 SCRA 33
j. De la Cruz v. Abelle - 352 SCRA 691
k. Rodriguez v. CA, GR 134275 August 7, 2002
l. Gonzales v. CSC - 490 SCRA 741
m. Berboso v. CA - 494 SCRA 583
n. Pontejos v. Desierto - 592 SCRA 64
o. NAECOR v. ERC - 653 SCRA 642
p. Imperial v. GSIS - 658 SCRA 497
q. Arroyo v. Rosal Homeowners - 684 SCRA 297
r. Ylaya v. Gacott - 689 SCRA 452
s. Moldex v. Villabona - 675 SCRA 615

I. Suretyship
a. Stronghold Insurance v. CA - 205 SCRA 605

J. Tariff and Customs Code

a. *Feeder v. CA - 197 SCRA 842
Facts: Company owned foreign vessel M/T ‘ULU WAI’ from
Singapore carried oil and gas bound for Zamboanga. It
however illegally anchored in Iloilo without notifying the
Customs authorities. The gas and oil were immediately
seized and forfeited due to illegal importation. The
testimonies of the owner’s representative were also made
without counsel.
Held: No violation of due process. Seizure and forfeiture
proceedings under the tariff and customs laws are not criminal
in nature as they do not result in the conviction of the offender
nor in the imposition of the penalty. They are purely civil and
administrative in character. In this case, the degree of proof
required is merely substantial evidence. The right to the
assistance of counsel is not indispensable to due process
unless required by the Constitution or a law. There is nothing
in the Constitution that says a party in a non-criminal
proceeding is entitled to be represented by counsel and that
without such representation he will not be bound by such
proceedings.
K. Appeal
a. Alba v. Deputy Ombudsman - 254 SCRA 753
b. Telan v. CA - 202 SCRA 534
c. Aris v. NLRC - 200 SCRA 246
d. Rivera v. CSC - 240 SCRA 43
e. Singson v. NLRC - 274 SCRA 358
f. Building Care v. Macaraeg - 687 SCRA 643
g. Diona v. Balergue - 688 SCRA 22

L. Closure Proceedings
a. *CB v. CA 220 SCRA 536 (relative constitutionality)
Facts: Pursuant to Monetary Board Resolution No. 596, the
Central Bank was authorized to take over and close
operations of Triumph Savings Bank (TSB) due to insolvency
even without notice and hearing. TSB argued it was denied
due process.
Held: This "close now and hear later" scheme is grounded on
practical and legal considerations to prevent unwarranted
dissipation of the bank's assets and as a valid exercise of
police power to protect the depositors, creditors, stockholders
and the general public. Due process does not necessarily
require a prior hearing; a hearing or an opportunity to be heard
may be subsequent to the closure. The banking business is
properly subject to reasonable regulation under the police
power of the state because of banks are affected with public
interest because they receive funds from the general public in
the form of deposits.
b. Rural Bank v. CA 162 SCRA 288
c. Phil. Merchants v. CA GR 112844 June 2, 1995

M. Biddings
a. Concerned Officials v. Vasquez, 240 SCRA 502

N. UDHA – R.A. 7279; Squatting; Procedure for relocation;

summary abatement
a. *Perez v. v. Madrona 668 SCRA 696
Facts: The Demolition Office of Marikina wanted to demolish the
fence and gate of Madrona’s house because it encroached the
sidewalk. Madrona filed a TRO arguing that his rights to due process
will be violated due to the summary demolition. The Demolition
Office argues that the clearing of the sidewalk is an infrastructure
project of Marikina and cannot be restrained.
Held: There is a right to be protected, that is, respondents’ right over
their concrete fence which cannot be removed without due process.
If petitioner indeed found respondents fence to have encroached on
 the sidewalk, his remedy is not to demolish the same summarily after
respondents failed to heed his request to remove it. Instead, he
should go to court and prove respondents supposed violations in the
construction of the concrete fence. Indeed, unless a thing is a
nuisance per se, it may not be abated summarily without judicial
intervention.

O. Cancellation of Property Rights/Privileges

a. *American Inter-Fashion v. OP 197 SCRA 409
Facts: In 1984, the Garments and Textile Export Board
(GTEB) found Glorious Sun Fashion Garments Corp.
(Glorious) guilty of dollar-salting (occurs when dollars are
removed from the Philippines without approval from the
Central Bank and transferred to an account outside the
county) and misdeclaration of importations. Glorious filed a
petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court but later on
withdrew the same. It argued that its right to due process was
violated when it was prevented to present evidence to the
GTEB.
Held: The glaring fact is that Glorious was denied due
process when GTEB failed to disclose evidence used by it in
rendering a resolution against Glorious. Moreover, the
documents disclosed to Glorious by GTEB in 1987 enhanced
the charge that the former was denied due process. Attention
was also brought to the Puno affidavit, wherein Puno, the
Chairman of the Investigating Panel created by the Ministry of
Trade and Industry admitted that he was pressured by
Minister Ongpin to look for ways and means to remove the
quotas from Glorious.
b. Alliance of DFLO v. Laguesma 254 SCRA 565
c. ABAKADA v. Ermita 469 SCRA 1
d. *British American Tobacco v. Camacho 562 SCRA 511
and (MR) 585 SCRA 36
Facts: British American Tobacco filed a TRO to enjoin the
implementing rules of Sec. 145 of the NIRC on the ground that
they discriminate against new brands of cigarettes, in violation
of the equal protection and uniformity provisions of the
Constitution. The said Section provides a classification freeze
provision where it taxed new brands of cigarettes according
to their current net retail price while existing or "old" brands
shall be taxed based on their net retail price.
Held: The classification freeze provision was in the main the
result of Congress’s earnest efforts to improve the efficiency
and effectivity of the tax administration over sin products while
trying to balance the same with other State interests. In
particular, the questioned provision addressed Congress’s
 administrative concerns regarding delegating too much
authority to the DOF and BIR as this will open the tax system
to potential areas for abuse and corruption. Congress may
have reasonably conceived that a tax system which would
give the least amount of discretion to the tax implementers
would address the problems of tax avoidance and tax
evasion.
e. DPWH v. Spouses Tecson, GR 179334, July 1, 2013

P. Administrative and Preliminary Investigation - Ombudsman

a. Roxas v. Vasquez GR 114944 June 19, 2001
b. Ocampo v. Ombudsman 322 SCRA 17
c. Serapio v. Sandiganbayan, GR 148468, Jan. 28, 2003
d. Estrada v. ombudsman, GR 212140, January 21, 2015
II. Substantive Due Process

*United States v. Toribio - 15 PHIL. 85

Facts: Respondent Toribio is an owner of carabao, residing in the town of Carmen in the
province of Bohol. The trial court of Bohol found that the respondent slaughtered or caused
to be slaughtered a carabao without a permit from the municipal treasurer of the
municipality wherein it was slaughtered, in violation of Sections 30 and 33 of Act No. 1147,
an Act regulating the registration, branding, and slaughter of Large Cattle. The act prohibits
the slaughter of large cattle fit for agricultural work or other draft purposes for human
consumption. The respondent counters by stating that what the Act is prohibiting is the
slaughter of large cattle in the municipal slaughter house without a permit given by the
municipal treasurer. Furthermore, he contends that the municipality of Carmen has no
slaughter house and that he slaughtered his carabao in his dwelling. Respondent said that
the statute is unconstitutional and in violation of the Philippine Bill which provides that “no
law shall be enacted which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law.”

Issue: Whether or not Act. No. 1147, regulating the registration, branding and slaughter of
large cattle, is an undue and unauthorized exercise of police power and unconstitutional.

Held: It is a valid exercise of police power of the state. Police power is the inherent power
of the state to legislate laws which may interfere with personal liberties. To justify the state
in the exercise of its sovereign police power it must appear (1) that the interest of the
general public requires it and (2) that the means are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.

The act primarily seeks to protect large cattle against theft to make it easy for the recovery
and return to owners, which encouraged them to regulate the registration and slaughter of
large cattle.

Also, several years prior to the enactment of the said law, an epidemic struck the Philippine
islands which threatened the survival of carabaos in the country. In some provinces
seventy, eighty and even one hundred percent of their local carabaos perished due to the
said epidemic. This drove the prices of carabaos up to four or five-fold, as a consequence
carabao theft became rampant due to the luxurious prices of these work animals.
Moreover, this greatly affected the food production of the country which prompted the
government to import rice from its neighboring countries.

As these work animals are vested with public interest for they are of fundamental use for
the production of crops, the government was prompted to pass a law that would protect
these work animals. The purpose of the law is to stabilize the number of carabaos in the
country as well as to redistribute them throughout the entire archipelago. It was also the
same reason why large cattles fit for farm work was prohibited to be slaughtered for human
consumption.

Further, the court is of the opinion that the act applies generally to the slaughter of large
cattle for human consumption, ANYWHERE, without a permit duly secured from the
municipal treasurer, For to do otherwise is to defeat the purpose of the law and the intent
of the law makers. Obviously, the provisions of the statute under consideration were
imposed strictly for the promotion of general welfare and public interest. These reasons
satisfy the requisites for the valid exercise of police power. The SC affirmed the decision
of the trial court.
*Churchill v. Rafferty - 32 PHIL. 580
Plaintiffs put up a billboard on a private land located in Rizal Province “quite distance from
the road and strongly built, not dangerous to the safety of the people, and contained no
advertising matter which is filthy, indecent, or deleterious to the morals of the
community.” However, defendant Rafferty, Collector of Internal Revenue, decided to
remove the billboards after due investigation made upon the complaints of the British and
German Consuls. Act No. 2339 authorized the then Collector of Internal Revenue to
remove after due investigation, any billboard exposed to the public view if it decides that it
is offensive to the sight or is otherwise a nuisance. In the agreed statement of facts
submitted by the parties, the plaintiffs "admit that the billboards mentioned were and still
are offensive to the sight." The Court of First Instance perpetually restrains and prohibits
the defendant and his deputies from collecting and enforcing against the plaintiffs and their
property the annual tax mentioned and described in subsection (b) of section 100 of Act
No. 2339, effective July 1, 1914, and from destroying or removing any sign, signboard, or
billboard, the property of the plaintiffs and decrees the cancellation of the bond given by
the plaintiffs. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WON Act No. 2339 was a legitimate exercise of the police power of the
Government?

HELD: YES. Things offensive to the senses, such as sight, smell or hearing, may be
suppressed by the State especially those situated in thickly populated districts. Aesthetics
may be regulated by the police power of the state, as long as it is justified by public interest
and safety. Moreover, if the police power may be exercised to encourage a healthy social
and economic condition in the country, and if the comfort and convenience of the people
are included within those subjects, everything which encroaches upon such territory is
amenable to the police power of the State. Hence, the judgment of the CFI is reversed.

*People v. Fajardo - 104 PHIL. 443

Facts: The municipal council of Baao, Camarines sur stating among others that
construction of a building, which will destroy the view of the plaza, shall not be allowed and
therefore be destroyed at the expense of the owner, enacted an ordinance.
Herein appellant filed a written request with the incumbent municipal mayor for a permit to
construct a building adjacent to their gasoline station on a parcel of land registered in
Fajardo's name, located along the national highway and separated from the public plaza
by a creek. The request was denied, for the reason among others that
the proposed building would destroy the view or beauty of the public
plaza. Defendants reiterated their request for a building permit, but again the mayor turned
down the request. Whereupon, appellants proceeded with the construction of the building
without a permit, because they needed a place of residence very badly, their former house
having been destroyed by a typhoon and hitherto they had been living on leased property.
Thereafter, defendants were charged in violation of the ordinance and subsequently
convicted. Hence this appeal.

Held: It is not a valid exercise of police power. The ordinance is unreasonable and
oppressive, in that it operates to permanently deprive appellants of the right to use their
own property; hence, it oversteps the bounds of police power, and amounts to a taking of
appellant’s property without just compensation. The ordinance fails to state any policy, or
to set up any standard to guide or limit the mayor's action. The ordinance is unreasonable
and oppressive, in that it operates to permanently deprive appellants of the right to use
their own property; hence, it oversteps the bounds of police power, and amounts to a taking
of appellants’ property without just compensation. The ordinance is not a mere regulation.
*Ermita-Malate Hotel & Motel Operator v. City of Manila - 20 SCRA 849
Facts: Ordinance 4670 would impose P6,000.00 license fee per annum for first class
motels and P4,500.00 for second class motels; there was also the requirement that the
guests would fill up a form specifying their personal information. There was also a provision
that the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging houses would be open
for inspection from city authorities. They claimed this to be violative of due process for
being vague. The law also classified motels into two classes and required the maintenance
of certain minimum facilities in first class motels such as a telephone in each room, a dining
room or, restaurant and laundry. The petitioners also invoked the lack of due process on
this for being arbitrary. It was also unlawful for the owner to lease any room or portion
thereof more than twice every 24 hours. There was also a prohibition for persons below 18
in the hotel. The challenged ordinance also caused the automatic cancellation of the
license of the hotels that violated the ordinance. The lower court declared the ordinance
unconstitutional. Hence, this appeal by the city of Manila.

Held: There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to
minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals, particularly fornication and prostitution.
Moreover, the increase in the licensed fees was intended to discourage "establishments of
the kind from operating for purpose other than legal" and at the same time, to increase "the
income of the city government." There is a presumption that the laws enacted by Congress
(in this case Mun Board) is valid. W/o a showing or a strong foundation of invalidity, the
presumption stays. As in this case, there was only a stipulation of facts and such cannot
prevail over the presumption. The ordinance is a valid exercise of Police Power. There is
no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain
practices hurtful to public morals. This is to minimize prostitution. The increase in taxes not
only discourages hotels/motels in doing any business other than legal but also increases
the revenue of the LGU concerned. And taxation is a valid exercise of police power as
well. The due process contention is likewise untenable, There is no controlling and precise
definition of due process. It has a standard to which the governmental action should
conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be
valid. What then is the standard of due process which must exist both as a procedural and
a substantive requisite to free the challenged ordinance from legal infirmity? It is
responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice.
Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided. Nothing in the petition is
sufficient to prove the ordinance’s nullity for an alleged failure to meet the due process
requirement. Also the constitutionality of the ordinance upheld for lack of evidence to rebut
such. It was enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals – alarming
increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery and fornication in Manila traceable in great part
to the existence of motels, which "provide a necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry,
presence and exit" and thus become the "ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill-seekers.” No
showing that the respondent acted unreasonableness and arbitrariness.

*Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court - 148 SCRA 659

Facts: In 1980 President Marcos amended Executive Order No. 626-A which orders that
no carabao and carabeef shall be transported from one province to another; such violation
shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the government, to be distributed to
charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat
Inspection Commission may see fit for the carabeef and to deserving farmers through
dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit in the case of the carabaos.

On January 13, 1984, Petitioner’s 6 carabaos were confiscated by the police station
commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for having been transported from Masbate to Iloilo in
violation of EO 626-A. He issued a writ for replevin, challenging the constitutionality of said
EO. The trial court sustained the confiscation of the animals and declined to rule on the
validity of the law on the ground that it lacked authority to do so. Its decision was affirmed
by the IAC.Hence, this petition for review filed by Petitioner.

Issue: Whether or not the said Executive Order is unconstitutional.

Held: SC ruled that while there is a lawful subject, there was no lawful method. The EO
imposes on the absolute ban not on the slaughter of carabaos but on their movement,
providing that no carabao and carabeef should be transported from one province to another
the purpose of which is to protect the community from the loss of the services of such
animals by their slaughter. SC said that the reasonable connection between the means
employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing.
They cannot see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can
prevent their indiscriminate slaughter considering that they can be killed anywhere.

The EO is also unconstitutional as there was outright confiscation of carabaos without

according the owner the right to be heard before a competent and impartial court. There
certainly was no reason why the offense prohibited by the EO should not have been proved
first in a court of justice, with the accused being accorded all the rights safeguarded to him
under the Constitution. The EO is penal in nature, the violation should have been
pronounced not by the police only but by a court of justice, which alone would have had
the authority to impose the prescribed penalty, and only after trial and conviction of the
accused. Wherefore, the EO is unconstitutional.

*Balacuit v. CFI - 163 SCRA 182

Facts: Petitioners, theater owners, assailed the constitutionality of Ordinance No. 640
passed by the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan on April 21, 1969. This called for a
reduction to ½ of the ticket price given to minors from 7-12 years old. There was a fine
from 200-600 pesos or a 2-6 month imprisonment. The complaint was issued in the trial
court. A TRO was then issued to prevent the law from being enforced. The respondent
court entered its decision declaring the law valid. Petitioners attack the validity and
constitutionality of Ordinance No. 640 on the grounds that it is ultra vires and an invalid
exercise of police power. Petitioners contend that Ordinance No. 640 is not within the
power of’ the Municipal Board to enact as provided for in Section 15(n) of Republic Act
No. 523 where it states that the Muncipal board can only fix license fees for theaters and
not admission rates. The respondent attempts to justify the enactment of the ordinance
by invoking the general welfare clause embodied in Section 15 of the cited law.

Issue: W/N Ordinance 640 – prohibiting payment on theater tickets for children below
seven (7) is constitutional?

Ruling: NO, because it infringes theater owners’ right to property. There is nothing
pernicious in demanding equal price for both children and adults. The petitioners are
merely conducting their legitimate businesses. The object of every business entrepreneur
is to make a profit out of his venture. There is nothing immoral or injurious in charging the
same price for both children and adults. In fact, no person is under compulsion to purchase
a ticket. It is a totally voluntary act on the part of the purchaser if he buys a ticket to such
performances. Such ticket represents a right, Positive or conditional, as the case may be,
according to the terms of the original contract of sale. This right is clearly a right of property.
The ticket which represents that right is also, necessarily, a species of property. As such,
the owner thereof, in the absence of any condition to the contrary in the contract by which
he obtained it, has the clear right to dispose of it, to sell it to whom he pleases and at such
price as he can obtain. So that an act prohibiting the sale of tickets to theaters or other
places of amusement at more than the regular price was held invalid as conflicting with the
state constitution securing the right of property.

*Magtajas v. Pryce Properties – 234 SCRA 255

Facts: The Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) is a corporation
created directly by P.D. 1869 to help centralize and regulate all games of chance, including
casinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines. PAGCOR
decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City by leasing a portion of a building
belonging to Pryce Properties Corporation Inc. for its casino. Sangguniang Panlungsod of
CDO enacted ordinance 3353, prohibiting the issuance of business permit and cancelling
existing business permit to any establishment for the using and allowing to be used its
premises or portion thereof for the operation of a casino. It enacted Ordinance 3375-93,
prohibiting the operation of casino and providing penalty for violation therefore.
Pryce assailed the ordinances before the CA, where it was joined by PAGCOR as
intervenor. The Court found the ordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed for to prohibit
their enforcement. CDO City and its mayor filed a petition for review under Rules of Court
with the Supreme Court.

Issue: WON the Sangguniang Panlungsod can prohibit the establishment of casino
operated by PAGCOR through an ordinance or resolution.

Held: No. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is generally considered inimical to the
interests of the people, there is nothing in the Constitution categorically proscribing or
penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even mentioning it at all. In the exercise of its own
discretion, the Congress may prohibit gambling altogether or allow it without limitation or it
may prohibit some forms of gambling and allow others for whatever reasons it may
consider sufficient.
Under Sec. 458 of the Local Government Code, local government units are authorized to
prevent or suppress, among others, “gambling and other prohibited games of chance.”
Ordinances should not contravene a statue as municipal governments are only agents of
the national government. Local councils exercise only delegated powers conferred on them
by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the
principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter.

The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held that
to be valid, an ordinance must conform to the following substantive requirements:
1) It must not contravene the constitution or any statute.
2) It must not be unfair or oppressive.
3) It must not be partial or discriminatory.
4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade.
5) It must be general and consistent with public policy.
6) It must not be unreasonable.

*Bennis v. Michigan - No. 94-8729 March 4, 1996

Facts: Petitioner, was a joint owner, with her husband of a car in which her husband
engaged in sexual activity with a prostitute. Petitioner’s husband was convicted of gross
indecency and the car was abated under 600.3801 and 600.3825 of Michigan’s Compiled
Laws. A Michigan court, Wayne County Circuit Court (probably like RTC in Philippines)
ordered the car forfeited as a public nuisance, notwithstanding her lack of knowledge of
her husband’s activity. 
 The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the decision of WCCC
and held that the car cannot be abated in absent of proof that she knew to what end the
car would be used. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the Michigan
Court of Appeals and reinstated the abatement, ordered by WCCC, completely. 


- Michigan Compiled Laws 600.3801 “Any building, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or place
used for the purpose of lewdness, assignation or prostitution or gambling, or used
by, or kept for the use of prostitutes or other disorderly persons, ... is declared a nui-
sance, ... and all ... nuisances shall be enjoined and abated as provided in this act
and as provided in the court rules. Any person or his or her servant, agent, or
employee who owns, leases, conducts, or maintains any building, vehicle, or place
used for any of the purposes or acts set forth in this section is guilty of a nuisance.”

Position of Petitioners: Petitioner’s defense was that she did not know that her husband
would use the car to violate Michigan’s indecency law.

Position of Respondents: According to jurisprudence, Michigan does not need to prove

that the owner knew or agreed that her vehicle would be used in a manner prescribed by
600.3801 when she entrusted it to another user.

ISSUE: W/N Michigan’s abatement scheme has deprived petitioner of her interest in the
forfeited car without due process, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment?

HELD/RATIO: NO. Wayne County Circuit Court took into consideration the fact that the
petitioners had another car to use in case the car in question is declared a public
nuisance. According to jurisprudence, owner’s interest in a property may be forfeited
even though the owner did not know that it was used as such and this is not a violation of
the due process clause. Forfeiture of property serves as a deterrent purpose. It prevents
illegal use both by preventing further illicit use of property and imposing economic
penalty. Also, the car taken away from the petitioner was by virtue of this case and not by
virtue of State’s exercise of eminent domain. Thus there is no just compensation needed.



*Cruzan v. Dir. Missouri - No. 88-1503 June 25, 1990

Facts: Petitioner Nancy Cruzan is incompetent, having sustained severe injuries in an

automobile accident, and now lies in a Missouri state hospital in what is referred to as a
persistent vegetative state: generally, a condition in which a person exhibits motor reflexes
but evinces no indications of significant cognitive function. The State is bearing the cost of
her care. Hospital employees refused, without court approval, to honor the request of
Cruzan's parents, co petitioners here, to terminate her artificial nutrition and hydration,
since that would result in death. A state trial court authorized the termination, finding that
a person in Cruzan's condition has a fundamental right under the State and Federal
Constitutions to direct or refuse the withdrawal of death-prolonging procedures, and that
Cruzan's expression to a former housemate that she would not wish to continue her life if
sick or injured unless she could live at least halfway normally suggested that she would
not wish to continue on with her nutrition and hydration. The State Supreme Court
reversed. While recognizing a right to refuse treatment embodied in the common-law
doctrine of informed consent, the court questioned its applicability in this case. It also
declined to read into the State Constitution a broad right to privacy that would support an
unrestricted right to refuse treatment and expressed doubt that the Federal Constitution
embodied such a right. The court then decided that the State Living Will statute embodied
a state policy strongly favoring the preservation of life, and that Cruzan's statements to her
housemate were unreliable for the purpose of determining her intent. It rejected the
argument that her parents were entitled to order the termination of her medical treatment,
concluding that no person can assume that choice for an incompetent in the absence of
the formalities required by the Living Will statute or clear and convincing evidence of the
patient's wishes.

Held: The Due Process Clause does not require a State to accept the "substituted
judgment" of close family members in the absence of substantial proof that their views
reflect the patient's. This Court's decision upholding a State's favored treatment of
traditional family relationships may not be turned into a constitutional requirement that a
State must recognize the primacy of these relationships in a situation like this. Nor may a
decision upholding a State's right to permit family decision making be turned into a
constitutional requirement that the State recognize such decision making. Nancy Cruzan's
parents would surely be qualified to exercise such a right of "substituted judgment" were it
required by the Constitution. However, for the same reasons that Missouri may require
clear and convincing evidence of a patient's wishes, it may also choose to defer only to
those wishes, rather than confide the decision to close family members.

*Chavez v. Romulo, 431 SCRA 534

Facts: President Gloria Arroyo delivered a speech before the members of the PNP
stressing the need for a nationwide gun ban in all public places, hence ordering PNP Chief
Ebdane to suspend the issuance of permits to carry firearms outside of residence
(PTCFOR). The Memorandum released by Ebdane states among others that all PTCFOR
are revoked except those covered with mission/letter orders. Chavez, as a licensed gun
owner, alleged that the PNP guidelines violate due process clause because the right to
own and carry a firearm is necessarily intertwined with right to life.
Held: A license authorizing a person to enjoy a certain privilege is neither a property nor
property right nor does it create a vested right. Consequently, a PTCFOR, just like ordinary
licenses in other regulated fields, may be revoked any time. It does not confer an absolute
right, but only a personal privilege to be exercised under existing restrictions, and such as
may thereafter be reasonably imposed.

*GSIS v. Montescarlos, 434 SCRA 441

Facts: Nicolas Montesclaros, 72 years old widower, married Milagors Orbiso, 43 years old.
He then filed with the GSIS an application for retirement benefits under PD 1146,
designating Milagros as his sole beneficiary. GSIS approved the application and later on,
he died. Milagros now claims for a survivorship pension, which the GSIS denied, stating
that under the law, a surviving spouse has no right to the survivorship pension unless she
contracted with the pensioner within 3 years before the deceased spouse is qualified for
pension. The marriage was only less than a year before the date of retirement of Nicolas.
Held: The sole proviso Sec. 18 of PD 1146 is unconstitutional. Under Section 18 of PD
1146, it prohibits the dependent spouse from receiving survivorship pension if such
dependent spouse married the pensioner within three years before the pensioner qualified
for the pension. The Court holds that such proviso is discriminatory and denies equal
protection of the law. The proviso is unduly oppressive in outrightly denying a dependent
spouses claim for survivorship pension if the dependent spouse contracted marriage to the
pensioner within the three-year prohibited period.
There is outright confiscation of benefits due the surviving spouse without giving the
surviving spouse an opportunity to be heard.
A statute based on reasonable classification does not violate the constitutional
guaranty of the equal protection of the law. The requirements for a valid and reasonable
classification are:
(1) it must rest on substantial distinctions;
(2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) it must apply equally to all members of the same class. Thus, the law may treat and
regulate one class differently from another class provided there are real and substantial
differences to distinguish one class from another.
The proviso in question does not satisfy these requirements. The proviso discriminates
against the dependent spouse who contracts marriage to the pensioner within three years
before the pensioner qualified for the pension. Under the proviso, even if the dependent
spouse married the pensioner more than three years before the pensioners death, the
dependent spouse would still not receive survivorship pension if the marriage took place
within three years before the pensioner qualified for pension. The object of the prohibition
is vague. There is no reasonable connection between the means employed and the
purpose intended. The law itself does not provide any reason or purpose for such a
prohibition. If the purpose of the proviso is to prevent deathbed marriages, then we do not
see why the proviso reckons the three-year prohibition from the date the pensioner
qualified for pension and not from the date the pensioner died. The classification does not
rest on substantial distinctions. Worse, the classification lumps all those marriages
contracted within three years before the pensioner qualified for pension as having been
contracted primarily for financial convenience to avail of pension benefits.

*Chavez v. COMELEC, 437 SCRA 415

Facts: Francisco Chavez, as a taxpayer and citizen, sought to enjoin COMELEC from
enforcing Section 32 of its Resolution No. 6520 which reads: All propaganda materials …
shall be presumed to have conducted premature campaigning in violation of Section 80 of
the Omnibus Election Code. Chavez have formal agreements with some establishments
to endorse products, thus, his name and face was shown in 3 billboards. He now asked to
be exempted from the provision, considering that the billboards are for product
endorsement and cannot be considered as paraphernalia for premature campaigning
Issue: Section 32 of COMELEC Resolution No. 6520 an invalid exercise of police power?
Held: Petitioner argues that the billboards, while they exhibit his name and image, do not
at all announce his candidacy for any public office nor solicit support for such candidacy
from the electorate. They are, he claims, mere product endorsements and not election
propaganda. Prohibiting, therefore, their exhibition to the public is not within the scope of
the powers of the COMELEC, he concludes.
Police power, as an inherent attribute of sovereignty, is the power to prescribe regulations
to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, or safety, and the general
welfare of the people. To determine the validity of a police measure, two questions must
be asked: (1) Does the interest of the public in general, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require the exercise of police power? and (2) Are the means employed
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals?
A close examination of the assailed provision reveals that its primary objectives are
to prohibit premature campaigning and to level the playing field for candidates of public
office, to equalize the situation between popular or rich candidates, on one hand, and
lesser-known or poorer candidates, on the other, by preventing the former from enjoying
undue advantage in exposure and publicity on account of their resources and popularity.
The latter is a valid reason for the exercise of police power. Moreover, petitioner cannot
claim that the subject billboards are purely product endorsements and do not announce
nor solicit any support for his candidacy
It is true that when petitioner entered into the contracts or agreements to endorse
certain products, he acted as a private individual and had all the right to lend his name and
image to these products. However, when he filed his certificate of candidacy for Senator,
the billboards featuring his name and image assumed partisan political character because
the same indirectly promoted his candidacy. Therefore, the COMELEC was acting well
within its scope of powers when it required petitioner to discontinue the display of the
subject billboards. If the subject billboards were to be allowed, candidates for public office
whose name and image are used to advertise commercial products would have more
opportunity to make themselves known to the electorate, to the disadvantage of other
candidates who do not have the same chance of lending their faces and names to endorse
popular commercial products as image models. Similarly, an individual intending to run for
public office within the next few months, could pay private corporations to use him as their
image model with the intention of familiarizing the public with his name and image even
before the start of the campaign period. This, without a doubt, would be a circumvention of
the rule against premature campaigning:
Under the abovementioned Constitutional provision, the COMELEC is expressly
authorized to supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all media communication
or information to ensure equal opportunity, time, and space. All these are aimed at the
holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.

*Lucena Grand Terminal v. JAC Liner, 452 SCRA 174

Facts: The City of Lucena enacted an ordinance which provides, inter alia, that: all buses,
mini-buses and out-of-town passenger jeepneys shall be prohibited from entering the city
and are hereby directed to proceed to the common terminal, for picking-up and/or dropping
of their passengers; and (b) all temporary terminals in the City of Lucena are hereby
declared inoperable starting from the effectivity of this ordinance. It also provides that all
jeepneys, mini-buses, and buses shall use the grand central terminal of the city. JAC Liner,
Inc. assailed the city ordinance as unconstitutional on the ground that, inter alia, the same
constituted an invalid exercise of police power, an undue taking of private property, and a
violation of the constitutional prohibition against monopolies.

Issue: Whether or not the ordinance satisfies the requisite of valid exercise of police power,
i.e. lawful subject and lawful means.

Held: The local government may be considered as having properly exercised its police
power only if the following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State, and (2)
the means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought to
be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. Otherwise stated, there must
be a concurrence of a lawful subject and lawful method. The questioned ordinances having
been enacted with the objective of relieving traffic congestion in the City of Lucena, they
involve public interest warranting the interference of the State. The first requisite for the
proper exercise of police power is thus present. This leaves for determination the issue of
whether the means employed by the Lucena Sangguniang Panlungsod to attain its
professed objective were reasonably necessary and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals. The ordinances assailed herein are characterized by overbreadth. They go
beyond what is reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem. Additionally, since the
compulsory use of the terminal operated by petitioner would subject the users thereof to
fees, rentals and charges, such measure is unduly oppressive, as correctly found by the
appellate court. What should have been done was to determine exactly where the problem
lies and then to stop it right there.
The true role of Constitutional Law is to effect an equilibrium between authority and liberty
so that rights are exercised within the framework of the law and the laws are enacted with
due deference to rights. It is its reasonableness, not its effectiveness, which bears upon its
constitutionality. If the constitutionality of a law were measured by its effectiveness, then
even tyrannical laws may be justified whenever they happen to be effective.

*City of Manila v. Laguio, 455 SCRA 308

Facts: The private respondent, Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTOC) is a
corporation engaged in the business of operating hotels, motels, hostels, and lodging
houses. It built and opened Victoria Court in Malate which was licensed as a motel although
duly accredited with the Department of Tourism as a hotel. City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim
approved an ordinance enacted which prohibited certain forms of amusement,
entertainment, services and facilities where women are used as tools in entertainment and
which tend to disturb the community, annoy the inhabitants, and adversely affect the social
and moral welfare of the community. The Ordinance prohibited the establishment of sauna
parlors, massage parlors, karaoke bars, beerhouses, night clubs, day clubs, cabarets,
motels, inns. Owners and operators of the enumerated establishments are given three
months to wind up business operations or transfer to any place outside Ermita-Malate or
convert said businesses to other kinds allowable within the area. The Ordinance also
provided that in case of violation and conviction, the premises of the erring establishment
shall be closed and padlocked permanently.

MTOC filed a Petition with the lower court, praying that the Ordinance, insofar as it included
motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and
unconstitutional for several reasons but mainly because it is not a valid exercise of police
power and it constitutes a denial of equal protection under the law. Judge Laguio ruled for
the petitioners. The case was elevated to the Supreme Court.

Issue: WON the Ordinance is constitutional.

Held: SC held that the ordinance is unconstitutional for several reasons.

First, it did not meet the valid exercise of police power. To successfully invoke the exercise
of police power, not only must it appear that (1)the interest of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private rights,
but (2)the means employed must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose and not unduly oppressive. The object of the ordinance was the promotion and
protection of the social and moral values of the community. The closing down and transfer
of businesses or their conversion into businesses allowed under the ordinance have no
reasonable relation to its purpose. Otherwise stated, the prohibition of the enumerated
establishments will not per se protect and promote social and moral welfare of the
community. It will not itself eradicate prostitution, adultery, fornication nor will it arrest the
spread of sexual disease in Manila.

The ordinance violates the equal protection clause. Equal protection requires that all
persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to the rights conferred
and responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects, in other words, should not be treated
differently, so as to give undue favor to some. Legislative bodies are allowed to classify the
subjects of legislation provided the classification is reasonable. To be valid, it must conform
to the following requirements: (1)It must be based on substantial distinction; (2)It must be
germane to the purpose of the law; (3)It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4)It must apply equally to all members of the class. In the Court’s view, there are no
substantial distinction between motels, inns, pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or
other similar establishments. By definition, all are commercial establishments providing
lodging and usually meals and other services for the public. No reason exists for prohibiting
motels and inns but not pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar
establishments. The Court likewise cannot see the logic for prohibiting the business and
operation of motels in the Ermita-Malate area but not outside this area. A noxious
establishment does not become any less noxious if located outside the area.

*Bayan v. Ermita, GR 169848, April 25, 2006

Facts: The petitioners, Bayan, et al., alleged that they are citizens and taxpayers of the
Philippines and that their right as organizations and individuals were violated when the rally
they participated in on October 6, 2005 was violently dispersed by policemen implementing
Batas Pambansa No. 880. Petitioners contended that Batas Pambansa No. 880 is clearly
as it requires a permit before one can stage a public assembly regardless of the presence
or absence of a clear and present danger. It also curtails the choice of venue and is thus
repugnant to the freedom of expression clause as the time and place of a public assembly
form part of the message which the expression is sought. Furthermore, it is not content-
neutral as it does not apply to mass actions in support of the government.

Issue: Whether the BP 880 violates the Constitution?

Held: Section 4 of Article III of the Philippine Constitution provides that no law shall be
passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances. The
right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances, together with freedom
of speech, of expression, and of the press, is a right that enjoys dominance in the sphere
of constitutional protection. For this rights represent the very basis of a functional
democratic polity, without which all the other rights would be meaningless and unprotected.

However, it must be remembered that the right, while sacrosanct, is not absolute. It may
be regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal
rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or society. The power to regulate the
exercise of such and other constitutional rights is termed the sovereign “police power,”
which is the power to prescribe regulations, to promote the health, morals, peace,
education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people.

B.P. No 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply
regulates the time, place and manner of the assemblies. B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows
that it refers to all kinds of public assemblies that would use public places. Furthermore,
the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present danger to public order,
public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health. This is a recognized
exception to the exercise of the rights even under the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

*KMU v. Dir. Gen. 487 SCRA 623

Facts: President Arroyo issued Executive Order 450 which requires all government
agencies and controlled corporations to have a uniform identification card; the director-
general of the national economic development authority was tasked to implement this
order. The information required to be in the said identification card would be: name, home
address, sex, picture, signature, date of birth, place of birth, marital status, names of
parents, height, weight, two index fingers and two thumb marks, any prominent
distinguishing features like moles and others, tax identification number (TIN). The
petitioners argued that the said executive order usurped legislative functions and violates
the right of privacy. Petitioners alleged that EO 450 is contrary to law because it violated
the principle handed down by the Court in Ople v Torres and RA 8282 or the Social Security
Act of 1997. The order according to the petitioners was also going to use funds that are
not appropriated by the Congress, it was also issued without a public hearing. The order
was also violating the constitutional provision of equal protection of the laws because it
discriminates and penalizes those who do not have an id. The petitioners also argue that
the order violates the right to privacy by allowing for the access of the personal data of the
owner without his or her consent.

Issue:
Whether or not EO 450 usurped legislative functions and violated the citizen’s right
to privacy.

Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the petition had no merit. The said order only applies
to government agencies who are already issuing identification cards even before the said
order was implemented. The purposes of the order were to: reduce costs, achieve
efficiency and reliability, convenience to the people served by the government entities and
insure compatibility. Section 17 Article VII of the Constitution also provides for the President
to have control to all executive departments, bureaus and offices. This constitutional power
of the President is self-executing and does not need implementing legislation. This power
of course is limited to executive branch of the government and does not extend to other
branches or independent constitutional commissions. EO 450 does not violate the right to
privacy since no citizen particularly government employee have complained upon the
showing of information on their identification cards, even the petitioners have not made
any complaint about their own identification cards. EO 450 also issues identification cards
that only have 14 data about the owner much less than what is issued upon Supreme Court
employees.

*Mirasol v. DPWH 490 SCRA 318

Facts: Pursuant to its mandate under R.A. 2000, DPWH issued on June 25, 1998
Department Order (DO) No. 215 declaring the Manila-Cavite (Coastal Road) Toll
Expressway as limited access facilities. The DPWH acting thru the TRB, issued
Department Order No. 123 (and AO 1) only allowing motorcycles with engine displacement
of 400 cubic centimeters inside limited access facilities (toll ways).
Held: The use of public highways by motor vehicles is subject to regulation as an exercise
of the police power of the state. AO 1 does not impose unreasonable restrictions. It merely
outlines several precautionary measures designed to ensure public safety and the
uninhibited flow of traffic within limited access facilities. A toll way is not an ordinary road.
Inevitably, such rules will restrict certain rights. But the mere fact that certain rights are
restricted does not invalidate the rules. The exercise of police power involves restriction,
but such must reasonable. AO 1 is not oppressive. Petitioners are not being deprived of
their right to use the limited access facility. They are merely being required, just like the
rest of the public, to adhere to the rules on how to use the facility. Further classification by
itself is not prohibited. Not all motorized vehicles are created equal. There is real and
substantial differences exist between a motorcycle and other forms of transport sufficient
to justify its classification among those prohibited from plying the toll ways.

*Parreno v. COA 523 SCRA 390

Facts: Petitioner retired, migrated to Hawaii and became a naturalized American
citizen. The AFP stopped petitioner’s monthly pension in accordance with Section 27 of
PD 1638, which provides that a retiree who loses his Filipino citizenship shall be removed
from the retired list and his retirement benefits terminated upon loss of Filipino
citizenship. Petitioner requested for reconsideration but the Judge Advocate General of the
AFP denied the request.
Held: PD 1638, as amended, does not impair any vested right or interest of
petitioner. Where the employee retires and meets the eligibility requirements, he acquires
a vested right to the benefits that is protected by the due process clause. At the time of the
approval of PD 1638 and at the time of its amendment, petitioner was still in active
service. Hence, petitioner’s retirement benefits were only future benefits and did not
constitute a vested right. Before a right to retirement benefits or pension vests in an
employee, he must have met the stated conditions of eligibility with respect to the nature
of employment, age, and length of service. It is only upon retirement that military personnel
acquire a vested right to retirement benefits. Retirees enjoy a protected property interest
whenever they acquire a right to immediate payment under pre-existing law.

*St. Luke’s v. NLRC 517 SCRA 677

Facts: Congress passed and enacted Republic Act No. 7431 known as the “Radiologic
Technology Act of 1992.” Said law requires that no person shall practice or offer to practice
as a radiology and/or x-ray technologist in the Philippines without having obtained the
proper certificate of registration from the Board of Radiologic Technology. Petitioner
Maribel Santos was hired as X-Ray Technician in the Radiology department of private
respondent St. Luke’s Medical Center, Inc. (SLMC).

SLMC issued a final notice to all practitioners of Radiologic Technology to comply with the
requirement otherwise, the unlicensed employee will be transferred to an area which does
not require a license to practice if a slot is available.

The Director of the Institute of Radiology issued another memorandum to petitioner Maribel
S. Santos advising her that only a license can assure her of her continued employment at
the Institute of Radiology of the private respondent SLMC and that the latter is giving her
the last chance to take and pass the forthcoming board examination scheduled in June
1998; otherwise, private respondent SLMC shall be constrained to take action which may
include her separation from employment. Director of the Institute of Radiology issued a
notice to petitioner Maribel S. Santos informing the latter that the management of private
respondent SLMC has approved her retirement in lieu of separation pay. SLMC issued a
“Notice of Separation from the Company” to petitioner Maribel S. Santos effective
December 30, 1998 in view of the latter’s refusal to accept private respondent SLMC’s offer
for early retirement.

Petitioner Maribel Santos files a complaint against private respondent illegal dismissal and
non-payment of salaries, allowances and other monetary benefits. She further contends
that her failure to pass the board licensure exam for exam for X-ray technicians did not
constitute just cause for termination as it violated her constitutional right to security of
tenure. The appellate court finds this contention untenable, hence this petition for certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is legally dismissed pursuant to R.A. 7431 exercising
police power of the State?

Held: Yes, the petitioner dismissal is valid due to her inability to secure a certificate of
registration from Board of Radiologic Technology. While the right of workers to security of
tenure is guaranteed by the Constitution, its exercise may be reasonably regulated
pursuant to the police power of the State to safeguard health, morals, peace, education,
order, safety, and the general welfare of the people. Consequently, persons who desire to
engage in the learned professions requiring scientific or technical knowledge may be
required to take an examination as a prerequisite to engaging in their chosen careers. The
state is justified in prescribing the specific requirements for x-ray technicians and/or any
other professions connected with the health and safety of its citizens. Respondent being
engaged in the hospital and health care business, is a proper subject of the cited law; thus,
having in mind the legal requirements of these laws, the latter cannot close its eyes and
complainant private interest override public interest.

*MMDA v. Viron 530 SCRA 341

Facts: Respondent Viron filed a petition for declaratory relief before the RTC of Manila
alleging that the MMDA was "poised to issue a Circular, Memorandum or Order closing, or
tantamount to closing, all provincial bus terminals along EDSA and in the whole of the
Metropolis under the pretext of traffic regulation." This impending move, it stressed, would
mean the closure of its bus terminal in Sampaloc and two others in Quezon City.

Held: In light of the administrative nature of its powers and functions, the MMDA is devoid
of authority to implement the Project as envisioned by the E.O; hence, it could not have
been validly designated by the President to undertake the Project. It follows that the MMDA
cannot validly order the elimination of respondents’ terminals. MMDA is not vested with
police power.

Police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare and a
reasonable relation must exist between the purposes and the means. The parties herein
concede that traffic congestion is a public concern that needs to be addressed immediately.
Indeed, the E.O. was issued due to the felt need to address the worsening traffic
congestion in Metro Manila which, the MMDA so determined, is caused by the increasing
volume of buses plying the major thoroughfares and the inefficient connectivity of existing
transport systems. It is thus beyond cavil that the motivating force behind the issuance of
the E.O. is the interest of the public in general. With the avowed objective of decongesting
traffic in Metro Manila, the E.O. seeks to "eliminate the bus terminals now located along
major Metro Manila thoroughfares and provide more convenient access to the mass
transport system to the commuting public through the provision of mass transport terminal
facilities. Common carriers with terminals along the major thoroughfares of Metro Manila
would thus be compelled to close down their existing bus terminals and use the MMDA-
designated common parking areas. This Court fails to see how the prohibition against the
existence of respondents’ terminals can be considered a reasonable necessity to ease
traffic congestion in the metropolis. On the contrary, the elimination of respondents’ bus
terminals brings forth the distinct possibility and the equally harrowing reality of traffic
congestion in the common parking areas, a case of transference from one site to another.
Less intrusive measures such as curbing the proliferation of "colorum" buses, vans and
taxis entering Metro Manila and using the streets for parking and passenger pick-up points,
as respondents suggest, might even be more effective in easing the traffic situation. So
would the strict enforcement of traffic rules and the removal of obstructions from major
thoroughfares.

*Sec. of DND v. Manalo 568 SCRA 42

Facts: Brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo were abducted by military men belonging
to the CAFGU on the suspicion that they were members and supporters of the NPA. After
18 months of detention and torture, the brothers escaped. Thereafter, they filed a Petition
for Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order to stop the military officers
and agents from depriving them of their right to liberty and other basic rights. While the
said case was pending, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo took effect. The Manalo’s
subsequently filed a manifestation and omnibus motion to treat their existing petition as
amparo petition

Held: In upholding the CA decision, the Supreme Court ruled that there is a continuing
violation of the Manalo’s right to security. The Writ of Amparo is the most potent remedy
available to any person whose right to life, liberty, and security has been violated or is
threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission by public officials or employees
and by private individuals or entities. Understandably, since their escape, the Manalo’s
have been under concealment and protection by private citizens because of the threat to
their life, liberty, and security. The circumstances of respondents’ abduction, detention,
torture and escape reasonably support a conclusion that there is an apparent threat that
they will again be abducted, tortured, and this time, even executed. These constitute
threats to their liberty, security, and life, actionable through a petition for a writ of amparo,

*White Light v. City of Manila 576 SCRA 416

Facts: On 3 Dec 1992, then Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7774 entitled “An Ordinance”
prohibiting short time admission in hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension houses and
similar establishments in the City of Manila. White Light Corp is an operator of mini hotels
and motels who sought to have the Ordinance be nullified as the said Ordinance infringes
on the private rights of their patrons. The RTC ruled in favor of WLC. It ruled that the
Ordinance strikes at the personal liberty of the individual guaranteed by the Constitution.
The City maintains that the ordinance is valid as it is a valid exercise of police power. Under
the LGC, the City is empowered to regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance
of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses
and other similar establishments, including tourist guides and transports. The CA ruled in
favor of the City.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance 7774 is valid.

HELD: The SC ruled that the said ordinance is null and void as it indeed infringes upon
individual liberty. It also violates the due process clause which serves as a guaranty for
protection against arbitrary regulation or seizure. The said ordinance invades private rights.
Note that not all who goes into motels and hotels for wash up rate are really there for
obscene purposes only. Some are tourists who needed rest or to “wash up” or to freshen
up. Hence, the infidelity sought to be avoided by the said ordinance is more or less
subjected only to a limited group of people. The SC reiterates that individual rights may be
adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands
of public interest or public welfare.

The City asserts that the subject establishments "have gained notoriety as venue of
‘prostitution, adultery and fornications’ in Manila. However, it must appear that the interests
of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an
interference with private rights (lawful subject) and the means must be reasonably
necessary (not arbitrary) for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive
of private rights (lawful means). It must also be evident that no other alternative for the
accomplishment of the purpose. Here, the Ordinance makes no distinction between places
frequented by patrons engaged in illicit activities and patrons engaged in legitimate actions.
Further, the behavior which the Ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already prohibited and
could in fact be diminished simply by applying existing laws. Less intrusive measures such
as curbing the proliferation of prostitutes and drug dealers through active police work would
be more effective in easing the situation. So would the strict enforcement of existing laws
and regulations penalizing prostitution and drug use. These measures would have minimal
intrusion on the businesses of the petitioners and other legitimate merchants. Further, it is
apparent that the Ordinance can easily be circumvented by merely paying the whole day
rate without any hindrance to those engaged in illicit activities. Moreover, drug dealers and
prostitutes can in fact collect "wash rates" from their clientele by charging their customers
a portion of the rent for motel rooms and even apartments.

Note: Standards of judicial review: strict scrutiny for laws dealing with freedom of the mind
or restricting the political process, the rational basis standard of review for economic
legislation, and the heightened or immediate scrutiny for evaluating classifications based
on gender and legitimacy. Using the rational basis examination, laws or ordinances are
upheld if they rationally further a legitimate governmental interest. Under intermediate
review, governmental interest is extensively examined and the availability of less restrictive
measures is considered. Applying strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence of
compelling, rather than substantial, governmental interest and on the absence of less
restrictive means for achieving that interest.

*Roxas v. Macapagal-Arroyo 630 SCRA 211

FACTS: Melissa Roxas, an American citizen of Filipino descent, while in the United States,
enrolled in an exposure program to the Philippines with the group Bagong Alyansang
Makabayan-United States of America (BAYAN- USA) of which she is a member. On 19
May 2009, after doing survey work in Tarlac, Roxas and her companions rested in the
house of Mr. Jesus Paolo in Sitio Bagong Sikat. While Roxas and her companions were
resting, 15 heavily armed men in civilian clothes forcibly entered the house and dragged
them inside a van. When they alighted from the van, she was informed that she is being
detained for being a member of Communist Party of the Philippines-New People’s Army
(CPP-NPA). She was then separated from her companions and was brought to a room,
from where she could hear sounds of gunfire, noise of planes taking off and landing, and
some construction bustle. She was interrogated and tortured for 5 straight days to convince
her to abandon her communist beliefs. She was informed by a person named “RC” that
those who tortured her came from the “Special Operations Group” and that she was
abducted because her name is included in the “Order of Battle.” On 25 May 2009, Roxas
was finally released and was given a cellular phone with a sim card. She was sternly
warned not to report the incident to the group Karapatan or something untoward will
happen to her and her family. After her release, Roxas continued to receive calls from RC
thru the cell phone given to her. Out of apprehension, she threw the phone and the sim
card.

Hence, on 01 June 2009, Roxas filed a petition for the issuance of Writs of Amparo and
Habeas Data before the Supreme Court, impleading the high-ranking officials of military
and Philippine National Police (PNP), on the belief that it was the government agents who
were behind her abduction and torture. SC issued the writs and referred the case to the
CA for hearing, reception of evidence and appropriate action. CA granted the privilege of
writs of amparo and habeas data. However, the court a quo absolved the respondents
because it was not convinced that the respondents were responsible for the abduction and
torture of Roxas. Aggrieved, Roxas filed an appeal with the SC.

ISSUES/HELD: WON substantial evidence to prove actual or threatened violation of the

right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim is necessary before the privilege of
the writ may be extended – YES.

Substantial evidence of an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty
or security of the victim is an indispensable requirement before the privilege of the writ may
be extended – An indispensable requirement before the privilege of the writ may be
extended is the showing, at least by substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened
violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim.

In the case at bar, Roxas failed to show that there is an actual or threatened violation of
such right. Hence, until such time that any of the respondents were found to be actually
responsible for the abduction and torture of Roxas, any inference regarding the existence
of reports being kept in violation of the petitioner’s right to privacy becomes farfetched, and
premature. The Court must, at least in the meantime, strike down the grant of the privilege
of the writ of habeas data.

Writ of amparo cannot be used to protect property rights. The Amparo rule does not allow
a fishing expedition of evidence. The place must be reasonably determinable from the
party’s allegations. An inspection order cannot issue on the bases of allegations that
unreliable and doubtful. The writ of habeas data was conceptualized as a judicial remedy
enforcing the right to privacy, most especially the right to informational privacy of
individuals. It protects a person’s right to control information regarding himself, especially
when the info is being collected through unlawful means for unlawful ends. To issue the
writ there must be showing of an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life,
liberty or security of the victim, which she failed to do.

*Meralco v. Lim 632 SCRA 195

Facts: A letter was sent to the Meralco admin department in bulacan denouncing Lim, an
administrative clerk. She was ordered to be transferred to Alabang due to concerns over
her safety. She complained under the premise that the transfer was a denialof her due
process. She wrote a letter stating that: “It appears that the veracity of these accusations
and threats to be [sic] highly suspicious, doubtful or are just mere jokes if they existed at
all.” She added, “instead of the management supposedly extending favor to me, the net
result and effect of management action would be a punitive one.” She asked for deferment
thereafter. Since the company didn’t respond, she filed for a writ of habeas data in the
Bulacan RTC due to meralco’s omission of provding her with details about the report of the
letter. To her, this constituted a violation of her liberty and security. She asked
for disclosure of the data and measures for keeping the confidentiality of the data. Meralco
filed a reply saying that the jurisdiction was with the NLRC and that the petition wasn’t in
order. Trial court ruled in her favor. In the SC, Meralco petitioned that Habeas Data applies
to entities engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding
an aggrieved party’s person, family or home

Issue: Is Habeas Data the right remedy for Lim?

Held: No, petition dismissed. “Section 1. Habeas Data. – The writ of habeas data is a
remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated
or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee or of a private
individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information
regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party”. It’s a
forum for enforcing one’s right to the truth. Like amparo, habeas data was a response
to killings and enforced disappearances. Employment is a property right in the due process
clause. Lim was concerned with her employment, one that can be solved in the NLRC. The
writs of amparo and habeas data will NOT issue to protect purely property or commercial
concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor are vague or
doubtful. Employment constitutes a property right under the context of the due process
clause of the Constitution. It is evident that respondent’s reservations on the real reasons
for her transfer - a legitimate concern respecting the terms and conditions of one’s
employment - are what prompted her to adopt the extraordinary remedy of habeas data.
Jurisdiction over such concerns is inarguably lodged by law with the NLRC and the Labor
Arbiters.

*Remman Enterprises v. Professional Regulatory Board, GR 197676, Feb 4 , 2014

Facts: This case involves a petition for review under Rule 45 on the subject of the Real
Estate Service Act of the Philippines. R.A. 9646 (Real Estate Service Act of the Philippines)
was passed. Its purpose is to professionalize the real estate service sector under regulatory
scheme of 
licensing, registration and supervision of real estate service practitioners. The
supervision was likewise lodged under the authority of the Professional Regulatory 

Commission (PRC). The law required that companies providing real estate services must
transact with the employ of duly licensed real estate brokers. Petitioner assails the
constitutionality of the law, alleging that it violates the due process clause 
and infringes
the ownership rights of real estate developers enshrined in Art. 428 of the Civil Code.
Furthermore, they claim that it violates the equal protection clause as owners of private
properties are allowed to sell their properties without the need of a licensed real estate
broker. The provisions in question are –
Section 29. Prohibition Against the Unauthorized
Practice of Real Estate Service & Section 32. Corporate Practice of the Real Estate
Service. The RTC denied the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.

ISSUES/HELD: Whether the assailed provisions are in violation of the due process clause,
particularly substantive due process- No. The requirements for substantive due process
are: Lawful government purpose; and Reasonable means necessary for the
accomplishment of the lawful purpose. The lawful purpose of R.A. 9646 is to
professionalize the real estate service and increase its standards. The law recognizes the
role of real estate practitioners in spearheading the continuous flow of capital, in boosting
investor confidence, and in promoting national progress. The requirement of employing a
duly licensed real estate broker for transactions is reasonable as it merely regulates the
conduct of business and does not curtail the exercise of petitioners’ ownership rights.
Lastly, there is a substantial distinction between real estate developers and owners of
private who want to sell their private property. Unlike individuals or entities having isolated
transactions over their own property, real estate developers sell lots, houses and
condominium units in the ordinary course of business, a business which is highly regulated
by the State to ensure the health and safety of home and lot buyers.

*Disini v. Secretary of Justice, GR 203335, Feb 18, 2014

Facts: Petitioner alleged that Section 12 and 15 of the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012
as unconstitutional for violation of due process.
Held: Is Section 12 on Real-Time collection of traffic data valid and constitutional? Void
and unconstitutional. Sec 12 empowers law enforcement authorities to collect or record
data upon determination of due cause without giving the extent of what due cause is, giving
them too much discretion. Thus, the authority that Section 12 gives law enforcement
agencies is too sweeping and lacks restraint. It may amount to a fishing expedition.
Is Section 15 on search, seizure and examination of computer data valid and
constitutional? Valid and constitutional, because Section 15 merely enumerates the duties
of law enforcement authorities that would ensure proper collection, preservation, and use
of computer system or data that have been seized by virtue of a court warrant.

*Imbong v. Ochoa, GR 204819, April 8, 2014

Facts: Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood
and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted. Challengers from various
sectors of society are questioning the constitutionality of the said Act.
Held: Due Process: Definition of certain terms are not vague. The definition of “private
health care service provider” must be seen in relation to Section 4(n) of the RH Law which
defines a “public health service provider”. The “private health care institution” cited under
Section 7 should be seen as synonymous to “private health care service provider.” The
terms “service” and “methods” are also broad enough to include providing of information
and rendering of medical procedures. Thus, hospitals operated by religious groups are
exempted from rendering RH service and modern family planning methods (as provided
for by Section 7 of the RH Law) as well as from giving RH information and procedures. The
RH Law also defines “incorrect information”. Used together in relation to Section 23 (a)(1),
the terms “incorrect” and “knowingly” connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead
or misrepresent the public as to the nature and effect of programs and services on
reproductive health.
Equal Protection: To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government’s RH
program is not a violation of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section
11, Article XIII of the Constitution, which states that the State shall prioritize the needs of
the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children and that it shall endeavor
to provide medical care to paupers.

*Garcia v. Drilon – 699 SCRA 352

Facts: Private respondent Rosalie Garcia filed a petition before the RTC of Bacolod City a
Temporary Protection Order against her husband, Jesus Garcia, pursuant to R.A. 9262,
entitled “An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for
Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes.”
She claimed to be a victim of physical, emotional, psychological and economic violence,
being threatened of deprivation of custody of her children and of financial support and also
a victim of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner. Petitioner hence, challenged the
constitutionality of RA 9262 on making a gender-based classification.
Held: Equal Protection: The equal protection clause in our Constitution does not guarantee
an absolute prohibition against classification. The non-identical treatment of women and
men under RA 9262 is justified to put them on equal footing and to give substance to the
policy and aim of the state to ensure the equality of women and men.
Due Process: RA 9262 is not violative of the due process clause of the Constitution. The
essence of due process is in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any
evidence one may have in support of one’s defense. A victim of VAWC may already have
suffered harrowing experiences in the hands of her tormentor, and possibly even death, if
notice and hearing were required before such acts could be prevented. It is a constitutional
commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process must yield to the
necessities of protecting vital public interests, among which is protection of women and
children from violence and threats to their personal safety and security.

*Caram v. Segui – 732 SCRA 86

Facts: Petitioner Christina and Marcelino had a baby without the benefit of marriage.
Christina voluntarily surrendered Baby Julian to the DSWD. Baby Julian was then declared
as “Legally Available for Adoption” and was then “matched” with Spouses Medina and
supervised trial custody commenced. Upon the death of Marcelino, his family offered to
help Petitioner. However, since the declaration that Baby Julian is legally available for
adoption had attained finality, Petitioner filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo
to obtain custody of the baby.

Held: The Court held that the availment of the remedy of writ of amparo is not proper as
there was no enforced disappearance in this case. “Enforced Disappearances” as the term
is statutorily defined in Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 9851 to wit: that there be an arrest,
detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty; that it be carried out by, or with
the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political organization; that it
be followed by the State or political organization’s refusal to acknowledge or give
information on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition; and
that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the protection of the law
for a prolonged period of time.

The Court held that there was no enforced disappearance because the respondent
DSWD officers never concealed Baby Julian’s whereabouts. In fact, Christina obtained a
copy of the DSWD’s Memorandum explicitly stating that Baby Julian was in the custody of
the Medina Spouses when she filed her petition before the RTC. Besides, she even
admitted in her petition that the respondent DSWD officers presented Baby Julian before
the RTC during the hearing. There is therefore, no “enforced disappearance” as used in
the context of the Amparo rule as the third and fourth elements are missing.

Christina’s directly accusing the respondents of forcibly separating her from her child and
placing the latter up for adoption, supposedly without complying with the necessary legal
requisites to qualify the child for adoption, clearly indicates that she is not searching for a
lost child but asserting her parental authority over the child and contesting custody over
him. Since it is extant from the pleadings filed that what is involved is the issue of child
custody and the exercise of parental rights over a child, who, for all intents and purposes,
has been legally considered a ward of the State, the Amparo rule cannot be properly
applied.

*Mison v. Gallegos – 760 SCRA 363

Facts: The Embassy of the Republic of Korea wrote a Letter-Request to petitioner
Chairperson of the Bureau of Immigration (BI) for the immediate arrest and deportation of
respondent Ja Hoon Ku (Ku) to Korea for being an undesirable alien. Pursuant to Summary
Deportation Order, Ku was arrested and detained at the BI detention center. Ku filed a
Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo with Interim Remedies which was granted by
Judge Gallegos.
Held: The Amparo rule was intended to address the intractable problem of the “extralegal
killings” and “enforced disappearances,” Guided by the parameters of RA 9851, we can
readily discern that Ku’s circumstance does not come under the statutory definition of an
enforced disappearance. Indeed, Ku was arrested by agents of the BI, but there was no
refusal on the part of the BI to acknowledge such arrest nor was there any refusal to give
information to remove Ku from the protection of the law for a prolonged time. More
importantly, there was no attempt on the part of the BI to conceal Ku or his whereabouts.

*Zarate v. Aquino III, GR 220028, November 10, 2015

Facts: Petitioners aver that they are members of various progressive party-lists that have
been wrongfully tagged by the military and the police as "communist front organizations.
As alleged in the petition, sometime in March 2014, the Government commenced
intensified military offensives in Talaingod, Davao del Norte under the rubric of
counterinsurgency. About 1,300 Manobos allegedly evacuated to Davao City to escape
the effects of said military operations evacuees. Beginning January 2015, however, some
of the Manobos started going back to Davao City. By July 2015, approximately 700
Manobos were at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines (UCCP) Haran. Petitioners
claimed that these Manobos sought refuge at UCCP Haran due to the persisting
militarization of their communities and their forcible recruitment to the paramilitary group,
Alamara. Certain Manobos claimed, on the other hand, that they were deceived into going
to Davao City; that, upon reaching UCCP Haran, they were deprived of their freedom of
locomotion and were held there against their will from 3 February 2015 to 25 February
2015; that during said period they were forced to listen to lectures and join rallies; until a
fellow tribe member was found dead, hanging lifeless on a tree, inside the UCCP Haran
compound; and that it was only then that they were allowed to go home with the body of
the deceased. Filed a complaint for (Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention), and
Republic Act No. 9208 (Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003).

To determine who would be charged in the complaint, the complainants were shown "lists"
from which they purportedly identified the defendants. Petitioners now aver that the
inclusion of their names and photographs in the "lists" indicates that they are and have
been the subject of State surveillance. incriminate them in fabricated criminal charges, and
insinuations of their links with the New People's Army. petitioners argue that their inclusion
in the "lists" are threats to their life, liberty, and security warranting the protection of the writ
of amparo. Additionally, petitioners claim that as there is absolutely no basis for the
inclusion of their names and photographs in the "lists," then respondents should be
compelled via the writ of habeas data to disclose and to provide petitioners with copies of
all information and evidence pertaining to them which respondents have in their files or
records, and for such information to be destroyed.

Held: Dismissed. Rule on the Writ of Amparo requires substantial evidence. "only actual
threats, as may be established from all the facts and circumstances of the case, can qualify
as a violation that may be addressed under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. Mere
membership in organizations or sectors historically involved in EJKs cannot equate to an
actual threat that would warrant the issuance of a writ of amparo. Of all the petitioners, it is
only petitioner Balaba personally who alleged circumstances claiming threatened violations
of her right to life, liberty and security. However, the instances cited by petitioner Balaba
fail to demonstrate an actual threat to her life, liberty, and security.

The writ of habeas data is a "remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life,
liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official
or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting, or
storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of
the aggrieved party. The extraordinary writ of habeas data "provides a judicial remedy to
protect a person's right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances
where such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve
unlawful ends. Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data) provides that the petition should aver "the
manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects the right to life,
liberty or security of the aggrieved party." The Habeas Data Rule likewise requires
substantial evidence. In the present petition, petitioners fail to show how their right to
privacy is violated given that the information contained in the "lists" are only their names,
their positions in their respective organizations, and their photographs. All these data are
of public knowledge and are readily accessible even to civilians.

Although the petition for a writ of habeas data may be filed by family member, or even
relatives, on behalf of the aggrieved party, the Habeas Data Rule presupposes that the
aggrieved party is still alive.

Equal Protection of Law

Requisites for a valid qualification:
a. It must rest on substantial distinction.
b. It must be germane to the purpose of the law.
c. It must not be limited to existing conditions only.
d. It shall be applicable to all subjects of the same class.

*Villegas v. Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho - 86 SCRA 270

FACTS: The Municipal Board of Manila enacted Ordinance 6537 requiring aliens (except
those employed in the diplomatic and consular missions of foreign countries, in technical
assistance programs of the government and another country, and members of religious
orders or congregations) to procure the requisite mayor’s permit so as to be employed or
engage in trade in the City of Manila. Thus, a case was filed with CFI-Manila to stop
enforcement of the ordinance. CFI-Manila declared the ordinance void. Thus, the present
petition for certiorari.

ISSUE: Does it violate the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution?

RULING: The P50 fee is unreasonable not only because it is excessive but because it fails
to consider valid substantial differences in situation among individual aliens who are
required to pay it. The same amount of P50 is being collected from every employed alien
whether he is casual or permanent, part time or full time or whether he is a lowly employee
or a highly paid executive. It violates the principle against undue designation of legislative
power as it does not lay down any criterion or standard to guide the Mayor in the exercise
of his discretion. It has been held that where an ordinance of a municipality fails to state
any policy or to set up any standard to guide or limit the action, thus conferring upon the
Mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power, such ordinance is invalid. And lastly it violates the
due process & equal protection clauses in requiring a person before he can be employed
to get a permit from the City Mayor of Manila who may withhold or refuse it at will is
tantamount to denying him the basic right of the people in the Philippines to engage in a
means of livelihood. The shelter of protection under the due process and equal protection
clause is given to all persons, both aliens and citizens. Thus, the ordinance is invalid. The
ordinance violates equal protection. While classification under the law is not
prohibited, such should be based on real and substantial differences having
a reasonable relation to the subject of the particular legislation. The permit
fee is not only unreasonable and excessive, but the law fails to consider
valid substantial differences among individual aliens: whether he is casual,
permanent, and part-time or full time, they are all similarly situated. Further,
the ordinance will unduly deprive the aliens of their basic right to engage in
livelihood, livelihood is a part of life protected by due process.
 *Ormoc Sugar Central v. Ormoc City - L-23794 February 17, 1968
Facts: The Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed Ordinance No. 4 imposing “on any and
all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., in Ormoc
City a municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%) per export sale to USA and other
foreign countries.” Payments for said tax were made, under protest, by Ormoc Sugar
Company, Inc. Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. filed before the Court of First Instance of Leyte
a complaint against the City of Ormoc as well as its Treasurer, Municipal Board and Mayor
alleging that the ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection
clause and the rule of uniformity of taxation. The court rendered a decision that upheld the
constitutionality of the ordinance. Hence, this appeal.

Issue: Whether or not constitutional limits on the power of taxation, specifically the equal
protection clause and rule of uniformity of taxation, were infringed?

Held: Yes. Equal protection clause applies only to persons or things identically situated
and does not bar a reasonable classification of the subject of legislation, and a
classification is reasonable where 1) it is based upon substantial distinctions; 2) these are
germane to the purpose of the law; 3) the classification applies not only to present
conditions, but also to future conditions substantially identical to those present; and 4) the
classification applies only to those who belong to the same class. A perusal of the
requisites shows that the questioned ordinance does not meet them, for it taxes only
centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none
other. At the time the ordinance was enacted, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. Was the only
sugar central in the City of Ormoc. Still, the classification, to be reasonable, should be in
terms applicable to future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance should not be singular
and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central for the coverage
of the tax. As it is now, even if later a similar company is set up, it cannot be subject to a
tax because the ordinance expressly points only to Ormoc City Sugar Company, Inc. As
the entity to be levied upon.

*Central Bank Employees Ass’n v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, 446 SCRA 299

Facts: On July 3, 1993, R.A. No. 7653 (the New Central Bank Act) took effect. It abolished the old
Central Bank of the Philippines, and created a new BSP. On June 8, 2001, almost eight
years after the effectivity of R.A. No. 7653, petitioner Central Bank (now BSP) Employees
Association, Inc., filed a petition for prohibition against BSP and the Executive Secretary
of the Office of the President, to restrain respondents from further implementing the
last proviso in Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, on the ground that it is
unconstitutional.

The thrust of petitioners challenge is that the above proviso makes

an unconstitutional cut between two classes of employees in the BSP, viz: (1) the
BSP officers or those exempted from the coverage of the Salary Standardization Law
(SSL) (exempt class); and (2) the rank-and-file (Salary Grade [SG] 19 and below), or
those not exempted from the coverage of the SSL (non-exempt class). It is contended that
this classification is a classic case of class legislation, allegedly not based on substantial
distinctions which make real differences, but solely on the SG of the BSP personnels
position. Petitioner also claims that it is not germane to the purposes of Section 15(c),
Article II of R.A. No. 7653, the most important of which is to establish professionalism and
excellence at all levels in the BSP. In sum, petitioner posits that the classification is not
reasonable but arbitrary and capricious, and violates the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.[
Issue: whether the last paragraph of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, runs afoul
of the constitutional mandate that "No person shall be. . . denied the equal protection of
the laws."

Held: Jurisprudential standards for equal protection challenges indubitably show that the
classification created by the questioned proviso, on its face and in its operation, bears no
constitutional infirmities. In the case at bar, it is clear in the legislative deliberations that the
exemption of officers (SG 20 and above) from the SSL (Salary Standardization Law
a)was intended to address the BSPs lack of competitiveness in terms of attracting
competent officers and executives. It was not intended to discriminate against the rank-
and-file. If the end-result did in fact lead to a disparity of treatment between the officers and
the rank-and-file in terms of salaries and benefits, the discrimination or distinction has a
rational basis and is not palpably, purely, and entirely arbitrary in the legislative sense. THE
ENACTMENT, HOWEVER, OF SUBSEQUENT LAWS -EXEMPTING ALL OTHER RANK-
AND-FILE EMPLOYEESOF GFIs FROM THE SSL - RENDERS THE
CONTINUED APPLICATION OF THE CHALLENGED PROVISION A VIOLATION OF
THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.

The above-mentioned subsequent enactments, however, constitute significant changes in

circumstance that considerably alter the reasonability of the continued operation of the
last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act No. 7653, thereby exposing
the proviso to more serious scrutiny. This time, the scrutiny relates to the constitutionality
of the classification - albeit made indirectly as a consequence of the passage of eight other
laws - between the rank-and-file of the BSP and the seven other GFIs. The classification
must not only be reasonable, but must also apply equally to all members of the
class. The proviso may be fair on its face and impartial in appearance but it cannot be
grossly discriminatory in its operation, so as practically to make unjust distinctions between
persons who are without difference. In the case at bar, it is precisely the fact that as regards
the exemption from the SSL, there are no characteristics peculiar only to the seven GFIs
or their rank-and-file so as to justify the exemption which BSP rank-and-file employees
were denied. The disparity of treatment between BSP rank-and-file and the rank-and-file
of the other seven GFIs definitely bears the unmistakable badge of invidious discrimination
- no one can, with candor and fairness, deny the discriminatory character of the subsequent
blanket and total exemption of the seven other GFIs from the SSL when such was withheld
from the BSP. Alikes are being treated as unalikes without any rational basis.
In light of the lack of real and substantial distinctions that would justify the unequal
treatment between the rank-and-file of BSP from the seven other GFIs, it is clear that the
enactment of the seven subsequent charters has rendered the continued application of the
challenged proviso anathema to the equal protection of the law, and the same should be
declared as an outlaw.
In the case at bar, the challenged proviso operates on the basis of the salary grade
or officer-employee status. It is akin to a distinction based on economic class and
status, with the higher grades as recipients of a benefit specifically withheld from the lower
grades. Officers of the BSP now receive higher compensation packages that are
competitive with the industry, while the poorer, low-salaried employees are limited to the
rates prescribed by the SSL. The implications are quite disturbing: BSP rank-and-file
employees are paid the strictly regimented rates of the SSL while employees higher in rank
- possessing higher and better education and opportunities for career advancement - are
given higher compensation packages to entice them to stay. Considering that majority, if
not all, the rank-and-file employees consist of people whose status and rank in life are less
and limited, especially in terms of job marketability, it is they - and not the officers - who
have the real economic and financial need for the adjustment This is in accord with the
policy of the Constitution "to free the people from poverty, provide adequate social
services, extend to them a decent standard of living, and improve the quality of life for all.
Any act of Congress that runs counter to this constitutional desideratum deserves strict
scrutiny by this Court before it can pass muster.
 To be sure, the BSP rank-and-file employees merit greater concern from this
Court. They represent the more impotent rank-and-file government employees who, unlike
employees in the private sector, have no specific right to organize as a collective bargaining
unit and negotiate for better terms and conditions of employment, nor the power to hold a
strike to protest unfair labor practices. Not only are they impotent as a labor unit, but their
efficacy to lobby in Congress is almost nil as R.A. No. 7653 effectively isolated them from
the other GFI rank-and-file in compensation. These BSP rank-and-file employees
represent the politically powerless and they should not be compelled to seek a political
solution to their unequal and iniquitous treatment. Indeed, they have waited for many years
for the legislature to act. They cannot be asked to wait some more for discrimination cannot
be given any waiting time. Unless the equal protection clause of the Constitution is a mere
platitude, it is the Courts duty to save them from reasonless discrimination.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, we hold that the continued operation and implementation of the
last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act No. 7653 is unconstitutional

*Ycasuegi v. PAL 569 SCRA 467

Facts: Petitioner Armando Yrasuegui was a flight steward of respondent Philippine Airlines
who was terminated due to his failure to adhere to the latter’s mandated weight. According
to respondent’s Cabin and Crew Administration Manual, petitioner’s ideal weight is 166lbs.
However, he was unable to maintain the required weight. For 4 years, petitioner was
removed from fight duty in order to meet the weight standards, and was even offered the
services of the company physician. Despite the leniency, petitioner still failed to comply
with the company policy. Hence, respondent was terminated for the violation of company
standards on weight requirements. LA ruled that petitioner was illegally dismissed. NLRC
affirmed ruling. Both found the company standards of respondent on weight requirements
to be reasonable. CA set aside the ruling of NLRC, and held that the failure to adhere to
the weight standards is an analogous case for the dismissal of an employee under Art.
282(e) of the Labor Code in relation to Art. 282(a). The CA also held that the weight
standards are a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ), and if violated “justifies
an employee’s separation from the service.”
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was discriminated against when he was dismissed by
respondent.
HELD: No. The SC held that petitioner failed to prove his allegations with particularity
i.e., he merely mentioned the names of other cabin crew members that were overweight.
Furthermore, petitioner cannot invoke the equal protection clause guaranty of the
Constitution, since such liberty is only addressed to the State or those acting under its
authority. The Bill of Rights is not meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals.
In addition, the SC also held that the company standards/BFOQ of the respondent is valid.

*People v. Siton – 600 SCRA 476

Facts: Respondents Evangeline Siton and Krystel Kate Sagarano were charged with
vagrancy pursuant to Art. 202 (2) of the RPC in two separate Informations. Accused were
found wandering and loitering around San Pedro and Legaspi Streets of Davao City,
without any visible means to support herself nor lawful and justifiable purpose.
Held: Article 202 (2) of the RPC does not violate the equal protection clause; neither does
it discriminate against the poor and the unemployed. Offenders of public order laws are
punished not for their status, as for being poor or unemployed, but for conducting
themselves under such circumstances as to endanger the public peace or cause alarm
and apprehension in the community. Being poor or unemployed is not a license or a
justification to act indecently or to engage in immoral conduct.
*League of Cities v. COMELEC – 608 SCRA 636
Facts: During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33
municipalities into cities. However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other
municipalities into cities. During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law RA 9009
which amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual
income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100
million. The rationale for the amendment was to restrain, in the words of Senator Aquilino
Pimentel, “the mad rush” of municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger
share in the Internal Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable of fiscal
independence. After the effectivity of RA 9009, Joint Resolution No 29 was adopted which
sought to exempt from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 the 24
municipalities whose cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th Congress. However, the
12th Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29. During the
13th Congress, the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint
Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate for approval. However, the Senate again
failed to approve the Joint Resolution. Later 16 municipalities filed, through their respective
sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills contained a common provision
exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009.
House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The Senate also approved the
cityhood bills in February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which was passed on 7 June
2007. The cityhood bills lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws) on various dates from March to
July 2007 without the President’s signature.

The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the
voters in each respondent municipality approve of the conversion of their municipality into
a city.

Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for
violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal
protection clause. Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of municipalities
into cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because
more cities will share the same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under
Section 285 of the Local Government Code.

Issue: Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.

Held: Yes. The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution, and
are thus unconstitutional. First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009
to the present case is a prospective, not a retroactive application, because RA 9009 took
effect in 2001 while the cityhood bills became law more than five years later. Second, the
Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the criteria for the creation of a city
in the Local Government Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood
Laws. Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution because
they prevent a fair and just distribution of the national taxes to local government units.
Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended
by RA 9009, for converting a municipality into a city are clear, plain and unambiguous,
needing no resort to any statutory construction. Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th
Congress to exempt certain municipalities from the coverage of RA 9009 remained an
intent and was never written into Section 450 of the Local Government Code.

Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or resolutions are
not extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed in the 13th Congress. Seventh, even if the
exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the Local Government
Code, the exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection
clause. Also limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities violates the requirement
that the classification must apply to all similarly situated. Municipalities with the same
income as the 16 respondent municipalities cannot convert into cities, while the 16
respondent municipalities can. Clearly, as worded the exemption provision found in the
Cityhood Laws, even if it were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, would
still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.

*Quinto v. COMELEC – 613 SCRA 385

Facts: The Court declared the second provisio in the third paragraph of sec 13 of RA 9369,
Sec 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Sec 4 of the COMELEC Resolution 8679 as
unconstitutional. COMELEC filed the motion for reconsideration. The second provisio in
the third paragraph of sec 13 of RA 9369, Sec 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Sec
4 of the COMELEC Resolution 8679: “Any person holding a public appointive office or
position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and
employees in GOCCs shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon filling of
his certificate of candidacy“

ISSUE: Whether or not the second provisio in the third paragraph of sec 13 of RA 9369,
Sec 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Sec 4 of the COMELEC Resolution 8679, violate
the equal protection clause of the constitution.

HELD: The Court declared the second provisio in the third paragraph of sec 13 of RA 9369,
Sec 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Sec 4 of the COMELEC Resolution 8679 as
constitutional. The equal protection of the law clause in the constitution is not absolute,
but is subject to reasonable classification if the groupings are characterized by substantial
distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated different
from the other. The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual
or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not
intended to prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or
by territory within which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among
residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike under like circumstances
and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection
clause is not enfringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a
specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class and reasonable ground
exists for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do
not. Substantial distinctions clearly exists between elective officials and appointive officials.
Elective officials occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. Appointive
officials hold their office by virtue of their designation by an appointing authority.

*People v. Jumanan - 722 SCRA 108

Facts: Accused-appellant and his wife, KKK, were married and have four children. On
February 19, 1999, KKK executed a Complaint-Affidavit, alleging that her husband, the
accused-appellant, raped her at 3 :00 a.m. of December 3, 1998 at their residence in
Cagayan de Oro City, and that on December 12, 1998, the accused-appellant boxed her
shoulder for refusing to have sex with him.
Held: The Supreme Court held that husbands do not have property rights over their wives’
bodies. Sexual intercourse, albeit within the realm of marriage, if not consensual, is rape.
The Court ruled that to treat marital rape cases differently from non-marital rape cases in
terms of the elements that constitute the crime and in the rules for their proof, infringes on
the equal protection clause. The Court found that there is no rational basis for
distinguishing between marital rape and non-marital rape. The various rationales which
have been asserted in defense of the exemption are either based upon archaic notions
about the consent and property rights incident to marriage or are simply unable to withstand
even the slightest scrutiny.
*Villanueva, v. JBC – 755 SCRA 182
Facts: After about a year from being appointed as a MCTC judge, Judge Villanueva applied
for the vacant position of presiding judge in some RTC branches. The JBC however
informed him that he was not included in the list of candidates for such position because
the JBC’s long-standing policy requires 5 years of service as judge of first-level courts
before one can apply as judge for second-level courts.
Held: The equal protection clause is not violated because the classification created by the
challenged policy satisfies the rational basis test. Substantial distinctions do exist between
lower court judges with five year experience and those with less than five years of
experience, like the petitioner, and the classification enshrined in the assailed policy is
reasonable and relevant to its legitimate purpose. The assailed criterion or consideration
for promotion to a second-level court, which is five years’ experience as judge of a first-
level court, is a direct adherence to the qualities prescribed by the Constitution. Placing a
premium on many years of judicial experience, the JBC is merely applying one of the
stringent constitutional standards requiring that a member of the judiciary be of “proven
competence.” In determining competence, the JBC considers, among other qualifications,
experience and performance.

*Ferrer v. Bautista – 760 SCRA 692

Facts: The City of Quezon passed an ordinance on Garbage Collection Fees imposing
fees depending on the amount of the land or floor area. Jose Ferrer, as a property owner
and taxpayer in Quezon City questioned the validity of the city ordinances for it violates the
rule on equality.
Held: For the purpose of garbage collection, there is, in fact, no substantial distinction
between an occupant of a lot, on one hand, and an occupant of a unit in a condominium,
socialized housing project or apartment, on the other hand. Most likely, garbage output
produced by these types of occupants is uniform and does not vary to a large degree; thus,
a similar schedule of fee is both just and equitable. Further, the classifications are not
germane to its declared purpose of “promoting shared responsibility with the residents to
attack their common mindless attitude in over-consuming the present resources and in
generating waste.” Instead of simplistically categorizing the payee into land or floor
occupant of a lot or unit, respondent City Council should have considered factors that could
truly measure the amount of wastes generated and the appropriate fee for its collection

*1-United v. COMELEC – 755 SCRA 441

Facts: COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 9615, which provides prohibited forms of
election propaganda on public places which includes: Public utility vehicles such as buses,
jeepneys, trains, taxi cabs, ferries, pedicabs and tricycles, whether motorized or not; and
within the premises of public transport terminals, such as bus terminals, airports, seaports,
docks, piers, train stations, and the like. The violation of such shall be a cause for the
revocation of the public utility franchise and will make the owner and/or operator of the
transportation service and/or terminal liable for an election offense.
Held: Prohibiting owners of PUVs and transport terminals from posting election campaign
materials violates the equal protection clause. The questioned provisions are not only
repugnant to the free speech clause, but are also violative of the equal protection clause,
as there is no substantial distinction between owners of PUV s and transport terminals and
owners of private vehicles and other properties.