VIII. NATURE & CREATION OF ATTY-CLIENT
LEGASPI
RELATIONSHIP
REGALA VS SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:
Raul ROco and his colleagues from the ACCRA Law Office
were charged together with Eduardo Cojuangco for
acquiring ill-gotten wealth. The PCGG based its charge
from the refusal of the law firm to divulge informations as
to who had been involved in PCGG Case No. 0033, despite
the nature of the services performed by AACRA (e.g. The
law firm knows the assets, personal transactions, & business
dealings of their clients).
Later, the PCGG amedned the complaint, resulting in the
exclusion of ROco from the list of defendants. Such
exclusion was based from the manifestation of Roco that he
would identify the persons & stockholders involved in the
said PCGG case.
The law firm petitioned for the PCGG to grant them the
same treatment as what had been accorded to Roco. It was
only at this point that the PCGG answered with a “set of
requirements and conditions for exclusion” which were:
1) disclosure of the identity of the clients
2) Submission of documents purporting to the
substantiation of the lawyer-client relationship
3) Presentation of the deeds of assignments which the
lawyers executed in favor of its clients, covering the
shareholdings of the latter
To bolster this set-up, the PCGG presented supposed proof
to the effect that Roco had complied with such conditions.
The 1st Division of SB denied the petition of ACCRA.
ISSUE: W/N SB did NOT uphold the sanctity of the
lawyer-client relationship.
HELD:
As a general rule, the identity of the client should not be
shrouded with mystery, as a requirement of due process,
EXCEPT when:
A) revealing the name of a client would implicate the latter
in the very activity for which he sought the advice of the
layer
B) The disclosure would expose the client to civil liability
C) The content of the client communication is relevant to
the subject matter of the legal problem on which the client
seeks legal assistance
The case of the prosecution must be built upon evidence
gathered by them from their own sources, not from
compelled testimony requiring them to reveal information
prejudicial to their client.
The confidentiality privilege extends even after the
termination of the lawyer-client relationship.
DAROY VS.
Facts:
♦ Fermina Daroy, Lydia Legaspi and Agripino Legaspi
hired the RamonLegaspi in May, 1962 to represent them in
the intestate proceeding for thesettlement of the estate of the
spouses Aquilino Gonzaga and Paz Velez-Gonzaga. The
complainants, together with their brother, Vivencio, who
wasabroad, were adjudged as one of the six groups of heirs
of the lateGonzaga spouses, their deceased mother,
Consuelo Gonzaga-Legaspi,being a daughter of the spouses.
♦ April 11, 1969 – in a joint petition dated which Atty.
Legaspi signed ascounsel for the complainants, agreed that
the coconut land left by thedecedents would be divided into
six equal parts, that the administrator beauthorized to sell
the land, and that, after payment of the obligations of
theestate, the net proceeds would be distributed among the
six groups of heirs.
♦ The land was sold. Fermina Daroy came to know of the
sale only when theAtty. Legaspi wrote a note dated
November 28, 1969 to her father, TeofiloLegaspi, wherein
he stated "that the money we have deposited may
bewithdrawn on December 8, 1969 at 9:00 o'clock". Atty.
Legaspi advisedTeofilo Legaspito see him on that date so
that the money could bewithdrawn. Complainants were not
able to withdraw the money.
♦ December 9, 1969 – Mrs. Daroy received a note wherein
Atty. Legaspiinformed them that he used their money to
solve his problems and that hewould pay the, as soon as he
receives the proceeds of his jeep.
♦ Complainants made several demands for payment buy
Atty. Legaspirepeatedly broke his promise and as such a
complaint for his disbarmentwas filed.
♦ Version of Legaspi:
O Teofilo Legaspi supposedly went to see him on October
21, 1969 andat their conference they supposedly agreed that
the sum of P700 wouldbe deducted from the P4,000 to
cover the expenses which hedescribed as "expenses
involved from the parties litigants, expensesseeking
evidence and other expenses relevant to the case" and
"major expenses" in the case and that his attorney's fees
would be equivalent"to a share of the petitioners", and that
the balance of P3,300 would bedivided into six equal parts
(six because of the four Legaspi children,the father Teofilo
Legaspi and the lawyer Ramon C. Legaspi); thatunder such
division each participant would receive P412 each
(P3,300divided by six gives a quotient of P550 not P412),
and that he gaveTeofilo the sum of P412. No receipt was
presented.
O First week of November 1969 Teofilo got from him the
share of Vivencio. Money left with him amounted to
P2,476.
O According to Atty. Legaspi the complainants "refused
consistently toreceive" the said balance from him because
they wanted the fullamount of P4,000. He said that he had
already paid to them the sum of P2,000 and that only the
sum of P476 was left in his custody. He didnot present any
receipt to prove the alleged payment of P2,000. Hesaid that
he could deliver that amount of P476 to the complainants.
♦ Mrs. Daroy stated that there was no agreement that Atty.
Legaspi wouldparticipate like an heir in the partition.WON
Atty. Legaspi paid the money to Teofilo Legaspi? NONote
of Atty. Legaspi to Mrs. Daroy dated December 9, 1969,
overwhelminglybelie his fabricated theory that he conferred
with Teofilo Legaspi at the end of October or in the first
week of November, 1969. He was tempted to concoct astory
as to his alleged payments to Teofilo Legaspi because the
latter is deadand could not refute him. However,
complainants' documentary evidence refuteshis
prevarications, distortions and fabrications.
Issue: WON Atty. Legaspi is guilty of malpractice? YES
♦ Carbon copy of a supposed extrajudicial partition
executed in 1968 by thefour children of Consuelo Gonzaga,
by her surviving husband, TeofiloLegaspi and by the
respondent, Atty. Legaspi, all the six being described inthe
document as "the legitimate children and sole heirs of
ConsueloGonzaga, who died on March 12. 1941". Atty.
Legaspi is not a legitimateheir and he did not explain why
he is referred to as one. The documentcasts a reflection on
his competency and integrity as a lawyer and on
thecompetency and integrity of the notary before whom it
was acknowledged.It was made to appear herein that
respondent Legaspi was an heir of Consuelo Gonzaga when,
obviously, he did not possess that status.
♦ A lawyer, under his oath, pledges himself not to delay any
man for money or malice and is bound to conduct himself
with all good fidelity to his clients.He is obligated to report
promptly the money of his clients that has comeinto his
possession. He should not commingle it with his private
property or use it for his personal purposes without his
client's consent. He shouldmaintain a reputation for honesty
and fidelity to private trust.
♦ Money collected by a lawyer in pursuance of a judgment
in favor of hisclients is held in trust and must be
immediately turned over to them
♦ Section 25, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that
when an attorneyunjustly retains in his hands money of his
client after it has been demanded,he may be punished for
contempt as an officer of the court who hasmisbehaved in
his official transactions and he is liable to a
criminalprosecution.
♦ A member of the bar who converts the money of his client
to his own benefitthrough false pretenses is guilty of deceit,
malpractice and grossmisconduct in his office of lawyer.
The attorney, who violates his oath of office, betrays the
confidence reposed in him by a client and practicesdeceit
cannot be permitted to continue as a law practitioner. Not
alone hashe degraded himself but as an unfaithful lawyer he
has besmirched the fair name of an honorable profession
♦ Sturr vs. State Bar of California: The conversion of funds
entrusted to anattorney is a gross violation of general
morality as well as professionaL ethics. It impairs public
confidence in the legal profession, "It deservessevere
punishment"
Holding: Atty. Legaspi is disbarred.
HADJULA V. ATTY MADIANDA
Facts:
Hadjula claimed that she asked legal advice from her friend,
Atty. Madianda. She disclosed confidential information
during that period. However, after the confidential
information was given by Hadjula, Atty. Madianda referred
her to another lawyer.
Hadjula filed a complaint against Atty. Madianda
because of this, claiming the lawyer just wanted to hear her
secrets. In answering the complaint, Atty. Madianda filed a
counter complaint against Hadjula for falsification of public
documents and immorality – using the disclosures as basis
for the charges.
Issue: What is to become of Atty. Madianda?
Held: Reprimanded.
The moment complainant approached the then
receptive respondent to seek legal advice, a veritable
lawyer-client relationship evolved between the two. Atty.
Madianda should have kept the information secret and
confidential, under the attorney-client privilege rule.
However, the seriousness of the respondent’s offense
notwithstanding, the Court feels that there is room for
compassion, absent compelling evidence that she (Atty.
Madianda) acted with ill-will. It appears that she was
actuated by the urge to retaliate without perhaps realizing
that in the process of giving bent to a negative sentiment,
she was violating the rule of confidentiality.
WILLIAM S. UY vs. ATTY. FERMIN L. GONZALES
A.C. No. 5280 : March 30, 2004
FACTS:
Complainant engaged the services of respondent lawyer to
prepare and file a petition for the issuance of a new
certificate of title. After confiding with respondent the
circumstances surrounding the lost title and discussing the
fees and costs, respondent prepared, finalized and submitted
to him a petition to be filed before the Regional Trial Court.
When the petition was about to be filed, respondent went to
complainant’s office demanding a certain amount other than
what was previously agreed upon. Respondent left his office
after reasoning with him. Expecting that said petition would
be filed, he was shocked to find out later that instead of
filing the petition for the issuance of a new certificate of
title, respondent filed a letter-complaint against him with the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for Falsification of
Public Documents. The letter-complaint contained facts and
circumstances pertaining to the transfer certificate of title
that was the subject matter of the petition which respondent
was supposed to have filed.
Respondent claims that he gave complainant a handwritten
letter telling complainant that he is withdrawing the petition
he prepared and that complainant should get another lawyer
to file the petition thereby terminating the lawyer-client
relationship between him and complainant; that there was
no longer any professional relationship between the two of
them when he filed the letter-complaint for falsification of
public document; that the facts and allegations contained in
the letter-complaint for falsification were culled from public
documents procured from the Office of the Register of
Deeds.
The IBP found him guilty of violating Rule 21.02, Canon 21
of the Canons of Professional Responsibility and
recommended for his suspension for 6 months.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent violated Canon 21 of
the CPR?
HELD:
No. Evidently, the facts alleged in the complaint for Estafa
Through Falsification of Public Documents filed by
respondent against complainant were obtained by
respondent due to his personal dealings with complainant.
Respondent volunteered his service to hasten the issuance of
the certificate of title of the land he has redeemed from
complainant. Clearly, there was no attorney-client
relationship between respondent and complainant. The
preparation and the proposed filing of the petition was only
incidental to their personal transaction.
Whatever facts alleged by respondent against complainant
were not obtained by respondent in his professional capacity
but as a redemptioner of a property originally owned by his
deceased son and therefore, when respondent filed the
complaint for estafa against herein complainant, which
necessarily involved alleging facts that would constitute
estafa, respondent was not, in any way, violating Canon 21.
There is no way we can equate the filing of the
affidavit-complaint against herein complainant to a
misconduct that is wanting in moral character, in honesty,
probity and good demeanor or that renders him unworthy to
continue as an officer of the court. To hold otherwise would
be precluding any lawyer from instituting a case against
anyone to protect his personal or proprietary interests.

PETITION DISMISSED for lack of merit.