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Abstract
This lecture argues for a theory of play that departs from the Freudian analysis of
pleasure and pain that associates pleasure with the resolution of a psychic tension or
anxiety rather than with play and its ambiguities. It advances the idea that poetry, the
domain of the aesthetic, eroticism, as well as that of the sacred involve forms of play.
Play is here conceptualized in its positive aspect as an experience beyond reflective
consciousness or calculation and that relates instead to the improbable, the fascinat-
ing, the risky and thus to the death instinct. To that extent, the decisive part of play
concerns the role of the unconscious in its elaboration. It is from such a perspective
that it proposes the identity of pleasure and play.
Keywords
experience, Freud, Nietzsche, play, pleasure, uncertainty, unconscious, work
To start with, the fact of having to face this issue shouldn’t prevent me
from subjecting Freud’s definition to a critique. Indeed, I believe I should
do so because it will be easier to criticize than justify my point of view. It is
not difficult to show – it is not obvious, but I am about to do so in detail –
that the establishment of a relation between pleasure, and the suppression
of an excitation or an anxiety in order to make of pleasure the effect of a
negative movement, introduces a malaise. Roughly speaking, pleasure is
grasped as a positive activity. In this respect, the immediate advantage of
play is in any case that of linking pleasure with positive activity. Here is the
definition which the Philosophical Dictionary of Lalande gives. Whilst it is
far from exhausting what play is, it has the advantage of allowing us a
glimpse of a valid aspect, at least provisionally. Lalande says that play is
‘an expenditure of physical or mental activity that does not have an imme-
diately useful or even definite aim, and whose only purpose in the mind of
whoever undertakes it is the pleasure which is intrinsic to it’ (Lalande,
1926). Thus we encounter from the beginning a positive aspect. ‘A physical
or mental1 activity’, an activity so inseparable from pleasure as its aim that
it appears as its only purpose.
And yet. . .
What one quickly notices with Lalande is that the definition of play
which it evokes, tied to pleasure, has but provided him with an occasion
for a valid evasion.
But I will limit myself to simply indicate that whatever definition of
play one may provide does not get us very far. I will present2 other
definitions but mainly to support a feeling of a profound problem.
Play, Huizinga tells us in his classic work, Homo Ludens, is ‘a voluntary
action or activity undertaken within some fixed boundaries of time and
space, in accordance with a freely consented but imperious rule, which
has its own aim, accompanied by a feeling of tension and joy, and a
recognition of ‘‘being otherwise’’ than in ‘‘everyday life’’’ (Huizinga,
1951: 57–8).
A more recent definition of Roger Caillois (1958), in Les Jeux et les
Hommes, is clearly more striking. Caillois believes that play can basically
be defined as an activity which is 1) Free; 2) Separate; 3) Uncertain (which
means that the outcome is not given in advance); 4) Non-productive; 5)
Regulated; 6) Fictitious. It may be legitimate to try and connect a defin-
ition to cases where play appears as a quite distinct activity. But that
would not prevent us from recognizing play outside these limits. I under-
line [that] for me what applies to play applies equally to some other
realities: with some exceptions, we all know what play is. Similarly, every-
one knows what poetry, religion, or the sacred or art is. But if one tries to
substitute a precisely articulated set of words for one’s immediate under-
standing, even if they may depict the point of view they are trying to
express, they nevertheless cannot provide us with the exact and immutable
limits of what immediate understanding had sought to capture.
Bataille 235
It is not by chance that I have brought together play and poetry, the
sacred and art; I could equally have mentioned eroticism or laughter, or
wit, as Freud (1930) understands it in Le Mot d’esprit [The Witticism].
Indeed the problem that these words pose – that besides can be defined in
as much as their contents are different (clearly, eroticism and the sacred
are different, etc.) – cannot seriously be understood if it is not posed
within the general perspective of play. I consider poetry, art or the excite-
ment of laughter or eroticism, as well as the sacred (in agreement with
Plato), to be so many forms of play. Of course, I do not exclude within
this rather general perspective the apparently insignificant and the sim-
plest games, particularly those of children and even those of animals.
To that extent, and without wanting to provide a positive definition,
I will speak of an aspect within this perspective that could henceforth
validate my intention of speaking about play in relation to Freud.
One can imagine all kinds of play within the rather vast perspective
that I have opened up[:]
Firstly, the diverse forms of play, whatever they may be, have more or
less major aesthetic value, whether such value mainly problematizes
beauty or, more modestly, merriment.
Secondly, the fact that their value is in relation to the role of the
unconscious in their elaboration. In the domain of play, intelligence
and calculation of outcome play their part, but the decisive part is that
of the unconscious.
I have sought to formulate such a claim in a language with which you
would be familiar given your orientation, yet I must now return to the
question which I posed earlier before starting on the articulation of this
lecture. I wondered earlier whether play could essentially amount to the
dissolution of all thought; whether the introduction of play within
thought did not systematically depart from the possibilities of know-
ledge, of understanding.
I am sorry if, because of this paradoxical direction, my thinking may
be hard to follow. But I believe that my reference to Freud’s thinking is
such as to make it more accessible.
I have indicated an account of the relation between play and the
unconscious which it seems to me is sufficiently clear. For me, we each
of us apprehend (I do not say know) what the unconscious is, not
so much by appeal to intelligence but to experience, to experience
perhaps elaborated through reflection, but to experience which brings
to the reflective consciousness particular exterior data, outside the data
of intelligence. I do not want to discuss Freud’s definitions. But I want to
point to their limits. I would recall an assertion of Janet that to know is
to know how. It is true that Freud is careful to explain to us how the
unconscious is produced. And it is true that we know the unconscious to
the extent that we know how it is produced. Thanks to Freud, we can
even follow its processes in great detail. Thus, we know what
236 Theory, Culture & Society 35(4–5)
for a détente without wondering about the search for a prior pleasure.
To some extent, it is true that on the other hand we can consider as
painful the tension that commits us to seek pleasure: it is possible, but
speaking personally, I experience the opposite. This tension is part of
pleasure and I cannot imagine pleasure without it, to the point that the
moment of relaxation represents for me what will put an end to pleasure;
for me relaxation is the suspension of pleasure, if not its opposite. If it is a
matter of pleasure considered in its generality, when we speak of pleas-
ure, relaxation, once secured, seems to me in principle to conform to the
dictum: ‘post coitum the animal is sad’, even if it is the case that, in spite
of the difference with what comes before, this moment is not at all sad.
On this point I have never harboured any doubt, and more than
20 years ago Freud’s lecture had taken me aback. I would not like to
limit myself to the sexual aspect of pleasure. It seems to me that in the
twists and turns and in the frenzy of singing in some choirs, I’m thinking
for instance about Russian choirs, the play of excitement and its escal-
ation explodes: the choir seems to be saying that though the excitement is
already crazy, we will not cease exceeding the present frenzy. In the end
what is it all about? It is about bursting the heavens, it is about going too
far. So far that thought could at no time represent what this ‘too far’
means. It is time: the heavens explode, one needed to burst the heavens.
It is impossible from that point to articulate an intelligible notion; if it
were or could be intelligible, that would be reason enough to reject it.
But I do not wish to stay with an essentially unintelligible delirium.
Delirium is one thing, but I didn’t come here to get into a frenzy. That
is to say, I allowed myself a temporary but conscious delirium, locating
that moment of madness within a cohesion, which means that I give it a
meaning5 in relation to a precise fact. I believe delirium has greater force; it
is more perfect when it is inserted in a strong cohesion that it must break.
Humanity never ceases to take up again the urge that lifts it to the
peak of the wave, and at that peak this impulse dissolves in the foam of
an overwhelming pleasure. The moment of pleasure is a blind moment.
But the state of blindness is itself what the excessive clarity of sight had
produced. Language probably cannot gain access to the positive expres-
sion of pleasure except in delirious terms that destroy the meaning of
language. But a negative expression is yet possible and necessary in order
to respond to the dominant fact that the ungraspable reality of pleasure is
in the last instance no less real than these objects determined by the
insensitive equations of science. I know that my emphatic excesses are
but a game, but I thus arrive at the point where I must return to
the simpler approach to the specific discussion.
What I have suggested in quite vague terms is in fact play. I imagine
that the sentences that I have used were in fact expressive of play, which I
said, negatively, could by definition not be defined. In my sentences,
I have tried to make sensible what is pursued by the thrust of play and
Bataille 241
that a curtailed language cannot reach. But here is now what I can say
with precision about this subject.
For whoever considers the principle of pleasure there are two possibi-
lities. The first is that of the scientist. It is the route that Freud and
Fechner chose. They accept that there is a variable quantity of given
energy which is (in theory if not in fact) measurable, and that has a
value of arousal, and they have looked for the quantitative relationship
that these quantities could have regarding pleasure and pain, with pleas-
ure corresponding to a decrease in energy, and displeasure to an increase.
It is at first difficult for me to oppose in principle the conceptualization of
the man (sic) of science to that of the man (sic) of play. No one knows in
fact the meaning of the man of play. However, it is possible for me to
propose the following: let us call the playing man the one who normally
shows a preference for play rather than work. Speaking thus, I am led to
promote the idea of a general opposition between the sphere of play and
that of work. Such an opposition has many aspects, the main one of
which opposes the sovereign (whatever is an end in itself) to the subor-
dinated (whatever is the outcome of work, useful for some other practical
enterprise or even sometimes for an ultimate end). But I underline this
aspect incidentally simply to make clear the value I attribute to play. For
the moment I want to argue that if science for me belongs to the sphere of
work, by denying the sovereignty to the work as such, I am bound to
deny it in the case of science. It is not a matter of neglecting or ignoring
science, it is a matter of recognizing its limits and, staying within the field
of science, of negatively locating what science can’t attain.
I thus get to what in essence I want to say today. I want to speak of
pleasure in the wake of Freud, as a critique of Freud. But I must recog-
nize for a start that my critique cannot have a scientific value except to
the extent that if pleasure has perhaps to do with play, and thus belong-
ing perhaps within the province of play, it can only partially be the object
of scientific research.
This does not necessarily mean that only a mystical understanding of
pleasure is possible; I do not speak in the language of mysticism when I
assert that if pleasure is tied to play, it can only in a negative manner be
the object of knowledge in the rigorous sense of the word, since play is
what escapes from work and since science can only speak of results that
occur with the rational regularity of the outcomes of work. In other
words, science can only envisage the necessary or the probable whilst
play always incites the improbable. This point leads to many problems
since the claim that pleasure can never be the probable outcome of such
and such an activity is indefensible. But it is not a matter of saying that,
in the existing world, such and such outcomes are unlikely. For sure,
given the world as it is, and the givenness of human existence, it is quite
likely that a particular activity would lead to pleasure. But if the world of
pleasure is viewed alongside the world of work, it is possible to grasp a
242 Theory, Culture & Society 35(4–5)
beyond the time of work, finding an activity that’s not limited by the need
to calculate outcomes is in itself a source of pleasure, pleasure being
essentially what we like as opposed to what is necessary, the responsibil-
ity to act beforehand in order to satisfy needs. Pleasure is positive, and if
it sometimes occurs in association, it can never be constrained within
its negative sense, which is characteristic of the state of mind tied to
the predominance of the values of science and work; pleasure
can never be contained within its negative conceptualization as the sup-
pression of pain.
It is the positive character of pleasure as play that determines its
ambiguity. According to the principle of play given by Caillois, there
is a grain of uncertainty in complete pleasure; for, neither its develop-
ment nor its outcome can be determined beforehand, since a degree of
freedom in the need to invent is granted to at least one of the partners.6
In the case of pleasure, risk or chance is constitutive, so long as it is not
limited by habit, by the passive fall into the inevitable. Habit tends to
demote this element of risk to the second rank, but risk is sufficiently
connected to the rise of pleasure for us to consider it as constitutive,
whereas the data of habit, of weakening or diminishing, can only have a
residual value.
I shall now attempt to sketch in its ensemble the role of chance in
pleasure, a minor aspect of which is the preference not necessarily, but
frequently, for novelty, for variety, for unexpected change. It could be a
change in the partner, in the situation or places, but above all there is,
trivially, the opening to the impossible. There is a need for qualitative or
even simply quantitative change whose insatiable character has been
stressed by Church Fathers. There is, in pleasure, a giddy opening that
announces its ambiguity. I therefore counter Fechner’s view which ties it
to stability, but it is not a matter of knowing if the quantity of energy
needed for arousal is constant or not: I think there is a fundamental
element of ambiguity in the search for pleasure. If the desire that initiates
the birth of the search for pleasure is linked to youth the constitutive
instability and vagueness of play can readily link desire to old age, in the
same way as the desire which essentially relates to beauty, to life, to what
is clean, is at its basis likely to be displaced onto ugliness, death, or dirt.
The indeterminacy of play inflects the possibilities of pleasure to the
wildest, to such an extent that even pain, the opposite of pleasure, can
be desired by the one who seeks pleasure.
And of course we are free to imagine a death instinct. I even believe
that in conceptualizing what he has said about this subject, and by
making of death the end and aim of life, Freud has managed to point
to the deep yearning that has sustained the whole of his research. But the
pursuit of death, the search for the culmination of life in the inorganic,
different from the desire relating to the inverse of the normal concerning
death or what is dying, can be imagined as the extreme point that we can
244 Theory, Culture & Society 35(4–5)
belongs to the world of science and labour. I have said already: the world
of play can only be negatively determined. If at most there is a philoso-
phy, it concerns a negative philosophy. There is in any case little rela-
tionship between philosophy as such and the way of thinking that I have
had to develop in your presence to express a particular point.
Only the thought of Nietzsche and, in general, the sense that he gave to
philosophy allows me to cite a precedent.
I would recall for you the claim which he made in Zarathoustra8 and to
which we do not usually pay attention: Zarathoustra says: ‘Let every
thought which does not make you burst out laughing at least once be
regarded as false’.
This means precisely that you should consider every thought which
you could not recognize within the framework of play as false. Within the
framework of play, that is to say, in such a way that by means of play it
contributes to experience; I do not say experimental knowledge, I say to
the experience of what in human existence is play.
I here insist on the fact that since play is the supreme value, because, by
definition, play, or at least what play created in opposition to work, is sov-
ereign, that all which is sovereign is play, all supreme value is dissolved (let
us say incidentally that if one looks at things from this point of view, one
sees to what point Nietzsche distances himself from fascism, since the
latter tries to construct a supreme value with the help of processes that
the fascists would probably have liked to borrow from the techniques
associated with the unconscious that have created the supreme values
from the past, but which they have essentially produced from the pro-
cesses of work that never exceed the calculation of outcomes).
But since I come round in my turn to finding myself some precedents,
I must add that the thought of Hegel has retained for me a fundamental
value. In one sense, there is probably nothing more contrary to my own
thinking or that of Nietzsche than that of Hegel. But, [if] Hegel’s phil-
osophy can be considered as a philosophy of work, at the same time it
constantly develops in opposition to every thought. So much so that no
thought is possible that does not derive from it. One can add the
unequalled scope of this philosopher, including being the father, prob-
ably denied, of Marx. Things are thus: Hegel, completed by Marx, has so
well constructed a philosophy of work that negative philosophy, or, if
you wish, anti-philosophy, that can be imagined from play as its basis,
differs as little as possible from what I would call Hegelian Marxism.
Marx had already pretended that he had put Hegel back on his feet. He
was starting from what Hegel himself had said, which is that the phil-
osopher is defined by the fact that, unlike everybody, he (sic) walked on
his head. I am myself strongly tempted to return to walking on my head.
That said, I must say a word about the relationship that could legit-
imately appear between my way of seeing and that of Heidegger. Indeed,
Heidegger’s research leads him, like me, to the opposite of these
246 Theory, Culture & Society 35(4–5)
Summary9
I propose the following relating to the theories that Freud has main-
tained in Beyond the Pleasure Principle. They are mainly paradoxical.
Bataille 247
Acknowledgments
This is a translation of the article ‘L’ambiguı̈té du plaisir et du jeu’, originally published in
French in Les Temps Modernes by Gallimard. It has been translated into English for
publication in Theory, Culture & Society with the permission of Julie Bataille. Rights and
permissions queries should be sent to Julie Bataille via Les Hommes sans épaules e´ditions
(les.hse@orange.fr). The abstract and keywords have been added for this English trans-
lation and were not part of the original publication.
Translator’s Notes
‘L’ambiguı̈té du plaisir et le jeu’ is the title that appears in paper 2 of
Georges Bataille’s manuscript. Nevertheless, Bataille barred such after-
wards. Therefore, we chose the new title that comes out of the text during
the lecture that Bataille gave at Sainte-Anne on 21 October 1958 upon
the invitation of Jacques Lacan, in accordance with the report of the
psychoanalyst Eugénie Lemoine-Luccioni, who was present at the con-
ference ‘Sur l’ambiguı̈té du plaisir et du jeu’ (1987. ‘La transgression chez
Georges Bataille et l’interdit analytique’, in Écrits d’ailleurs. Georges
Bataille et les ethnologues. Texts edited by Dominique Lecoq and Jean-
Luc Lory. Paris: Éditions de la Maison des sciences de l’homme, p. 67).
The lecture remained unpublished until the original French text was
edited and annotated by Marina Galletti on the basis of the manuscript
kept at the Bibliothèque nationale, Papiers Georges Bataille, Boı̂te
18,B,f, 91–131; 39 pages numbered by Bataille 1–39) with the authoriza-
tion of Julie Bataille; it first appeared in Les Temps Modernes 629, 2005:
7–28, with the title ‘L’ambiguı̈té du plaisir et du jeu’. The terms in
square brackets are added by Marina Galletti, whose transcriptions
Bataille 249
Notes
1. I found the correct citation. Bataille had written ‘sentimental’ instead of
‘mental’.
2. Underneath ‘will present’ Bataille added ‘will cite’.
3. Bataille at first wrote ‘make myself be understood’.
4. The citation is to the first sentence of Au-dela’ du principe du plaisir [Beyond
the Pleasure Principle], doubtless translated into French, like the other cit-
ations, by Bataille himself.
5. Bataille wrote initially: ‘this does not mean that I deprive it of its meaning’.
6. Bataille refers freely to a passage in Caillois (1958: 23).
7. He first read Freud in 1923, which is the date when he borrowed, from the
Bibliothèque nationale, Introduction à la psychoanalyse [Introduction to
Psychoanalysis] (1922), translated by Samuel Jankélévitch.
8. In the year in which Bataille gave this lecture, a new edition appeared of
Ainsi parlait Zarathoustra. Un livre pour tous et pour personne [Thus Spoke
Zarathoustra. A Book for All and None], translated by Henri Albert (Club du
meilleur livre).
9. Papiers Georges Bataille, Boı̂te 12 D, 8–11. Four pages recto, numbered by
Bataille 1–4, on each of which he has added ‘Résumé’ [Summary] at the top
right-hand corner. It refers to the summary of the lecture ‘On the Ambiguity
of Pleasure and Play’, to which Marina Galletti appended two pages of
preparatory notes, mainly quotations from Freud, and a plan for Le Pur
Bonheur [Pure Happiness], anticipating ‘(a) Theory of Religion?; (b) Lectures
on non-knowledge; (c) Three essays on play: 1. Article on Huizinga; 2.
Article on Caillois; 3. Conference on play (reviewed?)’.
10. Bataille at first wrote ‘return’.
References
Caillois, Roger (1958) Les Jeux et les Hommes (Le masque et le vertige). Paris:
Gallimard.
Fechner, Theodor (1873) Einige Ideen zur Schopfungs und
Entwicklungsgeschichte der Organismen. Leipzig: Druck und Verlag von
Breithopf und Härtel.
Freud, Sigmund (1930) Le Mot d’esprit dans ses rapports avec l’inconscient
[Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious], vol. VIII in the Standard
Edition, trans. Bonaparte, Marie and Nathan, Marcel. Paris: Gallimard.
Huizinga, Johan (1951 [1938]) Homo Ludens. Essai sur la fonction sociale du jeu,
trans. Seresia, Cécile. Paris: Gallimard.
Lalande, André (1926) Vocabulaire technique et critique de la philosophie, 2nd
edn. Paris: Félix Alcan.
Otto, Rudolf (1929) Le Sacre´: l’e´le´ment non rationnel dans l’ide´e du divin et sa
relation avec le rationnel. Paris: Payot. [In English as: The Idea of the Holy: An
250 Theory, Culture & Society 35(4–5)
Inquiry Into the Non-Rational Factor in the Idea of the Divine and Its Relation
to the Rational].
This article is part of the Theory, Culture & Society special issue on
‘Bataille and Heterology’, edited by Roy Boyne and Marina Galletti.