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ELECTRONICALLY FILED - 2018 Oct 05 12:27 PM - FLORENCE - COMMON PLEAS - CASE#2018CP2102082

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA ) IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS


COUNTY OF FLORENCE )
CIVIL ACTION NO.: 2018-CP-21-02082
Rechel M. Anderson, )
)
)
Plaintiff, )
) ANSWER ON BEHALF OF
vs. ) DEFENDANT FLORENCE COUNTY
) SCHOOL DISTRICT FOUR
Molly M. Spearman, State Superintendent; )
South Carolina Department of Education; )
Florence County School District Four, )
)
Defendants. )
___________________________________________ )

Defendant Florence County School District Four, [hereinafter referred to as “School

District” or “Defendant”], in all capacities alleged, hereby answers the Complaint of Plaintiff

Rechel M. Anderson, [hereinafter referred to as “Anderson” or the “Plaintiff”], and alleges as

follows:

FOR A FIRST DEFENSE

1. That this Court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of the Plaintiff’s Complaint

against Defendant School District.

FOR A SECOND DEFENSE

2. That the Complaint fails to state facts sufficient to constitute any cause of action or

any claim upon which relief may be granted against Defendant School District as a matter of law.

FOR A THIRD DEFENSE

3. That each and every allegation of the Complaint not hereinafter admitted is

specifically denied and strict proof thereof is demanded.

4. That Defendant School District responds to the allegations of the Complaint by

paragraph numbers corresponding to the paragraph numbers of the Complaint, as follows:

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1. That, upon information and belief, only so much of the allegations contained in

Paragraph 1 of the Complaint is admitted as allege or reference the residency of

Plaintiff Rechel M. Anderson. Defendant denies all claims advanced under any

theories by Plaintiff attempting to impose liability or seek damages or relief against

the Defendant. Strict proof is thereof demanded of all claims asserted in the

Complaint.

2. That the allegations contained in Paragraph 2 of the Complaint do not refer to or

reference the Defendant School District; and, therefore, no answer is required.

3. That the allegations contained in Paragraph 3 of the Complaint do not refer to or

reference the Defendant School District; and, therefore, no answer is required.

4. That only so much of the allegations contained in Paragraph 4 of the Complaint, and

elsewhere in the Complaint, is admitted as allege or imply that the Defendant School

District is a governmental entity or political subdivision of the State of South

Carolina, and that the School District, as a governmental entity or political

subdivision of the State, is amenable to suit only in strict accordance with the South

Carolina Tort Claims Act, S.C. Code Ann. §§ 15-78-10, et seq. (2016 Supp.) [“Tort

Claims Act”]. See also, §§ 15-78-20, -30(c), (d), (f), (h), and (i); 15-78-60; 15-78-

70; 15-78-100; 15-78-110; and 15-78-120 (2016 Supp.). The S.C. Tort Claims Act

and all of its immunities and defenses, including but not limited to, sovereign

immunity, as well as all of the immunities, limitations, and defenses granted or

preserved thereunder, serve as, and are herewith pled as, an affirmative defense and

bar to the within action brought by Plaintiff. In addition, only so much of the

allegations contained in Paragraph 4 of the Complaint, and elsewhere in the

Complaint, is admitted as allege or imply that Defendant School District and its

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employees, agents, and representatives, at all times relevant concerning the Plaintiff

and the subject matters of the Plaintiff’s Complaint, were acting objectively in good

faith under the circumstances presented and with no intent to harm. By way of

further response, the Defendant School District denies any actionable conduct on its

part, or on the part of any of its agents, employees, or representatives; denies having

breached any Employment Agreement concerning Plaintiff; denies having breached

any contract concerning Plaintiff; denies having committed any actionable tort;

denies having committed any intentional or unintentional torts; and denies any

negligent or grossly negligent conduct. In addition, the Defendant denies any

attempts to impose liability or seek damages or relief under any theory alleged in the

Complaint. Strict proof is demanded of all allegations.

5. That the allegations contained in Paragraph 5 of the Complaint, as worded, are

denied. Strict proof is thereof demanded.

6. That only so much of the allegations contained in Paragraph 6 of the Complaint is

admitted as allege or imply that a Memorandum of Agreement, [“MOA”], was

entered into between the South Carolina Department of Education, [“SCDE”], and

the School District on or about November 2, 2017, for the purpose of supporting

Brockington Elementary, Johnson Middle, and the School District has a whole; and,

the School District would crave reference to the MOA as containing the best

evidence of its specific terms, language, and provisions. Any remaining or contrary

allegations are denied.

7. That only so much of the allegations contained in Paragraph 7 of the Complaint is

admitted as allege or imply that on or about November 28, 2017, the School District

Board of Trustees held a meeting; and, Defendant School District would crave

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reference to the minutes of the November 28, 2017, meeting of the School District

Board of Trustees as containing the best evidence of votes, if any, taken by the

Board of Trustees for the School District during that meeting which may pertain to

the employment of the Plaintiff as the District Superintendent. Any remaining or

contrary allegations are denied.

8. That only so much of the allegations contained in Paragraph 8 of the Complaint is

admitted as allege or imply that on or about December 22, 2017, a Professional

Employment Agreement was entered into between the Board of Trustees of the

School District and Dr. Rechel Anderson; and, Defendant School District would

crave reference to the Professional Employment Agreement dated December 22,

2017, between the School District and Dr. Rechel Anderson as containing the best

evidence of its specific terms, language, and provisions. Any remaining or contrary

allegations are denied.

9. That only so much of the allegations contained in Paragraph 9 of the Complaint is

admitted as allege or imply that on or about January 23, 2018, the School District

Board of Trustees held a meeting; and, Defendant School District would crave

reference to the minutes of the January 23, 2018, meeting of the School District

Board of Trustees as containing the best evidence of votes, if any, taken by the

Board of Trustees for the School District during that meeting which may pertain to

the employment of the Plaintiff as the District Superintendent. Any remaining or

contrary allegations are denied.

10. That only so much of the allegations contained in Paragraph 10 of the Complaint is

admitted as allege or imply that on or about February 2, 2018, a First Amendment to

the Professional Employment Agreement was entered into between the Board of

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Trustees of the School District and Dr. Rechel Anderson; and, Defendant School

District would crave reference to the First Amendment to the Professional

Employment Agreement between the Board of Trustees of the School District and

Dr. Anderson as dated February 2, 2018, as containing the best evidence of its

specific terms, language, and provisions. Any remaining or contrary allegations are

denied.

11. That the allegations contained in Paragraph 11 of the Complaint concern a

description by Plaintiff concerning Exhibits 2, 3, and 4 that are attached to Plaintiff’s

Complaint and appear to contain legal arguments or legal conclusions by Plaintiff;

and, thus, these are allegations which can neither be admitted nor denied or require

any response. To any extent any response may be required, these allegations are

denied and strict proof is thereof demanded.

12. That only so much of the allegations contained in Paragraph 12 of the Complaint is

admitted as allege or imply that on or about May 8, 2018, Defendant Molly M.

Spearman, [“Spearman”], in her official capacity as State Superintendent of

Education for the State of South Carolina, declared, pursuant to or in accordance

with S.C. Code Ann. § 59-18-1570 (Supp. 2016), a state of emergency in the School

District; and, as a result, the Board of Trustees for the School District was relieved

of its duties in the management of the School District in accordance with applicable

state law. Any contrary or remaining allegations are denied.

13. That the allegations contained in Paragraph 13 of the Complaint are denied. Strict

proof thereof is demanded.

14. That only so much of the allegations contained in Paragraph 14 of the Complaint is

admitted as allege or imply that the Professional Employment Agreement between

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the Board of Trustees and Dr. Rechel Anderson as dated December 22, 2017,

contains language and paragraphs regarding termination, including, but not limited

to, a paragraph known as Paragraph 7(e) which Plaintiff makes reference to in

Paragraph 14 of the Complaint; however, there are other terms, provision, and

language contained in this Professional Employment Agreement as well.

Accordingly, Defendant School District would crave reference to the entire

Professional Employment Agreement as dated December 22, 2017, as containing the

best evidence of its specific terms, language, and provisions. Any remaining or

contrary allegations are denied.

15. That the allegations contained in Paragraph 15 of the Complaint are denied. Strict

proof thereof is demanded.

16. That the allegations contained in Paragraph 16 of the Complaint are denied. Strict

proof thereof is demanded.

17. That the allegations contained in Paragraphs 17 of the Complaint are denied. Strict

proof thereof is demanded.

AS TO THOSE ALLEGATIONS IN THE “Prayer for Relief”

That the allegations contained in the Prayer for Relief contained in Complaint are
denied. The Defendant School District denies all allegations with respect to both
alleged liability and alleged damages or relief asserted in the Complaint and in the
Prayer for Relief in the Complaint. Strict proof is demanded of all allegations
against Defendant School District.

FOR A FOURTH DEFENSE AND AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

5. That Plaintiff’s claims are barred by provisions of the South Carolina Tort Claims

Act, S.C. Code Ann. §§ 15-78-10, et. seq. (2016 Supp.), which is herewith pled in its entirety,

including the doctrine of sovereign immunity as well as all of the immunities, limitations, and

defenses granted or preserved thereunder, and also including, but not limited to, §§15-78-20, 15-78-

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30, 15-78-40, 15-78-60 [and all immunities applicable thereunder], 15-78-70, 15-78-100, 15-78-

110, 15-78-120, and 15-78-200, as well as other pertinent immunities and provisions of the Tort

Claims Act, all of which serve as and are pled as affirmative defenses and bars to the within action.

FOR A FIFTH DEFENSE AND AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

6. That Plaintiff’s breach of contract claims are barred by the doctrine of sovereign

immunity, which along with the South Carolina Tort Claims Act as hereinabove referenced, is pled

and asserted as an affirmative defense and bar to the within action.

FOR A SIXTH DEFENSE AND AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

7. That at all times relevant to the allegations in the Complaint, Defendant School

District and its and their agents’ actions were privileged because they were exercising discretionary

authority, discretionary judgment, and discretionary functions in good faith and/or were carrying out

proper official duties and functions under applicable state laws and regulations with respect to the

Plaintiff; and, therefore, the Plaintiff’s claims against the Defendant School District are barred

because the Defendant School District is entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law.

FOR A SEVENTH DEFENSE AND AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

8. That the Defendant School District and its and their agents, employees, servants,

officials, and representatives, at all times relevant hereto, during the performance or non-

performance of any acts or omissions alleged in the Complaint did not perform any acts or fail to

perform any acts in bad faith, in any malicious manner, or with corrupt motives; and, therefore, the

Defendant School District is immune from suit as a matter of law.

FOR AN EIGHTH DEFENSE

9. That the Professional Employment Agreement and/or any contract on which the

Plaintiff bases her breach of contact cause of action and any claims alleged in the Complaint now

are void and unenforceable per the terms of the Professional Employment Agreement, and pursuant

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to the provisions and applications of S.C. Code Ann. § 59-18-1570, all of which serves as and is

plead as a defense and bar to the within action as a matter of law.

FOR A NINTH DEFENSE

10. That Plaintiff has failed to exhaust all available grievance or other administrative and

available remedies; and, this serves as and is plead as a defense and bar to the within action as a

matter of law.

FOR A TENTH DEFENSE

11. That, upon present information and belief, the Plaintiff has failed to properly

mitigate, or undertake reasonable measures to mitigate, her damages and claims which are advanced

in the Complaint; and, this serves and is plead as a defense and bar to the within action as a matter

of law.

FOR AN ELEVENTH DEFENSE

12. That Plaintiff is not entitled to any award of attorney’s fees under S.C. Code Ann. §

15-77-300 in this action, as the Defendant School District is not a party that has acted “without

substantial justification” or has “pressed a claim” against Plaintiff, and there no “special

circumstances” justifying any potential award of attorney’s fees to Plaintiff, as a matter of law.

FOR A TWELFTH DEFENSE

13. That Plaintiff is not entitled to any claimed or asserted damages, relief, attorney’s

fees or costs set forth in any of the enumerated “claims” or “causes of action” in the Complaint; in

the “Prayer for Relief” in the Complaint; or based on any matter advanced in the Complaint, as a

matter of law.

FOR A THIRTEENTH DEFENSE

14. That the Defendant School District reserves, and specifically does not waive, any

and all additional defenses which may become evident through the discovery process or otherwise

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in this matter; and, in addition, Defendant reserves the right to amend this answer to include

additional defenses or withdraw others after the completion of discovery and at other times

thereafter, up to and including, during a potential trial.

WHEREFORE, having fully answered the Complaint, Defendant School District demands

that the Complaint and all claims asserted be dismissed with prejudice as to the Defendant in all

capacities; requests that the Defendant be awarded its costs, expenses and attorneys’ fees under

applicable statutory provisions, rules and case law, and under the S.C.R.Civ.P.; and requests that the

Court award such other and further relief as is deemed just and proper.

s/Leslie A. Cotter, Jr.


Leslie A. Cotter, Jr. [SC Bar #1414]

s/Eugene H. Matthews
Eugene H. Matthews [SC Bar #10193]

RICHARDSON PLOWDEN & ROBINSON, P.A.


Post Office Drawer 7788
Columbia, South Carolina 29202
Email: lcotter@richardsonplowden.com
Email: gmatthews@richardsonplowden.com

ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT FLORENCE


COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT FOUR
October 5, 2018
Columbia, South Carolina

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