Reading: Introduction to Epistemology

This week our focus is going to be on the area of philosophy known as

epistemology. Epistemology is the study of how we know things and what is meant by the idea
of knowing. What does it mean to say “I know that I ate breakfast this morning?” “I know you.” I
have known about this failure on the part of my friend for years.” “I know the wind is blowing
from the north.” I know it is going to rain tomorrow.” All of these are assertions of truth by the
speaker. But, what sort of meaning can we give to it?
This is a video introducing epistemology (Don’t get hung up on the mentions of evolution! They
are not useful in thinking about the topic of knowledge)

Having watched the video, ask yourself these questions:

How do I react to the idea that epistemology is based on fear?
Can I always trust my perception?

Before you readily assert that Yes, I can trust my perceptions, check out these images!
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/23/10-optical-illusions-that-will-blow-your-
mind_n_3307500.html
What does it mean to say I trust my eyes? “I know what I saw. I saw it with my own eyes.”
Does that mean I can trust what you say?
The area of epistemology has to do with these questions among many others.

Reading: Advice to Christian Philosophers by Alvin Plantinga

III. Theism and Theory of Knowledge
I can best approach my second example by indirection. Many philosophers have claimed to
find a serious problem for theism in the existence of evil, or of the amount and kinds of evil we
do in fact find. Many who claim to find a problem here for theists have urged the deductive
argument from evil: they have claimed that the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient, and
wholly good God is logically incompatible with the presence of evil in the world-a presence
conceded and indeed insisted upon by Christian theists. For their part, theists have argued that
there is no inconsistency here. I think the present consensus, even among those who urge
some form of the argument from evil, is that the deductive form of the argument from evil is
unsuccessful.
More recently, philosophers have claimed that the existence of God, while perhaps not actually
inconsistent with the existence of the amount and kinds of evil we do in fact find, is at any rate
unlikely or improbable with respect to it; that is, the probability of the existence of God with
respect to the evil we find, is less than the probability, with respect to that same evidence, that
there is no God-no omnipotent, omniscient and wholly good Creator. Hence the existence of
God is improbable with respect to what we know. But if theistic belief is improbable with
respect to what we know, then, so goes the claim, it is irrational or in any event intellectually
second rate to accept it.
Now suppose we briefly examine this claim. The objector holds that
1. God is the omnipotent, omniscient and wholly good creator of the world is improbable or
unlikely with respect to
2. There are 10E+13 turps of evil (where the turp is the basic unit of evil).
I've argued elsewhere that enormous difficulties beset the claim that (1) is unlikely or
improbable given (2). Call that response "the low road reply." Here I want to pursue what I shall
call the high road reply.
Suppose we stipulate, for purposes of argument, that (1) is, in fact, improbable on (2). Let's
agree that it is unlikely, given the existence of 10E+13 turps of evil, that the world has been
created by a God who is perfect in power, knowledge and goodness. What is supposed to
follow from that? How is that to be construed as an objection to theistic belief? How does the
objector's argument go from there? It doesn't follow, of course, that theism is false. Nor does it
follow that one who accepts both (1) and (2) [and let's add, recognizes that (1) is improbable
with respect to (2)] has an irrational system of beliefs or is in any way guilty of noetic
impropriety; obviously there might be pairs of propositions A and B, such that we know both A
and B, despite the fact that A is improbable on B.
I might know, for example, both that Feike is a Frisian and 9 out of 10 Frisians can't swim, and
also that Feike can swim; then I am obviously within my intellectual rights in accepting both
these propositions, even though the latter is improbable with respect to the former. So even if it
were a fact that (1) is improbable with respect to (2), that fact, so far, wouldn't be of much
consequence. How, therefore, can this objection be developed?
Presumably what the objector means to hold is that (1) is improbable, not just on (2) but on
some appropriate body of total evidence- perhaps all the evidence the theist has, or perhaps
the body of evidence he is rationally obliged to have. The objector must be supposing that the
theist has a relevant body of total evidence here, a body of evidence that includes (2); and his
claim is that (1) is improbable with respect to this relevant body of total evidence. Suppose we
say that T is the relevant body of total evidence for a given theist T; and suppose we agree that
a brief is rationally acceptable for him only if it is not improbable with respect to T. Now what
sorts of propositions are to be found in T?
Perhaps the propositions he knows to be true, or perhaps the largest subset of his beliefs that
he can rationally accept without evidence from other propositions, or perhaps the propositions
he knows immediately-knows, but does not know on the basis of other propositions. However
exactly we characterize this set T, the question I mean to press is this: why can't belief in God
be itself a member of T? Perhaps for the theist-for many theists, at any rate-belief in God is a
member of T. Perhaps the theist has a right to start from belief in God, taking that proposition
to be one of the ones probability with respect to which determines the rational propriety of other
beliefs he holds. But if so, then the Christian philosopher is entirely within his rights in starting
from belief in God to his philosophizing. He has a right to take the existence of God for granted
and go on from there in his philosophical work-just as other philosophers take for granted the
existence of the past, say, or of other persons, or the basic claims of contemporary physics.

Reprinted from Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers vol. 1:3,
(253-271), permanently copyrighted October 1984. Used by permission of the Editor. New
preface by author. Journal web site: www.faithandphilosophy.com
COPYRIGHT/REPRODUCTION LIMITATIONS:
This article is the sole property of Faith and Philosophy. It may not be altered or edited in any
way. It may be reproduced only in its entirety for circulation as "freeware," without charge. All
reproductions of this data file must contain this Copyright/Reproduction Limitations notice.
This data file may not be used without the permission of Faith and Philosophy for resale or the
enhancement of any other product sold.

Reading: Perception Blindness -- Why our own eyes cannot be

trusted
When you see something, do you notice all that there is to see about that thing so that you
know it, him, or her? No one, it seems, is that aware of their world. Our brains would be
overloaded with our sensory perceptions and simply could not handle that much information.
So we unconsciously decide what is important and what is not in that particular instant. It is
called “perception blindness.” I raise this psychological issue, because all to often we are
convinced that we know something, but we only know that which we have paid attention to.
Click on the link to see a video about perception blindness.

Having watched the video, are you as ready to affirm that you know something for sure? What
does this mean for us as followers of Jesus? How much do we know about ourselves as
disciples of Jesus? Might we actually know very little because we only pay attention to that
which we have previously decided is important as a disciple and have let the rest simply fall by
the wayside?

Reading: The limits of perception

There is a fascinating radio program I listen to from time to time called “Radiolab.” It is
produced by the public radio station in New York City in America. The link below will take you
to a podcast from the folks at Radiolab as they help us to learn about seeing. We all know the
colors of the rainbow, right? This podcast speaks to how we perceive color and the
trustworthiness of our eyesight.

http://www.radiolab.org/story/211178-rip-rainbow/

Having listened to this and watched the previous item, we have to ask ourselves, “Why is it that
we do not see things or why we do see them?” In the Christian faith, we begin with faith and
move on to sight – we live by faith, says St Paul, not by sight. So we find ourselves
challenged to believe in order to know.

The words of John Calvin,

“Now in describing the world as a mirror in which we ought to behold God, I do not want to be
understood as asserting either that our eyes are sufficiently clear-sighted to discern what the
fabric of heaven and earth represents or that the knowledge to be hence attained is sufficient
for salvation. And whereas the Lord invited us to himself by the means of created things, with
no other effect than that of thereby rendering us inexcusable, he has added (as was
necessary) a new remedy; or at least by a new aide he has assisted in the ignorance of our
mind. For by the Scriptures as our guide and teacher, he not only makes those things plain
that would otherwise escape our notice, but he almost compels us to behold them, as if he
had assisted our dull sight with spectacles” (From the Crossway Classic Commentaries
Series, edited by Alister McGrath and J.I Packer, page xiii and xiv)
What does Calvin’s thought say about epistemology?
Reading: Cartesian Epistemolgy
Rene Descartes has had a very strong influence on philosophy since his life. One of his
important areas of writing have to do with his theory of knowledge or epistemology. The
following excerpt from the Stanford Philosophical Library will give us a glimpse of the central
thought of Descartes on what we know. -RZ

Rene Descartes’ Philosophy of Knowledge

René Descartes (1596–1650) is widely regarded as the father of modern philosophy. His
noteworthy contributions extend to mathematics and physics. This entry focuses on his
philosophical contributions in the theory of knowledge. Specifically, the focus is on the
epistemological project of Descartes' famous work, Meditations on First Philosophy. Upon its
completion, the work was circulated to other philosophers for their comments and criticisms.
Descartes responded with detailed replies that provide a rich source of further information
about the original work. He indeed published the first edition (1641) of the Meditations together
with six sets of objections and replies, adding a seventh set with the second edition (1642).
Famously, Descartes defines knowledge in terms of doubt. While distinguishing rigorous
knowledge (scientia) and lesser grades of conviction (persuasio), Descartes writes:
I distinguish the two as follows: there is conviction when there remains some reason which
might lead us to doubt, but knowledge is conviction based on a reason so strong that it can
never be shaken by any stronger reason. (1640 letter to Regius, AT 3:65)
In the preceding few sentences, Descartes is saying that there are times when we have to
distinguish between what we can confidently assert as a conviction and what we cannot so
confidently affirm to be convinced of. The first he calls knowledge and the second is not
knowledge as far as he is concerned. It has to do with how shaky our convictions are. If we
know something so profoundly that it cannot be shaken by any doubts or reasons put forth in
an argument, then it is knowledge. – RZ
Elsewhere, while answering a challenge as to whether he succeeds in founding such
knowledge, Descartes writes:
But since I see that you are still stuck fast in the doubts which I put forward in the First
Meditation, and which I thought I had very carefully removed in the succeeding Meditations, I
shall now expound for a second time the basis on which it seems to me that all human
certainty can be founded.
First of all, as soon as we think that we correctly perceive something, we are spontaneously
convinced that it is true. Now if this conviction is so firm that it is impossible for us ever to have
any reason for doubting what we are convinced of, then there are no further questions for us to
ask: we have everything that we could reasonably want. … For the supposition which we are
making here is of a conviction so firm that it is quite incapable of being destroyed; and such a
conviction is clearly the same as the most perfect certainty. (Replies 2, AT 7:144–45)
As we will be seeing in the material that follows, Descartes sees knowledge as the opposite of
doubt. Ignorance is not doubt, and it is not the opposite of knowledge. It is doubt which raises
the uncertainty in one’s heart concerning the truthfulness of a particular assertion, it is not
ignorance that does so. Here is a for example,: If I say, “I know beyond a shadow of a doubt,
that my guilt has been paid for by the suffering and death of Jesus,” then that is knowledge that
I have. Now if Satan wants to challenge that in my life, he will not attack it head on and tell me I
am ignorant. Instead, the Serpent will ask, “Is it really so? Did God really say? …” In doing so,
he casts doubt into or hearts and destroys our knowledge. -RZ
These passages (and others) clarify that Descartes understands doubt as the contrast of
certainty. As my certainty increases, my doubt decreases; conversely, as my doubt increases,
my certainty decreases. The requirement that knowledge is to be based in complete, or perfect
certainty, amounts to requiring a complete absence of doubt — an indubitability, or inability to
undermine one's conviction. Descartes' methodic emphasis on doubt, rather than on certainty,
marks an epistemological innovation. This so-called ‘method of doubt’ is discussed below
(Section 2).
The certainty/indubitability of interest to Descartes is psychological in character, though not
merely psychological — not simply an inexplicable feeling. It has also a distinctively epistemic
character, involving a kind of rational insight. During moments of certainty, it is as if my
perception is guided by “a great light in the intellect” (Med. 4, AT 7:59). This rational
illumination empowers me to “see utterly clearly with my mind's eye”; my feelings of certainty
are grounded — indeed, “I see a manifest contradiction” in denying the proposition of which I'm
convinced. (Med. 3, AT 7:36)
In the denomination I grew up in, when a person was going to be baptized, the pastor would
read a set formulary for baptism. In that formulary it would be said that baptism is an
“indubitable sign and seal” of the promises of Most High God. I find that language to be
instructive as I read Descartes’ affirmation of what is true. It has the character of being
“indubitable.” -RZ
Should we regard Descartes' account as a version of the justified true belief analysis of
knowledge tracing back to Plato? The above texts (block quoted) are among Descartes'
clearest statements concerning the brand of knowledge he seeks. Yet they raise questions
about the extent to which his account is continuous with other analyses of knowledge. First of
all, his characterizations imply a justified belief analysis of knowledge — or in language closer
to his own (and where justification is construed in terms of unshakability), an unshakable
conviction analysis. There's no stated requirement that the would-be knower's conviction is to
be true, as opposed to being unshakably certain. Is truth, therefore, not a requirement of
Descartes' brand of strict knowledge?
Many will balk at the suggestion. For in numerous texts Descartes writes about truth, even
characterizing a “rule for establishing the truth” (Med. 5, AT 7:70, passim). It might therefore
seem clear, whatever else is the case, that Descartes conceives of knowledge as advancing
truth. Without denying this, let me play devil's advocate. It is not inconsistent to hold that
we're pursuing the truth, even succeeding in establishing the truth, and yet to construe
the conditions of success wholly in terms of the certainty of our conviction — i.e., wholly in
terms of internalist criteria. Thus construed, to establish a proposition just is to perceive it with
certainty; the result of having established it — i.e., what gets established — is the proposition's
truth. Truth is a consequence of knowledge, rather than its precondition. Note again that
Descartes says, of the perfect certainty he seeks, that it provides “everything that we could
reasonably want,” adding (in the same passage):
What is it to us that someone may make out that the perception whose truth we are so firmly
convinced of may appear false to God or an angel, so that it is, absolutely speaking, false?
Why should this alleged “absolute falsity” bother us, since we neither believe in it nor have
even the smallest suspicion of it? (Replies 2, AT 7:144–45)
On one reading of this remark, Descartes is explicitly embracing the consequence of having
defined knowledge wholly in terms of unshakable conviction: he's conceding that achieving the
brand of knowledge he seeks is compatible with being — “absolutely speaking” — in error. If
this is the correct reading, the interesting upshot is that Descartes' ultimate aspiration is not
absolute truth, but absolute certainty.
On a quite different reading of this passage, Descartes is clarifying that the analysis of
knowledge is neutral not about truth, but about absolute truth: he's conveying that the truth
condition requisite to knowledge involves truth as coherence. Harry Frankfurt defended such
an interpretation in his influential 1970 work, Demons, Dreamers, and Madmen. Yet, in a
follow-up paper he retracted the view:
I now think, however, that it was a mistake on my part to suggest that Descartes entertained a
coherence conception of truth. The fact is that there is no textual evidence to support that
suggestion; on the contrary, whenever Descartes gives an explicit account of truth he explains
it unequivocally as correspondence with reality. (1978, 36f)
More recently, Ernest Sosa (1997a) and Michael Della Rocca (2011) have helped revive
interest in whether Descartes should be read as holding some form of coherence theory.
A definitive interpretation of these issues has yet to gain general acceptance in the literature.
What is clear is that the brand of knowledge Descartes seeks requires, at least, unshakably
certain conviction. Arguably, this preoccupation with having the right kind of certainty —
including its being available to introspection — is linked with his commitment to
an internalist conception of knowledge.
In characterizing knowledge as “incapable of being destroyed,” Descartes portrays knowledge
as enduring. Our conviction must be, he writes, “so strong that it can never be shaken”; “so firm
that it is impossible for us ever to have any reason for doubting.” Descartes wants a brand of
certainty/indubitability that is of the highest rank, both in terms of degree and durability. He
wants knowledge that is utterly indefeasible. (Sceptical doubts count as defeaters.)
This indefeasibility requirement implies more than mere stability. A would-be knower could
achieve stability simply by never reflecting on reasons for doubt. But this would result in
mere undoubtedness, not indubitability. Referring to such a person, Descartes points out that
although a reason for “doubt may not occur to him, it can still crop up if someone else raises
the point or if he looks into the matter himself” (Replies 2, AT 7:141).
Retrieved from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/descartes-epistemology/

Reading: Epistemology from a Christian Perspective

So, the question remains for each of us: How do we justify “knowing “ what we say we do?
How do you and I know we are called of God to be followers of Jesus in our lives today? How
do we know what to do as followers? Can we actually give a solid definition of what it means
to know God? Over the years many books have been written on the subject of knowing God.
Each author seeks to open for us the avenue of knowledge with the author has chosen as the
(to use the Cartesian idea “indubitable”) way to knowledge of God. But is that how we should
begin?
For example, the Scriptures begin with a very simple epistemology, “In the beginning, God
created the heavens and the earth.” That is simply a straightforward assertion of the existence,
and the activity of God. Further, it goes on to simply recount the way in which God speaks, and
the universe becomes ordered so that humanity can have a place to live with God, in
communion with God, and for the good of the creation itself. The Scriptures, it can be said,
simply operate out of a faith perspective. But does faith negate the verifiability of the assertions
which are made?
As we look over the material which we have had in this week’s content, we discover that the
basis of knowing anything is preponderantly said to be our own experience (which can be very
faulty in determining truth) and our reason (Which can be notoriously problematic when we see
it at work in the insane.) But, what about the spiritual realities we as Christians not only believe
in, but are convinced of? Hebrews 11: 1 says Now faiths is the assurance of things hoped for,
the conviction of things not seen. So the basic text for the Christian faith in defining that word
faith is that it is a conviction (it is indubitable) of something that is not seen. Therefore, our faith
is a path to knowing facts with a conviction that cannot be denied. This recognition is the
assertion that for you and I as followers of Jesus, there is a third way of “knowing” – that is by
faith.
The age old question of Pontius Pilate to Jesus is relevant to us when thinking about
epistemology, “What is truth?” What can we know is true? Jesus claimed to be a king whose
kingdom is not of this world. He goes on
For this cause I was born, and for this cause I have come into the world, that I should bear
witness to the truth. Everyone who is of the truth hears My voice.”
38
Pilate said to Him, “What is truth?”
That question resonates with all of us. We all wonder at times what the truth of a matter is. And
how do we know? In our early 21st century, the assertion over and over again is that science
and the scientific method give us truth. But the crux of the matter arises as science continues
to “evolve.” The implication is that truth itself evolves as science makes discoveries. When I
was in high school and taking a biology class, I was taught that there are TWO kingdoms for
the purposes of classification of all living things. Either a living thing was a plant or it was an
animal. Today, the debate continues as to how many kingdoms there are, but at present the
classification system has five or six kingdoms depending on your preference (and interestingly,
predominately, a geographical location decides your preference). This creates an
epistemological quandary since in philosophy we want to discover what can be labeled truth no
matter where one finds oneself in the world. So one can look at biologists and ask, “What is
truth?” and they would be hard pressed to give an answer that will still hold tomorrow. The
truth, it seems, is only tenuously available to us.
In the face of this, it is very difficult for a Christian to maintain that not only is truth possible, but
that there is truth that is not evolving as we go. God is real. His creation is real. The heavens
declare his glory. The skies demonstrate the handiwork of his hands. So in your life, you will
need to be ready, as Peter says, “to make a defense to anyone who asks you for a reason for
the hope that is in you; yet do it with gentleness and respect…” One must learn to be able to
explain why we know the God of the Scriptures is real. Always be respectful and gentle says
Peter. That is the way our epistemology will be given a hearing.
In what follows (Yes, I know it is a long piece!!) we listen to a Christian scientist as he deals
with the question of truth in the world of science and the Christian faith.

Thoughts on the Epistemology of Christianity in Light of Science

John Suppe
Department of Geological and Geophysical Sciences, Princeton University, Princeton NJ
Science and religion are commonly considered antithetical. The scientific enterprise leads to
rational knowledge that is the acme of human knowing, whereas religious knowledge is viewed
as dogma and faith without a rational basis. This assessment has of course been quite strong
in intellectual circles over the last few centuries, but it seems to be breaking down somewhat
as we move into the "post-modern era". For example it has become widely appreciated that
science has some strongly intuitive elements that might be characterized as a kind of faith.
Nevertheless, scientific knowledge is still generally held to be the epitome of rationally based
knowledge.
In contrast, I believe there are some significant parallels between Christian and scientific
knowing that lie at the very core of contingent epistemology. Specifically, observation and
interaction are fundamental to both Christian and scientific knowledge.
Contingent Knowledge Requires Observation
The growth of scientific knowledge clearly feeds on observation. Not that it doesn't also feed on
fruitful theoretical, deductive, and speculative reasoning. The history of science since the
second World War illustrates how fundamentally science is data driven. The massive
investments in new technology--new data gathering--have opened up new worlds to
observation. For example, our understanding of the geology of Venus was about as fuzzy as a
tennis ball when we first started to observe it with the Goldstone radar antenna a few decades
ago. Recently the Magellan spacecraft, which arrived at Venus in August 1990, has supplied
nearly a hundred Gigabytes of imagery--covering nearly the whole surface of this geologically
active planet at a resolution of 75 meter pixels. The information transmitted by Magellan lies at
the core of our knowledge of Venus.
Clearly it would have been impossible to deduce the contingent geologic realities of Venus by
rational deduction from first principles of physics and chemistry plus the pre-Goldstone data. Of
course we could have substituted assumptions for any lacking data, but to deduce a world of
the complexity and intricacy that is revealed by Magellan would require a great intellectual
effort and would lead us to a fascinating Tolkien-like world, but not the Venus of our Solar
System. To actually learn about Venus, for example to study the fault-bend folds of the Artemis
Chasma fold-and-thrust belt, radar from the Magellan spacecraft had to interact with the
surface of Venus and then the information had to be transmitted back to Earth.
Our inability to use raw deduction to extend our knowledge of the contingent universe very far
beyond the data comes as no surprise to science. It is a well known principle that we must
interact with a system in an appropriate way to gain new information about it. Knowledge of the
contingent universe must have a strongly observational basis.
Contingent Knowledge of God Requires Observation
If Christian knowledge is at all like the scientific, as I am claiming, then it also must have a
strongly observational basis. There are several ways we might imagine Christian knowing
could be observationally based. For example, we might observe the universe--in light of the
claim that God is the Creator--and attempt to deduce attributes of God from properties of the
natural world. This is of course natural theology, a subject that has barely come through the
wars of the Enlightenment with its life.1 Clearly, natural theology has been utterly incapable of
bearing the weight of Christian epistemology over the last half millennium. Any cost-benefit
analysis would conclude we should not invest a lot in natural theology; superconducting
supercollidors seem to be a higher priority.2
The reason for failure of natural theology is of course that observing the natural world is not a
very direct and specific source of information about God. Indeed we could not begin to deduce
the full richness of Christian knowledge claims from observation of Nature. Nature is not totally
irrelevant, but it is not a particularly powerful probe of God. It is too indirect. To obtain very
specific knowledge of God we must interact with God as directly as possible.
Consider three possible theological claims, [1] that God exists, interacts, and communicates;
[2] that God exists but does not interact; and [3] that God does not exist:

Theological God's Behavior Possibility of Knowledge of God's

Claim Existence & Character
God Exists God Interacts & Knowledge Possible
 Communicates
God Doesn't Interact or
God Exists Knowledge Impossible
Communicate
God Doesn't
- Knowledge Impossible
Exist
Clearly, it is only in the first case that we have any possibility of any richly detailed contingent
knowledge of God. The second two cases--that God exists but is silent or that God doesn't
exist--are equivalent and indistinguishable in their results. Therefore if we want to consider the
possibility of God we must seriously consider claims that God interacts and communicates with
us. Otherwise we are functionally atheists.
Thus, we are thrown into a realm that makes many intellectuals, including many Christians,
uncomfortable--the supernatural. God interacting with us in recognizable ways is always in
some sense supernatural. If you are uncomfortable with the supernatural then forget about
knowledge of God. If you don't like electromagnetic radiation, forget about astronomy.
Saying that we must consider the supernatural to address the issue of God, does not mean
that we necessarily have to suddenly open a Pandora's box of unrestrained weirdness. The
minimum requirement is simply that information be transmitted between God and man in
recognizable ways. For information to be recognizably from God requires that it be in some
sense unnatural. Thus if we are seriously interested in the possibility of God we must be open
to the possibility of such phenomena as answered prayer, God speaking in language to and
through us, God acting specifically through nature, and even incarnation of God. Otherwise our
lack of knowledge of God simply follows from our presupposition of excluding the possibility of
God's communication and interaction.
The Stumbling Block of Determinism
Thus, it seems that information must be transmitted between God and humans if they are to
know much that is specific about God. Furthermore, there must be some effect on humans or
their environment for information to be transmitted from God to us. For example, when God
spoke to the boy Samuel or to Augustine under the fig tree they had to hear him or at least
think that they heard him. This mental activity, involving chemical reactions in brain cells and
transmission of electrons, apparently was induced by God. At least if we are to take seriously
God's communication, then God induces chemical reactions and the like in our brain by some
unknown specific mechanism.
Some intellectuals, including some Christians, have claimed that we live in a deterministic
universe and therefore God may not interact or intervene. The only alternative--still taking
seriously the notion that God communicates--is that the messages (i.e., the chemical activity)
were hard-wired in deistically at the Big Bang. If we erect a deterministic communication barrier
between God and man (& matter) then the only way around it is through the big bang or--in the
manner of Polkinghorne--through some quantum mechanical crack.3
This strikes me as very much like continental drift in the 1920's when Harold Jeffreys argued
so forcefully that it was physically impossible for rock in the interior of the earth to flow in the
manner that seemed required. The mechanisms of crystalline plasticity only began to be
discovered in the 1930's. In contrast, many stratigraphers of the southern hemisphere were
sufficiently impressed with the detailed stratigraphic similarities between the southern
continents that they accepted continental drift without having a satisfactory physical
mechanism. They held that if continental drift does happen it can happen. It is a matter of
history, not mechanism. Sir Harold's mistake is common enough that there tends to be a fairly
decent respect for observation in science.4
Christian Claims to Knowledge and Robust Observational Truth Claims
Christianity claims to be observationally, historically based. Its claims include [1] that God
communicates in language to and through people (e.g., Moses, Baalam, Samuel, Jeremiah,
Amos, John, Ananias, etc. "Thus says Yahweh..." and "My sheep hear my voice"), [2] that God
acts in history (e.g., Exodus, Song of Deborah, rescue of Jerusalem under Hezekiah and
Jehoshaphat), and [3] that God has come to Earth as a man, Jesus. The first two are not
strongly separated in Old Testament understanding, because the "word" (dabar) is Yahweh's
effective word that goes forth and accomplishes his historical acts.
There is possible ambiguity to Christian claims to knowledge--namely, there may be a 'natural'
explanation for the knowledge claim. For example could there be a natural cause of a healing,
is the answered prayer a coincidence, or is the prophet just 'hearing voices'? Most
fundamentally, could Jesus be just a man? Biblical literature is quite sensitive to these
ambiguities. There is considerable effort devoted, for example, to 'testing the prophets.'5
These natural ambiguities are in many cases overcome by what might be called "robust
observational truth claims" that allow the primary observers to discount the possibility of
coincidence, particularly when events are not prima facie supernatural. A good example is the
calling of Nathanael in John 2, outlined as follows:

1. Philip claimed that Jesus is the fulfillment of Messianic prophesy.

2. Nathanael is among those that take Messianic prophecy seriously; that is, he is open to
the possibility of God's action in history.
3. Nathanael doubts the observational report of Philip, yet is willing to "come and see", i.e.,
it is important enough to him to make the investigation.6
4. Jesus tells Nathanael something that is apparently known only to Nathanael.
5. Nathanael concludes that Jesus is the Messiah.
6. Jesus indicates that further confirmatory evidence will be much stronger.

Nathanael is well justified in concluding that Jesus is Messiah because, given circumstances 2
and 3, observation 4 could only have occurred if proposition 1 were true. 7 There is in addition
further opportunity for confirmation, 6. The account, in common with many scientific truth
claims, also seeks to deal directly with specific doubts by the use of credentialing arguments:
Claim: Jesus is the fulfillment of the prophets.
Specific doubt: He can't be, he's from wrong place.
Rejoinder: He can be, he knows something only the Messiah can know.
Specific doubt: There are other ways one can know--e.g., someone (Philip) told him.
Rejoinder: Philip didn't tell him. Jesus knew it before Philip called Nathanael. 8
A number of similar robust observational truth claims are presented in the Bible, for example
"the woman at the well" (John 4), "Ananias and Saul in Damascus" (Acts 9), and "Peter,
Cornelius, and the believers in Jerusalem" (Acts 10-11). In each case, given the
circumstances, the observation could only take place if there is a spiritual causal connection.
The case of Peter, Cornelius, and believers in Jerusalem is especially interesting because it
involves a highly controversial claim to new spiritual truth that seems to contradict accepted
spiritual truth. Thus, it seems appropriate that the truth claim is exceptionally robust. The
structure of the incident is complex with several nested and interrelated truth claims. Without
going into a full analysis, the key elements are:

1. Jesus' words, "John baptized with water, but you will be baptized with the Holy Spirit."
 2. Pouring out of the Holy Spirit--speaking in tongues--on Peter and other Jewish disciples
in Jerusalem on Pentecost.
3. Cornelius' vision with prediction of Peter at Joppa.
4. Sending of Cornelius' men to Joppa and finding prediction true.
5. Peter's vision and prediction of visitors from Caesarea.
6. Arrival of visitors as predicted.
7. Spontaneous anointing of Gentiles by the Holy Spirit--speaking in tongues--at Caesarea
during preaching.
8. Analogy between Peter's prior vision and events at Caesarea.
9. Claim that the Gospel is for Gentiles.

Peter and the Jewish believers in Jerusalem are well justified in concluding that the Gospel is
for Gentiles because given the nested circumstances of 1 through 6 and 8, observation 7 could
only have occurred if proposition 9 were true.
Evaluation of Truth Claims by Observational Repeatability
We have not yet addressed the issue of verifying observational claims and truth claims based
on them. It is often considered that verification in science comes from repeatability, that
experimental results can be checked by redoing the experiments. In fact, few experiments or
observations in science are redone. Repeatability appears to not be as important in science as
is sometimes claimed. In many cases major scientific conclusions have been made based on
single, unrepeated observations. What appears to be the case is that working scientists accept
experimental results by analogy. If we have done similar experiments or have made analogous
observations we can make evaluations of the experiments and observations of others. We do
not have to do identical experiments or redo our own experiments or observations if we are
reasonably experienced scientists. Most scientists have only a very limited body of first-hand
experimental or observational knowledge. We accept, or reject, accounts of experience of
others based on our own analogous experience as well as on theoretical considerations. The
fact that the scientific community is knit together by a mesh of overlapping analogous
experience allows us to make use of knowledge that is not based on first-hand observation.
Moving to the Christian community of knowledge, we may be inclined to accept, or reject,
certain accounts of answered prayer or other accounts of God's interaction and
communication--whether Biblical or not--based on the extent of our common analogous
experience. Commonly it has been held that miracles are untestable because of their unique,
unrepeatable character. This is not a strong argument to those who have experienced
miracles. If I have had an analogous experience, I am more inclined to accept an account of a
similar experience. It does not have to be an identical or repeatable experience. Peter and the
believers in Jerusalem had analogous experience to Cornelius and his household in Caesarea.
Why did John include the incident of Nathanael? Why did he believe it? Why was John's
account acceptable to the Church in later centuries and eventually accepted as Canon? John
possibly observed the event as a third party but he was not capable of fully entering into the
event in the way that Nathanael was. Jesus' reference to the fig tree may have been as
inherently ambiguous to John as it is to us. Apparently only Nathanael knew what Jesus was
talking about. But John had analogous experiences himself and observed other analogous
experiences as a third party or heard about them, for example the woman at the well. The
Church believes these accounts second or third hand, but the claim of truth becomes
especially strong when we have had analogous experiences. For example the people of
Sychar said to the woman at the well, "We no longer believe just because of what you said;
now we have heard for ourselves, and we know that this man really is the Savior of the world." 9
Post-NT Claims of God's Interaction and Communication
If the Biblical truth claims are indeed true it seems reasonable to think that God would continue
to communicate and interact with humans in post New Testament times. Otherwise God
suddenly becomes the god of deists at the end of the first century. This likelihood of continued
communication and interaction need not require that God interact in identical ways throughout
history; for example significant differences in God's interactions or at least man's perceptions of
God's interactions are apparent over the span of the Old and New Testaments. There are
substantial claims from Christian literature that God continues to interact and communicate in a
variety of ways, with the Biblical text as the canonical standard of Christian experience.
Nevertheless, the acts of God are always to some extent hidden, even as they were when God
called the boy Samuel: "In those days the word of the Lord was rare; there were not many
visions."10 In a similar way, the young man Augustine, not yet converted, was surprised to hear
accounts that God still acts in recent times:
We were amazed as we heard of [God's] wonderful acts very well attested and occurring so
recently, almost in our own time, done in orthodox faith and in the Catholic Church. 11
Later Augustine experienced the power of God for himself when he, perhaps like Nathanael,
sat under a fig tree in despair over his dissipated life and heard the voice singing, "Pick up and
read!" and found his soul flooded with light as he picked up and read the closing words of
Romans 13.12
Why not now? Why not an end to my impure life in this very hour?
As I was saying this and weeping in the bitter agony of my heart, suddenly I heard a voice from
the nearby house chanting as if it might be a boy or a girl (I do not know which), saying and
repeating over and over again "Pick up and read, pick up and read." At once my countenance
changed, and I began to think intently whether there might be some sort of children's game in
which such a chant is used. But I could not remember having heard of one. I checked the flood
of tears and stood up. I interpreted it solely as a divine command to me to open the book and
read the first chapter I might find. For I had heard how Antony happened to be present at the
gospel reading, and took it as an admonition addressed to himself when the words were read:
"Go, sell all you have, give to the poor, and you shall have treasure in heaven; and come,
follow me." By such an inspired utterance he was immediately converted to you. So I hurried
back to the place where Alypius was sitting. There I had put down the book of the apostle when
I got up. I seized it, opened it and in silence read the first passage on which my eyes lit: ''Not in
riots and drunken parties, not in eroticism and indecencies, not in strife and rivalry, but put on
the Lord Jesus Christ and make no provision for the flesh in its lusts."
I neither wished nor needed to read further. At once, with the last words of this sentence, it was
as if a light flooded into my heart. All the shadows of doubt were dispelled.13
Excerpted from Augustine’s Confessions 8.29.
Given the circumstances, Augustine, like Nathanael, was justified in believing that God had
specifically communicated to him. He became a Christian.
Claims of God's specific interaction and communication appear to be widespread right up to
the present.14 Indeed they are perhaps more widespread now than any time in history; both
because of the rapid worldwide growth of Christianity and because of widespread
communication. The Gallup poll indicates that a significant percentage of Americans claim to
have had a 'religious experience'. A study of contemporary religious experience in Britain
indicates widespread claims of Christian religious experience. 15
Whereas claims of religious experience are widespread it seems clear that not all is from God.
Substantial notice is given in the Old Testament to the problem of telling the difference
between true and false prophets. The New Testament deals with the issue of discernment of
spirits. Christian mystics have addressed the issue, for example St. John of the Cross and
Ignatius de Loyola. Johnathan Edwards addresses this at length in his essay, On Religious
Affections. One of the points that Edwards makes is that we can distinguish true and false
affections by their fruit (as in Galatians 5).
I would like to end this essay with a recent religious experience--in no way spectacular--that
has borne eternal fruit. It is an experience like those of Nathanael and Augustine.
A woman--a bright young graduate student from China--gave a testimony last Thanksgiving at
a church dinner. She said that a number of 'experiments' convinced her of the truth of
Christianity and she presented two of them. [1] She prayed that her younger brother who had a
problem of not working hard in school would change. Then she got letters from her father
saying that her brother had changed. [2] She had done very well in the university in China but
never had many friends. She felt that she wasn't pretty. Coming to United States she still felt
she wasn't pretty and didn't have many friends. She went to a dinner or party welcoming new
Chinese students held by a church. There also, not many talked to her and she again began to
think that she wasn't pretty. As she was thinking this a small girl came up and said something
like, "Auntie, you are so pretty." This made her think that God knows her innermost thoughts.
She became a Christian.

1. It has been shown recently that the ontological argument for the existence of God, thought to
have been disproved by Hume and Kant, is still very much alive. For a brief overview of this
issue see Diogenes Allen, Christian Belief in a Post Modern World, Westminster/John Knox
Press, Louisville (1989).
2. Indeed we are quite willing to spend money to build instruments to interact with the universe
to obtain information about it, whether it is $10 for a thermometer, $600,000 for an electron
probe microanalyzer, a half billion for the Magellan spacecraft to Venus, or as yet unknown
billions for the superconducting supercollidor. We have to interact with the universe in suitable
ways to obtain new information about it.
3. For example, John Polkinghorne, Science and Providence: God's Interaction with the World,
Shambahala Publications, Boston, (1989).
4. Jeffreys not only pronounced in the 1920's that continental drift was impossible, but lived so
long that he should have seen the error of his ways but didn't. Jeffreys died in 1989.
Nevertheless, Jeffreys made many fundamental contributions to geophysics, planetary
science, and mathematics.
5. There seems to be a fairly sophisticated understanding of spiritual authenticity in the Bible.
For example in the NT, especially John, there is a great deal of emphasis on 'testimony'.
Testify seems always to be 'testify against' or similar accusatory legal meaning in the OT, but
in the NT the meaning is quite different, generally a witnessing to observationally based
spiritual knowledge. The concepts of legal authenticity appear to have been taken over and
applied widely to matters of spiritual authenticity in a relatively direct way. Another example is
that the Deuteronomic requirement of two or three witnesses in legal matters is applied in the
NT, initially by Jesus and later by the Church, to spiritual authenticity.
6. We don't test every odd-ball scientific claim; it has to be worth the investment of time and
money.
7. cf. chapters 12 and 13 of Frederick Suppe, The Semantic Conception of Scientific Theories,
Univ. Illinois Press (1989).
8. The main specific doubt that is not dealt with in the account is the doubt that the account
might be false. This is a more pervasive issue that is dealt with elsewhere in Biblical literature;
we will deal with this issue indirectly below in the context of repeatability.
9. John 4.42.
10. 1 Sam. 3.1
11. 8.14 in Saint Augustine, Bishop of Hippo, Confessions: trans. with introduction and notes
by Henry Chadwick. Oxford University Press, (1991).
12. While writing this I thought I should look up Augustine, but I didn't have a copy of
his Confessions. The next day (Sunday, December 29, 1991), when my daughter went to the
library in the afternoon, I thought of going with her or having her look for the book, but then
didn't, thinking the Lord didn't want me to go. Later in the afternoon she came home from the
library with a stack of books, Augustine'sConfessions among them. She had not known I had
been thinking about Augustine or wanted the book. I don't recall her ever having interest in
such a book. She had looked up Augustine at the library; she said she didn't know why. My
impression was that God did all this.
13. Confessions 8.29.
14. Some Christian groups in recent centuries have explicitly or implicitly concluded for a
variety of reasons that God no longer continues to act. These ideas are outside the
mainstream of orthodox Christianity. For example, some liberal scholars, accepting the
arguments of Hume, have denied the possibility of God acting in history and have attempted to
demythologize the Bible. Remarkably, some conservative scholars have taken the same
arguments of Hume and argued that miracles are impossible in post NT times (for these,
Hume's arguments somehow become invalid within the wall of Biblical times). Colin Brown has
presented strong historical evidence that the conservative Protestant attacks on miracles
began essentially as anti-Catholicism (Colin Brown, Miracles and the Critical Mind,
Eerdmans/Paternoster, 1984).
15. Sir Alister Hardy, Spiritual Nature of Man: A Study of Contemporary Religious Experience.
Oxford, (1979).