Republic of the Philippines left the country and has gone abroad without the knowledge and permission
out the knowledge and permission of this
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 94284 April 8, 1991
RICARDO C. SILVERIO, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. BENIGNO G. GAVIOLA, as Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch IX, and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Quisumbing, Torres & Evangelista for petitioner.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
praying that the Decision of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 15827,
entitled "Ricardo C. Silverio vs. Hon. Benigno C. Gaviola, etc., et al.," dated 31
January 1990, as well as the Resolution of 29 June 1990 denying reconsideration, be
set aside.
On 14 October 1985, Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 20 (4) of the
Revised Securities Act in Criminal Case No. CBU-6304 of the Regional Trial Court
of Cebu. In due time, he posted bail for his provisional liberty.
On 26 January 1988, or more than two (2) years after the filing of the Information,
respondent People of the Philippines filed an Urgent ex parte Motion to cancel the
passport of and to issue a hold-departure Order against accused-petitioner on the
ground that he had gone abroad several times without the necessary Court approval
resulting in postponements of the arraignment and scheduled hearings.
Overruling opposition, the Regional Trial Court, on 4 April 1988, issued an Order
directing the Department of Foreign Affairs to cancel Petitioner's passport or to deny
his application therefor, and the Commission on Immigration to prevent Petitioner
from leaving the country. This order was based primarily on the Trial Court's finding
that since the filing of the Information on 14 October 1985, "the accused has not yet
been arraigned because he has never appeared in Court on the dates scheduled for his
arraignment and there is evidence to show that accused Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. has
1 | CRIMPRO-RULE 114 | MANCO
Court" (Rollo, p. 45). Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was denied on 28 July
1988.
Petitioner's Certiorari Petition before the Court of Appeals met a similar fate on 31
January 1990. Hence, this Petition for Review filed on 30 July 1990.
After the respective pleadings required by the Court were filed, we resolved to give
due course and to decide the case.
Petitioner contends that respondent Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the
Trial Court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in
issuing its Orders, dated 4 April and 28 July 1988, (1) on the basis of facts allegedly
patently erroneous, claiming that the scheduled arraignments could not be held
because there was a pending Motion to Quash the Information; and (2) finding that
the right to travel can be impaired upon lawful order of the Court, even on grounds
other than the "interest of national security, public safety or public health."
We perceive no reversible error.
1) Although the date of the filing of the Motion to Quash has been omitted by
Petitioner, it is apparent that it was filed long after the filing of the Information in
1985 and only after several arraignments had already been scheduled and cancelled
due to Petitioner's non-appearance. In fact, said Motion to Quash was set for hearing
only on 19 February 1988. Convincingly shown by the Trial Court and conformed to
by respondent Appellate Court is the concurrence of the following circumstances:
1. The records will show that the information was filed on October 14,
1985. Until this date (28 July 1988), the case had yet to be arraigned.
Several scheduled arraignments were cancelled and reset, mostly due to the
failure of accused Silverio to appear. The reason for accused Silverio's
failure to appear had invariably been because he is abroad in the United
States of America;
2. Since the information was filed, until this date, accused Silverio had
never appeared in person before the Court;
3. The bond posted by accused Silverio had been cancelled twice and
warrants of arrest had been issued against him all for the same reason ––
failure to appear at scheduled arraignments.
In all candidness, the Court makes the observation that it has given accused
Silverio more than enough consideration. The limit had long been reached
 (Order, 28 July 1988, Crim. Case No. CBU-6304, RTC, Cebu, p. 5; Rollo,
p. 73).
Patently, therefore, the questioned RTC Orders, dated 4 April 1988 and 28 July
1988, were not based on erroneous facts, as Petitioner would want this Court to
believe. To all appearances, the pendency of a Motion to Quash came about only
after several settings for arraignment had been scheduled and cancelled by reason of
Petitioner's non-appearance.
2) Petitioner's further submission is that respondent Appellate Court "glaringly
erred" in finding that the right to travel can be impaired upon lawful order of the
Court, even on grounds other than the "interest of national security, public safety or
public health."
To start with, and this has not been controverted by Petitioner, the bail bond he had
posted had been cancelled and Warrants of Arrest had been issued against him by
reason, in both instances, of his failure to appear at scheduled arraignments.
Warrants of Arrest having been issued against him for violation of the conditions of
his bail bond, he should be taken into custody. "Bail is the security given for the
release of a person in custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman,
conditioned upon his appearance before any court when so required by the Court or
the Rules (1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, Rule 114, Secs. 1 and 2).
The foregoing condition imposed upon an accused to make himself available at all
times whenever the Court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction of his
right to travel (Manotoc, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, et al. No. 62100, 30 May 1986,
142 SCRA 149). A person facing criminal charges may be restrained by the Court
from leaving the country or, if abroad, compelled to return (Constitutional Law,
Cruz, Isagani A., 1987 Edition, p. 138). So it is also that "An accused released on
bail may be re-arrested without the necessity of a warrant if he attempts to depart
from the Philippines without prior permission of the Court where the case is pending
(ibid., Sec. 20 [2nd
par. ]).
Petitioner takes the posture, however, that while the 1987 Constitution recognizes the
power of the Courts to curtail the liberty of abode within the limits prescribed by
law, it restricts the allowable impairment of the right to travel only on grounds of
interest of national security, public safety or public health, as compared to the
provisions on freedom of movement in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions.
Under the 1935 Constitution, the liberty of abode and of travel were treated under
one provision.1âwphi1 Article III, Section 1(4) thereof reads:
2 | CRIMPRO-RULE 114 | MANCO
The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed
by law shall not be impaired.
The 1973 Constitution altered the 1935 text by explicitly including the liberty of
travel, thus:
The liberty of abode and of travel shall not be impaired except upon lawful
order of the court or when necessary in the interest of national security,
public safety, or public health (Article IV, Section 5).
The 1987 Constitution has split the two freedoms into two distinct sentences and
treats them differently, to wit:
Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits
prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the
court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of
national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.
Petitioner thus theorizes that under the 1987 Constitution, Courts can impair the right
to travel only on the grounds of "national security, public safety, or public health."
The submission is not well taken.
Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should be interpreted to mean that
while the liberty of travel may be impaired even without Court Order, the
appropriate executive officers or administrative authorities are not armed with
arbitrary discretion to impose limitations. They can impose limits only on the basis
of "national security, public safety, or public health" and "as may be provided by
law," a limitive phrase which did not appear in the 1973 text (The Constitution,
Bernas, Joaquin G.,S.J., Vol. I, First Edition, 1987, p. 263). Apparently, the
phraseology in the 1987 Constitution was a reaction to the ban on international travel
imposed under the previous regime when there was a Travel Processing Center,
which issued certificates of eligibility to travel upon application of an interested
party (See Salonga vs. Hermoso & Travel Processing Center, No. 53622, 25 April
1980, 97 SCRA 121).
Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should by no means be construed as
delimiting the inherent power of the Courts to use all means necessary to carry their
orders into effect in criminal cases pending before them. When by law jurisdiction is
conferred on a Court or judicial officer, all auxillary writs, process and other means
necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such Court or officer (Rule 135,
Section 6, Rules of Court).
Petitioner's argument that the ruling in Manotoc, Jr., v. Court of Appeals, et al.
(supra), to the effect that the condition imposed upon an accused admitted to bail to
make himself available at all times whenever the Court requires his presence
operates as a valid restriction on the right to travel no longer holds under the 1987
Constitution, is far from tenable. The nature and function of a bail bond has
remained unchanged whether under the 1935, the 1973, or the 1987 Constitution.
Besides, the Manotoc ruling on that point was but a re-affirmation of that laid down
long before in People v. Uy Tuising, 61 Phil. 404 (1935).

Petitioner is facing a criminal charge. He has posted bail but has violated the
conditions thereof by failing to appear before the Court when required. Warrants for
his arrest have been issued. Those orders and processes would be rendered nugatory
if an accused were to be allowed to leave or to remain, at his pleasure, outside the
territorial confines of the country. Holding an accused in a criminal case within the
reach of the Courts by preventing his departure from the Philippines must be
considered as a valid restriction on his right to travel so that he may be dealt with in
accordance with law. The offended party in any criminal proceeding is the People of
the Philippines. It is to their best interest that criminal prosecutions should run their
course and proceed to finality without undue delay, with an accused holding himself
amenable at all times to Court Orders and processes.

WHEREFORE, the judgment under review is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against

petitioner, Ricardo C. Silverio.

SO ORDERED.

Paras, Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.

3 | CRIMPRO-RULE 114 | MANCO

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
A.M. No. RTJ-96-1335 March 5, 1997
INOCENCIO BASCO, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE LEO M. RAPATALO, Regional Trial Court, Branch 32, Agoo, La
Union, respondent.
RESOLUTION
ROMERO, J.:
In a sworn letter-complaint dated August 14, 1995, complainant Inocencio Basco
charged respondent Judge Leo M. Rapatalo of RTC, Branch 32, Agoo, La Union
with gross ignorance or willful disregard of established rule of law for granting bail
to an accused in a murder case (Criminal Case No. 2927) without receiving evidence
and conducting a hearing.
Complainant, who is the father of the victim, alleged that an information for murder
was filed against a certain Roger Morente, one of three accused. The accused
Morente filed a petition for bail. The hearing for said petition was set for May 31,
1995 by petitioner but was not heard since the respondent Judge was then on leave. It
was reset to June 8, 1995 but on said date, respondent Judge reset it to June 22, 1995.
The hearing for June 22, 1995, however, did not materialize. Instead, the accused
was arraigned and trial was set. Again, the petition for bail was not heard on said
date as the prosecution's witnesses in connection with said petition were not notified.
Another attempt was made to reset the hearing to July 17, 1995.
In the meantime, complainant allegedly saw the accused in Rosario, La Union on
July 3, 1995. He later learned that the accused was out on bail despite the fact that
the petition had not been heard at all. Upon investigation, complainant discovered
that bail had been granted and a release order dated June 29, 19951 was issued on the
basis of a marginal note2 dated June 22, 1995, at the bottom of the bail petition by
Assistant Prosecutor Manuel Oliva which stated: "No objection: P80,000.00," signed
4 | CRIMPRO-RULE 114 | MANCO
and approved by the assistant prosecutor and eventually by respondent Judge. Note
that there was already a release order dated June 29, 1995 on the basis of the
marginal note of the Assistant Prosecutor dated June 22, 1995 (when the hearing of
the petition for bail was aborted and instead arraignment took place) when another
hearing was scheduled for July 17, 1995.
In his comment dated October 16, 1995, respondent Judge alleged that he granted the
petition based on the prosecutor's option not to oppose the petition as well as the
latter's recommendation setting the bailbond in the amount of P80,000.00. He
averred that when the prosecution chose not to oppose the petition for bail, he had
the discretion on whether to approve it or not. He further declared that when he
approved the petition, he had a right to presume that the prosecutor knew what he
was doing since he was more familiar with the case, having conducted the
preliminary investigation. Furthermore, the private prosecutor was not around at the
time the public prosecutor recommended bail.
Respondent Judge stated that in any case, the bailbond posted by accused was
cancelled and a warrant for his arrest was issued on account of complainant's
motion for reconsideration. The Assistant Provincial Prosecutor apparently
conformed to and approved the motion for reconsideration.3 To date, accused is
confined at the La Union Provincial Jail.
A better understanding of bail as an aspect of criminal procedure entails appreciating
its nature and purposes. "Bail" is the security required by the court and given by the
accused to ensure that the accused appears before the proper court at the scheduled
time and place to answer the charges brought against him or her. In theory, the only
function of bail is to ensure the appearance of the defendant at the time set for trial.
The sole purpose of confining the accused
in jail before conviction, it has been observed, is to assure his presence at the trial. 4
In other words, if the denial of bail is authorized in capital offenses, it is only in
theory that the proof being strong, the defendant would flee, if he has the
opportunity, rather than face the verdict of the court. Hence the exception to the
fundamental right to be bailed should be applied in direct ratio to the extent of
probability of evasion of the prosecution.5 In practice, bail has also been used to
prevent the release of an accused who might otherwise be dangerous to society or
whom the judges might not want to release."6
It is in view of the abovementioned practical function of bail that it is not a matter of
right in cases where the person is charged with a capital offense punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Article 114, section 7 of the Rules of Court,
as amended, states, "No person" charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment when the evidence of guilt is
strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal action."
When the grant of bail is discretionary, the prosecution has the burden of showing
that the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. However, the determination
of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong, being a matter of judicial discretion,
remains with the judge. "This discretion by the very nature of things, may rightly be
exercised only after the evidence is submitted to the court at the hearing. Since the
discretion is directed to the weight of the evidence and since evidence cannot
properly be weighed if not duly exhibited or produced before the court,7 it is obvious
that a proper exercise of judicial discretion requires that the evidence of guilt be
submitted to the court, the petitioner having the right of cross examination and to
introduce his own evidence in rebuttal."8
To be sure, the discretion of the trial court, "is not absolute nor beyond control. It
must be sound, and exercised within reasonable bounds. Judicial discretion, by its
very nature involves the exercise of the judge's individual opinion and the law has
wisely provided that its exercise be guided by well-known rules which, while
allowing the judge rational latitude for the operation of his own individual views,
prevent them from getting out of control. An uncontrolled or uncontrollable
discretion on the part of a judge is a misnomer. It is a fallacy. Lord Mansfield,
speaking of the discretion to be exercised in granting or denying bail said: "But
discretion when applied to a court of justice, means sound discretion guided by law.
It must be governed by rule, not by humour; it must not be arbitrary, vague and
fanciful; but legal and regular."9
Consequently, in the application for bail of a person charged with a capital offense
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, a hearing, whether
summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court, must actually be conducted to
determine whether or not the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. "A
summary hearing means such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering
the evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent with the purpose of hearing
which is merely to determine the weight of evidence for the purposes of bail. On
such hearing, the court does not sit to try the merits or to enter into any nice inquiry
as to the weight that ought to be allowed to the evidence for or against the accused,
nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what further evidence may be
therein offered and admitted. The course of inquiry may be left to the discretion of
the court which may confine itself to receiving such evidence as has reference to
substantial matters, avoiding unnecessary thoroughness in the examination and cross
examination." 10 If a party is denied the opportunity to be heard, there would be a
violation of procedural due process.
That it is mandatory for the judge to require a hearing in a petition for bail is
emphasized in the following cases:
(1) People v. Sola decided in 1981. 11 In this case seven separate
informations for murder were filed against the accused Sola and 18
other persons. After preliminary investigation. the municipal trial
5 | CRIMPRO-RULE 114 | MANCO
court issued warrants for their arrest. However without giving the
prosecution the opportunity to prove that the evidence of guilt
against the accused is strong, the court granted them the right to
post bail for their temporary release. Citing People v San Diego,
12 we held: "We are of the considered opinion that whether the
motion for bail of a defendant who is in custody for a capital
offense be resolved in a summary proceeding or in the course of a
regular trial, the prosecution must be given an opportunity to
present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may
desire to introduce before the court should resolve the motion for
bail. If, as in the criminal case involved in the instant special civil
action, the prosecution should be denied such an opportunity, there
would be a violation of procedural due process, and the order of
the court granting bail should be considered void on that ground.
(2) People v. Dacudao decided in 1989. 13 In this case, an
information was filed against the accused for murder, a non-
bailable offense. The judge, without conducting any hearing,
granted bail on the ground that there was not enough evidence to
warrant a case for murder because only affidavits of the
prosecution witnesses who were allegedly not eyewitnesses to the
crime were filed. We held: "Whatever the court possessed at the
time it issued the questioned ruling was intended only for prima
facie determining whether or not there is sufficient ground to
engender a well founded belief that the crime was committed and
pinpointing the persons who probably committed it. Whether or
not the evidence of guilt is strong for each individual accused still
has to established unless the prosecution submits the issue on
whatever it has already presented. To appreciate the strength or
weakness of the evidence of guilt, the prosecution must be
consulted or held. It is equally entitled to due process.
(3) People v. Calo decided in 1990. 14 In this case, the prosecution
was scheduled to present nine witnesses at the hearings held to
determine whether the evidence against the private respondents
was strong. After hearing the fifth witness, the respondent judge
insisted on terminating the proceedings. We held: "The
prosecution in the instant case was not given adequate opportunity
to prove that there is strong evidence of guilt and to present within
a reasonable time all the evidence it desired to present.
(4) Libarios v. Dabalo decided in 1991 15 which involved an
administrative complaint against the respondent judge for
ignorance of the law and grave abuse of discretion. In this case, the
respondent judge, without conducting any prior hearing, directed
 the issuance of a warrant of arrest against the accused charged
with murder, fixing at the same time the bail at P50,000.00 each
on the ground that the evidence against them was merely
circumstantial. We held: "Where a person is accused of a capital
offense, the trial court must conduct a hearing in a summary
proceeding to allow the prosecution to present, within a reasonable
time, all evidence it may desire to produce to prove that the
evidence of guilt against the accused is strong before resolving the
issue of bail for the temporary release of the accused. Failure to
conduct a hearing before fixing bail in the instant case amounted to
a violation of due process." The respondent judge was ordered to
pay a fine of P20,000.00 and warned to exercise more care in the
performance of his duties.
(5) People v. Nano decided in 1992. 16 In this case, the judge
issued an order admitting the accused in a kidnapping and murder
case to bail without any hearing. We held: "The prosecution must
first be given an opportunity to present evidence because by the
very nature of deciding applications for bail, it is on the basis of
such evidence that judicial discretion is weighed against in
determining whether the guilt of the accused is strong."
(6) Pico v. Combong, Jr. decided in 1992. 17 In this administrative
case, the respondent judge granted bail to an accused charged
with an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua, without notice
and hearing, and even before the accused had been arrested or
detained. We held: "It is well settled that an application for bail
from a person charged with a capital offense (now an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua) must be set for hearing at which
both the defense and the prosecution must be given reasonable
opportunity to prove (in case of the prosecution) that the evidence
of guilt of the applicant is strong, or (in the case of the defense)
that such evidence of guilt was not strong." The respondent judge
was ordered to pay a fine of P20,000.00 and warned to exercise
greater care and diligence in the performance of his duties.
(7) De Guia v. Maglalang decided in 1993, 18 the respondent
judge issued a warrant of arrest and also fixed the bail of an
accused charged with the non bailable offense of statutory rape,
without allowing the prosecution an opportunity to show that the
evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. Respondent judge
alleged that the only evidence on record = the sworn statements of
the complaining witness and her guardian = were not sufficient to
justify the denial of bail. We held: "It is an established principle
that in cases where a person is accused of a capital offense, the trial
6 | CRIMPRO-RULE 114 | MANCO
court must conduct a hearing in a summary proceeding, to allow
the prosecution an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time,
all evidence it may desire to produce to prove that the evidence of
guilt against the accused is strong, before resolving the issue of
bail for the temporary release of the accused. Failure to conduct a
hearing before fixing bail amounts to a violation of due process." It
was noted that the warrant of arrest was returned unserved and that
after the case was re-raffled to the complainant judge's sala, the
warrant was set aside and cancelled. There was no evidence on
record showing whether the approved bail was revoked by the
complainant judge, whether the accused was apprehended or
whether the accused filed an application for bail. Hence, the
respondent judge was ordered to pay a fine of P5,000.00 instead of
the usual P20,000.00 that the court imposes on judges who grant
the application of bail without notice and hearing.
(8) Borinaga v. Tamin decided in 1993. 19 In this case, a
complaint for murder was filed against five persons. While the
preliminary investigation was pending in the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court, a petition for bail was filed by one of the accused
before the respondent judge in the Regional Trial Court. The
respondent judge ordered the prosecutor to appear at the hearing
to present evidence that the guilt of the accused is strong. At the
scheduled hearing, the public prosecutor failed to appear
prompting the respondent to grant the application for bail. We
held: "Whether the motion for bail of an accused who is in custody
for a capital offense be resolved in a summary proceeding or in the
course of a regular trial, the prosecution must be given an
opportunity to present within a reasonable time all evidence it may
desire to introduce before the court may resolve the motion for
bail." The respondent judge was fined P20,000.00 and was warned
that the commission of a similar offense in the future will be dealt
with more severely.
(9) Aurillo v. Francisco decided in 1994. 20 In this administrative
case, the respondent judge issued two separate warrants of arrest
against two persons charged with murder and parricide, but fixed
the amount of bail for each accused without notifying the
prosecution of any motion to fix bail nor of any order granting the
same. Citing People v. Dacudao, 21 we held: "A hearing is
absolutely indispensable before a judge can properly determine
whether the prosecution's evidence is weak or strong. Hence, a
denial of the prosecution's request to adduce evidence, deprives it
of procedural due process, a right to which it is equally entitled as
the defense. A hearing is required to afford the judge a basis for
 determining the existence of those factors set forth under Rule 114,
Sec 6." The respondent judge was ordered to pay a fine of P20,000
with a warning that the commission of the same or similar acts in
the future will be dealt with more severely.
(10) Estoya v. Abraham-Singson decided in 1994. 22 In this case,
an administrative complaint was filed against the respondent judge,
alleging, among others, that she granted an application for bail
filed by the accused charged with murder. The grant was made
over the objection of the prosecution which insisted that the
evidence of guilt was strong and without allowing the prosecution
to present evidence in this regard. We held: "In immediately
granting bail and fixing it at only P20,000.00 for each of the
accused without allowing the prosecution to present its evidence,
the respondent denied the prosecution due process. This Court had
said so in many cases and had imposed sanctions on judges who
granted applications for bail in capital offenses and in offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua without giving the prosecution
the opportunity to prove that the evidence of guilt is strong." The
respondent judge was dismissed from service because the
erroneous granting of bail was just one of the offenses found to
have been committed by her in the aforesaid complaint.
(11) Aguirre v. Belmonte decided in 1994. 23 In this administrative
case, the respondent judge issued warrants of arrest and, at the
same time and on his own motion, authorized the provisional
release on bail of the accused in two criminal cases for murder.
The accused were still at large at the time the order granting bail
was issued. We held: "A hearing is mandatory before bail can be
granted to an accused who is charged with a capital offense." The
judge was ordered to pay a fine of P25,000.00 with a warning that
a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt
with more severely. He was meted a fine in a higher amount than
the usual P20,000.00 because it involved two criminal cases
wherein the respondent judge, "was not only the grantor of bail but
likewise the applicant therefor."
(12) Lardizabal v. Reyes decided in 1994. 24 In this administrative
case, the respondent judge issued an order directing the arrest of
the accused charged with rape and, motu proprio, fixed the bail of
the accused in the amount of P80,000.00 without any application
on the part of the accused to be admitted to bail. When the accused
filed a motion to reduce bailbond, the respondent judge, again,
without any prior notice and hearing, reduced the bail to
P40,000.00. We held: "The rule is explicit that when an accused is
7 | CRIMPRO-RULE 114 | MANCO
charged with a serious offense punishable by reclusion perpetua,
such as rape, bail may be granted only after a motion for that
purpose has been filed by the accused and a hearing thereon
conducted by a judge to determine whether or not the prosecution's
evidence of guilt is strong." The respondent judge was ordered to
pay a fine of P20,000.00 with a warning that a repetition of similar
or the same offense will be dealt with more severely.
(13) Guillermo v. Reyes decided in 1995 25 involving an
administrative complaint against the respondent judge for granting
bail to the two accused charged with serious illegal detention.
When the two accused first filed a joint application for bail, the
petition for bail was duly heard and the evidence offered by the
accused and the prosecution in opposition thereto were properly
taken into account. However, the respondent judge denied the
application for bail on the around that it was premature since the
accused were not yet in custody of the law. In a subsequent order,
the respondent judge, without conducting any hearing on
aforestated application and thereby denying the prosecution an
opportunity to oppose the same, granted said petition upon the
voluntary appearance in court of the two accused. Respondent
judge insisted that there was a hearing but the proceeding he
adverted to was that which was conducted when the motion for
bail was first considered and then denied for being premature. We
held: "The error of the respondent judge lies in the fact that in his
subsequent consideration of the application for bail, he acted
affirmatively thereon without conducting another hearing and what
is worse, his order concededly lacked the requisite summary or
resume of the evidence presented by the parties and necessary to
support the grant of bail." The respondent judge was reprimanded
because despite the irregularity in the procedure adopted in the
proceeding, the prosecution was undeniably afforded the benefit of
notice and hearing. No erroneous appreciation of the evidence was
alleged nor did the prosecution indicate its desire to introduce
additional evidence in an appropriate challenge to the aforestated
grant of bail by the respondent.
(14) Santos v. Ofilada decided in 1995. 26 In this case, an
administrative complaint was filed against the respondent judge,
who, without notice and hearing to the prosecution, granted bail to
an accused charged with murder and illegal possession of firearm.
We held: "Where admission to bail is a matter of discretion, a
hearing is mandatory before an accused can be granted bail. At the
hearing, both the prosecution and the defense must be given
reasonable opportunity to prove, in case of the prosecution, that the
 evidence of guilt of the applicant is strong, and in the case of the
defense, that evidence of such guilt is not strong." The respondent
judge was ordered to pay a fine of P20,000.00 with a warning that
a repetition of similar acts will warrant a more severe sanction.
(15) Sule v. Biteng decided in 1995. 27 In this administrative case,
the respondent judge, without affording the prosecution the
opportunity to be heard, granted with indecent haste the petition
for bail filed by the accused charged with murder because the
accused ". . . voluntarily surrendered to the authorities as soon as
he was informed that he was one of the suspect (sic) . . . ." We
held: "With his open admission that he granted bail to the accused
without giving the prosecution any opportunity to be heard, the
respondent deliberately disregarded decisions of this court holding
that such act amounts to a denial of due process, and made himself
administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law for which
appropriate sanctions may be imposed." The respondent judge was
ordered to pay a fine of P20,000.00 and warned that commission of
the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more
severely.
(16) Reymualdo Buzon, Jr. v. Judge Tirso Velasco decided in 1996.
28 In this administrative case, the respondent judge, without
hearing nor comment from the prosecution, granted bail to an
accused charged with murder. Notably, no bail was recommended
in the warrant of arrest. We held: "When bail is a matter of
discretion, the judge is required to conduct a hearing and to give
notice of such hearing to the fiscal or require him to submit his
recommendation. . . . Truly, a judge would not be in a position to
determine whether the prosecution's evidence is weak or strong
unless a hearing is first conducted." A fine of P20,000.00 was
imposed on the respondent judge with the stern warning that a
repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with
more severely.
The aforecited cases are all to the effect that when bail is discretionary, a hearing,
whether summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court, should first be
conducted to determine the existence of strong evidence, or lack of it, against the
accused to enable the judge to make an intelligent assessment of the evidence
presented by the parties.
Since the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt against the accused is
strong is a matter of judicial discretion, the judge is mandated to conduct a hearing
even in cases where the prosecution chooses to just file a comment or leave the
application for bail to the discretion of the court.
8 | CRIMPRO-RULE 114 | MANCO
Hence:
(1) In the case of Gimeno v. Arcueno, Sr., 29 an administrative complaint was filed
against the respondent judge for granting bail to one of the accused in a robbery with
homicide case without affording the prosecution a chance to be heard. The
respondent judge explained that he issued an order for the motion to fix bail but the
public prosecutor filed a comment instead which respondent judge thought was
adequate compliance with law. Respondent added that the evidence of guilt of the
accused, as disclosed by the records, was not so strong as to deny the application for
bail. In fact, the accused who filed for bail, together with three others, were later
dropped by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor from the information for failure
of the witnesses to positively identify them. We held: "The grant of bail is a matter
of right except in cases involving capital offenses when the matter is left to the sound
discretion of the court. That discretion lies, not in the determination whether or not a
hearing should be held but in the appreciation and evaluation of the prosecution's
evidence of guilt against the accused. . . . A hearing is plainly indispensable before a
judge can aptly be said to be in a position to determine whether the evidence for the
prosecution is weak or strong." Although the respondent judge's explanation was not
enough to completely exculpate him, the circumstances, coupled with his sincere
belief in the propriety of his order warranted a mitigation of the usual sanction the
court imposes in cases of this nature. The respondent judge was ordered to pay a fine
of P5,000.00 and warned that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future will
be dealt with more severely.
(2) In the case of Concerned Citizens v. Elma, 30 an administrative complaint was
filed against the respondent judge for granting bail to a person charged with illegal
recruitment in large scale and estafa in five separate informations. The accused filed
a motion to fix bail and the respondent judge instead of setting the application for
hearing, directed the prosecution to file its comment or opposition. The prosecution
submitted its comment leaving the application for bail to the discretion of the court.
The respondent judge, in granting the bail of the accused rationalized that in ordering
the prosecution to comment on the accused's motion to fix bail, he has substantially
complied with the requirement of a formal hearing. He further claimed that he
required the prosecution to adduce evidence but the latter refused and left the
determination of the motion to his discretion. This Court held, "It is true that the
weight of the evidence adduced is addressed to the sound discretion of the court.
However, such discretion may only be exercised after the hearing called to ascertain
the degree of guilt of the accused for the purpose of determining whether or not he
should be granted liberty. . . . In the case at bar, however, no formal hearing was
conducted by the respondent judge. He could not have assessed the weight of
evidence against the accused Gatus before granting the latter's application for bail."
The respondent judge was dismissed from service because he was previously fined
for a similar offense and was sternly warned that a repetition of the same or similar
offense would be dealt with more severely.
(3) In the case of Baylon v. Sison, 31 an administrative complaint was filed against
the respondent judge for granting bail to several accused in a double murder case.
The respondent judge claimed that he granted the application for bail because the
assistant prosecutor who was present at the hearing did not interpose an objection
thereto and that the prosecution never requested that it be allowed to show that the
evidence of guilt is strong but instead, submitted the incident for resolution. The
respondent judge further claimed that the motion for reconsideration of the order
granting bail was denied only after due consideration of the pertinent affidavits. We
held: "The discretion of the court, in cases involving capital offenses may be
exercised only after there has been a hearing called to ascertain the weight of the
evidence against the accused. Peremptorily, the discretion lies, not in determining
whether or not there will be a hearing, but in appreciating and evaluating the weight
of the evidence of guilt against the accused." The respondent judge was ordered to
pay a fine of P20,000.00 with a stern warning that the commission of the same or
similar offense in the future would be dealt with more severely.
A hearing is likewise required if the prosecution refuses to adduce evidence in
opposition to the application to grant and fix bail. "The importance of a hearing has
been emphasized in not a few cases wherein the court ruled that even if the
prosecution refuses to adduce evidence or fails to interpose an objection to the
motion for bail, it is still mandatory for the court to conduct a hearing or ask
searching questions from which it may infer the strength of the evidence of guilt, or
the lack of it, against the accused." 32
In the recent case of Tucay v. Domagas, 33 an administrative complaint was filed
against the respondent judge for granting bail to an accused charged with murder.
The application for bail contained the annotation "No objection" of the provincial
prosecutor and the respondent judge, without holding a hearing to determine whether
the evidence of the prosecution was strong, granted bail and ordered the release of
the accused from detention with instructions to the bondsman to register the bond
with the Register of Deeds within ten days. It was later found out that the assessed
value of the property given was short of the amount fixed for the release of the
accused. We held: "Although the provincial prosecutor had interposed no objection
to the grant of bail to the accused, respondent judge should have nevertheless have
set the petition for bail for hearing and diligently ascertained from the prosecution
whether the latter was not really contesting the bail application . . . . Only after
satisfying himself that the prosecution did not wish to oppose the petition for bail for
justifiable cause (e.g., for tactical reasons) and taking into account the factors
enumerated in Rule 114, Sec. 6 for fixing bail should respondent judge have ordered
the petition for bail and ordered the release of the accused." Respondent judge herein
was ordered to pay a fine of P20,000.00 and was given a stern warning that the
commission of a similar offense in the future would be dealt with more severely.
Corollarily, another reason why hearing of a petition for bail is required, as can be
gleaned from the abovecited case, is for the court to take into consideration the
9 | CRIMPRO-RULE 114 | MANCO
guidelines set forth in Section 6, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court in fixing the amount
of bail. 34 This Court, in a number of cases 35 held that even if the prosecution fails
to adduce evidence in opposition to an application for bail of an accused, the court
may still require that it answer questions in order to ascertain not only the strength of
the state' s evidence but also the adequacy of the amount of bail.
After hearing, the court's order granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of
the evidence for the prosecution. 36 On the basis thereof, the judge should then
formulate his own conclusion as to whether the evidence so presented is strong
enough as to indicate the guilt of the accused. Otherwise, the order granting or
denying the application for bail may be invalidated because the summary of evidence
for the prosecution which contains the judge's evaluation of the evidence may be
considered as an aspect of procedural due process for both the prosecution and the
defense.
This court in the case of Carpio v. Maglalang 37 invalidated the order of respondent
judge granting bail to the accused because "Without summarizing the factual basis of
its order granting bail, the court merely stated the number of prosecution witnesses
but not their respective testimonies, and concluded that the evidence presented by the
prosecution was not "sufficiently strong" to deny bail to Escano."
With the mounting precedents, this Court sees no reason why it has to repeatedly
remind trial court judges to perform their mandatory duty of conducting the required
hearing in bail applications where the accused stands charged with a capital offense.
An evaluation of the records in the case at bar reveals that respondent Judge granted
bail to the accused without first conducting a hearing to prove that the guilt of the
accused is strong despite his knowledge that the offense charged is a capital offense
in disregard of the procedure laid down in Section 8, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court
as amended by Administrative Circular No. 12-94.
Respondent judge admittedly granted the petition for bail based on the prosecution's
declaration not to oppose the petition. Respondent's assertion, however, that he has a
right to presume that the prosecutor knows what he is doing on account of the latter's
familiarity with the case due to his having conducted the preliminary investigation is
faulty. Said reasoning is tantamount to ceding to the prosecutor the duty of
exercising judicial discretion to determine whether the guilt of the accused is strong.
Judicial discretion is the domain of the judge before whom the petition for
provisional liberty will be decided. The mandated duty to exercise discretion has
never been reposed upon the prosecutor.
In the case of Montalbo v. Santamaria, 38 this Court held that the respondent judge
is duty bound to exercise judicial discretion conferred upon him by law to determine
whether in the case at bar, the proof is evident or the presumption of guilt is strong
against the defendant and to grant or deny the petition for provisional liberty. It also
held that a writ of mandamus will lie in order to compel the respondent judge to
perform a duty imposed upon him by law.
The absence of objection from the prosecution is never a basis for granting bail to the
accused. It is the court's determination after a hearing that the guilt of the accused is
not strong that forms the basis for granting bail. Respondent Judge should not have
relied solely on the recommendation made by the prosecutor but should have
ascertained personally whether the evidence of guilt is strong. After all, the judge is
not bound by the prosecutor's recommendation. Moreover, there will be a violation
of due process if the respondent Judge grants the application for bail without hearing
since Section 8 of Rule 114 provides that whatever evidence presented for or against
the accused's provisional release will be determined at the hearing.
The practice by trial court judges of granting bail to the accused when the prosecutor
refuses or fails to present evidence to prove that the evidence of guilt of the accused
is strong can be traced to the case of Herras Teehankee v. Director of Prisons 39
where this Court gave the following "instructions" to the People's Court, 40 thus:
1) In capital cases like the present when the prosecutor does not
oppose the petition for release on bail, the court should, as a
general rule, in the proper exercise of its discretion, grant the
release after the approval of the bail which it should fix for the
purpose;
2) But if the court has reasons to believe that the special
prosecutor's attitude is not justified, it may ask him questions to
ascertain the strength of the state's evidence or to judge the
adequacy of the amount of bail;
3) When, however, the special prosecutor refuses to answer any
particular question on the ground that the answer may involve a
disclosure imperiling the success of the prosecution or jeopardizing
the public interest, the court may not compel him to do so, if and
when he exhibits a statement to that effect of the Solicitor General,
who, as head of the Office of Special Prosecutors, is vested with
the direction and control of the prosecution, and may not, even at
the trial, be ordered by the court to present evidence which he does
not want to introduce — provided, of course, that such refusal shall
not prejudice the rights of the defendant or detainee. 41
The rationale for the first instruction was stated by this Court, as follows:
10 | CRIMPRO-RULE 114 | MANCO
If, for any reason, any party should abstain from introducing
evidence in the case for any definite purpose, no law nor rule exists
by which he may be so compelled and the court before which the
case is pending has to act without that evidence and, in so doing, it
clearly would not be failing in its duties. If the Constitution or the
law plots a certain course of action to be taken by the court when
certain evidence is found by it to exist, and the opposite course if
that evidence is wanting, and said evidence is not voluntarily
adduced by the proper party, the court's clear duty would be to
adopt that course which has been provided for in case of absence
of such evidence. Applying the principle to the case at bar, it was
no more within the power — nor discretion — of the court to
coerce the prosecution into presenting its evidence than to force the
prisoner into adducing hers. And when both elected not to do so, as
they had a perfect right to elect, the only thing remaining for the
court to do was to grant the application for bail.
As for the second instruction, this Court stated that:
The prosecutor might not oppose the application for bail and might
refuse to satisfy his burden of proof, but where the court has
reasons to believe that the prosecutor's attitude is not justified, as
when he is evidently committing a gross error or a dereliction of
duty, the court must possess a reasonable degree of control over
him in the paramount interest of justice. Under such circumstance,
the court is authorized by our second instruction to inquire from
the prosecutor as to the nature of his evidence to determine
whether or not it is strong, it being possible for the prosecutor to
have erred in considering it weak and, therefore, recommending
bail.
As for the third instruction, this Court declared:
It must be observed that the court is made to rely upon the official
statement of the Solicitor General on the question of whether or
not the revelation of evidence may endanger the success of the
prosecution and jeopardize the public interest. This is so, for there
is no way for the court to determine that question without having
the evidence disclosed in the presence of the applicant, disclosure
which is sought to be avoided to protect the interests of the
prosecution before the trial.
It is to be recalled that Herras Teehankee was decided fully half a century ago under
a completely different factual milieu. Haydee Herras Teehankee was indicted under
a law dealing with treason cases and collaboration with the enemy. The said
"instructions" given in the said case under the 1940 Rules of Court no longer apply
due to the amendments introduced in the 1985 Rules of Court.
In the 1940 Rules of Court of the Philippines, the applicable provisions on "Bail"
provides, as follows:
Sec. 5. Capital offenses defined. — A capital offense, as the term
is used in this rule, is an offense which, under the law existing at
the time of its commission, and at the time of the application to be
admitted to bail, may be punished by death.
Sec. 6. Capital offenses not bailable. — No person in custody for
the commission of a capital offense shall be admitted to bail if the
evidence of his guilt is strong.
Sec. 7. Capital offense — burden of proof. — On the hearing of an
application for admission to bail made by any person who is in
custody for the commission of a capital offense, the burden of
showing that the evidence of guilt is strong is on the prosecution.
The above-cited provisions have not been adopted in toto in the 1985 Rules of Court,
as amended by Administrative Circular No. 12-94, since some phrases and lines have
been intercalated, as shown by the underscored phrases and statements below:
Sec. 6. Capital offense, defined. — A capital offense, as the term is
used in these rules, is an offense which, under the law existing at
the time of its commission and at the time of the application to be
admitted to bail, may be punished with death.
Sec. 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable. — No person charged
with a capital offense, of an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is strong,
shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal
prosecution.
Sec. 8. Burden of proof in bail application. — At the hearing of an
application for admission to bail filed by any person who is in
custody for the commission of an offense punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the prosecution has the
burden of showing that evidence of guilt is strong. The evidence
presented during the bail hearings shall be considered
automatically reproduced at the trial, but upon motion of either
11 | CRIMPRO-RULE 114 | MANCO
party, the court may recall any witness for additional examination
unless the witness is dead, outside of the Philippines or otherwise
unable to testify.
It should be noted that there has been added in Section 8 a crucial sentence not found
in the counterpart provision, Section 7, Rule 110 of the 1940 Rules of Court. The
above-underscored sentence in section 8, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules of Court, as
amended, was added to address a situation where in case the prosecution does not
choose to present evidence to oppose the application for bail, the judge may feel
duty-bound to grant the bail application. In such a case, the judge may well lose
control of the proceedings. In a sense, this undermines the authority of a judge since
all that the prosecution has to do to "force" the judge to grant the bail application is
to refrain from presenting evidence opposing the same. In effect, this situation makes
Sections 6 and 7 of the 1940 Rules of Court on "Bail" meaningless since whether or
not the evidence of guilt of a person charged with a capital offense is strong cannot
be determined if the prosecution chooses not to present evidence or oppose the bail
application in a hearing precisely to be conducted by the trial judge for that purpose,
as called for in the two sections. In the event that the prosecution fails or refuses to
adduce evidence in the scheduled hearing, then a hearing as in a regular trial should
be scheduled. In this regard, a hearing in the application for bail necessarily means
presentation of evidence, and the filing of a comment or a written opposition to the
bail application by the prosecution will not suffice.
The prosecution under the revised provision is duty bound to present evidence in the
bail hearing to prove whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong and not
merely to oppose the grant of bail to the accused. "This also prevents the practice in
the past wherein a petition for bail was used as a means to force the prosecution into
a premature revelation of its evidence and, if it refused to do so, the accused would
claim the grant of bail on the ground that the evidence of guilt was not strong." 42
It should be stressed at this point, however, that the nature of the hearing in an
application for bail must be equated with its purpose i.e., to determine the bailability
of the accused. If the prosecution were permitted to conduct a hearing for bail as if it
were a full-dress trial on the merits, the purpose of the proceeding, which is to secure
the provisional liberty of the accused to enable him to prepare for his defense, could
be defeated. At any rate, in case of a summary hearing, the prosecution witnesses
could always be recalled at the trial on the merits. 43
In the light of the applicable rules on bail and the jurisprudential principles just
enunciated, this Court reiterates the duties of the trial judge in case an application for
bail is filed:
 (1) Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail
or require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule
114 of the Rules of Court as amended);
(2) Conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of
whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show
that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling
the court to exercise its sound discretion (Sections 7 and 8, supra);
application for bail without notice and hearing. In view however of the
circumstances of this case, a reprimand instead of the P20,000.00 would suffice.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Judge Leo M. Rapatalo, RTC,
Branch 32, Agoo, La Union, is hereby REPRIMANDED with the WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

(3) Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong Regalado, Puno, Mendoza and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
based on the summary of evidence of the prosecution (Baylon v.
Sison, supra);

(4) If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused
upon the approval of the bailbond. (Section 19, supra). Otherwise,
petition should be denied.

The above-enumerated procedure should now leave no room for doubt as to the
duties of the trial judge in cases of bail applications. So basic and fundamental is it to
conduct a hearing in connection with the grant of bail in the proper cases that it
would amount to judicial apostasy for any member of the judiciary to disclaim
knowledge or awareness thereof. 44 A judge owes it to the public and the
administration of justice to know the law he is supposed to apply to a given
controversy. He is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with
the statutes and procedural rules. There will be faith in the administration of justice
only if there be a belief on the part of litigants that the occupants of the bench cannot
justly be accused of a deficiency in their grasp of legal principles. 45

Respondent judge herein insists that he could exercise his discretion in granting bail
to the accused since the Assistant Prosecutor signified in writing that he had no
objection to the grant of bail and recommended, instead, the bailbond in the sum of
P80,000.00. It is to be emphasized that although the court may have the discretion to
grant the application for bail, in cases of capital offenses, the determination as to
whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong can only be reached after due hearing
which, in this particular instance has not been substantially complied with by the
respondent Judge.

While it may be true that the respondent judge set the application for bail for hearing
three times, thus showing lack of malice or bad faith in granting bail to the accused,
nonetheless, this does not completely exculpate him because the fact remains that a
hearing has not actually been conducted in violation of his duty to determine whether
or not the evidence against the accused is strong for purposes of bail. Normally, the
Court imposes a penalty of P20,000.00 fine in cases where the judge grants the

12 | CRIMPRO-RULE 114 | MANCO

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
A.M. No. RTJ-08-2131 November 22, 2010
(Formerly OCA IPI No. 05-2241-RTJ)
LORNA M. VILLANUEVA, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE APOLINARIO M. BUAYA, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
In a verified affidavit-complaint1 dated March 15, 2005, complainant Lorna M.
Villanueva, assisted by her father Pantaleon Villanueva, charged respondent Acting
Presiding Judge Apolinario M. Buaya of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 17,
of Palompon, Leyte, with Gross Ignorance of the Law and Abuse of Authority.
In an affidavit-complaint executed on June 5, 2004,2 Villanueva accused then Vice-
Mayor Constantino S. Tupa of Palompon, Leyte, (of the crime of Qualified
Seduction. She later filed another complaint against the same accused for violation of
Section 5, paragraph (b), Article III of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610 (otherwise
known as the Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act)3 with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Palompon, Leyte.
MTC Judge Delia Noel-Bertulfo forwarded the case to the Office of the Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor after finding probable cause for two counts of violation of
Section 5, paragraph (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, allegedly committed on
October 29, 2002 and December 16, 2002. Judge Noel-Bertulfo allowed Tupa to post
bail in the amount of one hundred thousand pesos (₱100,000.00) for each case.
On September 27, 2004, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Prudencio O. Borgueta, Jr.
issued a Joint Resolution on Review,4 recommending the filing of two separate
informations for violation of Section 5(b) in relation with Section 31,5 of R.A. No.
7610 against the accused. He likewise recommended the cancellation of the bail
bond of ₱100,000.00 (per case) posted by Tupa as, under Section 31, Article XII of
R.A. No. 7610, if the offender is a public officer or employee, the penalty provided
in Section 5, Article III of R.A. No. 76106 is imposed in the maximum period, i.e.,
reclusion perpetua. Thus, bail is not a matter of right. He also added that the
cancellation of the bail bond was all the more appropriate since there was strong
13 | CRIMPRO-RULE 114 | MANCO
evidence of guilt against the accused based on Villanueva’s affidavit-complaint and
her material declarations during the preliminary investigation. The accused did not
refute these declarations and, in fact, even admitted the alleged sexual acts in his
counter-affidavit and through his statements during the clarificatory hearing.
Based on the above recommendation, the Provincial Prosecutor of Leyte filed two
separate Informations7 for violation of Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, in
relation with Section 31, Article XII of the same law, against Tupa before RTC,
Branch 17, of Palompon, Leyte. No bail was recommended in both cases.
Judge Eric F. Menchavez, then Presiding Judge of the RTC, Branch 17, of
Palompon, Leyte, issued a warrant for the arrest of Tupa.8 However, the warrant was
not served because Tupa went into hiding and could not be located. Meanwhile,
Judge Menchavez was reassigned to the RTC in Cebu City. This led to the
designation of Judge Apolinario M. Buaya as Acting Presiding Judge of the RTC,
Branch 17 on December 8, 2004.
On the very same day (December 8, 2004), Tupa allegedly surrendered voluntarily to
SPO2 Charito Daau of the Ormoc City Police Station and filed with the RTC, Branch
17 an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Grant Bail (ex-parte motion).9 Tupa argued that the
Prosecutor, in recommending the denial of bail, erred in considering the special
aggravating circumstance provided in Section 31, Article XII of R.A. No. 7610 in the
computation of the penalty to be used as basis in determining his right to bail. Citing
People of the Philippines v. Intermediate Appellate Court,10 Tupa contended that for
purposes of the right to bail, the criterion to determine whether the offense charged is
a capital offense is the penalty provided by the law, regardless of the attendant
circumstances.
In an Order11 issued on the same day the ex-parte motion was filed, without hearing
and without notice to the prosecution, Judge Buaya granted the ex-parte motion and
ordered the release of Tupa on bail.
On December 16, 2004, Villanueva moved to reconsider the order granting the ex-
parte motion. She argued that an application for bail should be heard and cannot be
contained in a mere ex-parte motion. Judge Buaya noted that Villanueva’s motion for
reconsideration was submitted by the private prosecutor without the conformity of
the public prosecutor, as required under the Rules on Criminal Procedure. Without
acting on the merits of the said motion, Judge Buaya issued an order allowing the
accused to submit his comment or opposition within ten days; thereafter, the matter
would be submitted for resolution.
Judge Buaya’s differing treatment of the ex-parte motion and her motion for
reconsideration apparently irked Villanueva, prompting her to file the present
administrative complaint against the RTC judge. She observed the seeming bias and
unfairness of Judge Buaya’s orders when he granted the ex-parte motion without the
required notice and hearing; on the other hand, he did not act on her motion for
reconsideration because it was not in the proper form, but allowed the accused to
comment on her motion.
In an Indorsement dated May 4, 2005,12 then Court Administrator Presbitero J.
Velasco, Jr. required Judge Buaya to comment on the administrative complaint filed
against him. The Court Administrator likewise required the Judge to explain why no
disciplinary action should be taken against him for violation of his professional
responsibility as a lawyer, pursuant to the Court’s En Banc Resolution dated
September 17, 2002 in A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC.13
Judge Buaya vehemently denied the charges against him in his Comment.14 He
argued that the crime charged against Tupa was a bailable offense; when bail is a
matter of right, no hearing of the motion to grant bail is required. Thus, he stood by
his order granting the accused temporary liberty, through bail, without a hearing. His
assailed order, reiterated in his comment, held that a hearing would be superfluous
and unnecessary given the peculiar and special circumstances attendant to the case.
During the preliminary examination, the investigating judge already passed upon and
fixed the amount of bail for the temporary liberty of the accused. In fact, the accused
had availed of and exercised his constitutional right to bail by posting the necessary
bond.1avvphi1 In his view, the prosecution, in canceling the bail bond in its joint
resolution for review, acted to the prejudice of the accused’s paramount right to
liberty. Judge Buaya, therefore, asked for the dismissal of the present administrative
complaint for lack of merit.
Villanueva filed a Reply15 contending that Judge Buaya’s assailed order on the ex-
parte motion was contrary to the Rules of Court requirement that a motion to grant
bail must be set for hearing to afford the State and the prosecutor their day in court.
She further accused Judge Buaya of being manifestly partial as evidenced by the two
temporary restraining orders (TROs) he issued in favor of the accused in another case
for quo warranto,16 then pending before the RTC, Branch 17. She observed that the
first TRO read more like a decision on the merits even though the case had not yet
reached the pre-trial stage. The second TRO, on the other hand, was allegedly issued
without a hearing and was antedated.
Prior to the Office of the Court Administrator’s (OCA’s) action on the administrative
complaint, the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 00449,17 rendered its
decision18 on the bail issue, granting the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed
by Villanueva, thus annulling and setting aside Judge Buaya’s order granting bail to
Tupa. Villanueva furnished the OCA with a copy of the CA decision.
On May 9, 2008, then Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepaño further evaluated the
merits of the case and opined that the issue of whether or not bail was a matter of
14 | CRIMPRO-RULE 114 | MANCO
right in the present case is judicial in nature. She preferred not to resolve the
administrative complaint based on the CA decision (which found the offense non-
bailable) since the decision was not yet final and executory at that time. However,
she found Judge Buaya’s precipitate haste in granting the accused bail to be unjust.
She reasoned out that since there was doubt on whether the offense was bailable,
basic considerations of fair play should have compelled Judge Buaya, at the
minimum, to consult with the prosecution and the other judge (who issued the
warrant of arrest) on the reason for not recommending bail. Court Administrator
Elepaño, therefore, recommended that the present administrative complaint be re-
docketed as a regular administrative case and that Judge Buaya, for lack of prudence,
be reprimanded, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the
future would be dealt with more severely.
By Resolution of July 9, 2008,19 this Court required the parties to manifest, within
ten days from notice, whether they were submitting the matter for resolution on the
basis of the pleadings filed.
In his Manifestation,20 Judge Buaya maintained his position that the offense at issue
is a bailable offense, therefore, bail is a matter of right and a hearing is not required.
He further alleged that the investigating prosecutor (who recommended that no bail
should be granted to Tupa) was pressured to reverse the investigating MTC judge’s
recommendation for bail during the preliminary investigation stage. The prosecutor
allegedly asked for a transfer of assignment from Palompon, Leyte to Tacloban, but
his request was denied, prompting him to resign and work in a private bank.
As added proof of the lack of merit of the present administrative case filed against
him, Judge Buaya furnished this Court with the Affidavit of Desistance and
Declaration Against Interest21 executed by Villanueva, together with the Transcript
of Stenographic Notes22 of her October 11, 2007 testimony before Presiding Judge
Celso L. Mantua of the RTC, Branch 17, of Palompon, Leyte. In both documents,
Villanueva retracted her accusations against Tupa and totally denied the occurrence
of the alleged acts of lasciviousness committed against her by the accused. Judge
Buaya alleged that Villanueva was merely used by certain political figures in their
locality, and was pressured to file the criminal cases against their former vice-mayor
and the present administrative case against him.
THE COURT’S RULING
As a preliminary matter, we cannot give any weight to Judge Buaya’s
unsubstantiated allegation that the prosecutor who had recommended bail was only
pressured to make his recommendation. This allegation, aside from being
unsubstantiated, is totally irrelevant to the case whose issue is the propriety of the
action of the judge in granting bail ex-parte, not the action of the prosecutor in
recommending that no bail be granted.
The complainant’s desistance is likewise not legally significant. We reiterate the
settled rule that administrative actions cannot depend on the will or pleasure of the
complainant who may, for reasons of his own, accept and condone what is otherwise
detestable. Neither can the Court be bound by the unilateral act of the complainant in
a matter relating to its disciplinary power. Desistance cannot divest the Court of its
jurisdiction to investigate and decide the complaint against the respondent. Where
public interest is at stake and the Court can act on the propriety and legality of the
conduct of judiciary officials and employees, the Court shall act irrespective of any
intervening private arrangements between the parties.23
On many occasions, we have impressed upon judges that they owe it to the public
and the legal profession to know the very law they are supposed to apply in a given
controversy.24 They are called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance
with statutes and procedural rules, to be conversant with the basic law, and to
maintain the desired professional competence.25
With the numerous cases already decided on the matter of bail, we feel justified to
expect judges to diligently discharge their duties on the grant or denial of
applications for bail. Basco v. Rapatalo26 laid down the rules outlining the duties of a
judge in case an application for bail is filed:
(1) Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or
require him to submit his recommendation x x x;
(2) Conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or
not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the
accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its
discretion x x x;
(3) Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong based on
the summary of evidence of the prosecution x x x; [and]
(4) If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the
approval of the [bail bond]. x x x Otherwise, petition should be denied.
In the present case, Judge Buaya granted the ex-parte motion to grant bail on the
same day that it was filed by the accused. He did this without the required notice and
hearing. He justified his action on the ex-parte motion by arguing that the offense
charged against the accused was a bailable offense; a hearing was no longer required
since bail was a matter of right. Under the present Rules of Court, however, notice
and hearing are required whether bail is a matter of right or discretion.27 Likewise,
jurisprudence is replete with decisions on the procedural necessity of a hearing,
whether summary or otherwise, relative to the grant of bail, especially in cases
15 | CRIMPRO-RULE 114 | MANCO
involving offenses punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
where bail is a matter of discretion.28
Judge Buaya further argued that in granting the ex-parte motion, he was merely
correcting a reversible error. Believing that the offense committed was bailable in
nature, he opined that when the investigating prosecutor revoked the bail already
posted by the accused, the prosecutor gravely violated the accused’s constitutional
right to bail. Judge Buaya firmly relied on the previous order of the investigating
MTC judge who, according to him, correctly fixed the amount of bail. Thus,
conducting a bail hearing on the ex-parte motion was no longer necessary. Even
assuming, however, that the previous order of the investigating MTC judge was
correct in granting bail to the accused, reliance on a previous order granting bail does
not justify the absence of a hearing in a subsequent petition for bail.29
The Court has always stressed the indispensable nature of a bail hearing in petitions
for bail. Where bail is a matter of discretion, the grant or the denial of bail hinges on
the issue of whether or not the evidence on the guilt of the accused is strong and the
determination of whether or not the evidence is strong is a matter of judicial
discretion which remains with the judge. In order for the judge to properly exercise
this discretion, he must first conduct a hearing to determine whether the evidence of
guilt is strong.30 This discretion lies not in the determination of whether or not a
hearing should be held, but in the appreciation and evaluation of the weight of the
prosecution’s evidence of guilt against the accused.
In any event, whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, a hearing for a petition
for bail is required in order for the court to consider the guidelines set forth in
Section 9, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court in fixing the amount of bail.31 This Court
has repeatedly held in past cases that even if the prosecution fails to adduce evidence
in opposition to an application for bail of an accused, the court may still require the
prosecution to answer questions in order to ascertain, not only the strength of the
State's evidence, but also the adequacy of the amount of bail. 32
One who accepts the exalted position of a judge owes the public and the Court the
duty to maintain professional competence at all times.33 When a judge displays an
utter lack of familiarity with the rules, he erodes the confidence of the public in the
courts. A judge owes the public and the Court the duty to be proficient in the law and
is expected to keep abreast of laws and prevailing jurisprudence. Ignorance of the
law by a judge can easily be the mainspring of injustice.34
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Acting Presiding Judge Apolinario M. Buaya
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, of Palompon, Leyte, GUILTY of Gross
Ignorance of the Law and Grave Abuse of Authority, and is hereby FINED Twenty
Thousand Pesos (₱20,000.00), with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or
similar acts in the future shall merit a more serious penalty.
SO ORDERED.

16 | CRIMPRO-RULE 114 | MANCO

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 189122 March 17, 2010
JOSE ANTONIO LEVISTE, Petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Bail, the security given by an accused who is in the custody of the law for his release
to guarantee his appearance before any court as may be required,1 is the answer of
the criminal justice system to a vexing question: what is to be done with the accused,
whose guilt has not yet been proven, in the "dubious interval," often years long,
between arrest and final adjudication?2 Bail acts as a reconciling mechanism to
accommodate both the accused’s interest in pretrial liberty and society’s interest in
assuring the accused’s presence at trial.3
Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the accused who has been sentenced to
prison must typically begin serving time immediately unless, on application, he is
admitted to bail.4 An accused not released on bail is incarcerated before an appellate
court confirms that his conviction is legal and proper. An erroneously convicted
accused who is denied bail loses his liberty to pay a debt to society he has never
owed.5 Even if the conviction is subsequently affirmed, however, the accused’s
interest in bail pending appeal includes freedom pending judicial review, opportunity
to efficiently prepare his case and avoidance of potential hardships of prison.6 On the
other hand, society has a compelling interest in protecting itself by swiftly
incarcerating an individual who is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a crime
serious enough to warrant prison time.7 Other recognized societal interests in the
denial of bail pending appeal include the prevention of the accused’s flight from
court custody, the protection of the community from potential danger and the
avoidance of delay in punishment.8 Under what circumstances an accused may
obtain bail pending appeal, then, is a delicate balance between the interests of society
and those of the accused.9
17 | CRIMPRO-RULE 114 | MANCO
Our rules authorize the proper courts to exercise discretion in the grant of bail
pending appeal to those convicted by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. In the exercise of that
discretion, the proper courts are to be guided by the fundamental principle that the
allowance of bail pending appeal should be exercised not with laxity but with grave
caution and only for strong reasons, considering that the accused has been in fact
convicted by the trial court.10
The Facts
Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas, petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste was
convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Makati City for the lesser crime of
homicide and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six years and one day
of prision mayor as minimum to 12 years and one day of reclusion temporal as
maximum.11
He appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals.12 Pending appeal, he filed an
urgent application for admission to bail pending appeal, citing his advanced age and
health condition, and claiming the absence of any risk or possibility of flight on his
part.
The Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s application for bail.13 It invoked the
bedrock principle in the matter of bail pending appeal, that the discretion to extend
bail during the course of appeal should be exercised "with grave caution and only for
strong reasons." Citing well-established jurisprudence, it ruled that bail is not a sick
pass for an ailing or aged detainee or a prisoner needing medical care outside the
prison facility. It found that petitioner
… failed to show that he suffers from ailment of such gravity that his continued
confinement during trial will permanently impair his health or put his life in danger.
x x x Notably, the physical condition of [petitioner] does not prevent him from
seeking medical attention while confined in prison, though he clearly preferred to be
attended by his personal physician.14
For purposes of determining whether petitioner’s application for bail could be
allowed pending appeal, the Court of Appeals also considered the fact of petitioner’s
conviction. It made a preliminary evaluation of petitioner’s case and made a prima
facie determination that there was no reason substantial enough to overturn the
evidence of petitioner’s guilt.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.15
Petitioner now questions as grave abuse of discretion the denial of his application for
bail, considering that none of the conditions justifying denial of bail under the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court was present. Petitioner’s
theory is that, where the penalty imposed by the trial court is more than six years but
not more than 20 years and the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of
Section 5 are absent, bail must be granted to an appellant pending appeal.
The Issue
The question presented to the Court is this: in an application for bail pending appeal
by an appellant sentenced by the trial court to a penalty of imprisonment for more
than six years, does the discretionary nature of the grant of bail pending appeal mean
that bail should automatically be granted absent any of the circumstances mentioned
in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court?
Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 5. Bail, when discretionary. — Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of
an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment,
admission to bail is discretionary. The application for bail may be filed and acted
upon by the trial court despite the filing of a notice of appeal, provided it has not
transmitted the original record to the appellate court. However, if the decision of the
trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from non-
bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed with and resolved by
the appellate court.
Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to continue on
provisional liberty during the pendency of the appeal under the same bail subject to
the consent of the bondsman.
If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6)
years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a
showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or other
similar circumstances:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or
has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded
sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without a valid
justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or
conditional pardon;
18 | CRIMPRO-RULE 114 | MANCO
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight
if released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during
the pendency of the appeal.
The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, review the
resolution of the Regional Trial Court after notice to the adverse party in either case.
(emphasis supplied)
Petitioner claims that, in the absence of any of the circumstances mentioned in the
third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, an application for bail
by an appellant sentenced by the Regional Trial Court to a penalty of more than six
years’ imprisonment should automatically be granted.
Petitioner’s stance is contrary to fundamental considerations of procedural and
substantive rules.
Basic Procedural Concerns Forbid Grant of Petition
Petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court to assail the denial by the Court of Appeals of his urgent application for
admission to bail pending appeal. While the said remedy may be resorted to
challenge an interlocutory order, such remedy is proper only where the interlocutory
order was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.16
Other than the sweeping averment that "[t]he Court of Appeals committed grave
abuse of discretion in denying petitioner’s application for bail pending appeal despite
the fact that none of the conditions to justify the denial thereof under Rule 114,
Section 5 [is] present, much less proven by the prosecution,"17 however, petitioner
actually failed to establish that the Court of Appeals indeed acted with grave abuse
of discretion. He simply relies on his claim that the Court of Appeals should have
granted bail in view of the absence of any of the circumstances enumerated in the
third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. Furthermore, petitioner
asserts that the Court of Appeals committed a grave error and prejudged the appeal
by denying his application for bail on the ground that the evidence that he committed
a capital offense was strong.
We disagree.
It cannot be said that the Court of Appeals issued the assailed resolution without or
in excess of its jurisdiction. One, pending appeal of a conviction by the Regional
Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment, admission to bail is expressly declared to be discretionary. Two, the
discretion to allow or disallow bail pending appeal in a case such as this where the
decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense
from non-bailable to bailable is exclusively lodged by the rules with the appellate
court. Thus, the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to hear and resolve petitioner’s
urgent application for admission to bail pending appeal.
Neither can it be correctly claimed that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse
of discretion when it denied petitioner’s application for bail pending appeal. Grave
abuse of discretion is not simply an error in judgment but it is such a capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment which is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction.18
Ordinary abuse of discretion is insufficient. The abuse of discretion must be grave,
that is, the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion
or personal hostility.19 It must be so patent and gross as to amount to evasion of
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in
contemplation of the law. In other words, for a petition for certiorari to prosper, there
must be a clear showing of caprice and arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion.20
Petitioner never alleged that, in denying his application for bail pending appeal, the
Court of Appeals exercised its judgment capriciously and whimsically. No
capriciousness or arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion was ever imputed to the
appellate court. Nor could any such implication or imputation be inferred. As
observed earlier, the Court of Appeals exercised grave caution in the exercise of its
discretion. The denial of petitioner’s application for bail pending appeal was not
unreasonable but was the result of a thorough assessment of petitioner’s claim of ill
health. By making a preliminary appraisal of the merits of the case for the purpose of
granting bail, the court also determined whether the appeal was frivolous or not, or
whether it raised a substantial question. The appellate court did not exercise its
discretion in a careless manner but followed doctrinal rulings of this Court.
At best, petitioner only points out the Court of Appeal’s erroneous application and
interpretation of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. However, the
extraordinary writ of certiorari will not be issued to cure errors in proceedings or
erroneous conclusions of law or fact.21 In this connection, Lee v. People22 is apropos:
… Certiorari may not be availed of where it is not shown that the respondent court
lacked or exceeded its jurisdiction over the case, even if its findings are not correct.
Its questioned acts would at most constitute errors of law and not abuse of discretion
correctible by certiorari.
In other words, certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction and not to
correct errors of procedure or mistakes in the court’s findings and conclusions. An
interlocutory order may be assailed by certiorari or prohibition only when it is shown
that the court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
19 | CRIMPRO-RULE 114 | MANCO
discretion. However, this Court generally frowns upon this remedial measure as
regards interlocutory orders. To tolerate the practice of allowing interlocutory orders
to be the subject of review by certiorari will not only delay the administration of
justice but will also unduly burden the courts.23 (emphasis supplied)
Wording of Third Paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 Contradicts Petitioner’s
Interpretation
The third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 applies to two scenarios where the
penalty imposed on the appellant applying for bail is imprisonment exceeding six
years. The first scenario deals with the circumstances enumerated in the said
paragraph (namely, recidivism, quasi-recidivism, habitual delinquency or
commission of the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration; previous
escape from legal confinement, evasion of sentence or violation of the conditions of
his bail without a valid justification; commission of the offense while under
probation, parole or conditional pardon; circumstances indicating the probability of
flight if released on bail; undue risk of committing another crime during the
pendency of the appeal; or other similar circumstances) not present. The second
scenario contemplates the existence of at least one of the said circumstances.
The implications of this distinction are discussed with erudition and clarity in the
commentary of retired Supreme Court Justice Florenz D. Regalado, an authority in
remedial law:
Under the present revised Rule 114, the availability of bail to an accused may be
summarized in the following rules:
xxx xxx xxx
e. After conviction by the Regional Trial Court wherein a penalty of
imprisonment exceeding 6 years but not more than 20 years is imposed, and
not one of the circumstances stated in Sec. 5 or any other similar
circumstance is present and proved, bail is a matter of discretion (Sec. 5);
f. After conviction by the Regional Trial Court imposing a penalty of
imprisonment exceeding 6 years but not more than 20 years, and any of the
circumstances stated in Sec. 5 or any other similar circumstance is present
and proved, no bail shall be granted by said court (Sec. 5); x x x24
(emphasis supplied)
Retired Court of Appeals Justice Oscar M. Herrera, another authority in remedial
law, is of the same thinking:
Bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the offense
charged is not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. On the
other hand, upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, bail becomes a matter of discretion.
Similarly, if the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6) years
then bail is a matter of discretion, except when any of the enumerated
circumstances under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present then bail
shall be denied.25 (emphasis supplied)
In the first situation, bail is a matter of sound judicial discretion. This means that, if
none of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is
present, the appellate court has the discretion to grant or deny bail. An application
for bail pending appeal may be denied even if the bail-negating26 circumstances in
the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 are absent. In other words, the appellate
court’s denial of bail pending appeal where none of the said circumstances exists
does not, by and of itself, constitute abuse of discretion.
On the other hand, in the second situation, the appellate court exercises a more
stringent discretion, that is, to carefully ascertain whether any of the enumerated
circumstances in fact exists. If it so determines, it has no other option except to deny
or revoke bail pending appeal. Conversely, if the appellate court grants bail pending
appeal, grave abuse of discretion will thereby be committed.
Given these two distinct scenarios, therefore, any application for bail pending appeal
should be viewed from the perspective of two stages: (1) the determination of
discretion stage, where the appellate court must determine whether any of the
circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present; this will
establish whether or not the appellate court will exercise sound discretion or
stringent discretion in resolving the application for bail pending appeal and (2) the
exercise of discretion stage where, assuming the appellant’s case falls within the first
scenario allowing the exercise of sound discretion, the appellate court may consider
all relevant circumstances, other than those mentioned in the third paragraph of
Section 5, Rule 114, including the demands of equity and justice;27 on the basis
thereof, it may either allow or disallow bail.
On the other hand, if the appellant’s case falls within the second scenario, the
appellate court’s stringent discretion requires that the exercise thereof be primarily
focused on the determination of the proof of the presence of any of the circumstances
that are prejudicial to the allowance of bail. This is so because the existence of any of
those circumstances is by itself sufficient to deny or revoke bail. Nonetheless, a
finding that none of the said circumstances is present will not automatically
result in the grant of bail. Such finding will simply authorize the court to use the
less stringent sound discretion approach.
20 | CRIMPRO-RULE 114 | MANCO
Petitioner disregards the fine yet substantial distinction between the two different
situations that are governed by the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114. Instead,
petitioner insists on a simplistic treatment that unduly dilutes the import of the said
provision and trivializes the established policy governing the grant of bail pending
appeal.
In particular, a careful reading of petitioner’s arguments reveals that it interprets the
third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 to cover all situations where the penalty
imposed by the trial court on the appellant is imprisonment exceeding six years. For
petitioner, in such a situation, the grant of bail pending appeal is always subject to
limited discretion, that is, one restricted to the determination of whether any of
the five bail-negating circumstances exists. The implication of this position is that,
if any such circumstance is present, then bail will be denied. Otherwise, bail will be
granted pending appeal.
Petitioner’s theory therefore reduces the appellate court into a mere fact-finding body
whose authority is limited to determining whether any of the five circumstances
mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 exists. This unduly
constricts its "discretion" into merely filling out the checklist of circumstances in the
third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 in all instances where the penalty imposed by
the Regional Trial Court on the appellant is imprisonment exceeding six years. In
short, petitioner’s interpretation severely curbs the discretion of the appellate court
by requiring it to determine a singular factual issue — whether any of the five bail-
negating circumstances is present.
However, judicial discretion has been defined as "choice."28 Choice occurs where,
between "two alternatives or among a possibly infinite number (of options)," there is
"more than one possible outcome, with the selection of the outcome left to the
decision maker."29 On the other hand, the establishment of a clearly defined rule of
action is the end of discretion.30 Thus, by severely clipping the appellate court’s
discretion and relegating that tribunal to a mere fact-finding body in applications for
bail pending appeal in all instances where the penalty imposed by the trial court on
the appellant is imprisonment exceeding six years, petitioner’s theory effectively
renders nugatory the provision that "upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court
of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment,
admission to bail is discretionary."
The judicial discretion granted to the proper court (the Court of Appeals in this case)
to rule on applications for bail pending appeal must necessarily involve the exercise
of judgment on the part of the court. The court must be allowed reasonable latitude
to express its own view of the case, its appreciation of the facts and its understanding
of the applicable law on the matter.31 In view of the grave caution required of it, the
court should consider whether or not, under all circumstances, the accused will be
present to abide by his punishment if his conviction is affirmed.32 It should also give
due regard to any other pertinent matters beyond the record of the particular case,
such as the record, character and reputation of the applicant,33 among other things.
More importantly, the discretion to determine allowance or disallowance of bail
pending appeal necessarily includes, at the very least, an initial determination that
the appeal is not frivolous but raises a substantial question of law or fact which must
be determined by the appellate court.34 In other words, a threshold requirement for
the grant of bail is a showing that the appeal is not pro forma and merely intended for
delay but presents a fairly debatable issue.35 This must be so; otherwise, the appellate
courts will be deluged with frivolous and time-wasting appeals made for the purpose
of taking advantage of a lenient attitude on bail pending appeal. Even more
significantly, this comports with the very strong presumption on appeal that the
lower court’s exercise of discretionary power was sound,36 specially since the rules
on criminal procedure require that no judgment shall be reversed or modified by the
Court of Appeals except for substantial error.37
Moreover, to limit the bail-negating circumstances to the five situations mentioned in
the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is wrong. By restricting the bail-negating
circumstances to those expressly mentioned, petitioner applies the expressio unius
est exclusio alterius38 rule in statutory construction. However, the very language of
the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 contradicts the idea that the enumeration
of the five situations therein was meant to be exclusive. The provision categorically
refers to "the following or other similar circumstances." Hence, under the rules,
similarly relevant situations other than those listed in the third paragraph of Section
5, Rule 114 may be considered in the allowance, denial or revocation of bail pending
appeal.
Finally, laws and rules should not be interpreted in such a way that leads to
unreasonable or senseless consequences. An absurd situation will result from
adopting petitioner’s interpretation that, where the penalty imposed by the trial court
is imprisonment exceeding six years, bail ought to be granted if none of the listed
bail-negating circumstances exists. Allowance of bail pending appeal in cases where
the penalty imposed is more than six years of imprisonment will be more lenient than
in cases where the penalty imposed does not exceed six years. While denial or
revocation of bail in cases where the penalty imposed is more than six years’
imprisonment must be made only if any of the five bail-negating conditions is
present, bail pending appeal in cases where the penalty imposed does not exceed six
years imprisonment may be denied even without those conditions.
Is it reasonable and in conformity with the dictates of justice that bail pending appeal
be more accessible to those convicted of serious offenses, compared to those
convicted of less serious crimes?
Petitioner’s Theory Deviates from History And Evolution of Rule on Bail
Pending Appeal
21 | CRIMPRO-RULE 114 | MANCO
Petitioner’s interpretation deviates from, even radically alters, the history and
evolution of the provisions on bail pending appeal.
The relevant original provisions on bail were provided under Sections 3 to 6, Rule
110 of the 1940 Rules of Criminal Procedure:
Sec. 3. Offenses less than capital before conviction by the Court of First
Instance. — After judgment by a municipal judge and before conviction by
the Court of First Instance, the defendant shall be admitted to bail as of
right.
Sec. 4. Non-capital offenses after conviction by the Court of First Instance.
— After conviction by the Court of First Instance, defendant may, upon
application, be bailed at the discretion of the court.
Sec. 5. Capital offense defined. — A capital offense, as the term is used in
this rule, is an offense which, under the law existing at the time of its
commission, and at the time of the application to be admitted to bail, may
be punished by death.
Sec. 6. Capital offense not bailable. — No person in custody for the
commission of a capital offense shall be admitted to bail if the evidence of
his guilt is strong.
The aforementioned provisions were reproduced as Sections 3 to 6, Rule 114 of the
1964 Rules of Criminal Procedure and then of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure.
They were modified in 1988 to read as follows:
Sec. 3. Bail, a matter of right; exception. — All persons in custody, shall
before final conviction be entitled to bail as a matter of right, except those
charged with a capital offense or an offense which, under the law at the time
of its commission and at the time of the application for bail, is punishable
by reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong.
Sec. 4. Capital offense, defined. — A capital offense, as the term is used in
this Rules, is an offense which, under the law existing at the time of its
commission, and at the time of the application to be admitted to bail, may
be punished by death. (emphasis supplied)
The significance of the above changes was clarified in Administrative Circular No.
2-92 dated January 20, 1992 as follows:
The basic governing principle on the right of the accused to bail is laid down in
Section 3 of Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, which
provides:
Sec. 3. Bail, a matter of right; exception. — All persons in custody, shall before final
conviction, be entitled to bail as a matter of right, except those charged with a capital
offense or an offense which, under the law at the time of its commission and at the
time of the application for bail, is punishable by reclusion perpetua, when evidence
of guilt is strong.
Pursuant to the aforecited provision, an accused who is charged with a capital
offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua, shall no longer be entitled to
bail as a matter of right even if he appeals the case to this Court since his conviction
clearly imports that the evidence of his guilt of the offense charged is strong.
Hence, for the guidelines of the bench and bar with respect to future as well as
pending cases before the trial courts, this Court en banc lays down the following
policies concerning the effectivity of the bail of the accused, to wit:
1) When an accused is charged with an offense which under the law
existing at the time of its commission and at the time of the application for
bail is punishable by a penalty lower than reclusion perpetua and is out on
bail, and after trial is convicted by the trial court of the offense charged or
of a lesser offense than that charged in the complaint or information, he
may be allowed to remain free on his original bail pending the resolution of
his appeal, unless the proper court directs otherwise pursuant to Rule 114,
Sec. 2 (a) of the Rules of Court, as amended;
2) When an accused is charged with a capital offense or an offense which
under the law at the time of its commission and at the time of the
application for bail is punishable by reclusion perpetua and is out on bail,
and after trial is convicted by the trial court of a lesser offense than that
charged in the complaint or information, the same rule set forth in the
preceding paragraph shall be applied;
3) When an accused is charged with a capital offense or an offense which
under the law at the time of its commission and at the time of the
application for bail is punishable by reclusion perpetua and is out on bail
and after trial is convicted by the trial court of the offense charged, his bond
shall be cancelled and the accused shall be placed in confinement pending
resolution of his appeal.
22 | CRIMPRO-RULE 114 | MANCO
As to criminal cases covered under the third rule abovecited, which are now pending
appeal before his Court where the accused is still on provisional liberty, the
following rules are laid down:
1) This Court shall order the bondsman to surrender the accused within ten
(10) days from notice to the court of origin. The bondsman thereupon, shall
inform this Court of the fact of surrender, after which, the cancellation of
the bond shall be ordered by this Court;
2) The RTC shall order the transmittal of the accused to the National
Bureau of Prisons thru the Philippine National Police as the accused shall
remain under confinement pending resolution of his appeal;
3) If the accused-appellant is not surrendered within the aforesaid period of
ten (10) days, his bond shall be forfeited and an order of arrest shall be
issued by this Court. The appeal taken by the accused shall also be
dismissed under Section 8, Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Court as he
shall be deemed to have jumped his bail. (emphasis supplied)
Amendments were further introduced in Administrative Circular No. 12-94 dated
August 16, 1994 which brought about important changes in the said rules as follows:
SECTION 4. Bail, a matter of right. — All persons in custody shall: (a) before or
after conviction by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal
Trial Court in Cities and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and (b) before conviction by
the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment, be admitted to bail as a matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or
be released on recognizance as prescribed by law of this Rule. (3a)
SECTION 5. Bail, when discretionary. — Upon conviction by the Regional Trial
Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
the court, on application, may admit the accused to bail.
The court, in its discretion, may allow the accused to continue on provisional liberty
under the same bail bond during the period of appeal subject to the consent of the
bondsman.
If the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6) years but not more
than twenty (20) years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail previously
granted shall be cancelled, upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the
accused, of the following or other similar circumstances:
(a) That the accused is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent,
or has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
 (b) That the accused is found to have previously escaped from legal
confinement, evaded sentence or has violated the conditions of his bail
without valid justification;
(c) That the accused committed the offense while on probation, parole,
under conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of the accused or his case indicate the probability
of flight if released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that during the pendency of the appeal, the
accused may commit another crime.
The appellate court may review the resolution of the Regional Trial Court, on motion
and with notice to the adverse party. (n)
SECTION 6. Capital offense, defined. — A capital offense, as the term is used in
these Rules, is an offense which, under the law existing at the time of its commission
and at the time of the application to be admitted to bail, maybe punished with death.
(4)
SECTION 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, not bailable. — No person charged with a capital offense, or an
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, when evidence of
guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal
prosecution. (emphasis supplied)
The above amendments of Administrative Circular No. 12-94 to Rule 114 were
thereafter amended by A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC to read as they do now.
The development over time of these rules reveals an orientation towards a more
restrictive approach to bail pending appeal. It indicates a faithful adherence to the
bedrock principle, that is, bail pending appeal should be allowed not with leniency
but with grave caution and only for strong reasons.
The earliest rules on the matter made all grants of bail after conviction for a non-
capital offense by the Court of First Instance (predecessor of the Regional Trial
Court) discretionary. The 1988 amendments made applications for bail pending
appeal favorable to the appellant-applicant. Bail before final conviction in trial courts
for non-capital offenses or offenses not punishable by reclusion perpetua was a
matter of right, meaning, admission to bail was a matter of right at any stage of the
action where the charge was not for a capital offense or was not punished by
reclusion perpetua.39
23 | CRIMPRO-RULE 114 | MANCO
The amendments introduced by Administrative Circular No. 12-94 made bail
pending appeal (of a conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment) discretionary. Thus,
Administrative Circular No. 12-94 laid down more stringent rules on the matter of
post-conviction grant of bail.
A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC modified Administrative Circular No. 12-94 by clearly
identifying which court has authority to act on applications for bail pending appeal
under certain conditions and in particular situations. More importantly, it reiterated
the "tough on bail pending appeal" configuration of Administrative Circular No. 12-
94. In particular, it amended Section 3 of the 1988 Rules on Criminal Procedure
which entitled the accused to bail as a matter of right before final conviction.40 Under
the present rule, bail is a matter of discretion upon conviction by the Regional Trial
Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.
Indeed, pursuant to the "tough on bail pending appeal" policy, the presence of bail-
negating conditions mandates the denial or revocation of bail pending appeal such
that those circumstances are deemed to be as grave as conviction by the trial court
for an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment where
bail is prohibited.
Now, what is more in consonance with a stringent standards approach to bail
pending appeal? What is more in conformity with an ex abundante cautelam view of
bail pending appeal? Is it a rule which favors the automatic grant of bail in the
absence of any of the circumstances under the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule
114? Or is it a rule that authorizes the denial of bail after due consideration of all
relevant circumstances, even if none of the circumstances under the third paragraph
of Section 5, Rule 114 is present?
The present inclination of the rules on criminal procedure to frown on bail pending
appeal parallels the approach adopted in the United States where our original
constitutional and procedural provisions on bail emanated.41 While this is of course
not to be followed blindly, it nonetheless shows that our treatment of bail pending
appeal is no different from that in other democratic societies.
In our jurisdiction, the trend towards a strict attitude towards the allowance of bail
pending appeal is anchored on the principle that judicial discretion — particularly
with respect to extending bail — should be exercised not with laxity but with caution
and only for strong reasons.42 In fact, it has even been pointed out that "grave caution
that must attend the exercise of judicial discretion in granting bail to a convicted
accused is best illustrated and exemplified in Administrative Circular No. 12-94
amending Rule 114, Section 5."43
Furthermore, this Court has been guided by the following:
The importance attached to conviction is due to the underlying principle that bail The Court of Appeals is hereby directed to resolve and decide, on the merits, the
should be granted only where it is uncertain whether the accused is guilty or appeal of petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 32159, with
innocent, and therefore, where that uncertainty is removed by conviction it would, dispatch.
generally speaking, be absurd to admit to bail. After a person has been tried and
convicted the presumption of innocence which may be relied upon in prior Costs against petitioner.
applications is rebutted, and the burden is upon the accused to show error in the
conviction. From another point of view it may be properly argued that the probability SO ORDERED.
of ultimate punishment is so enhanced by the conviction that the accused is much
more likely to attempt to escape if liberated on bail than before conviction.44
(emphasis supplied)

As a matter of fact, endorsing the reasoning quoted above and relying thereon, the
Court declared in Yap v. Court of Appeals45 (promulgated in 2001 when the present
rules were already effective), that denial of bail pending appeal is "a matter of wise
discretion."

A Final Word

Section 13, Article II of the Constitution provides:

SEC. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by
sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. x x x
(emphasis supplied)1avvphi1

After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of innocence terminates and,
accordingly, the constitutional right to bail ends.46 From then on, the grant of bail is
subject to judicial discretion. At the risk of being repetitious, such discretion must be
exercised with grave caution and only for strong reasons. Considering that the
accused was in fact convicted by the trial court, allowance of bail pending appeal
should be guided by a stringent-standards approach. This judicial disposition finds
strong support in the history and evolution of the rules on bail and the language of
Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. It is likewise consistent with the trial
court’s initial determination that the accused should be in prison. Furthermore,
letting the accused out on bail despite his conviction may destroy the deterrent effect
of our criminal laws. This is especially germane to bail pending appeal because long
delays often separate sentencing in the trial court and appellate review. In addition, at
the post-conviction stage, the accused faces a certain prison sentence and thus may
be more likely to flee regardless of bail bonds or other release conditions. Finally,
permitting bail too freely in spite of conviction invites frivolous and time-wasting
appeals which will make a mockery of our criminal justice system and court
processes.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

24 | CRIMPRO-RULE 114 | MANCO
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 158754 August 10, 2007
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (Special Division) and JOSE "JINGGOY" ESTRADA,
Respondents.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
The instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeks to
reverse and set aside the Resolution1 of herein respondent Sandiganbayan (Special
Division) issued on March 6, 2003 in Criminal Case No. 26558, granting bail to
private respondent Senator Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada (hereafter "Jinggoy" for brevity),
as effectively reiterated in its Resolution2 of May 30, 2003, denying the petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration.
The factual antecedents which gave rise to this proceeding are set forth in the Court’s
Decision3 of February 26, 2002, in G.R. No. 148965, to wit:
In November 2000, as an offshoot of the impeachment proceedings against Joseph
Ejercito Estrada, then President of the Republic of the Philippines, five criminal
complaints against the former President and members of his family, his associates,
friends and conspirators were filed with the … Office of the Ombudsman.
On April 4, 2001, the … Ombudsman issued a Joint Resolution finding probable
cause warranting the filing with the Sandiganbayan of several criminal Informations
against the former President and the other respondents therein. One of the
Informations was for the crime of plunder under Republic Act [RA] No. 7080 and
among the respondents was herein petitioner Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada, then mayor of
San Juan, Metro Manila.
The Information was amended and filed on April 18, 2001. Docketed as Criminal
Case No. 26558, the case was assigned to [the] respondent Third Division of the
Sandiganbayan. xxx. (Emphasis added.)
25 | CRIMPRO-RULE 114 | MANCO
The amended information referred to, like the original, charged respondent Jinggoy,
together with the former President and several others, with plunder, defined and
penalized under RA No. 7080, as amended by Section 12 of RA No. 7659, allegedly
committed as follows:
That during the period from June, 1998 to January, 2001, in the Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada,
THEN A PUBLIC OFFICER, …, by himself AND/OR in
CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his co-accused, WHO ARE MEMBERS OF
HIS FAMILY, RELATIVES BY AFFINITY OR CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS
ASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES AND/OR OTHER PERSONS, BY TAKING
UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL POSITION, AUTHORITY,
RELATIONSHIP, CONNECTION, OR INFLUENCE, did then and there wilfully
(sic), unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and acquire BY HIMSELF,
DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount OR
TOTAL VALUE of FOUR BILLION NINETY SEVEN MILLION EIGHT
HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS
AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS [P4,097,804,173.17], more or less, THEREBY
UNJUSTLY ENRICHING HIMSELF OR THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE
AND TO THE DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, through ANY OR A combination OR A series of overt OR
criminal acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS, described as follows:
(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL
INSTANCES, MONEY IN THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF…
(P545,000,000.00), MORE OR LESS, FROM ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN
THE FORM OF GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE, KICKBACK OR ANY
FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in
connivance with co-accused … Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada, …, [and] JOHN
DOES AND JANE DOES, in consideration OF TOLERATION OR
PROTECTION OF ILLEGAL GAMBLING;
(b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating, converting OR
misusing DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, for HIS OR THEIR PERSONAL
gain and benefit, public funds … [P130,000,000.00], more or less,
representing a portion of the … [P200,000,000] tobacco excise tax share
allocated for the Province of Ilocos Sur under R.A. No. 7171, BY
HIMSELF AND/OR in CONNIVANCE with co-accused Charlie ‘Atong’
Ang, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos
Tan or Mr. Uy, and Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, AND OTHER JOHN
DOES AND JANE DOES;
(c) by directing, ordering and compelling, FOR HIS PERSONAL GAIN
AND BENEFIT, the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) TO
PURCHASE 351,878,000 SHARES OF STOCK MORE OR LESS, and the
 Social Security System (SSS), 329,855,000 SHARES OF STOCK MORE
OR LESS, OF THE BELLE CORPORATION IN THE AMOUNT OF
MORE OR LESS … [P744,612,450.00], RESPECTIVELY, OR A TOTAL
OF MORE OR LESS … [P1,847,578,057.50]; AND BY COLLECTING
OR RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF
AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES,
COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES BY REASON OF SAID
PURCHASES OF SHARES OF STOCK IN THE AMOUNT …
[P189,700,000.00], MORE OR LESS, FROM THE BELLE
CORPORATION WHICH BECAME PART OF THE DEPOSIT IN THE
EQUITABLE-PCI BANK UNDER THE ACCOUNT NAME "JOSE
VELARDE";
(d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS, GIFTS,
SHARES, PERCENTAGES, KICKBACKS, OR ANY FORM OF
PECUNIARY BENEFITS, IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND
JANE DOES, in the amount of MORE OR LESS … [P3,233,104,173.17]
AND DEPOSITING THE SAME UNDER HIS ACCOUNT NAME "JOSE
VELARDE" AT THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK.4
What transpired next are narrated in the same February 26, 2002 Decision in G.R.
No. 148965, thus:
On April 25, 2001, the respondent court issued a warrant of arrest for [Jinggoy] and
his co-accused. On its basis, [Jinggoy] and his co-accused were placed in custody of
the law.
On April 30, 2001, [Jinggoy] filed a "Very Urgent Omnibus Motion" alleging that:
(1) no probable cause exists to put him on trial and hold him liable for plunder, it
appearing that he was only allegedly involved in illegal gambling and not in a "series
or combination of overt or criminal acts" as required in R.A. No. 7080; and (2) he is
entitled to bail as a matter of right. [He] prayed that he be excluded from the
Amended Information …. In the alternative, [he] also prayed that he be allowed to
post bail …..
On June 28, 2001, [he] filed a "Motion to Resolve Mayor Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada’s
Motion To Fix Bail On Grounds That An Outgoing Mayor Loses Clout An
Incumbent Has And That On Its Face, the Facts Charged In The Information Do Not
Make Out A Non-Bailable Offense As To Him."
xxx xxx xxx
On July 9, 2001, respondent Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying [Jinggoy’s]
"Motion to Quash and Suspend" and "Very Urgent Omnibus Motion." [His]
26 | CRIMPRO-RULE 114 | MANCO
alternative prayer to post bail was set for hearing after arraignment of all accused.
xxx
xxx xxx xxx
The following day, July 10, 2001, [Jinggoy] moved for reconsideration of the
Resolution. Respondent court denied the motion and proceeded to arraign [him].
[He] refused to make his plea prompting respondent court to enter a plea of "not
guilty" for him.5 (Emphasis and words in brackets added)
From the denial action of the Sandiganbayan immediately adverted to, Jinggoy
interposed a petition for certiorari before this Court claiming that the respondent
Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in, inter alia, (a) sustaining the
charge against him for alleged offenses and with alleged conspirators with whom he
is not even connected, and (b) in not fixing bail for him. Pending resolution of this
petition, docketed as G.R. No. 148965, Jinggoy filed with the Sandiganbayan an
"Urgent Second Motion for Bail for Medical Reasons." The Ombudsman opposed
the motion. For three (3) days in September 2001, the Sandiganbayan conducted
hearings on the motion for bail, with one Dr. Roberto Anastacio of the Makati
Medical Center appearing as sole witness for Jinggoy.6
On December 18, 2001, Jinggoy filed with the Court an Urgent Motion praying for
early resolution of his Petition for Bail on Medical/Humanitarian Considerations."
He reiterated his earlier plea for bail filed with the Sandiganbayan. On the same day,
the Court referred the motion to the Sandiganbayan for resolution and directed said
court to make a report, not later than 8:30 in the morning of December 21, 2001.7
The report was submitted as directed. Attached to the Report was a copy of the
Sandiganbayan’s Resolution dated December 20, 2001 denying Jinggoy’s motion for
bail for "lack of factual basis." According to the graft court, basing its findings on the
earlier testimony of Dr. Anastacio, Jinggoy "failed to submit sufficient evidence to
convince the court that the medical condition of the accused requires that he be
confined at home and for that purpose that he be allowed to post bail." 8
On February 26, 2002, the Court dismissed Jinggoy’s petition in G.R. No. 148965,
on the following rationale:
The constitutional mandate makes the grant or denial of bail in capital offenses hinge
on the issue of whether or not the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong. This
requires that the trial court conduct bail hearings xxx. The burden of proof lies with
the prosecution to show strong evidence of guilt.
This Court is not in a position to grant bail to [Jinggoy] as the matter requires
evidentiary hearing that should be conducted by the Sandiganbayan. The hearings on
which respondent court based its Resolution of December 20, 2001 involved the
reception of medical evidence only and which evidence was given in September
2001, five months ago. The records do not show that evidence on petitioner’s guilt
was presented before the lower court.
Upon proper motion of [Jinggoy], respondent Sandiganbayan should conduct
hearings to determine if the evidence of [Jinggoy’s] guilt is strong as to warrant the
granting of bail to [him].9 (Underscoring and words in brackets added).
On April 17, 2002, Jinggoy filed before the Sandiganbayan an Omnibus Application
for Bail 10 against which the prosecution filed its comment and opposition. Bail
hearings were then conducted, followed by the submission by the parties of their
respective memoranda.
In the herein assailed Resolution11 of March 6, 2003, respondent Sandiganbayan
(Special Division) granted the omnibus application for bail, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, in light of all the facts and applicable law and jurisprudence, JOSE
"JINGGOY" ESTRADA’s "OMNIBUS APPLICATION FOR BAIL" dated April
16, 2002 is GRANTED. Bail for accused-movant is fixed at Five Hundred Thousand
Pesos (Php500,000.00) to be paid in cash and his release is ordered upon the posting
thereof and its approval, unless movant is being held for some other legal cause.
This resolution is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration thereto which the respondent court
denied via the herein equally assailed May 30, 2003 Resolution,12 the dispositive part
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the prosecution’s "MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION [RE: GRANT OF JOSE "JINGGOY" ESTRADA’S
PETITION FOR BAIL] dated 13 March 2003 is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, the present petition on the submission13 that respondent Special Division of
the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction -
I.
27 | CRIMPRO-RULE 114 | MANCO
IN GRANTING BAIL TO RESPONDENT JINGGOY
ESTRADA,…[CONSIDERING] THE WELL-ESTABLISHED THEORY
OF OVERLAPPING CONSPIRACIES AND, THUS, GRIEVOUSLY
DISREGARDED THE APPLICATION OF ACCEPTED CRIMINAL
LAW PRECEPTS AND THEREBY SET A DANGEROUS PRECEDENT.
II.
xxx WHEN IT GRANTED BAIL TO RESPONDENT JINGGOY
ESTRADA WHEN IT FAILED TO RECOGNIZE THAT THE CONDUCT
OF RESPONDENT JINGGOY ESTRADA POINTED TO A
CONCURRENCE OF SENTIMENT OR CRIMINAL DESIGN
INDICATING THE EXISTENCE OF A CONSPIRACY BETWEEN
ACCUSED JOSEPH ESTRADA AND JINGGOY ESTRADA.
III.
xxx WHEN IT GRANTED BAIL TO RESPONDENT JINGGOY
ESTRADA CONSIDERING THAT THE UNDISPUTED FACT
CLEARLY EVIDENCES THAT RESPONDENT JINGGOY ESTRADA,
EVEN WITHOUT A FINDING OF CONSPIRACY, IS EQUALLY
GUILTY AND LIABLE AS ACCUSED JOSEPH ESTRADA HIMSELF
BY HIS INDISPENSABLE COOPERATION AND/OR DIRECT
PARTICIPATION IN THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME OF
PLUNDER.
IV.
xxx WHEN IT LIMITED THE CONSIDERATION OF THE EVIDENCE,
AS WELL AS THE POTENTIAL [LIABILITY] OF RESPONDENT
JINGGOY ESTRADA, TO SUBPARAGRAPH "A" OF THE AMENDED
INFORMATION.
The imputation of grave abuse of discretion to the public respondent is untenable.
To begin with, Section 13 of Article III (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution mandates:
Section 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by
sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. xxx.
Even if the capital offense charged is bailable owing to the weakness of the evidence
of guilt, the right to bail may justifiably still be denied if the probability of escape is
great.14 Here, ever since the promulgation of the assailed Resolutions a little more
than four (4) years ago, Jinggoy does not, as determined by Sandiganbayan, seem to
be a flight risk. We quote with approval what the graft court wrote in this regard:
It is not open to serious doubt that the movant [Jinggoy] has, in general, been
consistently respectful of the Court and its processes. He has not ominously shown,
by word or by deed, that he is of such a flight risk that would necessitate his
continued incarceration. Bearing in mind his conduct, social standing and his other
personal circumstances, the possibility of his escape in this case seems remote if not
nil.15
The likelihood of escape on the part individual respondent is now almost nil, given
his election on May 10, 2004, as Senator of the Republic of the Philippines. The
Court takes stock of the fact that those who usually jump bail are shadowy characters
mindless of their reputation in the eyes of the people for as long as they can flee from
the retribution of justice. On the other hand, those with a reputation and a respectable
name to protect and preserve are very unlikely to jump bail. The Court, to be sure,
cannot accept any suggestion that someone who has a popular mandate to serve as
Senator is harboring any plan to give up his Senate seat in exchange for becoming a
fugitive from justice.
Petitioner’s first argument denigrates as grave abuse of discretion the public
respondent’s rejection of the theory of overlapping conspiracies, which, in the
abstract, depicts a picture of a conspirator in the first level of conspiracy performing
acts which implement, or in furtherance of, another conspiracy in the next level of
which the actor is not an active party. As the petitioner’s logic goes following this
theory, respondent Jinggoy is not only liable for conspiring with former President
Estrada in the acquisition of ill-gotten wealth from "jueteng" under par. (a) of the
amended information. He has also a culpable connection with the conspiracy, under
par. (b), in the diversion of the tobacco excise tax and in receiving commissions and
kickbacks from the purchase by the SSS and GSIS of Belle Corporation shares and
other illegal sources under par. (c) and (d), albeit, he is not so named in the last three
paragraphs. And since the central figure in the overlapping conspiracies, i.e.,
President Estrada, is charged with a capital offense, all those within the conspiracy
loop would be considered charged with the same kind of non-bailable offense.
Explaining its point, petitioner cites People v. Castelo16 which, as here, also involves
multiple levels of conspiracies. Just like in the present case where the lead accused is
a former President no less, the prime suspect in Castelo was also a powerful high-
ranking government official – a former Judge who later rose to hold, in a concurrent
capacity, the positions of Secretary of Justice and Secretary of National Defense, to
be precise. In Castelo, charges and countercharges were initially hurled by and
between Castelo and Senator Claro Recto, who was then planning to present Manuel
Monroy as star witness against Castelo in a scandal case. Castelo left the Philippines
for Korea. While away, someone shot Monroy dead. Evidence pointed to a
28 | CRIMPRO-RULE 114 | MANCO
conspiracy led by a certain "Ben Ulo" (who appears to be the mastermind) and a
group of confidential agents of the Department of National Defense, one of whom
was the triggerman. Coincidentally, Ben Ulo was a close bodyguard of Castelo. In
the end, the Solicitor General tagged Ben Ulo (not Castelo) as the central figure in
the conspiracy. This notwithstanding, the Court held Castelo guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for murder, because only he had a motive for desiring Monroy’s
demise. The conspiracy between Castelo and Ben Ulo was then determined to be
overlapping with the conspiracy between Ben Ulo and the confidential agents, one of
whom was the triggerman.
Further explaining the theory of overlapping conspiracies, petitioner cites the ruling
in People v. Ty Sui Wong,17 featuring a love triangle involving a certain Victor and
Mariano, each out to win the heart of Ruby. Victor left Manila for Mindanao. While
Victor was away, the dead body of Mariano was found with multiple stab wounds in
a dark alley in Pasay. Evidence pointed to a conspiracy among "Sampaloc
hoodlums" who had no direct link with Victor. However, one of the neighbors of the
"Sampaloc hoodlums" was a classmate of Victor. In the end, on the basis of
interlocking confessions, the Court found Victor and his classmate together with all
the "Sampaloc hoodlums" guilty of murder.
Positing the applicability of Castelo and Ty Sui Wong under the premises, petitioner
presently argues:
It should be noted that this is the same scenario of accused Joseph Estrada conspiring
with former Gov. Singson for the collection and receipt of bribes (jueteng protection
money); and of former Gov. Singson involving respondent Jinggoy Estrada in yet
another level of conspiracy in pursuit of the first, i.e., the regular collection of
jueteng protection money for accused Joseph Estrada; and, respondent Jinggoy
Estrada, aware of the details of the conspiracy between accused Joseph Estrada and
Gov. Singson, agreeing to remit the greater part of his collection of bribes to accused
Joseph Estrada as its ultimate beneficiary. Thus, respondent Jinggoy Estrada reached
an agreement with former Gov. Singson, executed the plan and participated in
furtherance of the conspiracy for the receipt and collection of jueteng protection
money, i.e., collecting P3 Million in jueteng protection money every month;
remitting P2 Million thereof to former Gov. Singson for delivery to accused Joseph
Estrada and retaining P1 Million thereof for himself.
Similarly, therefore, respondent Jinggoy Estrada should have been denied bail since
he is as guilty and liable as accused Joseph Estrada for the non-bailable offense of
Plunder.18
As we see it, the rulings in Castelo and Ty Sui Wong are not on all-fours applicable
to and of governing sway to the issue of the propriety of revoking Jinggoy’s release
on bail.
As it were, the petitioner erroneously equates the provisional grant of bail to
respondent Jinggoy to his virtual acquittal in Criminal Case No. 26558. Petitioner is
wrong. Castelo and Ty Sui Wong contextually dealt with the guilt of culprits therein
for the crimes of murder after all the evidence had been adduced. Unlike in this
proceeding, the propriety of a grant of bail, given the evidence for or against the bail
application, was not an issue in Castelo and Ty Sui Wong. And in the present case,
respondent Sandiganbayan is still in the process of determining the facts and merits
of the main case. In the words of the public respondent:
As a cautionary parting word, it must be categorically stated herein that in making
the above pronouncements, this Court [Sandiganbayan] is not making any judgment
as to the final outcome of this case either with respect to movant [Jinggoy] or with
respect to accused Estrada. This Court [Sandiganbayan] is simply called to determine
whether, at this stage, the evidence of movant's guilt is strong as to warrant his
temporary release on bail. xxx.19
Revoking the bail thus granted to respondent Jinggoy, as the petitioner urges, which
necessarily implies that the evidence of his guilt is strong, would be tantamount to
pre-empting the Sandiganbayan’s ongoing determination of the facts and merits of
the main case.
Petitioner’s second and third arguments focus on the possible degrees of
participation of Jinggoy in the crime of Plunder. Noticeably, both arguments, if
pursued to their respective logical conclusions, tend to cancel each other out, one
leading as it were to a direction quite the opposite of the other. For while the second
argument attempts to establish an "implied conspiracy" between Jinggoy and his
father - hence, the guilt of one is the guilt of the other - the third argument eschews
the idea of conspiracy, but respondent Jinggoy is nonetheless "equally guilty" as
President Estrada because of his indispensable cooperation and/or direct participation
in the crime of Plunder.
By statutory definition, conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.20
Venturing into the gray areas of the concept of conspiracy, petitioner cites the
following obiter defining "implied conspiracy," thus:
When by their acts, two or more persons proceed toward the accomplishment of the
same felonious object, with each doing his act, so that their acts though seemingly
independent were in fact connected, showing a closeness of formal association and
concurrence of sentiment, conspiracy may be inferred.21
Admittedly, direct proof is not essential to establish conspiracy. Since by its nature
conspiracy is planned in utmost secrecy, it can rarely be proved by direct evidence.
Consequently, the presence of the concurrence of minds which is involved in
29 | CRIMPRO-RULE 114 | MANCO
conspiracy may be inferred from proof of facts and circumstances which, taken
together, apparently indicate that they are merely parts of some complete whole. If it
is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment
of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though
apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating a
closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment, a conspiracy may
be inferred though no actual meeting among them to concert is proved. That would
be termed an implied conspiracy.22
From the above pronouncements, petitioner then proceeds to present voluminous
documents and transcripts of stenographic notes purporting to prove that Jinggoy had
been deep inside the web of "implied conspiracy" under the second argument of this
petition. From the "implied conspiracy" theory, it then shifts gears to embrace the
"equally guilty" hypothesis under the fall-back third argument.
Regardless, however, of whatever legal strategy petitioner may have in mind, the
fundamental principle that the Court is not a trier of facts remains.1avvphi1
Petitioner’s second and third arguments are to be sure relevant to the proceedings for
the grant or denial of bail that were pending before in the Sandiganbayan. They are
of little moment here where the only issue now is whether or not there was grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan in granting bail to the private
respondent.
With the view we take of this case, the respondent court did not commit grave abuse
of discretion in issuing its assailed resolutions, because the grant of bail therein is
predicated only on its preliminary appreciation of the evidence adduced in the bail
hearing to determine whether or not deprivation of the right to bail is warranted.
Needless to stress, a grant of bail does not prevent the trier of facts, the same
Anti-Graft Court, from making a final assessment of the evidence after full trial on
the merits. As jurisprudence teaches:
xxx Such appreciation [of evidence] is at best preliminary and should not prevent the
trial judge from making a final assessment of the evidence before him after full trial.
It is not an uncommon occurrence that an accused person granted bail is convicted in
due course. 23
Petitioner’s last argument is, at bottom, an attempt to have the Court reverse in this
case its earlier holding in another case - G.R. No. 148965 - where we stated:
The Amended Information, in its first two paragraphs, charges petitioner [Jinggoy]
and his other co-accused with the crime of plunder. The first paragraph names all the
accused, while the second paragraph describes in general how plunder was
committed and lays down most of the elements of the crime itself. Sub-paragraphs
(a) to (d) describe in detail the predicate acts that constitute the crime and name
in particular the co-conspirators of former President Estrada in each predicate
act. The predicate acts alleged in the said four sub-paragraphs correspond to the
items enumerated in Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080. Sub-paragraph (a) alleged the
predicate act of receiving, on several instances, money from illegal gambling, in
consideration of toleration or protection of illegal gambling, and expressly names
petitioner [Jinggoy] as one of those who conspired with former President Estrada in
committing the offense. This predicate act corresponds with the offense described in
item [2] of the enumeration in Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080. Sub-paragraph (b)
alleged the predicate act of diverting, receiving or misappropriating a portion of the
tobacco excise tax share allocated for the province of Ilocos Sur, which act is the
offense described in item [1] in the enumeration in Section 1 (d) of the law. This sub-
paragraph does not mention petitioner but instead names other conspirators of the
former President. Sub-paragraph (c) alleged two predicate acts – that of ordering the
… (GSIS) and the … (SSS) to purchase shares of stock of Belle Corporation, and
collecting or receiving commissions from such purchase from the Belle Corporation
which became part of the deposit in the "Jose Velarde" account at the Equitable-PCI
Bank. These two predicate acts fall under items [2] and [3] in the enumeration of
R.A. No. 7080, and was allegedly committed by the former President in connivance
with John Does and Jane Does. Finally, sub-paragraph (d) alleged the predicate act
that the former President unjustly enriched himself from commissions, gifts,
kickbacks, in connivance with John Does and Jane Does, and deposited the same
under his account name "Jose Velarde" at the Equitable-PCI Bank. This act
corresponds to the offense under item [6] in the enumeration of Section 1 (d) of R.A.
No. 7080.
From the foregoing allegations of the Amended Information, it is clear that all the
accused named in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d), thru their individual acts, conspired with
former President Estrada to enable the latter to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-
gotten wealth …. As the Amended Information is worded, however, it is not certain
whether the accused in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) conspired with each other to enable
the former President to amass the subject ill-gotten wealth. In light of this lack of
clarity, petitioner cannot be penalized for the conspiracy entered into by the other
accused with the former President as related in the second paragraph of the Amended
Information in relation to its sub-paragraphs (b) to (d). We hold that petitioner can be
held accountable only for the predicate acts [illegal gambling] he allegedly
committed as related in sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended Information which were
allegedly done in conspiracy with the former President whose design was to amass
ill-gotten wealth amounting to more than P4 billion.24 (Emphasis added.)1avvphi1
Obviously hoping to maneuver around the above ruling so as to implicate individual
respondent for predicate acts described in sub-paragraphs (b), (c) and (d) of the
Amended Information, petitioner now argues:
It should be emphasized that in the course of the proceedings in the instant case,
respondent Jinggoy Estrada waived the benefit of the said ruling and opted, instead,
30 | CRIMPRO-RULE 114 | MANCO
to participate, as he did participate and later proceeded to cross-examine witnesses
whose testimonies were clearly offered to prove the other constitutive acts of Plunder
alleged in the Amended Information under sub-paragraphs "b", "c" and "d".25
We disagree.
At bottom, the petitioner assumes that the ruling accorded "benefits" to respondent
Jinggoy that were inexistent at the start of that case. But no such benefits were
extended, as the Court did not read into the Amended Information, as couched,
something not there in the first place. Respondent Jinggoy’s participation, if that be
the case, in the proceedings involving sub-paragraphs "b," "c" and "d," did not
change the legal situation set forth in the aforequoted portion of the Court’s ruling in
G.R. No. 148965. For when it passed, in G.R. No. 148965, upon the inculpatory acts
envisaged and ascribed in the Amended Information against Jinggoy, the Court
merely defined what he was indicted and can be penalized for. In legal jargon, the
Court informed him of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, a right
guaranteed an accused under the Constitution.26 In fine, all that the Court
contextually did in G.R. No. 148965 was no more than to implement his right to be
informed of the nature of the accusation in the light of the filing of the Amended
Information as worded. If at all, the Court’s holding in G.R. No. 148965 freed
individual respondent from the ill effects of a wrong interpretation that might be
given to the Amended Information.
In all, the Court rules that public respondent Sandiganbayan (Special Division) did
not commit grave abuse of discretion when, after conducting numerous bail hearings
and evaluating the weight of the prosecution’s evidence, it determined that the
evidence against individual respondent was not strong and, on the basis of that
determination, resolved to grant him bail.
As a final consideration, the Court notes a statement made by the respondent court
which adds an appropriate dimension to its resolve to grant bail subject of this
recourse. Wrote that court in its assailed resolution of March 6, 2003:
xxx Corollarily, it is not amiss to state that, at this time, there looms the possibility
that, in case of conviction, [respondent Jinggoy’s] criminal liability would probably
not warrant the death penalty or reclusion perpetua. (Underscoring in the original;
Words in bracket added).
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED.
No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 213847 August 18, 2015
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, Petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The decision whether to detain or release an accused before and during trial is
ultimately an incident of the judicial power to hear and determine his criminal case.
The strength of the Prosecution's case, albeit a good measure of the accused’s
propensity for flight or for causing harm to the public, is subsidiary to the primary
objective of bail, which is to ensure that the accused appears at trial.1
The Case
Before the Court is the petition for certiorari filed by Senator Juan Ponce Enrile to
assail and annul the resolutions dated July 14, 20142 and August 8, 20143 issued by
the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) in Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238, where he has
been charged with plunder along with several others. Enrile insists that the
resolutions, which respectively denied his Motion To Fix Bail and his Motion For
Reconsideration, were issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
Antecedents
On June 5, 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman charged Enrile and several others
with plunder in the Sandiganbayan on the basis of their purported involvement in the
diversion and misuse of appropriations under the Priority Development Assistance
Fund (PDAF).4 On June 10, 2014 and June 16, 2014, Enrile respectively filed his
Omnibus Motion5 and Supplemental Opposition,6 praying, among others, that he be
allowed to post bail should probable cause be found against him. The motions were
heard by the Sandiganbayan after the Prosecution filed its Consolidated Opposition.7
31 | CRIMPRO-RULE 114 | MANCO
On July 3, 2014, the Sandiganbaya n issued its resolution denying Enrile’s motion,
particularly on the matter of bail, on the ground of its prematurity considering that
Enrile had not yet then voluntarily surrendered or been placed under the custody of
the law.8 Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan ordered the arrest of Enrile.9
On the same day that the warrant for his arrest was issued, Enrile voluntarily
surrendered to Director Benjamin Magalong of the Criminal Investigation and
Detection Group (CIDG) in Camp Crame, Quezon City, and was later on confined at
the Philippine National Police (PNP) General Hospital following his medical
examination.10
Thereafter, Enrile filed his Motion for Detention at the PNP General Hospital ,11 and
his Motion to Fix Bail ,12 both dated July 7, 2014, which were heard by the
Sandiganbayan on July 8, 2014.13 In support of the motions, Enrile argued that he
should be allowed to post bail because: (a) the Prosecution had not yet established
that the evidence of his guilt was strong; (b) although he was charged with plunder,
the penalty as to him would only be reclusion temporal , not reclusion perpetua ; and
(c) he was not a flight risk, and his age and physical condition must further be
seriously considered.
On July 14, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued its first assailed resolution denying
Enrile’s Motion to Fix Bail, disposing thusly:
x x x [I]t is only after the prosecution shall have presented its evidence and the Court
shall have made a determination that the evidence of guilt is not strong against
accused Enrile can he demand bail as a matter of right. Then and only then will the
Court be duty-bound to fix the amount of his bail.
To be sure, no such determination has been made by the Court. In fact, accused
Enrile has not filed an application for bail. Necessarily, no bail hearing can even
commence. It is thus exceedingly premature for accused Enrile to ask the Court to fix
his bail.
Accused Enrile next argues that the Court should grant him bail because while he is
charged with plunder, "the maximum penalty that may be possibly imposed on him
is reclusion temporal, not reclusion perpetua." He anchors this claim on Section 2 of
R.A. No. 7080, as amended, and on the allegation that he is over seventy (70) years
old and that he voluntarily surrendered. "Accordingly, it may be said that the crime
charged against Enrile is not punishable by reclusion perpetua, and thus bailable."
The argument has no merit.
x x x [F]or purposes of bail, the presence of mitigating circumstance/s is not taken
into consideration. These circumstances will only be appreciated in the imposition of
the proper penalty after trial should the accused be found guilty of the offense
charged. x x x
Lastly, accused Enrile asserts that the Court should already fix his bail because he is
not a flight risk and his physical condition must also be seriously considered by the
Court.
Admittedly, the accused’s age, physical condition and his being a flight risk are
among the factors that are considered in fixing a reasonable amount of bail.
However, as explained above, it is premature for the Court to fix the amount of bail
without an anterior showing that the evidence of guilt against accused Enrile is not
strong.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Juan Ponce Enrile’s Motion to Fix
Bail dated July 7, 2014 is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.14
On August 8, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued it s second assailed resolution to deny
Enrile’s motion for reconsideration filed vis-à-vis the July 14, 2014 resolution.15
Enrile raises the following grounds in support of his petition for certiorari , namely:
A. Before judgment of the Sandiganbayan, Enrile is bailable as a
matter of right. Enrile may be deemed to fall within the exception only
upon concurrence of two (2) circumstances: (i) where the offense is
punishable by reclusion perpetua, and (ii) when evidence of guilt is
strong.
B. The prosecution failed to show clearly and conclusively that Enrile,
if ever he would be convicted, is punishable by reclusion perpetua;
hence, Enrile is entitled to bail as a matter of right.
C. The prosecution failed to show clearly and conclusively that evidence
of Enrile’s guilt (if ever) is strong; hence, Enrile is entitled to bail as a
matter of right.
D. At any rate, Enrile may be bailable as he is not a flight risk.16
Enrile claims that before judgment of conviction, an accused is entitled to bail as
matter of right; th at it is the duty and burden of the Prosecution to show clearly and
conclusively that Enrile comes under the exception and cannot be excluded from
enjoying the right to bail; that the Prosecution has failed to establish that Enrile, if
32 | CRIMPRO-RULE 114 | MANCO
convicted of plunder, is punishable by reclusion perpetua considering the presence of
two mitigating circumstances – his age and his voluntary surrender; that the
Prosecution has not come forward with proof showing that his guilt for the crime of
plunder is strong; and that he should not be considered a flight risk taking into
account that he is already over the age of 90, his medical condition, and his social
standing.
In its Comment ,17 the Ombudsman contends that Enrile’s right to bail is
discretionary as he is charged with a capital offense; that to be granted bail, it is
mandatory that a bail hearing be conducted to determine whether there is strong
evidence of his guilt, or the lack of it; and that entitlement to bail considers the
imposable penalty, regardless of the attendant circumstances.
Ruling of the Court
The petition for certiorari is meritorious.
1.
Bail protects the right of the accused to
due process and to be presumed innocent
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved.18 The presumption of innocence is rooted in the guarantee of due
process, and is safeguarded by the constitutional right to be released on bail,19 and
further binds the court to wait until after trial to impose any punishment on the
accused.20
It is worthy to note that bail is not granted to prevent the accused from committing
additional crimes.[[21] The purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the
accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the trial court. The amount of bail
should be high enough to assure the presence of the accused when so required, but it
should be no higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose.22 Thus, bail
acts as a reconciling mechanism to accommodate both the accused’s interest in his
provisional liberty before or during the trial, and the society’s interest in assuring the
accused’s presence at trial.23
2.
Bail may be granted as a
matter of right or of discretion
The right to bail is expressly afforded by Section 13, Article III (Bill of Rights) of
the Constitution, viz.:
x x x All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by
sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The
right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
This constitutional provision is repeated in Section 7, Rule 11424 of the Rules of
Court , as follows:
Section 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, not bailable. — No person charged with a capital offense, or an
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to
bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal
prosecution.
A capital offense in the context of the rule refers to an offense that, under the law
existing at the time of its commission and the application for admission to bail, may
be punished with death.25
The general rule is, therefore, that any person, before being convicted of any
criminal offense, shall be bailable, unless he is charged with a capital offense, or
with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the
evidence of his guilt is strong. Hence, from the moment he is placed under arrest, or
is detained or restrained by the officers of the law, he can claim the guarantee of his
provisional liberty under the Bill of Rights, and he retains his right to bail unless he
is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable with reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong.26 Once it has
been established that the evidence of guilt is strong, no right to bail shall be
recognized.27
As a result, all criminal cases within the competence of the Metropolitan Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial
Court are bailable as matter of right because these courts have no jurisdiction to try
capital offenses, or offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.
Likewise, bail is a matter of right prior to conviction by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) for any offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua , or life
imprisonment, or even prior to conviction for an offense punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua , or life imprisonment when evidence of guilt is not strong.28
On the other hand, the granting of bail is discretionary: (1) upon conviction by the
RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment;29 or (2) if the RTC has imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding
six years, provided none of the circumstances enumerated under paragraph 3 of
Section 5, Rule 114 is present, as follows:
33 | CRIMPRO-RULE 114 | MANCO
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has
committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded
sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or
conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of hi s case indicate the probability of flight if
released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the
pendency of the appeal.
3.
Admission to bail in offenses punished
by death, or life imprisonment, or reclusion
perpetua is subject to judicial discretion
For purposes of admission to bail, the determination of whether or not evidence of
guilt is strong in criminal cases involving capital offenses, or offenses punishable
with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment lies within the discretion of the trial
court. But, as the Court has held in Concerned Citizens v. Elma ,30 "such discretion
may be exercised only after the hearing called to ascertain the degree of guilt of the
accused for the purpose of whether or not he should be granted provisional liberty."
It is axiomatic, therefore, that bail cannot be allowed when its grant is a matter of
discretion on the part of the trial court unless there has been a hearing with notice to
the Prosecution.31 The indispensability of the hearing with notice has been aptly
explained in Aguirre v. Belmonte, viz. :32
x x x Even before its pronouncement in the Lim case, this Court already ruled in
People vs. Dacudao, etc., et al. that a hearing is mandatory before bail can be granted
to an accused who is charged with a capital offense, in this wise:
The respondent court acted irregularly in granting bail in a murder case without any
hearing on the motion asking for it, without bothering to ask the prosecution for its
conformity or comment, as it turned out later, over its strong objections. The court
granted bail on the sole basis of the complaint and the affidavits of three policemen,
not one of whom apparently witnessed the killing. Whatever the court possessed at
the time it issued the questioned ruling was intended only for prima facie
determining whether or not there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded
belief that the crime was committed and pinpointing the persons who probably
committed it. Whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong for each individual
accused still has to be established unless the prosecution submits the issue on
whatever it has already presented. To appreciate the strength or weakness of the
evidence of guilt, the prosecution must be consulted or heard. It is equally entitled as
the accused to due process.
Certain guidelines in the fixing of a bailbond call for the presentation of evidence
and reasonable opportunity for the prosecution to refute it. Among them are the
nature and circumstances of the crime, character and reputation of the accused, the
weight of the evidence against him, the probability of the accused appearing at the
trial, whether or not the accused is a fugitive from justice, and whether or not the
accused is under bond in other cases. (Section 6, Rule 114, Rules of Court) It is
highly doubtful if the trial court can appreciate these guidelines in an ex-parte
determination where the Fiscal is neither present nor heard.
The hearing, which may be either summary or otherwise, in the discretion of the
court, should primarily determine whether or not the evidence of guilt against the
accused is strong. For this purpose, a summary hearing means:
x x x such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence of
guilt as is practicable and consistent with the purpose of hearing which is merely to
determine the weight of evidence for purposes of bail. On such hearing, the court
does not sit to try the merits or to enter into any nice inquiry as to the weight that
ought to be allowed to the evidence for or against the accused, nor will it speculate
on the outcome of the trial or on what further evidence may be therein offered or
admitted. The course of inquiry may be left to the discretion of the court which may
confine itself to receiving such evidence as has reference to substantial matters,
avoiding unnecessary thoroughness in the examination and cross examination.33
In resolving bail applications of the accused who is charged with a capital offense, or
an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the trial judge is
expected to comply with the guidelines outlined in Cortes v. Catral,34 to wit:
1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the
prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit
his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, as
amended);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application
for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present
evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of
enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8, supra)
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary
of evidence of the prosecution;
34 | CRIMPRO-RULE 114 | MANCO
4. If the guilt of the accused is no t strong, discharge the accused upon the
approval of the bailbond (Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition should be
denied.
3.
Enrile’s poor health justifies his admission to bail
We first note that Enrile has averred in his Motion to Fix Bail the presence of two
mitigating circumstances that should be appreciated in his favor, namely: that he was
already over 70 years at the time of the alleged commission of the offense, and that
he voluntarily surrendered.35
Enrile’s averment has been mainly uncontested by the Prosecution, whose
Opposition to the Motion to Fix Bail has only argued that –
8. As regards the assertion that the maximum possible penalty that might be imposed
upon Enrile is only reclusion temporal due to the presence of two mitigating
circumstances, suffice it to state that the presence or absence of mitigating
circumstances is also not consideration that the Constitution deemed worthy. The
relevant clause in Section 13 is "charged with an offense punishable by." It is,
therefore, the maximum penalty provided by the offense that has bearing and not the
possibility of mitigating circumstances being appreciated in the accused’s favor.36
Yet, we do not determine now the question of whether or not Enrile’s averment on
the presence of the two mitigating circumstances could entitle him to bail despite the
crime alleged against him being punishable with reclusion perpetua ,37 simply
because the determination, being primarily factual in context, is ideally to be made
by the trial court.
Nonetheless, in now granting Enrile’s petition for certiorari, the Court is guided by
the earlier mentioned principal purpose of bail, which is to guarantee the appearance
of the accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the court. The Court is further
mindful of the Philippines’ responsibility in the international community arising
from the national commitment under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to:
x x x uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of
every person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our
Constitution which provides: "The State values the dignity of every human person
and guarantees full respect for human rights." The Philippines, therefore, has the
responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and
due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the
proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide without delay on the legality of the
detention and order their release if justified. In other words, the Philippine authorities
are under obligation to make available to every person under detention such
remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include
the right to be admitted to bail.38
This national commitment to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value
the worth and dignity of every person has authorized the grant of bail not only to
those charged in criminal proceedings but also to extraditees upon a clear and
convincing showing: (1 ) that the detainee will not be a flight risk or a danger to the
community; and (2 ) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling
circumstances.39
In our view, his social and political standing and his having immediately surrendered
to the authorities upon his being charged in court indicate that the risk of his flight or
escape from this jurisdiction is highly unlikely. His personal disposition from the
onset of his indictment for plunder, formal or otherwise, has demonstrated his utter
respect for the legal processes of this country. We also do not ignore that at an earlier
time many years ago when he had been charged with rebellion with murder and
multiple frustrated murder, he already evinced a similar personal disposition of
respect for the legal processes, and was granted bail during the pendency of his trial
because he was not seen as a flight risk.40 With his solid reputation in both his
public and his private lives, his long years of public service, and history’s judgment
of him being at stake, he should be granted bail.
The currently fragile state of Enrile’s health presents another compelling justification
for his admission to bail, but which the Sandiganbayan did not recognize.
In his testimony in the Sandiganbayan,41 Dr. Jose C. Gonzales, the Director of the
Philippine General Hospital (PGH), classified Enrile as a geriatric patient who was
found during the medical examinations conducted at the UP-PGH to be suffering
from the following conditions:
(1) Chronic Hypertension with fluctuating blood pressure levels on multiple
drug therapy; (Annexes 1.1, 1.2, 1.3);
(2) Diffuse atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease composed of the
following :
a. Previous history of cerebrovascular disease with carotid and
vertebral artery disease ; (Annexes 1.4, 4.1)
b. Heavy coronary artery calcifications; (Annex 1.5)
c. Ankle Brachial Index suggestive of arterial calcifications.
(Annex 1.6)
35 | CRIMPRO-RULE 114 | MANCO
(3) Atrial and Ventricular Arrhythmia (irregular heart beat) documented by
Holter monitoring ; (Annexes 1.7.1, 1.7.2)
(4) Asthma-COPD Overlap Syndrom (ACOS) and postnasal drip syndrome;
(Annexes 2.1, 2.2)
(5) Ophthalmology:
a. Age-related mascular degeneration, neovascular s/p laser of the
Retina, s/p Lucentis intra-ocular injections; (Annexes 3.0, 3.1, 3.2)
b. S/p Cataract surgery with posterior chamber intraocular lens.
(Annexes 3.1, 3.2)
(6) Historical diagnoses of the following:
a. High blood sugar/diabetes on medications;
b. High cholesterol levels/dyslipidemia;
c. Alpha thalassemia;
d. Gait/balance disorder;
e. Upper gastrointestinal bleeding (etiology uncertain) in 2014;
f. Benign prostatic hypertrophy (with documented enlarged
prostate on recent ultrasound).42
Dr. Gonzales attested that the following medical conditions, singly or collectively,
could pose significant risk s to the life of Enrile, to wit: (1) uncontrolled
hypertension, because it could lead to brain or heart complications, including
recurrence of stroke; (2) arrhythmia, because it could lead to fatal or non-fatal
cardiovascular events, especially under stressful conditions; (3) coronary
calcifications associated with coronary artery disease, because they could indicate a
future risk for heart attack under stressful conditions; and (4) exacerbations of
ACOS, because they could be triggered by certain circumstances (like excessive
heat, humidity, dust or allergen exposure) which could cause a deterioration in
patients with asthma or COPD.43
Based on foregoing, there is no question at all that Enrile’s advanced age and ill
health required special medical attention. His confinement at the PNP General
Hospital, albeit at his own instance,44 was not even recommended by the officer-in-
charge (O IC) and the internist doctor of that medical facility because of the
limitations in the medical support at that hospital. Their testimonies ran as follows:
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
The question is, do you feel comfortable with the continued confinement of Senator
Enrile at the Philippine National Police Hospital?
DR. SERVILLANO:
No, Your Honor.
DR. SERVILLANO:
Your Honor, in case of emergency situation we can handle it but probably if the
condition of the patient worsen, we have no facilities to do those things, Your
Honor.45
Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime charged,
should be allowed independently of the merits of the charge, provided his continued
incarceration is clearly shown to be injurious to his health or to endanger his life.
Indeed, denying him bail despite imperiling his health and life would not serve the
true objective of preventive incarceration during the trial.

JUSTICE MARTIRES: Granting bail to Enrile on the foregoing reasons is not unprecedented. The Court has
already held in Dela Rama v. The People’s Court:46
Director, doctor, do you feel comfortable with the continued confinement of Senator
x x x This court, in disposing of the first petition for certiorari, held the following:
Enrile at the PNP Hospital ?

x x x [ U]nless allowance of bail is forbidden by law in the particular case, the illness
PSUPT. JOCSON:
of the prisoner,
No, Your Honor.
independently of the merits of the case, is a circumstance, and the humanity of the
law makes it a consideration which should, regardless of the charge and the stage of
JUSTICE MARTIRES: the proceeding, influence the court to exercise its discretion to admit the prisoner to
bail ;47
Why?
xxx
PSUPT. JOCSON:
Considering the report of the Medical Director of the Quezon Institute to the effect
Because during emergency cases, Your Honor, we cannot give him the best. that the petitioner "is actually suffering from minimal, early, unstable type of
pulmonary tuberculosis, and chronic, granular pharyngitis," and that in said institute
JUSTICE MARTIRES: they "have seen similar cases, later progressing into advance stages when the
treatment and medicine are no longer of any avail;" taking into consideration that the
At present, since you are the attending physician of the accused, Senator Enrile, are petitioner’s previous petition for bail was denied by the People’s Court on the ground
you happy or have any fear in your heart of the present condition of the accused vis a that the petitioner was suffering from quiescent and not active tuberculosis, and the
vis the facilities of the hospital? implied purpose of the People’s Court in sending the petitioner to the Quezon
Institute for clinical examination and diagnosis of the actual condition of his lungs,
was evidently to verify whether the petitioner is suffering from active tuberculosis, in
DR. SERVILLANO:
order to act accordingly in deciding his petition for bail; and considering further that
the said People’s Court has adopted and applied the well-established doctrine cited in
Yes, Your Honor. I have a fear. our above-quoted resolution, in several cases, among them, the cases against Pio
Duran (case No. 3324) and Benigno Aquino (case No. 3527), in which the said
JUSTICE MARTIRES: defendants were released on bail on the ground that they were ill and their continued
confinement in New Bilibid Prison would be injurious to their health or endanger
That you will not be able to address in an emergency situation?
36 | CRIMPRO-RULE 114 | MANCO
their life; it is evident and we consequently hold that the People’s Court acted with
grave abuse of discretion in refusing to re lease the petitioner on bail.48

It is relevant to observe that granting provisional liberty to Enrile will then enable
him to have his medical condition be properly addressed and better attended to by
competent physicians in the hospitals of his choice. This will not only aid in his
adequate preparation of his defense but, more importantly , will guarantee his
appearance in court for the trial.

On the other hand, to mark time in order to wait for the trial to finish before a
meaningful consideration of the application for bail can be had is to defeat the
objective of bail, which is to entitle the accused to provisional liberty pending the
trial. There may be circumstances decisive of the issue of bail – whose existence is
either admitted by the Prosecution, or is properly the subject of judicial notice – that
the courts can already consider in resolving the application for bail without awaiting
the trial to finish.49 The Court thus balances the scales of justice by protecting the
interest of the People through ensuring his personal appearance at the trial, and at the
same time realizing for him the guarantees of due process as well as to be presumed
innocent until proven guilty.

Accordingly, we conclude that the Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the objective of

bail to ensure the appearance of the accused during the trial; and unwarrantedly
disregarded the clear showing of the fragile health and advanced age of Enrile. As
such, the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying Enrile’s Motion To
Fix Bail. Grave abuse of discretion, as the ground for the issuance of the writ of
certiorari , connotes whimsical and capricious exercise of judgment as is equivalent
to excess, or lack of jurisdiction.50 The abuse must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.51
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for certiorari ; ISSUES the writ of
certiorari ANNULING and SETTING ASIDE the Resolutions issued by the
Sandiganbayan (Third Division) in Case No. SB-14 CRM-0238 on July 14, 2014 and
August 8, 2014; ORDERS the PROVISIONAL RELEASE of petitioner Juan Ponce
Enrile in Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238 upon posting of a cash bond of ₱1,000,000.00
in the Sandiganbayan; and DIRECTS the immediate release of petitioner Juan Ponce
Enrile from custody unless he is being detained for some other lawful cause.

No pronouncement on costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

37 | CRIMPRO-RULE 114 | MANCO