REMEDIAL LAW is that branch oflaw which prescribes the respondent was late in filing his protest because
e in filing his protest because he filed the protest
method of enforcing rights or obtaining redress for their invasion
[Bustos vs. Lucero, 81 Phil. 640]. It is also known as
Adjective Law. SUBSTANTIVE LAW is one which creates,
defines, and regulates rights.
Substantive law is the set of laws that governs how members
of a society are to behave. Substantive law defines rights and
responsibilities in civil law, and crimes and punishments in
criminal law. It may be codified in statutes or exist through
precedent in common law.
Judicial Power
1. 012 Angara vs. Electoral Commission
[G.R. L-45081; July 15, 1936 ]
TOPIC: Judicial Review; Theory and Justification of Judicial Review
PONENTE: Laurel, J.
FACTS:
1. In the election of Sept. 17, 1935, Angara (herein petitioner) and
Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo, Dionision Mayor (Respondents) were
candidates voted to be members of the national assembly (NA) for
the first district of the Province of Tayabas.
2. On Oct 7, 1935, Angara was proclaimed as member-elect of the NA
for the said district. On November 15, 1935, he took his oath of
office.
3. On Dec 3, 1935, the NA in session assembled, passed Resolution No.
8 confirming the election of the members of the National Assembly
against whom no protest had thus far been filed.
4. On Dec 8, 1935, Ynsua, filed before the Electoral Commission a
“Motion of Protest” against the election of Angara. On Dec 9, 1935,
the EC adopted a resolution, par. 6 of which fixed said date as the
last day for the filing of protests against the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the NA, notwithstanding the previous
confirmation made by the NA.
5. Angara filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that by virtue of the NA
proclamation, Ynsua can no longer protest (the prescribed period for
filing of protests had already ended on December 3, and the
after December 3.).
6. Ynsua calims that there was no constitutional or legal provision
which stated that members of the NA cannot be contested after
confirmationof the NA.. EC denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss.
Petitioner then files a protest to the Supreme Court (SC) questioning
EC’s jurisdiction over the case. ( Petitioner argues that, EC could
only regulate proceedings, that SC has jurisdiction to pass upon
fundamental questions in the issue since it is an interpretation of the
constitution)
7. The Solicitor General (SolGen) argues that EC is a constitutional
body which has jurisdiction to try all contested cases re:elections and
said acts is beyond SC. Further, Res #8 did not deprive EC of its
jurisdiction. Since EC acquired jurisdiction over the election protest,
the Motion to dismiss filed in EC is not reviewable by the SC.
2. Tolentino v. COMELEC
G.R. No. L-34150; October 16, 1971
Ponente: Barredo, J.
FACTS:
After the election of delegates to the Constitutional Convention held
on November 10, 1970, the convention held its inaugural session on
June 1, 1971. On the early morning of September 28, 1971, the
Convention approved Organic Resolution No. 1 which seeks to amend
Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution, lowering the voting age to
18. On September 30, 1971, COMELEC resolved to inform the
Constitutional Convention that it will hold the plebiscite together with
the senatorial elections on November 8, 1971. Arturo Tolentino filed a
petition for prohibition against COMELEC and prayed that Organic
Resolution No. 1 and acts in obedience to the resolution be null and
void.
ISSUE:
1. Does the court have jurisdiction over the case?
2. Is the Organic Resolution No. 1 constitutional?
HELD:
1. The case at bar is justiciable. As held in Gonzales vs. Comelec,
the issue of whether or not a resolution of Congress, acting as a
constituent assembly, violates the constitution is a justiciable one and
thus subject to judicial review. The jurisdiction is not because the
Court is superior to the Convention but they are both subject to the
Constitution.
2. The act of the Convention calling for a plebiscite on a single
amendment in Organic Resolution No. 1 violated Sec. 1 of Article XV
of the Constitution which states that all amendments must be
submitted to the people in a single election or plebiscite. Moreover, the
voter must be provided sufficient time and ample basis to assess the
amendment in relation to the other parts of the Constitution, not
separately but together.
3. Javellana vs Executive Secretary et al. GR No. L-36142
FACTS:
On January 20, 1973, just two days before the Supreme Court decided
the sequel of plebiscite cases, Javellana filed this suit against the
respondents to restrain them from implementing any of the provisions
of the proposed Constitution not found in the present 1935
Constitution. This is a petition filed by him as a Filipino citizen and a
qualified and registered voter and as a class suit, for himself and in
behalf of all citizens and voters similarly situated. Javellana also
alleged that the President had announced the immediate
implementation of the new constitution, thru his Cabinet, respondents
including.
Respondents are acting without or in excess of jurisdiction in
implementing the said proposed constitution upon ground the that the
President as Commander-in-Chief of the AFP is without authority to
create the Citizens Assemblies; without power to approve proposed
constitution; without power to proclaim the ratification by the Filipino
people of the proposed constitution; and the election held to ratify the
proposed constitution was not a free election, hence null and void.
Following that, petitioners prayed for the nullification of Proclamation
No. 1102 and any order, decree, and proclamation which have the
same import and objective.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the issue of the validity of Proclamation No.
1102 is a justiciable or political question, and therefore non-
justiciable.
2. Whether or not the constitution proposed by the 1971
Constitutional Convention has been ratified validly conforming
to the applicable constitutional and statutory provisions.
3. Whether or not the proposed Constitution has been acquiesced
in (with or without valid ratification) by the people.
4. Whether or not the petitioners are entitled for relief.
5. Whether or not the proposed Constitution by the 1971
Constitutional Convention in force.
HELD:
First. To determine whether or not the new constitution is in force
depends upon whether or not the said new constitution has been
ratified in accordance with the requirements of the 1935 Constitution.
It is well settled that the matter of ratification of an amendment to the
constitution should be settled applying the provisions of the
constitution in force at the time of the alleged ratification of the old
constitution.
The issue whether the new constitution proposed has been ratified in
accordance with the provisions of Article XV of the 1935 Constitution
is justiciable as jurisprudence here and in the US (from whom we
patterned our 1935 Constitution) shall show.
Second. The Constitution does not allow Congress or anybody else to
vest in those lacking the qualifications and having the disqualifications
mentioned in the Constitution the right of suffrage.
The votes of persons less than 21 years of age render the proceedings
in the Citizen’s assemblies void. Proceedings held in such Citizen’s
Assemblies were fundamentally irregular, in that persons lacking the
qualifications prescribed in Article V Section 1 of the 1935
Constitution were allowed to vote in said Assemblies. And, since there
is no means by which the invalid votes of those less than 21 years of
age can be separated or segregated from those of the qualified voters,
the proceedings in the Citizen’s Assemblies must be considered null
and void.
Viva voce voting for the ratification of the constitution is void. Article
XV of the 1935 Constitution envisages with the term "votes cast"
choices made on ballots – not orally or by raising hands – by the
persons taking part in plebiscites. This is but natural and logical, for,
since the early years of the American regime, we had adopted the
Australian Ballot System, with its major characteristics, namely,
uniform official ballots prepared and furnished by the Government and
secrecy in the voting, with the advantage of keeping records that
permit judicial inquiry, when necessary, into the accuracy of the
election returns.
The plebiscite on the constitution not having been conducted under the
supervision of COMELEC is void. The point is that, such of the Barrio
Assemblies as were held took place without the intervention of the
COMELEC and without complying with the provisions of the Election
Code of 1971 or even of those of Presidential Decree No. 73. The
procedure therein mostly followed is such that there is no reasonable
means of checking the accuracy of the returns filed by the officers who
conducted said plebiscites. This is another patent violation of Article X
of the 1935 Constitution which form part of the fundamental scheme
set forth in the 1935 Constitution, as amended, to insure the "free,
orderly, and honest" expression of the people's will. For this, the
alleged plebiscite in the Citizen’s Assemblies is null and void, insofar
as the same are claimed to have ratified the revised Constitution.
Third. Proclamation No. 1102 is not an evidence of ratification. Article
X of the 1935 Constitution places COMELEC the "exclusive" charge
to the "the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the
conduct of elections," independently of the Executive. But there is not
even a certification by the COMELEC in support of the alleged results
of the citizen’s assemblies relied upon in Proclamation No. 1102.
Also, on January 17, 1973 neither the alleged president of the
Federation of Provincial or City Barangays nor the Department of
Local Governments had certified to the President the alleged result of
the citizens' assemblies all over the Philippines. The citizen’s
assemblies did not adopt the proposed constitution. It is to my mind a
matter of judicial knowledge that there have been no such citizen’s
assemblies in many parts of Manila and suburbs, not to say, also, in
other parts of the Philippines.
Fourth. The Court is not prepared to concede that the acts the officers
and offices of the Executive Department, in line with Proclamation
No. 1102, connote recognition of or acquiescence to the proposed
Constitution.
A department of the Government cannot “recognize” its own acts.
Recognition normally connotes the acknowledgment by a party of the
acts of another. Individual acts of recognition by members of Congress
do not constitute congressional recognition, unless the members have
performed said acts in session duly assembled. This is a well-
established principle of Administrative Law and of the Law of Public
Officers. The compliance by the people with the orders of martial law
government does not constitute acquiescence to the proposed
Constitution. Neither does the Court prepared to declare that the
people's inaction as regards Proclamation No. 1102, and their
compliance with a number of Presidential orders, decrees and/or
instructions, some or many of which have admittedly had salutary
effects, issued subsequently thereto, amounts to a ratification, adoption
or approval of said Proclamation No. 1102. The intimidation is there,
and inaction or obedience of the people, under these conditions, is not
necessarily an act of conformity or acquiescence.
As regards the applicability to these cases of the "enrolled bill" rule, it
is well to remember that the same refers to a document certified to the
President for his action under the Constitution by the Senate President
and the Speaker of the House of Reps, and attested to by the respective
Secretaries of both Houses, concerning legislative measures approved
by said Houses. Whereas, Proclamation No. 1102 is an act of the
President declaring the results of a plebiscite on the proposed
Constitution, an act which Article X of the 1935 Constitution denies
the executive department of the Government.
In all other respects and with regard to the other respondent in said
case, petitions therein should be given due course, there being more
than prima facie showing that the proposed Constitution has not been
ratified in accordance with Article XV of the 1935 Constitution, either
strictly, substantially, or has been acquiesced in by the people or
majority thereof; that said proposed Constitution is not in force and
effect; and that the 1935 Constitution is still the Fundamental Law of
the Land, without prejudice to the submission of said proposed
Constitution to the people at a plebiscite for its ratification or rejection
in accordance with Articles V, X and XV of the 1935 Constitution and
the provisions of the Revised Election Code in force at the time of
such plebiscite.
Fifth. Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Barredo,
Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra hold that it is in force by virtue of the
people's acceptance thereof; 4 members of the Court, namely, Justices
Makalintal, Castro, Fernando and Teehankee cast no vote thereon on
the premise stated in their votes on the third question that they could
not state with judicial certainty whether the people have accepted or
not accepted the Constitution; and 2 members of the Court, namely,
Justice Zaldivar and myself voted that the Constitution proposed by
the 1971 Constitutional Convention is not in force; with the result,
there are not enough votes to declare that the new Constitution is not
in force.
4. Francisco vs. House of Representatives, G.R. No
160261, November 10, 2003
SEPTEMBER 16, 2018
FACTS:
In late 2001 House of Representatives (HOR) of the 12th Congress
adopted its Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings. The new
rules superseded impeachment Rules of the 11th Congress. Secs. 16
and 17 of these Rules state that impeachment proceedings are deemed
initiated (1) if House Committee on Justice deems the complaint
sufficient in substance, or (2) if the House itself affirms or overturns
the findings of the House Committee on Justice on the substance of the
complaint, or (3) by filing or endorsement before the HOR Secretary
General by one-thirds of the members of the House.
A few months later, HoR passed a resolution directing the Committee
on Justice to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the
manner of disbursements and expenditures by Chief Justice Davide of
the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF).”
In June 2003, former President Estrada files the first impeachment
complaint against Chief Justice Davide and 7 Associate Justices of SC
for “culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of public trust and
other high crimes.” The complaint was referred to the House
Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003 in accordance with Section
3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.
On October 13, 2003, the HOR Committee on Justice found the first
impeachment complaint “sufficient in form.” However, it also voted to
dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in
substance. Ten days later, on October 23,2003, Teodoro and
Fuentebella filed a second impeachment complaint against CJ Davide,
founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry on the JDF.
The second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a “resolution
of Endorsement/Impeachment” signed by at least one-third of all the
Members of the House of Representatives.
Several petitions were filed with the SC by members of the bar,
members of the House of Representatives, as well as private
individuals, all asserting their rights, among others, as taxpayers to
stop the illegal spending of public funds for the impeachment
proceedings against the Chief Justice. The petitioners contend that
Article XI, Section 3 (5) of the 1987 Constitution bars the filing of the
second impeachment complaint. The constitutional provision states
that “(n)o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same
official more than once within a period of one year.”
Speaker Jose de Venecia submitted a manifestaiton to the SC stating
that the High Court does not have jurisdiction to hear the case as it
would mean an encroachment on the power of HoR, a co-equal branch
of government.
ISSUES/HELD:
1.) Whether the filing of the second impeachment complaint violates
Sec. 3(5), Article XI of the Constitution—YES
2) Whether Sec. 16 & 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in
Impeachment Proceedings approved by the HoR are unconstitutional –
YES
3.) Whether or not the certiorari jurisdiction of the court may be
invoked – YES
RATIO:
1. The second impeachment complaint falls under the one-year bar
under the Constitution.
2. Sec 16 and 17 of House Impeachment Rule V are unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court employed three principles in deciding the case:
1) Whenever possible, the words in the Constitution must be given
their ordinary meaning (verbal egis);
2) If there is ambiguity, the Constitution must be interpreted according
to the intent of the framers; and
3) The Constitution must be interpreted as a whole.
Applying these principles, to “initiate” in its ordinary acceptation
means simply to begin. The records of the debates by the framers
affirm this textual interpretation. From the records of the
Constitutional Convention and the amicus curiae briefs of its two
members (Maambong and Regalado), the term “to initiate” in Sec 3(5),
Art. XI of the Constitution refers to the filing of the impeachment
complaint coupled with taking initial action by Congress on the
complaint.
By contrast, Secs. 16 and 17 state that impeachment proceedings are
deemed initiated (1) if House Committee on Justice deems the
complaint sufficient in substance, or (2) if the House itself affirms or
overturns the findings of the House Committee on Justice on the
substance of the complaint, or (3) by filing or endorsement before the
HOR Secretary General by one-thirds of the members of the House.

In this light, Secs. 16 and 17 of the House Rules of Procedure for

Impeachment are unconstitutional because the rules clearly contravene
Sec. 3 (5), Art. XI since the rules give the term “initiate” a different
meaning from filing and referral.

Hence, the second impeachment complaint by Teodoro and

Fuentebella violates the constitutional one-year ban.

3. The certiorari jurisdiction of the court may be invoked.

The Supreme Court, in exercising its expanded power of judicial

review, only carried out its duty as stated in Section 1, Article VIII,
which mandates the judicial department to look into cases where there
has been a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the different
branches of government. Here, it only reviewed the constitutionality of
the Rules of Impeachment against the one-year ban explicitly stated in
the Constitution. Consequently, the contention that judicial review
over the case would result in a crisis is unwarranted.

The judiciary, with the Supreme Court at its helm as the final arbiter,
effectively checks on the other departments in the exercise of its power
to determine the law. It must declare executive and legislative acts
void if they violate the Constitution. The violation of Article XI,
Section 3(5) of the Constitution is thus within the competence of the
Court to decide.

5.